**Mori references p. 244**

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INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR

ATTACK

REPORT

OF THE

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION

OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

PURSUANT TO

S. Con. Res. 27, 79th Congress

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION TO INVESTIGATE THE

ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR ON DECEMBER

7, 1941, AND EVENTS AND CIRCUM-

STANCES RELATING THERETO

AND

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF MR. KEEFE

TOGETHER WITH

MINORITY VIEWS OF MR. FERGUSON AND MR. BREWSTER

July 20 (legislative day July 6), 1946 — Ordered to be

printed with illustrations

90179

UNITED STATES

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 1946

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL

HARBOR ATTACK

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JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman

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SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois Pennsylvania

OWEN BREWSTE^, Senator from Maine BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representa-

HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Michi- tive from California

gan FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative from

J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from

North Carolina

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JULE M. Hannapord, Assistant Counsel

John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel

(After January 14, 1946)

Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel

Samuel H. Kaufman. Associate General Counsel

John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel

Edward P. Morgan, Assistant Counsel

Logan J. Lane, Assistant Counsel

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

United States Senate and

House op Representatives,

Washington, D. C., July W, 1946.

Hod. Kenneth McKellar,

President pro tempore oj the Senate.

Hon. Sam Rayburn,

Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Dear Mr. President and Mr. Speaker: Pursuant to Senate Con-

current Resolution No. 27 (as extended). Seventy-ninth Congress,

first session, the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation

of the Pearl Harbor Attack has completed its work with a view to a

full and complete investigation of the facts relating to the events and

circumstances leading up to or following the attack made by Japa-

nese armed forces upon Pearl Harbor in the Territory of Hawaii, on

December 7, 1941.

The committee has endeavored faithfully to discharge the duties

assigned and respectfully submits herewith its report.

Sincerely yours,

Alben W. Barkley,

Chairman.

Jere Cooper,

Vice Chairman.

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FOREWORD

On Sunday morning, December 7, 1941, the United States and

Japan were at peace. Japanese ambassadors were in Washington in

conversation with our diplomatic officials looking to a general settle-

ment of differences in the Pacific.

At 7 :55 a. m. (Hawaiian time) over 300 Japanese planes launched

from 6 aircraft carriers attacked the island of Oahu and the American

Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor in the Territory of Hawaii. Within a

period of less than 2 hours our military and naval forces suffered a total

of 3,435 casualties in personnel and the loss of or severe damage to :

188 planes of all types, 8 battleships, 3 light cruisers, and 4 miscel-

laneous vessels.

The attack was well planned and skillfully executed. The Japanese

raiders withdrew from the attack and were recovered by the carriers

without the latter being detected, having suffered losses of less than

100 in personnel, 29 planes, and 5 midget submarines which had been

dispatched from mother craft that coordinated their attack with that

of the planes.

One hour after Japanese air and naval forces had struck the Territory

of Hawaii the emissaries of Japan delivered to the Secretary of State a

reply to a recent American note, a reply containing no sugg^tion of

attack by Japan upon the United States. With the benefit of informa-

tion now available it is known that the Japanese military had planned

for many weeks the unprovoked and ambitious act of December 7.

The Pyrrhic victory of having executed the attack with surprise,

cunning, and deceit belongs to the war lords of Japan whose dreams of

conquest were buried in the ashes of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. History

will properly place responsibility for Pearl Harbor upon the military-

clique dommating the people of Japan at the time. Indeed, this

responsibility Premier Tojo himself has already assumed.

We come today, over 4 years after the event, not to detract from

this responsibility but to record for posterity the facts of the disaster.

In another sense we seek to .find lessons to avoid pitfalls in the future,

to evolve constructive suggestions for the protection of our national

security, and to determine whether there were failures in our own

military and naval establishments which in any measure may have

contributed to the extent and intensity of the disaster.

XI

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT

On November 15, 1945, the Joint Congressional Committee on the

Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack held its first public hearings

pursuant to Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 27, Seventy-ninth

Congress, first session, as follows: \*

IN THE SENATE OP THE UNITED STATES

Septimbib 1945

Mr. Babklbt submitted the following ooncurrent resolution; which was

considered, modified, and agreed to

Septimbib 11, 1945

House oonours

CONCUBRSNT RbSOLUTION

Resolved by the Senate {the House of RepresentaHves concurring), That there is

hereby established a joint committee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor

attack, to be composed of five Members of the Senate (not more than three of

whom shall be members of the majority party), to be appointed by the President

pro tempore, and five Members of the House of Representatives (not more than

three of whom shall be members of the majority party), to be appointed by the

Speaker of the House. Vacancies in the membership of the committee shall not

affect the power of the remaining members to execute the functions of the com-

mittee, and shall be filled in the same manner as in the case of the original selection.

The committee shall select a chairman and a vice chainhan from among its mem-

bers.

Sec. 2. The committee shall make a full and complete investigation of the

facts relating to the events and circumstances leading up to or following the attack

made by Japanese armed forces upon Pearl Harbor in the Territory of Hawaii

on December 7, 1941, and shall report to the Senate and the House of Repre-

sentatives not later than January 3, 1046, the results of its investigation,

together with such recommendations as it may deem advisable.

Sec. 3. The testimony of any person in the armed services, and the fact that

such person testified before the joint committee herein provided for, shall not be

used against him in any court proceeding, or held against him in examining his

military status for credits in the service to which he belongs.

Sec. 4. (a) The committee, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is

authorized to sit and act at such places and times during the sessions, recesses, and

adjourned periods of the Seventy-ninth Congress (prior to January 3, 1946), to

require by subpena or otherwise the attendance of such witnesses and the pro-

duction of such books, papers, and documents, to administer such oaths, to take

such testimony, to procure such printing and binding, and to make such expendi-

tures as it deems advisable. The cost of stenographic services to report such

hearings shall not be in excess of 25 cents per hundred words.

(b) The committee is empowered to appoint and fix the compensation of such

experts, consultants, and clerical and stenographic assistants as it deems necessary,

but the compensation so fixed shall not exceed the compensation prescribed under

the Classification Act of 1923, as amended, for comparable duties.

(c) The expenses of the committee, which shall not exceed $25,000, shall be

paid one-half from the contingent fund of the Senate and one-half from the con-

1 The authority of the committee is to be found in S. Con. Res. No. 27. 79th Cong.. 1st sess., passed by

the Senate on September^ 1945. and concurred in by the House of Representatives on September 11. 1945,

and as extended by both Houses under S. Con. Res. No. 49. 79th Cong., 1st sess., and by S. Con. Res. No\*

54. 79th Cong.. 2d sess.

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XIV

INTRODUCTORY STATE5MBNT

tingent fund of the House of Representatives, upon vouchers signed by the

chairman.

Passed the Senate September 6, 1945.

Attest: Lksux L. Bifflx,

Secretary.

Passed the House of Representatives September 11, 1945.

Attest :

South Tbihblx

blerk.

On 70 days subsequent to November 15 and prior tp and including

May 31, 1946, .open hearii^ were conducted in the course of which

some 15,000 pages of testimony were taken and a total of 183 exhibits

received incident to an examination of 43 witnesses.

Of assistance to the ioonunittee and its work were the testimony and

exhibits of seven prior investigations concerning the Pearl Harbor

attack, including inquiries conducted by the Roberts Commission,^

Admiral Thomas C. Hart,\* the Arn^ Pearl Harbor Board,\* the Navy

Court of Inqui^,® Col. Carter W. Clarke,® Maj. Henry C. Clau-

sen,^ and Admiral H. Kent Hewitt.\* For purposes of convenient

reference there has been set forth in appendix A to this report a state\*

ment concerning the scope and character of each of these prior pro-

ceedings, the records of which total 9,754 printed pages of testimony

from 318 witnesses and the attendant 489 exhibits. The records of

these proceedings have been incorporated as exhibits to the record of

the committee which enconipass^ approximately 10,000,000 words.

All witne^es appeared under oath and were afforded the fullest

opportunity to offer any and all information which was r^arded as

having any relationship whatever to the disaster. In the course of

examination by committee counsel and the committee members

themselves, an effort was made to elicit all facts having an immedi-

ate or remote bearing on the tragedy of December 7, 1941. It is

believed the committee has succeeded thiough its record in preserv-

ing for posterity the material facts concerning the disaster.

The figures and witnesses in the drama of Pearl Harbor ran the

gamut of officials of the executive branch of the Government. The

principal personalities in the picture were the President of the United

States, Franklin D. Roosevelt; the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull;

the Secretary of War, Hemy U. Stimson; the Secretary of Navy,

Frank Knox; the Chief of Staff, George C. Marshall; the Chief of

Naval Operations, Harold R. Stark; the commander in chief of the

Pacific Fleet, Husband E. Kimmel; and the commanding general of

the Hawaiian Department, Walter C. Short. In appendix B to this

report there are set forth the names and positions of the ranking Anny

and Navy officials in Washii^ton and at Hawaii at the time of the

attack along with the principal witnesses in the various proceedings.

The committee’s invest^ation has extended to the files of aU

pertinent branches of the Government; Instructions in this regard

from the President of the United States, Harry S. Truman, to various

departrnents will be found in appendix C to this report. The com-

mittee through its counsel requested Miss Grace Tully, custodian of

the files of the late President Roosevelt, to furnish the conunittee all

. \* For proceedings of the Roberts Copimission, see committee exhibit No. 143.

. \* For proceedings of the Hart Inquiry, see committee exhibit No. 144.

\* For proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, see committee exhibit No. 146.

\* For proceedings of the Navy Court of Inquiry, see committee exhibit No. 146.

\* For proceedings of the Clarke investigation, see committee exhibit No. 147.

f For report of investigation conducted by Major Clausen, see committee exhibit No. 148.

i For proceedings of the Hewitt inquiry, see committee exhibit No. 149.

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT

XV

papers in these file^ for the year 1941 relating to Japan, the imminence

of war in the Pacific, and the general Far Eastern developments.

She furnished such papers in response to this request as she considered

might be involved and stood ready to testify before the committee at

any time.

AU paxties in interest have attested to the fact that they have been

afforded a fuU, fair, and impartial public hearing before the committee.

All witnesses who retained counsel — Admiral Stark, Admiral Kimmel,

and General Short — were given the opportunity to be examined by

their counsel if they so desired, and to submit questions to committee

counsel, to be asked other witnesses.

The following action was not taken by the committee for the reasons

mdicated}

. (il) Fcftimer Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson was not called

before the committee as a witness for the reason that his health would

not permit. Mr. Stimson did, however, submit a statement under

eath for the committee’s consideration and the answers supplied by

him to interrogatories propoimded were considered by the committee.

He supphed the portions of his personal diary requested by committee

eoimsel apd informed the committee that the portions of his dia^

now in evidence are the only portions thereof having any relationship

to the Pearl Harbor investigation.

(2) Former Ambassador to Japan Joseph Grew appeared before the

committee as a witness and testified to material appearing in his

personal diary having a relationship to the events and circumstances

of tile Pearl Harbor attack. On the basis of bis personal representa>

tion that no additional material pertinent to the subject of the com-

nrittee’s inquiry appeared in his diary beyond that to which he had

testified, the committee did not formally request or otherwise seek to

require production of Mr. Grew’s complete diary.

(3) A request by one member of the committee for the appearance

of the former Prime Minister of England, Mr. Winston Churdiill,

was disapproved by a majority of the committee. At the time Mr.

Churchill was a guest in the United States and it was not felt that he

should with propriety be requested to appear as a witness.

(4) A request by one member of the committee for production

by the State Department of all papers relating to the so-called Tyler

Kent case was disapproved by a majority of the committee. The

State Department had advised that these papers were in no way

pertinent to the subject of the committee’s inquiry, and, additionally,

member^ of the committee had discussed the question with Mr.

Kent who advised that he possessed no facts that would in any way

have relationship to the Pearl Harbor attack.

Former Secretary of State Cordell Hull appeared before the com-

mittee but was forced to retire by reason of failing health before

completion of the examination by all members of the committee.

Mr. Hid! subsequently responded to interrogatories propounded by

the committee.

The committee has conceived its duty to be not only that of indicat-

ing the nature and scope of responsibility for the disaster but also of

recording the pertinent considerations relating to the greatest defeat in

our military and naval history. Only through a reasonable amount

of detail is it possible to place events and responsibilities in their proper

perspective and give to the Nation a genuine appreciation of the

salient facts concerning Pearl Harbor. For this reason our report is

XVI

INTBODUCTTORT STAlSMliNT

of somewhat greater length than was initially believed necessary. It

is to be recalled in this connection, however, that the over-all record

of the committee comprehends some ten million words. It was felt

therefore that the story of the antecedent, contemporaneous, and suc-

ceeding events attending the disaster could not be properly encom-

passed within a report any more concise than that herewith submitted.

We believe there is much to be learned of a constructive character

as a result of the Japanese attack from the standpoint of legislation

and, additionally, for guidance in avoiding the possibility of another

military disaster such as Pearl Harbor. Accordingly, in the section

devoted to recommendations there are set forth, in addition to the

recommendations proper, a series of principles, based on errors re-

vealed by the investigation, which are being commended to our mili-

tary and naval services for their consideration and possible assistance.

Our report does not purport to set forth or refer to all of the enor-

mous volume of testimony and evidence adduced in the course of the

Pearl Harbor investigation. It is believed, however, that the ma-

terial facts relevant to the disaster have been outlined in the report.

The committee’s record and the records of all prior investigations

have been printed and are available for review and study. It is to be

borne in mind that the findings and conclusions are based on the

facts presently in our record after an exhatistive investigation.

We desire to acknowledge particular gratitude to those who have

acted as counsel to the committee for their excellent work during the

course of the investigation and for their magnificent assistance in

compiling the facts for the committee in order that we might draw

our conclusions, which are necessarily those of the committee only.

In the following pages an effort has been made to present a review

of the diplomatic and historical setting of the Pear) Harbor attack

followed by a picture of the Japanese attack itself. Set forth there-

after are separate treatments of responsibilities in Hawaii on the one

hand and responsibUities in Washmgton on the other. Situations

existing in our Army and Navy establishments having a proximate or

causative relationship to the disaster have been distinguished from

those which, while not to be condoned, are regarded as having no

direct or reasonable bearing on Uie conditions prevailing at Hawaii,

preceding and in the wake of the Japanese attack on Sunday morning,

December 7, 1941. To assist in following md better appreciating

the story of the attack there has been outlined in appendix F the

geographical considerations and military installations playing a role

m and relating to the disaster.

T^oughout the report italics have been freely employed to facilitate

reading and to bring out more clearly matters regarded as of particular

importance.

Part I

DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

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PAKT I. DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE PEARL

HARBOR ATTACK

Japanese Recobd of Deceit and Aggression

For several months prior to December 7, 1941, the Governments of

the United States and Japan had been engaged in conversations with

a view to settlement of fundamental differences existing in the Far

East. To appreciate the reahstic basis upon which the Government

of the United States participated in the negotiations it is necessary to

consider briefly the course of modem Japanese history in order to

gauge her diplomatic and military purposes. These puiposes become

apparent through an outline review of Japanese aggression: ‘

Upon the conclusion of a successful war against China in 1895

Jap^ annexed Foimosa and indicated her purpose, not then

realized, of establishing herself in China.

Following the Russo-Japanese War, Japan in 1905 effected a

foothold in Manchuria through acquisition of a lease of the Kwan-

tung territory and ownership of the South Manchuria Railway,

at the same time acquiring southern Sakhalin.

In 1910, after many years of encroachment, Japan annexed

Korea. (In 1904 she had guaranteed Korea’s independence and

territorial integrity.)

In the midst of the First World War Japan in 1915 took advan-

tage of the situation to present to China her notorious Twenty-

one Demands.

In 1918 Japan entered into an inter-AUied plan whereby not

exceeding some 7,000 troops of any one power were to be sent to

Siberia to guard military stores which might subsequently be

needed by Russian forces, to assist in organizing Russian self-

defense, and to aid in evacuating Czechoslovakian forces in Si-

beria. Seizing upon this opportunity the Japanese conceived the

idea of annexmg eastern Siberia, in which she was unsuccessful,

and sent more than 70,000 troops.

Japan participated in the Washington Conference of 1921-22

and became a party to the agreements concluded. One of these

agreements was the Nine Power Treaty which was designed to

provide for China fuU opportunity to develop and maintain a

stable government. Japan ple(teed herself to the principles and

policies of self-restraint toward China which was the cornerstone

of the N ine Power Treaty. J apan agreed to respect the sovereignty,

independence, and territorial and administrative integrity of

China, and agreed to use her influence to establish the principle of

equal opportunity in that coimtry. Following the advent of the

Cabinet of General Tanaka in 1927 Japan adopted a positive

policy toward China and manifested an increasing disposition

to interfere in Chinese internal affairs. In 1931 Japan invaded

Manchuria, subsequently establishing the puppet regime of Man-

chukuo. (This action was a flagrant violation of her agreements

see appendix d for a detailed review of the diplomatic conversations

BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN FROM THE ATLANTIC CONFERENCE

THROUGH DECEMBER 8, 1941

» See committee record, pp. 1076-1086. Committee record references throughout this report are to page

numbers of the official transcript of testimony, which are represented in the printed Hearings of the Com-

mittee by italic numerals enclosed in brackets.

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at the Washington Conference, and was in complete disregard

of her obligations under the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 for the

renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy.) \* The

Japanese delegate to the League of Nations had stated on No-

vember 21, 1931: “We want no more territory,” The end of 1932

saw Japanese occupying the whole of Manchuria. Later they

moved southward and westward occupying vast areas of China.

When the League of Nations adopted the report of the Lytton

Commission appointed by the League to investigate the Man-

churian situation, Japan walked out of the Assembly on February

24, 1933. On March 27 of the same year Japan gave notice of

her intention to withdraw from the League.®

On February 21, 1934 the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs

dispatched a note to the American Secretary of State expressing

the conviction that no question existed between, the United States

and Japan “that is fundamentally incapable of amicable solu-

tion”.\* Yet on April 17, 1934 a spokesman of the Japanese

Foreign Ofl5.ce issued the “hands off China” statement making

clear a purpose to compel China to follow the dictates of Japan

and to permit only such relations with China by other countries as

the Japanese Government saw fit.

In a formal declaration Japan on December 29, 1934 announced

her purpose to withdraw at the end of 1936 from the Naval Limita-

tion Treaty signed at Washington on February 6, 1922.\* There-

after she prepared her armaments with a view to launching the

invasion of China.

Conversations between Japan and Nazi Germany culminated

in the Anti-Comintern Pact of November 25, 1936, to which

Italy adhered in 1937. The pact marked the genesis of the

“Axis.” Thus the parallel courses of aggression being followed

by these countries blended in an expression of their common de-

signs in foreign policy.\*

Seizing upon the negligible Marco Polo Bridge incident be-

tween Japanese and Chinese forces near Peiping, Japan in July

of 1937 began wholesale invasion of China. The lawless acts of

the Japanese military in carrying forward the invasion was a

disgusting and degrading episode of rape, theft, and murder. In

the outrages attending the occupation of Nanking on December

13, 1937, the Japanese military wrote a particularly ignoble page

in history. Yet on July 27, 1937, the Japanese Premier, Prince

Konoye, stated, “In sending troops to North China, of course,

the Government has no other purpose, as was explained in its

recent statement, than to preserve the peace of East Asia.”

Again on October 28, 1937, the Japanese Foreign OflSce said:

“Japan never looks upon the Chinese people as an enemy.” As

observed by Secretary Hull: “Japan showed its friendly feeling

for China by bombing Chinese civilian populations, by bu rning

Chinese cities, by mafing millions of Chinese homeless and desti-

tute, by mistreating and killing civilians, and by acts of horror

and cruelty.”

> Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1031-41 (State Department publication), p. 4, committee

exhibit No. 28.

\* Id., at p. 7.

\* Id., at p. 18.

\* Id.,at p. 12,

•Id.,atp. 41.

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On December 12, 1937, Japanese aircraft bombed and sank, the

U. S. S. Panay in the Yangtze RiverJ

(A proposal made by the Japanese Prime Minister, Baron Hira-

numa, on May 18, 1939 to the Secretary of State, contained the

thesis that woi‘ld peace could only be obtained through assuring

to nations their “proper places in the world”. It was suggested

subsequently that Hiranuma was prepared to sound out Germany

and Italy with regard to the holding of a conference if the Presi-

dent were prepared at the same time to sound out Great Britain

and France on the settling of European problems.^\* The pro-

posal was received by the American Government with interest.

The suggestion was made that Japan could assist in attaining the

objective of world peace by settling the “armed conflict and conse-

quent political disturbances in the Far East today.” This sug-

f estion reminded the Japanese Government of “the methods of

apan in relations with China”, which perturbed American

opinion. In consequence, the proposal of Hiranuma withered with

the Japanese refusal to settle her “incident” with China, and to

indicate her good faith in proposing a search for world peace.)

On April 15, 1940, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs

stated that the “Japanese Government cannot but be deeply

concerned over any development \* ♦ ♦ that may affect the

status quo of the Netherlands East Indies.” But following the

occupation of the Netherlands by Germany, Japan sent a com-

mercial commission to the Indies asking far-reacmng concessions,

the effect of which, if acceded to, would have made the Indies a

virtual Japanese colony. In August and September of 1940 with \

German assistance Japan extorted from Vichy France an a^ee-

ment whereby Japanese forces moved into northern Indochina.

On September 27, 1940, Japan entered into the Tripartite Pact

along with Germany and Italy — an alliance pointed directly at the

United States.\* As stated by Secretary Hull: “It was designed

to discomage the United States from taking adequate measures

of self-defense until both Japan and Germany had completed

their program of conquest in Asia and Europe, when they could

turn on the United States then standing alone.” Commenting

on the Tripartite Pact, Premier Konoye was quoted in the press—

of October 1940, as having said:

If the United States refuses to understand the real intentions of Japan, Ger-

many, and Italy and continues persistently its challenging attitude and acts

\* \* \* those powers will be forced to go to war. Japan is now endeavor-

ing to adjust Russo-Japanese political and economic relations and will make

every effort to reduce friction between Japan and Russia. Japan is now

engaged in diplomatic maneuvers to induce Russia, Britain, and the United

States to suspend their operations in assisting the Chiang regime.

On July 30, 1941 Japanese aircraft bombed the U. S. S. Tutuila

at Chungking and struck within 400 yards of the American

Embassy at that place. On the following day Japan assured the

Government of the United States that her military would dis-

continue bombing the city area of Chungking. Yet only 11 days

later on August 11 the American Embassy reported that during

' Id., at pp. 62, 63.

7» Committee exhibit No. 177.

■ The pact provided that Germany, Italy, and Japan would assist one another with all political, eco-

nomic, and military means when one of the powers was attacked bu a power not then involved in the European

war or in the Chineee-Japaneee conflict. Peace and War, p. 84.

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. the preceding 4 days Chungkii^ had been delivered uhusually

heavy and prolonged Japanese air raids. Repeatedly Japan gave

assurances that .^nerican lives and property in China would be

respected. Despite her pledges ever incre^ng numbers of cases

were reported of bombing of American property with consequent

loss or endangering of American hves. Secretary Hull summar-

ized the picture in the following words: “Time and again the

Japanese gave assurances that American treaty rights in China

would be respected. Unnumbered measures infringing those

rights were put into effect in Japanese occupied areas. Trade

monopolies were set up, discriminatory taxes were imposed,

Amencan properties were occupied, and so on. In addition,

American nationals were assaulted, arbitrarily detained, and

subjected to indignities.”

Fundamental Differences Between American and Japanese

Policies

The bold aggression launched by Japan in 1931 in complete violation

and disregard of treaty obligations stands in irreconcuiable conflict

with the policy • voiced by the President-elect, Mr. Roosevelt, on

January 17, 1933:

I am \* ♦ ♦ wholly willing to make it clear that American foreign policies

must uphold the sanctity of international treaties. That is the cornerstone on

which all relations between nations must re6t.

In his inaugural address on March 4, 1933, President Roosevelt dedi-

cated the Nation to the policy of the good neighbor:

♦ ♦ ♦ the neighbor who resolutely respects himself and, because he does so,

respects the rights of others — ^the neighbors who respects his obligations and re-

spects the sanctity of his agreements in and with a world of neighbors.

From that time forward, despite repeated efforts and discussions

on the part of the Government of the United States to incline the

Government of Japan to a peaceful policy in the Orient, she

proceeded in July of 1937 to invade China. In consequence of this

policy of aggression by the Empire of Japan, the Secretary of State

made public a statement of fundamental principles of international

policy with a view to rallying all countries to the support of peaceful

processes. The Secretary said on July 16, 1937:‘®

I have been receiving from many sources inquiries and suggestions arising out

of disturbed situations in various parts of the world.

Unquestionably there are in a number of regions tensions and strains which

on their face involve only countries that are near neighbors but which in ultimate

analysis are of inevitable concern to the whole world. Any situation in which

armed hostilities are in progress or are threatened is a situation wherein rights and

interests of all nations either are or may be seriously affected. There can be no

serious hostilities anywhere in the world which will not one way or another affect

interests or rights or obligations of this country. I therefore feel warranted in

making — in fact, I feel it a duty to make — a statement of this Government’s

position in regard to international problems and situations with respect to which

this country feels deep concern.

This country constantly and consistently advocates maintenance of peace. We

advocate national and international self-restraint. We advocate abstinence by

all nations from use of force in pursuit of policy and from interference in the in-

ternal affairs of other nations. We advocate adjustment of problems in inter-

national relations by processes of peaceful negotiation and agreement. We advo-

> Committee record, pp. 10S4-10M.

Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan: 1031-41. (State Department publication), vol. 1,

pp. 326-323. Committee exhibit No. 29.

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cate observance of international agreements. Upholding the principle

oi the sanctity of treaties, we believe in modification of provisions of treaties,

when need therefor arises, by orderly processes carried out in a spirit of mutual

helpfulness and accommodation. We believe in respect by all nations for the rights

of others and performance by all nations of established obligations. We stand for

revitalizing and stren^hening of international law. We advocate steps toward J

promotion of economic security and stability the world over. We advocate \*

lowering Or removing of excessive barriers in international trade. We seek effec-

tive equality of commercial opportunity and we urge upon all nations application'

of the principle of equality of treatment. We believe in limitation and reduction

of armament. Realizing the necessity for maintaining armed forces adequate for

national security, we are prepared to reduce or to increase our own armed forces

in proportion to reductions or increases made by other countries. We avoid en-

tering into alliances or entangling commitments but we believe in cooperative

effort by, peaceful and practicable means in support of the principles hereinbefore

stated.

The principles announced in the statement of July 16, 1937, were

given express application to the Chinese situation in a statement of

the Secretary of State on August 23, 1937:

The situation in Shanghai is in many ways unique. Shanghai is a great cosmo-

politan center, with a population of over three million, a port which has been

developed^ by the nationals of many countries, at which there have prevailed

mutually advantageous contacts of all types and varieties between and among the

Chinese and people of almost all other countries of the world. At Shanghai

there exists a multiplicity of rights and interests which are of inevitable concern

to many countries, including the United States.

In the present situation, the American Government is engaged in facilitating

in every way possible an orderly and safe removal of American citizens from areas

where there is special danger. Further, it is the policy of the American Govern-

ment to afford its nationals Mpropriate protection primarily against mobs or

other uncontrolled elements. For that purpose it has for many years maintained

small detachments of armed forces in China, and for that purpose it is sending the

present small reinforcement. These armed forces there have no mission of ag-

gression. It is their function to be of assistance toward maintenance of order and

security. It has been the desire and the intention of the American Government

to remove these forces when performance of their function of protection is no

longer called for, and such remains its desire and expectation.

The issues and problems which are of concern to this Government in the present

situation in the Pacific area go far beyond merely the immediate question of

protection of the nationals and interests of the United States. The conditions

which prevail in that area are intimately connected with and have a direct and

fundamental relationship to the general principles of policy to which attention

was called in the statement of July 16, which statement has evoked expressions

of approval from more than 60 governments. This Government is firmly of the

opinion that the principles summarized in that statement should effectively govern

international relationships.

Wben there unfortunately arises in any part of the world the threat or the

existence of serious hostilities, the matter is of concern to all nations. Without

attempting to pass judgment regarding the merits of the controversy, we appeal

to the parties to refrain from resort to war. We urge that they settle their differ-

ences in accordance with principles which, in the opinion not alone of our people

but of most of the world, should govern in international relationships. We con-

sider applicable throughout the world, in the Pacific area as elsewhere, the prin-

ciples set forth in the statement of July 16. That statement of principles is

comprehensive and basic. It embraces the principles embodied in many treaties,

including the Washington Conference treaties and the Kellogg-Briand Pact of

Paris.

From the beginning of the present controversy in the Far East we have been

urging upon both the Chinese and the Japanese Governments the importance of

refraining from hostilities and of maintaining peace. We have been participating

constantly in consultation with interested governments directed toward peaceful

adjustment. The Government does not believe in political alliances or entangle-

ments, nor does it believe in extreme isolation. It does believe in international

cooperation for the purpose of seeking through pacific methods the achievement

of those objectives set forth in the statement of July 16. In the light of our well-

u Id., at pp.

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defined attitude and policies, and within the range thereof, this Government is

giving most solicitous attention to every phase of the Far Eastern situation, toward

safeguarding the lives and welfare of our people and making effective the policies —

especially the policy of peace — in which this country believes and to which it is

committ^.

On October, 6, 1937, a release by the Department of State stated,

among other things:

The Department of State has been informed by the American Minister to

Switzerland of the text of the report adopted by the Advisory Committee of the

League of Nations setting forth the Advisory Committee's examination of the

facts of the present situation in China and the treaty obligations of Japan. The

Minister has further informed the Department that this report was acfopted and

approved by the Assembly of the League of Nations today, October 6.

Since the beginning of the present controversy in the Far East, the Government

of the United States has urged upon both the Chinese and the Japanese Govern-

ments that they refrain from hostilities and has offered to be of assistance in an

effort to find some means, acceptable to both parties to the confiict, of composing

by pacific methods the situation in the Far East.

The Secretary of State, in statements made public on July 16 and August 23,

made clear the position of the Government of the United States in regard to

international problems and international relationships throughout the world and

as applied specifically to the hostilities which are at present unfortunately going

on between China and Japan. Among the principles which in the opinion of the

Government of the United States should govern international relationships, if

peace is to be maintained, are abstinence by all nations from the use of force in

the pursuit of policy and from interference in the internal affairs of other nations;

adjustment of problems in international relations by process of peaceful negotia-

tion and agreement; respect by all nations for the rights of others and observance

by all nations of established obligations; and the upholding of the principle of the

sanctity of treaties.

On October 5 at Chic^o the President elaborated these principles, emphasizing

their importance, and in a discussion of the world situation pointed out that

there can be no stability or peace either within nations or between nations except

under laws and moral standards adhered to by all; that, international anarchy

destroys every foundation for peace; that it jeopardizes either the immediate or

the future security of every nation, large or small; and that it is therefore of vital

interest and concern to the people of the United States that respect for treaties

and international morality be restored.

In the light of the unfolding developments in the Far East, the Government of

the United States has been forced to the conclusion that the action of Japan in

China is inconsistent with the principles which should govern the relationships

between nations and is contrary to the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty of

February 6, 1922, regarding principles and policies to be followed in matters

concerning China, and to those of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of August 27, 1928.

Thus the conclusions of this Government with respect to the foregoing are in

general accord with those of the Assembly of the League of Nations.

Pursuant to the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty of 1922, the

United States in November of 1937 with 18 other nations participated

in a conference convened at Brussels with a view to “stucly peaceable

means of hastening the end of the regrettable conflict which prevails”

in the Far East. The Government of Japan refused repeatedly to

participate in the conference which prevented bringing the conflict

in China to an end and resulted in the conference suspending its work

on November 24.\*®

The President late in 1937, exercising the discretion provided by

law, refrained from applying the provisions of the Neutrality Act to

the conflict between China and Japan. This position was assumed

in recognition of the fact that the arms-embai^o provisions of the

act worked to the detriment of China and to the benefit of Japan.\*\*

» Id., at pp. 396-397.

See statement of Secretary Hall, oonoanlttee record, pp. 1087, 1068; al 90 Fefioe War, pp 51, 6^

H See statement of Secretary Hull, committee record, p. 1088 .

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On July 26, 1939, the following notification was given the Japanese

Ambassador by the Secretary of State: “

EXCELLENCY: During recent years the Government of the United States

has been examining the treaties of commerce and navigation in force between

the United States and foreign countries with a view to determining what changes

may need to be made toward better serving the purpose for which such treaties

are concluded. In the course of this survey, the Government of the United States

has come to the conclusion that the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between

the United States and Japan which was signed at Washington on February 21,

1911, contains provisions which need new consideration. Toward preparing the

way for such consideration and with a view to better safeguarding and promoting

American interests as new developments may require, the Government of the

United States, acting in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Article XVII

of the treaty under reference, gives notice hereby of its desire that this treaty be

terminated, and, having thus given notice, will expect the treaty, together with

its accompanying protocol, to expire six months from this date.

In explaining the foregoing action Secretary Hull testified that

the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation was not affording adequate

protection to American commerce either in Japan or in Japanese-

occupied portions of China, while at the same time the operation of

the most-favored-natton clause of the treaty was a bar to the adoption

of retaliatory measures against Japanese commerce. With the termi-

nation of the treaty on January 26, 1940, the legal impediment to

placing restrictions upon trade with Japan was removed.

In the face of widespread bombings of Chinese civilians by the

Japanese, the Government of the United States placed into effect

“moral embargoes,’^ adopted on the basis of humanitarian considera-

tions.^^ On July 1, 1938, the Department of State notified aircraft

manufacturers and exporters that the United States Government

was strongly opposed to the sale of airplanes and aeronautical equip-

ment to countries whose armed forces were using airplanes for attack

on civilian populations. In 1939 the “moral embargo^^ was extended

to materials essential to airplane manufacture and to facilities for

production of high-quality gasoline.^® Following passage of the act

of July 2, 1941, restrictions were imposed in the interests of national

defense on an ever-increasing number of exports of strategic materials.

These measures had the additional purpose of deterring and express-

ing the opposition of the United States to Japanese aggression.^®

On April 15, 1940, when questioned by newspapermen concerning

Japan’s position with regard to possible involvement of the Nether-

lands in the Emopean war and its repercussion in the Netherlands

East Indies, the Japanese Foreign Minister replied:

With the South Seas regions, especially the Netherlands East Indies, Japan ii I

economically bound by an intimate relationship of mutuality in ministering toj |

one another’s needs. Similarly, other countries of East Asia maintain close;

economic relations with these regions. That is to say, Japan, these countries^

and these regions together are contributing to the prosperity of East Asia through

mutual aid and interdependence.

Should hostilities in Europe be extended to the Netherlands and produce

repercussions, as you say, in the Netherlands East Indies, it would not only

interfere with the maintenance and furtherance of the above-mentioned relations

of economic interdependence and of coexistence and coprosperity, but would also '

give rise to an undesirable situation from the standpoint of the peace and stability

of East Asia. In view of these considerations, the Japanese Government cannot

1\* Foreign Relations, vol. II, p. 1S9; also committee record, p. 1088.

M Committee record, p. 1088.

wid.

w Peace and War, p. 89.

» See statement of Secretary Hull, Committee Record, pp. 1088, 1089.

» Foreign Relations, vol. H, p. 281.

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but be deeply concerned over any development accompanying an agmvation of

the war in Europe that may affect the status quo of the NetherlandsEast Indies.

Referrii^ to the foregoing statement the Secretary of State made

the following comments on April 17, 1940:

I have noted with interest the statement by the Japanese Minister for Eoreign

Affairs expressing concern on the part of the Japanese Government for the

maintenance of the status quo of the Netherlands Indies.

Any change in the status of the Netherlands Indies would directly affect the

interests of many countries.

The Netherlands Indies are very important in the international relationships

of the whole Pacific Ocean. The islands themselves extend for a distance of

approximately 3,200 miles east and west astride of the Equator, from the Indian

Ocean on the west far into the Pacific Ocean on the east. They are also an

1 important factor in the commerce of the whole world. They produce consider-

I able portions of the world^s supplies of important essential commodities such as

I rubber, tin, quinine, copra, et cetera. Many countries, including the United

' States, depend substantially upon them for some of these commodities.

\ Intervention in the domestic affairs of the Netherlands Indies or any alteration

of their status quo by other than peaceful processes would be prejuaicial to the

cause of stability, peace, and security not only in the region of the Netherlands

Indies but in the entire Pacific area.

This conclusion, based on a doctrine which has universal application and for

which the United States unequivocally stands, is embodied in notes exchanged

on November 30, 1908, between the United States and Japan in which each of

the two Governments stated that its policy was directed to the maintenance of

the existing status quo in the region of the Pacific Ocean. It is reaffirmed in the

notes which the United States, the British Empire, France, and Japan — as parties

to the treaty signed at Washington on December 13, 1921, relating to their

insular possessions and their insular dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean —

sent to the Netherlands Government on February 4, 1922, in which each of those

Governments declared that 'fit is firmly resolved to respect the rights of the

Netherlands in relation to their insular possessions in the region of the Pacific

Ocean.'’

All peaceful nations have during recent years been earnestlv urging that policies

of force be abandoned and that peace be maintained on the basis of fundamental

principles, among which are respect by every nation for the rights of other nations

and nonintervention in their domestic affairs, the according of equality of fair and

just treatment, and the faithful observance of treaty pledges, with modification

thereof, when needful, by orderly processes.

It is the constant hope of the Government of the United States — as it is no

doubt that of aU peacefully inclined governments — that the attitudes and policies

of all governments will be based upon these principles and that these principles

will be applied not only in every part of the Pacific area, but also in every part of

the world.

The situation existing during 1940 was summarized by Secretary

Hull in his testimony before the committee: “

Throughout this period the United States increasi^ly followed a policy of

extending all feasible assistance and encouragement to China. This took several

different forms, including diplomatic actions in protest of Japan’s aggression

against China and of Japan’s violation of American rights. Loans and credits

aggregating some $200,000,000 were extended in order to bolster China’s economic

structure and to facilitate the acquisition by China of supplies. And later lend-

lease and other military supplies were sent to be used in China’s resistance against

Japan.

During the winter of 1940 and the spring of 1941 I had clearly in mind, and I

was explaining to Members of Congress and other Americans with whom I came

in contact, that it was apparent that the Japanese military leaders were starting

on a mission of conquest of the entire Pacific area west of a few hundred miles of

Hawaii and extending to the South Seas and to India. The Japanese were out

with force in collaboration with Hitler to establish a new world order, and they

thought they had the power to compel all peaceful nations to come in under that

new order in the half of the world they had arrogated to themselves.

« Id., at p. 282.

« Committee Record, pp. 1080-92.

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1 was aaying to those Americans that beginning in 1933 I had commenced a

systematic and consistently earnest effort to work out our relations with Japan.

I had been trying to see whether it was humanly possible to find any new way to

approach the Japanese and prevail on them to abandon this movement of con-

quest. We had been urging the Japanese to consider their own future from the

standpoint of political, economic, and social aspects. The perale of China were

living on a veiy low standard. Japan, if it should conquer China, would keep

China bled white and would not have the capital to aid in restoring purchasing

power and social welfare. It meant everything for the development of that half

of the world's population to use the capital of all nations, such as the United States

and other countries, in helping China, for example, to develop internal improve-

ments and increase its purchasing power. We had reminded the Japanese of our

traditional friendship and our mutually profitable relations.

During these years we had kept before the Japanese all these doctrines and

principles in the most tactful and earnest manner possible, and at all times we had

been careful not to make threats. I said that I had alwa\^ felt that if a govern-

ment makes a threat it ought to be ready to back it up. We had been forthright

but we had been as tactful as possible.

I was pointing out in these conversations that if we had not, by previously

modifying our Neutrality Act, been in a position to send military aid to Great

Britain in the early summer of 1940 there might well have been a different story.

Our aid assisted Britain to hold back the invaders for 7 months, while we had that

7 months in which to arm, and everybody knew that no country ever needed time

in which to arm more, than we did in the face of the world situation.

In his address to Congress on January 6, 1941^ President Roosevelt

declared ^ that ‘‘at no previous time has American security been as

seriously threatened from without as it is today. He observed that

the pattern of democratic life had been blotted out in an appalling

number of independent nations with the a^ressors still on the march

threateiiing other nations, great and small. The national policy of

the Government of the United States was outlined by the President

as committed to an all-inclusive national defense, to full support of

resolute peoples everywhere who were resisting agOTession and thereby

were keeping war away from our hemisphere, and to the proposition

that principles of morality and considerations for our own security

would “never permit us to acquiesce in a peace dictated by aggressors.

In a statement on January 15, 1941, in support of the Lend-Lease

Act before the Committee on Foreign AflFairs in the House of Repre-

sentatives, Secretary Hull said:

It has been clear throughout that Japan has been actuated from the start by

broad and ambitious plans for establishing herself in a dominant position in the-

entire region of the Western Pacific. Her leaders have openly declared their

determination to achieve and maintain that position by force of arms and thus

to make themselves master of an area containing almost one-half of the entire

population of the world. As a consequence, they would have arbitrary control

of the sea and trade routes in that region.

As Secretary Hull testified ^ —

I pointed out that mankind was face to face with an organized, ruthless, and

implacable movement of steadily expanding conquests and that control of the

high seas by law-abiding nations “is the key to the security of the Western Hemi-

sphere.^"

The Lope of the United States, therefore, for mediation and concili-

ation based on peaceful processes was overshadowed by an uncompro-

mising and relentless aggressor who had cast her lot with the Axis in

the Tripartite Pact of September 1940 and voiced her slogan of domi-

nation by force in the “Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.'^

» See Committee record, pp. 1092, 1093.

M Committee record, p. 1093.

\*«Id.

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The backdrop of activity by Japan’s partners left little doubt as to

the program and methods of the Axis: “

On October 14, 1933, Germany withdrew from the^isarmament

Conference coincidentally giving notice of withdrawal from the

League of Nations.

On October 3, 1935, Italian armed forces invaded Ethiopia.

In violation of the Locarno Pact Hitler proceeded in March of

1936 to occupy and fortify the demilitarized Rhineland.

On March 11, 1938, German forces entered Austria and 2 days

later proclaimed the union of Germany and Austria.

At Munich on September 29, 1938, Hitler and Mussolini ex-

torted a settlement by which Germany acquired the Sudeten-

land.

In violation of pledges given at Munich, Germany invaded

Czechoslovakia on March 14, 1939.

With further German aggression, war broke out in Europe on Sep-

tember 1, 1939, which as Secretary Hull stated “weakened the posi-

tion of all countries, including the United States, opposed to Japanese

banditry in the Pacific.” He presented the picture in the following

terms:

In the early summer of 1940 France’s effective resistance collapsed. Britain

was virtually under siege. Germany’s vast and powerful military machine

remained intact.

Nazi submarines and long-range bombers were taking a heavy toll of ships and

materials in the North Atlantic. Shipping was inadequate. The countries

resisting aggression desperately needed supplies to increase their defenses.

It was clear that any aggravation of the situation in the Far East would have a

serious effect on the already dangerous situation in Europe, while conversely, an

easement of the Far Eastern tension would aid enormously the struggle against the

Nazis in Europe.

Steps Taken by the United States To Meet the Threat of Axis

Aggression

With each threatened “annexation” or “occupation” of countries

bordering on Germany up to the invasion of Poland, President Roose-

velt had made an appeal for the settlement of differences without

recourse to force or the threat of force; but the United States in line

with its traditional aloofness in European affairs had adopted no

positive measures to deter Hitler’s course of aggression. In the face

of the inexorable trend of Axis militarism, however, progressive steps

were taken by the Government of the United States to build our

defenses and throw our weight on the side of France and Great Britain.

For purposes of convenient reference it would be well to review

briefly these steps.

Addressing the Congress in extraordinary session on September 21,

1939, the President recommended that the arms embargo be repealed

and that our citizens and our ships be restricted from dangerous areas

in order to prevent controversies that might involve the United States

in war. On November 4 the arms embargo was repealed, thereby

permitting large shipments of aircraft and other implements of war,

much of which had been ordered by Great Britain and France before

the outbreak of war, to be shipped across the Atlantic for use in

combating Nazi aggression.\*^

\*• See committee record, pp. 1093-1095.

Peace and War, pp. 69,^70.

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In an address on June 10, 1940, at Charlottesville, Va., the Presi-

dent announced the policy of extending the material resources of the

United States to the opponents of force. He said:

We will extend to the opponents of force the material resources of this Nation

and, at the same time, we will harness and speed up the use of those resources in

order that we ourselves in the Americas may have equipment and training equal

to the task of any emergency and every defense.\*\*

With a view to strengthening the defenses of the Western Hemi-

sphere an agreement was made on September 2, 1940, between the

United States and Great Britain whereby the latter received 50 over-

aged destroyers and the United States acquired the right to lease

naval and air bases in Newfoundland, in British Guiana, and in the

islands of Bermuda, the Bahamas, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Trinidad, and

Antigua. Referring to this agreement, the President stated that the

value to the Western Hemisphere “of these outposts of security is

beyond calculation.” He considered them essential to the protection

of the Panama Canal, Central America, the northern portion of South

America, the Antilles, Canada, Mexico, and our eastern and Gulf

seaboards.^®

On September 16., 1940, the Selective Training and Service Act was

enacted, marking another important step for national defense. The

act included a provision that persons inducted into the land forces

should not be employed beyond the Western Hemisphere except in

United States Territories and possessions. It marked, for the first

time in the history of the United States, the adoption of compulsory

military training of manpower when the Nation was not at war.®®

President Roosevelt, in an address of December 29, 1940, observed

that the Nazi masters of Germany had made it clear they intended

not only to dominate all life and thought in their own country but

also to enslave the whole of Europe and to use the resources of Europe

to dominate the rest of the world. He pointed out that although some

of our people liked to believe that wars in Europe and Asia were of no

concern to us, it was a matter of most vital concern that European

and Asiatic war makers should not gain control of the oceans which

led to the Western Hemisphere. He pointed out that if Great Britain

went down the Axis Powers would control the continents of Emope,

Asia, Africa, and the high seas, and would then be in a position to

bring enormous military and naval resources against this hemisphere.

Warning of the danger ahead, the President stated the Government

was planning our defense with the utmost m’gency and in it we must

“integrate the war needs of Britain and the other free nations resisting

aggression.” Referring to the need for increased production, the

President said we must have more ships, more gxms, more planes;

we must be the great “arsenal of democracy.”

With the signature of the President on March 11, 1941, the lend-

lease bill became law. This bill provided the machinery enabling

the United States to make the most effective use of our resources for

our own needs and for those whom, in our own self-defense, we were

determined to aid. Secretary Hull expressed the belief that this act

would make it possible for us to allocate our resources in ways best

» M., at p. 76.

» Id., St p. 83

«Id.,atp. 84.

n Id., at pp. 86, 87.

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calculated to provide for the security of the United States and of this

continent,®\*

On April 10, 1941, the Department of State announced an agree-

ment regarding Greenland, recognizing that as a result of a European

war there was dai^er that Greenland might be converted into a point

of aggression against nations of the American Continent. This agree-

ment accepted the responsibility on behalf of the United States of

assisting Greenland in the maintenance of its existing status, and

wanted to the United States the right to locate and construct airplane

landing fields and facilities for the defense of Greenland and this

continent.®®

In an address on May 27^ 1941, the President declared an “unlimited

national emergency,” stating that our whole program of aid for the

democracies had been “based on a hard-headed concern for our own

security and for the kind of safe and civilized world in which we wished

to live.” He stated that every dollar of material that we sent helped

to keep the dictators away from our own hemisphere and every day

they were held off gave us time in which to build more guns and

tanks and planes and ships.®\*

On July 7, 1941, the President annoimced that in accordance with

an imderstanding reached with the Prime Minister of Iceland, forces

had arrived in Iceland in order to supplement and eventually to

replace the British forces which had been stationed there to insure

the adequate defense of that coimtry. The President pointed out

that the United States could not permit the occupation by Germany

of a strategic outpost in the Atlantic to be used as air or naval bases

for eventual attack against the Western Hemisphere.®\* Subsequently,

there was instituted an escort to Iceland of United States and Iceland

shipping.®\*

In a joint declaration by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister

Churchill, the principles of the Atlantic Charter were enunciated on

August 14, 1941.®\*

In a message of August 15, 1941, m which he was joined by Prime

Minister Churchill, the President advised Premier Stalin that the

United States and Great Britain had consulted together as to how

best they could help the Soviet Union; that they were cooperating to

provide the Soviet Union with the very maximum of supplies most

urgently needed and that many shiploads had already left for the

Soviet Union and more would leave in the immediate future.®®

On September 11 , 1941, as a result of several incidents fully demon-

strating a grave menace to the vital interests of the United States,

the President warned that from that time forward, if German or

Italian vessels of war entered the waters the protection of which was

necessary for American defense, they would do so “at their own

peril.” ®\*

Despite the announcement of the “shooting orders”, ships of the

United States and other American Republics continued to be sunk in

the Atlantic Ocean by Nazi submarines. In view of this situation and

in view of the fact that the Neutrality Act of 1939 prohibited the arm-

“ Id., at p. 100.

W Id., at pp. 103, 104.

^ Id., at p. 111.

Id., at p. 111.

» See committee record, p. 6111.

w «Peace and War/\* p. 111.

» Id., at p. 113.

»• Id., at pp. 113-115.

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iBgi Of<y:iptited States merchant diips engaged in foreign commerce and

prevented United States merchant smps from carrying cargoes to

belligerent pwts, it became increasingly difficult to obtain shipping

for the ofttriage of lend-lease supplies to Great Britain and other na-

ti<His whose defense was considered vital to the defense of the United

States. Accordingly, on October 9, 1941, the President asked

Congress to modify the NeutraUty Act. On November 17, 1941, in a

joint resolution of the Congress, sections of the act were repealed per-

mitting United States vessels to be armed and to carry cargoes to bellig-

erent ports anywhere."

In contrast with our historic aloofness in European affairs, it was the

traditional policy of the United States, based upon territorial, comr

mercial, and humanitarian interests, to maintain a concern in the

Pacific. This policy had its inception in the enunciation of the Hay

open-door policy toward China in 1899 which formed the cornerstone

of the Nine-Power Treaty, adopted concurrently with the Washington

Naval Treaty of 1922."

To inclement this policy Japan’s course of aggression was countered

by a series of deterrent measures in addition to those relating generally

to the Axis or applying more specifically to the European situation.

These measures mcluded materid aid to China, curtailment of trade

with Japan, and basing of the Pacific Fleet at Hawaii.

Initial United States-Japanese Negotiations, 1941

Admiral Nomura, the new Japanese Ambassador, was received by

the President on February 14, 1941, at which time reference was made

to the progressive deterioration of relations between Japan and the

United States. President Roosevelt suggested that Ambassador

Nomura might desire to reexamine and frankly discuss with the

American Secretary of State important phases of American-Japanese

relations. Secretary Hull made the following observations concerning

the initid conversations with the Japanese Ambassadoc: \*\*

On Moreh 8 (1941) in my first extended conversation with the Japanese Am-

bassador 1 emphasized that the American people had become fully aroused over

the German and Japanese movements to take charge of the seas and of the other

continents for their own arbitrary control and to profit at the expense of the

welfare of all of the victims.

On March 14 the Japanese Ambassador saw the President and me. The

President agreed with an intimation by the Ambassador that matters between

our two countries could be worked out without a military clash and emphasized

that the first step would be removal of suspicion regarding Japan’s intentions.

With the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka on his way to Berlin, talking

loudly, and Japanese naval and air forces moving gradually toward Thailand,

there was. naturally serious concern and suspicion.

On April 16, I had a further conversation with the Japanese Ambassador. I

pointed out that the one paramount preliminary question about which our

Government was concerned was a definite assurance in advance that the Japanese

Government had the wUlingness and power to abandon its present doctrine of

conquest by force and to adopt four principles which our Government regarded as

the foundation upon which relations between nations should rest, as follows:

fl) Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all

nations;

(2) Support of the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other

countries;

\* Id., »t pp. 118-117.

« Id., at p. 188.

u Committee record, pp. 1103, 1104.

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(3) Support of the principle of equality, including equality of commercial

opportunity;

(4) Noncusturbance of the status quo in the Pacific except as the status quo

may be altered by peaceful means.

I told the Japanese Ambassador that our Government was willing to consider

any proposal which the Japanese Government might offer such as would be con-

sistent with those principles.

Japanese Proposal op May 12

The Japanese Ambassador on May 12 presented a proposal for a

general settlement the essence of which was (1) that the United States

should request Chiang Kai-shek to negotiate peace with Japan and,

if the Generalissimo should not accept we advice of the United States,

that the United States should discontinue its assistance to the Chinese

Government; (2) that normal trade relations between Japan and tbe

United States should be resumed; and (3) that the United States

should help Japan acquire access to facilities for the e^loitation of

natural resources (including oil, rubber, tin, and nickel) in the South-

west Pacific area.^ This proposal contained an affirmation of Japan’s

adherence to the Tripartite Pact with specific reference to Japan’s

obligations thereunder to come to the aid of any of the parties thersCo

if attacked by q power not at that time in the European war or in Hu

Sino-Japanese conflict, other than the Soviet Union which was expressly

excepted. In referring to the proposal Secretary Hull said:"

The peace conditions which Japan proposed to ofifer China were not defined

in clear-cut terms. Patient exploring, however, disclosed that they included

stipulations disguised in innocuous-sounding formulas whereby Japan would retain

control of various strategic resources, facilities, and enterprises in China and

would acquire the right to station large bodies of Japanese troops, professedly

for “joint defense against communism,’’ for an indefinite period in extensive key

areas of China proper and inner Mongolia. -

Notwithstanding the narrow and one-sided character of the Japanese proposals,

we took them as a starting point to explore the possibility of working out a broad-

gage settlement, covering the entire Pacific area, along lines consistent with the

principles for which this country stood.

The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs advised Ambassador

Grew on May 14, 1941, that he and Prince Konoye were determined

that Japan’s southward advance should be carried out only by peace-

- ful means ^‘unless circumstances render this imfossible.” Replymg

to the inquiry as to what circumstances he had m mind the Foreign

Minister referred to the concentration of British troops in Malayfi

and other British measures. When it was pointed out by Ambassador

Grew that such measures were defensive in character, the Japanese

Minister observed that the measures in question were regarded te

provocative by the Japanese public which might bring pressure on

the Government to act."

President Roosevelt on May 27, 1941, as has been indicated, pro-

claimed the existence of an “unlimited national emergency’’ and

declared in a radio address on the same day that our whole program

of aid for the democracies had been based on concern for our own

security."

« There were also other provisions, which Japan eventually dropped, calling for joint guaranty of Phfl-

ippine independence, for the consideration of Japanese immigration to the United States on a nondiscrlni’

inatory basis, and for a joint effort by the United States and Japan to prevent the further extension of^

European war and for the speedy restoration of peace in Europe.

« Committee record, pp. 1104-1106.

« See committee record, pp. 1106, 1107.

Id., at p. 1107.

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Secretary Hull commented as follows with respect to preliminary

conversations with Ambassador Nomura:

During the next few weeks there were a number of conversations for the pur-

pose of clarifying various points and narrowing areas of difference. We repeatedly

set forth our attitude on these points — the necessity of Japan^s. making clear its

relation to the Axis in case the United States should be involved in self-defense

in the war in Europe; application of the principle of noninterference in the internal

affairs of another country and withdrawal of Japanese troops from Chinese terri-

tory; application of the principle of nondiscrimination in commercial relations in

China and other areas of the Pacific; and assurance of Japan’s peaceful intent in

the Pacific. I emphasized that what we were seeking was a comprehensive agree-

ment w^hich would speak for itself as an instrument of peace.

The Japanese pressed for a complete reply to their proposals of May 12. Ac-

cordingly, on June 21, the Ambassador was given our views in the form of a ten-

tative r^raft of their proposals. In that redraft there was suggested a formula

which would naake clear that Japan was not committed to take action against

the United States should the latter be drawn by self-defense into the European

war. It was proposed that a further effort be made t6 work out a satisfactory

solution of the question of the stationing of Japanese troops in China and of the

question of economic cooperation between China and Japan. There also was

eliminated any suggestion that the United States would discontinue aid to the

Chinese Government. Various other suggested changes were proposed in the

mterest of clarification or for the purpose of harmonizing the proposed settlement

with our stated principles.

Japanese Reaction to German Invasion of Russia

In violation of the August 23, 1939, nonaggression pact, Germany

attacked the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. The invasion of Russia ^

removed the restraining influence on the western flank of Japan and

the life-and-death struggle of the Sovdet Union for existence was i

seized upon by the Government of Japan to realize its dreams of empire

in the Far East.

In an intercepted message of July 31, 1941, from Tokyo to its Wash-

ington Embassy the reaction of Japan to the war between Germany

and Russia was unequivocally expressed:^®

Needless to say, the Russo-German war has given us an excellent opportunity

to settle the northern question, and it is a fact that we are proceeding with our

preparations to take advantage of this occasion.

The opportunist disposition of Japan was cogently expressed much

earlier in a dispatch of September 12, 1940, from Ambassador Grew

to the State Department:^®

Whatever may be the intentions of the present Japanese Government, there

can be no doubt that the army and other elements in the country see in the 'present

world situation a golden opportunity to carry into effect their dreams of expansion;

the German victories have gone to their heads like strong wine; until recently

they have believed implicitly in the defeat of Great Britain; they have argued

that the war will probably (\*) in a quick German victory and that it is well to

consolidate Japan’s position in greater East Asia while Germany is still acquies-

cent and before the eventual hypothetical strengthening of German naval power ^

might rob Japan of far-flung control in the Far East ; they have discounted effec-

tive opposition on the part of the United States although carefully watching our

attitude. The ability of the saner heads in and out of the Government to control these

elements has been and is doubtful, \* \* \*

Diplomacy may occasionally retard but cannot effectively stem the tide. Force -

or the display of force can alone prevent these powers from attaining their objec-

tives^ Japan today is one of the predatory powers; she has submerged all moral ^

and ethical sense and has become frankly and unashamedly opportunist, seeking at

every turn to profit by the weakness of others. Her policy of southward expansion

Id., at pp. 1108, 1109.

M Comnmtee exhibit No. 1, p. 9.

4\* Committee exhibit No. 26.

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is a definite threat to American interests in the Pacific and is a thrust at the

British Empire in the east.

Following an Imperial Conference at Tokyo on July 2 at which “the

fimdamental national policy to be taken toward the present situatiim

was decided” .Japan proceeded with military preparations on a yaat

scale. From one to two million reservists and conscripts were called

to the colors. Japanese merchant vessels operating ia the Atlantic

Ocean were suddenly recalled; restrictions were imposed upon travel

in Japan; strict censorship of mads and commxmications was effected;

and conditions were generally imposed throughout the Empire pre-

saging a major military effort. The Japanese press dwelt constantly

on the theme that Japan was beii^ faced with measure directed against

it never before approached in its history. The United States was

chained with using the Philippine Islands as a “pistol aimed at Japan’s

heart.” The Japanese press warned that if the United States took

further action in the direction of encircling Japan, Japanese-American

relations would face a final crisis.^ This false propaganda was

dearly designed to condition the Japanese public for further mditary

agression.

In an intercepted dispatch of July 2, 1941, from Tokyo to Berlin for

the confidential information of the Japanese Ambassador and staff,

the policy of Japan was expressed in the following terms: \*’

1. Imperial Japan shall adhere to the p>olicy of contributing to world peace by

establislmg the Great East Asia Sphere of Coprosperity, regardless of how the

world situation may change.

2. The Imperial Government shall continue its endeavor to dispose of the

China incident, and shall take measures with a view to advancing southward in

order to establish firmly a basis for her self-existence and self-protection.

In a second part of the same message Japan outlined the ‘‘principal

points'' upon which she proposed to proceed:

For the purpose of bringing the Chiang Regime to submission, increasing

pressure shall be added from various points in the south, and by means of both

propaganda and fighting plans for the taking over of concessions shall be carried

out. Diplomatic negotiations shall be continued, and various other plans shall

be speeded with regard to the vital points in the south. Concomitantly , prepara^

tions for southward advance shall be reenforced and the policy already decided upon

with reference to French Indo-China and Thailand shall be executed. As regards

the Russo-German war, although the spirit of the Three-Power Axis shall be

maintained, every preparation shall be made at the present and the situation shall

be dealt with in our own way. In the meantime, diplomatic negotiations shall be

r carried on with extreme care. Although, every means available shall be resorted to

\in order to prevent the United States from joining the war, if need be, Japan shall

; act in accordance with the Three-Power Pact and shall decide when and how force wiU

be employed.

Temporary Cessation op Negotiations

During July of 1941 reports were received that a Japanese military

movement into southern Indochina was imminent. The Government

of the United States called to the attention of Japan the incompati-

bility of such reports with the conversations then under way looking

to an a^eement for peace in the Pacific. Asked concerning the facts

of the situation, the Japanese Ambassador on July 23 explained the

Japanese movement into southern as well as northern Indochina by

observing that Japan feared, first, that vital supplies including rice,

foodstuffs, and raw materials from Indochina might be cut off by

M Foreign Relations, vol II, pp. 330, 340.

u Committee exhibit No. 1, pp. 1, 2.

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de Gatdfet French agents and Chinese a^tators in southern Indochina

and, second, that Japan believed certain foreign powers were deter-

xoined tdvencircle Japan militarily and for that reason occupation of

southern ' Indochina was imdertaken purely as a precautionary

BMasiu'e\*^

The explanation of Ambassador Nomura is in interesting contrast

with aii intercepted dispatch of July 14, 1941, from Canton to Tokyo: “

dnbseqttlent information from the military officials to the Attaches is as follows:

1. ’ The recent general mobilization order expressed the irrevocable resolution

of Japan to put an end to Anglo-American assistance in thwarting her natural

expansion and her indomitable intention to carry this out, if possible, with the

backing of the Axis but, if neccessary, alone. Formalities, such as dining the

expeditionary forces and saying farewell to them, have been dispensed with.

T^t is because we did not wish to arouse greatly the feelings of the Japanese

pppulace and because we wished to face this new war with a calm and cool attitude.

2, The .immediate object of our occupation of French Indo-China will be to

achieve our purposes there. Secondly, its purpose is, when the international situa~1

tioii is suitable, to launch therefrom a rapid attack. This venture we will carry out\*

m Spite of any difficulties which may arise. We will endeavor to the last to

occupy. French Indo-China peacefully but, if resistance is offered, we will crush

it by force, occupy the country and set up martial law. After the occupation of]

French Indo-China, next on our schedule is the sending of an ultimatum to the Nether- j

lands Indies. In the seizing of Singapore the Navy will play the principal part.l ~

As for thO Army, in seizing Singapore it will need only one division and in seizing! '

the Netherlands Indies, only two \* \*

lU' commenting on the observations made by Ambassador Nomura,

Acting Secretary of State Sumner Wells on Jiuy 23, 1941, pointed out

that any agreement which might have been concluded between the

IVench Qpvernment at Vichy and Japan could only have resulted from

pressme exerted on Vichy by Germany; and in that consequence this

agreement could only be looked upon as offering assistance to Ger-

many’s j^olicy of world domination and conquest. He further observed

that conclusion of the agreement imder discussion by the Secretary of

State and Ambassador Nomura would bring about a far greater meas-

ure of economic security to Japan than she could secure through occu-

pation of Indochina: that the policy of the United States was the

r^posite of an encirclement policy or of any policy which would be a

threat td Japan; that Japan was not menaced by the policy of Great

Britain And if an agreement had been concluded, Great Britain, the

British Dominioirs, China, and the Netherlands would have joined the

United States and Japan in support of the underlying principles stood

for by the United States. He pointed out that the United States could

only regard the action of Japan as constituting notice that the Japanese

Government intended to pm^ue a policy of force and conquest, and,

since there was no apparent basis calling for fillmg Indochina with

Japanese military and other forces as a measure for defending Japan,

the United States must assume that Japan was taking the last step

before proceeding on a policy of expansion and conquest in the region

of the South Seas. Finally, the Acting Secretary said that in these

circumstances the Secretary of State — with whom he had talked a few

minutes before — could not see any basis for pursuing further the con-

versations in which the Secretary and the Ambassador had been en-

^\*Sn Jufy 24 Mr. Welles made a statement to the press in which he

characterized the Japanese action in Indochina in substantially the

Foreign Belations, vol. II, p. 340.

m Comzuttee exhibit No. 1, p. 2.

M See VonAgn Relations, vol. n, p. 341.

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same terms as in his statement of the previous da^ to the Japanese

Ambassador. He further pointed out that the actions of Japan en-

, dangered the use of the Pacific by peaceful nations; that these actions

' tended to jeopardize the procurement by the United States of essential

materials such as tin and rubber, which were necessary in our defense

program; and that the steps being taken by Japan endangered the

safety of other areas of the Pacific, including the Philippine Islands.\*\*

Also, on July 24, 1941, in the face of a progressive movement by

Japan into southern Indochina, the President proposed to the Japanese

Government that French Indochina be regarded as a “neutrmized”

co;mtry. .This proposal contemplated that Japan would be given the

fullest and freest opportunity of assuring for itself a source of food

supplies and other raw materials which on the basis of Japan’s own

representations she was seeking to obtain. The Japanese Government

did not accept the President’s proposal. The answer of Japan was

characteristically pragmatic and well described in the following

language: «

Large Japanei^e forces, however, soon were moved into southern Indoc hina^

Japan’s constant expansion of her military position in the southwest Pacific

had already substantially imperiled the security of the United States along with

that of other powers. By tlxis further expansion in southern Indochina, Japan

virtually completed the encirclement of the Philippine Islands and placed its

armed forces within striking distance of vital trade routes. This constituted an

I overt act directly menacing the security of the United States and other powers that were

I at peace with Japan. It created a situation in which the risk of war became s6

great that the United States and other countries concerned were confronted no

longer with the question of avoiding such risk but from then on with the problem

of preventing a complete undermining of their security. No sooner were Japanese

military forces moved into southern Indochina than there began to appear evi-

dence that there was in progress a vigorous under-cover movement of Japanese

infiltration into Thailand. With Japan’s armed forces poised for further attacks^

the possibility of averting armed conflict lay only in the bare chance that there

might be reached some agreement which would cause Japan to abandon her policy

and procedure of aggression. Under those circumstances and in the light of

those considerations, the Government of the United States decided at that point,

as did certain other governments especially concerned, that discontinuance of

trade with Japan had become an appropriate, warranted and necessary step —

as an open warning to Japan and as a measure of self-defense.

With the unsuccessful attempt to bring to a halt Japanese aggres-

sion in Indochina no further conversations were held on the subject of

an agreement until August of 1941.

Freezing of Assets

It was clear that positive action must be taken imder the circum-

stances for reasons well expressed by Secretary Hull in his testimony: ^

The hostilities between Japan and China had been in progress for four years..

During those years the United States had continued to follow in its relations

with Japan a policy of restraint and patience. It had done this notwithstanding

constant violation by Japanese authorities or agents of American rights and

legitimate interests in China, in neighboring areas, and even in Japan, and not-

withstanding acts and statements by Japanese officials indicating a policy of

widespread conquest by force and even threatening the United States. The

American Government had sought, while protesting against Japanese acts and

while yielding no rights, to make clear a willingness to work out with Japan by ;

peaceful processes a basis for continuance of amicable relations with Japan. It

had desired to give the Japanese every opportunity to turn of their own accord

from their program of conquest toward peaceful policies.

«ld.

Id., at p. 342. , . .

w Committee record, pp. 1111-1113.

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r The President an4 I, in our effort to bring about the conclusion of an agree-

ment, had endeavored to present to the Japanese Government a feasible alterna-

tive to Japan’s indicated program of conquest. We had made abundantly clear

<mr willingness to cooperate with Japan in a program based upon peaceful

principles. We had repeatedly indicated that if such a pro^am were adopted

for the Pacific, and if thereafter any countries or areas within the Pacific were

menaced, our Government would expect to cooperate with other governments in

extending assistance to the region threatened.

While these discussions were going on in Washington, many responsible

Japanese officials were affirming in Tokyo and elsewhere Japan’s determination

to pursue a policy of cooperation with her Axis allies. Both Mr. Matsuoka and

his successor as Minister for Foreign Affairs had declared that the Three Power

Pact stood and that Japanese policy was based upon that pact. Large-scale

prep>aration by Japan for extension of her military activities was in progress,

especially since early July. Notwithstanding our efforts expressly to impress

upon the Japanese Government our Government’s concern and our objection

to movement by Japan with use or threat of force into Indochina, the Japanese

Government had again obtained by duress from the Vichy Government an

authorization and Japanese armed forces had moved into southern Indochina,

occupied bases there, and were consolidating themselves there for further southr

ward movements.

Confronted with the imptlacable attitude of Japan, President

Roosevelt issued an Executive Order on July 26, 1941, freezing

Japanese assets in the United States. This order brought under

control of the Government all financial and import and export trade

transactions in which Japanese interests were involved. The effect

of the order was to brii^ to virtual cessation trade between the

United States and Japan.®\*

It should be noted that shortly before large Japanese forces WMit into

French Indochina, late in July, a change was effected in the Japanese

Cabinet whereby Admiral Toyoda took over the portfolio of Foreign

Affairs from Mr. Matsuoka. Thereafter the Japanese Prime Minister,

the new Japanese Foreign Minister and Ambassador Nomura made

emphatic and repeated protestations of Japan’s desire for peace and

an equitable settlement of Pacific problems. Despite these represen-

tations of peaceful intentions, the Japanese Government continued

with mobilization in Japan, and dispatched increasi^ numbers of

armed forces to Manchuria, Indochina, and south China. Bombing

of American property in China continued, including bursts which dam-

aged the American Embassy and the U. S. S. TutuUa at Chui^king.®\*

An intercepted message of July 19, 1941, from Tokyo to BerUn pre-

sented a candid estimate of the change in the Japanese Cabinet: “

The Cabinet shake-up was necessary to expedite matters in connection with

National Affairs and has no further significance. Japan’s foreign policy will not

be changed and she will remain faithful to the principles of the Tripartite Pact.

Resumption of Negotiations and Proposed Meeting op

President Roosevelt and Premier Konote

The Japanese Government did not reply to the President’s proposal

of July 24, but on August 6 the Japanese Ambass^or presented a

? roposal which, so he stated, puiported to be responsive to that of the

“resident. TMs proposal provided among other things:

(1) For removal of restrictions which the United States had imposed

upon trade with Japan;

\* Foreign Relations, vol. II, p. 343.

w Id., at p. 343.

•0 Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 3.

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(2) For “suspension of its (the United States’) military meastures

in the southwest Pacific area”;

(3) For the exercise of good offices by the United Stat^ifor tffie

initiation of direct nerotiations between Japan and China;

(4) For withdrawal of Japanese troops from Indochina a

settlement between Japan and China;

(5) For recognition by the United States of Japan’s speciaj position

in Indochina even after the withdrawal of Japanese troops. .. .

Throughout the negotiations it had been specified or implied that

Japan would expect the United States, in the proposed exercise of its

good offices between China and Japan, to discontinue.,, aid to

China. The Japanese proposal of August 6 completely ignored the

proposal of the President to which it was allegedly responsive. It

asked either expressly or by implication that the United States reipove

the restrictions it had imposed upon trade with Japan; suspend its

defensive preparations in the Philippines; discontinue fumishmg mili-

tary equipment to Great Britain and the Netherlands for the. arming

of their far eastern possessions; discontinue aid to the Chinese Govern-

ment; and acquiesce in Japan’s assertion and exercise of a special

mihtaiy position and a permanent preferential poUtical and economic

status in Indochina, involving, as tffis would, assent to procedmes cmd

disposals which menaced the security of the United States and which

were contrary to the principles to wluch this Government was com-

mitted. The Japanese Government in return offered not to station

Japanese troops in regions of the southwestern Pacific other than

Indochina. It proposed to retain its military establishment in Indo-

china for an indeterminate period. There tnus would still have re-

mained the menace to the security of the United States, already

mentioned, as well as the menace to the security of British and Dutch

territories in the southwestern Pacific area.

On August 8 Secretary Hull informed Japan’s Ambassador that the

n anese proposal was not responsive to the President’s proposal of

j 24. Ambassador Nomura thereupon inquired whether it mi^ht

be possible for President Roosevelt and Premier Konoye to meet with

a view to discussing means for reaching an adjustment of views be-

tween the two Governments.\*\* This suggestion was made pursuant

to a dispatch from Tokyo to Ambassador Nomura which related in

pertinent part:\*\*

We are firm in our conviction that the only means by which the situation can

be relieved is to have responsible persons representing each coimtry gather to-

gether and hold direct conferences. They shall lay their cards on the table,

express their true feelings, and attempt to determine a way out of the present

situation.

In the first proposal made by the United States mention was made of just such

a step. If, therefore, the United States is still agreeable to this plan, Prime

Minister Konoye himself will be willing to meet and converse in a friendly manner

with President Roosevelt.

Will you please make clear to them that we propose this step because we sii)-

cerely desire maintaining peace on the Pacific.

The sincerity of Japan’s desire for peace and the appraisal of any

hopes for a satisfactory settlement from such a meeting necessarily

had to be viewed in the light of a statement only 7 days earlier in an

intercepted dispatch from Tokyo to Ambassador Nomura:\*\*’

Foreign Relations, vol. II, p. 344.

u Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 12.

•\* Id., at p. 10.

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mecaures which our Empire shall take will he based upon a determination /

to bring about the success of the objectives of the Tripartite Pact. That this is a facl^'

is proven by the promulgation of an Imperial rescript. We are ever working

toward the realization of those objectives, and now during this dire emergency

is certainly no time to engage in any light impremeditated or over-speedy action.

On August 18, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs orally

observed to Ambassador Grew that the only way to prevent the

strained illations between the United States and Japan from further

deterioration would be through a meeting of President Roosevelt and

the Japanese Prime Minister. Strict secrecy concerning the proposal |

was ulged upon our Ambassador for the reason that premature an-

nouncement of the meeting would result in the project being “tor-

pedoed” by certain elements in Japan. The Japanese Government’s

concern for preserving the secrecy of the proposed meeting between

the President and Premier Konoye is fully evinced in an intercepted

dispatch from Tokyo to Washington on September 3, 1941:®\*

Since the existence of the Premier’s message was inadvertently made known

to the public, that gang that has been suspecting that unofficial talks were taking place,

hcfs really begun to yell and wave the Tripartite Pact banner.

In the midst of this confusion at home Fleisher’s story in the Herald-Tribune

relating the rumor of a proposed conference between the Premier and the President

br^e, which was unfortunate, to say the least, as you can well ima^ne.

The government is not afraid of the above-mentioned confusion; nor does it

feel that that condition will destroy the fruits of the said conference. It is only

that the government wished to keep the matter a secret until the arrangements

bad been completed. I am sure that you are aware that such a policy is not limited

to iust this case.

Because of the circumstances being what they are, we would like to make all

arrangements for the meeting around the middle of September, with all possible

speed, and issue a very simple statement to that effect as soon as possible. (If

the middle of September is not convenient, any early date would meet with our

ap^oval.)

Will you please convey this wish of the government to Hull and wire us the

results. If an immediate reply is not forthcoming, we plan to issue a public

statement describing our position in this matter. We feel that this should be done

from the viewpoint of our domestic situation. Please advise the United States of

this plan.

The fact that the Konoye Cabinet desired the suggested meeting

between, the President and the Japanese Premier to be strictly secret

for the reason that prematm-e disclosure would result in frustration of j

the move by hostile elements in Japan would indicate beyond doubfr-L

that there existed in Japan a formidable opposition to efforts desired

to achieve an improvement in relations with the United States.\*® Fur- '

ther, secrecy with respect to such a meeting would accomplish the

additional purpose from the Japanese viewpoint of disguising from her

Axis partners, Germany and Italy, the fact that steps might be under-

taken which would in any way compromise Japan’s commitments

imder the Tripartite Pact.

[ There will be found in Appendix D a detailed and comwehensive

review oj the diplomatic conversations between the United ^ates and

Japan, and related matters, during the critical period Jrom the Atlantic

Conference through December 8, 1941, in the light of the facets made

prvmic by this committee, to which reference is hereby made.]

In connection with the proposed meeting it should be noted that

President Roosevelt returned to Washington on August 17 from the

•\* Id., at p. 25.

M See Memoirs of Prince Fumimaro Konoye, committee exhibit No. 173.

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Atlantic Conference at which the far eastern situation had been dis-

cussed with Mr. Churchill. It had been agreed by both the Presi-

dent and Prime Minister Church^ that more time was needed by

both the United States and Britain to prepare their defenses against

Japanese attack in the Far East. It was further agreed that steps

should be taken to warn Japan against new moves of agression.

The President and Mr. Churchill were in agreement that this Govern-

ment should be prepared to continue its conversations with the

Government of Japan and thereby leave open to her a reasonable and

} ‘ust alternative to the aggressive course which she had mapped out

or herself.

Upon his return to Washington from the Atlantic Conference, the

President on Au^st 17 handed the Japanese Ambassador two docu-

ments, one pointing out that the principles and policies under discus-

sion in conversations between the two Governments precluded expan-

sion by force or threat of force and that if the Japanese Government

took any further steps in pursuance of a pro^am of domination by

force or threat of force of neighboring countries, the Government of

the United States would be compelled to take any and aU steps neces-

sary toward insuring the security of the Unit^ States.\*® In the

second document reference was made to the desire expressed earlier

in August by the Japanese Government to resume conversations and

to the Ambassador’s suggestion of August 8 that President Roosevelt

and the Japanese Minister meet with a view to discussing means for

a^ustment of relations between the United States and Japan. Re-

amrmation was made of this Government’s intention not to consider

any proposals affecting the rights of either coimtry except as such

proposals m^ht be in conformity with the basic principles to which

the United States had long been committed and of its intention to

continue to follow its policy of aiding nations resisting aggression.

It was pointed out that informal conversations with the Japanese

Government relative to a peaceful settlement would naturaUy en-

visage the working out of a progressive program involving the

application to the entire Pacific area of the principle of equahty of

commercial opportunity and treatment, thus making possible access

by all countries to raw materials and other essential commodities;

and that such a program would contemplate cooperation by all nations

of the Pacific toward utilizing all available resources of capital,

technical skill and economic leadership toward building up the

economies of each country and toward increasing the purchasing power

and raising the standards of living of the nations and peoples con-

cerned. The opinion was expressed that if Japan was seeking what

it aflSrmed to be its objectives the program outlined was one that

could be counted upon to assure Japan satisfaction of its economic

needs and legitimate aspirations with a far greater measure of certainty

than could any other program. The statement was made that, in

case Japan desired and was in a position to suspend its expansionist

activities, to readjust its position, and to embark upon a peaceful

program for the Pacific along the lines of the program and principles

to which the United States was committed, the Government of the

United States was prepared to consider resumption of the informal

exploratory discussions which had been interrupted in July and

would be glad to endeavor to arrange a suitable time and place to

N Fo^^eign Relations, vol. n, p. 566.

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exchange views. It was also stated that, before renewal of the

conversations or proceeding with plans for a meeting of the heads of

the two Governments, it would be helpful if the Japanese Govern-

ment would furnish a clearer statement than had as yet been given

of ite present attitude and plans. If the Japanese Government

continued its movement of force and conquest, “we could not,” the

President said to the Ambassador, “think of reopening the conver-

sations.”

On August 28 the Japanese Ambassador handed the President a

message from Premier Konoye urging a meeting between the heads of

the Governments of the United States and Japan to discuss all impor-

tant problems in the Pacific. This message was accompanied by a

statement of the Japanese Government in which assurances were given,

with several qualifications, of Japan’s peaceful intentions and her de-

sire to seek a program for the Pacific area consistent with the principles

to which the United States had long been committed. The qualifica-

tions were voiced in the following terms: the Japanese Government was

prepared to withdraw its troops from Indochina “as soon as the China

mcident is settled or a just peace is established in east Asia”; Japan

woidd take no military action against the Soviet Union as long as the

Soviet Union remained faithful to the Soviet-Japanese neutrality

treaty and did “not menace Japan or Manchukuo or undertake any

action contra^ to the spirit of said treaty”; the Japanese Government

had no intention of using “without provocation” notary force against

any neighboring nation.\*'^

On September 3 the President handed the Japanese Ambassador the

following “oral statement.”

Reference is made to the proposal of the Japanese Government communicated

on August 28, 1941, by the Japanese Ambassador to the President of the United

States that there be held as soon as possible a meeting between the responsible

heads of the Government of Japan and of the Government of the United States to

discuss important problems between Japan and the United States covering the

entire Pacific area in an endeavor to save the situation and to the reply of the

President of the United States, in which the President assured the Prime Minister

of the readiness of the Government of the United States to move as rapidly as

possible toward the consummation of arrangements for such a meeting and sug-

gested that there be held preliminary discussion of important questions that would

come up for consideration in the meeting. In further explanation of the views

of the Government of the United States in regard to the suggestion under reference

observations are offered, as follows:

On April 16, at the outset of the informal and exploratory conversations which

were entered into by the Secretary of State with the Japanese Ambassador, the

Secretary of State referred to four fundamental principles which this Government

regards as the foundation upon which all relations between nations should properly

rest. These four fundamental principles are as follows:

1. Resfpect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all

nations.

2. Support of the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other

countries.

3. Support of the principle of equality, including equality of commercial

opportunity,

4. Nondisturbance of the statuz quo in the Pacific except as the stains quo may

be altered by peaceful means.

In the subsequent conversations the Secretary of State endeavored to make it}

clear that in the opinion of the Government of the United States Japan stood to

gain more from adherence to courses in harmony with these principles than frofirr

any other course, as Japan would thus best be assured access to the raw materials

and markets which Japan needs and ways would be opened for mutually bene^ \

ficial cooperation with the United States and other countries, and that only upon \

« Id., at pp. 348, 34Y.

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the basis of these principles could an agreement be reached which ivould be

effective in establislung stability and peace in the Pacific area.

The Government of the Unit^ States notes with satisfaction that in the state-

ment marked \*\* Strictly Confidentiar’ which was communicated by the Japanese

Ambassador to the President of the United States on August 28 there were given

specific assurances of Japan’s peaceful intentions and assurances that Japan

desires and seeks a program for the Pacific area consistent with the principies to

which the Government of the United States has long been committed and which

were set forth in detail in the informal conversations already referred to. The

Government of the United States understands that the assurances which the

Japanese Government has given in that statement exclude any policy which

would seek political expansion or the acquisition of economic rights, advantagesy

or preferences by force.

The Government of the United States is very desirous of collabol^ting in

efforts to make effective in practice the principles to which the Japanese Govern-

ment has made reference. The Government of the United States believes that

it is all-important that preliminary precautions be taken to insure the success of

any efforts which the Governments of Japan and of the United States might

make to collaborate toward a peaceful settlement. It will be recalled that in the

course of the conversations to which reference has already been made, the Secre-

tary of State on June 21, 1941, handed the Japanese Ambassador a document

marked ‘‘Oral, Unofficial, and Without Commitment” which contained a redraft

of the Japanese Government’s proposal of May 12, 1941. It will be recalled

further that in oral discussion of this draft it was found that there were certain

fundamental questions with respect to which there were divergences of view

between the two Governments, and which remained unreconciled at the time the

conversations were interrupted in July. The Government of the United States

desires to facilitate progress toward a conclusive discussion^ hut believes that a com»

munity of view and a dear agreement upon the points above-mentioned are essential

to any satisfactory settlement of Pacific questions. It therefore seeks an indication

of the present attitude of the Japanese Government with regard to the funda-

mental questions under reference.

It goes without saying that each Government in reaching decisions on policy

must take into account the internal situation in its own country and the attitude

of public opinion therein. The Government of Japan will surely recognize that

the Government of the United States could not enter into any agreement which

would not be in harmony with the principles in which the American people — in

fact all nations that prefer peaceful methods to methods of force — believe.

The Government of the United States would be glad to have the reply of the

Japanese Government on the matters above set forth.

The formal reply of the President to the Japanese Prime Minister

was handed Ambassador Nomura on September 3, and follows:

I have read with appreciation Your Excellency’s message of August 27, which

was delivered to me by Admiral Nomura.

I have noted with satisfaction the sentiments expressed by you in regard to the

solicitude of Japan for the maintenance of the peace of the Pacific and Japan’s

desire to improve Japanese-American relations.

I fully share the desire expressed by you in these regards, and I wish to assure

you that the Government of the United States, recognizing the swiftly moving

character of world events, is prepared to proceed as rapidly as possible toward

the consummation of arrangements for a meeting at which you and I can exchange

views and endeavor to bring about an adjustment in the relations between our

two countries.

In the statement which accompanied your letter to me reference was made to

the principles to which the Government of the United States has long been com-

mitted, and it was declared that the Japanese Government “considers these prin-

ciples and the practical application thereof, in the friendliest manner possible, are

the prime requisites of a true peace and should be applied not only in the Pacific

area but throughout the entire world” and that “such a program has long been

desired and sought by Japan itself.”

I am very desirous of collaborating with you in efforts to make these principles

effective in practice. Because of my deep interest in this matter I find it neces-

sary that I constantly observe and take account of developments both iri my own

country and in Japan which have a bearing upon problems of relations between

our two countries. At this particular moment I cannot avoid taking cognizance

of indications of the existence in some quarters in Japan of concepts which, if

•• Id., at pp. 691, 692.

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Widely^ entertained, would seem capable of raising obstacles to successful collabo-

ration between you and me along the line which I am sure we both earnestly

desire to follow. Under these circumstances, I feel constrained to suggest, in the

belief that you will share my view, that it would seem highly desirable that we

take precautioriy toward ensuring that our proposed meeting shall prove a success^ by

endeavoring to enter immediately upon preliminary discussion of the fundamental and

essential Questions on which we seek agreement The questions which I have in

mind for such preliminary discussions involve practical application of the prin-

c^les fundamental to acliievement and maintenance of peace which are mentioned

with more specification in the statement accompanying your letter. I hope that

you will look favorably upon this suggestion.

The decision to defer any meeting between the President and the

Japanc^ : Prime Minister pending preliminary discussions of funda-

mental and essential questions was deliberate and well considered.

Secreta^ Hull testihed fully concerning the considerations attending

the decisibn: ™

A meeting between the President and Prince Konoe would have been a’sig-

ndfieitnt step. Decision whether it should be imdertaken by our Government ‘

involved several important considerations.

We kn^w that Japanese leaders were unreliable and treacherous. We asked I

ourselves ‘Whether the military element in Japan would permit the civilian element, \*

even il so disposed, to stop Japan’s course of expansion by force and to revert

to peaceful courses. Time and again .the civilian leaders gave assurances; time

and again the military took aggressive action in direct violation of those assur-

ances. Japan’s past and contemporary record was replete with instances of

military aggression and expansion by force. Since 1931 and especially since

1937 the military in Japan exercised a controlling voice in Japan^s national policy,

Japan’s formal partnership with Nazi Germany in the Tripartite ADiance was

a ’hard and inescapable fact. The Japanese had been consistently unwilling in

the conversations to pledge their Government to renounce Japan’s commitments

in the alliance. They would not state that Japan would refrain from attacking

this country if it became involved through self-defense in the European war.

They held on to the threat against the United States implicit in the alliance.

Our Government could not ignore the fact that throughout the conversations

the Japanese spokesmen had made a practice of offering general formulas and,

when pressed for explanation of the meaning, had consistently narrowed and made

more rigid their application. This suggested that when military leaders became

aware of the generalized formulas they insisted upon introducing conditions which

watered down the general assurances.

A meeting between the President and the Japanese Prime Minister would have

had important psychological results.

It would have had a critically discouraging effect upon the Chinese,

If the proposed meeting should merely endorse general principles, the Japanese

in the light of their past practice could have been expected to utilize such general

principles in support of any interpretation which Japan might choose to place

upon them.

responsible for the failure of the meeting.

The Japanese had already refused to agree to any preliminary steps toward

reversiop to peaceful courses, as, for example, adopting the President’s proposal of

July 24 regarding the neutralization of Indochina. Instead they steadily moved

on with their program of establishing themselves more firmly in Indochina.

It was clear to us that unless the meeting produced concrete and clear-cut commit-

ments toward peace, the J apanese would have distorted the significance of the meeting

in such a way as to weaken greatly this country\* s moral position and to facilitate their

aggressive course.

The acts of Japan under Konoe’s Prime Ministership could not be overlooked.

He had headed the Japanese Government in 1937 when Japan attacked China

and when huge Japanese armies poured into that country and occupied its

principal cities and industrial regions.

He was Prime Minister when Japanese armed forces attacked the U. S. S. Panay

on the Yangtze River on December 12, 1937.

^ Committee record, pp. 1120-1124. For a thoroughgoing discussion of events and circumstances attend-

ing- the proposed meeting between President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye, see Appendix D.

It Is to be noted that except in those instances where the name appears in direct quotations, the Jap-

anese Prime Minister’s name is spelled Konoye, rather than Konoe,

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He was Prime Minister when Japanese armed forces committed notorious out-

rages in Nanking in 1937.

He as Prime Minister had proclaimed in 1938 the basic principles upon which

the Japanese Gorernment, even throughout the 1941 conversations, stated that

it would insist in any peace agreement with China. Those principles in applica-

tion included stationing large bodies of Japanese troops in North China. They

would have enabled Japan to retain a permanent stranglehold on China.

He had been Prime Minister when the Japanese Government concluded in 1940

with the Chinese Quisling regime at Nanking a ‘‘treaty'' embodying the strangle-

hold principles mentioned in the preceding parasraph.

Prince Konoe had been Japanese Prime Minister when Japan signed the

Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy in 1940.

As a result of our close-up conversations with the Japanese over a period of

months, in which they showed no disposition to abandon their course of conquest'

we were thorouahly satisfied that a meeting with Konoe could only result either in

another Munich or in nothing ai aU, unless Japan was ready to give some clear

evidence of a purpose to move in a peaceful direction. I was opposed to the first

Munich and still more opposed to a second Munich.

Our Government ardently desired peace. It could not brush away the realities

t in the situation.

Although the President would, as he said, “have been happy to travel thou-

sands of miles to meet the Premier of Japan," it was felt that in view of the factors

mentioned the President could go to such a meeting only if there were first

obtained tentative commitments offering some assurance that the meeting

could accomplish good. Neither Prince Konoe nor any of Japan's spokesmen

provided an^hing tangible.^^

Japanese Proposals op September 6 and 27

On September 6 Ambassador Nomura handed Secretary Hull the

following proposal: ”

The Government of Japan undertakes:

(a) that Japan is ready to express its concurrence in those matters which were

already tentatively agreed upon between Japan and the United States in the

course of their preliminary informal conversations;

(b) that Japan will not make any military advancement from French Indo-

china against any of its adjoining areas, and 'likewise will not, without any

justifiable reason, resort to military action against any regions lying south of

Japan;

(c) that the attitudes of Japan and the United States towards the European

War will be decided by the concepts of protection and self-defense, and, in case

the United States should participate in the European War, the interpretation

and execution of the Tripartite Pact by Japan shall be independently decided;

(d) that Japan will endeavour to bring about the rehabilitation of general and

normal relationship between Japan and China, upon the realization of which

Japan is ready to withdraw its armed forces from China as soon as possible in

accordance with the agreements between Japan and China;

(e) that the economic activities of the United States in China will not be

restricted so long as pursued on an equitable basis;

The Konoye Memoirs reflect that the Japanese Navy approved the idea of a meeting between the

President and the Japanese Prime Minister whereas the Army viewed such a meeting as of questioned

desirability. After outlining his ideas with respect to such a meeting Prince Konoye observed: “Both

the War and Navy Ministers listened to me intently. Neither could give me an immediate reply but

before the day (August 4, 1941) was over, the Navy expressed complete accord and, moreover, anticipated

the success of the conference. The War Minister's reply came in writing, as follows:

“ Tf the Prime Minister were to personally meet with the President of the United States, the existing

diplomatic relations of the Empire, which are based on the Tripartite Pact, would unavoidably be weak\*

ened. At the same time, a considerable domestic stir would undoubtedly be created. For these reasons,,

the meeting is not considered a suitable move. The attempt to surmount the present critical situation by

the Prime Minister's offering his personal services is viewed with sincere respect and admiration. lu

th^efore. it is the Prime Minister's intention to attend such a meeting, with determination to firmly support the

bask wineiples embodied in the Empire's revised plan to the N plan and to carry out a war against America

if the President of the United States still fails to comprehend the true intentions of the Empire even after this final

effort is made, the army is not necessarily in disagreement.

“ ‘However, (1) it is not in favor of the meeting if, after making preliminary investigations, it is learned

that the meeting will be with someone other than tne President, such as Secretary Hull or one in a lesser

capacity; (2) you shall not resign your post as a result of the muting on the grounds that it was a faUwre; rather,

you shall be prepared to assume leadership in the war against Amerka.\*

“The War Minister was of the opinion that ‘failure of this meeting is the greater likellhdod.\* ’\* See

committee exhibit No. 173, pp. 30, 31.

» Foreign Relations, vol. 11, pp. 608, 609.

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(f) that Japan’s activities in the Southwestern Pacific Area will be carried on

by peaceful means and in accordance with the principle of nondiscrimination in

mtemational commerce, and that Jap>an will cooperate in the production and

procurement by the United States of natural resources in the said area which it

needs;

(g) that Japan will take measures necessary for th0 resumption of normal trade

relations between Japan and the United States, and in connection with the above-

mentioned, Japan is ready to discontinue immediately the application of the

foreigners’ transactions control regulations with regard to the United States on

the basis of reciprocity. j

The Government of the United States undertakes:

\*^(a) that, in response to the Japanese ^vemment’s commitment expressed in

point (d) referred to above, the United fetates will, abstain from any measures

and actions which will be prejudicial to tfhe endeavour by Japan concerning the

settlement of the China Affair;

^'(b) that the United States will reciprbcate Japan’s commitment expressed in

point (f) referred to above;

‘‘(c) that the United States will suspend any military measures in the Far

East and in the Southwestern Pacific Area;

“(d) that the United States will immediately [upon settlement] reciprocate

Japan’s commitment expressed in point (g) referred to above by discontinuing

the application of the so-called freezing act with re^rd to Japan and further by

removing the prohibition against the passage of Japanese vessels through the

Panama .Canal.”

Secretary Hull made the following comments with respect to the

foregoing Japanese proposal:

On September 6 the Japanese Ambassador presented a new draft of proposals.

These proposals were much narrower than the assurances given in the statement

communicated to the President on August 28. In the September 6 Japanese

draft the Japanese gave only an evasive formula with regard to their obligations

under the Tripartite Pact. There was a qualified undertaking that Japan would

not “without a^y justifiable reason” resort to military action against any region

south of Japan. No commitment was offered in regard to the nature of the terms

which J^an would offer to China; nor any assurance of an intention by Japan to

respect China’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, to refrain from interference

in China’s internal affairs, not to station Japanese troops indefinitely in wide areas

of China, and to conform to the principle of nondiscrimination in international

commercial relations. The formula contained in the draft that “the economic

activities of the United States in China will not be restricted ao long as pursued on

an equitable basis” [italics added] clearly implied a concept that the conditions

under which American trade and conunerce in China were henceforth to be con-

ducted were to be a matter for decision by Japan.^^

From time to time during September of 1941 discussions were held

between Secretary Hull and the Japanese Ambassador. On Septem-

ber 27, Ambassador Nomura presented a complete redraft of the

Japanese proposals of September 6, following the form of the American

proposals of June 21. On October 2, Secretary Hull replied to the

proposals made by the Japanese Ambassador during September,

handing the Ambassador an ‘‘oral statement’ ' reviewing significant

developments in the conversations and explaining our Government’s

attitude toward various points in the Japanese proposals which our

Government did not consider consistent with the principles to which

this coimtiy was committed. He said:

Disappointment was expressed over the narrow character of the outstanding

Japanese proposals, and questions were raised in regard to Japan’s intentions

regarding the indefinite stationing of Japanese troops in wide areas of China and

regarding Japan’s relationship to the Axis Powers. While welcoming the Jap-

anese suggestion of a meeting between the President and the Japanese Prime

n Committee record, pp. 1118, 1119.

n The Konoye Memoirs reveal that on September 6 an imperial conference was held at which were Jdeter-

mined the basic principles of the Japanese Empire's national policy. Among these principles was the under\*

standing that in case there was no way found for attainment of Japanese demands by early in October of

1941, the Empire should at once determine to make up its mind to get ready for war against the United

States, Qreat Britain, and the Netherlands. Committee exhibit No. 173.

n Committee record, pp. 1124-1126.

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Minister, we proposed, in order to lay a firm foundation for such a meeting,

that renewed consideration be given to fundamental principles so as to teach a

meeting of minds on essential questions. It was stated in conclusion that the

subject of the meeting proposed by the Prime Minister and the objectives sought

had engaged the close and active interest of the President and that it was the

President's earnest hope that discussion of the fundamental questions might be

so developed that such a meeting could be held.

During this period there was a further advance of Japanese armed forces in

Indochina, Japanese military preparations at home were increased and sj>eeded

up, and there continued Japanese bombing of Chinese civilian populations,

constant agitation in the Japanese press in support of extremist policies, and the

unconciliatory and bellicose utterances of Japanese leaders. For example,

Captain Hideo Hiraide, director of the naval intelligence section of Imperial

Headquarters, was quoted on October 16 as having declared in a public speech:

‘^America, feeling her insecurity ♦ \* ♦ , is carrying out naval expansion on

a large scale. But at present America is unable to carry out naval< operations

in both the Atlantic and Pacific simultaneously.

\*^The imperial navy is prepared for the worst and has completed aU necessary

preparations. In factf the imperial navy is itching for action, when needed.

‘‘In spite of strenuous efforts by the government, the situation is now approach-

ing a final parting of the ways. The fate of our empire depends upon how we

act at this moment. It is certain that at such a moment our Navy should set

about on its primary mission.''

It is of interest to note the Japanese estimate of Secretary Hull^s

position in the negotiations, reflected in an intercepted message of

September 15 from Nomura to Tokyo:^®

Whatever we tell to Secretary Hull you should understand will surely be passed

on to the President if he is in Washington. It seems that the matter of prelimi-

nary conversations has been entrusted by the President to Secretary Hull, in. fact

he told me that if a matter could not be settled by me and Secretary Hull it would

not be settled whoever conducted the conversations. Hull himself told me that

during the past eight years he and the President had not differed on foreign

policies once, and that they are as “two in one.''

Advent of the Tojo Cabinet

The Konoye Cabinet fell on October 16, 1941, and was replaced on

the following day by a new cabinet headed by General Hideki Tojo.^®\*

On October 17 a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington was inter-

cepted manifesting a disposition by the Tojo Cabinet to continue the

negotiations:

The Cabinet has reached a decision to resign as a body. At this time I wish to

thank Your Excellency and your entire staff for aU the efforts you have made.

The resignation was brought about by a split within the Cabinet. It is true

that one of the main items on which pinion differed was on the matter of station-

ing troops or evacuating them from China. However, regardless of th^ make-up

of the new Cabinet, negotiations with the United States shall be continued along

the lines already formulated. There shall be no changes in this respect.

Please, therefore, will you and your staff work in unison and a single purpose,

with even more effort, if possible, than before.

The situation existing from the advent of the Tojo Cabinet to the

arrival of Saburo Kurusu in Washington on November 15 to assist

Ambassador Nomura in the conversations was depicted by Secretary

Hull as follows:

On October 17 the American press carried the following statement by Maj.

Gen. Kiyofuku Okamoto:

“Despite the different views advanced on the Japanese- American question,

our national policy for solution of the China affair and establishment of a common

coprosperity sphere in East Asia remains unaltered.

Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 27.

For a complete discussion of the fall of the Konoye Cabinet, see Appendix D.

^ Id., at p. 76.

” Committee record, pp. 1127-34.

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fiUfiUment of this national policy, this country has sought to reach an

agreement of views with the U. S. by means of diplomatic means. lliere is,

however, a limit to our concessions, and the n^otiations may end in a break

with the worst possible situation following. The people must therefore be

resolved to cope with such a situation.''

Clearly the Japanese war lords expected to clinch their policy of aggrandize\*

meni and have the United States make aU the concessions.

On October 30, the Japanese Foreign Minister told the American Ambassador

thaj^ the Japanese Government desired that the conversations be concluded

successfully without delay and he said that “in order to make progress, the

United States should face certain realities and facts," and here thereupon cited

the stationing in China of Japanese armed forces.

The generaJ world situation continued to be very critical, rendering it desirable

that every reasonable effort be made to avoid or at least to defer as long as possible

any rupture in the conversat ons. From here on for some wee£ especially

intensive study was given in the Department of State to the possibility of reach-

ing some stopgap arrangement with the Japanese so as to tide over the immediate

critical situation and thus to prevent a break-down in the conversations, and

even perhaps tojpave the way for a subsequent general agreement. The presenta-

tion to the Japanese of a proposal which would serve to keep alive the conversa-

tions would also give our Army and Navy time to prepare and to expose Japan's

bad faith if it did not accept. We considered every kind of suggestion we could

find which might help or keep alive the conversations and at the same time be

consistent with the integrity of American principles.

In the last part of October and early November messages came to this Gov-

ernment from United States Army and Navy officers in China and from General-

issimo Chiang Kai-shek stating that he believed that a Japanese attack on

Kunming was inuninent. The Generalissimo requested that the United States

s^d air units to China to defeat this threat. He made a similar request of the

British Government. He also asked that the United States issue a warning to

At this time the Chinese had been resisting the Japanese invaders for 4 years.

China sorely needed equipment. Its economic and financial situations were very

bad. Morale was naturally low. In view of this, even though a Chinese request

might contain points with which we could not comply, we dealt with any such

request in a spirit of utmost consideration befitting the gravity of the situation

confronting our hard-pressed Chinese friends.

I suggested that the War and Navy Departments study this Chinese appeal.

In response, the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations sent a memo-

randum of November 5 to the President giving an estimate concerning the Far

Eastern situation. At the conclusion of this estimate the Chief of Staff and the

Chief of Naval Operations recommended:

“That the dispatch of United States armed forces for intervention against

Japan in China be disapproved.

“That material aid to China be accelerated consonant with the needs of Russia,

Grqat Britain, and our own forces.

“That aid to the American Volunteer Group be continued and accelerated to

the maximum practicable extent.

“That no ultimatum be delivered to Japan." ^

I was in thorough accord with the views of the Chief of Staff and the Chief of i

Naval Operations that United States armed forces should not be sent to China

for use against Japan. I also believed so far as American foreign policy consider- '

ations were involved that material aid to China should be accelerated as much

as feasible, and that aid to the American Volunteer Group should be accelerated.

Finally, I concurred completely in the view that no ultimatum should be delivered

ta Japan. I had been striving for months to avoid a show-down with Japan, and )

to explore every possible avenue for averting or delaying war between the United

States and Japan. That was the cornerstone of the effort which the President

and I were putting forth with our utmost patience.

On November 14 the President replied to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, in

hna with the estimate and recommendations contained in the memorandum of

November 5 of the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations. The

Generalissimo was told that from our information it did not ap^ar that a Jap-

anese land campaign against Kunming was immediately imminent. It was in-

dicated that American air units could not be sent and that the United States

would not issue a warning but there were outlined ways, mentioned in the mem^-

orandum of the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations, in which the

United States would continue to assist China.

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On November 7, 1 attended the regular Cabinet meeting. It was the President’s

custom either to start off the discussion himself or to ask some member of the

Cabinet a question. At this meeting he turned to me and asked whether I had

anything in mind. I thereupon pointed out for about 15 minutes the dangers in

the international situation. I went over fully developments in the conversations

with Japan and emphasized that in my opinion relations were extremely critical

and that we should be on the lookout for a military attack anywhere by Japan at

any time. When I finished, the President went around the Cabinet. All con-

curred in my estimate of the dangers. It became the consensus of the Cabinet

that the critical situation might well be emphasized in speeches in order that the

country would, if possible, be better prepared for such a development. .

Accordingly, Secretary of the Navy Knox delivered an address on November 11,

1941, in which he stated that we were not only confronted with the necessity of

extreme measures of self-defense in the Atlantic, but we were ‘‘likewise faced with

grim possibilities on the other side of the world — on the far side of the Pacific\*^;

that the Pacific no less than the Atlantic called for instant readiness for defense.

On the same day Under Secretary of State Welles in an address stated that

beyond the Atlantic a sinister and pitiless conqueror had reduced more than half

of Europe to abject serfdom and that in the Far East the same forces of conquest

were menacing the safety of all nations bordering on the Pacific. Th0 waves of

world conquest were “breaking high both in the East and in the West,” he said,

and were threatening, more and more with each passing day, “to engulf our own

shores.” He warned that the United States was in far greater peril than in 1917;

that “at any moment war may be forced upon us.”

Early in November the Japanese Government decided to send Mr. Saburo

Kurusu to Washington to assist the Japanese Ambassador in the conversations.

On November 7,?the Japanese Ambassador handed me a document containing

draft provisions relating to Japanese forces in China, Japanese forces in ]^dd-

china, and the principle of nondiscrimination. That proposal contained nothing

fundamentally new or offering any real recessions from the position consistently

maintained by the Japanese Government.

In telegrams of November 3 and November 17 the American Ambassador in

Japan caWed warnings of the possibility of sudden Japanese attacks which might

make inevitable war with the United States.

In the first half of November there were several indeterminate conversations

with the Japanese designed to clarify specific points. On November 15 I gdve

the Japanese Ambassador an outline for a possible joint declaration by the

United States and Japan on economic policy. 1 pointed out that this represented

but one part of the general settlement we had in mind. This draft declaration of

economic policy envisaged that Japan could join with the United States in leading

the way toward a general application of economic practices which would give

Japan much of whafc her leaders professed to desire. '

On November 12 the Japanese Foreign Office, both through Ambassador Grew

and through their Ambassiador here, urged that the conversations be brought to a

settlement at the earliest possible time. In view of the pressing insistence of the

Japanese for a definitive reply to their outstanding proposals, I was impelled to

comment to the Japanese Ambassador on November 15 that the American

Government did not feel that it should be receiving such representations, sugges-

tive of ultimatums.

On November 15 Mr. Kurusu reached Washington. On November 17 he and

the Japanese Ambassador called on me and later on the same day on the President.

Arrival of Saburo Kurusu

Mr. Kurusu in his initial conversation with President Roosevelt and

Secretary Hull indicated that Prime Minister Tojo desired a peaceful

adjustment of differences. At the same time it was clear that Kurusu

had nothing new to suggest concerning Japan ^s participation in the

Tripartite Pact or the presence of her troops in China. The President

reiterated the desire of the United States to avoid war between the two

countries and to effect a peaceful settlement of divergent positions in

the Pacific. The Secretary of State, setting forth his comments at the

conference, stated: -

^ Foreign Relations, vol. II, pp. 740, 741.

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Ambassador Kurusu made some specious attempt to explain away the Tripartite

Pact. I replied in language similar to that which I used in discussing this matter

with. Ambassador Nomura on November fifteenth, which need not be repeated

here. 1 made it clear that any kind of a peaceful settlement for the Pacific area,

with Japan still clinging to her Tripartite Pact with Germany, would cause the

President and myself to be denounced in immeasurable terms and the peace

arrangement would not for a moment he taken seriously while all of. the countries

interested in the Pacific would redouble their efforts to arm against Japanese

aggression. I emphasized the point about the Tripartite Pact and self-defense

by saying that when Hitler starts on a march of invasion across the earth with ten

million soldiers and thirty thousand airplanes with an official announcement that

he is out for unlimited invasion objectives, this country from that time was in

danger and that danger has grown each week until this minute. The result was

that this country with no other motive except self-defense has recognized that

danger, and has proceeded thus far to defend itself before it is too late; and that

the Government of Japan says that it does not know whether this country is thue

acting in self-defense or not. This country feels so profoundly the danger that

it has committed itself to ten, twenty-five, or fifty billions of dollars in self-defense;

but when Japan is asked about whether this is self-defense, she indicates that she

has no opinion on the subject — I said that I cannot get this view over to the Ameri-

can people; that they believe Japan must know that we are acting in self-defense

and, therefore, they do. not understand her present attitude. I- said that he was

speaking of their political difficulties and that I was thus illustrating some of our

difficulties in connection with this country's relations with J^an.

In a further conversation with Ambassador Nomura and Mr.

Kurusu on November 18/ Secretary HulPs observations were related

in the following terms: ^

The Secretary of State conferred again with the Japanese Ambassador and Mr.

Kurusu on November 18. The Secretary expressed great doubt whether any

agreement into which we entered with Japan while Japan had an alliance with

Hitler would carry the confidence of our people. He said that a difficult situation

was created when, for example, telegrams of congratulation were sent to Hitler

by Japanese leaders when he commits some atrocity, and he emphasized that we

would have to have a clear-cut agreement making clear our peaceful purpose, for

otherwise there would be a redoubled effort by all nations to strengthen their

armaments. He pointed out that we were trying to make a contribution to the

establishment of a peaceful world, based on law and order. He said that this is

what we want to work out with Japan; that we had nothing to offer in the way of

bargaining except our friendship. He said that frankly he did not know whether

an 3 Tthing could be done in the matter of reaching a satisfactory agreement with

Japan; that we can go so far but rather than go beyond a certain point it would

be better for us to stand and take the consequences.

During tiie discussion Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu sug- I

gested the possibility of a modus vwendi or a temporary arrangement

to tide over the abnormal situation.®^ They offered as a possibility !

return to the status prevailing prior to Julv 26, 1941, when Japanese

assets in the United States were frozen following Japan^s entry into

southern French Indochina. To this suggestion, Secretary Hull

rephed:

I said that if we should make some modifications in our embargo on the strength

of such a step by Japan as the Ambassador had mentioned, we would not know

whether the troops to be withdrawn from French Indochina would be diverted to

some equally objectionable movement elsewhere. I said that it would be difficifit

for our Government to go a long way in removing the embargo unless we believed

that Japan was definitely started on a peaceful course and had renounced pur-

poses of conquest. I said that I would consult with the representatives of other i

countries on this suggestion. On the same day I informed the British Minister

of my talk with the Japanese about the suggestion of a temporary limited arrange- 1

ment.

M Id., at p. 363.

n Sed committee record, p. 1135.

• Id.

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Negotiations versos Deadlines

In a conversation with the Secretary of State on November 19,

the Japanese emi^aries made it clear that Japan could not abrogate

the Tripartite Alliance and regarded herself as bound to carry out its

obligations. Through all of the discussions it was evident that Japan

f was pressing for an early decision. In a series of “deadlines” (now

|| known to have been keyed to the contemplated departure of the task

4i force that struck Pearl Harbor) contained in intercepted messages

lifrom Tokyo to Washington the urgency of the negotiations was

explained:

November 5, 1941, circular No. 736.“

Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements

for the signing of this agreement he completed by the 26th of this month, I realize

that this is a difficult order, but under the circumstances it is an unavoidable one.

Please understand this thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving the Japanese-

U. S. relations from falling into chaotic condition. Do so with great determination

and with unstinted efifort, I beg of you.

This information is to be kept strictly to yourself only.

November 11, 1941, circular No. 762.®^

Judging from the progress of the conversations, there seem to be indications

that the united States is still not fully aware of the exceedingly criticalness of the

situation here. The fact remains that the date set forth in my message t736 is abso-

lutely immovable under present conditions. It is a definite dead-line and therefore

it is essential that a settlement be reached by about that time. The session of Parlia-

ment opens on the 15th (work will start on [the following daj^?]) according to the

schedule. The government must have a clear picture of things to come, in pre-

senting its case at the session. You can see, therefore, that the situation is nearing

a climax, and that time is indeed becoming short.

I appreciate the fact that you are making strenuous efforts, but in view of the

above mentioned situation, will you redouble them. When talking to the Secre-

tary of State and others, drive the points home to them. Do everything in your

power to get a clear picture of the tJ. S. attitude in the minimum amount of time.

At the same time do everything in your power to have them give their speedy approval

to our final proposal.

We would appreciate being advised of your opinions on whether or not they will

accept our final proposal A.

November 22, 1941, circular No. 812.“

To both you Ambassadors.

It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the dato we set in my No. 736.

You should know this, however, I know you are working hard. Stick to our fixed

policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the solution

we desire. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle

Japanese- American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or four days

you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be com-

pleted by the 29th (let me write it out for you — twenty-ninth) \* if the pertinent

notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and

the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished, we have decided to

wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the dead line absolutely cannot

be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen. Please take this

into ybur careful consideration and work harder than you ever have before. This,

for the present, is for the information of you two Ambassadors alone.

Japanese Ultimatum op November 20 and the Moms Viyenw

During a conversation with Secretary Hull on November 20 the

Japanese Ambassador presented a proposal which was in fact an

ultimatum, reading as follows: “

« Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 100.

M Id., at p. 116.

M Id., at p. 165.

• Foreign Relations, vol. II, pp. 366, 367.

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1. Both the Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to

make any armed advancement into any of the regions in the Southeastern Asia

Mid the .Sputhern Pacific area excepting the part of French Indo-China where the

J^apahese troops are stationed at present.

2^ The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw its troops now stationed

in French indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and

Qiuna or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area.

Jh the meantime the Government of Japan declares that it is prepared to remove

its troops now stationed in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern

part of the said territory upon the conclusion of the present arrangement which

shall later be embodied in the final agreement.

^ The Government of Japan and the United States shall cooperate with a view "

to securing the acquisition of those goods and commodities which the two countries

need in Netherlands East Indies.

4. The Governments of Japan and the United States mutually undertake to

restore commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of the

assets. .

. The Goy.ernment of the United States shall supply Japan a required quantity of

oil.

6. (government of the United States undertakes to refrain from such meas-

ures and actions as will be prejudicial to the endeavors for the restoration of general

peace between Japan and China.

In his testimony Secretary HnU observed with respect to the fore-

going proposal:

Oh November 20 the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu presented to me a

proposal which on its face was extreme. I knew, as did other high officers of the

Goyernihent, from intercepted Japanese messages supplied to me by the War and

Navy Departments, that this proposal was the final Japanese proposition — an^ /

idtimatum,

The plan thus offered called for the supplying by the United States to Japan

of as much oil as Japan might require, for suspension of freezing measures, for \

discontinuance by the United States of aid to China, and for withdrawal of moral

and material support from the recognized Chinese Government. It contained a

provision that Japan would shift her armed forces from southern Indochina to

northern Indochina, but placed no limit on the number of armed forces which

Japan might send to Indochina and made no provision for withdrawal of those

forces until after either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the

establishment of an ‘‘equitable” peace in the Pacific area. While there were stipu-

lations against further extension of Japan's armed force into southeastern Asia

and the southern Pacific (except Indochina) , there were no provisions which would

have prevented continued or fresh Japanese aggressive activities in any of the

regions of Asia lying to the north of Indochina — for example, China and the

Soviet Union. The proposal contained no provision pledging Japan to abandon

aggres£Hon and to revert to peaceful courses.

There can now be no question that Japan intended her proposal of

November 20 as an ultimatum. It was their final proposal ®® and a

deadline of November 25, subsequently changed to November 29, had

been set for its acceptance. It was a proposal which the Government

of Japap.knew we could not accept. It was the final gesture of /

the Tojo Cabinet before laimching the vast campaign of aggression j

which the military overlords of Japan had long before decidea upon.

The critical situation culminating in consideration of a modus

vivendi was revealed by Secretary Him:

On November 21 we received word from the Dutch that they had information

that a Japanese force had arrived near Palao, the nearest point in the Japanese

Mandated Islands to the heart of the Netherlands Indies. Our Consuls at Hanoi

and Saigoq had been reporting extensive new landings of Japanese troops and

equipment in Indochina. We had information through intercepted Japanese

messages tha t the Japanese Government had decided that the negotiations must

Comnattee record, pp. 1136-1138.

N In an intercepted dispatch from Tokyo to Washin^n on November 19, the Japanese Government

stated, in referring to the ultimatum presented to the United States on the following day: “If the United

States consent to this cannot be secured, the negotiations will have to be broken off: therefore, with the

above well in mind put forth your very best efforts.” Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 155.

» Committee record, pp. 1138-1141.

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be terminated by November 25, later extended to November 29. We knew from

other intercepted Japanese messages that the Japanese did not intend to make

any concessions, anci from this fact taken together with Kurusu's statement to

me of November 21 making clear that his Government had nothing further to

offer, it was plain, as I have mentioned, that the Japanese proposal of November

20 was in fact their “absolutely final proposal.”

The whole issue presented was whether Japan would yxM in her avowed movement

of conquest or whether we would yield the fundamental principles for which we stood

in the Pacific and aU over the world. By midsummer of 1941 we were pretty well

^satisfied that the Japanese were determined to continue with their course of ex-

pansion by force. We had made it clear to them that we were standing fast by

our principles. It was evident, however, that they were playing for the chance

that we might be overawed into yielding by their threats of force. They were

armed to the teeth and we knew they would attack whenever and wherever they

pleased. If by chance we should have yielded our fundamental principles, Japan

would probably not have attacked for the time being — at least not until she had

consolidated the gains she would have made without fighting.

There was never any question of this country forcing J apan to fight. The question

was whether this country was ready to sacrifice its principles.

To have accepted the Japanese proposal of November 20 was clearly unthink-

able. It would have made the United States an ally of Japan in Japan’s program

of conquest and aggression and of collaboration with Hitler. It would have meant

yielding to the Japanese demand that the United States abandon its principles

and policies. It would have meant abject surrender of our position under in-

timidation.

The situation was critical and virtitaUy hopeless. On the one hand our Govern-

ment desired to exhaust aU possibilities of finding a mearts to a peaceful solution and

to avert or delay an armed clash, especially as the heads of this country\* s armed forces

continued to emphasize the need of time to prepare for resistance. On the other hand,

Japan was calling for a showdown.

There the situation stood — ^the Japanese unyielding and intimidating in their

demands and we standing firmly for our principles.

The chances of meeting the crisis by diplomacy had practically vanished. We

had reached the point of clutching at straws.

Three possible choices presented themselves.

Our Government might have made no reply. The Japanese war lords could

then have told their people that the American Government not only would make

no reply but would afeo not offer any alternative.

Our Government might have rejected flatly the Japanese proposal. In that

event the Japanese war lords would be afforded a pretext, although wholly false,

for military attack.

Our Government might endeavor to present a reasonable counter-proposal\*

The last course was the one chosen.

Full consideratioD was given by oflBcials of our Government to a

counterproposal to the Japanese note of November 20, including

the thought of a possible modus vivendi. It was recomized that such

an arrangement would demonstrate the desire of the United States for

peace and at the same time afford a possible opMrtunity for the Army |

and Navy to continue its preparations. From November 22 to 26 the

President, State Department, and the highest military authorities dis-

cussed a modus vive^i, a first draft being completed on November 22.

Revised drafts were prepared on November 24 and 25. The final draft

of November 25, which is being set forth in its entirety in view of the

testimony that has been adduced concerning it, was as follows:

The representatives of the Government of the United States and of the Gov-

ernment of Japan have been carrying on during the past several months informal

and exploratory conversations for the purpose of arriving at a settlement if pos-

sible of questions relating to the entire Pacific area based upon the principles of

peace, law and order, and fair dealing among nations. These principles] include |

the principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and

all nations; the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other coun-

tries; the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity ahd

See Committee Exhibit No. 18.

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treatment; and the principle of reliance upon international cooperation and con-

ciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for im-

provement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.

It is believed that in our discussions some progress has been made in reference

to the general principles which constitute the basis of a peaceful settlement cover-

ing the entire Pacific area. Recently, the Japanese Ambassador has stated that

the Japanese Government is desirous of continuing the conversations directed

toward a comprehensive and peaceful settlement in the Pacific area; that it would

be helpful toward creating an atmosphere favorable to the successful outcome of

the conversations if a temporary modus vivendi could be agreed upon to be in effect

while the conversations looking to a peaceful settlement in the Pacific were con-

tinuing; and that it would be desirable that such modus vivendi include as one of

its provisions some initial and temporary steps of a reciprocal character in the

resumption of trade and normal intercourse between Japan and the United States,

On November 20, the Japanese Ambassador communicated to the Secretary

of State proposals in regard to temporary measures to be taken respectively by

the Government of Japan and by the Government of the United States, which

measures are understood to have been designed to accomplish the purposes above

indicated. These proposals contain features which, in the opinion of this Gov-

ernment, conflict with the fundamental principles which form a part of the general

settlement under consideration and to which each Government has declared that

it is committed.

The Government of the United States is earnestly desirous to contribute to the

promotion and maintenance of peace in the Pacific area and to afford every

opportunity for the continuance of discussions with the Japanese Government

directed toward working out a broad-gauge program of peace throughout the

Pacific area. With these ends in view, the Government of the United States

offers for the consideration of the Japanese Government an alternative suggestion

for a temporary modus vivendi, as follows:

Modus Vivendi

1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan, both

being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific, affirm that their national policies are

directed toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the Pacific area and

that they have no territorial designs therein.

2. They undertake reciprocally not to make from regions in which they have

military establishments any advance by force or threat of force into any areas in

Southeastern or Northeastern Asia or in the southern or the northern Pacific

area.

3. The Japanese Government undertakes forthwith to withdraw its forces now

stationed in southern French Indochina and not to replace those forces; to reduce

the total of its force in French Indochina to the number there on July 26, 1941;

and not to send additional naval, land, or air forces to Indochina for replacements

or otherwise.

The provisions of the foregoing pafagraph are without prejudice to the position

of the Government of the United States with regard to the presence of foreign

troops in that area.

4. The Government of the United States undertakes forthwith to modify the

application of its existing freezing and export restrictions to the extent necessary

to permit the following resumption of trade between the United States and Japan

in articles for the use and needs of their peoples:

(а) Imports from Japan to be freely permitted and the proceeds of the sale

thereof to be paid into a clearing account to be used for the purchase of the exports

from the United States listed below, and at Japan’s option for the payment of

interest and principal of Japanese obligations within the United States, provided

that at least two-thirds in value of such imports per month consist of raw silk.

It is understood that all American-owned goods now in Japan, the movement of

which in transit to the United States has been interrupted following the adoption

of freezing measures shall be forwarded forthwith to the United States.

(б) Exports from the United States to Japan to be permitted as follows:

(i) Bunkers and supplies for vessels engaged in the trade here provided for

and for such other vessels engaged in other trades as the two Governments

may agree.

(ii) Food and food products from the United States subject to such limita-

tions as the appropriate authorities may prescribe in respect of commodities

in short supply in the United States.

(iii) Raw cotton from the United States to the extent of $600,000 in value

per month.

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(iv) Medical and pharmaceutical supplies subject to such limitations as

the appropriate authorities may prescribe in respect of commodities in diort

supply in the United States.

f (v) Petroleum. The United States will permit the export to Japaii of

' petroleum, within the cat^ories permitted general export, upon a monthly

basis for civilian needs. The proportionate amount of petroleum to be ex\*-

ported from the United States for such needs will be determined after con^-

sultation with the British and the Dutch Governments. It. is understood

that by civilian needs in Japan is meant such purposes as the operation of the

fishing industry, the transport system, lighting, heating, indu^rial and agri-

^ cultural uses, and other civilian uses.

(vi) The above-stated amounts of exports may be increased and additional

commodities added by agreement between the two Governments as it may

appear to them that the operation of this agreement is furthering <the peace-

ful and equitable solution of outstanding problems in the Pacific area.

The Government of Japan undertakes forthwith to modify the application of

its existing freezing and export restrictions to the extent necessary to permit the

resumption of trade between Japan and the United States as provided for in

paragraph 4 above.

6. The Government of the United States undertakes forthwith to approach the

Australian, British, and Dutch Governnaents with a view to those Governments

taking measures similar to those provided for in paragraph 4 above.

7. With reference to the current hostilities between Japan and China, the

fundamental interest of the Government of the United States in reference to any

discussions which may be entered into between the Japanese and the Chines^

Governments is simply that these discussions and any settlement reached as a

result thereof be based upon and exemplify the fundamental principles of peace,

law, order, and justice, which constitute the central spirit of the current con-

versations between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United

States and which are applicable uniformly throughout the Pacific area.

8. This modus vivendi shall remain in force for a period of 3 months with the

understanding that the two parties shall confer at the instance of either to ascer-

tain whether the prospects of reaching a peaceful settlement covering the entire

Pacific area justify an extension of the modus vivendi for a further period.

The tentative modus vivendi was submitted |for consideration to the

Governments of Great Britain, Australia, the Netherlands, and China.

The ultimate decision to abandon it was made for reasons best set

forth in Secretary HulPs testimony:

On the evening of November 25 and on November 26 I went over again the

considerations relating to our proposed plan, especiaUy the modus vivendi aspect.

As I have indicated, all the successive drafts, of November 22, of November 24.

and of November 26, contained two things: (1) The possible modus vivendi) ana

(2) a statement of principles, with a suggest^ example of how those principles

could be applied — that which has since been commonly described as the 10-point

proposal.

I and other high officers of our Government knew that the Japanese military

were poised for attack. We knew that the Japanese were demanding — and had set

a time limit, first of November 25 and extended later to November 29, for — accept-

ance by our Government of their extreme, last-word proposal of November 20.

It was therefore my judgment, as it was that of the President and other high

officers, that the chance of the Japanese accepting our proposal was remote.

So far as the modus vivendi aspect would have appeared to the Japanese, it

contained only a little chicken feed in the shape of some cotton, oil, and a few

other commodities in very limited quantities as compared with the unlimited

quantities the Japanese were demanding.

It was manifest that there would be widespread opposition from American

opinion to the modus vivendi aspect of the pro^sal es^cially to the supplying to

Japan of even liinited quantities of oil. The Chinese Government violently opposed

the idea. The other interested governments were ^mpathetic to the Chinese view and

fundamentally were unfavorable or lukewarm. Their cooperation was a part of the

plan. It developed that the conclusion with Japan of such an arrangement would

have been a major blow to Chinese morale. In view of these considerations it became

clear that the slight prospects of Japan’s agreeing to the modus vivendi did not

warrant assuming the risks involved in proceeding with it, especially the serious

•\* Committee Record, pp. 1146-1147.

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risk of collapse of Chinese morale and resistance, and even of disintegration of

Ghina. lt!therefore became perfectly evident that the modus vivendi aspect would

not be feasible.

The Japanese were spreading propaganda to the effect that they were being

encircled. On the one hand we were faced by this charge and on the other by

one that we were preparing to pursue a policy of appeasing Japan. In view of

the resulting confusion, it seemed important to restate the fundamentals. We

could offer Japan once more what we offered all countries, a suggested program

of collaboration along peaceful and mutually beneficial and progressive lines. It

had always been open to Japan to accept that kind of a program and to move in

that direction. It still was possible for Japan to do so. That was a matter for

Japan’s decision. Our hope that Japan would so decide had been virtually

extinguished. Yet it was felt desirable to put forth this further basic effort, in

the form of one sample of a broad but simple settlement to be worked out in our

future conversations, on the principle that no effort should be spared to test and

exhaust every method of peaceful settlement.

In the li^t of the foregoing considerations, on November 26 I recommended

to the President — and he approved — my calling in the Japanese representatives

and handing them the broad basic proposals while withholding the modus vivendi

plan. This was done in the late afternoon of that day.

^ The Yerj serious reaction of the Chinese to the suggested tnodm

vivendi is clearly set forth in a dispatch dated November 25, 1941, from

an American adviser to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in Chung-

king:”

After discussion with the Generalissimo the Chinese Ambassador’s conference

with the Secretary of State, I feel you should urgently advise the President of the

Generalissimo’s very strong reaction. I have never seen him really agitated

before. Loosening of economic pressure or unfreezing would dangerously increase

Japan’s military advantage in China. A relaxation of American pressure while

Japan has its forces in China would dismay the Chinese. Any ‘‘modus vivendi”

now arrived at with Japan would be disastrous to Chinese belief in America and

analogous to the closing of the Burma Road, which permanently destroyed

British prestige. Japan and Chinese defeatists would instantly exploit the

resulting disillusionment and urge oriental solidarity against occidental treachery.

It is doubtful whether either past assistance or increasing aid could compensate

for the feeling of being deserted at this hour. The Generalissimo has deep

confidence in the President’s fidelity to his consistent policy but I must warn you

that even the Generalissimo questions his ability to hold the situation together

if the Chinese national trust in America is undermined by reports of Japan’s

escaping military defeat by diplomatic victory.

There is no possibility whatever that the modus vicendi would have

been accepted by the Japanese. In an intercepted dispatch of

November 19 ” the Japanese Ambassadors suggested to Tokyo that

there were three courses open to the Empire: (1) maintain the

status quo, (2) break the “present deadlock” by an advance under

force of arms, or (3) devise some means for bringing about a mutual

nona^ression arrangement. In favoring the third mternative it was

stated:

\* \* \* as I view it, the present, after exhausting our strength by 4 years of

the China incident following right upon the Manchma incident, is hardly an

opportune time for venturing upon another long-drawn-out warfare on a large

scale. I think that it would be better to fix up a temporary “truce” now in the

spirit of “give and take” and make this the prelude to greater achievement to

come later \* \* \*.

Replying to the foregoing suggestion, Tokyo advised on November

20” that “under the circumstances here, we regret that the flan

suggested by you, as we have stated in our message would not suffice for

M Communication from Owen Lattimore in Chungking to Lauchlin Currie, Presidential Assistant

handling Chinese matters, in Washington. See committee exhibit No. 18.

•\* Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 168.

•4 Id., at p. leo.

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saving the present situaiion. We see no prospects for breaking the

deadlock except for you to push negotiations immediately along the

lines of the latter part of our No. 798.\*\* Please understand this.

The Premier also is absolutely in accord with this opinion.'^

It is significant to note that when Mr. Kurusu suggested the

possibility of a modus vivendi to Secretary Hull on November 18, the

Japanese ambassadors very obviously had not consulted their Tokyo

superiors. When they did on November 19, Tokyo replied the

following day rejecting the idea completely, as indicated above.

Writing in his diary for November 25, 1941, Secretary Stimson, in

referring to the tentative draft of a modus vivendi, clearly indicated

an appreciation of the fact that it would not be acceptable to the

Japanese:

At 9:30 Knox and I met in Hull's oflBce for our meeting of three. Hull showed

us the proposal for a 3 months' truce, which he was going to lay before the

Japanese today or tomorrow. It adequately safeguarded all our interests, I

thought as I read it, but I don\*t think there is any chance of the Japanese accepting

it, because it was so drastic. In return for the propositions which they were to

do, namely, to at once evaquate and at once to stop all preparations or threap of

action, and to take no aggressive action against any of her neighbors, etc., we

were to give them open trade in sufl5cient quantities only for their civilian popula-

tion. This restriction was particularly applicable to oil.

Had our Government submitted the tentative modus vivendi, it is

clear that Japan would have rejected it, and Chinese morale and

resistance would very probably have been seriously impaired if not

destroyed.

United States Memorandum op November 26

The modus vivendi was designed to accompany a statement of princi-

ples with a suggested example of how the principles could be applied.

With the decision not to propose a modus vivendi, the Secretary of

State on November 26 presented to the Japanese Ambassador its

accompanying material which was as follows: ^

The representatives of the Government of the United States and of the Govern-

ment of Japan have been carrying on during the past several months informal and

exploratory conversations for the purpose of arriving at a settlement if possible

of questions relating to the entire Pacific area based upon the principles of peace,

law and order and fair dealing among nations. These principles include the prin-

ciple of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations;

the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries; the prin-

ciple of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment;

and the principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for

the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of

international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.

It is believed that in our discussions some progress has been made in reference

to the general principles which constitute the basis of a peaceful settlement cover-

' ing the entire Pacific area. Recently the Japanese Ambassador has stated that

the Japanese Government is desirous of continuing the conversations directed

toward a comprehensive and peaceful settlement in the Pacific area: that it would

be helpful toward creating an atmosphere favorable to the successful outcome of

the conversations if a temporary modus vivendi could be agreed upon to be in

effect while the conversations looking to a peaceful settlement in the Pacific were

continuing. On November 20 the Japanese Ambassador communicated to the

Secretary of State proposals in regard to temporary measures to be taken respec-

•• See committee exhibit No. 1, p. 155.

•• See committee record, pp. 14417, 14418.

n Foreign Relations, vol. II, pp. 766-770.

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tively by th^ Government of Japan and by the Government of the United States,

which measures are understood to have b^n desh^ned to accomplish the purposes

above indicated.

The Government of the United States most earnestly desires to contribute to the

promotion and maintenance of p^ace and stability in the Pacific area, and to afford

every opportunity for the continuance of discussions with the Japanese Govern-

ment directed toward working out a broad-gauge program of peace throughout the

Pacific area. The proposals which were presented by the Japanese Ambassador

on November 20 contain some features which, in the opinion of this Government,

conflict with the fundamental principles which form a part of the general settle-

ment under consideration and to which each Government has declared that it is

committed. The Government of the United States believes that the adoption of

such proposals would not be likely to contribute to the ultimate objectives of ensur-

ing peace under law, order and justice in the Pacific area, and it suggests that

further effort be made to resolve our divergences of views in regard to the practical

application of the fundamental principles already mentioned.

With this object in view the Government of the United States offers for the con-

sideration of the Japanese Government a plan of a broad but simple settlement

covering the entire Pacific area as one practical exemplification of a 'program

which this Government envisages as something to he worked out during our further

conversations,

. . The plan therein suggested represents an effort to bridge the gap between our

diraft of June 21, 1941, and the Japanese draft of September 25 by making a new

approach to the essential problems underlying a comprehensive Pacific settlement.

This plan contains provisions dealing with the practical application of the funda-

mental principles which we have agreed in our conversations constitute the only

sound basis for worthwhile international relations. We hope that in this way

progress toward reaching a meeting of minds between our two Governments may

be expedited.

m

Outline OF Pboposed Basis for Agreement Between the United States

AND Japan

section I — draft mutual declaration of policy

The Government of the United States and the Governm^t of Japan both being

solicitous for the peace of the Pacific affirm that their national policies are directed

toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the Pacific area, that they have no

territorial designs in that area, that they have no intention of threatening other

countries or of using military force aggressively against any neighboring nation,

and that, accordingly, in their national policies they w^ill actively support and

give practical application to the following fundamental principles upon which

their relations with each other and with all other governments are based:

“(1) The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of

each and all nations.

‘^(2) The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

“(3) The principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity

and treatment.

“(4) The principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation

for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of

international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.''

The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States have

agreed that toward eliminating chronic political instability, preventing recurrent

economic collapse, and providing a basis for peace, they will actively support and

practically apply the following principles in their economic relations with each

other and with other nations and peoples:

\*^C1) The principle of nondiscrimination in international commercial relations.

I\* (2) The principle of international economic cooperation and abolition of

extreme nationalism as expressed in excessive traderestrictions.

^'(3) The principle of nondiscriminatory access by all nations to raw-material

supplies.

'\*(4) The principle of full protection of the interests pf consuming countries and

populations as regards the operation of international commodity agreements. ,

‘^(5) The principle of establishment of such institutions and arrangements of

international finance as may lend aid to tb^ essential enterprises and the continuous

development of all countries and may permit payments through processes of trade

consonant with the welfare of all countries^"

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8BCT10N II — STEPS TO BE TAKEN BY THE GOVBKNMBNT OF THE UNITHE STATES

AND BY THE GOVERNMENT OP JAPAN

The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan propose

to take steps as follows:

1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will

endeavor to conclude a inultilateral nonaggression pact among the foitish Em-

pire, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the ^viet Union, Thailand, and the United

States.

2. Both Governments will endeavor to conclude among the American, Britsh,

Chinese, Japanese, the Netherlands, and Thai Governments an agreement where-

under each of the Governments would pledge itself to respect the territorial

integrity of French Indochina and, in the event that there should develop a

threat to the territorial integrity of Indochina, to enter into immediate con-

sultation with a view to taking such measures as may be deemed necessary and

advisable to meet \he threat in question. Such agreement would provide also

that each of the Governments party to the agreement would not seek or accept

preferential treatment in its trade or economic relations with Indochina and

would use its influence to obtain for each of the signatories equality of treatment

in trade and commerce wfth French Indochina.

3. The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air, and police

forces from China an3 from Indochina.

4. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will

not support — militarily, politically, economically — any government or regime in

China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital

temporarily at Chungking.

5. Both Governments will give up all extraterritorial rights in China, including

rights and interests in and with re^rd to international settlements and conces-

sions, and rights under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

Both Governments will endeavor to obtain the agreement of the British and

other governments to give up extraterritorial rights in China, including rights in

international settlements and in concessions and under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

6. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will

enter into negotiations for the conclusion between the United States and Japan

of a trade agreement, based upon reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment and

reduction of trade barriers by both countries, including an undertaking by the

United States to bind raw silk on the free list.

7. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will,

respectively, remove the freezing restrictions on Japanese funds in the United

States and on American funds in Japan.

8. Both Governments will agree upon a plan for the stabilization of the dollar^

yen rate, with the allocation of funds adequate for this purpose, half to be sup\*

plied by Japan and half by the United States.

9. Both Governments will agree that no agreement which either has concluded

with any third power or powers shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to

conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and

preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area.

10. Both Governments will use their influence to cause other governments to

adhere to and to give practical application to the basic political and economic

principles set forth in this agreement.

The foregoing reply was clearly not an ultimatum from the stand-

point of the Government of the United States. On the contrary it

was an admirable statement of every honorable principle for w'hich

the United States has stood for many years in the Orient. Ambas-

sador Grew characterized the N ovember 26 note of Secretary Hull as

follows : November 29, 1941.

Our Government has handed to the Japanese a 10-point draft proposal for ad-

justing the whole situation in the Far East. It is a broad-gauge objective, and

statesmanlike document, offering to Japan practically everything that she has

ostensibly been fighting for if she will simply stop her aggressive policy. By

''l^dopting such a program she would be offered free access to needed raw materials,

/ free trade and commerce, financial cooperation and support, withdrawal of the

freezing orders, and an opportunity to negotiate a new treaty of commerce with

If she wants a political and economic stranglehold on the countries of East

us.

Asia (euphemistically called the New Order in East Asia and the East Asia

M Grew, Ten Years in Japan (1944), pp. 482, 483. Committee exhibit No. 30.

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Oo+Prosperfty Sphere) — which most of her extremists do want — and if she pursues

her southward advance by force, she will soon be at war with all of the A B C D

powers anci will unquestionably be defeated and reduced to the status of a third-

rate power. But if she plays her cards wisely, she can obtain without further

fighting all of the desiderata for which she allegedly started fighting — strategic,

ecoaoihic,;i^ancial, and social security.

Referring to the November 26 note Secretary Stimson said: \*\* \*

I personally was relieved that we had not backed down on any of the funda-

ment principles on which we had stood for so long and which I felt we covJd not

qiw up without the sacrifice of our national honor ana prestige in the world. I sub-

mit, however, that no impartial reading of this document can characterize it as

being couched in the terms of an ultimatum, although the Japanese were of course

only too quick to seize upon it and give that designation for their own purposes. '

As sug^sted by Mr. Stimson, Japan did choose to regard it as an

ultimatum consistent with her purposes. Her note of November 20,

it is apparent, was the final diplomatic move and failing to secure the

concessions demanded the November 26 reply of the United States

was seized upon bv the war lords of Japan in subsequent propaganda

as their, excuse for the attack on Pearl Harbor which they had

pianned for many weeks. It is to be noted in this connection that

the Japanese task force was enroute for its attack on Pearl Harbor

before the American note of November 26 was delivered to the Gov-

ernment of Japan. At the time of receiving the note from Secretary

HuU, Kurusu stated the Japanese Grovemment would be likely “to throw

up its hands” when it received the proposal; that he felt the response

which had thus been given to the Japanese proposal of November

20 could be interpret^ as tantamount to meaning the end of the

conyersations.'°° A dispatch from Amba^ador Grew to the State

Draartment on December 5 reflected the strong reaction in Japan.\*\*\*\*

^cretary HuU said: \*\*“

1% is not surprising that Japanese propaganda, especially after Japan had

begun to suffer serious defeats, has tried to distort and give false meaning to

our memorandum of November 26 by referring to it as an ‘‘ultimatum.\*' This

was in line with a well-known Japanese characteristic of utilizing completely

false and flimsy pretexts to delude their people and gain their support for mil-

itaristic depredations and aggrandizement.

In press conferences on November 26 and 27, Secretary Hull out-

lined the status of American-Japanese relations.^®^

The decision to stand by basic American principles was the only

honorable position imder the circumstances.^®^ To have acceded to

the Japanese ultimatum of November 20 would have been indefensible.

Firmness was the only language Japan imderstood. As Ambassador

Grew had stated in his celebrated ^ ‘green light’^ dispatch of Septem-

berJ2j I940,"to the State Department:^®^

Force or the display of force can alone prevent these powers (including Japan)

frcmi attaining their objectives ♦ ♦ ♦.

If then we can by firmness preserve the status quo in the Pacific until and if

Britain emerges successfully from the European struggle, Japan will be faced with

a situation which will make it impossible for the present opportunist philosophy

to maintain the upper hand ♦ \*

In the present situation and outlook I believe that the time has come when

continued patience and restraint on the part of the United States may and prob-

ably will lead to developments which will render Japanese-American relations

progressively precarious.

•• See committee record, p. 14393.

Foreign Relations, vol. II, p. 376.

m Committee Record, p. 1821-24.

»•\* Committee Record, p. 1163.

See statement of Secretary Hull, Committee Record, pp. 1153 et seq.

iN Id., p. 1166.

IN Committee exhibit No. 26.

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That firmness, the only language the Japanese understood, failed to

dissuade them cannot redound to our regret but only to the ignominy

of the Empire of Japan.

Fraudulent Nature of Japanese Diplomacy — November 28 to

December 7

An intercepted dispatch No. 844 from Tokyo to its Washington

Embassy on November 28 left little doubt of the fraudulent character

of the negotiations thereafter and is a classic example of Japanese

deceit and duplicity:\*®\*

Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite of

this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal.

This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Government

can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a report of the

views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send

you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is in-

evitable. However j I do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are

broken off. Merely say to them that you are awaiting instructions and that,

although the opinions of your Government are not yet clear to you, to your own

way of thinking the Imperial Government has always made just claims and has

borne great sacrifices for the sake of peace in the Pacific. Say that we have always

demonstrated a long-suffering and conciliatory attitude, but that, on the other

hand, the United States has been unbending, making it impossible for Japan to

establish negotiations. Since things have come to this pass, I contacted the man

you told me to in your #1180 and he said that under the present circumstances

what you suggest is entirely unsuitable. From now on do the best you can.

The following dispatch, while the attack force was en route to Pearl

Harbor, was sent from Tokyo to Washington on December 1:\*®\*

The date (November 29) set in my message #812 has come and gone, and the

situation continues to be increasingly critical. However, to prevent the United

States from becoming unduly suspicious we have been advising the press and

others that though there are some wide differences between Japan and the United

States, the negotiations are continuing. (The above is for only your information)

After November 26 Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu con-

ferred with the President and Secretary Hull on several occasions but

with nothing new being developed looking to a peaceful settlement.

On the morning of December 6 a dispatch from Tokyo .to Washing-

ton was intercepted advising that the Japanese reply to the American

note of November 26 was being transmitted:

I will send it in fourteen parts and I imagine you will receive it tomorrow.

However, I am not sure. The situation is extremely delicate, and when you

receive it I want you to please keep it secret for the time being.

This dispatch indicated that subsequent instructions would be

forthcoming concerning the time for presenting the reply to. the

Government of the United States. By approximately 9 p. m. on the

evening of December 6 the first 13 parts of the 14-part Japanese

memorandum had been intercepted, decoded, and made ready for

distribution to authorized recipients by our military. These 13 parts

were a long recapitulation of the negotiations with the purposes

of Japan colored with pious hue and those of the United States per-

verted into a base and ulterior scheme “for the extension of the war.”

The thirteenth part concluded on the note that —

therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese Government regrets that it cannot

accept the proposal (American proposal of November 26) as a basis of negotiations.

1 C 6 Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 195.

107 See committee exhibit No. 1, p. 181.

iM Committee exhibit No. 1, p. JWS.

IN See committee exhibit No. 1, p. 165, setting the date November 29 as the deadline for effecting an

understanding.

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The fourteenth part was intercepted early on the morning of

December 7 and was available for distribution at approximately

8 a. m. It stated that —

obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great

Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan’s efforts toward the establishment

of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and especially to

preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at war.

With the observation that this intention had been revealed during

the course of the negotiations and the “earnest hope of the Japanese

Government \* ♦ \* to preserve and promote the peace of the

Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has

finally been lost”, the Japanese memorandum closed with the

statement;

The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American

Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot

but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further

negotiations.

Nowhere in the memorandum was there any indication or intima-

tion of an intention to attack the United States nor, indeed, that

formal diplomatic relations were to be broken — ^merely that it was

impossible to reach an a^eement through the then current negotia-

tions. Coincident with the receipt of the full reply, instructions were

issued to Japan’s representatives for its delivery to the American

Government at an hour keyed to the time set for the assault on Pear

Harbor. On the previous evening. President Roosevelt had dispatched

an earnest appeal to the Emperor of Japan for the preservation Of

peace in the Pacific.”\* The infamous character of the Japanese reply

vas voiced by Secretary Hull to the Japanese ambassadors who were

making delivery 1 hour after”\* the first bombs had fallen on

Pearl Harbor:\*”

I must say that in all my conversations with you (the Japanese ambassador)

during the last nine months I have never uttered one word of untruth. This is

borne out absolutely by the record. In all my fifty years of public service I

have never seen a document that was more crowded with infamous falsehoods

and distortions — infamous falsehoods and distortions on a scale so huge that I

never imagined until today that any Government on this planet was capable of

uttering them.

Diplomatic and Military Liaison in Washington

With a view to effecting the fullest liaison between the diplomatic

and military arms of the Government, there was created in the Ught

of the ap^oachiug emergency a body familiarly referred to as the

War Council. This Council consisted of the President, the Secreta^

of State, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of Navy, the Arnw Chief

of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations, and, on occasion, the Chief of

the Army Air Forces.\*\*\* It met at the call of the President, and dur-

ing the fall of 1941 it was in frequent session. Secretary Hull said:

Sec committee exhibit No. 1, pp. 2S&-245.

uj See Foreign Relations, vol. II, pp. 784-786. Several hours after the Pearl Harbor attack had begun

Ambassador Qrew was informed by the Japanese Foreign Minister that the Japanese 14-part memorandum

replying to the American note of November 26 was to be regarded as the Emperor’s reply to the President’s

appeal. See Peace and War, p. 148.

The Japanese Ambassadors were instructed to deliver the Japanese note to the American Secretary of

State at 1 p. m. on Sunday, December 7. They made the appointment pursuant to the instruction; how-

ever, they later postponed for 1 hour their previous appointment, stating the delay was due to the need of

more time to decode the message they were to deliver,

u\* Foreign Relations, vol. II, p. 787.

For a rather fuU discussion of liaison between the various departments, see testimony of Secretary

Stimson, Army Pearl Harbor Board Record, p. 4041 seg.

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“The War Council, which consisted of the President, the Secretaries

of State, War, and Navy, the Chief of Staff, and the Chief of Naval

Operations, was a sort of clearing house for aE the information and

views which we were currently discussing with our respective contacts

and in our respective circles. The high lights in the developments

at a particular juncture were mvariably reviewed at those meetiogs."

In addition to the War Council, another liaison body, consisting of

the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of

Navy, was created during 1940, with a view to holding weekly meet-

ings, which were scheduled for 9:30 each Tuesday morning. Secretary

Stunson said:"\*

They were perfectly informal and unofficial meetings, but they were very

regular, and we met once a week regularly; and ♦ ♦ \* just before Pearl

Harbor, we had extra meetings. In fact, we were in such a meeting on the

Sunday morning that the Japanese attacked. The meetings took place in the

State Department, Mr. Hulrs office, and during that time the Secretary of

State, the Secretary of Navy, and myself were in constant contact.

And again

During this entire period I kept in constant and close touch with M?r Hull and

Mr. Knox, as well as having frequent meetings with the President.

During 1941 Rear Adm. R. E. Schuirmann was tlie Director of the

Central Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and had as

one of his duties liaison with the State Department. He made the

following observations concerning State Department liaison:\*^

A 'Xiaison Committee'' consisting of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief

of Staff, U. S. Army, and the Under Secretary of State was set up while Admiral

Leahy was Chief of Naval Operations. This Committee was mainly occupied

with questions other than the Far East, but occasionally questions relating to the

Far East were discussed. About the middle of May 1941, the practice of having a

stenographer present to record the discussion was commenced; prior to that time

I would take notes of the meetings in order to be able to follow up such matters as

required .action, and I believe one of Mr. Welles' assistants made a precis of the

meetings. At times there were^^'^off the record" discussions at these liaison oomi-

mittee meetings. I made notes of some of these "off the record" discussions.

Aside from the meetings of the Liaison Committee, Secretary Hull held meeting

with various officials of the Navy De^rtment, and I maintained liaison with

Dr. Hornbeck and Mr. Hamilton of the Far Eastern Division of the State Depart-

ment by visit and by telephone. I know of no official record of these meetings

and discussions. Fragmentary notes of some are in the files of the Central

Division as are such records of the Liaison Committee as are in the possession of

the Navy Department. It is possible that the State Department representatives

may have made notes of some of these meetings and discussions with Secretary

Hull and other State Department officials.

Admiral R. K. Turney Director of War Plans Division in the 'Office

of the Chief of Naval Operations, summarized the liaison with the

State Department as follows:

The Chief of Naval Operations had a close personal association with the Secre-

tary of State and Under Secretary of State. He consulted them frequently and

they consulted him, I might say invariably, before making any particular diplomatic

move. In the Office of Naval Operations, the Chief of the Central Division was

^pointed as liaison officer with the State Department. He visited the State

Department and discussed problems with them practically eveiw day. There

was a weekly meeting in the State Department conducted by the Under Secretary

of State, Mr. Welles, usually attended by the Chief of Navid Operations, the

Chief of Staff of the Army, Chief of the War Plans of the Army, Chief of War

»\* Committee record, p. 1144.

»• Roberts record, pp. 4051-4053, 4078-4079.

117 Committee record, p. 14386.

ii» Hart record, p. 406.

M»Id.,stp.a67.

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Plans of Navy, the Chief of the Central Division of the Office of Naval Oper<

ations, an officer of the General Staff not in the War Plans Division, and two or

three representatives of the State Department. The matters discussed at these

meetings usually related to events in Western Hemisphere countries. The Army

was building a lot of air fields in the Caribbean and South America. The Navy

imd the Army, both, had sent missions to those countries and at the meetings

with the Under Secretary it was chiefly American affairs that were discussed.

Occasionally, possibly once a month, the Secretary of State would hold a con-

ference with representatives of the War and Navy Departments, and at these

meetings events outside of the Americas were discussed. From time to time the

Secretary of State would call individuals from the War and Navy Departments

to discuss particular aspects of world events. There were other unscheduled

conferenced between the State and War and Navy Departments. I participated

in a great many such conferences. From time to time, informal memoranda

were exchanged between individuals of the State and Navy Departments or

exchanged between the Secretary of State and the Chief of NavsJ Operations.

I would say that relations between the State and War and State and Navy DeparU

merUs were very close and were characterized by good feeling.

At a regular Cabinet meeting on November 7 tie President inquired

of Secreta^ Hull as to whether he had anything in mind. In replying

Secretary Hull testified:

I thereupon pointed out for about 15 minutes the dangers in the international

situation. I went over fully developments in the conversations with Japan and

emphasized that in my opinion relations were extremely critical and that we should

be on the lookout for a military attack anywhere by Japan at any time. When I

finished, the President went around the Cabinet. All concurrea in my estimate

of the dangers. It became the consensus of the Cabinet that the critical situation

might well be emphasized in speeches in order that the country would, if possible,

be better prepared for such a development.^\*'

SecreUffy Stimson stated:

On Friday, November 7, we had the usual weekly Cabinet meeting. The

Far Eastern situation was uppermost in many of our mindsi Mr. Hull imormed

iis that relations had become extremely critical and that we should be on the

outlook for an attack by Japan at any time.

At a meeting of the war council on November 25 Secretary Hull

pointed out that the leaders of Japan were determined and desperate,

and, in his opinion, the Japanese mihtary was already poised for

attack; that they might attack at any time and at any place. He

emphasized the probable element of surprise in Japanese plans, that

“virtually the last stage had been reached and that the safeguarding

of our national security was in the hands of the Army and Navy.”

. At the same meeting of the council the President warned that we

were likely to be attacked, perhaps as soon as the following Monday,

for “the Japanese are notorious for making an attack without

warning.”

On the morning of November 26, Secretary Hull advised Secretary

Stimson that he had about decided not to make the proposition of

the 3-month truce, the modus vivendi, that he had discussed with

Secretaries Knox and Stimson on November 25 — “the Chinese, for

Committee record, p. 1131.

In an address delivered on November 11, 1941, Secretary Knox warned that the Nation was confronted

not only by the necessity for extreme measures of self-defense in the Atlantic but was “likewise faced with

grim possibilities on the other side of the world—on the far side of the Pacific.’\* See committee record at

pp. 1131, 1132.

iM Committee record, pp. 14387, 14388.

iw In an address on November 11, Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles stated that beyond the Atlantic

a sinister and pitiless conqueror had reduced more than half of Europe to abject serfdom and that in the Far

East the same forces of conquest were menacing the safety of all nations bordering on the Pacific. He said

that the waves of world conquest were “breaking high both in the East and in the West” and were threaten-

ing “to engulf our own shores”; that the United States was in far greater peril than In 1917 and “at any

moment war may be forced upon us.” See committee record, p. 1132.

m Id., at p. 1144. See also statement of Mr. Stimson, committee record, p. 14390.

m See statem^t of Mr. Stimson, committee record, p. 14390.

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one thing, had pointed out strong objections to the proposal, par-

ticularly the effect on the morale of their own people/’ Secretary

Stimson said: 127

Early that morning (November 27) I had called up Mr. Hull to find out what

his final word had been with the Japanese — whether he had handed them the

proposal for three months\* truce, or whether he had told them he had no other

proposition to make. He told me that he had broken the whole matter off. His

words were: \*\*/ have washed my hands of it, and it is now in the hands of you and

Knox — the Army and the ISiavyJ^ I then called up the President, who ^ve me a

little different view. He said that it was true that the talks had been called off,

but that they had ended up with a magnificient statement prepared by Hull.

I found out afterwards that this was the fact and that the statement contained a

reaffirmation of our constant and regular position without the suggestion of a

threat of any kind.

With reference to his remarks before the War Council on November

28, Secretary Hull stated:

♦ \* \* I reviewed the November 26 proposal which we had made to the

Japanese, and i^inted out that there was practically no possibility of an agree-

ment being achieved with Japan. I emphasized that in my opinion the Japanese

were likely to break out at any time with new acts of conquest and that the matter of

safeguarding our national security was in the hands of the Army and the Navy,

With due deference I expressed my judgment that any plans for our military

defense should include an assumption that the Japanese might make the element

of surprise a central point in their strategy and also niight attack at various points

simultaneously with a view to demoralizing efforts of defense and of coordination.

. Addressing a public rally in Japan on November 30, Premier Tojo

stated:

The fact that Chiang-Kai-shek is dancing to the tune of Britain, America, and

communism at the expense of able-bodied and promising young men in his futile

resistance against Japan is only due to the desire of Britain and the United States

to fish in the troubled waters of East Asia by putting [pitting?] the East Asiatic

peoples against each other and to grasp the hegemony of East Asia. This is a

stock in trade of Britain and the United States.

For the honor and pride of mankind we must purge this sort of practice from

East Asia with a vengeance.

Following a conference with military leaders concerning the Jap-

anese Premier’s address. Secretary Hull called the President at Warm

Spring, Ga., urging him to advance the date set for his return to

Washington. The President accordingly returned to Washington on

December 1.^^

In testifying before the Navy inquiry conducted by Admiral Hart,

Admiral Schuirmann stated in reply to a query as to whether the

State Department’s estimate of the situation vis-a-vis Japan as con-

veyed to the Navy Department was in accord with the statements

contained on page 138 of the book Peace and War”:

I was not present at any meeting that I recall where the Secretary expressed

the element of surprise so strongly or if at all, or the probability of attack at

various points. However, the particular meetings which he mentioned, I do not

know if 1 was present. I cannot make any positive statement that he did not make

such a statement. However, on Wednesday or Thursday before Pearl Harbor,

Secretary Hull phoned me saying in effect, ‘‘7 know you Navy fellows are always

ahead of me hut I want you to know that I aonH seem to he able to do anything more

with these Japanese and they are liable to run loose like a mad dog and bite anyone.\*\*

I assured him that a war warning had been sent out. I reported the conversation

to Admiral Stark.

«« Committee record, pp. 14391, 14392.

Id., at pp. 14392, 14393.

U8 Committee record, pp, 11^, 1161.

»» See committee record, p. 1162.

Id., at p. 1163.

Halt record, p. 412.

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Referrii^ to a meeting at the State Department on the morning of

December 7, Mr. Stimson said;

On December 7, 1941, Knox and I arranged a conference with Hull at ten-,

thirty, and we talked the whole matter over. Hull is very certain that the Japs'

are planning some deviltry, and we are all wondering where the blow will strike. Wo

three stayed together in conference until lunchtime, going over the plans for what ‘

should be said and done.

Considering all of the observations made by Secretary Hull to Army

and Navy Officials in the days before December 7, 1941, it is difficult

to imagine bow he could have more clearly and forcefully depicted

the manner in which relations between the United States and Japan

had passed beyond the realm of diplomacy and become a matter of

cold military reality.^® This thought was expressed by General

Marshall when he testified to a distinct recollection of Mr. Hull's saying:

‘‘These fellows mean to fight; you will have to be prepared.”

That there was the fullest exchange of information between the

diplomatic and military arms of the Government is further indicated

by the manner in which intercepted and decoded Japanese diplomatic

messages were distributed. These messages, familiarly referred to as

“Magic” and discussed in detail elsewhere in this report, contained

detaued instructions and proposals from Tokyo to its Washington

Embassy and the comments concemii^ and contents of American

proposals as forwarded to Tokyo by its ambassadors. This material

not only indicated what Japan and her ambassadors were saying but

literally what they were thinking. This material was available to the

Secretaries of War and Navy, the Chief of Staff, the Chief of Naval

Operations, the Directors of War Plans in both the Army and Navy,

and the heads of the intelligence branches of both the services, among

others.

Conclusions

Begging in 1931 Japan embarked on a career of conquest no less

ambitious nor avowed than that of the Nazis. Despite American

protests she overran and subjugated Manchuria. In 1937, bulwarked

by her Anti-Comintem Pact with Germany of the preceding year, she

invaded China. In 1940 she seized upon the struggle for survival of

the western powers against Hitler’s war machine to conclude an iron-

clad alliance with Germany and Italy aimed directly at the United

States. Thereupon she set about to drive the “barbarians” from the

Orient and to engulf the Far East in her Greater East Asia Co-

prosperity Sphere which was to be her bastion for world conquest.

As early as January of 1941 the dominating military chque prepared

for war on the United States and conceived the attack on Pearl

Harbor.

Hailing the German invasion of Russia on June 22, 1941, as a

“divine wind” securing her northern flank, Japan within a period of

20 days adopted a crucial pohcy followed by an all-out mobilization

for war. Almost immediately thereafter she mvaded Southern French

Indochina for the purpose “when the international situation is suit-

able, to launch therefrom a rapid attack.” She boldly declared in an

intercepted dispatch of July 14, 1941:

Army Pearl Harbor Board record, p. 4081. See also committee record, p. 14428.

For a record of Mr. HulFs coDferences, consultations, and telephone conversations (as entered in

engagement books) with representatives of the War and Navy Departments, November 20 to December 7,

1941, and arrangements for contacts between the Departments of State, War, and Navy in 1940 and 1941^

fee committee record, pp. 1166-1176. See also committee record, p. 1180.

Committee record, p. 3079.

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I After the occupation of French Indochina, next on our schedule is the sending

i of an ultimatum to the Netherlands Indies. In the seizing of Singapore the Navy

I will play the principal part.

The invasion of southern Indochina resulted in the freezing of assets

and virtual cessation of trade between the United States and Japan.

On November 20, 1941, the Empire of Japan delivered an ulti-

. -matum to the Government of the United States. It required that

the United States supply Japan as much oil as she might require;

that we discontinue aid to China, withdrawing moral and material

support from the recognized Chinese Government. It contained no

provision pledging Japan to abandon aggression and to resort to

peaceful methods. The ultimatum contamed no tenable basis for an

agreement, a fact well known to and contemplated by the Tojo

Cabinet.

During all of the negotiations, Japan qualified and restricted every

intimation of her peaceful purposes. With each succeeding proposal

it became abundantly apparent that she did not intend to com-

promise in any measure the bellicose utterances and plans of conquest

of her military masters. She uniformly declared her purpose to

fulfill her obligations under the Tripartite Pact — aimed directly at the

United States. She refused to relinq^uish the preferential commercial

position in the Orient which she Wd arrogated to herself. She

demanded a victor’s peace in China and would give no effective recog-

nition to the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of

other countries. Her clear purpose was to maintain a military and

economic overlordship of China.

The story of our negotiations with the Empire of Japan during the

year 1941 epitomizes the traditional purpose of the United States to

seek peace where compatible with national honor. Conversations

were carried forward with the representatives of that nation in the hope

of bringing to an end the frightful aggression that had brought sorrow,

death, and degradation to the Orient for almost a decade. At the

same time it was realistically recognized that the negotiations afforded

precious time to improve our own capacity for self-defense, the appall-

ing need for which was becoming daily more apparent as the Axis

dreams of world conquest pushed relentlessly toward realization.

That there were elements in Japan who desired peace is unques-

tioned. But for many years the Government of that nation had been

divided into two schools of thought, the one conceivably disposed to

think in terms of international good will with the other dominated by

the militarism of the war lords who had always ultimately resolved

Japanese pohcy.\*®\* It was this monstrous condition which, from the

time of Japan’s emergence as a power in world affairs, resulted in her

military acts invariably belying her diplomatic promises. The United

States therefore in looking to any final settlement had properly before

it the substantial question of whether those in Japan who might wish

peace possessed the capacity and power to enter a binding and effec-

tive agreement reasonably designed to stabilize conditions in the Far

East. It was for this reason that om\* Government insisted Japan offer

some tangible proof of her honest purpose to abandon a policy of ag-

gression. No such proof or disposition to provide it was at any time

forthcoming.

See testimony of Mr. Hull, committee record, p. 1120.

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In considering the negotiations in their entirety the conclusion is

inescapable that Japan had no concessions to make and that her

program of aggression was immutable. , When the Konoye Cabinet

could not secure an agreement giving Japan an unrestrained hand in

the Orient it was replaced by a Cabinet headed by General To jo.

Tojo made one gesture in the form of an idtimatum to reahze Japan’s

ambitions without fighting for them. When he realized such a price

for peace was too high even for the United States, his Government

launched the infamous attack on Pearl Harbor while instructing her

ambassadors in characteristic dupUcity to maintain the pretense of

continuing negotiations.\*®®

It is concluded that the diplomatic actions of the United States

provided no provocation whatever for the attack by Japan on Pearl

Harbor. It is further concluded that the Secretary of State fully

informed both the War and Navy Departments of diplomatic de-

velopments and that he in a timely and forceful manner clearly

pointed out to these Departments that relations between the United

States and Japan had passed beyond the stage of diplomacy and were

in the hands of the military.

lu The Japanese force to strike Pearl Harbor actually left Hitokappu Bay for the attack at 7 p. m., No\*

vember 25, Washington time, before the United States note in reply to the Japanese ultimatum of Novem-

ber 20 was delivered to Japan’s ambassadors on November 26.

Part II

THE JAPANESE ATTACK AND ITS AFTERMATH

PART II. THE JAPANESE ATTACK AND ITS AFTERMATH

Formulation op the Plan and Date for Execution ‘

The evidence tends to indicate that a surprise attack on Pearl

Harbor was originally conceived and proposed early in January of 1941

by Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, commander in chief of the combined

Japanese Fleet, who at that time ordered Admiral Onishi, chief of

staff of the Eleventh Air Fleet, to study the operation. Admiral

Yamamoto is reported to have told Onishi about February 1,^ “If we

have war with the United States we will have no hope of winning unless

the United States Fleet in Hawaiian waters can be destroyed.” ®

During the latter part of August 1941, all fleet commanders and other

key staff members were ordered to Tokyo by Yamamoto for war

games preliminary to formulation of flnal operation plans for a Paciflc

campaign which included a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. A war

plans conference was held continuously at the Naval War College,

Tokyo, from September 2 to 13, and on September 13 an outline incor-

porating the essential points of a basic operation order, which was later

to be issued as Combined Fleet Top Secret Operation Order No. 1, was

completed. On November 5, 1941, this operation order, which in-

cluded detailed plans for the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, was

promulgated to all fleet and task force commanders. The date,

November 5, is in consequence properly to be regarded as the date on

which the plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor was completed.

Under the heading “Preparations for the outbreak of war,” opera-

tion order No. 1 provided that “when the decision is made to complete

over-all preparations for operations, orders wfll be issued establishing

the approximate date (Y-day) for commencement of operations and

announcing ‘flrst preparations for war.’ ” The order further provided

that “the time for the outbreak of war (X-day) will be given in an

imperial general headquarters order.” The details of the plan with

respect to the Pearl Harbor attack were worked out by membera of

the naval general staff operations section, combined fleet operations

staff, and flrat air fleet operations staff.

Admiral Yamamoto on November 7 issued combined fleet top

secret operation order No. 2 relating: “First preparations for war.

Y-day will be December 8.” Consistent with the deflnition of Y-day

as given in operation order No. 1, December 8 (December 7, Hono-

lulu time) was thus established only as the approximate date for

commencement of operations. The imperial general headquarters,

1 The chief sources of information concerning the attack are translations of captured Japanese documents,

interrogations of prisoners of war, and reiwrts submitted by general headquarters, supreme commander for

the Allied Powers, comprising questionnaires filled out since VJ-day by former members of the Japanese

naval high command. See committee exhibits Nos. 8, 8A, 8B, 8C, and 8D.

For puri)oses of convenience, the term Hawaii is used throughout this report as synonymous with the

Territory of Hawaii. , ,. .. .

\* Unless otherwise stated the time indicated is Tokyo time. To obtain the corresponding time m Wash-

ington and Honolulu, 14 hours and hours, respectively, should be subtracted from Tokyo time. See

committee exhibit No. 6. item 4.

< See committee exhibit No. 8D.

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however, issued an order on December 2 stating, "The hostile actions

against the United States of America shall be commenced on Decem-

ber 8,” thereby announcing X-day as defined in operation order l^o. 1 .

The tentative approximate date for the attack selected on November 7

and defined as Y-day in consequence became the final precise date,

X-day.

The Japanese imperial headquarters navy section, in discussions

prior to November 7, generally recognized December 8 as a propitious

date from an operational viewpoint and decided upon this date in

conjunction with the leaders of the combined fleet. It was noted that

from the standpoint of a dawn attack in the Hawaiian area Decem-

ber 10 would have been suitable in view of the dark of the moon. But

it was expected the United States Pacific Fleet, in accordance with

its custom during maneuvers, would enter Pearl Harbor on Friday

and leave on Monday. Sunday, December 8, was therefore decided

upon with the imderstanding that, to assiu\*e the success of the attack

and still avoid a night attack, the take-off time of the attacking planes

was to be set as near to dawn as possible; that is, apmoxunately

1 hour before sunrise. An imperial naval order issued on December 1

stated: ‘'Japan \* \* \* has reached a decision to declare war on

the United States oj America, British Empire, and the Netherlands." \*

Nature op the Plan

Three possible avenues in approaching Hawaii for the attack pre-

sented themselves: The northern course, which was used; a central

course which headed east following the Hawaiian Islands; and a

southern route passing through the Marshall Islands and approaching

from the south. Because of the absolute requirement that the element

of surprise be a factor in the attack, the northern course was selected

since it was far from the United States patrol screen of land-based

aircraft, and there was little chance of meeting commercial vessels.

Screening destroyers were to be sent ahead of the Japanese Fleet

and in the event any vessels were encountered the main body of the

force was to make a severe change in course and endeavor to avoid

detection. If the striking force was detected prior to the day before

the attack, it was planned to have the force retirm to Japanese waters

without executing the attack. On the other hand, should the force be

detected on the day before the attack, the question of whether to ca^

home the attack or to return was to be resolved in accordance with

local conditions.® If the attack should fail, the main force of the

Japanese Navy, located in the Inland Sea, was to be brought out to the

Pacific in order to return the striking force to home waters.

According to Japanese sources interviewed since the defeat of

Japan, the sources of mformation employed in planning the attack

included public broadcasts from Hawaii; reports from naval attaches

in the Japanese Embassy, Washington; public newspapers in the

United States; reconnaissance submarines in Hawaiian waters prior

to the attack; and information obtained from crews and passengers

\* See committee exhibit No. 8D.

• Had the American Fleet left port it is reported that the Japanese force would have scouted an area of

about 300 miles around Oahu and was prepared to attack. If the American Fleet could not be located the

striking force wus to withdraw. See committee exhibit No. 8.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

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of ships which had called at Honolulu in mid-November.® It also

appears that Japan was receiving the same type of espionage infor-

mation from its Honolulu consul as from other Japanese diplomatic

establishments.^

The Japanese plan of operation was predicated on certain assump-

tions with respect to the United States Pacific Fleet: (1) That the

main bo^ of the fleet would be at anchor within Pearl Harbor on

Sxmday, December 7, Hawaii time; (2) that a carrier could be moved

from Japanese home waters across the Pacific to within striking dis-

tance of the main islands of the Hawaiian group without undue risk

of detection by American defensive reconnaissance; (3) that should

the two foregoing assumptions be in error, a reserve group of heavy

naval units, could sortie from the Inland Sea to give support to the

carrier striking force in a decisive engagement with the American Fleet;

(4) that a powerful carrier air strike against the American forces based

in Hawaii could, if tactical surprise were effective, achieve the strategic

resTdt of crippling the American Fleet, and (5) that such a strike could

achieve also the destruction of American land-based air power and

thus permit the Japanese striking force to withdraw without damage.

Incident to preparations and discussions on September 6 and 7 re-

lating to operation order No. 1, it was decided that no landing on the

island of Oahu should be attempted since (1) it would have been im-

possible to make preparations for such a landing within less than a

month after the opening of hostilities; (2) it was recognized that the

problems of speed and supply; for an accompanying convoy would have

rendered it unlikely that the initial attack could be accomphshed with-

out detection; and (3) insuperable logistic problems rendered landings

on Oahu impractical. In formulating the final plans it was deter-

mined that a torpedo attack against ships anchored in Pearl Harbor

was the most effective method of putting the United States Pacific

Fleet in the Hawaiian area out of action for a long period of time.

Two obstacles to a torpedo attack were considered: The fact that

Pearl Harbor is narrow and shallow; and the fact that it was prob-

ab^ equipped with torpedo nets. In order to overcome the first

difficulty it was decided to attach stabilizers to the toipedoes and

launch them from extremely low altitude. Since the success of an

aerial torpedo attack could not be assured because of the likelihood

of torpedo nets a bombing attack was also to be employed.

\* It is reported that Japanese agents in Hawaii played no part in the attack. See committee exhibit

No. 8.

The location of the anchorages shown on the maps recovered from the attacking force was determined

on the basis of the indicated sources beginning in the early part of 1941.

It has been reported that the intelligence section of the Japanese naval general staff was having a most

difficult time judging the habits, strength, and security situations of the American Fleet in the Hawaiian

area. Because of this, the intelligence section had been for years compiling material by carefully collecting,

making into statistics, and analyzing bits of information obtained from naval officers at Washington, news-

papers and magazines published in Amefica, American radio broadcasts, signal intelligence^ passengers and

crews of ships stopping over at Honolulu, other foreign diplomatic establishments, commercial firms, and

similar sources. According to the signals of the American ships, the number of ships and small craft of the

Pacific Fleet anchored in Pearl Harbor or out on training was deduced. By combining the flying time

(judged according to signal situations) of airplanes shuttling between bases and aircraft carriers out on

training missions, and the location of United States Fleet units as seen by passengers and crews of ships

stopping over at Honolulu, the training areas of the fleet were determined. The zone, time, etc., of air-

planes at Hawaii were deduced in the samef way. From newspapers and magazines published in the United

States, material was obtained for deduction of America’s war preparation, progress and expansion of mili-

tftfy installations, location and capabilities of warships and airplanes. Army strength at Hawaii, Panama,

the Philippines, and other places.

It is reported from Japanese sources that the reports from foreign diplomatic establishments and com-

mercial firms in foreign countries were regarded as not important enough from the standpoint of intelligence

to have a “special write-up. and were considered on their own merits.” See committee exhibit No. 80

7 See committee exhibit No. 2.

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The complete plan of the attack was known in advance to members

of the Navy general staff, the commander in chief and chiefs of staff,

and staff members of the combined fleet headquarters and first air fleet

headquarters. Portions of the plan were known to the Navy Minister,

the Navy Vice Minister, and other ranking naval officers. It has been

reported that the Japanese Emperor knew in advance only the general

outline of the plan and that none of the Japanese officials in the United

States, including Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu, knew anything

concerning the plan prior to the attack.

The aims of the entire Japanese campaign, including the attack on

Pearl Harbor, were based on the desire for military conquest, security,

and enhancement of the Empire by occupation of areas rich in natural

resources. With respect to the Pearl Harbor attack, operation Order

No. 1 stated: ‘Tn the east the American Fleet will be destroyed and

American lines of operation, and supply lines to the Orient, will be cut.

Enemy forces will be intercepted and annihilated. Victories will be

exploited to break the enemy’s will to fight.” ®

Departure for the Attack

On or about November 14 ® units of the Pearl Harbor attacking

force were ordered to assemble in Hitokappu Bay, located in the

Kurile Islands,^® this operation being completed by November 22.

On November 25 the commander in chief of the combined Japanese

Fleet issued the following order; “

(а) The task force, keeping its movements strictly secret and maintaining

close guard against submarines and aircraft, shall advance into Hawaiian waters

and upon the very opening of hostilities, shall attack the main force of the United

States Fleet in Hawaii and deal it a mortal blow. The first air raid is planned

for dawn of X-day (exact date to be given by later order) .

Upon completion of the air raid the task force, keeping close coordination and

guarding against enemy counterattack, shall speedily leave the enemy waters

and then return to Japan.

(б) Should it appear certain that Japanese- American negotiations will reach

an amicable settlement prior to the commencement of hostile action, all the

forces of the combined fleet are to be ordered to reassemble and return to their

bases.

(c) The task force shall leave Hitokappu Bay on the morning of November 26

and advance to 42° N. and 170° E. (standing-by position) on the afternoon of

December 4, Japan time, and speedily complete refueling. (The actual time of

departure was 9 a. m., November 26, Japan time — 1:30 p. m., November 25,

Hawaii time.)

Since the American Fleet and air power based in the Hawaiian area

were the only obstacles of consequence, a major task force built

around a carrier striking group was considered essential to conducting

a successful surprise attack. Accordingly, the striking force con-

sisted of -6 aircraft carriers, including the Akagi, the flagship of

Admiral Nagumo; 2 battleships, 2 heavy cruisers, 9 destroyers, 3

submarines, 8 train vessels, and approximately 360 planes, which

• Other factors included (1) rendering impotent the United States Pacific Fleet in order to gain time and

maintain freedom of action in the South Seas operation, including the Philippine Islands, and (2) the defense

of Japan's mandated islands. See committee exhibit No. 8.

• Other information obtained indicates that the commander in chief of the combined fleet issued the fol-

lowing order on November 7: “The task force, keeping its movements strictly secret will assemble in

Hitokappu Bay by November 22 for refueling." Committee exhibit No. 8.

w Also referr^ to as Tankan Bay (Etorfu Islands, KurUes), and Tankappu-Wan.

“ See committee exhibit No. 8.

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participated in the attack. Other submarines had proceeded from

the Inland Sea independent of the striking force.\*\*

At 9 a. m., November 26,’® the Japanese Fleet departed under

complete radio silence from Hitokappu Bay for its destination 200

miles north of Oahu. Held down by the low speed of the train vessels

and the need for fuel economy, the force cruised eastward at 13 knots.

Lookouts were posted, but no searches or combat air patrols were

flown. The anticipated difficulty in refueling at sea because of

weather conditions did not materialize, since the weather proved

uniformly calm. On or about December 2 all ships were darkened, and

on December 4 the rendezvous point (42° north; 170° east) was reached

and the combat ships fueled to capacity from the tankers. The

cruise had been entirely uneventful, no planes or ships having been

sighted.’®

The green light to execute the attack had been sent by Admiral

Yamamoto from his flagship, the Yamato, on December 2. The mes-

sage was “Niita Kayama Nobore,” translated ‘‘‘Climb Mount

Niitaka,” which was the code phrase meaning “proceed with

attack.” ’\*

Execution op the Attack ’\*

AIR PHASE

On the night of December 6-7 (Hawaii time) the “run-in” to a

point 200 mues north of Oahu was made at top speed, 26 knots.

Beginning at 6 a. m. and ending at 7:15 a. m., December 7, a total of

360 planes were launched in three waves. The planes rendezvoused

to the south and then flew in for coordinated attacks. In addition

to the attack planes, it is reported that two type Zero reconnaissance

w The following allocation of forces for the attack was made (see committee exhibit No. 6, item 17):

STRIKINa FORCE

Commanding Oflacer: CinC 1st Air Fleet, Vice Admiral Chuichl NAGUMO>

BatDiv 3 (1st Section) (HIEI, KIRISHIMA), 2 BB.

CarDiv 1 (KAGA, AKAGI).

CarDiv 2 (HIRYU, SORYU).

CarDiv 6 (SHOKAKU, ZUIKA.KU), 6 CV.

CruDiv 8 (TONE, CHIKUMA), 2 CA.

DesRon 1 (ABUKUMA, 4 DesDivs), 1 CL, 16 DD.

8 Train Vessels.

ADVANCE EXPEDinONART FORCE

Commanding Oflacer: CinC 6th Fleet, Vice Admiral Mitsumi SHIMIZU.

ISUZU, YURA, 2 CL.

KATORI 1 CL^T

I-class submarines (including SubRons 1, 2, 3) (I-l, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 16, 17, 18, 20, 22-24, 68, 69, 74), 20 SS.

Midget submarines, 6 M-SS.

6 Train Vessels.

The corresponding time in Washington would be 7 p. m. November 25.

A very close watch was kept on Hawaiian broadcasts by Commander Ono, staff communication oflacer

of the striking force. Admiral Nagumo and his staff believed that they could sense from these broadcasts

whether or not the forces on Oahu had an inxling of the impending attack. They felt they could judge the

tenseness of the situation by these broadcasts. Since stations KGU and KGMB were going along in their

normal manner. Admiral Nagumo felt that American forces were still oblivious of developments. For

several days prior to the attack the Jap force had been intercepting messages from our patrol planes. They

had not broken the code, but they had been able to plot in their positions with radio bearings and knew the

number of our patrol planes in the air at all times and that they were patrolling entirely in the southwestern

sector from Oahu. Committee exhibit No. 8D.

u To disguise the move against Pearl Harbor the main Japanese force in the Inland Sea area and the land-

based air units in the Kyushu area carried on deceptive communications, and deceptive measures were taken

to indicate that the task force was still in training in the Kyushu area. See committee exhibit No. 8

\*• Committee exhibit No. 8D.

w The time hereafter indicated is Hawaiian time unless otherwise specified.

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seaplanes were launched at approximately 5 a. m., December 7, to

execute reconnaissance of Pearl Harbor and Lahaina Anchorag^e just

before the attack, reaching their destination about 1 hour before

arrival of the attack planes.

The Japanese aircraft participating in the operation included 81

fighters, 135 dive bombers, 104 horizontal bombers, and 40 torpedo

bombers. Five distinct phases were noted in the execution of the

attack, as recounted from the Navy point of view:

Phase I: Combined torpedo plane and dive bomber attacks lasting

from 7:55 a. m. to 8:25 a. m.

Phase II: Lull in attacks lasting from 8:25 a. m. to 8:40 a. m.

Phase III: Horizontal bomber attacks extending from 8:40 a. m.

to 9:15 a. m.

Phase IV: Dive bomber attacks between 9:15 a. m. and 9:45 a. m.

Phase V: Warning of attacks and completion of raid after 9:45 a. m.

The primary objectives of the Japanese during the raid were the

heavy combatant ships and aircraft. Damage to the light forces and

the industrial plant was incidental to the destruction or disablement

of the heavy ships and aircraft based ashore. In the statement

submitted for the consideration of the committee and in his testimony,

Rear Adm. R. B. Inglis set forth a review of the various phases of the

attack: ^

Phase I: 7:55-8:25 a. m. — Combined Torpedo Plane and Dive Bomber Attacks

The beginning of the attack coincided with the hoisting of the preparatory

signal for 8 o^clock colors. At this time (namely, 7:55 a. m.) Japanese dive

bombers appeared over Ford Island, and within the next few seconds enemy

torpedo planes and dive bombers swung in from various sectors to concentrate

their attack on the heavy ships moored in Pearl Harbor. It is estimated that

nine planes engaged in the attack on the naval air station on Ford Island and

concentrated on the planes parked in the vicinity of hangar No. 6.

At the time of the attack Navy planes (patrol flying boats, float planes, and scout

bombers, carrier type) were lined up on the field. These planes caught fire and

exploded. Machine-gun emplacements were set up hastily and manned, although

the return fire from shore on Ford Island was pitifully weak. Then, as suddenly

as they had appeared, the Japanese planes vanished. No further attack on this

air station was made during the day. Except for a direct hit on hangar No. 6

resulting from a bomb which was apparently aimed at the battleship California

and which fell short, the damage to the station itself was comparatively slight.

However, 33 of the Navy^s best planes out of a total of 70 planes of all types

were destroyed or damaged.

As soon as the attack began the commander of patrol wing 2 broadcasted from

Ford Island the warning: “Air raid. Pearl Harbor. This is not drill.” This

warning was followed a few minutes later by a similar message from the com-

mander in chief. United States Fleet.

At approximately the same time that the Japanese dive bombers appeared over

Ford Island, other low-flying planes struck at the Kaneohe Naval Air Station on

the other side of the island. The attack was well executed, with the planes

coming down in shallow dives and inflicting severe casualties on the seaplanes

moored in the water. Machine guns and rifles were brought out, and men dis-

persed to fire at will at the low-flying planes. After a period of 10 to 15 minutes,

the attacking planes drew off to the north at a low altitude and disappeared from

sight. Several other contingents of bombers passed over, but none dropped

bombs on Kaneohe Bay.

About 25 minutes after the first attack, another squadron of planes, similar to

one of the Navy^s light bomber types, appeared over Kaneohe and commenced

bombing and strafing. No. 3 hanger received a direct hit during this attack, and

» See committee exhibit No. 156.

For a description of the attack as obtained from Japanese sources since VJ-day, see committee exhibits

Nos. 8 and 8B. p. 10.

\*• Committee record, pp. 85-103.

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four planes in the hangar were flestroyed. The majority of the casualties suffered

at Kaneohe resulted from this attack. Most of the injured personnel were in the

squadrons attenmting either to launch their planes or to save those planes not as

yet damaged. When the enemy withdrew, some 10 to 15 minutes later, salvage

operations were commenced, but it was too late to save No. 1 hangar, which

burned until only its steel structural work was left. Only 9 out of the 36 planes

at Kaneohe escaped destruction in this attack; 6 of these were damaged, and 3

were in the air on patrol south of Oahu.

Meanwhile, the Marine air base at Ewa was undergoing similar attack. Appar-

ently the attack on Ewa preceded that at Pearl Harbor by about 2 minutes. It

was delivered by 2 squadrons of 18 to 24 single-seater fighter planes using machine-

gun strafing tactics, which came in from the northwest at an altitude of approxi-

mately 1,000 feet. These enemy planes would descend to within 20 to 25 feet of

the ground, attacking single planes with short bursts of gunfire. Then they

would pull over the treetops, reverte their course, and attack from the opposite

direction. Within less than 15 minutes, all the Marine tactical aircraft had been

shot up or set on fire. Then the guns of the enemy fighters were turned upon

Navy utility aircraft, upon planes that had been disassembled for repair, and

upon the marines themselves.

Effective defense measures were impossible until after the first raid had sub-

sided. Pilots aching to strike at the enemy in the air viewed the wreckage which

until a few minutes before had been a strong air CToup of Marine fighters and

bombers. Altogether 33 out of the 49 planes at Ewa had gone up in smoke.

Some marines, unable to find anything more effective, had tried to oppose fighter

planes with pistols, since the remaining 16 planes were too badly damaged to fly.

Although in phase I of the attack on the ship^ at Pearl Harbor Japanese dive

bombers were effective, the torpedo planes did the most damage. They adhered

strictly to a carefully laid plan and directed their attacks from those sectors which

afforded the best avenues of approach for torpedo attack against selected heavy

ship objectives. Thus they indicated accurate knowledge of harbor and channel

depths and the berths ordinarily occupied by the major combatant units of the

fleet. At least in the great majority of cases, the depth of water in Pearl Harbor

did not prevent the successful execution of this form of attack. Shallow dives

of the torpedoes upon launching were assured by the use of specially constructed

wooden fins, remnants of which were discovered on enemy torpedpes salvaged

after the attack.

Four separate torpedo plane attacks were made during phase I. The major

attack was made by 12 planes, which swung in generally from the southeast

over the tank farm and the vicinity of Merry Point. After splitting, they launched

their torpedoes at very low altitudes (within 50 to 100 feet of the water), and from

very short distances, aiming for the battleships berthed on the southeast side of

Ford Island. All the outboard battleships (namely, the Nevada^ Arizona, West

Virginia, Oklahoma, and California) were effectively hit by one or more^torpedoes.

Strafing was simultaneously conducted from the rear cockpits. A recovered

unexploded torpedo carried an explosive charge of 1,000 pounds.

During the second of these attacks, the Oklahoma was struck by three torpedoes

on the port side and heeled rapidly to port, impeding the efforts of her defenders

to beat off the attackers.

The third attack was made by one torpedo plane which appeared from the

west and was directed against the light cruiser Helena and the minelayer Oglala,

both of which were temporarily occupying the berth previously assigned to the

battleship Pennsylvania, flagship of the Pacific Fleet. One torpedo passed under

the Oglata and exploded against the side of the Helena. The blast stove in the

side plates of the Oglala. Submersible pumps for tne Oglala were obtained from

the Helena but could not be used since no power was available because of damage

to the ship^s engineering plant.

The fourth wave of five planes came in from the northwest and attacked the

seaplane tender Tangier, the target ship Utah, and the light cruisers Raleigh and

Detroit. The Raleigh was struck by one torpedo, and the Utah received two hits

in succession, capsizing at 8:13 a. m. At first it was feared that the Raleigh

would capsize. Orders were thereupon given for all men not at the guns to

jettison all topside weights and put both airplanes in the water. Extra manila

and wire lines were also run to the quays to help keep the ship from capsizing.

The Utah, an old battleship converted into a target ship, had recently returned

from serving as a target for practice aerial bombardment. As soon as she re-

ceived her torpedo hits, she began listing rapidly to port. After she had listed

to about 40 degrees, the order was given to abandon ship. This order was

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executed with some diflBculty, as the attacking pibnes strafed the crew as they

went over the side. Remnants of the crew had reached Ford Island safely.

Later knocking was heard within the hull of the Utah, With cutting tools

obtained from the Raleigh a volunteer crew succeeded in cutting through the

hull and rescuing a fireman, second class, who had been entrapped in the void

space underneath the dynamo room.

An interesting sidelight on Japanese intentions and advance knowledge is

suggested by the fact that berths F-10 and F-11 in which the Utah and Raleigh

were placed, were designated carrier berths and that a carrier was frequently

moored in nearby F-9.

The Detroit and Tangier escaped torpedo damage, one torpedo passing just

astern of the Detroit and burying itself in the mud. Another torpedo passed

between the Tangier and the Utah,

It is estimated that the total number of torpedo planes engaged in these 4

attacks was 21.

In the eight dive-bomber attacks occurring during phase I, three types of bombs

were employed — light, medium, and incendiary.

During the second of these attacks, a bomb hit exploded the forward 14-inch

powder magazine on the battleship Arizona and caused a ravaging oil fire, which

sent up a great cloud of smoke, thereby interfering with antiaircraft fire. The

battleship Tennessee in the adjacent berth was endangered seriously by the oil

fire.

The West Virginia was hit during the third of these attacks by tw^o heavy

bombs as well as by torpedoes. Like the California, she had to be abandoned

after a large fire broke out amidships. Her executive officer, the senior survivor,

dove overboard and swam to the Tennessee, where he organized a party of West

Virginia survivors to help extinguish the fire in the rubbish, trash, and oil which

covered the water between the Tennessee and Ford Island.

The total number of dive bombers engaged in this phase is estimated at 30.

While a few fighters were reported among the attackers in the various phases,

they were no doubt confused with light bombers and accordingly are not treated

as a distinct type.

Although the major attack by high-altitude horizontal bombers did not occur

until phase III, 15 planes of this type operating in 4 groups were active during

phase I.

Most of the torpedo damage to the fieet had occurred by 8:25 a. m. All out-

board battleships had been hit by one or more torpedoes; all the battleships had

^en hit by one or more bombs with the exception of the Oklahoma, which took

four torpedoes before it capsized, and the Pennsylvania, which received a bomb

hit later. By the end of the first phase, the West Virginia was in a sinking condi-

tion; the California was down by the stern; the Arizona was a fiaming ruin; the

other battleships were all damaged to a greater or lesser degree.

Although the initial attack of the Japanese came as a surprise, defensive action

on the part of the fieet was prompt. All ships immediately went to general quarters.

Battleship ready machine guns likewise opened fi^e at once, and within an esti-

mated average time of less than 5 minutes, practically all battleship and anti-

aircraft batteries were firing. The cruisers were firing all antiaircraft batteries

within an average time of about 4 minutes. The destroyers, although opening

up with machine guns almost immediately, averaged 7 minutes in bringing all

antiaircraft guns into action.

During this phase of the battle there was no movement of ships within the

harbor proper. The destroyer Helm, which had gotten under way just prior to

the attack, was just outside the harbor entrance when, at 8:17 a. m., a submarine

conning tower was sighted toxhe right of the entrance channel and northward of

buoy No. 1. The submarine immediately submerged. The Helm opened fire

at 8:19 a. m., when the submarine again surfaced temporarily. No hits were

observed\*

Phase II: 8:25-8:40 a. m. — Lull in Attacks

This phase is described as a lull only by way of comparison. Air activity con-

tinued, although somewhat abated, with sporadic attacks by dive and horizontal

bombers. During this phase an estimated total of 15 dive bombers participated

in 5 attacks upon the ships in the navy yard, the battleships Maryland, Oklahoma,

Nevada, and Pennsylvania, and various light cruisers and destroyers.

Although three attacks by horizontal bombers occurred during the lull, these

appear to have overlapped into phase III and are considered under that heading.

At 8:32 a. m. the battleship Oklahoma took a heavy list to starboard and

capsized.

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During phase II there was still relatively little ship movement within the

harbor. The ready-duty destroyer Monaghan had received orders at 7:51 a. m.

(Pearl Harbor time) to ^^proceed immediately and contact the Ward in defensive

sea area.” At about 8:37, observing an enemy submarine just west of Ford

Island under fire from both the Curtiss and Tangier y the Monaghan proceeded at

high speed and at about 8:43 rammed the submarine. As the enemy vessel had

submerged, the shock was slight. The Monaghan thereupon reversed engines and

draped two depth charges.

The Curtiss had previously scored two direct hits on the conning tower. This

submarine was later salvaged for inspection and disposal. The Monaghan then

proceeded down the channel and continued her sortie. At the same time that

the Monaghan got under way, the destroyer Henley slipped her chain from buoy

X-11 and sortied, following the Monaghan down the channel.

Phase III: 8:40-9: 15 a. m. — Horizontal Bomber Attacks

The so-called ‘lull” in the air raid was terminated by the appearance over the

fleet of eight groups of high-altitude horizontal bombers which crossed and re-

crossed their targets from various directions, inflicting serious damage. Some

of the bombs dropped were converted 15- or 16-inch shells of somewhat less explo-

sive quality, marked by very little flame. According to some observers, many

bombs dropped by high-altitude horizontal bombers either failed to explode or

landed outside the harbor area.

During the second attack (at 9:06 a. m.) the Pennsylvania was hit by a heavy

bomb which passed through the main deck amidships and detonated, causing a

fire, which was extinguished with some difficulty.

The third group of planes followed very closely the line of battleship moorings.

It was probably one of these planes that hit the California with what is believed

to have been a 15-inch projectile equipped with tail vanes which penetrated to the

second deck and exploded. As a result of the explosion, the armored hatch to the

machine shop was badly sprung and could not be closed, resulting in the spread-

ing of a serious fire.

Altogether, 30 horizontal bombers, including 9 planes which had participated

in earlier attacks, are estimated to have engaged in phase III. Once more it was

the heavy combatant ships, the battleships and cruisers, which bore the brunt of

these attacks.

Although phase III was largely devoted to horizontal bombing, approximately

18 dive bombers organized in 5 groups also participated.

It was probably the second of these groups which did considerable damage to

the Nevada, then proceeding down the South Channel, and also to the Shaw,

Cassin, and Downes, all three of which were set afire.

During the fifth attack, a Japanese dive bomber succeeded in dropping 1

bomb on the seaplane tender Curtiss which detonated on the main deck level,

killing 20 men, wounding 58, and leaving 1 other unaccounted for.

During this same phase, the Curtiss took under fire one of these bombers, which

was pulling out of a dive over the naval air station. Hit squarely by the Curtiss\*

gunfire, the plane crashed on the ship, spattering burning gasoline and starting

fires so menacing that one of the guns had to be temporarily abandoned.

Considerable ship movement took place during phase III. At 8:40 a. m. the

Nevada cleared berth F-8 without ^sistance and proceeded down the South

Channel. As soon as the Japanese became aware that a battleship was trying to

reach open water, they sent dive bomber after dive bomber down after her and

registered several hits. In spite of the damage she had sustained in the vicinity of

floating drydock No. 2, and although her bridge and forestructure were ablaze,

the ship continued to fight effectively. At 9:10, however, while she was attempt-

ing to make a turn in the channel, the Nevada ran aground in the vicinity of buoy

No. 19.

Meanwhile the repair ship Vestal, also without assistance, had gotten under way

at about 8:40, had cleared the burning Arizona, and at about 9:40 anchored well

clear northeast of Ford Island.

Soon after the Nevada and Vestal had cleared their berths, tugs began to move

the Oglala to a position astern of the Helena at 10-10 dock. The Oglala was finally

secured in her berth at about 9, but shortly thereafter she capsized.

At 8:42, the oiler Neosho cleared berth F-4 unaided and stood toward Merry

Point in order to reduce fire hazard to her cargo and to clear the way for a possible

sortie by the battleship Maryland,

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Phase IV: 9:15-9:45 — Dive Bomber Attacka

During phase IV an estimated 27 dive bonibers conducted 9 strafing attacks

directed against ships throughout the entire harbor area. In all probability the

planes were the same ones that had conducted previous attacks. These attacks

overlapped by about 10 minutes the horizontal bomber attacks described in phase

III.

Phase V: 9:45 — Waning of Attacks and Completion of Raid

By 9:45 all enemy planes had retired. Evading Navy aerial searches, both

shore-based and from carriers at sea, the Japanese striking force retired to its

home waters without being contacted by any American units.

An outline review of the Japanese attack on Army planes and in-

stallations is as follows

Hicham Field

(Army planes at the time of the attack were lined up on the warming-up aprons

three or four abreast with approximately 10 feet between wing tips, and approxi-

mately 135 feet from the tail of one plane to the nose of another.)

First attack (lasting about 10 minutes) : At about 7 :55 a. m. nine dive bombers

attacked the Hawaiian Air Depot buildings and three additional planes attacked

the same objectives from the northwest. Several minutes later nine additional

bombers bombed Hickam Field hangar line from the southeast. Immediately

thereafter, seven more dive bombers attacked the hangar line from the east.

Second attack (lasting between 10 and 15 minutes) : At about 8:25 a. m. between

six and nine planes attacked the No. 1 Aqua System,\*'\* the technical buildings,

and the consolidated barracks. During and immediately after this bombing

attack, Army planes on the parking apron were attacked with gunfire. About

8:26 a. m. a formation of five or six planes bombed the baseball diamond from a

hi^ altitude, possibly believing the gasoline storage system to be in that area.

Third attack (lasting about 8 minutes): At 9 a. m. from six to nine planes

attacked with machine gun fire the technical buildings behind the hangar lines

and certain planes which by then were dispersed. At about the same time from

seven to nine planes bombed the consolidated barracks, the parade ground and

the post exchange.

Wheeler Field

(Army planes were parked in the space between the aprons in front of the

hangars, generally in a series of parallel lines approximately wing tip to wing tip,

the lines varying from 15 to 20 feet apart.)

First attack (lasting approximately 15 minutes): At 8:02 a. m. 25 planes dive-

bombed the hangar lines; machine-gun fire was also employed during the attack.

Second attack (lasting less than 5 minutes) : At 9 a. m. seven planes machine-

gunned Army planes being taxied to the airdrome.

Bellows Field

(The P-40^s were parked in line at 10 to 15 feet intervals; the reconnaissance

planes were also parked in a line at slightly greater intervals.)

First attack: At 8:30 a single Japanese fighter machine-gunned the tent area.

Second attack (lasting about 15 minutes): At about 9 a, m. nine fighters

machine-gunned the Army planes.

Haleiwa Field was not attacked and after 9:45 a. m. there were no

further attacks on Army installations. The evidence indicates that a

maximum of 1 05 planes participated in the attacks on the airfields, it

being noted that some of the planes included in this number may have

taken part in more than one attack.

SUBMARINE PHASE

Prior to completion of the surprise attack the advance Japanese

expeditionary force of submarines was under the command of the

striking force commander, Admiral Nagumo. The precise move-

Spo testimony of Col. Bernard Thielon, Committee Record, pages 104-111.

A hydrostatic pass for the fuel-pumping system. See committee record, p. 105.

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ments of the participating submarines are not known, but it is believed

that most of these units departed from Japanese home waters in late

November and proceeded to the Hawaiian area by way of Kwajalein.

A few of the submarines, delayed in leaving Japan, proceeded directly

to Hawaii. The functions assigned to the submarines in operations

order No. 1 were:\*\*

(a) Until X-day minus 3 some of the submarines were to

reconnoiter important points in the Aleutians, Fiji, and Samoa,

and 'were to observe and report on any strong American forces

discovered.

(b) One element was assigned to patrol the route of the striking

force in advance of the movement of that force to insure an im-

detected approach.

(c) Until X-day minus 5, the remaining submarines were to

surround Hawaii at extreme range while one element approached

and reconnoitered without being observed.

(d) On X-day the submarines in the area were to “observe

and attack the American Fleet in the Hawaii area ; make a surprise

attack on the channel leading into Pearl Harbor and attempt to

close it; if the enemy moves out to fight, he will be pursued and

attacked.”

With orders not to attack until the task force strike was verified,

the force of I-class submarines took up scouting positions on the

evening of December 6 in allotted patrol sectors covering the waters

in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor. Between 50 and 100 mfles off Pearl

Harbor, five midget submarines were launched from specially fitted

fleet submarines as a special attacking force to conduct an offensive

against American ships within the harbor and to prevent the escape

of the Pacific Fleet through the harbor entrance dming the scheduled

air raid. Available data indicates that only one of the five midget

submarines penetrated into the harbor, dischargmg its torpedoes

harmlessly. None of the five midget submarines rejoined the Japa-

nese force.\*\*

The 1-class submarines maintained their patrols in the Hawaiian

area after the attack and at least one of the groiip (the 1-7) launched

its aircraft to conduct a reconnaissance of Pearl Harbor to ascertain

the status of the American Fleet and installations. In the event of

virtual destruction of the American Fleet at Pearl Harbor, the opera-

tion plan provided that one submarine division or less would be placed

between Hawaii and North America to destroy sea traffic. At least

one submarine (the 1-7) was dispatched to the Oregon coast on or

about December 13.

Withdrawal of the Striking Force

Upon completion of the laimchings of aircraft at 7:15 a. m., De-

cember 7, the fleet units of the Japanese striking force withdrew at

high speed to the northwest. Plane recovery was effected between

10:30 a. m. and 1:30 p. m., whereupon the force proceeded by a

circuitous route to Kure, arriving on December 23. En route two

carriers, two cruisers, and two destroyers were detached on December

15 to serve as reinforcements for the Wake Island operation. The

« See committee exhibit No. 8.

\*» All midget submarine personnel were prepared for death and none expected to return alive. Committee

exhibit No. 8.

‘JU17D- -4G G

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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

original plans called for the retiring force to strike at Midway if

possible but this strike was not made, probably because of the

presence of a United States task force south of Midway

Damage to United States Naval Forces and Installations as a

Result of the Attack

Of the vessels in Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7,^

the following were either sunk or damaged: ^

Battleships

Light cruisers

Destroyers

Repair ship

Minelayer

Seaplane tender

Miscellaneous auxiliaries

Type

Name

Extent of damage

Arizona

California

West Virginia

Oklahoma

Nevada

Maryland

Pennsylvania

Tennessee

Helena

Honolulu

Raleigh

Shaw.

Cass in

Downes

Vestal

Oglala

Curtiss

Utah

Sunk.

Do.

Do.

Capsized.

Heavily damaged.

Damaged.

Do.

Do.

Heavily damaged.

Damped.

Heavily damaged.

Do.

Heavily damaged (burned).

Do.

Badly damaged.

Sunk.

Damaged.

Capsized.

The Navy and Marine Corps suffered a total of 2,835 casualties, of

which 2,086 officers and men were killed or fatally wounded. Seven

hundred and forty-nine wounded survived. None were missing.^\*

• A total of 92 naval planes (including 5 scout planes from the carrier

Enterprise) were lost and an additional 31 planes damaged.\*^ At the

Ford Island Naval Air Station one hangar was badly damaged by fire

and another suffered minor damage. A complete hai^ar, in which

planes were stored, was destroyed at Kaneohe Naval Air Station along

with the planes therein and the seaplane parking area was damaged.

At the marine base at Ewa a considerable amount of damage was

suffered by material, installations, machinery, tentage, and buudings.

Damage at the base to aircraft was extremely heavy inasmuch as the

primary objective was aircraft on the ground, the att^icks being made

on individual aircraft by enemy planes using explosive and incendiary

bullets from extremely low altitudes.^

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor cannot be separated from the wide-scale operations of which it

was a part. On the evening of December 7, Japanese forces struck Hong Kong, Guam, the Philippine

Islands, Wake and, on the morning of December 8, Midway.

2\* The vessels in Pearl Harbor included 8 battleships; 2 heavy cruisers; 6 light cruisers; 29 destroyers;

5 submarines; 1 gunboat; 8 destroyer minelayers; 1 minelayer; 4 destroyer minesweepers; 6 minesweepers;

and 24 auxiliaries. Committee exhibit No. 6.

Units of the Pacific Fleet not in Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack included: (1) Task Force 8 under

Admiral Halsey, consisting of one aircraft carrier, the Enterprise^ three heavy cruisers, and nine destroyers,

was about 200 miles west of Oahu en route to Pearl Harbor after having ferried Marine Corps fighter planes

to Wake Island. (2) Task Force 12 under Admiral Newton, consisting of one aircraft carrier, the Lexington,

three heavy cruisers, and five destroyers, was about 460 miles southeast of Midw^ en route to Midway

from Pearl Harbor with a squadron of Marine Corps scout bombers. (3) Task Force 3 under Admiral

Wilson Brown, consisting of one heavy cruiser and five destroyer minesweepers, had just arrived off Johnston

Island to conduct tests of a new type landing craft. (4) Other units of the fleet were on isolated missions

of one type or another. See testimony of Admiral Inglis, committee record, pp. 52-55.

26 See committee exhibit No. 6.

26 a See testimony of Admiral Inglis, committee record, p. 131.

27 See testimony of Admiral Inglis, committee record, pp. 128, 135, 136.

28 See committee exhibit No. 6.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 65

Damage to United States Army Forces and Installations as a

Result of the Attack

The Army suffered a total of 600 casualties, including 194 killed in

action and 360 wounded.\*®

A total of 96 Army planes were lost as a result of enemy action,

this figure including aircraft destroyed in depots and those damaged

planes which were subsequently stripped for parts.\*®

In addition, extensive damage was inflicted on Army installations as

reflected by photographic evidence submitted to the committee.\*\*

Japanese Losses

It has been estimated by our own sources, that the Japanese lost a

total of 28 planes, most of them being dive-bombers and torpedo planes,

as a result of Navy action. Three Japanese submarines of 45 tons

each, carrying two torpedoes, were accounted for; two were destroyed

by Navy action and one was grounded off Bellows Field and recovered.

From reports available it is estimated that the Japanese lost, due

solely to Navy action, a minimum of 68 killed. One oflScer, an

ensign, was taken prisoner when he abandoned the submarine which

grounded off Bellows Field.\*\*

General Short reported that 11 enemy aircraft were shot down by

Army pursuit planes and antiaircraft fire.\*\*

Information developed through Japanese sources indicates, however,

that a total of only 29 aircraft were lost and all of the 5 midget sub-

marines.\*^

Summary Comparison of Losses

As a result of the December 7 attack on Hawaii, military and naval

forces of the United States suffered 3,435 casualties; Japan, less than

100. We lost outright 188 planes; Japan, 29. We suffered severe

damage to or loss of 8 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 destroyers, and

4 miscellaneous vessels; Japan lost 5 midget submarines. The as-

toimdingly disproportionate extent pf losses marks the neatest

military and naval disaster in our Nation’s history.\*® The omy com-

pensating feature was the many acts of personal valor during the

attack.\*\* ‘

» In addition 22 were missing in action, 2 died (nonbattle), 1 was declared dead (Public Law 490), and 21

died of wounds. Committee exhibit No. 5.

See testimony of Colonel Thielen, committee record, p. 130. In a statement by General Short concern-

ing events and conditions leading up to the Japanese attack, a total of 128 Army planes are indicated as

having been damaged in the raid. See Roberts (Army) exhibit No. 7,

« See committee record, p. 130; exhibits Nos. 5 and 6.

\*\* See testimony of Admiral Inglis, committee record, p. 128.

M See testimony of Colonel Thielen, committee record, p. 130.

M Committee exhibit No. 8B.

The Japanese estimate of losses inflicted was: 4 battleships, 1 cruiser, and 2 tankers sunk; 4 battle-

ships heavily damaged; 1 battleship lightly damaged; and 260 planes destroyed. Committee exhibit No. 8.

»• In the accounts of some 90 ships under attack, commanding officers have recorded hundreds of acts of

heroism in keeping with the highest traditions of the naval service. No instance is recorded in which the

behavior of crews or individuals left anything to be desired.

References to individual valor are replete with such acts as:

(1) Medical officers and hospital corpsmen rendering aid and treatment while they themselves

needed help.

(2) Officers and men recovering dead and wounded through flame and from flooded compartments.

(3) Fighting fires while in actual physical contact with the flames.

(4) Handling and passing ammunition under heavy fire and strafing.

(5) Repairing ordnance and other equipment under fire.

(6) Remaining at guns and battle stations though wounded or while ships were sinking.

(7) Reporting for further duty to other ships after being blown off their own sinking vessels.

For deeds of extreme heroism on December 7, 15 Medals of Honor have been awarded and 60 Navy

crosses. (Testimony of Admiral Inglis, committee record, pp. 131, 132.)

On the Army side, too, acts of heroism were numerous. Five Distinguished Service Crosses and 65

Silver Stars were awarded to Army personnel for heroism displayed during the December 7 attack.

(Testimony of Colonel Thielen, committee record, p. 133.)

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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

State op Readiness to Meet the Attack

ATTACK A SURPRISE

The Japanese attack came as an utter surprise to the Army and

Navy commanders in Hawaii. The Army was on an alert against

sabotage only with the planes, which were on 4 hours’ notice, lined

up side by side as perfect targets for an attack. The state of readi-

ness aboard naval vessels was the usual state of readiness for vessels in

port. Fifty percent of the Navy planes were on 4 hours’ notice.

Although the Hawaiian forces were completely surprised, two sig-

nificant events occurred on the morning of December 7 which indicated

a possible attack.

The first indication came at 3:50 a. m. when the United States

coastal minesweeper Condor reported sighting the periscope of a

submerged submarine while approximately 1% miles southwest of

the Pearl Harbor entrance buoys, an area in which American sub-

marines were prohibited from operating submerged.\*^ The Navy

destroyer Ward was informed and, after instituting a search, sighted

the periscope of an unidentified submarine apparently trailing a

target repair ship en route to Honolulu harbor. This submarine was

suiOi: shortly after 6:45 a. m. No action was taken apart from dis-

patching the ready-duty destroyer U. S. S. Monaghan to proceed to

sea, to close the net gate to Pearl Harbor, and to attempt to verify

the submarine contact report. The presence of the submarine was

not interpreted as indicating the possibility of an attack on Pearl

Harbor.\*®

The second indication of an attack came at approximately 7:02 a. m.,

December 7, when an Army mobile radar unit detected a large number

of planes approaching Oahu at a distance of 132 miles from 3° east

of north.\*\* These planes were the Japanese attacking force. The

aircraft warning information center, which closed down at 7 a. m.

on the morning of December 7, was advised of the approaching planes

at 7:20 a. m. An Army lieutenant, whose tour of duty at the imorma-

tion center was for training and observation and continued until

8 a. m., took the call and instructed the radar operators in effect to

“forget it.” His estimate of the situation appears to have been

occasioned by reason of a feeling that the detected fiight was either

a naval patrol, a fiight of Hickam Field bombers, or possibly some

B-17’s from the maimand that were scheduled to arrive at Hawaii on

December 7.

PERSONNEL

A summarized statement of Navy personnel actually on board ship

at the beginning of the attack is as follows:^®

On board

Commanding officers of battleships 5 out of 8.

Commanding officers of cruisers 6 out of 7.

Commanding officers of destroyers 63 percent.

.Damage control officers of battlesliips 6 out of 8.

See committee exhibit No. 112, p. 96.

See discussion, infra, of the submarine contact on the inorniiiK of Pecomber 7.

\*• See committee exhibit No. 165.

<0 See testimony of Admiral Inglis, committee record, p. 103.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

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Average percentage of officers:

Battleships (approximate) 60 to 70 percent.

Cruisers, battle force (approximate) 65 percent.

Destroyers, battle force (approximate) 50 percent.

Average percentage of men:

Battleships 95 percent.

Cruisers, battle force 98 percent.

Destroyers, battle force 85 percent.

There were ample personnel present and ready to man all naval

shore installations.

In the case of the Army, a summary report compiled by the Adju-

tant General of the Hawaiian Department indicates that at least

85 percent of the officers and men were present with their units at

8 a. m., December 7.^\*

ANTIAIRCRAFT

All naval antiaircraft batteries, consisting of 780 guns, were

ship-based ; that is, located on the ships in Pearl Harbor. At the time

of the attack, roughly one-fourth of all antiaircraft guns were manned,

and within 7 to 10 minutes, all antiaircraft batteries were manned and

firing. It appears that all naval batteries were in operating condi-

tion; the number of temporary gun stoppages during action was so

low as to be negligible. All ships had the full service allowance of

ammunition on board, except in a few instances where removal was

necessary because of repairs in progress, and ammunition was ready

at the guns in accordance with existing directives. Ready antiair-

craft machine guns opened fire immediately and within an average esti-

mated time of under 5 minutes practically all battleship anti-

aircraft batteries were firing; cruisers were firing all antiaircraft

batteries within an average time of 4 minutes; and destroyers, though

opening up with machine guns almost immediately, averaged 7

minutes in bringing all antiaircraft guns into action. Minor com-

batant types had all joined in the fire within 10 minutes after the

beginning of the attack.^

In the case of the Army, the following table reflects the places and

times at which antiaircraft units were in position:^^

Regiment

Battery

In position and ready

to fire

Sixty-fourth (alerted at 8:15a.m.)..

A (searchlight) at Honolulu

10:00 a. m.

B (3-inch) at Aiea

10:00 a. m.

C (3-inch) at Aliamanu

10:30 a. m.

D (3-inch) south of Aliamanu

11:00 a. m.

E (searchlight) at Ewa-Pearl Harbor

(Time not known.)

11:05 a. m.

F (3-inch) at Pearl Citv

G (3-inch) at Ahua Point.

10:30 a. ra.

H (3-inch) at Fort Weaver -

1 1 :45 a. m.

I (37-mm.) at Aliamanu..

[(Known only that bat-

< teries were m posi-

1 tion before 11:45a.m.)

11:55 a. m.

K (37-mm.) at Hickara Field

L (37-mm.) at Hickam Field

M (37-mm.) at Wheeler Field

Ninety-seventh (alerted between

7:55 and 8:10 a. m.).

A (searchlight) at Fort Karaehameha

F (3-inch) at Fort Kamehameha

O (3-inch) at Fort Weaver

H (3-inch) at Fort Barrett

8:34 a. m.

8:55 a. m.

8:30 a. m.

10:20 a. m.

N inety-eighth

A (searchlight) at Schofield Barracks...

(Time not known.)

9:55 a. m.

B (3-inch) at Schofield Barracks

C (3-inch) at Schofield Barracks

10:30 a. m.

D (3-inch) at Puuloa dump, south of Ewa...

F (3-inch) at Kaneohe Naval Air Station

G (3-inch) at Kaneohe Naval Air Station

H (3-inch) at Waipahu High School

11:45 a. m.

1:15 p. m.

1:15 p. m.

1:30 p. m.

« See testimony of Colonel Thielen, committee record, p. 114.

« See testimony of Admiral Inglis, committee record, pp. 123, 124

« See committee exhibit No. 5.

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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Regiment

Battery

In position and ready

to fire

Two Hundred and Fifty-first..

A (searchlight) at Ewa.

(Tiiffe not known.)

B (3-inch) at West Loch

11:45 a. m.

C (3-inch) at Ewa Beach

11:45 a. m.

D (3-inch) at South of Ewa

11:45 a. m.

E (50-caliber) at Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor..

12:41 p. m.

F (37-mm.) at Navy recreation area

12:30 p. m.

G (37-mm.) at tank farm, Schofield Barracks.

11:00 a. m.

H (37-mm.) at Navy Yard

12:05 p. m.

One antiaircraft detachment was located at Sand Island when the

attack started and engaged the enemy with 3-inch guns at 8:15 a. m.,

shooting down two enemy planes at that time.

The foregomg table reflects that of 31 army antiaircraft batteries,

27 were not in position and ready to fire until after the attack and in

several instances not for a considerable period of time after the attack.

The extraordinary lack of readiness of Army antiaircraft units

appears to have been occasioned largely by the time required for

moving into position and the fact that ammunition was not readily

accessible to the mobile batteries.^

AIRCRAFT

Seven Navy patrol flying boats were in the air at the time of the

attack. Three of these planes were engaged in a routine search of

the fleet operating area approximately 120 miles south of Oahu and

the remaining four were engaged in intertype tactical exOTcises with

United States submarines near Lahaina Roads. Eight scout bombers

that had been launched from the carrier Enterprise, which was 200

miles west of Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack, for the purpose

of searching ahead of the ship and then landing at Ewa, arrived during

the attack and engaged Japanese aircraft. Three of these planes

landed after the attack while the remaining five were lost.\*® The

majority of the Navy planes were on 4 hours’ notice.\*\*

In the case of the Army, planes were generally on 4 hours’ notice.

Between 25 and 35 planes, these being fighters, took off after the

attack began and before it was concluded."

Action Taken Following the Attack

An effort was made in the course of and after the attack, through

planes already in the air and those that could get into the air during

\*\* Colonel Thielen stated: “• • • only a limited amount of ammunition was in the hands of troops of

the Hawaiian Department. The Coast Artillery Command had previously been authorized to draw, and

had drawn, ammunition for its fixed positions only, including antiaircraft. However, at these installations,

the shells were kept in boxes in order to keep the ammunition from damage and deterioration. The ammu-

nition for the mobile gims and batteries was in storage chiefiy at Aliamanu Crater and Schofield Barracks.

The Infantry and Artillery units of the Twenty-fourth and Twenty-fifth Divisions had only a small amount

of machine gun and rifie ammunition. All divisional artillery ammunition, grenades, and mortar shells

were in the ordnance storage depots, principally at Schofield Barracks.’\* Committee record, pp. 119, 120.

The situation with respect to artillery ammunition was testified to by General Burgin as follows: \*‘They

were all ready to go into action immediately, with the exception that the mobile batteries did not have the

ammunition. The fixed batteries along the seacoast, those batteries bolted down to concrete, had the

ammunition nearby. I had insisted on that with General Short in person and had gotten his permission

to take this antiaircraft ammunition, move it into the seacoast gun battery positions, and have it nearby

the antiaircraft guns. It was, however, boxed up in wooden boxes and had to be taken out. The ammu-

nition for the mobile guns and batteries was in Aliamanu Crater, which, you may know or may not, is about

a mile from Fort Shatter, up in the old volcano. The mobile batteries had to send there to get ammunition.

In addition to that, the mobile batteries had to move out from the various posts to their field positions.

They were not in field positions.” Roberts Commission Record, pp. 2604-2605.

See committee record, pp. 71, 72.

« Admiral Bellinger stated that of 62 patrol planes at Oahu, 2 were on 15-minute notice, 8 on 30-minute

notice, 9 were undergoing repairs, and 42 were on 4 hours’ notice. Committee record, p. 9303.

« See committee exhibit No. 5.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

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and following the attack, to locate the Japanese carrier force but to

no avail. The attacking planes withdrew and were recovered by the

fleet units without the latter being detected.

While it appears some planes under Navy direction were assigned

to search the sector to the north of Oahu, generally regarded as the

dangerous sector from the standpoint of an air attack, they were

diverted to the southwest by reason of a false report that the Japa-

nese carriers were in that direction.\*\*

The deplorable featme of the action following the attack was the

failure of the Navy and Army to coordinate their efforts through

intell^ence at hand. The same Army radar imit that had tracked

the Japanese force in, plotted it back out to the north.\*\* Yet this

vital information, which would have made possible an effective search,

was employed by neither service.\*®

Defensive Forces and Facilities of the Navy at Hawaii

The principal vessels in Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack were

8 battleships, 8 cruisers, and 29 destroyers. Inasmuch as there were

no naval antiaircraft shore batteries in or around Pearl Harbor at the

time of the Japanese attack, these warships provided the chief anti-

aircraft defense. The ship-based antiaircraft batteries totaled 780

guns, 427 of which had an effective range of from 500 to 2,500 yards

and the remainder from 5,000 to 12,000 yards.®^

The Navy is indicated to have had a total of 169 planes at Hawaii

prior to the attack, 71 of which were patrol bombers and 15 fighter

planes.®\* It is to be noted, however, that Admiral Bellinger in a

report to Admiral Kimmel on December 19, 1941, concerning the

availability and disposition of patrol planes on the morning of Decem-

ber 7 indicated 69 patrol planes as being at Hawaii. His tabulation

was as follows: ®\*

In commis-

sion

Top available

for flight

Under repair

Ready at

base

In air

At Kaneohe

36

33

3

80

3

At Pearl

33

28

5

24

4

At Midway

12

11

1

4

7

Total

81

72

9

58

14

It thus appears that a total of 61 patrol planes were available for flight

as of December 7. Fifty-four of the patrol planes were new PBY-5’s

that had been recently ferried to Hawaii between October 28 and

November 23, 1941. Admiral Bellinger indicated that the new

« Admiral Smith, Chief of Staff to Admiral Kimmel, said he did not get the information as to the prob-

able location from which the Japanese carriers launched the attack for some 2 days. There was a gn^at

deal of confusion including false civilian reports of troop parachute landings and a false report from one of

our own planes concerning an enemy carrier to the south. A chart showing the position of the Japanese

carriers was taken from a Japanese plane by the Army on December 7 but was not shown the Navy until

the afternoon. See Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 564.

With further respect to the confusion that prevailed. Captain Rochefort stated that when the attack

began his communications unit at Pearl Harbor lost all contact with the “direction finder” stations,

located at Lualualei and Aiea, and that in consequence no bearings on the attacking Japanese force were

received by his unit. He commented that the failure of communications was the result of an accident,

caused by Army personnel setting up new circuits. See Hewitt inquiry record, pp. 63, 64.

See committee exhibit No. 155 for original radar plot of Opana station, December 7, 1941.

•• Admiral Kitts said that on December 8 while in conference with General Davidson he was shown a

plot showing planes coming in to Oahu and going out again. This plot was not reported to the Navy

until Kitts saw it on December 8; See Hewitt inquiry record, p. 520.

•1 See testimony of Admiral Inglis, committee record, p. 122.

\*\* See cpmmitt^ exhibit No. 6.

M Seeibramittee exhibit No. 120

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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

PBY-5’s were ej^eriencing the usual shake-down difficulties and were

hampered in maintenance by an absence of spare parts. He pointed

out that 12 of the patrol planes indicated as available for flight had

returned from Midway on December 5 after an arduous tour of duty

at Midway and Wake since October 17, and were in relatively poor

material condition because of the extended operations.\*^

While radar equipment was available on three of the battleships and

on one seaplane tender, it was not being manned inasmuch as the height

of the land surrounding Pearl Harbor rendered ships’ radar ineffective.®\*

Defensive Forces and Facilities of the Army in Hawaii

As of December 6, 1941, General Short had a total of 42,959 officers

and men under his command. The principal elements of the Hawaiian

Department were 2 infantry divisions and supporting ground troops

composing the beach and land defense forces; the Coast Artillery

Command, consisting of the seacoast and antiaircraft defense forces;

and the Hawaiian Air Force.\*\*

The Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command had a total of 213 anti-

aircraft guns.\*^ Eighty-six were 3-inch antiaircraft guns (70 percent

mobile); 20, 37-millimeter; and 107 caliber .50.

The Army on December 7, prior to the attack, had a total of 227

planes \*\* located principally at Hickam, Wlieeler, and Bellows Fields.

They consisted of 12 heavy bombers; 36 medium bombers (obsoles-

cent); 14 light bombers (2 obsolescent) ; 152 pursuit planes (53 obsoles-

cent) ; and 13 observation planes.\*\* Eighty-seven of these planes for

one reason or another were not available for flight, including 6 of the

heavy bombers and 58 of the pursuit planes. Ninety-four pursuit

planes (including 30 of the obsolescent craft) were available for flight.

In addition, the Army had six mobile radar units which were avail-

able and in operating condition.\*®

Comparison of Strength and Losses: Japanese Attacking Force

AND Hawaiian Defensive Forces

The Japanese attacking force brought to bear 360 planes incident

to the attack; whereas the Army and Navy together had a total of

402 planes of all types, not taking into account those not available for

flight on the morning of December 7. The operating strength of the

opposing forces by comparison follows:

»\*Id.

M The only ships in Pearl Harbor equipj^ with ship search radar on December 7 were the battleships

Pennsylvania, California, and West Virginia and the seaplane tender Curtiss. The radar equipment on

these ships was not manned since the height of the land around Pearl Harbor would have made it ineffec-

tive. The equipment of the Curtiss was put into operation at the beginning of the first attack and that

on the Pennsylvania began to operate 15 minutes later, both with negative results. There were no naval

radar stations on shore in Hawaii. See testimony of Admiral Inglis, committee record, p. 82.

See testimony of Colonel Thielen, committee record, p. 64; also committee exhibit No. 5.

w The principal weapons of the Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command included: 4 16-inch guns, 2 14-inch

guns (obsolescent), 4 12-inch guns (2 obsolescent), 4 3-inch seacoast guns, 36 155-millimeter guns, 86 3-inch

antiaircraft guns (70 percent mobile), 20 37-millimeter antiaircraft guns, and 107 caliber .50 antiaircraft guns.

Committee exhibit No. 5.

M The statement of General Short of events and conditions leading up to the Japanese attack, Roberts

(Army) exhibit No. 7, reflected the status of planes as follows: Pursuit planes in commission, 80; pursuit

planes out of commission, 69; reconnaissance planes in commission, 6; reconnaissance planes out of com-

mission, 7; bombers in commission, 39; bombers out of commission, 33.

M See committee exhibit No. 5.

w Three additional radar units calling for permanent installation were not as yet in operating condition.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

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Japanese attacking force

Fighters ®^81

Dive bombers 135

Horizontal bombers 104

Torpedo planes 40

Defending forces Available for Not available

^ ^ flight for flight

Fighters. (30 obsolescent) 108 59

Navy patrol bombers 61 8

Navy scout bombers 36 1

Army observation planes 11 2

Miscellaneous Navy ^anes 45 1

(Planes from carrier Enterprise which joined the defense) 8

Army-Navy antiaircraft 993 guns

A comparison of losses or severe damage in summary form is as

follows:

J apanese attacking force Defending force

Personnel (less than) 100 3,435

Planes 29 188

SWps 0 “18

Submarines (midget) 5 i 0

Facilities. (Extensive damage to Army and Navy installations on Oahu.)

• 8 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 destroyers, and 4 miscellaneous vessels.

The extreme disproportion of Army and Navy losses to equip-

ment and facilities at hand is traceable to the complete surprise of

the commanders in Hawaii when the Japanese struck on the morning of

December 7. The Japanese employed, it is true, a powerful attack-

ing force, much more powerful than they had been thought capable of

utilizing in a single tactical venture. They executed the attack with a

skill, daring, and military know-how of which we thought them incapa-

ble. However, as reflected by the comparison of relative strength, the

Hawaiian commanders had formidable defensive forces which if

properly coordinated and brought into play should have been capable

of inflicting severe damage on the Japanese raiders and repelling the

attack to a degree. How great the losses that might have been

inflicted on the attacking force and the extent to which the attack

might have been repulsed wfll forever remain a matter of conjecture —

the real power of the defenses of Hawaii was not brought into the

fight.®\*\*

There can be no question that some damage would have been in-

flicted irrespective of the state of alertness that might have prevailed;

for te a ij^tary proposition it is agreed that some attacking planes

will invariably get tl^ugh the screen of defense and carry home the

attack. This is largely true no matter how fully equipped and how

alert a garrison may be.®® But this fact does not draw forth the con-

« It is reported that of the Japanese fighter planes, 39 were kept around the carriers as interceptors incase

the American planes got in the air and made an attack. Committee Exhibit No. 8D (Enclosure 1, p. 2),

It is interesting to note that Admiral Bloch testified that had the Japanese attacked the oil supply at

Oahu, the drydocks, repair shops, barracks and other facilities instead of the airfields and ships of the fleet,

the United States would have been hurt more so far as the prosecution of the war was concerned even though

we did have a terrific loss of life. He pointed out that the oil storage was in tanks above the ground or visible

from the air. See Hart Inquiry Record, p. 94.

It is interesting to note that the Japanese had estimated the air strength in Hawaii at roughly twice

the actual strength and had expected to lose one-third of the striking force, including two of the aircraft

carriers. See discussion “The Role of Espionage in the Attack" Part III, infra.

M It appears agreed as a military proposition that carrier-borne planes must be caught before they are

launched in order to repel successfully a carrier attack. See, for example, testiiigDny of Admiral Bellinger,

Navy Court of Inquiry Record, p. 686; also Admiral Stark, Id., pp. 1023, 1024.

As stated by the Navy Court of Inquiry: “An attack by carrier aircraft can be prevented only by inter-

cepting and destroying the carrier prior to the launching of planes. Once launched, attacking planes can

be prevented from inflicting damage only by other planes or antiaircraft gunfire or both. Even when a

determined air attack is intercepted, engaged by aircraft, and opposed by gunfire, some of the attacking

planes rarely fail to get through and inflict damage." See Navy Court of Inquiry Report, committee

exhibits Nos. 157 and 181.

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elusion that the attackers cannot and must not be made to pay and

pay heavily.

The disaster of Pearl Harbor lies in the failure of the Army and

Navy in Hawaii to make their fight with the equipment at hand —

it was not that they had no equipment, for they did, but that they did

not utilize what they had. This failure is attributable to the complete

surprise with which the attack came. It is proper, therefore, to

inquire at this point to determine whether the Hawaiian commanders

should thus have been surprised and, more particularly, whether

they were justified in emploving their defensive facilities in a manner

least calculated to meet the Japanese on the morning of December 7.

{The responsibilities relating to the disaster affecting both Hawaii and

Washington will be found treated in Parts III and TV, respectively,

infra.)

Part III

RESPONSIBILITIES IN HAWAII

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PART III. RESPONSIBILITIES IN HAWAII

Consciousness of Danger From Air Attack

ADMIRAL KIMMEL’s AWARENESS OP DANGER FROM AIR ATTACK

The Japanese raiding force approached the island of Oahu with

virtually no danger of detection and executed its treacherous attack

at a time when only a minimum state of readiness prevailed to meet

it.\* One of the causes of the disaster in consequence must lie in the

failure to employ facilities available to detect the attacking force in

sufficient time to effect a state of readiness best designed to repel or

minimize the attack. That the attack on Pearl Harbor surprised

the defending Army and Navy establishments is indisputable. The

question therefore becomes, as previously indicated: Under all of the

circumstances should the responsible commanders at Hawaii have

been surprised or, more particularly, were they justified in failing to

employ adequately the defensive facilities available to them on the

morning of December 7, 1941? \*

The estimate of both Admirals Richardson ® and Kimmel \* in a letter

which they jointly prepared and dispatched to the Chief of Naval

Operations on January 25, 1941, pointed out that if Japan entered the

war or committed an overt act against the United States our position

would be primarily defensive in the Pacific.® There were outlined in

the letter certain assumptions upon which the action of the Pacific

Fleet would be predicated, including:

(o) United States is at war with Germany and Italy; (6) war with Japan immi-

nent; (c) Japan may attack without warning, and these attacks may take any

form — even to attacks by Japanese ships flying German or Italian flags or by sub-

marines, under a doubtful presumption that they may be considered German or

Italian; and (d) Japanese attacks may be expected against shipping, outlying

positions, or naval units. Surprise raids on Pearl Harbor, or attempts to block

the channel are possible.

It was pointed out that the tasks to be undertaken by the fleet with

respect to these assumptions included the taking of full security

\* See section “State of Readiness/' Part II, supra.

\* The Army Pearl Harbor Board said: “Therefore, the situation on December 7 can be summed up as

follows: No distant reconnaissance was being conducted by the Navy; the usual four or five PBY's were

not out: the antiaircraft artillery was not out on its usual Sunday maneuvers with the Fleet air arm; the

naval carriers with their planes were at a distance from Oahu on that Sunday; the aircraft were on the

ground, were parked, both Army and Navy, closely adjacent to one another; the Fleet was in the harbor

with the exception of Task Forces 9 and 12, which included some cruisers, destroyers, and the two carriers

Lerington and Enterprise. Ammunition for the Army was, with the exception of that near the fixed anti-

aircraft guns, in ordnance storehouses, and the two combat divisions as well as the antiaircraft artillery

were in their permanent quarters and not in battle positions. Everything was concentrated in close con-

fines by reason of antisabotage Alert No. 1. This made of them easy targets for an air attack. In short,

everything that was done made the situation perfect for an air attack and the Japanese took full advantage of it'\*

See Report of Army Pearl Harbor Board, Committee Exhibit No. 157.

\* Admiral James O. Richardson, who preceded Admiral Kimmel as commander in chief of the Pacific

Fleet.

« Admiral Husband E. Kimmel assumed command of the United States Pacific Fleet on February 1, 1941.

and served in that capacity until December 17, 1941. The evidence clearly indicates that while Admiral

Kimmel was promoted over several other officers with more seniority, his selection was made because he was

regarded as preeminently qualified for the position of commander in chief.

• See Navy Court of Inquiry exhibit No. 70.

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measures for the protection of the fleet in port and at sea. There-

after there were set forth observations concerning the existing de-

ficiencies in the defenses of Oahu.

Under date of January 24, 1941, the Secretary of Navy addressed a

communication to the Secretary of War, with copies designated for the

commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet and the commandant of the

Foin:teenth Naval District, observing among other things: ®

The security of the U. S. Pacific Fleet while in Pearl Harbor, and of the Pearl

Harbor' Naval Base itself, has been under renewed study by the Navy Depart-

ment and forces afloat for the past several weeks. This reexamination has been,

in part, prompted by the increased gravity of the situation with respect to Japan,

and by reports from abroad of successful bombing and torpedo plane attacks on

ships while in bases. If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible

that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the Fleet or the Naval

Base at Pearl Harbor.

In my opinion, the inherent possibilities of a major disaster to the Fleet or

naval base warrant taking every step, as rapidly as can be done, that will increase

the joint readiness of the Army and Navy to withstand a raid of the character

mentioned above.

The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are con-

sidered to be:

(1) Air bombing attack.

(2) Air torpedo plane attack.

(3) Sabotage.

(4) Submarine attack.

(5) Mining.

(6) Bombardment by gun fire.

Defense against aU but the first two of these dangers appears to have been pro-

vided for satisfactorily. The following paragraphs are devoted principaUy to a

discussion of the problems encompassed in (1) and (2) above, the solution of

which I consider to be of primary importance.

Both types of air attack are possible. They may be carried out successively,

simultaneously, or in combination with any of the other operations enumerated.

The maximum probable enemy effort may be put at twelve aircraft squadrons,

and the minimum at two. Attacks would be launched from a striking force of

carriers and their supporting vessels.

The counter measures to be considered are:

(a) Location and engagement of enemy carriers and supporting vessels

before air attack can be launched;

(b) Location and engagement of enemy aircraft before they reach their

objectives;

(c) Repulse of enemy aircraft by antiaircraft fire;

(d) Concealment of vital installations by artificial smoke;

(e) Protection of vital installations by balloon barrages.

The operations set forth in (a) are largely functions of the Fleet but, quite

possibly, might not be carried out in case of an air attack initiated without warning

prior to a declaration of war. Pursuit aircraft in large numbers and an effective

warning net are required for the operations in (b). It is understood that only

thirty-six Army pursuit aircraft are at present in Oahu, and that, while the organ-

ization and equipping of an Anti- Air Information Service supported by modern

fire control equipment is in progress, the present system relies wholly on visual

observation and sound locators which are only effective up to four miles. \* \* \*

The foregoing communication was seen by Admiral Kimmel shortly

after he assumed command.^

The Secretary of War on February 7, 1941, replied to the letter of

the Secretary of Navy in the following terms: \*

1. In replying to your letter of January 24, regarding the possibility of surprise

attacks upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor, I wish to express com-

plete concurrence as to the importance of this matter and the urgency of our mak-

ing every possible preparation to meet such a hostile effort. The Hawaiian

» Committee Exhibit No. 10.

f Admiral Elmmel testified: «\* \* ♦ i saw the letter of the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War

dated January 24, 1941, early in February 1941. Navy Court of Inquiry Record, p. 286.

\* Navy Court of Inquiry exhibit No. 24.

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Department is the best equipped of all our overseas departments, and continues to

hold a high priority for the completion of its projected defenses because of the

importance of giving full protection to the Fleet.

2. The Hawaiian Project provides for one hundred and forty-eight pursuit

planes. There are now in Hawaii thirty-six pursuit planes; nineteen of these are

F-36’s and seventeen are of somewhat less efficiency. I am arranging to have

thirtjr-one P-36 pursuit planes assembled at San Diego for shipment to Hawaii

within the next ten days, as agreed to with the Navy Department. This will

bring the Army pursuit ^oup in Hawaii up to fifty of the P-36 type and seventeen

of a somewhat less efficient type. In addition, fifty of the new P-4Q-B pursuit

planes, with their guns, leakproof tanks and modern armor will be assembled at

San Diego about March 15 for shipment by carrier to Hawaii.

3. There are at present in the Hawaiian Islands eighty-two 3-inch A A guns,

twenty 37 mm A A guns (en route), and one hundred and nine caliber .50 A A

machine guns. The total project calls for ninety-eight 3-inch guns, one hundred

and twenty 37 mm A A guns, and three hundred and eight caliber .50 A A machine

guns.

4. With reference to the Aircraft Warning Service, the equipment therefor

has been ordered and will be delivered in Hawaii in June. All 'arrangements for

installation will have been made by the time the equipment is delivered. Inquiry

develops the information that delivery of the necessary equipment cannot be

made at an earlier date.

5. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, is being directed to give

immediate consideration to the question of the employment of balloon barrages

and the use of smoke in protecting the Fleet and base facilities. Barrage balloons

are not available at the present time for installation, and cannot be made available

prior to the summer of 1941. At present there are three on hand and eighty-four

being manufactured — forty for delivery by June 30, 1941, and the remainder by

September. The Budget now has under consideration funds for two thousand

nine hundred and fifty balloons. The value of smoke for screening vital areas

on Oahu is a controversial subject. Qualified opinion is that atmospheric and

geographic conditions in Oahu render the employment of smoke impracticable

for large-scale screening operations. However, the Commanding General will

look into this matter again.

6. With reference to your other proposals for joint defense, I am forwarding

a copy of your letter and this reply to the Commanding General, Hawaiian

Dep^ment, and am directing him to cooperate with the local naval authorities

in making those measures effective.''

In a letter to the Chief of Naval Operations dated January 27,

1941,® Admiral Kimmel stated he thought the supply of an adequate

number of Army planes imd guns for the defense of Pearl Harbor

should be given the highest priority.

It should be noted at this point in considering the letter of the

Secretary of Navy dated January 24, 1941, that the following dis-

patch dated February 1, 1941, was sent the commander in chief of

the Pacific Fleet from the Chief of Naval Operations concerning the

subject ‘‘Rumored Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor^':

1. The following is forwarded for your information. Under date of 27 January

the American Ambassador at Tokyo telegraphed the State Department to the

following effect:

‘'The Peruvian Minister has informed a member of my staff that he has heard

from many sources, including a Japanese source, that in the event of trouble break-

ing out between the United States and Japan, the Japanese intend to make a

surprise attack against Pearl Harbor with all of their strength and employing all

of their equipment. The Peruvian Minister considered the rumors fantastic.

Nevertheless he considered them of sufficient importance to convey this informa-

tion to a member of my staff."

2. The Division of Naval Intelligence places no credence in these rumors.

Furthermore, based on known data regarding the present disposition and employ-

ment of Japanese Naval and Army forces, no move against Pearl Harbor appears

imminent or planned for in the foreseeable future.

t Committee exhibit No. 106.

!• This dispatch is indicated to have been dictated by Lt. Comdr. (now Captain) A. H, McCollum on

January 31, i941. See committee exhibit No. 15.

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The estimate made concerning the information supplied by the

Peruvian Minister with respect to a rumored Japanese surprise attack

on Pearl Harbor and a copy of the Secretary of the Navy’s letter of

January 24 were received by Admiral Kimmel at approximately the

same time and are in apparent conflict. However, the dispatch of

February 1 was an estimate of the rumor concerning the Japanese

plan to make a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor based on the then pres-

ent disposition and employment of Japanese forces, whereas the Sec-

retary’s letter relates to the dangers of the Pearl Harbor situation in

contemplation of future conflict with Japan. The communications

apparently were so interpreted by Admiral Kimmel for in a letter

dated February 18, 1941, to the Chief of Naval Operations he said: “

I feel that a surprise attack (submarine, air, or combined) on Pearl Harbor is

a possibility. We are taking immediate practical steps to minimize the damage

inflicted and to ensure that the attacking force will pay.

In a letter of February 15, 1941 the Chief of Naval Operations

wrote Admiral Kimmel concerning antitorpedo baffles for protection

against air-torpedo attack on Pearl Harbor. He stated that the con-

gestion in the harbor and the necessity for maneuverabihty limited

the practicability of the then present type of baffles. Further, the

letter indicated that the shallow depth of water in Pearl Harbor limited

the need for torpedo nets; that a minimum depth of water of 75 feet

might be assumed necessary to drop torpedoes successfully from

planes and that the desirable height for dropping is 60 feet or less. A

similar communication was sent Admiral Bloch, the commandant of

the Fourteenth Naval District, among others, requesting his recom-

mendations and comments concerning me matter.^®

In a letter of March 20,^^ Admiral Bloch replied, stating that the

depth of water at Pearl Harbor was 45 feet and for this reason among

others he did not recommend antitorpedo baffles. Admiral Kimmd

was in agreement with this recommendation until such time as a hght

efflcient net was developed.^^

However, in Jime of 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations directed a

communication to the commandants of naval districts as follows:

1 \* ♦ \* Commandants were requested to consider the employment of, and

to make recommendations concerning, antitorpedo baffles especially for the pro-

tection of large and valuable units of the fleet in their respective harbors and

especially at the major fleet bases. In paragraph 3 were itemized certain limita-

tions to consider in the use of A/T baffles among which the following was stated:

‘‘A minimum depth of water of 75 feet may be assumed necessary to success-

fully drop torpedoes from planes. About two hundred yards of torpedo run is

necessary before the exploding device is armed, but this may be altered.’’

2. Recent developments have shown that United States and British torpedoes

may be dropped from planes at heights of as much as three hundred feet, and in

some cases make initial dives of considerably less than 75 feet, and make excellent

runs. Hence, it may be stated that it cannot be assumed that any capital ship or

other valuable vessel is safe when at anchor from this type of attack if surrounded

by water at a sufficient run to arm the torpedo.

3. While no minimum depth of water in which naval vessels may be anchored

can arbitrarily be assumed as providing safety from torpedo-plane attack, it may

Committee exhibit No. 106.

1\* Id., No. 116.

w Letter from Chief of Naval Operations dated February 17, 1941. Committee exhibit No. 116.

Committee exhibit No. 116.

1\* Letter to the Chief of Naval Operations dated March 12, 1941. Committee exhibit No. 116.

Letter dated June 13, 1941, from Chief of Naval Operations to commandants of all naval districts. Com-

mittee exhibit No. 116. This communication made reference to the observations set forth in the letter of

February 17, 1941 (committee exhibit No. 116), pointing out certain limitations with respect to air torpedo

attack. Note 13, supra.

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be assumed that depth of water will be one of the factors considered by any attack-

ing force, and an attack launched in relatively deep water (10 fathoms or more)

is much more likely.

4. As a matter of information the torpedoes launched by the British at Taranto

were, in general, in thirteen to fifteen fathoms of water, although several torpedoes

may have been launched in eleven or twelve fathoms.^^

The foregoing communication clearly indicated that preconceived

views concerning the invulnerability of Pearl Harbor to air-torpedo

attack were in error.

Admiral Kimmel himself stated that during his visit to Washington

in June of 1941 he told the President and Admiral Stark of certain

dangers to the fleet at Pearl Harbor including air attack, blocking of

the harbor, and similar matters.'^

GENKRAL SHORX’S AWARENESS OF DANGER FROM AIR ATTACK

On February 7, 1941, General Short “ assumed command of the

Hawaiian Department of the Army. Upon his arrival he bad the

benefit of conversations with General Herron,^ his predecessor, with

respect to problems prevaibng in the D^artment. Significantly,

General Herron had been directed by the War Department on June

17, 1940, to institute an alert against a possible trans-Pacific raid.^\*

This alert was an all-out endeavor with full eguipment and ammu-

nition and lasted 6 weeks. It was suspended after the 6-week period

and thereafter resumed for some time. Planes had been dispersed

and gun crews alerted with the ammimition available. The Com-

•manding General had the benefit of all the plans and operations inci-

cent to the so-called “Herron alert” as a guide in estimating the steps

to be taken on the occasion of a threat of enemy attack.

General Short saw both the letter from the Secretary of Navy dated

January 24 and the reply of the Secretary of War dated February 7,

set forth in the preceding section, concerning the danger of attack

from the air.“ ,

Under date of February 7, 1941, General Marshall directed a letter

to General Short relating in utmost clarity the problems and responsi-

bility of General Short in his new command.\*® . This letter, which

referred to a conversation with Admiral Stark, pointed out that there

was need for additional planes and antiaircraft guns; that the fullest

protection for the Pacific Fleet was the rather than a major consider-

ation of the Army; that the risk of sabotage and the risk involved in

a surprise raid by air and by submarine constituted the real perils of

the situation; and, again, that they were keeping clearly in mmd that

the first concern is to protect the fleet.

On February 19, 1941, General Short wrote General Marshall ^

pointing out, among other thin^, the great importance of (1) coopera-

tion with the Navy; (2) dispersion and protection of aircraft and of the

repair, maintenance, and servicing of aircraft; (3) impro^ment of the

A fathom is 6 feet.

The evidence reflects repeated efforts by the Chief of Naval Operations to secure from the Bureau of

Ordnance more eflicient light-weight baffles. See committee exhibit No. 116.

Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 367.

Lt. Qen. Walter C. Short served as commanding general of the Hawaiian Department from February

7, 1941, to December 17, 1941.

\*• Maj. Gen. Charles D. Herron.

» See Army Pearl Harbor Board record, pp. 213-215.

» Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 237.

» Committee exhibit No. 53, pp. 1-3.

»• Id., at pp. 4-9.

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antiaircraft defense; (4) improvement Of the situation with reference to

searchlights; and (5) bombproofing of vital installations such as com-

mand posts and communication centers. General Short advised the

Chief of Staff that he was taking the necessary steps in fine with the

important needs of the Department.

On March 5, 1941, the Chief of Staff wrote General short: \*\*

I would appreciate your early review of the situation in the Hawaiian Depart-

ment with regard to defense from air attack. The establishment erf a satisfactory

system of coordinating all means available to this end is a matter of first priority.

In a letter to the Chief of Stajff dated March 6, 1941,^ General Short

observed that the Aircraft Warning Service was vital to the defense of

the Hawaiian Islands and referred to delays in construction and

estabhshment of sites. In a subsequent letter General Short again

referred to the necessity for the dispersion and protection of aircraft as

well as to the matter of coordinating antiaircraft defense. A letter

dated March 28, 1941,^® from General Marshall made reference to

General Short's proposal for reheving congestion by the construction

of an additional airfield and by the dispersion of OTOunded aircraft in

protected bunkers at existing airfields with the observation that the

proposal was undoubtedly sound. He also indicated his hopefulness of

arranging for the early augmentation of the antiaircraft garrison.

On April 14, 1941, General Short wrote the Chief of Staff, as fol-

lows: ®

Knowing that you are very much interested in the progress that we are making

in cooperating with the Navy, I am enclosing the following agreements made with

them:

1. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Department, and Four-

teenth Naval District, Annex No. VII, Section VI, Joint Security Measure.

2. Agreement signed by the Commander of the Hawaiian Air Force and

Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force, to implement the above agree-

ment.

3. Field Orders No. 1 NS (Naval Security) putting into effect for the Army

the provisions of the joint agreenaent.

I have found both Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch very cooperative and

we all feel steps have been taken which make it possible for the Army and Navy

air forces to act together and with the unity of command as the situation requires.

We still have some de'tail work to do with reference to coordinating the air force

and the antiaircraft defense. I hope we shall arrive at something on that in the

near future. The more I go into the details the more I am becoming convinced

that it will be necessary for us to set up an air defense command. Some months

before my arrival this matter was considered and at that time the conclusion was

reached that it was not necessary. On this account I am anxious that both General

Martin and General Gardner attend the West Coast Air Defense Exercise in the

Fall.

Everything is going along extremely well although there is a great deal to be

done as rapidly as possible. The Navy has felt very much encouraged by the

increase in our Air and Antiaircraft defense. I shall write you from time to time

as matters come up which I think will interest you.

In a letter to the Chief of Staff dated May 29, 1941, General Short

made the flowing comments concerning the first phase of their

recent maneuvers:

The maneuver was divided into three phases. The first phase consisted of the

air action and the actual issue of one day’s fire and of Engineer Supplies for Field

» Id., at p. 10.

“ Id., at pp. 11, 12.

n Letter dated March 15, 1941. Committee exhibit No. 63, pp. 15-17.

M Committee exhibit No. 53, p. 18.

\*» Id., at pp. 19J20.

w See section “Plans for Defense of Hawaiian Coastal Frontier”, Infra.

>1 Committee exhibit No. 53, pp. 85, 36.

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Fortifications and of Engineer tools. During the air phase our bombers acted

under navy command in cooperation with the Nav^ Patrol Squadrons and

actually located and bombed airplane carriers 250 miles out at sea. The move-

ment of the carrier was entirely free so that the navy patrol planes had the mission

of locating the ship and notifying our bombers and they then made the attack.

Pursuit attacked enemy bombers represented by naval planes and our own

bombers when they came in to attack ground defenses. Upon receipt of the

warning for this phase our bombers were sent to fields on outlying islands and

pursuit planes were dispersed. The Navy cooperated very fully during this

phase and I believe we learned more about the coordination of Army Air Force,

Navy Air Force, and Antiaircraft than we had during any previous exercise.

On August 19, 1941j General Marshall addressed a letter to General

Short setting forth his reasons for deciding to establish an airfield

base for the Fifteenth Pursuit Group at Kahuku Point and stated:

. I feel sure that the Naval authorities comprehend fully the importance of

adequate air defense of the Oahu Naval installation and accordingly, will enter\*

tain favorably any proposal which will implement the efficiency of such defense.\*\*

The Chief of Staff on October 10, 1941, sent the following letter to

General Short: “

The mimeographed standard operating procedure for the Hawaiian Depart-

ment, dated July 14, has just come to my attention apd I am particularly con-

cerned with missions assigned to air units. For instance, the Hawaiian Air

Force, among other things, is assigned the mission of defending Schofield Barracks

and all air fields on Oahu against sabotage and ground attacks; and with providing

a provisional battalion of 500 men for military police duty.

This seems inconsistent with the emphasis we are placing on air strength in Hawaii,

particularly in view of the fact that only minimum operating and maintenance

personnel have been provided. As a matter of fact, we are now in process of

■ testing the organization of air-base defense battalions, consisting tentatively of

a rifle company and two antiaircraft batteries, designed for the specific purpose

of relieving the air maintenance people from ground missions of this kind at

locations where there are no large garrisons for ground defense, as there are in

Hawaii.

On October 28, 1941, General Marshall wrote General Short

stating that he appreciated the reasons General Short had assigned

for giving ground defense training to Air Corps personnel ^ but that

it appeared the best policy would be to allow them to concentrate on

techmcal Air Corps training until they have completed their expansion

program and have their feet on the ground as far as their primary

mission is concerned.”

From the foregoing correspondence there can be no doubt that

General Short was adequately apprised of his responsibility to defend

the fleet from attack and that he was conscious of the necessity of

building up the defense against air attack.

PLANS POE THE DEFENSE OP HAWAIIAN COASTAL PEONTIER

There is nowhere, however, a better expression of the keen under-

standing of the danger of a surprise air attack upon Oahu than is

manifested in the plans which the Army and Navy jointly effected

for the defense of the Hawaiian coastal frontier.

» Id., at pp. 40, 41.

» Id., at p. 42.

M In this connection General Short had written General Marshall on October 14, 1941, In part: “At the

time our tentative Standing Operating Procedure was put out the Air Corps had 7,229 men. Full Com-

bat details and all overhead required only 3,885 men for the planes and organisations actually on hand.

This left a surplus of 3,344 men with no assigned duties during Maneuvers. One of the main reasons for

the assignment was to give these men something to do during the Maneuvers. Another reason was ^e

belief that any serious threat of an enemy ground attack of Qwu could come only after destruction ofoqr

Air Forces.” See committee exhibit No. 63.

» Ooi^ttee exhibit No. 63, pp. 44, 46.

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The Hawaiian coastal frontier was listed in defense category D.

This cate^ry covered coastal frontiers that may be subject to major

attack. The war plans “Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 1935,”

the basic document controlling the relationship of the Army and Navy

in the formulation of defense plans for the Hawaiian Islands, contains

the following with respect to category D: ”

Coastal frontiers that may be subject to major attack. Under this category,

the coastal defense areas should, in general, be provided with the means of defense,

both Army and Navy, required to meet enemy naval operations preliminary to

joint operatioris. All available means of defense will generally find application,

and a stronger outpost and a more extensive patrol, inshoj-e and offshore, than

for Category C (coastal frontiers that in all probability will be subject to minor

attack) will\* be required. Under this category certain defensive sea areas will be

established. In addition, an antiaircraft gun and machine-gun defense of impor-

tant areas outside of harbor defenses should be organized; general reserves should

be strategically located so as to facilitate prompt reinforcement of the frontiers;

and plans should be developed for the defense of specific areas likely to become

theaters of operations. Long-range air reconnaissance will be provided and

plans made for use of the GHQ air force.

As a basic responsibility (“Joint Action Army and Navy 1935”)

under contemplation of normal circumstances responsibility for the

defense of Pearl Harbor was that of the Army.’^ It was recognized

that — “

♦ ♦ \* The strategic freedom of action of the Fleet must be assured. This

requires that coastal frontier defense be so effectively conducted as to remqye

any anxiety of the Fleet in regard to the security of its bases \* ♦

The basic allocation of Army and Navy responsi])iliW for coastal

defense was not possible under conditions prevailing in Hawaii during

1941. Fundamental deficiencies in equipment, particularly shortage

of suflBcient Army patrol planes, confronted the responsible com-

manders. As Admiral Kimmel stated shortly after assuming com-

mand at Pearl Harbor —

There is a definite line of demarcation between this objective and longer range

planning. The latter has its proper sphere and must be continued as an essential

basis for determining and stressing improved readiness requirements. This

planning will naturally include the more effective schemes of employment that

improved readiness, when attained, will permit.

Current readiness plans, however, cannot be based on any recommendation for,

or expectation of, improved conditions or facilities. Such plans must he based only

on hard fad. They must be so developed as to provide for immediate action, based

on facilities and materials that are now available.

A subject emphatically calling for attention in line with the foregoing is maxi-

mum readiness in the Hawaiian area, particularly for Pearl Harbor defense, of all

available aviation components. As is well known, much remains to be done for

adequate future effectiveness in this respect. Much, however, can now be done

with means now available, to make arrangements for local employment of aviation

more effective than they now are.

In realistic recognition of this situation, plans were conceived early

in 1941 known as “The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian

Coastal Frontier”." This plan was signed and placed in effect on

April 11, 1941, by General Short and Admiral Bloch, commandant

of the Fourteenth Naval District. The plan was based on the joint

\*\* Action of the Army and Navy, 1835\*', Navy Court of Inquiry exhibit No. 6.

\*^Id.

» Id., at p. 42.

\*\* Letter of February 4, 1941, from Admiral Kimmel to Pacific Fleet personnel. See committee record,

pp. 14511, 14512.

4\* See committee exhibit No. 44; also Navy Court of Inquiry exhibit No. 7.

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Army and Navy basic war plans " and was to constitute the basis

on which all subsidiary peace and war prefects, joint operating plans,

and mobilization plans would be based. The method of coordination

under the plan was by mutual cooperaiion which was to apply to aU

activities wherein the Army and me Navy would cooperate in coor-

dination until and if the method of unity of command were invoked.

Under the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan the following tasks

of the Army and Navy were recognized:

a. JOINT TASK. To hold OAHU as a main outlying naval base, and to

control and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone. ‘

b. ARMY TASK. To hold OAHU against attacks by sea, land, and air

forces, and against hostile sympathizers; to support the naval forces.

c. Navy task. To patrol the Coastal Zone and to contol and protect

shipping therein; to support the Army forces.

One of the most significant features of the plan was the assumption

of responsibility by the Navy for distant reconnaissance, a normal

task of the Axmy. In this regard, the plan provided: “The Com-

mandant, Fourteenth Naval District, shall provide for: \* \* •

i. Distant Reconnaissance.”

On March 28, 1941, an agreement, incorporated as an annex to the

Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan,“ was prepared and approved by

General Short and Admiral Bloch on April 2 dealing with joint security

measures and protection of the fieet and the Pearl Harbor base. This

agreement was entered into —

in order to coordinate joint defensive measures for the security of the Fleet and for

the Pearl Harbor Naval Base for defense against hostile raids or air attacks

delivered prior to a declaration of war and before a general mobilization for war.

It was recognized that —

when the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base

Defense Officer (the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District) agree that

the threat of a hostile raid or attack is sufficiently imminent to warrant such action,

each commander will take such preliminary steps as are necessary to make avail-

able without delay to the other commander such proportion of the air forces at

his disposal as the circumstances warrant in order that joint operations may be

conducted \* \* \*. .

Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels were to be executed under

the tactical command of the Navy. When naval forces were insuffi-

cient for long-distance patrol and search operations and Army aircraft

were made available, these aircraft were to be under the tactical

control of the Navy. It was contemplated that the Army woiild

expedite the installation and operation of an Aircraft Warning

Service through use of radar.

On March 31, 1941, Admiral Bellinger, as colhmander, Naval Base

Defense Air Force, and General Martin, commanding Hawaiian Air

Force, prepared a joint estimate covering joint Army and Navy air

action m the event of sudden hostile action against Oahu or fleet imits

in the Hawaiian area. The situation was summarized in the following

terms: ^

(1) Eolations between the United States and Japan are strained,

uncertain, and varying.

(2) In the past Japan has never preceded hostile actions by a

declaration of war.

« See Navy Court of Inquiry exhibits Nos. 4 and 6.

« Annex VII, sec. VI. See committee exhibit No. 44.

^ See committee exhibit No. 44.

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(3) A successful, sudden raid against our ships and naval in-

stallations on Oahu might prevent effective offensive action by

our forces in the Western Pacific for a long period.

(4) A strong part of our fieet is now constantly at sea in the

operating areas organized to take prompt offensive action against

any surface or submarine force which initiates hostile action.

(5) It appears possible that Japanese submarines and/or a

Japanese fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with

no prior warning from our intelligence service.

The estimate embracing a “Survey of Opposing Strength” indicated,

among oilier things, that Japan might send into the Hawaiian area

one or more submarines and one or more fast raiding forces composed

of carriers supported by fast cruisers; that the most difficult situation

to meet would be when several of the above elements were present

and closely coordinating their actions; and that the aircraft available

in Hawaii were inadequate to maintain for any extended period from

bases on Oahu a patrol extensive enough to insure that an air attack

from a Japanese carrier could not arrive over Oahu as a complete

surprise. It was elsewhere observed in the estimate that it would

be desirable to run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through

360° but that this could only be effectively maiutained with “present

personnel and material” for a very short period, and as a practical

measure could not therefore be undertaken unless other intelligence

indicated that a surface raid was probable within narrow limits of

time.\*\*

The outline of possible enemy action as set forth in the Martin-

Bellinger estimate is a startling harbinger of what actually occurred:\*®

(a) A declaration of war might be preceded by:

1. A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area.

2. A surprise attack on OAHU including ships and installations in

Pearl Harbor.

3. A combination of these two.

(b) It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on OAHU would

he an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would

most likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably

approach inside of 300 miles.

(c) A single attack might or might not indicate the presence of more submarines

or more planes awaiting to attack after defending aircraft have been

drawn awav by the original thrust.

(d) Any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of a considerable

undiscovered surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied

by a carrier.

(e) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it could be delivered as a

complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using and that it

might find us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be

slow to start, also it might be successful as a diversion to draw attention

away from a second attacking force. The major disadvantage would be

that we could have all day to find and attack the carrier. A dusk attack

would have the advantage that the carrier could use the night for escape

44 In a statement submitted to the Navy Court of Inquiry, Admiral Kimmel referred to this portion

of the estimate and stated: \*^This plan was on file with the Departments in Washington. They ^ew of

this decision. They had done nothing to change or alter the basic deficiencies in personnel and material which

required that decision ”

This statement, it should be noted, Is not strictly accurate. The number of Navy patrol bombers adapt-

able for distant reconnaissance was increased appreciably after the Martin-Bellinger estimate was prepared.

As will subsequently appear, there were sufScient patrol planes at Oahu to conduct a distant reconnaissance

for a considerable period of time after receipt of tne November 27 “war warning^ (detailed reference will

be made to this warning, infra). The estimate made by Admiral Bellinger and General Martin was pre-

pared in March of 1941 and was necessarily in contemplation of patrol planes then available. As indicated,

the number of Navy planes available for this purpose was substantially increased before December 7. See

committee exhibit No. 120.

4» Committee exhibit No. 44.

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and might not be located the next day near enough for us to make a

'successful air attack. The disadvantage would be that it would spend

the day of the attack approaching the islands and might be observed.

Under the existing conditions this might not be a serious disadvantage

for until an overt act has been committed we probably will take no

offensive action and the only thing that would be lost would be complete

surprise. Midday attacks have all the disadvantages and none of the

advantages of the above. After hostilities have commenced, a night

attack would offer certain advantages but as an initial crippling blow

a dawn or dusk attack would probably be no more hazardous and

would have a better chance for accomplishing a large success. Sub-

marine attacks could be coordinated with any air attack.

Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41 from Admiral Kimmel

to the Pacific Fleet, concerning the security of the fleet at base and in

operating areas, was issued in February 1941 and reissued in revised

form on October 14, 1941." This fleet order was predicated on two

assumptions, one being —

That a declaration of war may be preceded by —

(1) A Burprise attack on ehips at Pearl Harbor.

(2) A surprise submarine attack on ships in operating area.

(3) A combination of these two.

Among the provisions of this letter concerning action to be taken if

a submarine attacked in the operating area it was pointed out —

It must be remembered that a single attack may or may not indicate the

presence of more submarines waiting to attack —

that“^

it must be remembered too, that a single submarine attack may indicate the

presence of a considerable surface force probably composed of fast ships aocom-

p^ied by a carrier. The Task Force Commander must, therefore, assemble

his task groups as quickly as the situation and daylight conditions warrant in

order to be prepared to pursue or meet enemy ships that may be located by air

search or other means.

A letter dated August 20, 1941, to the commanding general, Army

Air Forces, Washington, prepared by General Martin, and transmitted

through General Short, submitted as an enclosure a plan for the em-

E loyment of long-range bombardment aviation in the defense of Oahu.

everal observations set forth in this plan are of particular perti-

nence: ^

The Hawaiian Air Force is primarily concerned with the destruction of hostile

carriers in this vicinity before the approach within range of Oahu where they can

launch their bombardment aircraft for a raid or an attack on Oahu.

He ♦ ♦

Our most likely enemy, Orange (Japan), can probably employ a maximum of

six carriers against Oahu.

4c « V

♦ ♦ ♦ early morning attack is, therefore, the best plan of action open to

the enemy.

♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ \*

^Id.

® Referring to Admiral Kimmers letter of October 14, 1941, to the fleet 2CL-41 (revised) wherein it was

stated that a declaration of war may be preceded by a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor (see com-

mittee exhibit No. 44), he was asked what form of surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor he contemplated

by this statement. Admiral Kimmel replied:

\*\*An airplane attack. This was an assumption upon which to base our training. The probability of an air attack

on Pearl Harbor was sufficient to justify complete training for this purpose, I felt, as the situation developed,

the Fleet might move away from Pearl Harbor, and in such a contingency the possibility of a quick raid on

the installations at Pearl Harbor might be attempted. I thought it was much more prooable that the Japs

would attempt a raid on Pearl Harbor if the Fleet were away than if it were there. However, at no time did

I consider it more than a possibility, and one which ordinary prudence would make us guard against.”

See Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 287.

^ See committee exhibit No. 13.

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It is the opinion of some individuals that a late afternoon attack is highly

probable since it permits an enemy carrier to escape under cover of darkness.

This presupposes that search operations are impracticable. This headquarters

cannot subscribe to this opinion for the following reasons:

(1) A minor surprise raid such as a single carrier is not a logical method of

attack to reduce the defenses of Oahu.

(2) It permits us to operate against him for a long period on D-Day at close

range.

(3) The enemy will be more concerned with deliveryi^ a successful attack

than he will be with escaping after the attack. He will have carefully

considered the cost of the enterprise, will probably make a determined

attack with maximum force and will willingly accept his losses if his

attack is successful.

:«c « « ♦ \* « «

The most favorable plan of action open to the enemy, and the action upon

which we should hose our plans of operation is the early morning attack in which

the enemy must make good the following time schedule:

(1) Cross circle 881 nautical miles from Oahu at dawn of the day before the

attack.

(2) Cross circle 530 nautical miles from Oahu at dusk of the day before the

attack.

(3) Launch his planes 233 nautical miles from Oahu at dawn the day of the

attack.

(4) Recover his planes 167 nautical miles from Oahu 2:30 after dawn the day

of the attack.

He (Japan) will not have unlimited avenues of approach for his attack.

a. He must avoid the shipping lanes to negate detection.

5. Any approach to Oahu which is made from east of the 158th meridian

materially increases his cruising distance and the probability of detection by

friendly surface vessels. It seems that his most probable avenue of approach is the

hemisphere from 0° (due north) counterclockwise to 180^ around Oahu; the next

probable, the quadrant 180® counterclockwise to 90®; the least probable, 90® to 0®

Admiral Kimmel and General Short were both fully familiar with

all the provisions of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan. The

plans effected for the defense of the Hawaiian coastal frontier viewed

in their entirety were fully adequate under the circumstances and

represent a commendable recomition by the Hawaiian commanders

of the realities of their situation.^ The unfortunate fact is that features

of the plan designed to meet an air attack were not invoked prior to

the actual attack in view of the imminence of hostile Japanese action.

It is clear that the plans with respect to joint air operations was to be

operative when the commanding general of the Hawaiian'^ Department

and the naval base defense officer ‘‘agree that the threat of a hostile

raid or attack is sufficiently imminent to warrant such action.^’ It

is equally clear that the joint security measures for the protection of

the fleet and the Pearl Harbor base were desired in order to coordi-

nate joint defensive measures for defense against hostile raids or air

attacks dehvered prior to a declaration ojf war and before a general

mobilization for war. The plan against air attack was prepared in

Hawaii; it was designed to meet the peculiar problems existing in

<• Before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, Admiral Kimmel stated that “he (Admiral Bloch) accepted

responsibility for distant reconnaissance, because he couldn’t do anything else and be sensible.” See

Army Pearl Harbor Board Record, p. 1753.

He commented: “There weren’t any general headquarters Army aircraft available in Hawaii, and we

knew that there weren’t going to be any.^’ Id.

w Committee exhibit No. 44.

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Hawaii; its invocation, implementation, and execution was essentially

a responsibility resting in Hawaii.®\*

From a review of the defense plans prepared in Hawaii the con-

clusion is inescapable that the Army and Navy commanders there

not only appreciated the dangers of an air attack on Pearl Harbor

but had also prepared detailed arrangements to meet this threat.

CONCEPT OP THE WAR IN THE PACIFIC

It is to be recalled that from January 29 to March 27, 1941, stafif

conversations were held in Washington between Army and Navy

officials of Great Britain and the United States to determine the best

methods by which the armed forces of the United States and the

British Commonwealth, with its allies, could defeat Germany and the

powers allied with her should the United States be compelled to resort

to vxir^’‘ The report of these conversations, dated March 27, 1941,

and referred to by the short title “ABC-1,” reflected certain prin-

ciples governing contemplated action, including: ®®

Since Germany is the predominant member of the Axis Powers, the Atlantic

and European area is considered to be the decisive theater. The principal United

States military effort will be exerted in that theater, and operations of United

States forces in other theaters will be conducted in such a manner as to facilitate

that effort.

In recognition of the fore^ing principle that the Atlantic and

European area was to be considered the decisive theater, the concept

of military operations as respecting Japan was expressed as follows:®\*

Even if Japan were not initially to enter the war on the side of the Axis Powers,

it would still be necessary for the Associated Powers to deploy their forces in a

manner to guard against eventual Japanese intervention. If Japan does enter

the war, the military strategy in the Far East mil be defensive. The United States

does not intend to add to its present military strength in the Far East but will

employ the United States Pacific Fleet offensively in the manner best calculated

to weaken Japanese economic power, and to support the defense of the Malay

barrier by diverting Japanese strength away from Malaysia. The United States

intends so to augment its forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas that the

British Commonwealth will be in a position to release the necessary forces for the

Far East.

Pursuant to the principles and plans visualized in ABC-1, the

Army and Navy prepared “Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan —

Rainbow No. 5,” which was approved by the Secretary of the Navy

on May 28, 1941, and by the Secretary of War on June 2, 1941.®® On

July 21, 1941, United States Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow

Five was distributed to the Pacific Fleet by Admiral Kimmel. This

\_ ^

« The Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, expressed this thought in the following terms: \* • each

theater commander is charged with the preparation of his own local defense plan, including the working

out of any defense operations with the local naval authorities. Such plans are submitted to the appropri-

ate division of the General Staff in Washington and are subject to any changes or modifications that might

emanate from that source. The primary responsibility for such plans and their execution, however, rests on

the commanding officer familiar with the local situation and conditions. Before December 7, 1941, detailed

plans for the defense of the Hawaiian Department had been devised and worked out by General Short as

well as a joint agreement with the local naval authorities for joint action in the event of an emergency,

and he and the Navy commanding officer had the primary responsibility of putting into effect these plans or such

portions thereof as the occasion demanded.\*\* See statement of Secretary of War with respect to the report of

the Army Pearl Harbor Board; committee exhibit No. 157.

\*\* Committee exhibit No. 49. See section ‘‘ABCD Understanding?'', Part IV, infra, this report.

M Committee exhibit No. 49, p. 5.

»\* Id., at pp. 6, 6.

« See Navy Court of Inquiry exhibit No. 4. This plan is also referred to as “WPL-46."

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plan was designed to implement the Navy basic war plan (Rainbow

Five) insofar as the tasks assigned the United States Pacific Fleet were

concerned and was approved by the Chief of Naval Operations on

September 9, 1941.®\* It assumed, consistent with “ABC-1” and the

United States Paeific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five, that the

principal military efforts of the Associated Powers would be in the

Atlantic and European areas, and that operations in other areas

would be so conducted as to facilitate that effort.

In estimating the likely enemy (Japanese) action it was observed,

among other tmn^, that it was believed Japan’s initial action would

be toward “possimy raids or stronger attaclsB on Wake, Midway, and

other outlying United States positions” and “raiding and observation

forces widely distributed in the Pacific, and submarines in the Ha-

waiian Area.” One of the tasks formmated to accomplish assigned

missions contemplated by the plan under phase I (Japan not in the

war) was to “guard against sinprise attack by Japan.”

Under phase lA (initial tasks — Japan in the war) the Pacific Fleet,

among other things was to “make reconnaissance and raid in force on

the Marshall Islands.” Among the tasks imder phase II (succeeding

tasks) was “to capture and establish a protected fleet base anchorage

in the Marshall Island area.”

From the Army standpoint, as stated by General Marshall, the

fullest protection for the Pacific Fleet was the rather than a major

consideration.®^ The fxmction of the Army, therefore, was primanly

that of protecting Hawaii because it was the sea and air base of the

fleet and to render protection to the fleet proper when it was in har-

bor.®\* Aside from these purposes, the protection of the Hawaiian

Islands was secondary and necessa^ ordy to the extent of making

it possible for the Army to e^jecute its primary mission.

CONCLUSIONS WITH RESPECT TO CONSCIOUSNESS OP DANGER PROM

AIR ATTACK

Considering all of the information made available to the command-

ing officers of the Army and Navy in Hawaii from the time of their

assuming command until December 7, 1941, it must be concluded

that both General Short and Admiral Kimmel knew that if Pearl

Harbor was to be attacked the danger of a Japanese air attack upon

that base was the greatest peril of their situation and that the neces-

sity of taking steps to provide the best possible defense to this most

dangerous form of attack was clearly indicated. It is further con-

cluded that both responsible officers appreciated the fact that Japan

might strike before a formal declaration of war.

It is clear that the function of both the Army and the Navy in the

Pacific was essentially a defensive one, particularly in the early stages

of the war. While diversionary and sporadic raids were envisaged for

the fleet, naval operations were to be fundamentally defensive in

character. Pending imminence of war against Japan both servio<!t>

were engaged in preparation and training for this eventuality.

«• Id., exhibit No. 6. This plan is referred to as S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan, Rainbow 5, Navy

Plan 0-1, Rainbow Five (WPPac-46).”

Committee exhibit No. 53, pp. 1-3.

M As stated by the Navy Court of Inquiry: “The defense of a permanent naval base is the direct responsi-

bility of tne Army. The Navy is expected to assist with the means provided the naval district within whose

limits the permanent naval base is located and the defense of the base is a Joint operation only to that ex-

tent.” See Navy Court of Inquiry report, committee exhibit No. 167.

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The next point of inquiry is to determine whether Admiral Kimmel

and General Short, tMough information available to them, were

adequately informed concerning the imminence of war in such manner

as reasonably to contemplate they would employ every facility at their

command in defense of the fleet and the fleet base.

Information Supplied Admiral Kimmel by Washington

Indicating the Imminence of War

In a letter to Admiral Stark dated February 18, 1941, Admiral

Kimmel set forth the following comments in a postscript:

I have recently been told by an officer fresh from Washington that ONI con-

siders it the function of Operations to furnish the Commandei^in-Chief with in-

formation of a secret nature. I have heard also that Operations considers the

responsibility for furnishing the same type of information to be that of ONI.

I do not know that we have missed anything, but if there is any doubt as to whose

responsibility it is to keep the Commander-in-Chief fuUy informed with pertinent

reports on subjects that should be of interest to the Fleet, will you kindly fix

that responsibility so that there will be no misunderstanding?

In reply the Chief of Naval Operations advised that the Office of

Naval Intelligence was fully aware of its responsibility to keep the

commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet ad^uately infonned concern-

ing foreign nations, activities of these nations, and disloyal elements

within the United States; that information concerning the location of

Japanese merchant vessels was forwarded by air mall weekly and if

desired could be issued more frequently.

On February 25 Admiral Stark wrote Admiral Kimmel, forwarding

a copy of a memorandum for the President, dated February 11, 1941,

discussing the possibility of sending a detachment to the Philippines by

way of the “southern route.” “ Also enclosed was a copy of another

memorandum for the President of February 5, 1941, setting forth an

analysis of the situation in Indochina, prepared by Admiral Stark.

This expressed Admiral Stark’s view that Japan had some fear that

the British and the United States would intervene if Japan moved into

southern Indochina and Thailand; and that the size of Japanese land

forces in Formosa and Hainan was insufficient for occupying Indo-

china and Thailand, for attacking Singapore, and for keeping an

expeditionary force ready to use against the Phihppines. It observed

that insofar as Admiral Stark could tell, an insufficient number of

transports was assembled for a major move; that, as he saw the situa-

tion, Japan desired to move against the British, the Dutch, and the

United States in succession, and not to take on more than one at a

time; and that at present she desired not to go to war with the United

States at all.

The following simificant dispatch was sent on April 1, 1941, from

the Chief of Naval Operations addressed to the commandants of all

naval districts: “

PERSONNEL OF YOUR NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE SHOULD

BE ADVISED THAT BECAUSE OF THE FACT THAT FROM PAST EX-

PERIENCE SHOWS THE AXIS POWERS OFTEN BEGIN ACTIVITIES

Committeo exhibit No. 106.

••Id.

•> Committeo exhibit No. 37, p. 1.

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IN A PARTICULAR FIELD ON SATURDAYS AND SUNDAYS OR ON

NATIONAL HOLIDAYS OF THE COUNTRY CONCERNED, THEY

SHOULD TAKE STEPS ON SUCH DAYS TO SEE THAT PROPER

WATCHES AND PRECAUTIONS ARE IN EFFECT.

In a letter of April 3, 1941,®\* Admiral Stark expressed his observa-

tions on the international situation to the commanders in chief, Pacific

Fleet, Asiatic Fleet, and Atlantic Fleet, including a discussion of the

preparation of Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 5. Admiral

Stark stated that the basic idea of this plan contemplated that the

United States woxild draw forces from the Pacific Fleet to reenforce

the Atlantic Fleet; that the British, if necessary, would transfer naval

forces to the Far East to attempt to hold the Japanese north of the

Malay barrier; and that the United States Asiatic Fleet would be

supported through offensive operations of the United States Pacific

Fleet. He then discussed the dangera facing Britain and stated that

the Japanese attitude would continue to have an extremely important

bearing on the future of the war in the Atlantic. He observed that

for some time Japan had been showing less inclination to attack the

British, Dutch, and the United States in the Far East. Admiral

Stark instructed the addressees to watch this situation closely. He

expressed the feeling that beyond question the presence of the Pacific

Fleet in Hawaii had a stabilizing effect in the Far East but that the

question was when and not whether we would enter the war. Admiral

Stark’s personal view was that we might be in the war against Ger-

many and Italy within about 2 months, but there was a reasonable

possibility that Japan might remain out altogether. However, he

added, we coxild not act on that possibility. In the meantime, he

suggested that as much time as available be devoted to training.

Under date of April 18, 1941, instructions were given various naval

observers to include the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet as an

information addressee in all dispatch reports and to fmnish one copy

of all intelligence reports directly to him.\*®

In a memorandum dated May 26 to the Chief of Naval Operations

the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet suggested that he be

guided by broad policy and objectives rather than' by categorical

instructions; and that it be made a cardinal principle that he be

immediately informed of all important developments as soon as they

occur and by the quickest secure means possible.\*®

•\* Committee exhibit No. 106.

M Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 3.

M Admiral Kimmel said:

“The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, is in a very difficult position. He is far removed from the

seat of government, in a complex and rapidly changing situation. He is, as a rule, not informed as

to the policy, or change of policy, reflected in current events and naval movements and, as a result, is

unable to evaluate the possible effect upon his own situation. He is not even sure of what force will be

avaOable to him and has little voice in matters radically affecting his ability to carry out his assigned

tasks. The lack of information is disturbing and tends to create uncertainty, a condition which

directly contravenes that singleness of purpose and confidence is one’s own course of action so necessary

to the conduct of military operations.

“It is realized that, on occasion, the rapid developments in the international picture, both diplomatic

and military, and, perhaps, even the lack of knowledge of the military authorities themselves, may

militate against the furnishing of timely information, but certainly the present situation is susceptible

to marked improvement. Full and authoritative knowledge of current policies and objectives, even

though necessarily late at times, would enable the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to modify,

adapt or even reorient his possible courses of action to conform to current concepts. This is particu-

larly applicable to the current Pacific situation, where the necessities for intensive training of a par-

tially trained Fleet must be carefully balanced against the desirability of interruption of this training

by strategic dispositions, or otherwise, to meet impending eventualities. Moreover, due to this same

factor of distance and time, the Department itself is not too well informed as to the local situation,

particularly with regard to the status of current outlying island development, thn^ making it even more

neeeesary that the Commander-in- Chiefs Pacific f'leett be guided by broad policy and objectives rather than

by categorical inetructions,

\*\*U is suggested that it be made a cardinal principle that the Commander-in- Chief , Pacific Fleets be imme-

diately informed of all important developments as they occur and by the quickest secure means available.\*\*

See committee exhibit No. 106.

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In June of 1941 Admiral Kimmel risited Washington at which time

matters of naval policy were reviewed with him.“

On July 3, 1941, Admiral Kimmel, among others, was advised “for

action” by the Chief of Naval Operations,\*® that the unmistakable

deduction from information obtained from nmuerous sources was that

the Japanese Government had determined upon its future policy, sup-

ported by all principal Japanese political and military groups; that

this policy probably involved war in the near future. It was pointed

out that an advance by Japan against the British and Dutch could

not be entirely ruled out but that the Chief of Naval Operations hold

to the opinion that Japanese activity in “the south” would be con-

fined for the present to seizure and development of naval, army, and

air bases in Indochina. The dispatch stated that the Japanese neu-

trality pact with Russia would be abrogated and the major military

effort on the part of Japan against Russia would be toward the latter’s

maritime provinces probably toward the end of July, although the

attack might be deferred irntU after the collapse of European Russia.

It was pointed out that all Japanese vessels in United States Atlantic

ports had been ordered to be west of the Panama Canal by August 1 ;

that the movement of Japanese “flag shipping” from Japan had been

suspended and additional merchant vessels were being requisitioned.

With an admonition to secrecy, instructions were issued to inform

the principal army commanders and the commander in chief’s own

immediate subordinates.

In another dispatch of July 3 ,” Admiral Kimmel was advised for

action that definite information had been received indicating that

between July 16 and 22 the Japanese Government had issued an

order for 7 of the 11 Japanese vessels then in the North Atlantic and

Caribbean areas to pass through the Panama Canal to the Pacific, and

that imder routine schedules three of the remaining ships were to

move to the Pacific during the same period. It was suggested that

in Japanese business communities strong rumors were current that

Russia would be attacked by Japan on July 20, and that a definite

move by the Japanese might be expected during the period July 20

to August 1, 1941.

On July 7 the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet was advised

for information of the substance of three intercepted dispatches,

including one of July 2 from Tokyo to Berlin, stating: \*®

JAPAN IS PREPARING FOR ALL POSSIBLE EVENTUALITIES RE-

GARDING SOVIET IN ORDER (TO) JOIN FORCES WITH GERMANY

IN ACTIVELY COMBATTING COMMUNIST (SIC) AND DESTROYING

COMMUNIST SYSTEM IN EASTERN SIBERIA. AT SAME TIME

JAPAN CANNOT AND WILL NOT RELAX EFFORTS IN THE SOUTH

TO RESTRAIN BRITAIN AND THE UNITED [STATES. NEW INDO-

CHINA BASES WILL INTENSIFY RESTRAINT [AND BE VITAL CON-

TRIBUTION TO AXIS VICTORY.

And another of July 2 from Berlin to Tokyo: ••

OSHIMA DELIVERS ABOVE NOTE AND TELLS RIBBENTROP IN

PART, “MATSUOKA WILL SOON SUBMIT A DECISION. IF YOU

GERMANS HAD ONLY LET US KNOW YOU WERE GOING TO FIGHT

« See Navy Court of Inquiry record, page 113.

•• Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 4.

w Id., at p. 6.

• Id..atp. 6.

Id. Tnia^ dispatch and that indicated, note 68. supra, were based on the so-called Magic. For a dis-

cussion of Ma^c, see Part IV, this report.

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RUSSIA SO SOON WE MIGHT HAVE BEEN READY. WE WERE PLAN-

NING TO SETTLE SOUTH SEAS QUESTIONS AND CHINA INCIDENT

HENCE DECISION CANNOT BE REACHED IMMEDIATELY, BUT

JAPAN WILL NOT SIT ON FENCE WHILE GERMANY FIGHTS.”

The Chief of Naval Operations in a dkpatch of July 16,™ sent

Admiral Kimmel for information, suppHed intelligence received to the

effect that within “the next day or two,” Japan would begin com-

mercial negotiations with Vichy France at which time she would

g ropose “in the name of mptual defense” Japan’s taking over southern

Vench Indochina naval and air bases; and that at the same time

Japan would attempt to station army and navy air forces peacefully

with French agreement, if possible. It was pointed out that if Vichy

objected Japan had decided to \ise force; and that Japan did not intend

to move farther south or interfere with colonial government. On the

basis of the information received it was observed that the Japanese

move was necessary to guarantee supphes from “Colony and Thailand”

and to prevent “Syrian type British action”; and that while Tokyo

wished to avoid friction with Britain and particularly the United

States, if possible, the risk was regarded as necessary.

In a dispatch sent Admiral Kimmel on July 17 for his information,

he was advised of a six-point ultimatum sent by Tokyo to Vichy re-

quiring an answer by July 20.’^ The six points were specified as:

(1) Japan to send necessary Army and Navy air forces to

southern French Indochina;

(2) Vichy to turn over certain naval and air bases;

(3) Japanese expeditionary force to have right to maneuver

and move about fredy ;

(4) Vichy to withdraw forces at landing points to avoid pos-

sible clashes;

(5) Vichy to authorize French Indochina military to arrange

details with Japanese either before or after landing;

(6) Colony to pay Japan 23,000,000 piastres annually to meet

cost of occupation.

This same dispatch advised of intelligence received on July 14 that

the Japanese Army was planning its advance on or about July 20 and,

of intelligence received on July 14, that Japan intended to carry out

its plans by force if opposed or if Britain or the United States inter-

fered.

On July 19 Admiral Kimmel was advised for his information con-

cerning the substance of an intercepted Japanese dispatch from

Canton to Tokyo, as follows: ”

THE RECENT GENERAL MOBILIZATION ORDER EXPRESSES

JAPAN'S IRREVOCABLE RESOLUTION TO END ANGLO-AMERICAN

ASSISTANCE IN THWARTING JAPAN’S NATURAL EXPANSION AND

HER INDOMITABLE INTENTION TO CARRY THIS OUT WITH THE

BACKING OF THE AXIS IF POSSIBLE BUT ALONE IF NECESSARY.

FORMALI'TIES SUCH AS DINING THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCES

AND SAYING FAREWELL TO THEM WERE DISPENSED WITH TO

AVOID ALARM AND BECAUSE WE WISHED TO FACE THIS NEW

WAR WITH A CALM AND COOL ATTITUDE. \* ♦ ♦ IMMEDIATE

OBJECT WILL BE TO ATTEMPT PEACEFUL FRENCH INDOCHINA

OCCUPATION BUT WILL CRUSH RESISTANCE IF OFFERED AND

w Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 8. This dispatch was based on Magic.

Id., at page 9. Thifi dispatch was also based on Magic.

Id., at p. TO. This dispatch was likewise based on Magic, see committee exhibit No. 1, p. 2.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

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SET UP MARTIAL LAW. SECONDLY OUR PURPOSE IS TO LAUNCH

THEREFROM A RAPID ATTACK WHEN THE INTERNATIONAL

SITUATION IS SUITABLE. AFTER OCCUPATION NEXT ON OUR

SCHEDULE IS SENDING ULTIMATUM TO NETHERLANDS INDIES.

IN THE SEIZING OF SINGAPORE THE NAVY WILL PLAY THE PRIN-

CIPAL PART. ARMY WILL NEED ONLY ONE DIVISION TO SEIZE

SINGAPORE AND TWO DIVISIONS TO SEIZE NETHERLANDS INDIES

WITH AIR FORCES BASED ON CANTON, SPRATL^, PALAU, SINGORA

IN THAILAND, PORTUGUESE TIMOR AND INDOCHINA AND WITH

SUBMARINE FLEET IN MANDATES, HAINAN, AND INDOCHINA WE

WILL CRUSH BRITISH AMERICAN MILITARY POWER AND ABILITY

TO ASSIST IN SCHEMES AGAINST US.

On July 19 Admiral Kimmel was advised of an intercepted dispatch

from Tokyo informing that although the Japanese Cabinet had

changed there would be no departure from the principle that the

Tripartite Pact formed the keystone of Japan’s national policy and

that the new Cabinet would also pursue the policy of the former

Cabinet in all other matters.” In another dispatch, supplying infor-

mation concerning an intercepted Tokyo message to Vichy, Admiral

Kimmel was advised on July 20, that the Japanese Army had made all

preparations and had decided to advance regardless of whether Vichy

France accepted her demands.”

Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Hart on July 24, 1941,” sending

a copy of the letter to Admiral Kimmel, concerning among other

things, a 2-hour conversation between Admiral Sta^ and Ambas-

sador Nomura, Admiral Stark expressed the thought that Nomura

was sincere in his desire that the United States and Japan avoid

open rupture; stated they had a very plain talk; and observed that

he. Admiral Stark, liked Nomura. He advised that Nomura discus-

sea at length Japan’s need for the rice and minerals of Indochina.

Admiral Stark said his guess was that with the establishment of bases

in Indochina, Japan would stop for the time being, consolidate her

positions and await world reaction; that no doubt the Japanese

would use their Indochina bases from which to take early action

gainst the Burma Koad. He said that, of course, there was the

possibility that Japan would strike at Borneo, but that he doubted

this in the near future unless we were to embargo oil shipments to

tJaem. Admiral Stark also said that he talked with the President

and hoped no open rupture would come but that conditions were not

getting better.

On July 25, 1941, Admiral Kimmel was advised that be ginnin g

July 26 the United States would impose economic sanctions against

Japan and that it was expected these sanctions would embargo aU

trade between Japan and the United States, subject to modification

through a licensing system for certain material.” It was further

pointed out that funds in the United States would be frozen except as

they may be moved under licensing. In estimating the situation it

was observed:

Do not anticipate immediate hoetile reaction by Japan through the use of military

means but you are furnished this information in order that you may take appropriate

precautionary measures against hostile eventualities,

w Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 11.

Id., at p. 12.

M Committee exhibit No. 106.

» Committee exhibit No. 37, p. H.

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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

In a letter to Admiral Kimmel dated July 31, 1941,” Admiral Stark

discussed the over-all international situation, and stated that “after

the Russian situation broke” he proposed to the President that they

should start escorting immediately and that we should consider, along

with the British, a joint protectorate over the Dutch East Indies. He

stated he thought it fainy safe to say that the opinion was generally

held that Japan would not go into the N. E. I.™ but that Admiral

Turner thought Japan would go into the maritime provinces in August.

He commented that Turner might be right and usually was. Ad-

miral Stark said his thought had been that while Japan would

ultimately go into Siberia she would delay doing so until she had the

Indochina-Thailand situation more or less to her liking and imtU

there was some clarification of the Russian-German clash. He also

said that we would give aid to Russia. A postscript to this letter

stated, among other things, that —

obviously^ the situation in the Far East continues to deteriorate; this is one thing that is

^actual.

Admiral Kimmel was advised on August 14 that the Japanese were

rapidly completing withdrawal from world shipping routes, that

scheduled sailings were canceled, and that the majority of ships in

other than China and Japan Sea areas were homeward bound.™

The following dispatch of August 28 was sent to Admiral Kimmel,

among others, for action:

CERTAIN OPERATIONS PRESCRIBED FOR THE ATLANTIC BY

WPL 51 ARE HEREBY EXTENDED TO AREAS OF THE PACIFIC OCEAN

AS DESCRIBED HEREIN IN VIEW OF THE DESTRUCTION BY

RAIDERS OF MERCHANT VESSELS IN THE PACIFIC OCEAN WITHIN

THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE NEUTRALITY ZONE AS DEFINED IN

THE DECLARATION OF PANAMA OF OCTOBER 3, 1939. FORMAL

CHANGES IN WPL 51 WILL BE ISSUED, BUT MEANWHILE ACTION

ADDRESSES WILL EXECUTE IMMEDIATELY THE FOLLOWING

INSTRUCTIONS. CINCPAC CONSTITUTE THE SOUTHEAST PACIFIC

FORCE CONSISTING OF TWO 7,500-TON LIGHT CRUISERS AND DIS-

PATCH IT TO BALBOA. FOR TASK PURPOSES THIS FORCE WILL

OPERATE DIRECTLY UNDER CNO “ AFTER ENTERING THE SOUTH-

EAST PACIFIC SUB AREA AS DEFINED IN WPL 46 PAR. 3222 EXCEPT

WESTERN LIMIT IS LONGITUDE 100° WEST. WITHIN THE PACIFIC

SECTOR OF THE PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER AND WITHIN

THE SOUTHEAST PACIFIC SUB AREA THE COMMANDER PANAMA

NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER AND COMMANDER SOUTHEAST

PACIFIC FORCE WILL IN COOPERATION AND ACTING UNDER THE

STRATEGIC DIRECTION OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

EXECUTE THE FOLLOWING TASK: DESTROY SURFACE RAIDERS

WHICH ATTACK OR THREATEN UNITED STATES FLAG SHIPPING.

INTERPRET AN APPROACH OF SURFACE RAIDERS WITHIN THE

PACIFIC SECTOR OF THE PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER OR

THE PACIFIC SOUTHEAST SUB AREA AS A THREAT TO UNITED

STATES FLAG SHIPPING. FOR THE PRESENT THE FORCES CON-

CERNED WILL BASE BALBOA, BUT CNO WILL ENDEAVOR TO MAKE

ARRANGEMENTS FOR BASING ON SOUTH AMERICAN PORTS AS

rt Committee exhibit No. 106.

Netherlands East Indies.

Committee exhibit No. 87, p. 15.

“ Id., at p. 16.

Chief of Naval Operations.

PEABL HABBOR ATTACK

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MAY BE REQUIRED, ACTION ADEES »» AND COMMANDER SOUTH-

EAST PACIFIC FORCE INFORM CNO WHEN THESE INSTRUCTIONS

HAVE BEEN PLACED IN EFFECT.

In a letter to Admiral Kimmel, also on August 28, 1941.\*® Admiral

Stark discussed, among other things, the status, of the Japanese

situation and observed that the Japanese seemed to have arrived at

another one of their indecisive periods; that some very strong mes-

sages had been sent to them, but just what they were going to do he

did not know. He said he had told one of Japan’s statesmen that

another move, such as the one into Thailand, would go a long way

toward destroying before the American public what good will still

remained. Admiral Stark said he had not given up hope of continuing

peace in the Pacific, but he wished the thread by which it continued to

hang were not so slender.

Admiral Kimmel raised specific questions in a letter to Admiral

Stark of September 12, 1941 \*\* such as whether he should not issue

shooting orders to the escorts for ships proceeding to the Far East.

Admiral Kimmel also raised the question of what to do about sub-

marine contacts off Pearl Harbor and vicinity. He said:

As you know, our present orders are to trail all contacts, but not to bomb

unless they are in the defensive sea areas. Should we now bomb contacts, without

waiting to be attacked?

Admiral Stark answered on September 23, 1941,\*® and stated, among

other things, that at the time the President had issued shooting orders

only for the Atlantic and Southeast Pacific submarine area; that the

longer they could keep the situation in the Pacific in stains quo, the

better for all concerned. He said that no orders should bo given to

shoot, at that time, other than those set forth in article 723 of the

Navy Regulations.®\* The letter also stated, in connection with the

question of submarine contacts, that they had no definite information

that Japanese submarines had ever operated in close vicinity to the

Hawaiian Islands, Alaska, or om\* Pacific coast; that existing orders,

i. e., not to bomb suspected submarines except in the defensive sea

areas, were appropriate, and continued:

If conclusive, and I repeat conclusive, evidence is obtained that Japanese sub-

marines are actually in or near United States territory, then a strong warning and

a threat of hostile action against such submarines would app>ear to be our next

step. Keep us informed.

Going on. Admiral Stark said that he might be mistaken, but he did

not believe that the major portion of the Japanese Fleet was likely

to be sent to the Marshalls or the Caroline Islands under the circum-

stances that then seemed possible; and that in dl probability the

Pacific Fleet could operate successfully and effectively even though

decidedly weaker than the entire Japanese Fleet, which certauuy

could be concentrated in one area only with the greatest difficulty.

In this letter. Admiral Stark inquired:

m \* \* would it not be possible for your force to “carefully” get some pictures

of the Mandated Islands?

In a postscript to this letter, Admiral Stark stated that Secretary Hull

had ioformed him that the conversations with the Japanese had

\*2 Addressees.

\*» Committee exhibit No. 106.

Mid.

M Id.

•• These regulations provide for the use of force in self-preservation, in the sound judgment of responsible

officers, as a last resort .

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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

practically reached an impasse. He said that, as he saw it, we could

get nowhere toward a settlement and peace in the Far East until there

was some agreement between Japan and China, which seemed to be

remote. A second postscript to the letter, in making reference to a

conversation between Admiral Stark and Nomura, said that Ambas-

sador Nomura usually came in when he began to feel near the end of

his rope, and that there was not much to spare at that end then.

Admiral Stark observed that conversations without results could not

last forever and that if the conversations fell through, which looked

likely, the situation could only grow more tense. Admiral Stark

said he had again talked to Secretary Hull and thought the Secretary

would make one more try. He said that Secretary Hull kept him.

Admiral Stark, pretty frilly informed; and, if there was anything of

moment, he would of course hasten to let Kimmel know.

With this letter there was enclosed a copjjr of a memorandum from

General Marshall to Admiral Stark setting forth what was being done

to strengthen the Philippines. The memorandum indicated, among

other things, that on September 30, 26 Flying Fortresses woiild leave

San Francisco for Hawaii en route to the Phuippines.

The following dispatch of October 16, 1941, was sent to the com-

mander in chief. Pacific Fleet, for action: ^

THE RESIGNATION OF THE JAPANESE CABINET HAS CREATED A

GRAVE SITUATION. IF A NEW CABINET IS FORMED IT WILL PROB-

ABLY BE STRONGLY NATIONALISTIC AND ANTI-AMERICAN. IF

THE KONOYE CABINET REMAINS THE EFFECT WILL BE THAT IT

WILL OPERATE UNDER A NEW MANDATE WHICH WILL NOT IN-

CLUDE RAPPROCHEMENT WITH THE U. S. IN EITHER CASE HOS-

TILITIES BETWEEN JAPAN AND RUSSIA ARE A STRONG POSSI-

BILITY. SINCE THE U. S. AND BRITAIN ARE HELD RESPONSIBLE

BY JAPAN FOR HER PRESENT DESPERATE SITUATION THERE IS

ALSO A POSSIBILITY THAT JAPAN MAY ATTACK THESE TWO

POWERS. IN VIEW OF THESE POSSIBILITIES YOU WILL TAKE DUE

PRECAUTIONS INCLUDING SUCH PREPARATORY DEPLOYMENTS

AS WILL NOT DISCLOSE STRATEGIC INTENTION NOR CONSTITUTE

PROVOCATIVE ACTIONS AGAINST JAPAN. SECOND AND THIRD

ADEES INFORM APPROPRIATE ARMY AND NAVAL DISTRICT

AUTHORITIES. ACKNOWLEDGE.

Keferring to the dispatch of October 16 concerning the resimation

of the Japanese Cabinet, Admiral Stark stated in a letter of October

17 to Admiral Kimmel: ®

Personally I do not believe the Japs are going to sail into us and the message

I sent you merely stated the “possibility”; in fact I tempered the message handed

to me considerably. Perhaps I am wrong, but I hope not. In any case after

lon| pow-wows in the White House it was felt we should be on guard, at least

until something indicates the trend.

In a postscript to this letter Admiral Stark said:

Marshall just called up and was anxious that we make some sort of a reconnais-

sance so that he could feel assured that on arrival at Wake, a Japanese raider

attack may not be in order on his bombers. I told him that we could not assure

against any such contingency, but that I felt it extremely improbable and that,

while we keep track of Japanese ships so far as we can, a carefully planned raid

87 Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 18.

88 Committee exhibit No. 106.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

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on any of these Island carriers in the Pacific might be difficult to detect. However,

we are on guard to the best of our ability, and my advice to hi m was not to worry.®

On October 17, 1941, Admiral Kimmel was advised for his ioforma-

tion that, effective immediately, all trans-Pacifio^United 'States flag

shipping to and from the Far East, India, and East India area was to

be routed through the Torres Straits, keeping to the southward and

well clear of the Japanese. Mandates.®® On the same day he was

advised for action that —

BECAUSE OF THE GREAT IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUING TO RE-

ENFORCE THE PHILIPPINES WITH LONG-RANGE ARMY BOMBERS

YOU ARE REQUESTED TO TAKE ALL PRACTICAL PRECAUTIONS

FOR THE SAFETY OF THE AIRFIELDS AT WAKE AND MIDWAY.\*\*

Admiral Kimmel was advised, among other things, on October 23

that until further orders all Aimy and Navy “trans-Pacific troop

transports, ammunition ships and such others with sufificiently impor-

tant military cargo” would be escorted both ways between Honolulu

and Manila.®®

On November 4, 1941, Admiral Kimmel was informed that complete

withdrawal from Western Hemisphere waters of Japanese merchant

vessels appeared in progress.®®

A letter to Admiral Kimmel from Admiral Stark on November 7

commented, among other things: ®\*

Things seem to be moving steadily towards a crisis in the Pacific. Just when it

will break, no one can tell. The principle reaction I have to it all is what I have

written you before; it contiMally gets “worser and worser!” A month may see,

literally, most anything. Two irreconcilable policies cannot go on forever —

particularly if one party cannot live with the set-up. It doesn’t look good.

On November 14, Admiral Stark wrote Admiral Kimmel, stating

among other things:®\*

The next few days hold much for us. Kurusu’s arrival in Washington has

been delayed. I am not hopeful that anything in the way of better understanding

between the United States and Japan will come of his visit. I note this morning in

the press despatches a listing of a number of points by the Japan Times and

w Transmitted as an enclosure to this letter was an estimate dated October 17 prepared by Admiral

Schuirmann with respect to the chanpe in tlie Japanese Cabinet, stating:

\*T believe we are inclined to overestimate the importance of changes in the Japanese Cabinet as indicative

of great changes in Japanese political thought or action.

“The plain fact is that Japanese politics has been ultimately controlled for years by the military. Wheth-

er or not a policy of peace or a policy of furtner military adventuring is pursued Is determined by the military

based on their estimate as to whether the time is opportune and what they are able to do, not by what

cabinet is in power or on diplomatic maneuvering, diplomatic notes or diplomatic treaties.”

After recounting that Konoye cabinets had time and again expressed disapproval of the acts committed

by the Japanese military but remedial action had not been taken; that Konoye himself had declared Japan’s

policy was to beat China to her knees; that while the Konoye cabinet may have restrained the exlremiBU

among the military it had not opposed Japan’s program of expansion by force; that when opportunities

arise during the “coming months” which seemed favorable to the military for further advance, they would

be seized; and that the same “bill of goods,” regarding the necessity of making some concession to the

“moderates” in order to enable them to cope with the “extremists” had been offered \*to the United States

since the days when Mr. Stimson was Secretary of State and Debuchi Ambassador, Admiral Schuirmann

concluded:

“Present reports are that the new cabinet to be formed will be no better and no worse than the one which

has just fallen. Japan may attack Russia, or may move southward, but in the final analysis this will be

determined by the military on the basis of opportunity , and what they can get away with, not by what cabinet is

in power\*" (Committee exhibit No. 106).

» Committee exhibit No. 87, p. 21,

« Id., at p. 22.

M Id., at p. 23.

« Id., at p. 24.

M Committee exhibit No. 106.

M Id. As an enclosure to this letter. Admiral Stark forwarded a copy of a joint memorandum for the

President which he and General Marshall had prepared dated November 5 and bearing caption “Estimate

concerning Far Eastern Situation.” This memorandum was prepared with respect to dispatches received

indicating it to be Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek’s belief that a Japanese attack on Kunming was immi-

nent and that military support from outside sources, particularly by the use of United States and British

air units, was the sole hope for defeat of this threat. The Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations op-

posed dispatching American military assistance to meet this supposed threat. For a discussion of this

memorandum, see Part IV, infra, this report.

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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Advertiser upon which concessions by the United States are necessary for the

“solution of the Pacific Crisis”. Complete capitulation by the United States on

every point of difference between the Japanese and this country was indicated as

a satisfactory solution. It will be impossible to reconcile such divergent points

of view.

On November 24, 1941, Admiral Kimmel received the following

message marked for action: ®\*

CHANCES OF FAVORABLE OUTCOME OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH

JAPAN VERY DOUBTFUL. THIS SITUATION COUPLED WITH STATE-

MENTS OF JAPANESE GOVERNMENT AND MOVEMENTS THEIR

NAVAL AND MILITARY FORCES INDICATE IN OUR OPINION

THAT A SURPRISE AGGRESSIVE MOVEMENT IN ANY DIRECTION

INCLUDING ATTACK ON PHILIPPINES OR GUAM IS A POSSIBILITY.

CHIEF OF STAFF HAS SEEN THIS DESPATCH CONCURS AND RE-

QUESTS ACTION ADEES TO INFORM SENIOR ARMY OFFICERS

THEIR AREAS. UTMOST SECRECY NECESSARY IN ORDER NOT

TO COMPLICATE AN ALREADY TENSE SITUATION OR PRECIPI-

TATE JAPANESE ACTION. GUAM WILL BE INFORMED SEPA-

RATELY.

The postscript of a personal letter dated November 25 from Admiral

Stark to Admiral Kimmel read; ”

I held this up pending a meeting with the President and Mr. Hull today. I

have been in constant touch with Mr. Hull and it was only after a long talk with

him that I sent the message to you a day or two ago showing the gravity of the

situation. He confirmed it all in today’s meeting, as did the President. Neither

would be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack, from many angles an attack

on the Philippines would be the most embarrassing thing that could happen to us.

There are some here who think it likely to occur. I do not give it the weight

others do, but I included it because of the strong feeling among some people.

You know I have generally held that it was not time for the Japanese to proceed

against Russia. I still do. Also I still rather look for an advance into Thailand,

Indo-China, Burma Road areas as the most likely.

I won’t go into the pros or cons of what the United States may do. I will

be damned if I know. I wish I did. The only thing I do know is that we may

do most anything and that’s the only thing I know to be prepared for; or we may

do nothing — I think it is more likely to be “anything.”

On November 27, 1941, the following dispatch was sent Admiral

Kimmel for action: •\*

THIS DESPA TCH IS TO BE CONSIDERED A WAR WARNING. NEGO-

TIATIONS WITH JAPAN LOOKING TOWARD STABILIZATION OF

CONDITIONS IN THE PACIFIC HAVE CEASED AND AN AGGRESSIVE

MOVE BY JAPAN IS EXPECTED WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

THE NUMBER AND EQUIPMENT OF JAPANESE TROOPS AND THE

ORGANIZATION OF NAVAL TASK FORCES INDICATES AN AMPHIBI-

OUS EXPEDITION AGAINST EITHER THE PHILIPPINES THAI OR KRA

PENINSULA OR POSSIBLY BORNEO. EXECUTE AN APPROPRIATE

DEFENSIVE DEPLOYMENT PREPARATORY TO CARRYING OUT THE

TASKS ASSIGNED IN WPL46. INFORM DISTRICT AND ARMY

AUTHORITIES. A SIMILAR WARNING IS BEING SENT BY WAR

DEPARTMENT. SPENAVO •» INFORM BRITISH. CONTINENTAL

DISTRICTS GUAM SAMOA DIRECTED TAKE APPROPRIATE MEA-

SURES AGAINST SABOTAGE.

w Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 32. This dispatch was also sent for action to commander in chief Asiatic

Fleet and commandants of the Twelfth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Naval Districts.

” Committee exhibit No. 106.

•« Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 36. This dispatch was also sent for action to the commander in chief of

the Asiatic Fleet. It has been referred to throughout the proceedings as the “War Warning.”

•• Special naval observer.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

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The following dispatch dated November 28, 1941, refer^g to the

November 27 warning, was supplied Admiral Kinunel for his informa-

tion;

\* \* \* ARMY HAS SENT FOLLOWING TO COMMANDER WESTERN

DEFENSE COMMAND “NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN APPEAR TO BE

TERMINATED TO ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES WITH ONLY THE

BAREST POSSIBILITIES THAT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT MIGHT

COME BACK AND OFFER TO CONTINUE. JAPANESE FUTURE AC-

TION UNPREDICTABLE BUT HOSTILE ACTION POSSIBLE AT ANY

MOMENT. IF HOSTILITIES CANNOT REPEAT NOT BE AVOIDED

THE UNITED STATES DESIRES THAT JAPAN COMMIT THE FIRST

OVERT ACT. THIS POLICY SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT BE CON-

STRUED AS RESTRICTING YOU TO A COURSE OF ACTION THAT

MIGHT JEOPARDIZE YOUR DEFENSE. PRIOR TO HOSTILE JAPA-

NESE ACTION YOU ARE DIRECTED TO UNDERTAKE SUCH RECON-

NAISSANCE AND OTHER MEASURES AS YOU DEEM NECESSARY

BUT THESE MEASURES SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT SO AS NOT

REPEAT NOT TO ALARM CIVIL POPULATION OR DISCLOSE INTENT.

REPORT MEASURES TAKEN. A SEPARATE MESSAGE IS BEING SENT

TO G TWO NINTH CORPS AREA RE SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES IN UNI-

TED STATES. SHOULD HOSTILITIES OCCUR THEY WILL CARRY

OUT THE TASKS ASSIGNED IN RAINBOW FIVE SO FAR AS THEY

PERTAIN TO JAPAN. LIMIT DISSEMINATION OF THIS HIGHLY

SECRET INFORMATION TO MINIMUM ESSENTIAL OFFICERS.”

WPL 62 IS NOT APPLICABLE TO PACIFIC AREA AND WILL NOT BE

PLACED IN EFFECT IN THAT AREA EXCEPT AS NOW IN FORCE IN

SOUTHEAST PACIFIC SUB AREA AND PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL

FRONTIER. UNDERTAKE NO OFFENSIVE ACTION UNTIL JAPAN

HAS COMMITTED AN OVERT ACT. BE PREPARED TO CARRY OUT

TASKS ASSIGNED IN WPL 46 SO FAR AS THEY APPLY TO JAPAN IN

CASE HOSTILITIES OCCUR.

On December 1 the Chief of Naval Operations sent Admiral Kim-

mel a dispatch for information describing a Japanese intrigue in

Malaya. The dispatch indicated that Japan planned a landing at

Khota Baru in Malaya in order to entice the British to cross the fron-

tier from Malay into Thailand. Thailand would then brand Britain

an aggressor and call upon Japan for aid, thereby facilitating the

Japanese entry into Thailand as a full-fledged ally and give Japan air

bases on the Era Peninsula and a position to carry out any further

operations along Malaya.^®°‘

100 Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 38. This dispatch was sent for action to the naval commanders on the

west coast.

i®oa This dispatch, No. 011400 which was addressed to the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet for

action, read: “AMBASSADOR TSUBOKAMI IN BANGKOK ON TWENTY NINTH SENT TO

TOKYO AS NUMBER EIGHT SEVEN TWO THE FOLLOWING QUOTE CONFERENCES

NOW IN PROGRESS IN BANGKOK CONSIDERING PLANS AIMED AT FORCING BRITISH

TO ATTACK THAI AT PADANG BESSA NEAR SING ORA AS COUNTER MOVE TO JAPA-

NESE LANDINGAT KOTA BHARU. SINCE THAI INTENDS TO CONSIDER FIRST INVADER

AS HER ENEMY, ORANGE BELIEVES THIS LANDING IN MALAY WOULD FORCE BRIT-

ISH TO INVADE THAI AT PADANG BESSA. THAI WOULD THEN DECLARE WAR AND

REQUEST ORANGE HELP. THIS PLAN APPEARS TO HAVE APPROVAL OF THAI CHIEF

OF STAFF BIJITTO. THAI GOVERNMENT CIRCLES HAVE BEEN SHARPLY DIVIDED

BETWEEN PROBRITISH AND PROORANGE UNTIL TWENTY FIVE NOVEMBER BUT

NOW WANITTO AND SHIN WHO FAVOR JOINT MILITARY ACTION WITH ORANGE

HAVE SILENCED ANTI ORANGE GROUP AND INTEND TO FORCE PREMIUR PIBUL

TO MAKE A DECISION. EARLY AND FAVORABLE DEVELOPMENTS ARE POSSIBLE

UN QU OTE.” See committee exhibit No. 112, p. 67.

100

PEABL HARBOR ATTACK

On December 3, 1941, Admiral Kimmel was supplied the following

information for action:

HIGHLY RELIABLE INFORMATION HAS BEEN RECEIVED THAT

CATEGORIC AND URGENT INSTRUCTIONS WERE SENT YESTERDAY

TO JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS AT HONGKONG,

SINGAPORE, BATAVIA, MANILA, WASHINGTON AND LONDON TO

DESTROY MOST OF THEIR CODES AND CIPHERS AT ONCE AND TO

BURN ALL OTHER IMPORTANT CONFIDENTIAL AND SECRET

DOCUMENTS.

And, again, on December 3, 1941, he received the following message

for his information:

CIRCULAR TWENTY FOUR FORTY FOUR FROM TOKYO ONE

DECEMBER ORDERED LONDON, HONGKONG, SINGAPORE AND

MANILA TO DESTROY MACHINE. BATAVIA MACHINE ALREADY

SENT TO TOKYO. DECEMBER SECOND WASHINGTON ALSO DI-

RECTED DESTROY, ALL BUT ONE COPY OF OTHER SYSTEMS, AND

ALL SECRET DOCUMENTS. BRITISH ADMIRALTY LONDON TODAY

REPORTS EMBASSY LONDON HAS COMPLIED.

On December 4, 1941, a dispatch was supplied the commander in

chief of the Pacific Fleet, for his information, instructing Guam to

destroy all secret and confidential publications and other classified

matter except that essential for current purposes, and to be prepared

to destroy instantly, in event of emergency, aU classified matter.

A dispatch to Adnmal Kimmel of December 6 for action stated

that “in view of the international situation and the exposed position

of our outlying Pacific islands” he was authorized to order the destruc-

tion in such outlying islands secret and confidential documents "now

or under later conditions of greater emergency.” It was pointed out

that means of communication to support “our current operations and

special intelligence” should be maintained imtil the last moment.

From a review of dispatches and correspondence sent Admiral

Kimmel it is concluded that he was fully imormed concerning the

progressive deterioration of relations with Japan and was amply

warned of the imminence of war with that nation.

Information Supplied General Short by Washington

Indicating the Imminence op War

The accepted practice in the Navy whereby the Chief of Naval

Operations supplemented oflSicial dispatches by personal correspond-

ence does not appear to have been followed by the War Department.

The letters sent by the Chief of Staff to General Short, heretofore dis-

cussed, related largely to the latter’s responsibility, steps necessary to

improve the Army defenses in Hawaii, and suggestions and comments

with respect thereto. It does not appear that such correspondence

was employed to acquaint the commanding general of die Hawaiian

Department with the international situation generally nor to convey

the personal estimates and impressions of the Chief of Staff. The

Oommittee exhibit No. 37, p. 40. This dispatch was also sent for action to the commander in chief of

the Pacific Fleet and the commandants of the Fourteenth and Sixteenth Naval Districts.

101 Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 41. This dispatch was sent for action to tlie commander in chief Asiatic

Fleet and the commandant of the Sixteenth Naval District,

m Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 44.

!•\* Id., at p. 43,

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evidence indicates that the Army did not forward the substance of

any intercepted Japanese dispatches .to field commanders because of

the feeling that the Army codes were gwerally not so secure as those

of the Navy.^“ General Short, howevefj'j^s supplied either directly

from the War Department or by reference\*from •Ws naval opposites in

Hawaii adequate information concerning the’ <?rlticql international

situation and the impending likelihood of war with'jRp&n%..

The dispatch of July 3, 1941, to Admiral Kimmel, advlsiijg among

other things that the unmistakable deduction from infoittfation re-

ceived from numerous sources was to the effect tlMit Japan was'flgi'^d .■

on a policy involving war in the near future, carried instructions to";

advise General Short/®\*

Admiral Kimmel was instructed to supply General Short the in-

formation contained in the dispatch of July 25 advising of economic

sanctions against Japan and possible Japanese reaction/®^

The following Navy message of October 16, 1941, was received by

General Short through reference from Admiral Kimmel: ‘®\*

THE FOLLOWING IS A PARAPHRASE OF A DISPATCH FROM THE

C. N. O. WHICH I HAVE BEEN DIRECTED TO PASS TO YOU. QUOTE:

“JAPANESE CABINET RESIGNATION CREATES A GRAVE SITUA-

TION. IF A NEW CABINET IS FORMED IT WILL PROBABLY BE ANTI-

AMERICAN AND EXTREMELY NATIONALISTIC. IP THE KONOYE

CABINET REMAINS IT WILL OPERATE UNDER A NEW MANDATE

WHICH WILL NOT INCLUDE RAPPROACHMENT WITH THE UNITED

STATES. EITHER WAY HOSTILITIES BETWEEN JAPAN AND RUSSIA

ARE STRONGLY POSSIBLE. SINCE BRITAIN AND THE UNITED

STATES ARE HELD RESPONSIBLE BY JAPAN FOR HER PRESENT

SITUATION THERE IS ALSO A POSSIBILITY THAT JAPAN MAY

ATTACK THESE TWO POWERS. IN VIEW OF THESE POSSIBILITIES

YOU WILL TAKE DUE PRECAUTIONS INCLUDING SUCH PREPARA-

TORY DEPLOYMENTS AS WILL NOT DISCLOSE STRATEGIC INTEN-

TION NOR CONSTITUTE PROVOCATIVE ACTION AGAINST JAPAN.”

In a radiomam of October 20 signed “Adams” \*®\* the "War Depart-

ment advised the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department

of its estimate of the situation in the following terms:

TENSION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN REMAINS

STRAINED BUT NO ABRUPT CHANGE IN JAPANESE FOREIGN

POLICY APPEARS IMMINENT."®

Admiral Kimmel was instructed to advise General Short concerning

the dispatch of November 24 from the Chief of Naval Operations

advis^, among other things, that “chances of favorable outcome of

negotiations with Japan very doubtful” and movements of Japanese

forces “indicate in our opinion that a surprise a^ressive movement

in any direction including attack on Phdippines or Guam is a possi-

bility.” General Short expressed the belief that he had seen this

dispatch.^^\*

See committee record, pp. 2220-2222.

Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 4; also. No. 32, p. 1.

iw Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 14; also No. 32, p. 2.

iM Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 18; also, No. 32, p. 3. See Army Pearl Harbor board record, p. 279.

Maj. Qen. Emory S. Adams, Adjutant General.

110 Committee exhibit No. 32, p. 4. See £dso Army Pearl Harbor board record, p. 4258.

lit Committee exhibit No. 32, p. 5.

11\* See Army Pearl Harbor board record, p. 4258.

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A dispatch of November 26 signed “Adams” was sent General Short

reading in part as follows:

\* \* \* IT IS DESIRED THAT THE PILOTS BE INSTRUCTED TO

PHOTOGRAPH TRUK ISL’AND IN THE CAROLINE GROUP JALUIT IN

THE MARSHALL GROyP.\*' VISUAL RECONNAISSANCE SHOULD BE

MADE SIMULT.ANKOUSLY. INFORMATION DESIRED AS TO THE

NUMBER..AN1) “LOCATION OF NAVAL VESSELS INCLUDING SUB-

MARINES ,\*> \* \* INSURE THAT BOTH B-TWENTY FOUR AIR-

PLANps' ARE FULLY EQUIPPED WITH GUN AMMUNITION UPON

I5 ^EpARTURE from HONOLULU.\*\*\*

The November 27 dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations to

Admiral Kimmel be ginnin g “This despatch is to be considered a war

warning” \*\*® contained iostructions that General Short be informed

and he did in fact see this warning.

On November 27 the following dispatch signed “Marshall” \*\*\* was

sent General Short by the War Department: \*\*^

NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN APPEAR TO BE TERMINATED TO

ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES WITH ONLY THE BAREST POSSIBILITIES

THAT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT MIGHT COME BACK AND

OFFER TO CONTINUE. JAPANESE FUTURE ACTION UNPREDICT-

ABLE BUT HOSTILE ACTION POSSIBLE AT ANY MOMENT. IF

HOSTILITIES CANNOT, REPEAT CANNOT, BE AVOIDED THE UNITED

STATES DESIRES THAT JAPAN COMMIT THE FIRST OVERT ACT.

THIS POLICY SHOULD NOT, REPEAT NOT, BE CONSTRUED AS RE-

STRICTING YOU TO A COURSE OF ACTION THAT MIGHT JEOPARD-

IZE YOUR DEFENSE. PRIOR TO HOSTILE JAPANESE ACTION YOU

ARE DIRECTED TO UNDERTAKE SUCH RECONNAISSANCE AND

OTHER MEASURES AS YOU DEEM NECESSARY BUT THESE MEAS-

URES SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT SO AS NOT, REPEAT NOT, TO

ALARM CIVIL POPULATION OR DISCLOSE INTENT. REPORT

MEASURES TAKEN. SHOULD HOSTILITIES OCCUR YOU WILL

CARRY OUT THE TASKS ASSIGNED IN RAINBOW FIVE SO FAR AS

THEY PERTAIN TO JAPAN. LIMIT DISSEMINATION OF THIS

HIGHLY SECRET INFORMATION TO MINIMUM ESSENTIAL

OFFICERS.

The following dispatch signed “MUes”,\*\*® and also dated November

27, was sent the commanding general, Hawaiian Department:\*\*®

JAPANESE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE COME TO PRACTICAL STALE-

MATE HOSTILITIES MAY ENSUE. SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES MAY

BE EXPECTED. INFORM COMMANDING GENERAL AND CHIEF

OF staff' only.

On November 28 a dispatch signed “Adams” was directed to

General Short, as follows:\*®®

CRITICAL SITUATION DEMANDS THAT ALL PRECAUTIONS BE

TAKEN IMMEDIATELY AGAINST SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES WITHIN

FIELD OF INVESTIGATIVE RESPONSIBILITY OF WAR DEPARTMENT

(SEE PARAGRAPH THREE MID SC THIRTY— FORTY FIVE). ALSO

Committee exhibit No. 32, p. 6.

This reconnaissance was not flown inasmuch as the Army planes were not made ready prior to the

December 7 attack.

118 Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 36.

ii« Gen. George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff.

117 Committee exhibit No. 32, p. 7.

Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles, Chief of Q-2, Army Intelligence.

Ill Committee exhibit No. 32, p. 10.

»» Id., at p. 13.

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DESIRED THAT YOU INITIATE FORTHWITH ALL ADDITIONAL

MEASURES NECESSARY TO PROVIDE FOR PROTECTION OF YOUR

ESTABLISHMENTS, PROPERTY, AND EQUIPMENT AGAINST SABO-

TAGE, PROTECTION OF YOUR PERSONNEL AGAINST SUBVERSIVE

PROPAGANDA AND PROTECTION OF ALL ACTIVITIES AGAINST

ESPIONAGE. THIS DOES NOT REPEAT NOT MEAN THAT ANY

ILLEGAL MEASURES ARE AUTHORIZED. PROTECTIVE MEASURES

SHOULD BE CONFINED TO THOSE ESSENTIAL TO SECURITY, A-

VOIDING UNNECESSARY PUBLICITY AND ALARM. TO INSURE

SPEED OF TRANSMISSION IDENTICAL TELEGRAMS ARE BEING

SENT TO ALL AIR STATIONS BUT THIS DOES NOT REPEAT NOT

AFFECT YOUR RESPONSIBILITY UNDER EXISTING INSTRUC-

TIONS.‘»>«

Again on November 28 another dispatch from the War Depart-

ment was sent the commanding general, Hawaiian Department, as

follows:\*\*\*

ATTENTION COMMANDING GENERAL HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE.

THAT INSTRUCTIONS SUBSTANTIALLY AS FOLLOWS BE ISSUED

TO ALL ESTABLISHMENTS AND UNITS UNDER YOUR CONTROL

AND COMMAND IS DESIRED; AGAINST THOSE SUBVERSIVE ACTIV-

ITIES WITHIN THE FIELD OF INVESTIGATIVE RESPONSIBILITY

OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT (SEE PARAGRAPH THREE MID SR

30—45) THE PRESENT CRITICAL SITUATION DEMANDS THAT

ALL PRECAUTIONS BE TAKEN AT ONCE. IT IS DESIRED ALSO

THAT ALL ADDITIONAL MEASURES NECESSARY BE INITIATED

BY YOU IMMEDIATELY TO PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING: PROTEC-

TION OF YOUR PERSONNEL AGAINST SUBVERSIVE PROPAGANDA,

PROTECTION OF ALL ACTIVITIES AGAINST ESPIONAGE, AND

PROTECTION AGAINST SABOTAGE OF YOUR EQUIPMENT, PROP-

ERTY AND ESTABLISHMENTS. THIS DOES NOT REPEAT NOT

AUTHORIZE ANY ILLEGAL MEASURES. AVOIDING UNNECESSARY

ALARM AND PUBLICITY PROTECTIVE MEASURES SHOULD BE

CONFINED TO THOSE ESSENTIAL TO SECURITY.

IT IS ALSO DESIRED THAT ON OR BEFORE DECEMBER FIVE THIS

YEAR REPORTS BE SUBMITTED TO THE CHIEF ARMY AIR FORCES

OF ALL STEPS INITIATED BY YOU TO COMPLY WITH THESE IN-

STRUCTIONS. SIGNED ARNOLD.

A dispatch dated December 5 and signed “MUes”,\*\*\* was sent the

assistant chief of staff headquarters, Gr-2 Hawaiian Department, to —

CONTACT COMMANDER ROCHEFORT IMMEDIATELY THROUGH

COMMANDANT FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT REGARDING

BROADCASTS FROM TOKYO REFERENCE WEATHER.««

Action Taken by Admiral Kimmel Pursuant to Warnings

AND Orders prom Washington

DISPATCH OP OCTOBER 16 PROM CHIEP OP NAVAL OPERATIONS

In the dispatch of October 16 \*\*^ Admiral Kimmel was advised that

the. resignation of the Japanese Cabinet had created a grave situation;

iMa For the reply of General Short to this message from the Adjutant General, see committee exhibit

No 32, p. 17.

Id., at p. 14. This message was also signed “Adams.”

IB Committee exhibit No. 32, p. 20.

IB This dispatch refers to the so-called winds code which will be found discussed in detail in Part IV, infra,

this report.

M\* Comsdttee exhibit No. 37, p. 18.

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that there was a strong possibility of hostilities between Japan'^and

Russia and there also was a possibility Japan might attack the United

States and Great Britain; and that he should —

take due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose

strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan.

Pursuant to the order Admiral Kimmel ordered submarines to

assume a “war patrol” off both Wake and Midway; he reinforced

Johnston and Wake with additional marines, ammunition, and stores

and also sent additional marines to Palmyra Island; he ordered the

commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District to direct an alert

status in the outlying islands; he placed on 12 hours’ notice certain

vessels of the fleet which were in west^coast ports, held 6 submarines

in readiness to depart for Japan, and delayed the sailing of 1 battle-

ship which was scheduled to visit a west-coast navy yard; he dis-

patched 12 patrpl planes to Midway with orders to carry out daily

patrols within 100 miles of the island and placed in effect additional

security measures in the fleet operating areas.\*\*\*

On October 22, Admiral Kimmel reported by letter \*\*\* these disposi-

tions to the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark. By letter

dated November 7 Admiral Stark wrote the commander in chief of

the Pacific Fleet: \*\*\*

OK on the disposition which you made in connection with the recent change

in the Japanese Cabinet. The big question is — what next?

DISPATCH OP NOVEMBER 24 PROM CHIEP OP NAVAL OPERATIONS

In the dispatch of November 24 \*\*• Admiral Kimmel was advised

that the chances of a favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan

WCTe very doubtful and that the movements of Japanese naval and

military forces —

indicate in our opinion that a surprise ag^essive movement in any direction in-

cluding attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility.

This dispatch carried no orders for the commander in chief of the

Pacific Fleet \*\*\* and would appear designed to acquaint him with the

moimting tenseness of the situation as well as to supply him with an

estiiAate of probable Japanese action.\*\*\* No action appears to have

been taken by Admiral Kimmel pursuant to this dispatch and he has

stated that he felt the message required no action other than that

which he had already taken.\*\*\*

“war warning” dispatch op NOVEMBER 27

The dispatch of November 27 began with the words:\*\*® “This dis-

patch is to be considered a war warning.” \*\*\* It stated that n^otia-

tions with Japan looking toward stabuization of conditions in the

Admiral Kimmel said: “The term ‘preparatory deployments’ used in this dispatch is nontechnical.

It has no especial significance other than its natural meaning.” Committee record, pp. 6706, 6700.

See testimony of Admiral iCimmel, committee record, p. 6709.

Committee exhibit No. 106.

Id.

«• Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 32.

See Navy court of inquiry record, pp 60-63.

Admiral Turner testified: \*\*The dispatch of the g^th we did not consider reguired any immediate action,

except to get ready plans for putting into effect when we gave them another warning\*\* Committee record, p. 6169.

See Navy court of inquiry record, pp. 298, 299.

Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 36.

Admiral Kimmel observed: “The phrase ‘war warning\* cannot be made a catch-all for all the oontin-

genoies hindsight may suggest. It is a characterization of the specific information which the dispatch con-

tained.” Committee record, p. 6717.

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Pacific had ceased and "an ag^essive move by Japan is expected

within the next few days,” and that "the number and equipment of

Japanese troops and the oganization of naval task forces indicates an

amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra

Peninsula, or possibly Borneo,” Admiral Kimmel was ordered "to

execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying

out the tasks assigned in WPIrA6.”

After receiving this warning Admiral Kimmel made the deliberate

decision not to institute long-range recoimaissance from Pearl Harbor

against possible air attacks for reasons which will subsequently ap-

pear.\*^ Between the warning and the attack on December 7 the

following deployments were made and action taken:

1. On November 28, Admiral Halsey left Pearl Harbor en route to

Wake in command of Task Force 8, consisting of the carrier K’nferpn'w,

three heavy cruisers and nine destroyers. He carried out morning

and afternoon searches to 300 miles for any sign of hostile shipping.\*®\*

The sending of this force to Wake was pursuant to a dispatch dated

November 26 to Admiral Kimmel stating, in part —

in order to keep the planes of the 2nd marine aircraft wing available for eroedi-

tionary use OpNav has requested and Army has agreed to station 25 Army

pursuit planes at Midway and a similar number at Wake provided you consider

this feasible and desirable. It will be necessary for you to transport these planes

and ground crews from Oahu to these stations on an aircraft carrier.

Admiral Halsey knew of the war warning dispatch and held a lengthy

conference with Admiral Kimmel and other officers on November 27.

He stated that when he prepared to depart with the task force for

Wake Island, he asked Adnural Kimmel how far the latter wanted

him to go: that Admiral Kimmel replied "Use your common sense.”

Admiral Smith said that before Admiral Htdsey left in the Enterprise,

he asked Admiral Kimmel what he should do in case he met Japanese

forces, to which Admiral Kimmel replied he should use his own

discretion. Admiral Smith stated that Admiral Halsey commented

these were the best orders he had received and that if he foimd even

a Japanese sampan he would sink it.\*\*\*

2. On December 5, Admiral Newton left Pearl Harbor en route to

Midway in command of Task Force 2, consisting of the carrier Lexing-

ton, three heavy cruisers, and five destroyers. Like Halsey, Newton

conducted scouting flights with his planes to cover his advance.\*\*\*

Despite the fact, however, that Adnural Newton was leaving Pearl

Harbor with some of the most powerful and valuable imits of the

Pacific fleet be was not even shown the war warning, had no knowl-

edge of it, and indeed had no knowledge of the dispatches of October

JW The Navy court of inquiry found: “It was the duty of Rear Admiral Bloch, when and If ordered by the

oommander in chief, Pacific Fleet, to conduct long-range reconnaissance. The commander in chief.

Pacific Fleet, for definite and sound reasons and after making provision for such reconnaissance in case of

emergency, specifically ordered that no routine long-range reconnaissance be undertaken and assumed full

responsibility for this action. The omission of this reconnaissance was not due to oversight or neglect.

It wof the result of a military decision ^ reached after much deliberation and consultation with exj^ienced officers,

and after weighing the information at hand and all the factors involved,” Navy court of inquiry report, com-

mittee exhibit No. 167.

«• Testimony of Admiral Kimmel, committee record, p. 6760. See also testimony of Admiral Halsey,

Hart inquiry record, p. 299.

iw OfiBce of Naval Ojierations.

Dispatch from Chief of Naval Operations to oommander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, No. 270038, dated

November 26, 1941. Committee exhibit No. 112. See also committee record, pp. 1614, 1616; also Hart inquiry

record, p. 299.

Hart inquiry record, pp. 297, 298.

Id., at p. 43.

141 Testimony of Admiral Kimmel, committee record, p. 6760; see also testimony of Admiral Newton,

Hart inquiry record, p. 318.

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16 and November 24 or the December 3 dispatch concerning the

destruction of codes to which reference will hereafter be made.

Except for what he read in the press, Admiral Newton received no

information concerning the increasing danger of our relations with

Japan. He was given no sj)ecial orders and regarded his departure

from Hawaii as a mission with no special significance other than to

proceed to Midway for the piurpose of flying off the Lexington a squad-

ron of planes for the reinforcement of the island. In consequence,

no special orders were given for the arming of planes or making prep-

aration for war apart from ordinary routine.^" The failure to supply

Admiral Newton any orders or information is in marked contrast with

the “free hand” orders given Admiral Halsey. In his testimony

Admiral Kimmel stated that Admiral Newton’s orders and information

would have come through Admiral Brown, who was Newton’s

superior.i^\*\*

3. Admiral Wilson Brown on December 5 left Pearl Harbor en

route to Johnston Island with Task Force 3 to conduct landing exer-

cises.\*^\*

4. On November 28, orders were issued to bomb unidentified sub-

marines foimd in the operating sea areas around Oahu. Full security

was invoked for the ships at sea, which were ordered to bomb sub-

marine contacts.\*\*\* However, no change was made in the condition

of readiness in port except that a Coast Guard patrol was started off

Pearl Harbor and they began sweeping the harbor channel and

approaches.\*\*\*

5. Upon receipt of the war warning Admiral Kimmel ordered a

squadron of patrol planes to proceed from Midway to Wake and

search the ocean areas en route. While at Wake and Midway on

December 2 and 3 they searched to a distance of 525 miles.\*\*\*

6. A squadron of patrol planes from Pearl Harbor was ordered to

replace the squadron which went from Midway to Wake. This

squadron of patrol planes left Pearl Harbor on November 30. It

proceeded from Johnston to Midway, making another reconnaissance

sweep on the way. Upon reaching Midway, this squadron of patrol

planes conducted distant searches of not less than 500 miles of varying

sectors from that island on December 3, 4, 5, and 6. On December 7,

five of these Midway based patrol planes were searching the sector

120° to 170° from Midway, to a distance of 450 miles. An additional

two patrol pianos of the Midway squadron left at the same time to

rendezvous with the Lexington at a point 400 miles from Midway.

Four of the remaining patrol planes at Midway, each loaded with

bombs, were on 10-minute notice as a ready stri&ig force.\*\*'\*

Admiral McMorris, Director of War Plans under Admiral Kimmel,

testified before the Hewitt inquiry with respect to what defensive

deployment was executed, stating —

there was no material change in the disposition and deployment of the fleet

forces at that time other than the movement of certain aircraft to Midway and

See Hart inquiry record, pp. 316-318.

In this regard, the testimony of Admiral Brown indicates that he was not shown the “war warning^'.

See testimony of Rear Admiral Brown before the Roberts Commission, Committee exhibit No. 143.

Testimony of Admiral Kimmel, committee record, p. 6751.

See Navy Court of Inquiry record, pp. 299, 300; see also committee exhibit No. 112, p. 96.

See Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 395.

141 Testimony of Admiral Kimmel, committee record, p. 6751.

See testimony of Admiral Kimmel, committee record, page 6752; also testimony of Admir^ Bellinger

Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 684.

It should be noted that Admiral Inglis stated, “ There is no written record available of any searches having been

made on December either from the Hawaiian area or from Midway.^\* For further testimony of Admiral

Inglis concerning the matter of reconnaissance see committee record, pp. 70-73,

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Wake and of the carriers with their attendant cruisers and destroyers, to those

locations to deliver aircraft.\*^\*

While the dispatch of the three task forces does not appear to have

been primarily made by Admiral Kimmel as a result of the implications

of the war warning,'" this action combined with the other steps above-

mentioned had the effect of providing reconnaissance sweeps of the

patrol-plane squadrons moving from Midway to Wake; from Pearl

Harbor to Johnston and from Johnston to Midway; from Wake to

Midway^ and Midway to Pearl Harbor covering a aistance of nearly

5,000 i^es. Each squadron as it proceeded would cover a 400-mile

strand of ocean along its path, bring under the coverage of air search

about 2,000,000 square miles of ocean area. In addition, submarines

of the Fleet on and after November 27 were on war patrols from

Midway and Wake Islands continuously.\*®® The southwest ap-

proaches to Hawaii were thereby to a degree effectively screened by

reconnaissance from a raiding force bent on attacking Pearl Harbor

by surprise.\*®\* Nothing was done, however, to detect an approaching

hostile Jorce coming jrom tike north and northwest, recognized as the most

dangerous sector, and it is into the justification jor this nonaction that we

shall inguire}^^

Evalttation op the “War Warning” Dispatch op November 27

ON WHERE THE ATTACK MIGHT COME

Admiral Kimmel stated that the war warning dispatch of November

27 did not warn the Pacific Fleet of an attack in the Hawaiian area

nor did it state expressly or by implication that an attack in the

Hawaiian area was imminent or probable.\*®®

The warning dispatch did not, it is true, mention Pearl Harbor as a

specific point of attack, and gave the estimate that the number and

equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces

indicated an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines,

Thailand or the Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo.\*®®\* It is to be re-

called in this connection, however, that the November 24 dispatch \*®®®

to Admiral Kimmel warned of “a surprise aggressive movement in any

direction including attack on Philippines or Quam is a possibilUy” .

The latter dispatch while indicating that an attack would possibly

come in the vicinity of the Philippines or Guam did nevertheless

indicate, by use of the words “m any direction,” that just where the

attack might come coqld not be predicted.\*®\*

M8 Hewitt inouiry record, pp. 321, 322.

See committee record, to. 9312, 9313.

Testimony of Admiral Kimmel, committee record, p. 6762.

In this connection, see testimony of Admiral Bellinger, committee record, pp. 9321, 9324.

See testimony of Admiral Bellinger, committee record, pp. 9324, 9325; also 9436, 9437.

iM Admiral Kimmel testified: “The so-called ‘war warning’ dispatch of November 27 did not warn the

Pacific Fleet of an attack in the Hawaiian area. It did not state expressly or by implication that an attack

in the Hawaiian area was imminent or probable.” Committee record, p. 6716. For a detailed statement

by Admiral Kimmel concerning where the attack mignt come based on the “war warning,” see Navy Court

of Inquiry record, p. 301.

!»• For the full text of the “war warning” dispatch, see p. 98, supra\*

For the full text of the November 24 dispatch, see p. 98, supra.

\*\*\* Admiral Kimmel stated that in the November 24 dispatch the words “in any direction” did include,

so far as bis estimate was concerned, a possible submarine attack on the Hawaiian Islands but not an air

attach. See Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 299.

It has been pointed out that the estimate of enemy action referred to in the “war warning” — an amphibious

opercUion to the SotUh— is to be distinguished from a surprise aggressive movement in any direction mentioned

in the November 24 warning; that the distinction between an amphibious expedition and a surprise aggres-

sive movement' is such that a war warning in making reference to such an expedition in no way superseded

the estimate'^of surprise’^aggressive action mentioned in the November 24 dispatch. See in this regard the

testimony of Admiral Turner, Navy Court of Inquiry record, pp. 997, 1020.

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The fact that Admiral Kimmel was ordered to take appropriate

defensive deployment preparatory to canying out the tasks assigned in

WPL-46'' indicated that his situation was subject to possible danger

requiring such action.^ It was Washington’s responsibility to give

Admiral Kimmel its best estimate of where the major strategic

enemy effort would come.^®® It was Admiral Kimmel’s responsibility

as commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet to be prepared for the worst

conting^cy, and when he was warned of war and order^ to execute

a defensive deployment it was necessarily in contemplation that such

action would be against all possible dangers with which the Hawaiian

situation was fraught.^®^

OTHER DISPATCHES RECEIVED ON NOVEMBER 27

Admiral Kimmel stated that two other dispatches which he received

on November 27 were affirmative evidence that the War or Navy

Departments did not consider hostile action on Pearl Harbor imminent

or probable.^®® The first of these dispatches read:^®®

Army has oflFered to make available some units of infantry for reenforcing

defence battalions now on station if you consider this desirable. Army also

proposes to prepare in Hawaii garrison troops for advance bases which you may

occupy but is unable at this time to provide any antiaircraft units. Take this into

consideration in your plans and advise when practicable number of troops desired

and recommended armament.

The second read:^®®

In order to keen the planes of the second marine aircraft wing available for expeditions^

ary use Op Nav has requested and Army has agreed to station 26 Army pursuit planes

at Midway and a similar number at Wake provided you consider this feasible and desir-

able. It will be {necessary for you to transport these planes and ground crews from

Oahu to these stations on an aircraft carrier. Planes will be flown off at destination

and ground personnel landed in boats; essential spare parts, tools, and ammunition

will be taken in the carrier or on later trips of regular Navy supply vessels. Army

understands these forces must be quartered in tents. Navy must be responsible

for supplying water and subsistence and transporting other Army supplies.

Stationing these planes must not be allowed to interfere with planned movements

of Army bombers to Philippines. Additional parking areas should be laid prompt-

ly if necessary. Can Navy bombs now at outlying positions be carried by Army

bombers which may fly to those positions for supporting Navy operations?

Confer with commanding general and advise as soon as practicable.

Both of these dispatches, however, were dated November 26, the

day before the war warning dispatch. The latter dispatch was not to

be controlled by messages which antedated it. The reinforcing of

Wake and Midway was left up entirely to Admiral K.immel both as to

feasibility and desirability.’®^ The fact that other outposts needed

reinforcements and steps were outlined in that direction did not elim-

1“ In this connection It is to be noted that the \*\*war warning" dispatch was directed for action to the com-

mander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet and the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet (committee exhibit

No. 37, p. 36). This would appear to be an indication to Admiral Kimmel that the same defensive action

was expected of him as of Admiral Hart In the Philippine area who was located in the path of the Japanese

move to the south; that the message of November 2? placed in the same category— exposed to the same

perils and requiring the same action— the Asiatic and the Pacific Fleets.

1“ See testimony of Admiral Ingersoll, Navy Court of Inquiry record, pp. 839-842.

See discussion regarding "Admiral Simmers awareness of danger from air attack," Part IH, p. 75

et se^ supra.

Testimony of Admiral Kimmel, committee record, pp. 6716, 6717.

Committee exhibit No. 112, p. M.

Id., at p. 65.

Admiral Kimmel testified before the Nay Court of Inquiry that he regarded the proposal from the

Chief of Naval Operations to transfer Army pursuit planes to Midway and Wake in order to conserve the

marine planes for expeditionary duty as a suggestion and not a directive. See Navy Court olinquiry rec-

ord, p. 307.

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mate the neceesity for the defense of Hawaii, the best-equipped out-

post the United States possessed, nor remove it as a possible point of

attack. The same is true with respect to the use of Hawaii as a cross-

roads for dispositions going to the Philippines or elsewhere; Hawaii

was the only point we controlled in the Pacific which had adequate

facilities to be such a crossroads.

“psychological handicaps" INDICATED BY ADMIRAL KIMMEL

In his testimony Admiral Eliimnel has suggested that one can

appreciate the “psycholo^cal handicaps" that dispatches he received

placed upon the Navy in Hawaii. He stated:

In effect, I was told:

"Do take precautions”

“Do not alarm civilians” “\*

“Do take a preparatory deployment”

“Do not disclose intent”

“Do take a defensive deployment”'\*\*

“Do not commit the first overt act.” \*\*'

In this connection, however, it is to be noted that the only cautions

mentioned, wWch were contained largely in Army messages, were not

to alarm civilians, not to disclose intent, and not to commit the first

overt act. To have deployed the fleet; to have instituted distant

reconnaissance; to have effected a higher degree of readiness, on a

maneuver basis if necessary — ^none of these steps would have alarmed

the civilian population of Hawaii,\*\*® have disclosed intent, or have

constituted an overt act against Japan.

Admiral Kimmel’s contention must be judged in light of the fact

that on November 28 on his own responsibility,\*\*® he instructed the

fleet to depth bomb all submarine contacts expected to be hostile in

the fleet \_ operating areas.\*™ The Office of Naval Operations ac-

quiesced in this order to depth bomb submarine contacts.

Admiral Halsey, prior to departii^ for Wake Island on November

28, received orders from Admiral Kimmel which he interpreted as

permitting him to sink “even a Japanese sampan" if he found it.\*^\*

Asked by Admiral Halsey as to how far he “should go" Admiral

Kimmel replied, “Use your common sense." \*”

MS Referring to the dispatch of October 16 advising of the resignation of the Japanese Cabinet and stating

in part, “You will take due precautions including such preparatory deploiuneuts as will not disclose stra-

tegic intention nor constitute provocative action against Japan.\*\* See committee exhibit No. 37.

iM Referring to a portion of the dispatch of November 28 sent Admiral Kimmel for information and incor-

porating a portion of an Army message sent the commanding general of the Western Defense Command,

which latter message stated in part, “The United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act

• • • . Measures should be carried out so as not to alarm civil population or disclose intent.\*\* See

committee exhibit No. 37.

Referring to the dispatch of October 16, note 162, supra.

Mi Referring to the dispatches of October 16 and November 28, notes 162 and 163, supra.

Ml Referring to the “war warning\*\* dispatch of November 27. Committee exhibit No. 87,

Referring to the dispatch of November 28, note 163, supra.

m There had been air raid drills at Pearl Harbor on April 24, May 12, 13; June 19; July 10, 26; August 1,

20; September 6, 27: October 13, 27; andrNovember 12, 1941.'\*-^ Committee exhibit No. 120.

m As stated by the Navy court of inquiry: \*\* \* • • he7(Admlral Kimmel) has issued, on his own

responsibility, orders that all unidentified submarines discovered in Hawaiian waters were to be depth-

charged and sunk. In so doing he exceeded his orders from higher authority and ran the risk of commuting

an otfert act against «/apan, but did so feeling that it is best to follow the rule ‘shoot first and explain after-

wards\*.\*\* See Navy Court of Inquiry report, committee exhibit No. 167.

Ml See dispatch No. 280356 from Admiral Kimmel to the Pacific Fleet with a copy for information to the

Ofidoe of Naval Operations; committee exhibit No. 112, p. 96. For a description of the fleet operating

sea areasjsee committee exhibit No. 6, Item 3.

Ml See Hart inquiry record, p. 43.

iM Id., at pp. 297, 298.11

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The “war warning” dispatch of November 27 to the commander in

chief of the Pacific Fleet contained no cautions, admonitions, or

restraints whatever.\*”

THE "war WARNING” AND TRAINING

It has been pointed out by Admiral Kimmel that had he effected

aU-out security measures upon receiving each alarming dispatch from

Washington, the training program wouW have been curtailed so dras-

tically that the fleet could not have been prepared for war.\*” To

appraise the merit of this observation it is necessary to consider the

nature of instructions with respect to training under which the fleet

operated. Admiral Kimmel has stated he was under a specific in-

junction to continue the training proOTam, referring in this connection

to a letter from the Chief Of Naval Operations dated April 3, 1941.\*”

In this letter, however, the Chief of Naval Operations had stated

the question was when and not whether we would enter the war and

that in the meantime he would advise that Admiral Kimmel devote

as much time as may be available to training his forces in the parti-

cular duties which the various units might be called upon to perform

under the Pacific Fleet operating plans. Clearly the suggestion that

training be conducted was made pending a more critical turn indicat-

ing the imminence of war. The dispatch of November 27 with vivid

poignance warned of war with Japan. It stated that negotiations

with Japan looking to stabilization of conditions in the Pacific had

ceased and that an aggressive move by Japan was expected within the

not jew days. The time for training for a prospective eventuality

was past — the eventuality, war, was at hand.\*” In none other of the

dispatches had the commander in chief been so emphatically advised

that war was imminent. Indeed the November 27 dispatch used the

words “war wamii^,” an expression which Admiral Kimmel testified

he had never before seen employed in an official dispatch in all of his

40 years in the Navy. Manifestly the commander in chief of the

United States Fleet and the Pacific Fleet would not expect that it

would be necessary for the Navy Department to advise him to put

aside his training now that war was imminent. The “war warning”

provided adequate indication that the •primary junction thereafter was

not training but dejense against a treacherous foe who had invariably

struck without a declaration of war.

THE TERM “DEFENSIVE DEPLOYMENT” AND FAILURE TO INSTITUTE

DISTANT RECONNAISSANCE

Admiral Kimmel has made particular reference to the fact that the

term “defensive deployment” was nontechnical and that it was to be

Referring to the November 27 warning, Admiral Stark said: ‘‘This message begins with the words

‘This dispatcn is to be considered a war warning.’ These words were carefully weighed and chosen after

considerable thought and discussion with my principal advisors and with the Secretary of the Navy. The

words ‘war warning’ had never before been used in any of my dispatches to the commander in chief. Pacific

Fleet. They were ^ut at the beginning of the message to accentuate the extreme gravity of the situation.

We considered the picture as we saw it and we felt that there was grave danger of Japan striking anywhere.

We wanted our people in the Pacific to know it, and we used language which we thought would convey what

we felt.” Committee record, pp. 6650, 6651.

174 Committee record, p. 6703; see also testimony of Admiral Bellinger, Committee record, p. 9350.

171 Committee record, p. 6702. For letter see committee exhibit No. 106.

>71 Before the Navy Court of Inquiry, Admiral Kimmel stated, after outlining the circumstances attending

the decision, teetifi^: • i made the decision on the 27th of November not to stop training in the

Fleet but to continue until further developments.” Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 285,

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efifected “preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in "W PL-46.”

This plan called for a raid upon the Marshall Islands the Pacific

Fleet very shortly after hostilities with Japan should begin. Admiral

Kimmel has pointed out that the prime purpose of the raids was to

divert Japanese strength from the Malay Barrier. He has observed

that the only patrol planes of consequence at Pearl Harbor were

assigned to the fleet and that these planes would be required in the

raid on the Marshalls. He further pointed out that he had only 49

patrol planes in flying condition, an insufficient number to conduct

each day a 360° distant reconnaissance from Oahu. In this connection

he observed that to insure an island base against a surprise attack

from fast carrier-based planes, it was necessary to patrol the evening

before to a distance of 800 miles and that this required 84 planes on

one flight of 16 hours to cover the 360° perimeter. He testified that,

of course, the same planes and the same crews cannot make a 16-hour

flight every day and therefore for searches of this character over a

protracted period 250 patrol planes would be required. He observed

that a search of all sectors of approach to an island base is the only

type of search that deserves the name and that’ he manifestly had an

insufficient number of planes for this purpose.\*” In consequence of

this situation. Admiral Kimmel decided to undertake no distant recon-

naissance whatever from Pearl Harbor and regarded the deployment

of the task forces and other measures already indicated as an adequate

defensive deployment within the terms of the order contained in the

war warning.\*”

In this connection, as heretofore pointed out, Admiral McMorris,

Director of War Plans under Admiral Kimmel, testified before the

Hewitt Inquiry with respect to what defensive deployment was exe-

cuted, stating —

there was no material change in the disposition and deploj'ment of the fleet forces

at that time other than the movement of certain aircraft to Midway and Wake

and of the carriers with their attendant cruisers and destroyers, to those locations

to deliver aircraft.”’

He further stated that the language with respect to a defensive

deployment in the war warning was a “direction” and that he consid-

ered the action taken constituted an appropriate defensive deploy-

ment; that it was a major action in line with the measure to execute

an appropriate defensive deployment; and jthat the major portion of

the fleet was disposed in Hawaiian waters and reinforcements were

sent to Midway and Wake. He said, however, that the establishing

of an air patrol from Oahu to guard against a surprise attack by

Japan would have been an appropriate act but that —

no one act nor no one disposition can be examined independent of other require-

ments.\*”

Admiral Smith, Chief of Staff to Admiral Kimmel, said that follow-

ing the war warning of November 27 the establishment of aircraft

patrols from Oahu would have been an appropriate defensive deploy-

ment to carry out the initial tasks assigned by the Pacific Fleet war

plans.\*®\*

177\* See testimony of Admiral Kimmel, committee record, pp. 6762-6759.

J” See committee record, pp. 6769-6761; also Navy Court of Inquiry record, pp. 1144, 1146.

»?\* Hewitt Inquiry record, pp. 321, 322.

iw Id., at pp. 323, 324.

Hewitt Inquiry record, pp. 372, 373.

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Admiral Turner, Director of War Plans, who had a principal part in

preparing the November 27 war warning, testified as follows with

respect to the term defensive deployment

Before coming to the meat of the answer, I invite attention to the fact that

this dispatch has a multiple address. It goes to the commander in chief of the

Asiatic Fleet for action and it goes to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet for

action. It is as if it were the Army practice, with two dispatches, one addressed

to each, but both in identical terms.

A ‘‘deployment” is a spreading out of forces. A naval deployment means to

spread out and make ready for hostilities. To get into the best positions from

which to execute the operating plans against the enemy. The defensive deploy-

ment as applied to Hawaii, which is of chief interest, was for the defense of Hawaii

and of the west coast of the United States, because one of the tasks of WPL46 is

to defend the territory and coastal zones, our own territory and coastal zones,

and to defend our shipping.

Instead of being in a concentrated place, or instead of being off in some distant

region holding exercises and drills, it meant that the forces under the command

of the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet could take station for the most

probable attack against them or against the Hawaiian Islands, keeping in mind

their responsibilities for covering the United States and Panama.

The deployment in the vicinity of Hawaii, if wide enough, would in itself

constitute a formidable barrier against any attempt further east, and we definitely

did not expect an attack, that is, the Navy did not, an attack on the west coast

or in Panama, as is indicated by a dispatch going out the same day to the com-

mandants of districts to take precautions against subversive activities, but we

did not tell them to make any defensive deployment.

The deployment from Hawaii might have been made in a number of different

ways. Certainly I would expect that in accordance with the plans that should

have been drawn up, and they were, that airplanes would have been sent to

Midway, if not already there, to Wake, to Johnston Island, to Palmyra, the

reconnaissance planes as well as defensive planes, and that a reconnaissance

would have been undertaken. The movement of those planes and forces to those

positions constituted part of the defensive deployment.

The battleships, of course, w^ere of no use whatsoever against undamaged fast

ships. Naturally, it was not to be expected that the Japanese would bring over

slow ships unless they were making their full and complete effort against Hawaii,

so that a proper deployment for the battleships w^ould have been in the best

position to do what was within their power, which was only to defend Hawaii

against actual landings. In other w^ords, if they had been at sea and in a retired

position even, such that if actual landings were attempted on the Hawaiian

Islands and at such a distance that they could arrive prior to or during the landings,

they vrould have been most useful indeed to have interfered with and defeated

the landings.

Since, as has been pointed out previously, the danger zone, the danger position

of Hawaii was to the north, because there were not little outlying islands there

from which observation could have been made, since there was no possibility of

detecting raiders from the north except by airplanes and ships, an appropriate

deployment would have been to have sent some fast ships, possibly with small

seaplanes, up to the north to assist and possibly to cover certain sectors against

approach, w'hich the long-range reconnaissance could not have done. Of course,

these ships w^ould naturally have been in considerable danger, but that was w^hat

they w^ere there for, because fighting ships are of no use unless they are in a dan-

gerous position so that they can engage the enemy and inflict loss on them.

Another part of a deployment, even where airplanes w ould not be moved, would

have been to put them on operating air fields scattered throughout the islands so

that they could be in a mutual supporting position with respect to other fields

and to cover a somewhat wider arc.

Another part of the deployment w^ould have been to have sent submarines, as

many as w^ere available, out into a position from which they could exercise either

surveillance or could make attacks against approaching vessels.

It is to be noted that there was no offensive action ordered for submarines.

The offensive action, of course, would have been to send them into Japanese

waters.

Committee record, pp. 5168-5172.

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With respect to the same matter, Admiral Stark said that he had

anticipated that full security measures would be taken, that the

Army would set a condition of readiness for aircraft and the aircraft

warning service, that Admiral Kimmel would invoke full readiness

measures, distant reconnaissance and anti-submarine measures, and

that the plans previously agreed on with the Army would be imple-

mented.\*\*®

In considering the validity of Admiral Kimmel's position that the

order to execute an appropriate defensive deployment is inseparable

from the language “preparatory to carrying out the task assigned in

WPL-46” it is necessaiy to consider what the purport of the message

would have been without the words “execute an appropriate defensive

deployment.” In such case Admiral Kimmel might conceivably

have been partially justified in making aU preparations with a view

to carrying out the tasks assigned after war began. But under the

terms of the dispatch as received by him he was to do something else.

He was to execute a defensive deployment preparatory to carrying

out these tasks— a defensive deployment before war broke.

Fui thermore, Admiral Kimmel received for his information the

message of November 28 directed for action to the naval commanders

on the west coast.\*\*^ After quoting the Army dispatch of November

27 to the commander of the Army Western Defense Command, this

message stated: “\* \* \* Be prepared to carry out tasks assigned

in WPL-46 so far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur.”

The west coast commanders were riot ordered to effect a defensive

deployment, only to be 'prepared to carry out the tasks assigned in

WPL-46. Here was a clear indication to the Commander of the

Pacific Fleet that he was to do something significantly more than

merely getting prepared to carry out war tasks. He was to execute

a defensive depfoyment preparatory to carrying out such tasks.

And among Admiral Kimmel’s tasks under the war plans, prior to

outbreak of war, were the maintenance of fleet security and guarding

“against a surprise attack by Japan.” As has already been' seen in

the plans for the defense of the Hawaiian coastal frontier it was

recognized that a declaration of war might be preceded by a surprise

submarine attack ori ships in the operating areas and a surprise

attack ori Oahu including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor;

that it appeared “the most likely and dangerous form of attack on

Oahu would be an air attack.” \*\*\*

«»See Navy Court of Inquiry record, pp. 64-62, 84. Asked what was meant by the ‘‘defensive deploy-

ment" in the message of November 27, Admiral Stark said; “My thought in that message about the de-

fensive deployment was clear all-out security measures. Certainly, having been directed to take a defensive

deployment, the Army having been directed to make reconnaissance, but regardless of the Army, our

message to Admiral Kimmel, that the n atural thing — and perhaps he did to it — was to take up with the Army

right away in the gravity of the situation, the plans that they had made, and then make dispositions as best

he could against surprise for the safety not only of the ships which he decided to keep in port but also for

the safety of the ships which he had at sea. He had certain material which he could use for that and we

naturally expected he would use it."

“• \* \* a defensive deployment would be to spread and to use his forces to the maximum extent to avoid mr-

prise and, if he could, to hit the other fellow and in conjunction with the Army, to implement the arrangements

which had previously been made for just this sort of thing ” Committee record, pp. 6706, 6706.

iw Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 38.

iw See committee exhibit No. 44,

Admiral Bellinger testified that in his opinion an air attack was the most likely form of attack on Pearl

Harbor. Committee record, p. 9355. He further testified that the Martin-Bellinger estimate was not an

estimate of the strategy that the Japanese would employ in starting the war but rather an estimate cover-

ing the event of sudden hostile action against Oahu: in other words, that it was not an estimate which in-

dicated that Japan was going to strike against Oahu as part of their national strategy but rather if they

were going to strike Oahu this was the estimate of how it would be done. Committee record, p. 9382.

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With the clear recognition that Japan might attack before a declara

tion of war and with a war warning carrying an order to execute an

appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to performing ta^sks

dining war, it is diflBcult to understand why Admiral Kimmel should

have concluded that no distant air reconnaissance should be con-

ducted, particularly in the dangerous sector to the north. Apart from

radio intelligence which will be later discussed, distant reconnaissance

admittedly was the only adequate means of detecting an approaching

raiding force in sufficient time to avoid a surprise attack. Certainly

the sector from the west to the south was covered, partially at least,

by the three task forces. And yet the most dangerous sector the 90°

counterclockwise from due north to due west, the sector through which

the Japanese striking force approached, was given no attention what-

ever.^\*® Admiral Bellinger testified that had distant reconnaissance

been conducted it would have been to the north and, although he

was responsible for Navy patrol planes. Admiral Bellinger was not

even shown the war warning.\*\*\*

Admiral Kimmel has suggested that under the Joint Coastal Frontier

Defense Plan Admiral Bloch was responsible for distant reconnaissance

and had the latter desired planes he could have called upon the

commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet.\*\*\* This suggestion, apart

from being incompatible with Admiral Kimmers stating he made

the decision not to condtict distant reconnaissance, is not tenable.

Admiral Bloch had no planes with which to conduct distant patrols

and Admiral Kimmel knew it.\*\*® While he was on the ground, it was

the responsibility of the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet to

take all necessary steps in line with a defensive deployment and in

recognition of the realities at Hawaii to protect the fleet.\*\*\*

Admiral KimmePs assertion that only a 360^-distant reconnaissance

is worthy of the name ignores the fact that a 90® arc to the southwest

was being partially covered, a fact concerning which he has made a

J oint in testifying before the committee. Manifestly, to have con-

noted reconnaissance to any extent would have been more effective

than no reconnaissance at aU.\*\*\* And Admiral Kimmel had adequate

See testimony of Admiral Bellinger, Committee record, pp. 9369, 9370; also section “Plans for the

Defense of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier,” Part III, this report.

wt Committee record, pp. 9324, 9325; also Hewitt Inquiry record, pp. 606, 507.

In testifying before the Navy Court of Inquiry Admiral Kimmel was asked what he could consider the

most probable areas of approach for a surprise attack launched from carriers against Pearl Harbor. He

replied; “I testified before the so-called Roberts Commission that I thought the northern sector was the

most probable. I thought at the time that the aircraft had come from the north— the time I testified I

mean — and I didn't wish to make alibis. However, I feel that there is no sector around Oahu which is

much more dangerous than any other sector. We have an island which can be approached from any dilu-

tion. There is no outlying land which prevents this, and you have got a 360® arc, minus the very small line

which runs up along the Hawaiian chain. From the southern, we have observation stations, Johnston and

Palmyra, and the closest Japanese possession is to the southwestward in the Marshalls, and these Japanese

carriers were fuel eaters and short -legged. I would say that while all sectors are important, if I were re-

stricted, I would probably search the western 180® sector first.” Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 305.

Committee record, pp. 9305, 9306; also 9362, 9363.

iM Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 1125.

See Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 1125.

The Navy Court of Inquiry found; ^‘The Naval Base Defense Oflaoer (Admiral Bloch) was entirely

without aircraft, either fighters or patrol planes, assigned permanently to him. He was compelled to rely

upon Fleet aircraft for joint effort in conjunction with Army air units.” See Navy Court of Inquiry report,

committee exhibit No. 157.

i\*i Admiral Bellinger testified that in the absence of definite information as to the probability of an attack,

it was the responsibility of Admiral Kimmel to order long-range reconnaissance. Hart Inquiry record,

p. 126.

in Admiral Bellinger testified that covering certain selected sectors was a possible and feasible operation.

Hewitt inquiry record, p. 477.

Admiral Kimmel admitted that “Of course, any patrol run has some value. I will admit that as far as

surface ship.” Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 1126.

Admiral Stark testified: “When you haven't got enough planes to search the entire area which you would

like to search, whether it is planes or what not, you narrow down to where you think is the most likely

area of travel, and your next study is how can you cover that or how much of it can you cover.” Com-

mittee record, p. 6702.

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patrol planes to conduct distant reconnaissance for an extended period

throiignout the most dangerous sectors. The evidence reflects that

there were 81 planes available to the commander in chief of the P^ciflo

Fleet which were capable of performing distant reconnaissance.\*®\*

Estimates of the number which can prcmerly be regarded as in a state

of readiness to conduct reconnaissance flights from Oahu as of Decem-

ber 7 range from 48 to 69. In addition the Army had six long-range

bombers \*\*\* which were available to the Navy under the plans for joint

air operations at Hawaii. Even with the minimum estimate of 48 and

the conservative basis of employing each plane only once every 3

days,\*®\* a sector of 128° could have been covered daily for several

weeks.\*\*® This fact, when considered with the reconnaissance sweeps

from Midway and by the task forces, leaves clear that the most dan-

gerous sectors could have been fully covered.\*®^ In all events it would

have been entirely po^ible and proper to have employed aircraft to any

extent available for distant reconnaissance in the more dangerous sec-

tors, using submarines, destroyers, or other vessels in the less dangerous

approaches to Oahu.\*®\* That substantial and effective distant recon-

naissance could have been conducted is demonstrated by the fact that

it was instituted immediately after the attack despite the fact that

over half the available planes were rendered inoperative by the

attack.\*®®

Yet Admiral Kimmel contends that use of all his available planes

would have unduly impaired his ability to carry out the offensive

measures assi^ed the Pacific Fleet in the event of war.\*®® The

evidence establishes, however, that his plans for the conduct of

See committee exhibit No. 120.

Admiral Bellinger stated, however, that the Army reported S B-17’s available for December 6, 1041.

Committee record, p. 9307.

w See testimony of Admiral Bellinger, committee record, pp. 0328, 9320.

»• Id., Hewitt inquiry record, pp. 480-507. See also committee record, p. 9330 where Bellinger stated

the patrol could be maintained for 11 days to 2 weeks, perhaps longer. Admiral Bellinger testified that 1

patrol plane could cover 8° to 700 miles. Committee record, p. 9325.

Admiral Davis, fleet aviation officer, said that the entire 360® circumference was not of equal Impor-

tahoe; that a considerable arc to the north and west and another aro to the south and west were the most

important. He said that although there were not enough planes and pilots to have established and main\*

tained a long-range 360° search indefinitely, there were enough to have made searches using relatively

short-range planes in the least dangerous sectors and by obtaining some assistance from available Army

aircra^. Hart Inquiry record, pp. 98, 99; 240, 241.

The evidence before the committee contradicts the following conclusion of the Navy Court of Inqufry:

“Neither surface ships nor submarines properly may be employed to perform this duty (reconnaissance),

even if the necessary number be available. The resulting dispersion of strength not only renders the fleet

incapable of performing its proper function, but exposes the units to destruction in detail. A defensive

deployment of surface ships and submarines over an extensive sea area as a means of continuously guarding\*

against a possible attack from an unknown quarter and at an unknown time, is not sound military procedure

either in peace or in war.” The committee regards the employment of surface vessels for the purpose of recon-

naissance as sound military procedure where reconnaissance is imperative and the more adaptable facUUies,

patrol planeSt are not sufficiently available. See also note 192, supra.

It is highly significant that the Commandant of the 16th Naval District (Panama) was taking the following

action, as reported by General Andrews to the War Department under date of November 29, 1941: “In the

Panama Sector, the Commandant of the 15th Naval District is conducting continuous surface patrol of the area

induded within the Panama Coastal Frontier, supplemented, within the limits of the aircraft at his disposal, by

an air patrol. In my opinion, the Commandant of the 15th Naval District, does not have sufficient aircraft

or vessels within his control for adequate reconnaissance.” See Committee Exhibit No. 32, p. 18.

\*\*• See testimony of Admiral Bellinger, committee record, pp. 9371, 9372.

••In his statement submitted to the Navy Court of Inquiry, Admiral Kimmel said: “Having covered

the operating areas by air patrols it was not prudent in my judgment and that of my staff to fritter away our

slim resources in patrol planes in token searches and thus seriously impair their required availability to carry

out their functions with the Fleet under approved War Plans.”

When questioned concerning the time that Admiral Kimmel would be expected to start a raid against the

Marshall Islands after war began, Admiral Ingersoll stated that Admiral Kimmel “co«W have chosen any

date, and we did not expect him to move on any particular date, we expected him to move to carry out that task when

he was ready.” If I can digress a little bit on that, I do not know that Admiral Kimmel, or anybody, knew

what was the state of the Japanese fortifications and defenses in the Marshall Islands. Any movement of

that kind I have no doubt would have been preceded by reconnaissance, possibly from carrier planes or

■possibly from some of the long-range Army planes which were fixed up for photographic purposes, and they

would undoubtedly have made a reconnaissance to determine where the Japanese strength was, what

islands were fortified, and so forth, and upon the receipt of that mtelligence base their plans. As a matter of

fact, I think we were trying to get out of the Army a reconnaissance of those islands in connections with the

flight of Army planes from Hawaii to Australia. I believe it did not take place until after Pearl Harbor.”

Committee record, p. 11457.

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offensive operations, after outbreak of war, contemplated the use of

a maximum of 24 patrol planes.\*®^ Even if this number were deducted

from -those available, there were stiU sufficient planes to have covered

at least the entire dangerous northwest sector. The offensive tasks

of the future did not justify disregarding the danger that the Pacific

Fleet might be caught by surprise while still in port and before

offensive operations could begin.

In making the decision not to conduct distant reconnaissance. Admi-

ral Kimmel erred.\*®\* In determining whether making the decision

that he did evinced poor judgment consideration must be given his

responsibility as commander in chief and the realities of his situation.

It was essentially his duty to protect the Pacific Fleet from all dangers

to the utmost oi his ability. He knew that the primary function of

the Pacific Fleet in the early stages of the war was a defensive one,

save for sporadic raids and limited offensive operations, in recognition

of the fact that our Pacific Fleet was inferior to that of Japan. He

was ordered to effect an appropriate defensive deployment. This

was a general directive consistent with his specific suggestion that

the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet be guided by broad policy

and objectives rather than by categorical instructions.\*®\* He was

given free rein to effect defensive security, in line with his more inti-

mate knowledge of the detailed and pecidiar problems affecting the

Pacific Fleet, prior to carrying out the tasks assigned in the Pacific war

plans. He knew that one of the tasks before the outbreak of war was

guarding against a possible surprise attack by Japan. He knew that

the only effective means of detecting a surprise raiding force in ade-

quate time to combat it was by distant reconnaissance. He knew

the Japanese reputation for deceit and treachery. He knew the great-

est danger to the Fleet at Pearl Harbor was the possibility of an air

raid. He knew that the maintenance and protection of the Fleet

while in its base constituted a fundamental element in making military

dispositions at Pearl Harbor. He had been categorically warned of

war. He knew or must have known that the necessity of Japan's

striking the first blow required of him greater vigilance consistent with

his fundamental duty as commander m chief to prepare for the worst

contingency. He had adequate facilities to patrol the most dangerous

approaches to Pearl Harbor. The decision was not a simple one, but,

failing to resolve his dilemma by seeking advice from the Navy De-

partment,\*®^ Admiral Kimmel displayed poor judgment in failing to

See committee record, p. 9316 et seq.

As to the use of long-distance patrol planes by Admiral Kimmel in prospective raids on the Marshall

Islands under the war plans, Admiral Ingersoll stated: “The radius of patrol planes out there was about

600 miles, or somewhere in the neighborhood of a 1,200-mile flight. They could not have been used in that

operation to cover actual operations in the Marshalls area, unless he was able to establish a base in the

Marshalls from which the planes could operate. They could, however, cover the movement of vessels to

the westward of Johnston and Palmyra and Wake to the extent that their radius could take them; that is,

600 miles from those positions.” Committee record, p. 11450.

202 There is no substantial evidence of any specific discussions between Admiral Kimmel and members of

his staff on or after the receipt of the “war warning” concerning the advisability or practicability of distant

reconnaissance from Oahu. Admiral McMorris, war plans officer, thought that the subject must have

been discussed, but could recall no specific discussion. The commander of the fleet patrol planes. Admiral

Bellinger, who had not been informed of any of the significant warning messages, testified that Admiral

Kimmel had no disc\*ussion with him concerning the matter.

203 See memorandum from Admiral Kimm.el to the Chief of Naval Operations, dated May 26, 1941, com-

mittee exhibit No. 106.

Admiral Stark testified that the handling of the Pacific Fleet was up to the commander in chief: “• \* •

it was then up to the Commander in Chief on the spot. I would not have presume 1, sitting at a desk in

Washington, to tell him what to do with his fleet. There were many factors involved, of which he was the

only person who had the knowledge, and once I had started, if I had sta» ted, to give him directives, I would

have been handling the fleet. That was not my job.” Committee record, p. 67u5.

20< Referring to the order to execute an appropriate “defensive deploynjent,” Admiral Kimmel stated:

“This appropriate defensive deployment was a new term to me. I decided that what was meant was sotpe\*

thing similar to the disposition I had made on October 16, which had been approved by the originator of

both these dispatches (Chief of Naval Operations), and I therefore made the dispositions which I have out-

lined.” See Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 306.

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employ every instrumentality at his command to defend the fleet.\*®®

Conceding for purposes of discussion that Admiral Kimmel’s

decision to employ none of the fleet patrol planes for distant recon-

naissance was a reasonable military decision under the circumstances,

the very fact of having made such decision placed upon him the

affirmative responsibility of determining that every other available

means for reconnaissance was being employed to protect the fleet.

His determination not to conduct long-range reconnaissance is of

itself a reco^ition by him that it was his obligation to provide

such reconnaissance. He knew that the Army was depending upon

him for certain defensive measures.\*®® Further, the fact that there

was an agreement with the Army at Hawaii whereby the Navy was

to perform distant reconnaissance placed upon Admiral Kimmel the

obligation of advising General Short that he had decided not to conduct

such reconnaissance. Indeed, General Short, who saw the war warn-

ing, testified that in his opinion the “defensive deployment” which

the Navy was directed to execute “woidd necessarily include distant

reconnaissance.” \*®\* Admiral Kimmel’s clear duty, therefore, in the

absence of Navy reconnaissance was to confer with General Short

to insure that Army radar, antiaircraft, and planes were fully utilized

and alerted. None of these things were done. And there appears to

be no substantial reason for failure to call upon the Army, consistent

with the joint plans, for the six long-range bombers which were

admittedly available to the Navy at Hawaii for the asking.\*®®

Action Which Was Not Taken Upon Receipt op the “War

Warning”

As has been seen, following the warning dispatch of November 27 no

distant reconnaissance as such was instituted.\*®®\* This meant that

there was no adequate means whatever taken by the Navy to detect

The Navy Court of Inquiry found: “It is a fact that the use of fleet patrol planes for daily long-range,

all-around reconnaissance was not justified in the absence of information indicating that an attack was to

be expected within narrow limits of time." The committee is in essential disagreement with this conclu-

sion. Admiral Kimrnel was warned in categorical fashion of war on November 27, 2 days after the Japanese

Task Force bad left Hitokappu Bay and while on the way to Pearl Harbor. It is difftctUt to imagine how

ft would have been possible from Washington to have narrowed the limits of time in which Japan might strike in

any more timely fashion, particularly inasmuch as Radio Intelligence had lost track completely of substantial

carrier units of the Japanese Fleet. This being true, distant reconnaissance w’^iS the only possible means of

detecting the striking force within adequate time to prepare to meet the attack. There was no other channel

for indicating that an attack was to be expected within narrow limits of time or otherwise.

Going on, the Navj’ Court of Inquiry stated: “It is a further fact that, even if justified, this was not

possible with the inadequate number of fleet planes available." The court is here of course referring to

all-around reconnaissance from Oahu. As has been dearly indicated, there were adequate facilities for patrol-

ling the more dangero^jis sectors, a procedure that was practical, feasible, and desirable.

As stated by the commander in chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral

King: “In the case of Pearl Harbor, where local defenses were inadequate, the commander in chief of the

Pacific Fleet could not, and did not, evade responsibility for assisting in the defense, merely because, in

principle, this is not normally a fleet task. It appears from the record that Admiral Kimmel appreciated

properly this phase of the situation. His contention appears to be that Pearl Harbor should nave been

strong enough for self-defense. The fact that it was not strong enough for self-defense hampered his arrange-

ments for the employment of the fleet, but, nevertheless, he was aware of, and accepted the necessity for,

employing the fleet in the defensive measures." See “Second Endorsement" to report of Navy Comt of

Inquiry, committee exhibit No. 157. '

Admiral King also observed, “I think • • • that Admiral Kimmel was fully aware that. In view of

the weakness of local defenses, the fleet had to be employed to protect Pearl Harbor and the Hawaiian

Islands in general.\*' Id.

Committee record, pp. 7926, 7927.

See in this connection testimony of Admiral Bellinger, committee record, p. 9310.

When questioned as to any reason why Admiral Kimmel should not have had long-range reconnais-

sance operating from November 27 on through to the time Japan struck, with whatever planes we had even

if it were only “three," Admiral Ingersoll replied: “I had every reason to expect that he would do that,

and I was surprised that he had not done it. As I stated the other day, I was very much surprised that the

sttack had gotten in undetected \* • \* I expected that it would be done not only because the planes

were there, but because this (WPL-46) plan inferred that it was gomg to be done. It never occurred to me

that it was not being done." Committee record, p. 11420.

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the approach of a raiding force in sufficient time to repel it or eflfec-

tively minimize the force of an attack. The Pacific Fleet patrol planes

which were under the control of Admiral Kimmel were operating in

accordance with schedules prepared as of November 22, 1941, stressing

training operations. These schedules were not changed prior to the

attack.

No effort was made to secure the available long-range bombers of

the Army for reconnaissance.

No change was made in the condition of readiness of vessels in

Pearl Harbor which had been in effect for a considerable period of time

preceding November 27.®“\* This condition of readiness has been

referred to as “an augmented Navy No. 3,” the No. 3 condition being

the lowest state of reamness.®‘“ The three conditions of readiness

established for the Navy were:

No. 1. Entire crew, officers and men at battle stations. Action

imminent.

No. 2. Provides the means of opening fire immediately with one-

half the armament. Enemy beheved to be in vicinity.

No. 3. Provides a means of opening fire with a portion of the second-

ary and antiaircraft batteries in case of surprise encounter.

While it appears that condition No. 3 prevailed subsequently during

wartime at Pearl Harbor and is the condition normally maintained in

port, there nevertheless was an extensive distant reconnaissance de-

signed to alert the fleet to a higher condition of readiness prior to pos-

sible attack and to afford a considerable measure of protection. This

means of protection was not available to the fleet on the morning of

December 7.®“

\*w In testifying before the Navy Court of Inquiry, Admiral Kimmel was ask^: “On the morning of 7

December 1941 , preceding the attack, can you tell the court what the material condition of readiness was in

effect on ships of the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor?” Admiral Kimmel replied : “The condition of readiness

No. 3, as laid down in 2CL-41 had been prescribed some time before by Vice Admiral Pye, and that was in

effect on the day of the attack. In addition to that, the Commander of Battleships, Battle Force, had

issued an order requiring two 5-inch guns and two 50-calibre guns on each battleship to be manned at all

times. These were, to the best of my knowledge and belief, manned on the date in question.” p. 278.

The three conditions of readiness with respect to naval base defense, as set forth in 2CLr-41 follow:

Condition I. General quarters in all ships. Condition of aircraft as prescribed by naval base defense

officer.

Condition II. One-half of antiaircraft battery of all ships in each sector manned and ready. Condition

of aircraft as prescribed by naval base defense officer.

Condition III. Antiaircraft battery (gims which bear in assigned sector) of at least one ship in each sector

manned and ready (minimum of four guns required for each sector). Condition of aircraft as prescribed

by naval base defense officer.

See committee exhibit No. 44.

Admiral Kimmel was asked whether, upon receipt of the November 27 war warning, be consulted with

the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District on any measures of security to be adopted in the

Fourteenth Naval District that were different from any then in effect. He rephed that he discussed the

message with the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District but no additional measures of security

were deemed advisable as a result of the conversation. See Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 303.

M While virtually all antiaircraft guns aboard ship were firing within 10 minutes, only about one-fourth

were “ready machine gims” available to fire immediately. Inasmuch as by far the greatest damage was

effected by the torpedo planes in the first wave, a higher de^ee of readiness would have reduced beyond

question the effectiveness of this initial thrust. Admiral Kimmel said: “Hod it not been for the torpedoea I

think the damage would have been enormously lees.\*\* Roberts record, p. 547.

For the indicated reason the conclusion of Navy Court of Inquiry that “a higher condition of readiness

could have added little, if anything to the defense” is in error. See Navy Court of Inquiry report, commit-

tee exhibit No. 157.

In its report, the Navy Court of Inquiry has observed: “It has been suggested that each day all naval

pfenes should have been in the air, all naval personnel at their stations, and all antiaircraft guns manned..

The Court is of the opinion that the wisdom of this is questionable when it is considered that it would not

be known when an attack would take place and that, to make sure, it would have been necessary to impose

a state of tension on the p^sonnel day after day, and to disrupt the maintenance and operating schedules

of ships and planes beginning at an indefinite date between 16 October and 7 December.

This statement contains within itself the certain proof of its invalidity. It was foi the very reason that

it could not be known when an attack would take place that it was essential a higher degree of readiness

prevail. If it were possible to know with definitiveness when the attack would come the necessity for a

nigher state of readiness would be obviated until the time for the attack bad approached. Furthermore,,

the extreme state of readiness suggested by the court is a far cry from the lowest conditions of readinesa

which prevailed at the time of the attack in both the Army and Navy Commands.

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No change was effected in the state of readiness of naval aircraft.

The airoraft on the ground and the patrol planes moored on the water

wereTtbt in condition to take to the air promptly. Approximately 50

percent of the planes on December 7 were on 4 hours’ notice.

Having elected to institute no distant reconnaissance by aircraft,

no effort was made to inau^rate patrols by surface or subsurface craft

to compensate and partial^ serve in lieu of distant reconnaissance by

planes.\*\*^ The evidence shows there were 29 destroyers and 6 sub-

marines in Pearl Harbor bn the morning of December While

the employment of surface craft or submarines in lieu of distant air

reconnaissance is not altogether satisfactory or fully effective, it none-

theless would have provided a measure of protection more to be desired

than no reconnaissance whatever.

No effort was made to maintain a striking force at sea in readiness

to intercept possible raiding forces approaching through the danger-

ous northern sector.\*\*\*

No change was made in the schedules of ships proceeding to Pearl

Harbor with a view to maintenance of a minimum force at harbor

with provision for entry into port at irregular intervals.

After the decision jto institute no distant reconnaissance, the Navy

did not check or otherwise maintain effective liaison with the Army as

to the readiness of Army antiaircraft defense and aircraft warning

installations.

Estimate and Action Taken by General Short With Respect

TO THE Warning Dispatch of November 27

The commanding general of the Hawaiian Department does not

appear to have taken any appreciable action, apart from his normal

training operations, on the basis of any information received by him

with respect to our critical relations with Japan prior to the warning

of November 27 from the Chief of Staff, General Marshall.

This dispatch, No. 472,\*\*® advised that negotiations with Japan

appeared terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest

possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer

to continue; that Japanese future action was unpredictable but hostile

action was possible at any moment. It stated that if hostilities could

not be avoided the United States desired that Japan commit the first

overt act. It pointed but, however, that this policy should not be

construed as restricting General Short to a course of action that might

t 'eopardize his defense. It ordered the commanding general, prior to

lostile Japanese action, to imdertake such reconnaissance and other

measures as he deemed necessary but admonished that these measures

should be carried out so as not to alarm the civil population or dis-

close intent. It instructed that should hostilities occur. General

Short should carry out the tasks assigned in the war plans insofar

as they applied to Japan. He was to limit the dissemination of “this

highly secret information to minimum essential officers” and to report

measures taken.

See note 192, mpra.

M Committee exhibit No. 6.

«4Id.

Committee exhibit No. 32, p. 7,

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Within 30 minutes of receiving this dispatch and after consulting

only with his chief of staff, Colonel Phillips, General Short replied

to the War Department as follows:

Reurad four seven two 27th, Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage.

Liaison with the Navy.

SaoBT.

As a result of the November 27 dispatch General Short decided to

institute alert No. 1, the lowest of three alerts provided for the

Hawaiian Department. The three alerts were: \*\*\*

No. 1. Defense against sabotage and uprisings. No threat from

without.

No. 2. Security against attacks from hostile subsurface, surface,

and aircraft, in addition to No. 1.

No. 3. Requires occupation of all field positions by all units, pre-

pared for maximum defense of Oahu and the Army instal-

• lations on outlying islands.

At the same time that he ordered alert No. 1, the commanding general

directed that the Interceptor Command, including the .^craft

Warning Service (Radar) and Information Center, should operate

from 4 a. m. to 7 a. m. daily. In addition, it should be noted that

the six mobile radar stations operated daily except Simday from 7

a. m. to 11 a. m. for routine training and dailjr, except Saturday and

Sunday, from 12 noon until 4 p. m. for framing and maintenance

work.\*\*® In explaining his reasons and the considerations responsible

for his instituting an alert against sabotage only. General Short has

stated: (1) That the message of Novenaber 27 contained nothing

directing him to be prepared to meet an air raid or an all-out attack

on Hawaii; \*“ (2) that he received other messages after the November

27 dispatch emphasizing measures against sabotage and subversive

activities; \*\*\* (3) that the dispatch was a “do-don’t” message which

conveyed to him the impression that the avoidance of war wm para-

mount and the greatest fear of the War Department was that some

international incident might occur in Hawaii which Japan would

regard as an overt act; \*\*\* (4) that he was looking to the Navy to

provide him adequate warning of the approach of a hostile force,

particularly through distant reconnaissance which was a Navy

responsibility; and (5) that instituting alerts 2 or 3 would have

seriously interfered witb the training mission of the Hawaiian

Department.\*\*\*

NO WARNING OF ATTACK ON HAWAII

The first statement by General Short that there was nothing direct-

ing him to be prepared to meet an air raid or an all-out attack on

Hawaii will be considered. Implicit in this contention is the assump-

tion that, despite the known imminence of war between the United

States and Japan and the fact that he commanded a Pacific outpost,

Colonel Walter C. Phillips. See committee record, pp. 7946, 7946.

Committee exhibit No. 32, p. 12.

See committee exhibit No. 44. See also testimony of General Short, committee record pp. 7944, 7945.

Testimony of General Short, committee record, p. 7946.

General Short said, “There was nothing in the message directing me to be prepared to meet an air

raid or an ell-out attack. “ Committee record, p. 7929.

Committee record, p. 7929.

Id., at p. 7927.

Id., at p. 7946 et seq.

Id., at pp. 7948-7951.

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it was not his duty to be on the alert against a tl\reat from without.

This assumption does not appear to be supported by military doctrine

or the logic of the Hawaiian situation prior to the attack.^®

The wording of the November 27 dispatch indicated the possibility

of an attack from without in ordering General Short to imdertake

reconnaissance. The only conceivable reconnaissance which could

have been undertaken by the Army was through employment of air-

craft or radar, either or both of which would be in contemplation of

an attack from without. General Marshall had told the command-

ing general of the Hawaiian Department much earlier, with emphasis

and clarity, that the fimction of the Army in Hawaii was to defend

the fleet hase. Despite this fact, when warned that Japan’s future

action was impredictable but hostile action was possible at any mo-

ment andwhen his attention was called to the necessity for reconnais-

sance, General Short proceeded to institute an alert against sabotage

only. This was done although there had not been one single act of

sabotage on the islands up to that time; for that matter, there were

no acts of sabotage thereafter, although this danger in Hawaii had

been recognized by both the Hawaiian Department and Washing-

ton.“®\* However, in all of General Short’s correspondence with

General Marshall the subject of sabotage was not emphasized and

scarcely discussed. Quite to the contrary, the letters referred re-

peatedly to aircraft and antiaircraft defense.

DISPATCHES INDICATING THREAT OP SABOTAGE

We will now consider the contention made by General Short that

he received other messages emphasizing measures against sabotage and

subversive activities, which to his mind confirmed the accuracy of his

judgment in instituting an alert against sabotage only. All of these

messages, however, were received after the warning dispatch of Novem-

ber 27 and after he had replied thereto.”® They could not, therefore,

have influenced in any way his decision to institute an alert against

sabotage only.

The first of the messages concerning possible subversive activities

was signed by General Miles and was dated November 27. It pointed

out that hostilities may ensue and that subversive activities may be

expected. This message made definitely clear that subversive activi-

ties and sabotage were not all that might be expected but hostilities

as well. In this connection, however. General Short has referred to

the fact that sabotage was a form of hostile action.\*”

On November 28 the Hawaiian Department received two dispatches

from the War Department specifically warning of the danger of sabo-

tage and subversive activities.\*\*® To the first of these dispatches

which was signed by General Adams, the Adjutant General, the

As expressed by Secretary Stimson in his statement submitted for the committee’s consideration:

“The outpost commander is like a sentinel on duty in the face of the enemy. His fundamental duties are

clear and precise. He must assume that the enemy will attack at his particular post; and that the enemy

will attack at the time and in the way in which it will be most difficult to defeat him. It is not the duty

of the outpost commander to speculate or rely on the possibilities of the enemy attacking at some other

outpost instead of his own. It is his duty to meet him at his post at any time and to make the be.st possible

fight that can be made against him with the weapons with which he has been supplied. ” Committee record,

PP. 14405, 14406.

See in this connection an aide memoire concerning “Defense of Hawaii” prepared by the War Depart-

ment and presented to the President by General Marshall in May of 1941. Part IV, Note 42, infra.

Committee exhibit No. 32, pp. 10, 13, and 34.

General Short said: “ ‘Hostile action at any moment’ meant to me that as far as Hawaii was concerned

the War Department was predicting sabotage. Sabotage is a form of hostile action.” Committee record,

p. 7929.

\*\*\* For the full text of these two dispatches see pages 102 and 103, supra.

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following reply (directed to the Adjutant General) was made on

November 29:

Re your secret radio four eight two twenty eighth, fuU precautions are being

taken against subversive activities within the field of investigative responsibility

of War Department (paragraph three MID SC thirty dash forty five) and military

establishments including personnel and equipment. As regards protection of

vital installations outside of miltary reservations such as power plants, telephone

exchanges and highway bridges, this headquarters by confidential letter dated

June nineteen nineteen forty one requested the Gk)vemor of the Territory to use

the broad powers vested in him by section sixty seven of the organic act which

provides, in effect, that the Governor may call upon the commanders of military

and naval forces of the United States in the territory of Hawaii to prevent or

suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, etc. Pursuant to the authority

stated the Governor on June twentieth confidentially made a formal written

demand on this headquarters to furnish him and to continue to furnish such ade-

quate protection as may be necessary to prevent sabotage, and lawless violence in

connection therewith, being committed against vital installations and structures in

the Territory. Pursuant to the foregoing request appropriate military protection

is now being afforded vital civilian installations. In this connection, at the

instigation of this headquarters the City and County of Honolulu on June thirtieth

nineteen forty one enacted an ordnance which permits the commanding general

Hawaiian Department, to close, or restrict the use of and travel upon, any high-

way within the City and County of Honolulu, whenever the commanding general

deems such action necessary in the interest of national defense. The authority

thus given has not yet been exercised. Relations with FBI and all other federal

and territorial officials are and have been cordial and mutual cooperation has been

given on all pertinent matters.

The reply (directed to General Arnold) to the second dispatch was

not received in the War Department until December 10, 1941.^

General Short, as heretofore indicated, has referred to the two dis-

patches from the War Department of November 28 warning of the

danger of sabotage and subversive activities as confirming his original

decision to institute an alert against sabotage only. It is significant,

however, that the army conunanders at Panama, on the West Coast,

and in the Philippines received these same dispatches warning of

subversive activities that were received by the Hawaiian command-

280 a They did not deter the commanders at these other places frmn

taking full and complete measiu\*es to alert their commands or convey

to their minds that defense against sabotage was the only action

required.^®\*’

The November 27 warning to General Short concerning possible

hostile action at any moment was signed by General Marshall — a

command directive — whereas the dispatches relating to sabotage and

subversive activities were signed bv subordinate officials of the War

Department. Inasmuch as General MarshalPs message contained no

reference to sabotage whatever, it would seem fair to suggest that

upon receiving subsequent dispatches from subordinate War Depart-

ment officials warnings of this danger there should have been aroused

in the Commanding GeneraPs mind the thought that perhaps he had

misjudged the purport of the original warning. The evidence reflects

that anv reference to sabotage or subversive activities was deliberately

omitted from the warning message sent General Short (and the com-

manders at Panama, on the West Coast, and in the Philippines) on

November 27 in order ^Hhat this message could be interpreted only as

Committee exhibit No. 32, pp. 17, 18.

Id., at pp. 19, 20.

See Committee exhibit No. 35, p, 2.

MOb For dispatches reflecting the full and complete measures taken by these commanders (Panama,

West Coast, the Philippines) see Committee exhibit No. 32 pp. 11, 15, 15a, 16, 18, 18a, and 18b.

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warmng the commanding general in Hawaii against an attack from

without”

General Short stated that he assumed ^e Navy would conduct

distant reconnaissance and that he was relymg on the Navy to

give him timely warning of an attack, indicating thereby that he

realized the warning messages required precautionary measures against

all possible contingencies. It naturally follows that his failure to take

the action required by the November 27 warning was not due to the

subsequent emphasis on the specific danger of subversive activities

but rather by reason of his failure to institute liaison with the Navy —

failure to determine what the Navy was really doing — as he advised

the "War Department he had done, and his unwarranted assumption

that even though he did not him self institute precautionary measures

i^ainst the danger of an air attacK, the Navy would do so.

“dO-DON’t” character op the NOVEMBER 27 DISPATCH AND

"avoidance op war”

As earlier indicated. General Short has referred to the November

27 dispatch as a "do-don’t” message which conveyed to him the

impression that the avoidance of war was paramount and the greatest

fear of the War Department was that some international incident

might occur in Hawaii which Japan would regard as an overt act.

To test the merits of this contention it is necessary to aline the direc-

tives and intelligence beside the prohibitions and admonitions:

Negotiations with the Japanese ap-

pear to be terminated to all practical

purposes with only the barest possibil-

ities that the Japanese Government

might come back and offer to continue.

Japanese future action unpredictable

but hostile action possible at any

moment. If hostilities cannot be avoided the

United States desires that Japan com-

mit the first overt act.

This policy should not be construed

as restricting you to a course of action

that might joepardize your defense.

Prior to hostile Japanese action, you are

directed to undertake such recon-

naissance and other measures as you

deem necessary but these measures should be carried

out so as not to alarm the civil popula-

tion or disclose intent.

Report measures taken. Should hos-

tilities occur, you will carry out the

tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far

as they pertain to Japan. Limit the dissemination of this highly

secret infemnation to minimum essential

officers.

The first admonition appearing in the foregoing dispatch is a state-

ment of traditional American policy against the initiation of war —

if hostilities cannot be avoided the united States desires the prospective

enemy to commit the first overt act. This General Short already knew.

Certainly he did not have in mind committing an overt act against

Japan. There was nothing here to restrict the commanding general's

See testimony of General Qerow, Committee record, pp. 209C-2698.

MM See committee record, p. 7927.

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contemplated plan of action. Indeed, the dispatch itself clearly

pointed out that the policy should not be construed as restricting

General Short to a course of action that might jeopardize his defense.^'

The very fact that Japan must commit the first overt act emphasized

the need for greater vigilance and defenseive effort.

The prohibition in the dispatch was that reconnaissance and “other

measures” should not be carried out so as to alarm the civil population

or disclose intent. This was incorj)orated in the message because of

the large number of Japanese inhabitants and it was felt that nothing

should be done, unless necessary to defense, to alarm the civil popula-

tion and thus possibly precipitate an incident which would give Japan

an excuse to go to war saying we had committed the first overt act.\*®’

No one appreciated more than General Short the abnormally large

percentage of Japanese among the population of Hawaii. He knew

that 37 percent or approximately 160,000 of the population were of

Japanese descent, some 35,000 being ahens. Tms was one of the

principal reasons for the alert against sabotage.\*®®

The civil population was inured to Army and Navy maneuvers which

were going on continuously.\*®^ To have taken any of the logical steps

to defend Oahu — reconnaissance, 24 hour operation of radar, effecting

a high state of aircraft and anti-aircraft readiness — would not have

alarmed a population accustomed to simulated conditions of warfare.\*®\*

In this respect the November 27 dispatch from the War Department

interjected no deterrent to full and adequate defensive measures.

The admonition to limit dissemination of the information in the

dispatch to minimum essential officers was within the complete dis-

cretion of the Commanding General. Dissemination of the informa-

tion was to follow and not precede the selection of the proper alert;

and there were no restrictions in the November 27 warning which

should have precluded General Short’s instituting an alert commen-

Mr. Stimson stated: “When General Short was informed on November 27 that \* Japanese action un-

predictable' and that ‘hostile action possible at any moment/ and that the policy directed ‘should not

comma repeat not comma be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardise your

defense/ we had a right to assume that he would competently perform this paramount duty entrust^ to

him.” Mr. Stimson’s statement, committee record, pp. 14397, 14398.

\*\*\* See statement of Mr. Stimson, committee recorn, p. 14397. This admonition was not Included in tho

message to General MacArthur but was contained in the message to the Commanding General, Western

Defense Command. See committee exhibit No. 32, pp. 8, 9.

It is to be noted that one of the best criterions that General Short possessed to determine what might

alarm the civil population was the so-called Ileiron Alert during the summer of 1940. This was an all-out

alert with complete dispersal of planes and troops with ammunition at the guns and reconnaissance being

conducted. There was no disturbance of the civil population resulting from this action. See in this con-

nection Army Pearl Harbor Board record, pp. 1398, 2025, 2720, 2738, 2772, 2772, 3096, 3097.

Ceveral Maxwell Murray testified that the action r€Q7iired by Alert No. 1 — taking oner water, lights, gas and

oil utilities, patrols all over, all important bridges guar ded—was just as mueh af an alarm to the people that some-

thing was anticipated \*\*as if they had gone to the b€aches'’—all out alert. See Army Pearl Harbor Board Record,

p. 3096, 3097.

Before the Navy Court of Inquiry, Admiral Kimmel testified: “I discussed the question of air attack

on Pearl Harbor with the commanding general on various occasions. We simulated such attack; we sent

planes in to attack Pearl Harbor, I don't know how many tin.es, but several times, during the year I was

out there, and we put the defending planes or other elements into operation.” Navy Court of Inquiry

record, p. 1131.

Testifying before the Navy Court of Inquiry, Admiral Kiirmcl was asked whether there were any drills

furthering joint Army-Navy exercises. He replied: “Yes. Air raid drills for several months were conduct-

ed each week. For about 2 to 3 months prior to December 7, 1941, we conducted the drills once every 2

weeks. Q^his was in order to insure the participation of all elements in each drill as held, and when the drills

were held weekly there w^ere too many people excused due to overhauling a plane or some work that they

considered essential and more important than taking part in drills.” Navy Court of Inquiry Record, p.

296.

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surate with the warning and orders contained therein.^\* Perhaps,

after the event the warning message could be improved upon. It

nevertheless was adequate and its orders should have been carried out

with an appreciation of the implications of the warning it conveyed.

COMMANDING GENERAL’s RELIANCE ON THE NAVY

It is apparent from the evidence that General Short was depending

on the Navy to give him timely and adequate warning of any enemy

force approaching Hawaii. He stated that from repeated conversa-

tions with the Navy he knew that the Japanese naval vessels were

supposed to be either in their home ports or proceeding south; that

he knew the Navy had task forces at sea with reconnaissance from

Midway, Wake, Palmyra, and Johnston Islands, which would render

an air attack highly improbable; that the War Plans Officer on Ad-

miral Kimmel’s staff. Admiral McMorris, had stated that there was

no chance of a surprise attack on Oahu; that it was only through the

Navy that he could obtain information concerning the movement of

Japanese vessels; and that distant reconnaissance was a Navy respon-

sibility.\*®^

General Short’s unfortunate predicament on the morning of Decem-

ber 7 was occasioned to a degree by reason of his reliance on the Navy

to provide him timely warning. However, the fact that he was rely-

ing on the Navy does not excuse General Short for his failure to deter-

mine whether his assumptions with respect to what the Navy was

doing were correct. He assumed operations of the task forces ren-

dered an air attack highly improbable; he assumed the Navy was

conducting distant reconnaissance from Oahu; he assumed the Navy

would advise him of the location and movement of Japanese warships.

Yet a simple inquiry by General Short would have revealed that the

task forces effected no coverage of the dangerous northern approaches

to Oahu; that the Navy was not conducting distant reconnaissance;

and that the Navy did not know where the Japanese carrier strength

was for over a week prior to December 7. We can understand General

Short’s dependence on the Navy, but we cannot overlook the fact that

he made these assumptions with no attempt to verify their correctness.

INTERFERENCE WITH TRAINING

General Short has pointed out that the factor of training was con-

sidered in selecting Alert No. 1; that the use of Alerts 2 or 3 would

In commenting concerning the November 27 warning sent General Short, Secretary Stimson said:

“This message has been characterized as ambiguous and described as a ‘do-don't' message. The fact Is that

it presented with the utmost precision the situation with which we were all confronted and in the light of

which all our commanding officers, as well as we ourselves ip Washington, had to govern our conduct. The

situation was admittedly delicate and critical. On the one hand, in view of the fact that we wanted more

time, we did not want to precipitate war at this moment if it could be avoided. If there was to be war,

moreover, we wanted the Japanese to commit the first overt act. On the other hand, the matter of defense

against an attack by Japan was the first consideration. In Hawaii, because of the large numbers of Japanese

imiabitants, it was felt desirable to issue a special warning so that nothing would be done, unless necessary

to the defense, to alarm the civil population and thus possibly to precipitate an incident and give the Japa-

nese an excuse to go to war and the chance to say that we had committed the first overt act.” Further:

\*\*All then considerations were placed before the commanding officers of their respedive areas, and it was because

they were tho^ight competent to act in a situation of delicacy requiring judgment and skill that they had been placed

in these high posts of command.^' Mr, Stimson’s statement, committee record, pp. 14396, 14397.

Committee record, page 7946 et seq.

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have seriously interfered with his training mission. He observed that

the soldiers and oflBcers of his command were in large part relatively

new to the Army and to their specialized tasks and that regular train-

ing was essential. He stated that the War Department dispatch of

November 27 “had not indicated in any way that our training mission

was modified, suspended or abolished, and that all troops were to go

immediately into tactical status.”

General Short has pointed out that the Hawaiian Air Force had the

particiilar mission of training combat crews and ferrying B-17’s to

the Philippine Islands. He recalled that on September 8, 1941, 9

trained combat teams were sent to the Philippines; that before

November 27, 18 trained combat teams had been sent to the main- .

land and 17 more teams were ready to go to the mainland for ferrying

purposes; and that 12 more combat crews had to be trained for planes

expected to arrive at an early date. He observed that only 6 of

his 12 Flying Fortresses were in condition and available for the train-

ing and that it was imperative General Martin make maximum use of

these planes for training. He felt that if war were momentarily

expected in the Hawaiian coastal frontier, the training considerations

would give way but that every indication was that the War Depart-

ment expected the war to break out, if at all, only in the far Pacific

and not at Hawaii.\*®\*

As has been earlier indicated, however, the very fact of having sug-

gested to General Short that he undertake reconnaissance was an

indication of the possibility of an attack on Hawaii from without.

This committee believes that the warning dispatch of November 27

was ample notice to a general in the field that his training was now

secondary — that his primary mission had become execution of the

orders contained in the dispatch and tlie effecting of maximum

defensive security.

\*

The Order to Undertake Reconnaissance

The very fact that General Short noted the order with respect to

imdertaking reconnaissance contained in the dispatch of November 27

and thereafter instituted an alert against sabotage only demonstrates

a failure to grasp the serious circumstances confronting his command.

It is to be recalled in this connection that Army commanders in the

Phihppines, at Panama, and on the West Coast, upon receiving the

dispatch of November 27 in substantially the same terms as General

Short, instituted full measures adequately to alert their commands.\*\*®

The observation has been made by General Short that he presumed

the man who prepared the message of November 27 ordering him to

undertake recoimaissance was unfamiliar with the fact that the Navy

«» Id., St pp. 7948, 7949.

»» Id.

MO See Committee iSxhibit No. 32, pp. 11, 15, 16 and 18 for replies, pursuant to the warning messages of

November 27, from General MacArthur in the Philippines, General DeWitt on the West Coast, and

General Andrews at Panama.

General Mac A rthiir replied under date of November 28: “Pursuant to instructions contained in your radio

six two four, air reconnaissance has been extended and intensified in conjunction with the Navy. Ground

security measures have been taken. Within the limitations imposed by present state of development of

this theatre of operations everything is in readiness for the conduct of a successful defense. Intimate liaison

and cooperation and cordial relations exist between Army and Navy.“

A significant portion of the reply from General Andrews follows: “In the Panama Sector, the Commandant

• of the 15th Naval District is conducting continuous surface patrol of the area included within the Panama

Coastal Frontier, supplemented, within the limits of the aircraft at his disposal, by an air patrol. In my

opinion, the Commandant of the 15th Naval District, does not have sufficient airciidt or vessels within his

control for adequate reooimaissanoe.”

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was responsible for distant • reconnaissance.\*" It is inconceivable,

however, that in the face of a specific directive with respect to recon-

naissance General Short should not have requested clarification from

the War Department in the event he felt the latter did not mean

what it had unequivocally said and had failed to take into consider-

ation the Navy’s responsibility for reconnaissance. This fact takes

on added importance when it is realized that the November 27

dispatch was the first and only dispatch General Short had received

signed by General Marshall, the Chief of Staff, since becoming com-

manding general of the Hawaiian Department. It was a command

directive which should have received the closest scrutiny and con-

sideration by the Hawaiian general.

Certainly the least that General Short could have done was to

advise Admiral Kimmel or Admiral Bloch and consult with them at

once concerning the fact that he had been directed to undertake

reconnaissance if he presumed the Navy was to perform this function.

The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, the very document wherein

the Navy assumed responsibility for distant reconnaissance, con-

tained in an annex thereto provision for joint operations when the

Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Naval

Base Defense Officer agree that a threat of a hostile raid or attack is

suMdently imminent. The failure to appreciate the necessity for

following through on an order to undertake reconnaissance is not in

keeping with the good judgment expected from the commandii^

general of the Hawaiian Department.

It is further to be Ijome in mind that General Short had six mobile

radar units which were available for reconnaissance use. He ordered

their operations from 4 a. m. to 7 a. m., in addition to the normal

training operation of radar during the day, but failed to provide the

necessary officers handling the equipment with the knowledge that

war was at hand in order that they would intelligently attach sig-

nificance to information which the radar might develop. In testifying

before the committee concerning the operation of radar, Generid

Short said; “That (the radar) was put into alert during what

I considered the most dangerous hours of the day for an air attack,

from 4 o’clock to 7 o’clock a. m. daily.” The very fact that radar

was ordered operated at all was in recognition of the danger of a

threat from without; indeed it was only m contemplation of such a

threat that General Short would have been suppUed radar at all.\*"

Army Pearl Harbor Board record, pp. 4436, 4437.

Committee record, p. 8054.

\*\*\* In a statement submitted for the committee’s consideration, Mr. Stimson said: “You will notice that

this message of November 27th specifically mentions that reconnaissance is to be undertaken. This to my

mind was a very important part of the message, not only because of its obvious desirability but also because

we had provided theHawaiian Department with what I regarded as a most effective means of reconnaissance

against air attack and one to which 1 had personally devoted a great deal of attention duiing the preceding

months, I refer to the radar equipment with which the Hawaiian Department was then provided. This

equipment permitted approaching planes to be seen at distances of approximately 100 miles; and to do so in

darkness and storm as well as in clear daylight. In the early part of 1941 1 had taken up earnestly the matter

of securing such radar equipment for aircraft protection. I knew, although it was not then generally known,

that radar had proved or the utmost importance to the British in the Battle of Britain, and I felt in the begin-

ning of 1941 that we were not getting this into production and to the troops as quickly as we should, and put

on all the pressure I could to speed up its acquisition. By the autumn of 1941 we had got some of this equip-

ment out to Hawaii, and only a few days before this I had received a report of the tests which had been made

of this equipment in Hawaii on November 19th, which indicated very satisfactory results in detecting

approaching airplanes. I testified at considerable length with regard to this before the Army Pearl Harbor

Board (A. P. H. B. 4064, et seq.) . When we specifically directed the commanding ofidcer at Hawaii, who had

been warned that war was likely at any moment, to make reconnaissance, I assumed that all means of recon^

naisfance available to both the Army and Navywould be employed. On the same day a war warning was dis-

patched to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet by the Chief of Naval Operations. The standing

instractions to the theatre commanders were that all messages of this character were to be exchanged between

the Army and Navy commands.” Committee record, pp. 14398, 14399.

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The Short Reply

It is recalled that the dispatch of November 27, No. 472, carried

instructions to report measures taken and that General Short, refer ring '

to the dispatch by number, advised that the Hawaiian Department was

“alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy.” As paraphrased

and reviewed in the War Department, this reply read; “Report De-

partment alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy reurad

four seven two twenty seven.”\*\*® No action was taken by the War

Department following receipt of this reply.

General Short has stated that the silence and failure of the War

Department to reply to his report of measures taken constituted

reasonable grounds for his belief that his action was exactly what the

War Department desired. He has pointed out that if the action

taken by him was not consistent with the desires of the War Depart-

ment it should have informed him of that fact.\*\*\*

The question at this point, however, is not whether Washington

should have replied to General Short’s dispatch but whether the com-

manding general was entitled to believe that his reply had ade-

quately informed Washington that he had or had not carried out the

orders contained in General Marshall’s warning of November 27.\*\*®

General Gerow has already assumed full responsibility for failure to

follow up to insure that the alert to prevent sabotage was not the

only step taken by the Hawaiian Department under the circum-

stances. No one in Washington appears to have been impressed with

or caught the fact that General Short’s report of measures {taken

was inadequate and not sufficiently responsive to the directive. This

failme of supervision cannot be condoned.

However, a reasonable inference from the statement “liaison with

Navy” was that through liaison with the Navy he had taken the nec-

essary steps to implement the War Department warning, including the

undertaking of reconnaissance. This was clearly recognized by Gen-

eral Short. In testifying before the Army Pearl Harbor Board he

was asked the question: \*\*\* “In yom message of November 27, you

say, ‘Liaison with the Navy.’ Just what did you mean by that?

How did that cover anything required by that particular message?”

\

General Short. To my mind it meant very definitely keeping in touch with

the Navy, knowing what information they had and what they were doing.''

Question. Did it indicate in any way that you expected the Navy to carry out

its part of that agreement for long-distance reconnaissance?

General Short. Yes. Without any question, whether I had sent that or not,

it would have affected it, because they signed a definite agreement which was

approved by the Navy as well as our Chief of Staff.

See committee exhibit No. 32, p. 12.

Committee record, p. 7965 et seq.

Referring to General Short’s reply, Secretary Stimson said: “• • • he then sent a reply message

to Washington which gave no adequate notice of what he had failed to do and which was susceptible of

being taken, and was taken, as a general compliance with the main warning from Washington. My initials

show that this message crossed my desk, and in spite of my keen interest in the situation it certainly gave

me no intimation that the alert order against an enemy attack was not being carried out. Although it

advised me that General Short was alert against sabotage, I had no idea that being ‘alerted to prevent sabo^\*

tage’ was in any way an express or implied denial of being alert against an attack by Japan’s armed forces.

The very purpose of a fortress such as Hawaii is to repel such an attack, and Short was the commander of

that fortress. Furthermore, Short’s statement in his message that ‘liaison’ was being carried out with the

Navy, coupled with the fact that our messige of November 27th had specifically directed reconnaissance,

naturally gave the impression that the various reconnaissance and other defensive measures in which the

cooperation of the Army and the Navy is necessary, were under way and a proper alert was in effect.”

Committee record, pp. 14408, 11409.

Army Pearl Harbor Board record, p. 380.

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General Short was not entitled to presume that his responsibilities

as Commander of the Hawaiian Department had been discharged or

shifted to the War Department through dispatch of his reply This

conclusion is most fully appreciated when he admittedly was not

clear concerning the order to undertake reconnaissance.\*^ The War

Department was entitled to expect the commanding general had car-

ried out the orcTer to effect reconnaissance or in the alternative that

he would have requested clarifying instructions. .Conceding that

General Short presumed the War Department would correct him if

he was in error, the fact that supplemental instructions were not

issued does not serve to remove that error. Had he made no report

whatever the situation in Hawaii on the morning of December 7

would have been the same.

Although General Short specifically advised the War Department

on November 27 that he was maintaining “liaison with Navy” the

evidence is unmistakably clear, as will subsequently appear, that he

did not establish liaison with the Navy concerning the action to be

taken pursuant to the Department’s warning message.

Action Which Was Not Taken Upon Receipt op the November 27

Dispatch

Apart from instituting an alert against sabotage and ordering the

oi>eration of radar from 4 to 7 a. m. no other appreciable steps were

taken by the commanding general to prepare his command for defense

against possible hostilities.\*^

No change was made in the state of readiness of aircraft which were

on four hours’ notice. There was therefore no integi’ation of aircraft

and radar, even in the latter’s limited operation from 4 to 7 a. m.

The maximum distance radar could pick up appiroachmg planes was

api>roximately 130 miles. With the Army aircraft on 4 hours’

notice a warning from the radar information center would have been

of little avail.

Operation of radar was not instituted on a 24-hour basis. It was

so operated immediately after the attack, although as a matter of

fact it was not until December 17 that the aircraft warning service

was placed under complete control of the Air Corps and the Signal

Corps, handling the training phases, removed from the picture.\*\*®

No action was taken with a view to tightening up the antiaircraft

defenses.\*\*\* The ammunition for the 60 mobUe antiarcraft guns was

M7 See committee record, pp. 442(h 4421.

Referring to the testimony of General Gerow to the effect that the commanding general’s report would

have been perfectly clear if he had indicated he was alerted against sabotage only (see note 247, supra)

General Short commented that General Gerow “was unwilling to read my message and admit it meant

what it said, no more and no less.” Yet General Short failed to accord the War Department the same

privilege he was taking; that is, that the order to undertake reconnaissance meant what it said, no more and

no less. See committee record, pp. 7967, 7968.

Referring to the action taken by General Short, Secretary Stimson stated : “ ♦ • • to cluster his air-

planes in such groups and positions that in an emergency they could not take the air for several hours, and

to keep his antiaircraft emmuuition so stored that it could not be promptly and immediately available,

and to use his best reconnaissance system, the radar, only for a very small fraction of the day an/i night, in

my opinion betrayed a misconception of his real duty which was almost beyond belief.” See statement of

Secretary Stimson submitted for the committee’s consideration; committee record, p. 14408.

Committee record, p. 8379.

In testifying before the Navy Court of Inouiry , Admiral Kimmel was asked which service was charged

with remising enemy aircraft by antiaircraft fire on December 7, 1941. He replied: “The Army, I should

say, had the prime responsibility. The plans that we had provided for the Navy rendering every possible

assistance to the Army. It provided for the use of all guns, including 30 calibers and even shoulder rifles by

the marines in the navy yard, and by the crews of the flying field. In addition. It provided that the bat-

teries of all ships should take part in shooting down the planes.” Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 295.

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located in Aliamanu Crater, between 2 and 3 miles from Fort Shafter.\*“

The crews of the antiaircraft guns were not alerted in such manner as

to provide effective defense even with maximum warning from the

radar information center.

As in the case of Admiral Kimmel, no effective action was taken

with a view to integration and coordination of Army-Navy facilities

for defense.

The “Code Destruction” Intelligence

As has been seen, Admiral Kimmel was advised “for action” on

December 3 of information received that categoric and urgent instruc-

tions were sent on December 2 to Japanese diplomatic and consular

posts at Hongkong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington, and

lx>ndon to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to bum

all other important confidential and secret documents.\*®

Testifying with respect to the foregoing intelligence. Admiral Kim-

mel stated that both he and his staff noted that most of the codes and

ciphers — not all — were to be destroyed and that this information ap-

peared to fit in with the information “we had received about a Japa-

nese movement in South East Asia.” He commented that Japan

would naturally take precautions to prevent the compromise of her

communication system in the event her action in southeast Asia

caused Britain and the United States to declare war, and take over

diplomatic residences.\*®

Admiral Kimmel did not supply General Short the information he

had received concerning the orders from Tokyo to destroy codes,

ciphers, and confidential documents. He testified: “I didn’t consider

that of any vital importance when I received it \* \* \* .” \*“

General Short, on the other hand, has complained that he was not

provided this intelligence and has indicated it would have been of the

greatest significance to him. Referring to the intelligence concerning

the fact that Washington had been ordered to destroy its code ma-

chine \*\*• General Short said: “The one thing that would have affected

me more than the other matter was the fact &ey had ordered their code

machines destroyed, because to us that means just one thing: that

they are going into an entirely new phase and that they want to be

perfectlv sure that the code will not be broken for a minimum time,

say of tmee or four days \* \* \*.” \*® He further testified that had

the Navy g^ven him any of the dispatches received concerning the

destruction of codes he would have gone into a more serious alert.\*“

In strange contrast with the view of the code burning intelligence

taken by Admiral Kimmel, virtually all witnesses have aCTeed that

this was the most significant information received between November

27 and December 6 with respect to the imminence of war. Indeed,

the overwhelming weight of the testimony is to effect that orders to

Mi See Army Pearl Harbor Board record, pp. 2604-2607.

M» Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 40.

On the same day Admiral Kimmel was advised for his infonnation of the substance of an intercepted

Tokyo dispatch of December 1 ordering London, Hongkong, Singapore, and Manila to destroy (their code)

machine. It was stated that the Batavia (code) machine had already been sent to Tokyo and on December

2 Washington was also directed to destroy all but one copy of other systems and ah secret documents; that

the British Admiralty had reported London Embassy had complied. Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 41.

M4 Committee record, p. 6723.

M» Id., at p. 7477.

M« This advice was contained in a December 7 dispatch from the War Department which was not received

by General Short until after the attack. This dispatch will be found discussed in detail, Part IV, infra.

M7 Roberts Commission record, p. 1020,

Committee record, p. 8397.

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destroy codes mean from a military standpoint only one thing — war

within a very few days.\*®\*

It is concluded that the failure of Admiral Kimmel to supply this intel-

ligence to General Short was inexcusable and that the purport of this

imormation was to advise the commander in chief within reasonably

narrow limits of time as to when Japan might be expected to strike.

While orders to bum codes may not always mean war in the diplo-

matic sense, it very definitely meant war — and soon — in a military

sense after the “war warning" of November 27, Admiral Kimmel

received this intelligence less than 4 days before the attack; it gave

him an opportunity to correct his mistake in failing to institute dis-

tant reconnaissance and effect a state of readiness commensurate with

the likelihood of hostilities after the November 27 war warning.

Nothing was done — General Short was not even informed.

On December 4 the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet was

advised for information of orders instructing Guam to destroy all

secret and confidential publications and other classified matter except

that essential for current purposes, and to be prepared to destroy

instantly, in event of emergencjr, all classified matter.\*\*® This intel-

ligence was of the greatest simificance. It meant that not only was

war almost immemately at hand but that a landing operation by

Japan against Guam was regarded as a possibility. Nothing was done.

On December 6 the Chief of Naval Operations sent a dispatch to

Admiral Kimmel advising, for action, that in view of the international

situation and the exposed position of our outlying Pacific Islands he

was authorized to order destruction in such outlying islands secret and

confidential documents “now or under later conditions of greater

emergency." \*\*\* This dispatch suggested the possibility of landing

operations against our outlying islands including Wake and Midway.

General Short’s Knowledge of Destruction op Confidential

Matter by Japanese Consulate

The evidence reflects that althou^ Admiral Kimmel received signi-

ficant information on four different occasions between December 3

and 6 concerning the destruction of codes and confidential documents

in Japanese diplomatic establishments as well as in our own outlying

possessions, he failed to convey this information to General Short.

Despite this fact it appears that the commanding general obtained

adequate information concerning the destruction of confidential mat-

ter by Japanese diplomatic establishments.

Col. George W. Bicknell, assistant G-2 of the Hawaiian Depart-

ment, stated that he learned from Navy sources in Hawaii about

December 3 that diplomatic representatives of Japan in Washington,

' /■

»»• See Part IV, infra, re code destruction.

Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 44.

\*•\* Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 45.

A memordandum submitted by the Navy Department, concerning this dispatch, under date of January

29, 1946 stated: '‘Opnav dispatch 061743 was transmitted to Radio Honolulu at 5:54 p. m. December 6 1941,

Washington local time" (Committee record, p. 11441). %

It is to be noted that during committee examination Admiral Kimmel was asked whether he had testified

as to when he had received the message of December 6. 1941, authorizing the destruction of confidential

papers referred to in the preceding paragraph. Admiral Kimmel said: “I will look at it. I couldn’t tell

you when that was received, but to the best of my recollection I never saw it until after the attack. It is an

even bet as to whether I saw it before or after the attack. I think I didn’t get it until after the attack. • • •

I have no record upon which I can definitely state that. I can only state my recollection.’’

Going on. Admiral Kimmel said: \*\*At uny rof€, if I did receive thi% before the attack^ it was no more than I

would have expected under the circumstances, \* • \* And that (referring to the message) was not particularJy

alarming.” See committee record, pp. 7649, 7660.

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London, Hongkong, Singapore, Manila, and elsewhere were destroying

their codes and papers. He further stated that about the same time he

learned from the Special Agent in Charge of the FBI that the latter

had intercepted a telephone “message from the Japanese consulate,

Honolulu, which disclosed that the Japanese consul general was

burning and destroying all his important papers.” Colonel Bicknell

said: \*\*\*

In the morning of 6 December 1941, at the usual staff conference conducted

by the Chief of Staff for General Short I told those assembled, which included the

Chief of Staff, what I had learned concerning the destruction of their important

papers by Japanese consuls, and stated that because of this and concurrent in-

formation which I had from proved reliable sources that the destruction of such

papers had a very serious intent and that something warlike by Japan was about

to happen somewhere.

General Fielder stated tbat he was present at the staff conference

and tbat on December 6 he gave to General Short the information

that the J^anese consul at Honolulu had destroyed his codes and

papers.\*\*® (jolonel Phillips also stated that this information was

given by him to General Short.

The Special Agent in Charge of the FBI stated that on December

3 the district intelligence officer of the Navy asked him if he could

verify information that the Japanese consul general in Honolulu was

burning his codes and papers ; that about 2 hours later the FBI inter-

cepted a telephone conversation between the cook of the Japanese

consulate and a Japanese in Honolulu in the course of which the cook |

stated that ti e consul general was “burning and destroying all his

important papers.” He stated that he immediately gave this in-

formation to the district intelligence officer of the Navy and the

assistant G-2 of the Army; and thereupon sent a dispatch to Director

J. Edgar Hoover in Washington: “Japanese Consul General Honolulu

is burning and destroying all important papers.” \*\*\*

In testifying before the Roberts Commission General Short stated

that he received no information from his intelligence officer until

after the attack that the consular records were being burned. He

stated: \*\*\*

As a matter of fact, I didn’t know that they had really burned anything until

the time that the FBI arrested them on the 7th; they interrupted the burning.

I wasn’t cognizant of the fact that they had burned the previous day.

Before the committee, however. General Short corrected his former

testimony, stating that he had been advised on the morning of Decem-

ber 6 that the Honolulu consul was burning his papers.\*\*®

While the ‘evidence would indicate that General Short was advised

on December 6 that the Japanese consul w^as burning his codes and

papers, a point has been made by the conunanding general that his

information was limited to the fact that the consul was burning his

papers without reference to codes. Even conceding this to be true,

the fact that the consul was burning his papers after General Short

had been informed hostilities were possible at any moment was of

adequate import to impress the commanding general with the fact

that our relations with Japan were extraordinarily critical. It is

\*«» See affidavit dated February 25, 1945, of Colonel Bicknell before Major Clausen. Committee exhibit

No. 148.

See affidavit of Colonel (now General) Kendall J. Fielder dated May 11, 1945, before Major Clausen.

Committee exhibit No. 148.

See affidavit of Robert L. Shivers dated April 10, 1945, before Major Clausen.

Roberts Commission record, p. 1620.

Committee record, pp. 8398, 8399.

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concluded that General Short received prior to the attack substantially

the intelligence concerning the destruction of codes and confidential

papers by Japanese diplomatic representatives, although he was not

informed by Admiral Kimmel of the very significant fact that the

Navy Department had issued orders for the destruction of codes in

certain of our oum outlying possessions.

The “Lost” Japanese Carriers — Radio Intelligence at Hawaii

Perhaps the most vital intelligence available to the commander in

chief of the Pacific Fleet indicating Pearl Harbor as a possible jwint

of attack was that gathered from his own Radio Intelligence Unit at

Hawaii. ' This unit was engaged in “traffic analyses”; that is, identi-

fying, locating, and determini^ the movements of Japanese warships

through their call signals. The location of vessels was effected

through radio-direction methods.\*”

Information of a similar type was contained in dispatches from the

Radio Intelligence Unit in the Philippines and from the Far Eastern

Section of Naval Intelligence in Washington. Fortnightly intelli-

gence bulletins incorporating information received from the radio

mtelligence units in the Philippines and at Pearl Harbor were issued

hy the Office of Naval Intelligence. These bulletins were made

available to Admiral Kimmel.

Because of conflicting reports that had been received concerning

Japanese naval movements and the further fact that reports received

from the commandant of the Sixteenth Naval District (Philippines)

were considered the most reliable, the Chief of Naval Operations on

November 24 advised the commanders in chief of the Asiatic and

Pacific Fleets, among others, that other reports should be carefully

evaluated and sent to the commandant of the Sixteenth Naval

District for action and to the Office of Naval Operations for infor-

mation. After combining all incoming reports the commandant of

the Sixteenth Naval District was to direct dispatches to the Office

of Naval Operations with copies to Admiral Kimmel for information

setting forth his evaluation and best possible continuity.

The commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District on November 26

advised the Office of Naval Operations and the commandant of

the Sixteenth Naval District in summary form of information

with respect to Japanese naval movements obtained by the Radio

Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor during the preceding month. This

dispatch expressed the belief that a strong concentration of Japanese

submarines and air groups, including at least one carrier division unit

(not necessarily a carrier) and probably one-third of the submarine

fleet, were located in the vicinity of the Marshall Islands. The esti-

mate of the situation was to the effect that a strong force might be

preparing to operate in southeastern Asia, while some units might

operate from Paleo and the Marshalls. On the same day, the Radio

Intelligence Unit in the Philippines advised, among others, the com-

mander in chief of the Pacific Fleet and the Office of Naval Operations,

in commenting on the November 26 dispatch from Hawaii, that

traffic analysis for the past few days indicated that the commander in

chief of the Second Fleet (Japanese) was directing various fleet units

in a loose-knit task force that apparently would be divided into two

See testimony of Capt. Edwin T. Layton, Hewitt Inquiry record, pp. 182-292\*

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sections, the first of which was expected to operate in the south China

area, the second, in the Mandates. It was estimated that the second

section included Carrier Division 3 “Ryujo, and one Mara.” This

dispatch further pointed out that the commandant of the Sixteenth

Naval District covld not confirm the supposition that carriers and

submarines in force were in the Mandated Islands and that his best

indications were that all known carriers were still in the Sasebo-Kure

area. The opinion was expressed that this evaluation was regarded

as reliable.

Periodically after November 27, 1941, there were sighting reports

from the Asiatic Fleet as well as from other observers confirming the

movement of important Japanese naval forces southward from Japan.

These reports, however, copies of which were received by Admiral

Kimmel, did not indicate the movement of any Japanese carriers.

The Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor continued the practice

after November 27 of preparing daily summaries of the information

received through its traffic analyses of Japanese naval communica-

tions.“\* These summaries were submitted each day to the Fleet

Intelligence Officer, Captain Layton, for transmittal to Admiral

Kimmel on the following morning. On November 28, an intelligence

summary, reviewed by Admiral Kimmel, stated there was no further

information concerning the presence of a carrier division in the

Mandates and that “carriers were stUl located in home waters.” The

next day he received the November 28 summary which indicated,

among other things, the view that the Japanese radio intelligence net

was operating at full strength upon United States Naval Conununi-

cations and “is getting resmts.” There was no information set forth

in the summary with respect to carriers. On the following day.

Admiral Kimmel received the summary dated November 29, indi-

cating that Carrier Division 3 was under the immediate command

of the commander in chief. Second Fleet. On December 1, Admiral

Kimmel received the previous day’s summary which stated with

respect to carriers that the presence of a unit of “plane guard” de-

stroyers indicated the presence of at least one carrier in the Mandates,

although this had not been confirmed.

The Fortnightly Intelligence Summary dated December 1\*\*® re-

ceived by Admiral Kimmd from the Office of Naval Intelligence in

Washington stated, among other things, with respect to the Japanese

naval situation that “ \* \* \* the major capital ship strength

remains in home waters, as well as the greatest portion of the car-

riers.” This summary related to information obtained during the

2 weeks preceding its date of December 1 and the Washington esti-

mate of the situation was necessarily based on radio intelligence in-

formation received largely from the Philippines and Hawaii before

the sudden and unexplained change in the call signals of Japanese

vessels on December 1 .

The December 1 summary, which Admiral Kimmel received from

Captain Layton stated that all Japanese service radio calls of forces

afloat had changed promptly at 0000 on December I ; that previously

service calls had been changed after a period of 6 months or more

and that calls had been last changed on 1 November 1941. This

summary stated:

The fact that service calls lasted only one month indicates an additional progressive

step in preparing for operations on a large scale.

For these summaries, see committee exhibits Nos. 115 and 115A.

Ml Committee exhibit No. 80.

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This statement was underlined by Admiral Kimmel. The summary

also stated, among other thinm, that a large number of submarines

were believed to be east of lokosuka-Chichijima and Saipan, and

that as to carriers there was “no change.”

On December 2, 1941, Admiral Kin^el examined a memorandum

which Layton had prepared on December 1 at his request. This

contained Layton’s estimate, on the basis of all available information,

conce ming the location of Japanese naval forces. This estimate

place A in the Bako-Takao area Carrier Division 3 and Carrier Divi-

sion 4, which included four carriers, and the Kdsuga Maru (believed

to have been a converted carrier). The estimate placed one car-

rier “Koryu (?) plus plane guards” in the Marshalls area.

Layton’s written estimate made no mention of Japanese Carrier

Divisions 1 and 2, consisting of four carriers. This omission was de-

liberate, the reason being that Layton considered the information as

to the location of those carriers was not sufficient to warrant a reUable

estimate of their whereabouts.\*”®

On December 2, 1941, according to Captain Layton, he and Ad-

miral Kimmel had the following conversation:\*”\*

Captain Layton. As best I recall it, Admiral Kimmel ssid ^^What! Yon don’t

know ’^ere Carrier Division 1 and Carrier Division 2 are?’^ and I replied, “No,

sir, I do not. I think they are in home waters, but I do not know where they are.

The rest of these units, I feel pretty confident of their location.” Then Admiral

Kimmel looked at me, as sometimes he would, with somewhat a stern countenance

and yet partially with a twinkle in his eye and said, “Do you mean to say that

they could be rounding Diamond Head and you wouldn’t know it?” or words to

that effect. My reply was that, “I hope they would be sighted before now,” or

words to that effect.

Captain Layton observed that the incident was impressed on his

mind and that Admiral Kimmel was pointing out to him his complete

ignorance as to the location of the Japanese caiTier divisions. How-

ever, the very reference by Admiral !^mmel to the carriers rounding

“Diamond Head” was recognition by him of this possibility and his

complete lack of knowledge as to where they might be. Admiral

Kimmel and Captain Layton discussed —

radio intelligence, its faults and its promises, its inexactities and yet the over-all

picture that it will produce. Whether then or at other times, we discussed the fact

thcU a force can take sealed orders, proceed under radio silence and never be detected

by visual or other sighting.

'The December 2 radio intelligence summary, which was delivered

to Admiral Kimmel on December 3, read as follows:

Almost a complete blank of information on the carriers today. Lack of identifi-

cation has somewhat promoted this lack of information. However, since over

200 service calls have been partially identified since the change on the 1st of De-

cember and not one carrier call has been recovered, it is evident that carrier

traffic is at a low ebb.

The Radio Intelligence summary delivered to Admiral Kimmel on

December 4 stated, in part, “No information on submarines or car-

riers.” The summary delivered on December 6 contained no mention

of carriers. The summary delivered oh December 6 stated “ No traffic

from the Commander Carriers or Submarine Force has been seen either.”

Other than radio intelligence and sighting reports from other sources,

the only way by which Admiral Kimmd would have obtained in-

See Hewitt Inquiry record, p. 212.

Hewitt Inquiry record, pp. 212, 213,

m Testimony of Captain Layton, Hewitt Inquiry record, p. 215.

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formation as to the location or movements of Japanese naval forces

from 27 November to 7 December 1941 was by distant air reconnais-

sance. Knowledge of the location of Japanese carriers was vital to

the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet. Two carrier divisions

very definitely could not be located. The service calls of Japanese

vessels were changed on December 1, a most imusual procedure

inasmuch as they had been changed only a month previously on

November 1. Admiral Kimmel fully appreciated the significance

of this change and actually underscored the statement submitted

to him: “ The fact that service calls lasted only one month indicates an

additional progressive step in preparing for operations on a large scale.”

It would appear Admiral Kimmel regarded the preparation to be in

anticipation of a Japanese movement to South East Asia.

The presumption was made that inasmuch as the Japanese carriers

could not be located they were in home waters. It was fully known,

however, that the missing carriers of Japan were not engaged in a

, movement to the south since such an operation woiild be open to

visual observation by our forces in the Philippines as well as by

friendly powers. In consequence, only two reasonable alternatives

remained — either the carriers were in home waters or they were en-

gaged in an operation under radio silence in some direction othei^than

to the south. It was Admiral Kimmel’s duty to be prepared for the

alternative most dangerous to him. Had he concluded that the un-

usual, change in service signals on December 1 clothed a Japanese

major operation, perhaps to the eastward at Hawaii, he could have

predicted within reasonably narrow limits of time as to when such

an attack would come.\*^®

Admiral Kimmel has referred to the lack of exactitude of radio

intelligence and the fact that this was not the first instance in which

his staff had been unable to get a line on the location of Japanese

vessels.®^®\* Recognizing all of the vagaries of radio intelligence analysis,

however, it was stUl not in keeping with his responsibility as com-

mander in chief of the Fleet for Admiral Kimmel to ignore the sinister

implications of the information supplied through the Radio Intelli-

gence Unit after he had been warned of war. In many respects the

picture presented by radio intelligence was among the most significant

information relating to when and, to a degree, where the Japanese

would possibly attack.

\*78 Secretary of the Navy Forrestal observed: “I am of the view that the information as to the location

and movements of the Japanese naval forces which was received by Admiral Kimmel during the week pre-

ceding the attack, coupled with all the other information which he had received, including the ‘war warnmg'

and other messages from the Chief of Naval Operations, should have been interpreted as indicating that an

attack on Hawaii was not unlikely and that the time of such an attack could be predicted within fairly

narrow limits.’" See “Fourth Endorsement” to report of Navy Court of Inquiry, committee exhibit No.

157.

And again: “The absence of positive information as to the location of the Japanese carriers, a study of the

movement which was possible to them, under radio silence, through the unguarded areas of the Pacific^

and a due appreciation of the possible effects of an air attack should nave induced Admiral Kimmel to take

all practicable precautions to reduce the effectiveness of such an attack.” Id.

\*73» In this regard. Admiral Kimmel stated, among other things: “The failure to identify Japanese carrier

traffic, on and after December first when the call signs changed, was not an unusual condition. During

the six months preceding Pearl Harbor, there were seven periods of eight to fourteen days each, in which

there was a similar uncertainty about the location of the Japanese battleships. During the six months pre-

ceding Pearl Harbor, there was an almost continual absence of positive indications of the locations of the

cruisers of the Japanese First Fleet, and eight periods of ten to twenty days each, in which the location of

the greater number of cruisers of the Japanese Second Fleet was uncertain. As to the Japanese carriers,

during the six months preceding Pearl Harbor, there existed a total of one hundred and thirty-four days—

in twelve separate periods — each ranging from nine to twenty-two days, when the location of the Japan^e

carriers from radio traffic analysis was uncertain.” Committee record, pp. 6727, 6728.

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The “Mori Call”

The Federal Bureau of Investigation on December 6 delivered to

respo^ible Armv and Navy intelligence officers at Hawaii a transcript

of an intercepted trans-Pacific radiotelephone conversation between

a person in Honolulu named “Mori” and an individual in Japan.

The\_ transcript of this conversation indicated, among other things, that

the individual in Japan was interested in the daily lights of airplanes,

particularly large planes, from Honolulu; whether searchlights were

being used; and the number of ships present at Pearl Harbor. Refer-

ence was made during the conversation to various flowers,”® the

significance of which was not known, but which conceivably could have

been an open code employed to copyey information concerning the

presence or absence of fleet vessels to the approaching Japanese attack

force, which could have listened in on the conversation.

Instead of taking action on the basis of the conversation, the office

of the District Intelligence Officer of the Navy decided that it should

be studied further by a Japanese linguist. This was not done until

after the attack and in consequence the transcript of the conversation

was not seen by Admiral Kimmcl before December 7. The transcript

wasidelivered to General Short and his G-2 on the evening of Decem-

ber 6 by Colonel Bicknell, his assistant G-2, the latter attaching great

significance to the matters discussed. Colonel Bicknell stated that\*

the special agent in chame of the FBI was alarmed at what he con-

sidered the nuhtery implications of the Mori conversation with respect

to Pearl Harbor and that he, Bicknell, concurred in this view, consider-

ing the conversation as veiy irregiilar and highly suspicious. He

stated, however, that “both Colonel Fielder and General Short indi-

cated that I was perhaps too ‘intelhgence conscious’ and that to them

the message seemed to be quite in order, and that it was nothing to be

excited about.”\*” No action whatever was taken by General Short.

Regardless of what use the Japanese made of the “Mori call,” the

conversation should have been, on its very face, of the greatest signifi-

cance to the responsible commanders in Hawaii. Members of the Mori

family were the subject of investigation by the FBI, a fact known to

the intelligence offices of both the Army and Navy. An interest by

Japan in tbe daily flights of “large airplanes” and whether search-

lights were employed could have but one meaning to alert Commanders

who were properly vigilant and should have been prepared for the

worst in the knowledge that hostilities were imminent — a desire to

know whether air reconnaissance was being conducted and whether

searchlights were employed for defense against air attack. The un-

decipherable and suspicious reference to flowers should have intensified

alertness by reason of the very fact that the true meaning could not be

gathered. The Mori call 'pointed directly at Hawaii.

The decision of the District Intelligence Office of the Navy to place

the matter aside for further study was inescusable and reflects the

apathetic state of alertness throughout the Navy command.

See committee exhibit No. 84 for complete transcript of the conversation.

\*?• The Mori family included iJr. Motokazu Mori, his wife Mrs. Ishiko Mori, his father Dr. Iga Mori, and

his son Victor Motojiro Mori. The family was the subject of security investigations in Hawaii.

\*7\* In the course of the conversation the question wasa sked, “What kind of flowers are in bloom in Hawaii

at present?” The reply was: “Presently, the flowers in bloom are fewest out cf the whole year. However,

the hibiscue and the poinsettia are in bloom now.\*\*

277 See aflQaavit of Col. George W. Bicknell dated February 26, 1945, before Major Clausen. Committee

exhibit No. 148.

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Detection of Japanese Submarine on Morning of December 7

The U. S. S. CoTidor, a minesweeper, at 3:42 a. m. (Honolulu time),

December 7, reported sighting a submarine periscope off the entrance

buoys to Pearl Harbor in a defensive area where American submarines

had been restricted from operating while submerged. The Condor by

visual signal reported this sighting to the U. S. S. Ward, a destroyer

of the Inshore Patrol between 3:60 and 3:58 a. m. After receivmg

this information the Ward searched for the submarine for approxi-

mately one and one-half hours without results. It thereupon con-

tacted the Condor, inquiring as to the distance and course of the

submarine that was sighted. At 5:20 a. m. the Condor replied but

the Ward was unable to effect the submarine’s location on the basis

of this information. The commander of the Ward thought the

Condor had been mistaken in concluding that it had seen a submarine

and made no report to higher authority.\*^\* The radio conversation

between the Ward and the Condor was overheard and transcribed in

the log of the Section Base, Bishop’s Point, Oahu, a radio station

under the jurisdiction of the Inshore Patrol, Fourteenth Naval

District. Inasmuch as the conversation was solely between the

ships, was not addressed to the Section Base, and no request jyas

made that it be relayed, the radio station did not report it to higher

authority.

At 6:30 a. m. the U. S. S. Antares, arriving off Pearl Harbor with a

barge in tow, sighted a suspicious object which appeared to be a small

submarine. The Antares notified the Ward, asking it to investigate,

and at approximately 6:33 a. m. observed a Navy patrol plane circle

and drop two “smoke pots” near the object. At 6:40 the Ward

sighted an unidentified submarine apparently following the Antares.

The Ward opened fire at 6:45 and the Antares, observing the fire of

the Ward, noted about the same time that a Navy patrol plane

appeared to drop depth charges or bombs on the submarine. When

the submarine keel^ over and started to sink, the Ward ceased

firing and then dropped depth charges.

At 6:51 the Ward radioed the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval

District: “W'’e have dropped depth charges upon subs operating in

defensive sea area.” The captain of the Ward followed this dispatch

with a supplemental message at 6:53: “We have attacked, fired upon

and droned depth charges upon submarine operating in defensive sea

area.” This information was received by the Chief of Staff to Admiral

Bloch at 7:12 and by the Duty OflScer of Admiral Kimmel at 7:15.

Admiral Kimmel stated he received this information between 7:30

and 7:40 a. m.

Admiral Bloch, ^cording to his testimony, was informed by Ws

Chief of Staff , but in view of numerous previous reports of submarine

contacts, their reaction was that the Ward had probably been mis-

taken, but that if it were not a mistake, the Ward and the relief duty

destroyer could take care of the situation; that Admiral Kimmel to

whom the infoimation had been referred had the power to take any

action which might be desired.\*” Admiral Kimmel testified:\*\*®

Between 7 ;30 and 7 :40, I received information from the Staff Duty Officer of

the Ward’s report, the dispatch of the ready-duty destroyer to assist the Ward,

See Hewitt inquiry record, pp. 87-92; 428, 429.

Id., at pages 414-416; 452-469. For further details concerning this incident, see Hewitt inquiry exhibits

Nos. 18, 73, 75, and 76.

Committee record, p. 6760-6770.

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and the eflForta then underway to obtain a verification of the Ward’s report.

I was awaiting such verification at the time of the attack. In my jud^ent,

the effort to obtain confirmation of the reported submarine attack off Pearl

Harbor was a proper preliminary to more drastic action in view of the number

of such contacts which had not been been verified in the past.

It is to be noted, however, that in Admiral Eimmel's own statement

he refers to only two reports concemi^ possible submarine contacts

after November 3 in addition to the gWard incident. He stated:

\* ♦ \* On November 28, 1941, the U. S. S. Helena reported thatja radar

operator without knowledge of my orders directing an alert against submarines

was positive that a submarine was in a restricted area. A search by a task group

with three destroyers of the suspected area produced no contacts. During the

night of December 2, 1941, the U. S. S. Gamble reported a clear metallic echo in

latitude 20-30, longitude 158-23. An investigation directed by Destroyer

Division Four produced no conclusive evidence of the presence of a submarine.

The reported sighting of a submarine periscope at 3:42 a. m. on

the morning of December 7, in close proximitjr to Pearl Harbor, even

though not verified, should have put the entire Navy command on

the qui vive and when at 6:40 a. m. the presence of a submarine was

defimtely established, the entire Navy command should have been

on a full alert. In the Martin-Bellmger estimate annexed to the

Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan it was pointed out that a single

submarine attack may indicate the presence of a considerable surface

force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier.

Admiral Kimmel in his letter to the Fleet, 2CLr-41 fRevised), dated

October 14, 1941, made this identical statement and lollowed it with

the words: “The Task Force Commander must, therefore, assemble

his task groups as quickly as the situation and daylight conditions

warrant in order to be prepared to pursue or meet enemy ships that may

be located by air search or other means ”

The evidence does not reflect that the sighting and sinking of a

submarine, particularly in close proximity to Pearl Harbor, was of

such frequent occurrence as to justify the failure to attach significance

to the events of the morning of December 7. This is especially true

when it is realized that a war warning had been received and Admiral

Kimmel’s own estimates indicated the extreme significance of sub-

marine activity. As a matter of fact the Condor and Ward incidents

appear to be the first instance of reported sighting and sinking of a

submarine since the critical turn in oitf negotiations with Japan.

The reported sighting was at 3:42 a. m., over 4 hours bejore the

Japanese air jorce struck. Appearing before the Roberts Com-

mission, General Short commented as follows with respect to the

Ward incident:

That would, under the conditions, have indicated to me that there was danger.

The Navy did not visualize it as anything but a submarine attack. They con-

sidered that and sabotage their greatest danger; and it was Admiral Bloch’s duty

as Commander of the District to get that information to me right away. He stated

to me in the presence of Secretary Knox that at the time he visualized it only as a

submarine attack and was busy with that phase of it and just failed to notify me;

that he could see then, after the fact, that he had been absolutely wrong, but that

at the time the urgent necessity of getting the information to me had not — at

any rate, I did not get the information until after the attack.

w Id., at p. 6T6S.

>v Htwiu inquiry exhibit No. 8; committee exhibit No. 44.

>\*\* Roberts Commission record, p. 311.

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The supposed sighting of a submarine at 3:42 a. m. and the attack

upon a submarine at 6:45 a. m., December 7, should have been

reco^ized as immediate basis for an all-out alert to meet all military

contingencies.^\*

Radar Detection of Japanese Raiding Force

I

The army radar was scheduled for operation on Sunday mor ning ,

December 7 from 4 a. m. to 7 a. m.\*\*\*‘ The normal operation for

training purposes after 7 a. m. was discontinued for this particular

Sunday by reason of special authorization obtained from the control

officer.

At one of the more remote aircraft warning stations, Opana, Privates

Joseph Lockard and George Elliott had been on duty from 4 to 7 a. m.

Inasmuch as they were waiting for the army truck to return them to

quarters for breakfast, it was decided to operate the radar after 7

a. m..in order that Private Lockard, who was skilled in the operation

of the radar detector, might afford his partner additional instruction.

As the machine was being adjusted. Pi ivate Lockard sdw on the radar

screen an unusual formation he had not previously seen in the machine.

Inasmuch as the indicator reflected a large number of planes co ming

in and he was confident there was nothing hke it in the air, he felt

that the machine must be at fault. After additional checking he

found, however, that the machine was operating properly and con-

cluded at 7:02 a. m. that there was a large number of planes approach-

ing Oahu at a distance of 132 miles from 3° east of north.\*\*®

After some discussion concerning the advisabihty of informing the

information center. Private Lockard called the center at 7:20 a. m.

advising that a large number of planes were heading toward Oahu

from the direction indicated. It is to be noted that, as General

Short stated, “At 7 a. m. all the men at the information center except

the telephone operator had folded up their equipment and left.”\*\*\*

The switchboard operator was unable to do anything about the call

and accordingly, since the information center personnel had departed,

referred it to Lt. Kermit A. Tyler, a pursuit officer of the Air

Corps whose tour of duty at the center was until 8 a. m. He was

there solely for training and observation.

Lieutenant Tyler, upon being advised of the approach of a laige

number of planes, told Private Lockard in substance and effect to

“forget it.” He assumed that the flight indicated was either a naval

patrol, a flight of Hickam Field bombers, or possibly some B-17’s

from the mainland that were scheduled to arrive on December 7.

the light of the known and declared significance to be attached to the presence of a Japanese sub-

marine in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, this committee does not concur in the implications of the conclusion

made by the Navy Court of Inauiry that: “There was nothing, however, in the presence of a single sub\*

marine in the vicinity of Oahu to indicate that an air attack on Pearl Harbor was imminent." See Navy

Court of Inauiry report, committee exhibit No. 157.

In the course of examination by Counsel, General Short was asked if radar was put on the alert after

the warning of November 27. General Short replied: \*\*Tkat was piU into alert during what I considered the

most dangerous hours of the day for an air attack, from 4 o\*clock to 7 o'clock a. m. daily.”

Asked if just putting the radar into operation was effective without an Information Center that worked

with it. General Short said: ”7'he information center was working with it.” Committee record, page 8054.

The evidence reflects that installation of three permanent radar stations had not been completed. The

mobile sets had been in operation, however, for some time prior to December 7 with very satisfactory results.

See in this regard Note 287, infra.

-‘W For complete discussion, see testimony of Joseph L. Lockard, Army Peail Harbor Board record, pp.

1014-1034; Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 628-643; testimony of George Elliott, Army Pearl Harbor

• Board record, pp. 994-1014; Navy Court of Inquiry record, pages 644-659; and committee record, p. 18380-

13499 .

2 M Committee record, p. 7976.

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General Short stated:®”

If he (Tyler) had alerted the interceptor command there would have been time,

if the pursuit squadrons had been alerted, to disperse the planes. There would

not have been time to get them in the air. \* \* \*. It would have made a great

difference in the loss \* \* \*. It would have been a question of split seconds

instead of minutes in getting into action.

In testifying before the joint committee, General Short said:®“

If Lieutenant Tyler had realized that the incoming flight was Japanese, there

would have been time to disperse the planes but not to warm up the engines and

get them into the air. Lieutenant Tyler made no report of this matter to me and

as far as I know did not report the incident to the control officer. Major Tyndall,

after the information center was manned about 8:30 a. m. This matter was not

brought to my attention until the next day when it was too late to be of value.

Had this incident been reported to the control officer at 8:30 a. m. on the 7th, he

would have informed the Navy and it might haVe enabled them to locate the

carriers.

If the Army command at Hawaii had been adequately alerted,

Lieutenant Tyler’s position would be indefensible. He was at the

information center for training and observation, had no knowledge on

which to predicate any action, and accordingly should have consulted

higher authority. His fatal estimate — “Forget it” — was empty

assumption. The fact that Lieutenant Tyler took the step that he

did, merely tends to demonstrate how thoroughly unprepared and

how completely lacking in readiness the Army command really was

on the morning of December 7.

Further, the evidence reflects that Privates Lockard and Elliott

debated the advisability of informing the Information Center con-

cerning the approach of a large number of planes. It would appear

that this unusual in formation concerning a large number of planes —

so unusual in fact that Private Lockard stated he had never before

seen such a formation — should have provided immediate and com-

pelling reason for advising the Information Center had the necessary

alert been ordered after the November 27 warning and the proper

alertness pervaded the Army command.

While it was not possible with the then state of radar development

to distinguish friendly planes from hostile planes, this fact is of no

appheation to the situation in Hawaii; for in a command adequately

a erted to war any presumptions of the friendly or enemy chafacter

of approaching forces must be that they are enemy forces. It is to

be noted General Short has stated that' if Lieutenant Tyler had

alerted the interceptor command there would have been time to

disperse the planes and to have reduced the losses.

The real reason, however, that the information developed by the

radar was of no avail was the failure of the commanding general to

^ Roberts Commission record, pp. 312, 313. However, in a memorandum dated November 14, 1941,

Lt. Col. C. A. Powell, Signal Corps, Hawaiian Department, stated: “In recent exercises held in the Hawai-

ian Department, the operation of the radio set SCR-270 was found to be very satisfactory. The exercise

was started approximately 4:30 in the morning and with three radio sets in operation. We noted when

the planes tooK off from the airplane carrier in the oscilloscope. We determined this distance to be approxi-

mately 80 miles, due to the fact the planes would circle around waiting the assemblage of the remainder

from the carrier.

“As soon as the planes were assembled, they proceeded toward Hawaii. This was very easily determined

and within six minutes, the pursuit aircraft were notified and they took off and intercepted the incoming bombers

at approximately SO miles from Pearl Harbor . .

A copy of this memorandum was forwarded under date of November 19, 1941, to Mr. Harvey H. Bundy,

special assistant to the Secretary of War. See committee exhibit No. 136.

Committee record, p. 7977.

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order an alert commensurate with the warning he had been given by

the War Department that hostilities were possible at any moment.\*\*\*®

Other Intelligence Received by Army and Navy in Hawaii

CHANNELS OP INTELLIGENCE

Both the Army and Navy commanders in Hawaii had responsible

intelligence officers whose duty it was to coordinate and evaluate

information from all sources and of all pertinent types for their

superiors. The record reflects full exploitation of all sources for this

purpose including the interview of passengers transiting Hawaii.

The record also reflects that the Federal Bureau of Investigation and

other agencies in Hawaii were supplying Army and Navy intelligence

officers with data available.\*\*®

The Special Agent in Chaise of the FBI at Honolulu, for example,

stated that on or about November 28, 1941, he received a radio

communication from Director J. Edgar Hoover to the effect “that

peace negotiations between the United States and Japan were breaking

down and to be on the alert at all times as anything could happen”

and that, on the same day, he delivered this information to responsible

Army and Navy intelligence officers in Hawaii.\*®®

THE “MANILA MESSAGE”

Both the Ai’my and Navy intelligence offices received about Decem-

ber 3, 1941, the following dispatch from a British source in Manila

through a British representative in Honolulu: \*®^

'We have received considerable intelligence confirming following developments

in Indo-China;

A. 1. Accelerated Japanese preparation of airfields and railways.

2. Arrival since Nov. 10 of additional 10Q,000 repeat 100,000 troops and con-

siderable quantities fighters, medium bombers, tanks, and guns (75

mm).

B. Estimates of specific quantities have already been telegraphed Washington

Nov. 21 by American Military Intelligence here.

C. Our considered opinion concludes that Japan envisages early hostilities with

Britain and U. S. Japan does not repeat not intend to attack Russia at present

but will act in South.

You may inform Chiefs of American Military and Naval Intelligence Honolulu.

The assistant G-2 of the Hawaiian Department stated he gave the

foregoing intelligence to General Short.®®\*

THE HONOLULU PRESS

The information available in the Hawaiian Islands from the press

and the attendant state of the public mind in the days before Pearl

Harbor can to a great extent be gathered from a recitation of the head-

lines appearing in Honolulu newspapers. Among the headhnes were

the following: \*®\*

Illustrative of the insuflUciency of the radar alert is the fact that although the charts plotting the Japa-

nese force in and plotting the force as it retired were turned over to higher authority during the course of

the attack, this information was not employed to assist in locating the Japanese ta^ force and it appears

no inquiries were made concerning it for a considerable period of time after the attack.

See testimony of Col. George W. Bicknell before the joint committee, committee record, pp. 1S53&-

13620.

See affidavit of Robert L. Shivers, dated April 10, 1945, before Major Clausen; Clausen investigation,

pp. 88-91.

See exhibits, Clausen investigation.

8^ supplemental affidavit of Col. George W. Bicknell, dated August 14, 1945, before Clausen.

Committee record, p. 13622-13627.

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Honolulu Advertiser

November 7, 1941

“Kurusu Carrying Special Note to F. D. R. From Premier Tojo —

Japan Ready to Act Unless Tension Eases.”

“Japan Waits Before Move in Far East — ^A^ession in Pacific

Appears Shelved Until Kmusu’s Mission has been Completed in U. S.”

“Invasion Held too Difficult by Officials — Offensive May Start in

Middle East Soon; Invasion of Continent Impracticable at Present.”

November 13, 1941

“Tokyo Radio Asserts War is Already on — ^Any Military Moves

Only Logical Result of Encirclement Policy, Japanese Staff Says.”

“Envoy Undismayed — Carries Broad Powers to Act — ^Kurusu

Denies Taking Message, Implies Errand of Bigger Scope.”

November I 4 , 1941

“Japanese Confident of Naval Victory.”

November 26, 1941

“Americans Get Warning to Leave Japan, China.”

“Hull Reply to Japan Ready.”

November 27, 1941

“ U. S.-Japan Talks Broken Off as Hull Rejects Appeasement —

Full Siurender Demanded in U. S. Statement.”

“Evacuation Speeded as Peace Fades.”

November 28, 1941

“Parris Island, S. C. — This is the tail assembly of the captive barrage

balloon at Panis Island, S. C., looking for all the w;orld like an air

monster. The wench controlling it is in the sandbagged structure pro-

tected there from bomb splinters. The helium sausage may be used

to protect beachheads, bridgeheads and other strong points, thereby

differing from the British technique which keeps them flying over

London. The marines encamped on Parris Island, S. C., have a

special training school on these balloons.”

November 29, 1941

“U. S. Rejects Compi'omise in Far East — Washington Insists on

Maintenance of Status Quo, Withdrawal from China by Japan

Army.”

“U. S. Warplanes May Protect Burma Road — Protective Force of

200 Planes, 500 Pilots Held Sufficient to Ward Off Attack by Japan-

ese.”

November SO, 1941

“Kurusu Bluntly Warned Nation Ready for Battle — Foreign Affairs

Expert Attacks Tokyo Madness.”

90179—46 11

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“Leaders Call Troops Back in Singapore— Hope Wanes as Nations

Fail at Parleys; Nightly Blackouts Held in P. I.; Hawaii Troops

Alerted.”

December 1, 1941

“Japanese Press Warns Thailand.”

“Burma Troops Are Reinforced — ^British, Indian Units Arrive at

Rangoon.”

“F. D. R. Hurries to Parleys on Orient Crisis.”

December 1941

“Japan Called StUl Hopeful of Making Peace with U. S. — Thailand

Now in Allied Bloc, Press Charges.”

“Japan Gives Two Weeks More to Negotiations — Prepares for

Action in Event of Failure.”

“Malaya Forces Called to Full Mobilization.”

“Quezon Held to Blame in P. I. Defense Delay.”

December S, 1941

“Huge Pincer attack on U. S. by Japan, France Predicted— Pepper

Visions Nations Acting as Nazi Pawns.”

“U. S. Demands Explanation of Japan Moves — ^Americans Prepare

for Any Emergency; Navy Declared Ready.”

December 4, 1941

“Hawaii Martial Law Measure Killed for Present Session.”

“Japanese Pin Blame on U. S. — ^Army Paper Charges Violation

byF. D. R.”

December 6, 1941

“Probe of Japanese Activities Here Will Be Made by Senate — Spy

Inquiry Rapidly Gets Tentative O. K. by State Department.”

“Pacific Zero Hour Near; Japan Answers U. S. Today.”

“Japan Calls in Nationals.”

“Japan Has Secret Shanghai Agents.”

December 6, 1941

“America Expected to Reject Japan’s Reply on Indo China — ^HuU

May Ask Proof, Suggest Troop’s Recall.”

“Japan Troops Concentrated on Thai Front — Military Observers

Say Few Units Have Been Posted in North.”

December 7, 1941

“F. D. R. Will Send Message to' Emperor on War Crisis — Japanese

Deiw Massing Troops for Thai War.”

“British Fear Tientsin Row, Call Up Guards — ^May Isolate Con-

cession to ‘Prevent’ Agitation over U. S.-Japan Rumors.”

“Hirohito Holds Power to Stop Japanese Army.”

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Honolulu Star Bulletin

November 10, 1941

“Navy Control for Honolulu Harbor.”

• December 1, 1941

“U. S. Army Alerted in Manila — Singapore Mobilizing as War

Tension Grows.”

“Japan Envoys Resume Talks Amid Tension.”

December 4, 1941

“Japan Spurns U. S. Program — ^Press Holds Acceptance Not

Possible.” '

December 6, 1941

“Japan Parries Open U, S. Break.”

“Fiu'ther Peace Efforts Urged — Tokyo Claims Policy ‘Misunder-

stood' in Washington as One of Force and Conquest.”

December 6, 1941

“Singapore on War Footing — Sudden Order Calls Troops to Posi-

tions — State of Readiness is Completed; No Explanation Given.”

“New Peace Effort Urged in Tokyo — d^oint Commission to Iron

Out Deadlock with U. S. Proposed.”

It would seem difficult to imagine how anyone — upon reading the

newspapers alone — could have failed to appreciate the increasing

tenseness of the international situation and the unmistakable signs

of war.“®

The Role op Espionage in the Attack

It has been suggested that Admiral Eimmel and General Short

should be charged with knowledge that the Japanese were conducting

extensive espionage activity in Hawaii and by reason thereof they

should have exercised greater vigilance commensurate with the real-

ization that Japan knew everything concerning the fleet, the fleet

base and the defenses available thereto. Implicit in this suggestion

is the assumption that superior intelligence possessed bjr Japan con-

cerning Pearl Harbor conditioned her decision to strike there or,

\*\*\* Referring to the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department, Secretary Stimson expressed this

idea in the following terms:

‘‘Even without any such message (the War Department dispatch of November 27) the outpost com-

mander should have been on the alert. If he did not know that the relations between Japan and the United

States were strained Etnd might be broken at any time, he must have been almost the only man in Hawaii

who did not tmow it, for the radio and the newspapers were blazoning out those facts daily, and he had a

chief of staff and an intelligence officer to tell him so. And if he did not know that the Japanese were likely

to strike without warning, he could not have read his history of Japan or known the lessons taught in the

Army schools in respect to such matters." Statement of Mr. Stimson, committee record, p. 14408.

Both Admiral Kimmel and General Short have made a point of the fact that after the warnings of

November 27 they were dependent on the newspapers for information concerning the state of negotiations

and from the press, gathered that the conversations were still continuing. It is to be recalled, however,

that the “code destruction" intelligence was made available after November 27 and indicated with unmis-

tsAable clarity that effective negotiations were at an end. In any event it would appear anomalous that

the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department and the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet

would permit unofficial newspaper accoimts to take precedence over official War and Navy Department

dispatches, setting forth the break-down in negotiations. Admiral Kimmel. himself, admitted that he did

not act on newspaper haformatioh in preference to official fr^orpiation supplied him by the Navy Depart-

ment, after havmg previously observed that he obtained a major portion of his “diplomatic information

from the newspapers." See Navy Court of Inquiry record, pp. 306, 307.

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otherwise stated, that Japan would not have attacked' Pearl Harbor

on the morning of December 7 if she had not the benefit of unusual

and superior intelligence. Virtually every report that has been

heretofore prepared concerning the disaster has referred to the proba-

bility of supposed extensive espionage activity in Hawaii and the

peculiar vulnerability of the fleet base to such activity by reason of

the surroimding moimtainous terrain.®®\*

There is evidence before the committee, however, which reveals

several salient considerations indicating that Japanese Hawaiian

espionage was not particularlv effective and ^at from this standpoint

there was nothing unusual about the Hawaiian situation. It is clear

beyond reasonable doubt that superior Japanese intelligence had

nothing whatever to do with the decision to attack Pearl Harbor.

Among the considerations giving rise to this conclusion are the

followmg:

1. Radar equipment was available on Oahu for use in detecting

approaching planes. That Japan knew of radar and its capa-

bilities would seem clear if for no other reason than on November

. 22 her consul in Panama advised her that the United States had

set up airplane detector bases and ‘‘some of these detectors are

said to be able to discover a plane 200 miles away.” ®®® The

attacking force was actually detected throu^ radar over 130

miles from Oahu. Had Japanese espionage developed the fact

that radar was in use at Hawaii and so advised Tokyo of that

fact, it woidd seem unlikely that the attacking planes would have

come in for the raid at high altitude but, on the other hand, would

have flown a few feet above the water in order to take advantage

of the radar electrical horizon — presupposing of course that Japan

possessed at least an elementary working knowledge of radar

and its potentialities.

2. Perhaps the greatest single item of damage which the at-

tacking force could have inflicted on Oahu and our potential for

effectively prosecuting the war would have been to bomb the

oil-storage tanks around Pearl Harbor.®\*\* These tan^ were

exposed and visible from the air. Had they been hit, inexplicable

damage would have resulted. Considering the nature of instal-

lations that were struck during the attack, it is questionable

whether Japanese espionage had developed fully the extraordinary

vulnerabilitv of the oil storage to bombing and its peculiar and

indispensable importance to the fleet.

3. The evidence before the Committee reflects that other

Japanese consulates were supplying Tokyo as much information

as the Honolulu consulate.®®® Information supplied by the

Manila and Panama consuls was detailed in character and related

meticulously to defenses available and those in process of develop-

ment. It appears that it was not until a few days before Decem-

ber 7 that the Honolulu consul supplied bis Japanese superiors

any significant information concerning the defenses of Oahu, and

See reports of Army Pearl Harbor Board and Navy Court of Inquiry, committee exhibit No. 157.

Committee exhibit No. 2, p. 49.

Admiral Bloch pointed out that, had the Japanese attacked the oil supply at Oahu, the drydocks,

repair shop, barracks, and other facilities instead of the airfields and the ships of the fleet, the United States

would have suffered more insofar as the prosecution of the war was conceited. See Hart inquiry record,

pu 94. It is, of course, known that the Japanese knew generally as to the location of the oil-storage tanks

ss reflected by a map recovered after the attack. See Hewitt inquiry, exhibit No. 30.

From evidence before the Committee it appe^ that the Manila and Panama consuls were supplying

Tokyo more information and of a type far more indicative of an attack than that received concerning Hawaii.

See section “Ships in Harbor Reports, ■' Part IV, infra, this report.

iSSXi

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at a time when the attacking force was already on its way to

Pearl Harbor.®”

4. The Japanese task force left Hitokappu Bay on November

25 with December 7 set as the tme for the attack. This depar-

ture, it would seem clear, was in anticipation of the faUure to

secure concessions from the United States through further nego-

tiations. The date December 7 had been recognized as suitable

for the attack in discussions prior to .November 7. It is hardly

credible that superior intelligence should have precipitated or

otherwise conditioned the attack when the decision to strike on

December 7 was made many days earlier and, manifestly, in the

interim between the decision and the attack date the entire

defensive situation at Hawaii could have changed.®®\* As a matter

of fact two of our task forces left Pearl Harbor while the raiders

were en route for the attack.

5. It is apparent from the evidence obtained through Japanese

sources since VJ-day that the decision to attack on December 7

was made on the basis of the general assumption that units of the

fleet ordinarily came into Pearl Harborjon Friday and remained

over the week end.®®® With this realization providing ade^ate

odds that substantial units of the Pacific Fleet would be in Pearl

Harbor on Sunday, December 7, that date was selected.

6. In February of 1941 Admiral Yamamoto is reported to have

stated,

If we have war with the United States we will have no hope of winning

unless the U. S. Fleet in Hawaiian waters can be destroyed.\*®\*

This statement is clearly in line with the premise laid down by

several witnesses before the committee that Japan woidd open

her attack on us by hitting our Pacific Fleet wherever it might

be — whether at Pearl Harbor, Manila, Panama, or on the west

coast — in order to immobolize it as a threat to Japanese moves to

the south.®®\* The fleet happened to be based at Pearl Harbor and

in consequence that was where Japan struck.

7. The “Mori call,” to which reference has heretofore been

made, was on the evening of December 5. It would appear

, doubtful that Japan should have been seeking information just

before the attack in the rather inexpert manner displayed in the

call if she possessed any wealth of intelligence gleaned through

espionage agents in Hawaii.

8. Investigation conducted in Japan since VJ-day indicates,

as a matter of fact, that espionage agents, apart from the consul

and his staff, played no role whatever in the attack.®®® The

sources of information employed, according to Japanese inter-

viewed, were naval attaches to the Japanese Embassy in Wash-

ington, public newspapers in the United States, American radio

broadcasts (public), crews and passengers on ships which put in

at Honolulu, and general information.®\*!?

See oommittee exhibit No. 2.

Committee exhibit No. 8.

Id.

Committee exhibit No. 8D.

See testimony of Capt. Arthur McCollum, committee record, pp.' 9115-9288;, testimony of Capt. Ellis

Zacharies, oommittee record, pp. 8709-8778, 8909-^044.

See committee exhibit No. 8. Also note 6, Part II, this report,

w Id.

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9. As late as December 2, Tokyo was solicitously asking its

Honolulu consul —

whether or not there are any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or

if there are any indications they will be sent up. Also advise me whether

the warships are provided with antimine nets.\*®'

On December 6, the Honolulu Consul advised Tokyo;

In my opinion the battleships do not have torpedo nets. The details are

not known. I will report'the results of my investigation."\*

The foregoing is\_ hardly indicative of any superior sources or

facilities for obtaining intelligence.

It is reported that the decision to employ a horizontal-bombing

attack on Pearl Harbor in conjunction with an air-torpedo attack

was for the reason that Tokyo could not determine whether ships

at Pearl Harbor were equipped with torpedo nets and the hori-

zontal bombing could be depended upon to inflict some damage

if the torpedo attack failed.®®\*

10. In planning for the attack, Japan made elaborate precau-

tions to protect the raiding task force which was of itself very

formidable, probably more so as a striking force than the entire

fleet based at Pearl Harber. A large str&ing force was held in

readiness in the Inland Sea to proceed to assist the raiding force

if the latter were detected or attacked.®'® It is proper to suggest

that such precautions wo\dd seem unlikely and misplaced if

Japan had known through superior espion^e information that

there was no air or other reconnaissance from Oahu and the

defenses were not properly alerted.

The evidence reflects that the raiding task force probably

determined the extent of reconnaissance through plotting in our

plane positions with radio bearings. Further, the Japanese force

followed the broadcasts from Honolulu commercial radio stations

on the theory that if the stations were goirig along in their normal

manner, the Hawaiian forces were still oblivious to develop-

ments.®"

11. In moving in for the attack on December 7, the Japanese

ran the risk of tipping over the apple cart by sending out scout-

ing planes a considerable period of time ahead of the bombers.®\*\*

They took the further risk of having several submarines in the

operating sea areas around Pearl Harbor. If Japan had possessed

extraordinary intelligence concerning the state of Hawaiian

defenses or lack thereof, it would seem improbable that she would

have invited disaster by taking such risks.

12. Reference has been made to the large number of semi-

oflBcial consular agents that were stationed in Hawaii, the impli-

cation being they were engaged in widespread espionage activity

Yet the facts before the committee reflect no evidence that these

agents committed a single act of espionage, except as it may be

inferred from the information sent by the Honolulu consul to

Tokyo, which as will be indicated was no more extensive than was

being received from other consulates.

See oommittee exhibit No. 2, p. 21.

Id., at pp. 27, 28.

See oommittee exhibit No. 8.

Id.

See committee exhibit No. 8D.

•1\* Id.

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13. It would seem likely that Japan expected some of the most

effective striking units of the Pacific Fleet, particularly the

carriers, to be in Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack. The

raiders, for example, as testified by Admiral Kimmel, bombed a

vessel with lumber on its upper deck, apparently thinking it

was a carrier. In the light of retrospection and the experiences

of the war, it is suggested that Japan would not have indulged

the Pyrrhic victory of destroying om\* lumbering battleships if

she had ‘not also hoped to find the fast striking imits of the fleet.

14. Japanese estimates in the late fall of 1941 as to the disposi-

tion of United States air strength in the Pacific were, with respect

to Hawaii, as follows: Fighter planes, 200; small attack planes,

150; 4-engine planes, 40; 2-engine planes, 100; reconnaissance

and patrol planes, 35; and flying boats, 110, for a total of 635

planes This estimate is roughly twice that of the actual

number of planes at Hawaii and reflects a thoroughly erroneous

impression as to the ratio of planes in a particular category. The

inability to make an approximation of enemy strength within

more narrow limits of exactitude can hardly be credited as superior

intelligence.

15. In the last analysis it is difficult to believe that Japanese

espionage was actually able to develop satisfactorily the real

strength of pur Pacific Fleet. In December of 1941 the Japanese

fleet was superior to our fleet in the Pacific. The latter would

have been unable, based on the testimony of witnesses ques-

tioned on the subject, to have proceeded, for example, to the aid

of General MacArthur in the Philippines even had Pearl Harhqr

- not been attacked. Our war plan in the Pacific, particularly in

the early stages, was essentially defensive in character, save for

sporadic tactical raids.

If the Japanese really knew the weakness of the Pacific Fleet

they must also have known that it did not present a formidable

deterrent to anything Japan desired to do in the Far East. As

already suggested, the question presents itself: ^^'hy, if Japanese

espionage in Hawaii was superior, would Japan invite the unqualified

wrath oj the American people, weld disunited American public opinion,

and render certain a declaration of war by the Congress through a

sneak attack on Pearl Harbor when the only real weapon we had, our

Pacific Fleet, presented itself no substantial obstacle to what Japan

had in mind? A logical answer would seem to be that Japan had

not been able to determine and, in consequence, was not cognizant

of our real naval weakness in the Pacific.\*\*^\*\* The extremely larce

raiding force and the excessive number of attacking planes would

appear to be further confirmation of this conclusion.

See War Department memorandum dated May 21, 1946, transmitting a letter of the same date from

Commander Walter Wilds, Oflace of the Chairman of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey. Com-

mittee record, p. 14626.

8Ub When questioned as to the deterring effect the Pacific Fleet based at Pearl Harbor in December 1941

might have on Japanese aggressive action in the Far East, Admiral Ingersoll declared: “The Pacific Fleet

had no train, it had no trainsports, it did not have sufficient oilers to leave the Hawaiian Islands on an of-

fensive campaign and Javan knew it just as well as we did and she knew that she could make an attack

is the area in which she did, that is, Southeast Asia and the Philippines, with impunity.” Committee rec-

ord, p. 11370.

It appears that the statement by Admiral Ingersoll concerning his estimate of Japanese knowledge con-

cerning the capacity of the Pacific Fleet is illogical and completely incompatible with the risks entailed by

Japan in attacking Pearl Harbor.

During the war games carried on at the Naval War College, Tokyo, from September 2 to 13, 1941, it tca$

assumed that the Pearl Harbor Striking Force would suffer the loss one4hird of its varticipating units; it was

specifically assumed that one ARA 01 class carrier , and one SOR YU class carrier wovld be lost. See committee

record, p. 457.

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From the foregoing considerations it is proper to suggest that the

role played by espionage in the Pearl Harbor attack may have been

magged all out of proportion to the realities of the situation.

The Japanese diplomatic establishments and others did, however,

have imcensored channels of communication with Tokyo as a result

of statutory restrictions imposed upon our own counterespionage

agencies by the Communications Act of 1934. The position assumed

m 1941 by the Federal Communications Commission was expressed

in a memorandum dated September 29, 1944, by the Chairman, James

Lawrence Fly, as follows:

The United States was at peace with Japan prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor

on December 7, 1941, and the Communications Act of 1934, under which the

Federal Communications Commission was organized and from which it derives

its powers, prohibited the tapping of wires or other interception of messages trans-

mitted between points in the United States, including its territories, and a foreign

country (sec. 605). Since that prohibition upon the Commission had not beer

in any way superseded, the Commission did not intercept any messages over the

radio-telegraph, cable telegraph, or radiotelephone circuits between the United

States (including Hawaii) and Japan prior to Dec. 7, 1941.

The siiuation should never again be ‘permitted iffhereby the efforts oj

our Government to combat forces inimical to our national security are

hamstrung by restrictions of our own imposition 'which aid the enemy.

Liaison Between Admiral Kimmel and General Short

Consistent with instructions from the Chief of Staff,"\* General

Short set about immediately upon assuming command of the Hawaiian

Department to establish a cordial and cooperative relationship with

Admiral Kimmel and his staff. That he was successful is undisputed

and there can be no doubt that a bond of personal friendship developed

between the commanders of the Army and the Navy in Hawaii.

They addressed themselves to the task of preparing for war and set

about to perfect plans for defense resulting in the Joint Coastal Fron-

tier Defense Plan. As has been seen, this plan was thorough, despite

the recognized limitations of equipment, well conceived and ^ timely

invoked using all of the facilities at hand was adequate to effect maxi-

mum defensive security. The evidence reflects, however, that per-

sonal friendship was obviously confused with effective liaison at a

time when the latter was indispensable to the security of the Hawaiian

Coastal Frontier.®\*\*

They exchanged the warning messages of November 27 and dis-

cussed their import. They did not, however, in the face of these

warnings sit down with one another to determine what they together

had and what they could jointly do to defend the fleet and the fleet

base. This action and this alone could have demonstrated effective

liaison in a command by mutual cooperation. After reading the

“war warning’' sent Admiral Kimmel, General Short assumed the

See report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, committee exhibit No. 157.

General Short testified: “The one thing that that letter Getter of February 7, 1941, from General Mar-

shall) emphasized to me, I think, more than an 3 fthing else, was the necessity for the closest cooperation

with the Navy. I think that that part of the letter Impressed me more than anything else.” Army Pearl

Harbor Board Record, p. 355.

\*\*\* The Army Pearl Harbor Board, it should be noted, said: “General Short accomplished what he set

out to do, to establish a cordial and friendly relationship with the Navy. His instructions from the Chief

of Staff to do this were not for the purpose of social intercourse, but for more effectively accomplishing the

objective of a sound and complete detail working agreement with the Navy to get results. He successfully

accomplished fully only the cordial relationship with his opposite numbers in the Navy, i. e., the top rana

of the Navy; he did not accomplish fully the detailed working relationship necessary for his own full informa-

tion, the complete execution of his own job and the performance of his mission. The claim of a satisfactory

relationship for practical purposes is not substantiated.” See Report of Army Pearl Harbor Board, com-

mittee exhibit No. 167.

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Navy would be conducting distant reconnaissance when ordered to

effect a defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out war tasks.®\*\*

Admiral Kimmel assumed, on the other hand, that the Army in the

face of the warnings would be on an all-out alert.®\*\* In fact, he testi-

fied he didn’t know the Army was alerted to prevent sabotage only;

that he thought they were on an aU-out alert; and that he didn’t

know they had any other kind of alert. He also assumed the Army

radar would be in fuU operation. Even though General Short testified

that he conferred with Admiral Kimmel on December 1, 2, and 3 and

they talked over everjr phase of what they were doing ®\*^ these fatal

assumptions stiU persisted. In short, when the time came for really

effective liaison it was entirely absent.

The Navy failed to advise General Short of information received

on four different occasions between December 3 and 6 concerning the

destruction of codes and confidential documents in Japanese diplomatic

establishments and in our own outlying islands.®\*\* General Short

testified that had he known of these messages he would have ordered

a more “serious alert.” ®\*®

On November 26 the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District

expressed to the Chief of Naval Operations the belief, based on radio

intelligence, that a strong Japanese concentration of submarines and ^

air groups, including at least one carrier division unit (not necessarily ‘

a carrier) and probably one-third of the submarine fleet, were located

in the vicinity of the Marshall Islands. In spite of the believed

dangerous proximity to Hawaii of possible Japanese carrier units, the

commanding general was not advised of this highly significant infor-

mation.®®\* While this information was questioned the same day by

the radio intelligence unit in the Philippmes, it nevertheless displays

the futility of General Short’s assumption that the Navy would keep

him informed of the location of Japanese warships.

On November 28, 1941, the commander in chief of the Asiatic

Fleet directed a dispatch to the Chief of Naval Operations with a

copy to Admiral Kimmel for information concerning the establish-

ment by Japan of the celebrated “winds code” to be employed in

“ordinary Tokyo news broadcasts” to advise when “diplomatic rela-

tions are on the verge of being severed.” ®®\* Certain Japanese phrases

were set up to indicate a break of relations with the United States,

England and the Netherlands, and Russia. Efforts were made by

the Navy at Hawaii to monitor for a broadcast employing this code.

On December 1 the Chief of Naval Operations sent a ^spatch to the

commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet, with a copy to Admiral

Kimmel, advising of Japanese broadcast frequencies.®®® Despite the

importance which was attached to the winds code at the time. General

Short has testified this information was not supplied him by the Navy

in Hawaii.®®®

»» Committee record, pp. 7926, 7927.

Yet if is difficult to understand why he should have expected such an alert when in his statement

submittea to the Navy Court of Inquiry, Admiral Kimmel said: “On November 28th the messages from

the War and Navy Departments were discussed (with General Short). We arrived at the conclusion at

this and succeeding conferences that probable Japanese actions would be confined to the Far East with

Thailand most probably and Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies and the Philippines the next most

probable objectives in the order named. In generalt we arrived at the conclusion that no immediate activity

beyond possible sabotage was to be expected in Hawaii\*\* (p. 31 of statement). See committee exhibit No. 146.

See Navy Court of Inquiry record, pp. 242, 251.

See committee record, pp. 8366-8368.

mid., at p. 8397.

mid., at p. 8261.

M\* Committee exhibit No. 142. See discussion of “Winds Code,\*' Part. IV, Infra,

m Committee record, p. 8374.

m Id., at p. 8374.

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Beginning November 30, Admiral Kimmel made a daily memoran-

dum entitled: “Steps to be taken in case of American-Japanese war

within the next twenty-four hours,” the last of these memoranda being

reviewed and approved by him on the morning of December 6. Al-

though conferences were held with Admiral Kimmel subsequent to

the initiation of these memoranda. General Short has testihed he did

nqt know of these steps being taken by the Navy There is some

in(iication that Admiral Kimm el acted as arbiter of what information

General Short received.\*\*®

Admiral Bellinger, who was not shown the war warning, has stated

that between November 27 and December 7 he did not confer with the

Army Air Force commander. General Martin, regarding long-range

reconnaissance.\*\*® In other words, there were no discussions during

this critical period between the two officers responsible for the air

arms of the .^my and Navy in Hawaii. It is to be recalled that Ad-

miral Bellinger and General Martin prepared the estimate of possible

Japanese action against Hawaii which reflected in such startling detail

what did occur on the morning of December 7.

At 3:42 a. m. on December 7 (Honolulu time) a Navy mine sweeper

reported the sighting of a submarine periscope off the entrance buoys

to Pearl Harbor in the defensive sea area where American submarines

•had been restricted from operating submerged. Between 6:30 and

6:45 a. m. a submarine was sunk in naval action. Both Admiral

Kimmel and Admiral Bloch knew of this prior to the attack. Although

the Martin-Bellinger estimate of possible enemy action had stated that

any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of a consid-

erable undiscovered surface force probably composed of fast ships

accompanied by a carrier. General Short was not advised of the fact

that the submarine had been sighted and sunk.

The Army radar at 7:02 a. m. December 7 detected a large con-

tingent of airplanes which turned out to be the attacking force ap-

proaching Oahu at a distance of 132 miles away. This i^ormation

was not supplied the Navy until after the attack.

Although the Army radar plotted the withdrawal to the north of the

Japanese force after the attack, this vital information was not em-

ployed following the raid in searches for the raiders.\*\*\* This situation

IS traceable to faulty liaison and a complete failure in integration of

Army-Navy effort.

The Navy maintained a liaison officer in the Army operations sec-

tion for purposes of informing the Fourteenth Naval District concern-

ing action being taken by the Army. No liaison officer, however, was

maintained in the Navy operations section by the Army, although an

»« Id., at pp. 8375-8378.

Before the Navy Court of Inquiry Admiral Kimmel was asked: “Did your organization exchange

intelligence with the Commanding Genera] of the Hawaiian Department?" Admiral Kimmel replied:

“We did, to this extent: The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department had his interests re-

stricted to the defense of Hawaii and to such of the outlying islands as he had his forces and the ones to which

he expected to send his forces. He was primarily interested in the probability of attack where his forces

were stationed, and in general the information I gave to him bore upon his interests, or was confined to his

interests. My own interests covered a much greater geographical area and many more factors. I tried to

keep the Commanding General informed of everything that I thought would be useful to him. I did not

inform the Commanding General of my proposed plans and what I expected to do in the Marshalls and

other places distant from Hawaii. I saw no reason for taking the additional chance of having such infor\*

mation divulged by giving it to any agency who would have no part in the execution of the plan."

See Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 282.

M« Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 672.

Committee record, pp. 9343-9346.

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officer was assigned on an 8-hour shift to the harbor patrol.®\*\* That

Admiral Kimmel was completely oblivious of what the Army was

really doing evinces the ineffectiveness of the liaison that was main-

tained by the Navy in the Army operations section.

No conferences were held by Admiral Kimme l and General Short

between December 3 and the attack.®\*®

General Short said: ®®° “I would say franklv that I imagine that as

a senior admiral, Kimmel would have resented it if I tried to have him

report every time a ship went in or out. \* \* \* »

The considerations which apparently occasioned Admiral Kimmel’s

failure to acquaint himself with what the Army was doing were voiced

by him as foUows: ®®^

\* ♦ \* when you have a responsible oflBcer in charge of the Army and re-

sponsible commanders in the Navy, it does not sit very toell to be constantly check-

ing up on them.

And yet when asked whether, in the method of mutual cooperation,

it was necessary for one commander to know what the other com-

mander was doing and what his plans were. Admiral Kimmel admitted

that this knowledge was necessary.\*®\*

While such concern for the sensibilities of another may have social

propriety, it is completely out of place when designed to control the

relationship of two outpost commanders whose very existence is

dependent upon full exchange of information and coordination of

effort.®\*® It defeats the purpose of command by mutual cooperation

and is worse than no liaison at all. At least, without the pretense of

liaison, each commander would not be blindly relying on what the

other was doing.

It can fairly be concluded that there was a complete failure in

Hawaii of effective Army-Navy liaison during the critical period

November 27 to December 7.®®^ There was but little coordination

and no integration of Army and Navy facihties and efforts for defense.

Neither of the responsible commanders really knew what the other

was doing with respect to essential military activities.®\*®

Estimate of the Situation

The consideration overshadowing all others in the minds of the

Hawaiian commanders was the belief and conviction that Pearl Har-

>»Id.,atpp.8m8206.

\*\*• See committee record, p. 8204.

Army Pearl Harbor Board record, p. 383.

Roberts Commission record, p. 631.

Id.

The Army Pearl Harbor Board, for example, commented: '^Apparently Short was ahraid that if he

went much beyond social contacts and really got down to business with the Navy to get what he had a

ri^t to know in order to do his job, he would give offense to the Navy and lose the good will of the Navy

which he was charged with securing.” See Report of Army Pearl Harbor Board, committee exhibit No. 167.

» Admiral McMorris, Chief of War Plans to Admiral Kimmel, admitted that he had no knowledge as to

whether the Army antiaircraft defenses were actually alerted nor as to their condition of readiness, but he

assumed they were in a state of readiness. ”\* • • Perhaps I was remiss in not acquainting myself more

fully as to what they were doing. We knew that our own establishment was fairly good. Actually they

proved not to be as good as I felt. We were a bit too complacent there, I had been around all of the aircraft

defenses of Hawaii; I knew their general location. I had witnessed a number of their antiaircraft practices

and knew the quantity and general disposition of their aircraft. I knew that they were parked closely to-

gether as a more ready protection against sabotage rather than dispersed. Nonetheleen, I was not directly

stequainted or indirectly acquainted with the actual state of readiness being maintained or of the watches being kepV\*

Hewitt Inquiry record, p. 330-332.

»• See committee record, p. 8205.

During the course of examination Admiral Kimmel was asked: “In other words, neither you nor any mem\*

her of your staff made any attempt to verify or find out what the condition of alertness was with respect to

the antiaircraft guns operated by the Army?” He replied: “And neither did General Short make any attempt

to find out the details of an alert that the Fleet had in effect at that time.\*\* Committee record, p. 7053.

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bor would not be attacked.\*®\* It explains the reason for no effective

steps being taken to meet the Japanese raiders on the morning of

December 7. This was not occasioned through disregard of obliga-

tions or indiflferenee to responsibilities but rather because of unfortu-

nate errors of judgment. The commander in chief of the Pacific

Fleet and the Commanding general of the Hawaiian Department

failed to appreciate the demands of their situation and the necessities

of their responsibility in the light of the information and warnings

they had received. More than anyone else it cannot be doubted that

Admiral Kimmel and General Short would have desired to avoid the

disaster of December 7. But unfortimately they were blinded by

the self-evident; they felt that Japan would attack to the south and

Hawaii was safe. Their errors of judgment were honest mistakes —

yet errors they were.

The evidence reflects that both General Short and Admiral Kimmel

addressed themselves assiduously to the task of training and other-

wise preparing the outpost of Hawaii and the Pacific Fleet for war.

Throughout their respective tenures as commanding general of the

Hawaiian Department and commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet

they manifested a keen awareness of the imperative necessity that

personnel and material be increased commensurate with the realities

and responsibilities in the Pacific. From the time of assuming com-

mand throughout the year 1941 their correspondence with the War

and Navy Departments is replete with clear statements concerning

shortages in equipment and expressioiis of the need for improving

Hawaiian defenses. As will subsequently appear, they were success-

ful in effecting marked improvement in the situation generally and

the potential capacity of Hawaii to defend itself particularljr. General

Short and Admit al Kimmel were conscientious and indefatigable com-

manders. The^ were relentless in what they regarded as the consum-

ing need in their commands — training and preparation for war.

One of the major responsibilities of Admiral Kimmel and the major

responsibility of General Short was defense of the Hawaiian coastal

frontier and the Pacific Fleet. They knew that an air attack on

Hawaii was a possibility; they knew this to be the most dangerous

form of attack to Oahu; they knew that extensive efforts had been

made to improve Hawaiian defenses against air attack; they had heen

warned of war; they knew of the unfading practice of Japan to launch

an attack with dramatic and treacherous suddenness without a decla-

ration of war; they had been given orders calling for defensive action

against an attack from without; they were the commanders of the

Hawaii outpost. In the face of this knowledge it is difficult to under-

stand that the withering Japanese attack shoffid have come without

any substantial effort having been made to detect a possible hostde

force and with a state of readiness least designed to meet the on-

slaught. That the responsible commanders were sOTprised that Japan

During the course of counsel’s examination of Admiral Kimmel, he was asked this question; “The

fact is, is it not, Admiral, that as you approached December 7 you very definitely gave the Navy program

for action in event of the declaration of war precedence over the establishment of the defense of Peari Har-

bor?” and Admiral Kimmel replied; “// 1 had believed in those days preceding Pearl Harbor that there was a

60-60 chance or anything approaching that of an attack on Pearl Harbor ^ it would have changed my viewpoint

entirely. I didn’t believe it. And in that I was of the same opinion as that of the members of my staf^ my

advisers, my senior advisers.” Committee record, p. 7054.

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struck Hawaii is \mderstandable; that they should have failed to pre-

pare their defenses against such a surprise- is not understandable.®\*^

The estimate of the situation made by Admiral Kimniel and General

Short is not altogether incredible in the light of the inevitable lassitude

bom of over 20 years of peace.\*®\* But the fact that their inaction is to

a de^ee understandable does not mean that it can be condoned. The

peo^e are entitled to neater vigilance and greater resourcefidness

from those charged wim the duty of defending the Nation from an

a^ressor.

Hawaii is properly chargeable with possessing highly significant

information and intelligence in the days before Pearl Harbor, includ-

ing: Correspondence with Washington and plans revealing the possible

dangers of air attack, the warning dispatches, the code-destruction

intelligence, radio intelligence concerning the “lost” Japanese carriers,

the Mori call, the report of sighting and subsequent attack on a

Japanese submarine in close proximity to Pearl Harbor, and radar

detection of the Japanese raiding force over 130 miles from Oahu

on the morning of December 7. Despite the foregoing, the esti-

mate was made and persisted that Hawaii was safe from an air attack,

although the very assumptions made by the Army and Navy com-

manders are implicit with the contemplation of an attack from with-

out. General Short assumed the Navy was conducting distant recon-

naissance. Admiral Kimmel assumed, on the othei hand, that the

Army would alert its aircraft warning service, antiaircraft guns, and

fighter planes.\*\*\*

Both Admiral Kimmel and General Short have insisted they

received no information that Hawaii was to be attacked. Yet com-

manders in the field cannot presume to expect that they will be

advised of the exact time and place an enemy will attack or indeed

that their particular post will be attacked. As outpost commanders

it was their responsibility to be prepared against surprise and the

worst possible contingency.\*" They have suggested that the War

This distinction was clearly recognized by Admiral Ingersoll when he was asked if he was surprised

when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. He replied: teas surprised thmPearl

Harbor was attacked hut I was more surprised that the attack was not detected, that was my first readtion, and if I

express it in the words which I used at the time, it was, \*How in the hell did they get in there without somebody

finding it outf\* ” Committee record, p. 11310.

Admiral Kimmel stated: “ \* • • and what is so often overlooked in connection with this Pearl

Harbor affair is that we were still at peace and stiU conducting conversations, and there were limits that I

could take with planes and aviators. We were still in the peace psychology, and I myself was affected by

it just like everybody else.” Navy Court of Inquiry Be«ord, page 1126, 1127.

See note 336, supra.

Incident to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, the following interrogation occurred:

Question. ‘Tn estimating the situation with which a military commander is confronted, our teaching in the

military establishment generally have been along the lines of taking all information that is available, eval-

uating it and using it as a guide. Is that correct?”

General Short \*\*Yes \*\*

Question. “That is in accordance with our Leavenworth teaching, our war college teaching and our actual

practice in the organization. Now in coming to a decision on military disposition and general practiw in the

Army, Army teachings, as perhaps Army tradition, indicate that a commander should prepare for enemy

ftctlou of chftr&ct 0 r?^^

General Short. “The worst.” See Army Pearl Harbor Board record, pp. 436 and 437.

The Report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board stated: “It is a familiar premise of military procedure in

estimating a situation to select the most dangerous and disastrous ty^ of attack the enemy may make and devote

your primary efforts to meeting this most serious of the attacks” (Citing Army Pearl Harbor Board record,

pp. 1121, 2662.) See conunittee exhibit 157 for APHB Report.

Mr. Stimson said, “One of the basic policies of the Army command, which has been adhered to throughout

the entire war, and in most instances with complete success, has been to give the local commander his object

tive and mission but not to interfere with him in the performance of it.” Stimson’s statement, committee

record,f p. 14397.

Testi ying before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, General Herron, General Short’s predecessor, was

asked the question: “I have one more question on alerts. The fact that you received a directive from the

War Department to alert the command (Gener'al Herron on June 17, 1940, had been directed by Washington

to institute an alert): Did that leave the impression in your mind that if anything serious happened in the

future the War Department would direct you to go on the alert, or leave it up to your judgment?” He

replied: “I always felt that 1 was entirely responsible out there and I had better protect the island.” See

Army Pearl Harbor Board record, p. 228; also pp. 213-216.

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and Navy Departments possessed additional information which they

were not given. But the fact that additional information may have

been available alsewhere did not alter fimdamental military responsi-

bilities in the field. Admiral Kimmel and General Short were the

responsible military commanders at Hawaii. They were officers of

vast experience and exemplary records in their respective services.

That Admiral Kimmel and General Short were supplied enough in-

formation as reasonably to justify the expectation that Hawaiian

defenses would be alerted to any military contingency is irrefutable.®\*\*

That there may have been other information which could have been

supplied them cannot becloud or modify this conclusion. It is into

the nature of this further information that we shall hereafter inquire.

And yet Admiral Kimmel has indicated he felt he was entitled to more warning. In a statement sub-

mitted to the Navy Court of Inquiry, he said: “I had many diflacult decisions to make but none which re-

quired more accurate timing than the decision as to when to drastically curtail training and to utilise ^

my forces in the highest form of alert status. The warnings I received prior to 7 December 1941, were of such

a nature that I felt training could still continue. I felt that I was entitled and would receive further wamingt

before the actual outbreak of war. I am convinced now that my estimate based on the intelligence received

was correct.’\* (P. 38 of statement.) See committee exhibit No. 146.

Pabt IV

RESPONSIBILITIES IN WASHINGTON

PART IV. RESPONSIBILITIES IN WASHINGTON

Basing the Pacibic Fleet at Hawaii

Beginning in May of 1940 the entire American Pacific Fleet operated

in the Hawaiian theater with Pearl Harbor as its base.^ Prior to that

time the fleet had been based on the west coast with certain conting-

ents operati^ from time to time in the Hawaiian area. Admiral

James O. Richai;'dson, who was commander in chief of the Pacific

Fleet in 1940, stated that while the fleet was in Hawaii incident to

exercises during the summer of 1940 he received instructions to

announce to the press that “at his request” the fleet would continue

at Hawaii for the purpose of calling out further exercises.\* It was

his understanding that the decision to base the Pacific Fleet at Pearl

Harbor was with a view to its providing a restraining influence on

Japan.\*

At the time of orl^al contemplation it appears that the fleet was

to remain at Hawaii on a relatively temporary basis.\* Admiral

Richardson did not concur in the decision to station the fleet there

and so informed the Chief of Naval Operations.® He testified with

respect to his objections as follows:®

My objections for remaining there were, primarily, that you only had one

port,\* secure port, and very crowded, no recreation facilities for the men, a long

distance from Pearl Harbor to the city of Honolulu, inadequate transportation,

inadequate airfields.

A carrier cannot conduct all training for her planes from the carrier deck.

In order to launch her planes she must be underway at substantial speed, using

up large amounts of fuel. So that wherever carriers are training their squadrons

there must be flying fields available, so that while the ship herself is undergoing

overhaul, or repair, or upkeep, the planes may conduct training, flying from the

flying fields.

There were inadequate and restricted areas for anchorages of the fleet; to take

them in and out of Pearl Harbor wasted time.

Another reason, which was a substantial one: Americans are perfectly willing

to go anywhere, stay anywhere, do anything when there is a job to be done and

they can see the reason for their being there, but to keep the fleet, during what the

men considered normal peacetimes, away from the coast and away from their

families, away from recreation, rendered it difficult to maintain a high state of

morale that is essential to successful training.

For those reasons, and because I believed that the fleet could be better prepared

for war on a normal basis on the west coast, I wanted to return to the west coast.

As a result of a visit to Washington in July of 1940, Admiral Rich-

ardson stated he gained three distinct impressions:^

First. That the Fleet was retained in the Hawaiian area solely to support diplo-

matic representations and as a deterrent to Japanese aggressive action;

Second. That there was no intention of embarking on actual hostilities against

Japan;

Third. That the immediate mission of the Fleet was accelerated training and

absorption of new personnel and the attainment of a maximum condition of

1 See committee exhibit No. 9 for file of correspondence between Admirals Stark and Bichardson con-

cerning, among other thing^ the matter of basing the fleet at Hawaii. For a description of the base at

Pearl Harbor, see appendix F to this report.

\* Committee record, p. 669.

\* See committee record, p. 682; also Navy Court of Inquiry, pp. 1057, 1058.

\* Committee record, p. 668.

\* See committee exhibit No. 9.

\* Committee record, pp. 674, 675.

7 See memorandum dated October 22, 1940, from Admiral Bichardson to the Chief of Naval Operations.

Committee exhibit No. 9.

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material and personnel readiness consistent with its retention in the Hawaiian

area.

In a memorandum for the Secretary of Navy dated September 12,

1940, Admiral Richardson jwinted out several disadvantages from a

Navy point of view of retaining the fleet in the Hawaiian area and

stated:®

If factors other than purely naval ones are to influence the decision as to where

the fleet should be based at this time, the naval factors should be fully presented

and carefully considered, as well as the probable effect of the decision on the readi-

ness of the Fleet. In other words, is it more important to lend strength to diplo-

matic representations in the Paciflc by basing the Fleet in the Hawaiian Area, than

to facilitate its preparation for active service in any area by basing the major part

of it on normal Pacific coast bases?

During October of 1940 while in Washington he talked with Presi-

dent Roosevelt at which time the President informed him that the

Pacific Fleet was retained in the Hawaiian area in order to exercise

a restraining influence on the actions of Japan. Admiral Richardson

testified:\*

I stated that in my opinion the presence of the fleet in Hawaii might influence

a civilian political government, but that Japan had a military government which

knew that the fleet was undermanned, unprepared for war, and had no training

or auxiliary ships without which it could not undertake active operations. There-

fore, the presence of the Fleet in Hawaii could not exercise a restraining influence

on Japanese action. I further stated we were more likely to make the Japanese

feel that we meant business if a train were assembled and the fleet returned to

the Paciflc coast, the complements filled, the ships docked, and fully suppli^

with ammunition, provisions, stores, and fuel, and then stripped for war

operations.

He stated that the President’s comment to the foregoing was in

effect, “Despite what you believe, I know that the presence of the

fleet in the Hawaiian area, has had, and is now having a restraining

influence on the actions of Japan.”

Admiral Richardson testified that he replied that he still did not

believe this to be the case and that he knew the Pacific Fleet was

disadvantageously disposed to prepare for or to initiate war opera-

tions, whereupon the President said: “ “I can be convinced of the

desirability of returning the battleships to the west coast if I can be

given a good statement which will convince the American people and

the Japanese Government that in bringing the battleships to the

west coast we are not stepping backward.”

It is clear from consideration of the evidence that Admiral Richard-

son’s position was based on the feeling that the fleet could be better

prepared for war if based on the west coast and not because he feared

for the security of the fleet at Pearl Harbor.\*\* In a letter to Admiral

Stark on November 28 concerning the matter of the security of the

Pacific Fleet in the Hawaiian area he said:\*® “This feature of the problem

\* Oommittee exhibit No. 9.

• Oommittee record, pp. 682, 683.

w Committee record, p. 683.

Id.

» See, however, in this connection the testimony of Mr. Sumner Welles, committee record, pp. 1124, 1126.

18 Committee exhibit No. 9. This comment was made by Admiral Richardson pursuant to a letter from

Admiral Stark dated November 22, 1940, in which the latter had stated, among other things: “Since the

Taranto incident my concern for the safety of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor, already great, has become even

greater. This concern has to do both with possible activities on the part of the Japanese residents of Haw^

and with the possibilities of attack coming from overseas. By far the most profitable object of sudden at-

tack in Hawaiian waters would be the Fleet units based in that area. Without question the safety of these

units is paramount and imposes on the Commander-in-Chief and the forces afloat a responsibility in which

he must receive the complete support of Commandant Fourteen, and of the Army. I realize most fully

that you are giving this problem comprehensive thought. My object in writing you is to find out what

steps the Navy Department and the War Department should be taking to provide additional equipment

and additional protective measures."

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does not give me a great deal oj concern and, I think, can be easily pro-

vided jor” Admiral Stark testified that Admiral Richardson did not

raise any question concerning the safety of the fleet at Pearl Harbor

as a reason for bringing it back to the west coast.“

Referring to the decision to base fleet at Hawaii Admiral

Kimmel stated:^®

When T assumed command, the decision to base the Fleet in the Hawaiian area

was an historical fact. The target and base facilities required to train the Fleet

for war were in the process of being moved from the West Coast to Hawaii.

The Fleet had been practically without gunnery practice for nearly a year due

to the previous uncertainty as to the location of its base. Any further uncertainty

would have delayed the availability of the mobile facUities to maintain, repair,

and train the Fleet. The resulting loss of time in starting intensive training

would have been disastrous. This was my view when I took command. My

appointment was in no wise contingent upon any acquiescence on my part in a

decision already made months before to keep the Fleet in Hawaiian waters.

Admiral Kimmel stated that during his visit to Washington in June

of 1941, he told the President and Admiral Stark of certain dangers to

the fleet at Pearl Harbor, including air attack, blocking of the harbor,

and similar matters. He said that generally he felt the fleet shotild

not remain at Pearl Harbor but he made no protests and submitted

no recommendation for withdrawal of any of the battleships or car-

riers.\*®

Regardless of the position taken by the commander in chief of the

Pacific Fleet during 1940 with respect to basing the fleet at Pearl

Harbor, extensive me^ures were taken thereafter and long before the

outbreak of war to improve the fleet’s security at Hawaii.\*^ The

Secretary of State, as well as om\* Ambassador to Japan, were satisfied

that the presence of the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor did in fact prove

a deterrent to Japanese action as did the Chief of Naval Operations.\*\*

Referring to the presence of our fleet at Hawaii, the Japanese Foreign

Minister in June of 1940 stated to Ambassador Grew that “th4 con-

tinued stay of our fleet in those waters (Hawaiian) constitutes an im-

plied suspicion of the intentions of Japan vis-a-vis the Netherlands

East Indies and the South Seas \* \* \*® As Secretary Hull

stated,\*® “The worst bandit \* \* \* doesn’t like for the most inno-

cent citizen to point an unloaded pistol or an unloaded gun at him

\* \* \*. They will take cognizance of naval establishments, some-

where on the high seas, whether fully equipped or not.” The degree

to which the presence of the Pacific Fleet in Hawaiian waters influenced

Japanese action necessarily cannot be precisely determined but the

fact is the Japanese did not strike at the Netherlands East Indies and

the Malay barrier for more than a year and a half after it was con-

templated she would make such a move.

The wisdom and merit of the decision to base the Pacific Fleet at

Hawaii cannot be divorced from the high Government policy of which

that decision was a part. As has elsewhere been observed, the tradi-

tional interest of the United States in the Pacific and our determination

Committee record, p. 6687.

w Committee record, pp. 6661, 6662.

w Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 367.

8ee section, infra, ^‘Defensive Fafcilities Available in Hawaii.”

w See testimony of Secretary Hull, committee record, pp. 1203-1206, 1462, 1464, 1603, 1608; testimony of

Mr. Grew, committee record, pp. 1570, 1738, 1919, 1969.

In a letter of April 3, 1941, to the commanders in chief. Pacific Fleet, Asiatic Fleet, and Atlantic Fleet,

Admiral Stark expressed the feeling that beyond question the presence of the Pacific Fleet in Hawaii bad

• a stabilizing effect in the Far East. See committee exhibit No. 106.

!• See “Foreign Relations,” vol. II, p. 69.

» Committee record, p. 1603.

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to aid the valiant Chinese fighting under insuperable odds the Jugger-

naut of Japanese aggression made imperative our taking every reason-

able step which would assist in deterring the insatiable Japanese

ambition for conquest and at the same time bolster flagging Chinese

morale. Basing of the fleet at Pearl Harbor was but one of the steps

taken in this direction.\*\*

The fact that it had been decided to make Hawaii the base of the

fleet did not require that all of the battleships and other substantial

fleet units should be in Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7

after the responsible commander had been warned of war and ordered

to execute an appropriate defensive deployment.\*\* The very words

defensive deployment could have meant nothing if not that the fleet

should be moved and stationed in such manner as to afford

maximum defensive security not only to the fleet itself but to the

Hawaiian Islands, the west coast, and the Panama Canal as well.

This order required the deploying of vessels in the Hawaiian waters,

which afforded the commander in chief a vast scope of operations, and

it was left to his judgment and discretion as to what specific action

was required consistent with his responsibilities. It has certainly

never been suggested that because a particular harbor has been

designated as the base for a fleet its vessels are thereby restricted to

that harbor, particularly after an order has been issued for their

deployment.

It remains a debatable question as to whether the Pacific Fleet

was e:^osed to ^y greater danger by reason of the fact that it was

based at Hawaii. The 360° perimeter of the islands afforded im-

limited avenues for operations and the maximum channels for escape

in the event of attack by a hostile superior force. The west coast,

on the other hand, afforded only a 180° ^ope of operation with no

avenues for escape from a superior attacking force and left only the

alternative of proceeding into the teeth of such a force. Nor does it

appear that the fleet was exposed to any greater danger from the

standpoint of espionage by reason of its being at Hawaii.\*\* TTie

evidence before this Committee reflects that Tokyo was receiving as

much information, if not more information, from its diplomatic estab-

lishments which operated outside the restraining counterespionage

efforts of our own Government, located in Panama, on the west coast,

and in Manila as from the Honolulu consulate.\*\* There is a strong

possibility that Japan would have taken the Hawaiian Islands by

amphibious operations as she did in the case of so many other outlying

Pacific Islands had the fleet not been based at Pearl Harbor.\*\* Fur-

« See Part I, supra, “Diplomatic Bacaground of the Pearl Harbor Attack.\*\*

In the course of counsel’s examination, Admiral Turner was asked: “During this time after around

November 27 to December 7, in all your discussions around the Navy with those in authority was any

consideration given to the question of whether the fleet should be moved out of Pearl Harbor and sent to

sea?”

Admiral Turner. “No; there was not that I recall. I assumed that most or all of it would be at sea.\*\*

Question. “Well, why did you assume that?”

Admiral Turner. “Well, that was the place for them under Admiral Kimmel’s operating plan for their

deployihent.” Committee record^p 6224, 6225.

The evidence reflects that the Oflice of Naval Operations in Washington did not know the exact location

of the various units of the Pacific Fleet. See committee record, p 13966.

M See section “The Role of Espionage in the Attack,” Parc III, this report.

In referring to Japanese espionage activity. Admiral Stark said: “We had felt that rio< onlp in HawaU

but at practically all our given posts the Japs knew everything we were doing.” Committee record, p 6707.

M In the course of his testimony before the committee. General Short was asked whether he befieved,

fssuming that the fleet had been withdrawn to the west coast end conditions at Pearl Harbor were other

w ise the same, the Japanese could have made a landing with the striking air forces that they had and brought

the planes down as they did. He replied: “It would have been thoroughly possible. If they had sent as

large a force as they sent against the Philippines they could have made the landing.” Committee record,

pp. 8293, 8294.

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thermore, had the fleet been based on the west coast a raid on our

west coast cities and the Panama Canal could not have been entirely

repulsed. For it is agreed as a military proposition that even with

the most effective resistance to an enemy air attack some units \vill

inevitably get through the screen of defense and cany home the

attack.

In this connection, the opinion has been expressed by several naval

witnesses that it was their belief Japan would attack our Pacific Fleet

wherever it might be at the very outset of hostilities with a view to

immobflizing it, temporarily at least, as a restraining and deterring

influence on Japanese sea-borne operations in Pacific Far Eastern

waters.\*® Under this view, which has the weight of logic and the

experience of December 7, the fact the fleet was based at Hawaii bore

no conclusive relationship to nor conditioned the Japanese decision to

attack our Pacific Fleet.

As has been indicated, the basing of the fleet at Hawaii is inseparable

from the global plan of operations in which the Pacific Fleet was to

perform only one phase. It was an integral part of our policy and

action in the Atlantic and can only be questioned save as one pre-

sumes to challenge the policies of the United States Government from

1937 to 1941 and our determination to aid the impoverished free

peoples of the world striving in desperation to stem the overpowering

tide of Axis aggression and world conquest.

Defensive Facilities Available in Hawaii

There can be no question that Hawaii was regarded as the best

equipped of our outposts and possessed the greatest potential for its

own defense.\*^ In this connection General Marshall testified:\*\*

I will say as to the attack on Pearl Harbor, we felt that was a vital installation^

but we also felt that that was the only installation we had anywhere that was reasonably \

well equipped. Therefore, we were not worried about it. In o%ir opinion, the com- 1

manors had been alerted. In our opinion, there was nothing more we could give J

them at the time for the purpose of defense. In our opinion, that was one place thfltr

had enough within itself to put up a reasonable defense.

MacArthur, in the Philippines, was just beginning to get something. His

position was pitiable, and it was still in a state of complete flux, with the ships on

the ocean en route out there and the planes half delivered and half still to go.

The Panama Canal was quite inadequate at that period, seriously inadequate

in planes, and, of course, of vast importance to anything in the Pacific.

, The only place we had any assurance about was Hawaii, and for that reason we

had leas concern about Hawaii because we had worked on it very industriously, we had

a tremendous amount of correspondence about it, and we felt reasonably secure at

that one point.

Therefore we felt that it would be a great hazard for the Japanese to attack it.

The correspondence between the Chief of Staff and General Short

during 1941,\*\* as well as that between the Chief of Naval Operations

and Admiral Kimmel,\*® manifest clearly the mutual desire to improve

See section, supra, Part III, “The Role of Espionage in the Attack.\*\*

^ In the course of committee examination Admiral Turner was asked: “Did you consider the fleet in

Hawaii prepared for that attack at the time it did come?’\*

Admiral Turner. “Yes, sir, within the limits of the material improvements program, I felt that the

fleet was efficient and was ready for war.\*\*

Question. “You felt confident that the Pacific Fleet based at Pearl Harbor was ready for war on Decern\*

ber 7 1^1?\*\*

Admiral Turner. “Yes, sir, and further that the district was ready for war within the limits of the

material that we had been able to provide. We all had the utmoH confidence in the command of the fleet and

the command ashore.” Committee record, pp. 5253, 5254.

» Committee record, pp. 13792, 13793.

^ See committee exhibit No. 53.

wid., No. 106.

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to the utmost the defensive facilities available to the Hawaiian ^m-

manders. But both General Marshall and Admiral Stark, in addition

to their interest in Hawaii, had the enormous task and responsibility

of allocating to many places, consistent with an ever-expanding

global conflict, the military and naval equipment that was produced

during the year 1941.®\* They had the obligation to spread the resulte

of our productive efforts in those quarters where the needs and exi-

gencies appeared in their best judgment to be most pressing. Our

defensive facilities on the mainland were in ^eat need of improvement;

Panama and the Philippines were in woeful need of additional equip-

ment; the Nation had committed itself to aiding the Chinese who

had been fighting Japanese aggression for 4 years with little more thsm

sheer courage and the will to exist as a nation; we were determined

that supplies being shipped imder lend-lease should not be destroyed

by German and Italian raiders before they reached their destination,

necessitating thereby the building up of our naval power in the

Atlantic; we were determined to aid Britain and Russia to the extent

of our capacity for om" own self-protection before the overpowering

might of the German war machine had destroyed the last vestige of

resistance on the continent of Europe and we were left alone to stem

the Axis thrust for world conquest — all of these considerations were

a part of the problem posed for the Chief of Staff and the Chief of

Naval Operations in making allocations of the mat6riel at hand. It

should be noted that most of the lend-lease transfers effected prior to

December 7, 1941, were in a category in which, by the terms of the

Lend-Lease Act, it was provided that transfers to foreipi governments

could be made only after consultation with the Chief of Staff of the

Army or the Chief of Naval Operations of the Navy. The Chief of

Staff or the Chief of Naval Operations personally approved these

transfers.®®

The only justifiable allegation concerning the shortage of equip-

ment at Hawaii relating to the failure to detect the Japanese task

force was the fact that insufficient long-range patrol planes were

available to conduct a 360° distant search from Oahu. As has been

seen, however, adequate patrol planes were on hand to cover the vital

and more dangerous sectors.®® Referring to the lack of long-range

planes, it is in order to determine the extent to which such planes were

available and conceivably might have been sent to Hawaii.

In the case of 210 B-17’s and B-24’s, Army heavy bombers adapt-

able for distant reconnaissance, delivered between February 1 and

November 30, 1941, none were shipped under lend-lease and a total

In a letter of November 7, 1941, Admiral Stark pointed out to Admiral Kimmel the diflacultiea experi-

enced through shortage of material needs: “I note the great desirability of many things for the Pacific Fleet —

particularly destroyers and cruisers. We jutt haven’t any destroyers or cruisers to give you at the moment,

nor is the prospect bright for getting any for you in the near future. I fully appreciate your need for them.

We could profitably employ twice the number we now have if they were available. I will not burden you

with a recital of King’s troubles but he is up against it for DDs for esoort—and defense against raiders.\*\*

(Admiral King at the time was commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet.) Committee record, p. 5675.

\*\* See letter from Chester T. Lane, Deputy Commissioner Oflace of Foreign Liquidation Commissioner,

Department of State, concerning the organi^tion of Lend-Lease. Committee record, p. 14095 et seq.

M See Part III, supra.

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of 113 were sold for cash to foreign countries; 12 B-17’s were shipped

to Hawaii and 35 to the Philippines.®\*

With respect to Navy planes, there were no lend-lease transfers of

long-range patrol bombers or scout bombers during the same period.

Of a total of 835 Navy planes of all types delivered during this period,

Februap^ 1 to November 30, 582 were delivered to the Navy and 253

to foreign countries (Britain, Canada, Australia, the Netherlands,

and Norway) under cash transactions. Of the 582 planes delivered

to the Navy, 218 were sent to the Hawaiian area, 146 of the planes

being assigned to carriers.®\*

It appears that of 3,128 Army and Navy planes of various types

delivered between February 1 and November 30, 1941, only 177 were

shipped under lend-lease to foreign countries and none of these were

capable of performing distant reconnaissance. The record is clear,

therefore, that the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations

did not prejudice our own defenses in approving excessive allocations

to foreign governments. A brief review of the improvement effected

in the Hawaiian situation during the year 1941 will serve to demon-

strate the manner in which the exigencies and problems prevailing in

the Pacific were recognized.

The total number of Army planes in the Hawaiian Department was

virtually doubled between January 31 and December 7, 1941, having

been increased from 124 to 227 planes. The number of B-17 four-

motored bombers was increased from none on January 31 to 21 as of

May 31, 1941, this number subsequently being reduced to 12 by

reason of the trapsfer of 9 B-17’s to the Philippines in September.

As of September 1, 1941, the United States possessed 109 B-17’s

\*\* See enclosure to War Department memorandum to committee counsel dated March 20, 1946, com-

mittee exhibit No. 172. In response to a request of the general counsel of the Committee, the War De-

partment on March 20, 1946, transmitted a tabulation supplied by the Army Air Forces reflecting, among

other things, the total deliveries and types of American-produced planes delivered between February 1

and November 30, 1941, without any break-down as to months. This tabulation reflects a total of 579

planes delivered having a maximum range without bombs in excess of 1 ,600 miles. In addition to this flgure,

the tabulation shows 836 planes delivered having ranges of 2,000 and 1,120 miles with no break-down indi-

cating how many planes were produced in a particular range category. The tabulation of plane deliveries

was not introduced as an exhibit by the general counsel until May 23, 1946. General Marshall appeared

before the committee for the second time on April 9, 1946, but he was asked no questions concerning the

dispositions of these planes, it being noted that General Marshall had earlier testified that Hawaii had

received priority consideration in the disposition of equipment. Although the tabulation delivered by the

War Department on March 20 was available to the Committee counsel it was not available to the members of

the committee for consideration and examination at the time General Marshall appeared on April 9.

The committee has thus been placed in the position of not having inquired concerning the adaptability,

design, and potentialities of these planes with ranges exceeding 1,600 miles; of not having determined where

they may otherwise have been disposed and the exigencies requiring such dispositions; of not having deter-

mined whether there were crews available to man these planes; of not having determined whether ferry-

ing facilities were available had they been directed to Hawaii; of not having determined exactly when the

planes were delivered to determine whether they could have been sent to Hawaii before December 7, 1941;

and of not having determined whether they would satisfy the distant reconnaissance requirements in

Hawaii, among other things.

In the latter connection, however, it is to be noted that General Martin, commanding general of the^

Hawaiian Air Forces, under date of August 20, 1941, recommended the War Department give considera-

tion to the allotment of “B-17D type airplanes or other four-engine bombers with equal or better perform-

ance and operating range’\* for reconnaissance purposes, committee exhibit No. 13. It would appear that

in the making of aircraft dispositions the indicated needs of the Hawaiian Department would be a con-

trolling consideration.

It appears from the evidence before the committee that only 210 of the Army-type planes delivered be-

tween February 1 and November 30, 1941, were four-engine bombers of a type adaptable to the type of

long- distance reconnaissance required by the plans and requirements of the Hawaiian commanders. It is

to be noted that a tabulation of factory deliveries of bombers to foreign countries appearing on page 12991

of the Committee record is superseded by Committee exhibit No. 172.

\*» See enclosure to Navy Department memorandum to committee counsel dated April 12, 1946, committee

exhibit No. 172.

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disposed: 21 in Hawaii, 7 in Panama, and 81 in the continental United

States.\*\* The number of P-40 pursuit planes was increased from none

in January to 99 as of November 30; and the number of P-36’s from

19 to 39.\*^

In the case of the Navy at Hawaii, during January of 1941 a

squadron of 12 PBY-3’s left the west coast for the Hawauan area. In

April a second squadron equipped with 12 PBY-3’s also moved to

Hawaii. In October and November of 1941, 3 squadrons of 12 planes

each and 1 squadron of 6 planes, then in the Hawaiian area, returned

to the west coast and exchanged theh PBY-3’s for PBY-5’s after

which they returned to Hawau. During this same period the third

squadron of Patrol Wing 1, equipped with 12 new PBY-5’s left the

west coast for Hawaii. This represents an over-all increase of 36 in

the number of patrol planes between January 1 and November 30,

1941.\*® During the period February 1 to November 30, 1941, 146

planes were assigned to carriers in the Pacific; and on May 13, 1941, 18

planes arrived at Ewa Field, Hawaii, being assigned to a marine scout

bomber squadron.\*®

The Committee did not inquire into the matter of allocations, gen-

erally, of Army and Navy planes or other equipment to points other

than to Hawaii. There is no evidence before us that General Marshall

and Admiral Stark made dispositions of the materiel available incon-

sistent with their best judgment in the light of the situation as it

could be viewed in the days before Pearl Harbor.

The question of whether Japan would have struck Hawaii had addi-

tional equipment been available there must be considered in light of

the fact that in their estimates made in the fall of 1941, the Japanese

placed the number of aircraft in Hawaii at roughly twice that of the

actual air strength. Further, during the war games carried on at the

Naval War College, Tokyo, from September 2 to 13, 1941, it was as-

sumed that the Pearl Har^r striking force would suffer the loss of

one-third of its participating units.\*'\* It was specifically assumed

that one AArapi-class carrier and one Sorytt-class carrier would be lost.

It is clear that immediately after December 7 every effort was

made to increase the materiel facilities in Hawaii as much as possible.

M Memorandum from War Department dated December 13, 1945. See committee record p. 14595.

A study contemplating 360® long-distance reconnaissance and attacks, submitted by the commander of

the Army Air Forces in Hawaii on August 20, 1941, and endorsed by the Army commander, called for 180

Army 4-engine bombers, the B-17’s. Committee exhibit No. 13. As of December 7, there were only 148

B“17’s in the entire Army: 35 of these were in the Philippines, 12 at Hawaii, 8 in the Caribbean area, 6 at

Atlantic bases, and 87 in the continental United States. Committee record, pp. 2865, 2866.

w Army aircraft in Hawaiian Department as reflected by AAF monthly inventories. See also committee

exhibit No. 5.

M See enclosure to Navy memorandum for committee counsel dated April 12, 1946. Committee exhibit

No. 172.

wid.

As expressed by Mr. Stimson: \*\* During those days in November 1941 we at the War Department had

been informed and believed that Hawaii had been more generously equipped from the Nation’s inadequate

supplies of men and munitions than either of the other three important Pacific outposts, and we believed

that with the fleet at hand there it was more capable of defense.” Statement of Mr. Stimson to the com-

mittee. Committee record, p. 14,407.

Admiral Stark testified that he gave to Admiral Kimmel all that he could of what he had. Committee

record, pp. 5701-5704.

He said: “We were not able to give the Commander in Chief; Pacific Fleet, all the ships and men he wanted

but neither were we able to put in the Atlantic or in the Asiatic Fleet the strength we knew they wanted.”

Committee record, p. 5575.

On November 25, Admiral Stark wrote Admiral Kimmel, in part: “ W'e have sweat blood in the endeavor

to divide adequately our forces for a two-ocean war; but you cannot take inadequate forces and divide them

into two or three parts and get adequate forces anywhere. It was for this reason that almost as soon as I got

here I started working on increasing the Navy.” Committee record, p. 5578.

See War Department memorandum dated May 21, 1946, transmitting a letter of the same date from

Commander Walter Wilds, OfiSce of the Chairman of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Com-

mittee record, p. 14626. See further, committee record, p. 457.

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necessarily at the expense of sacrificing the needs of other installations.

The evidence reflects, however, that it was a very considerable period

of time after the attack before the Nation^s production of war mate- •

rials was sufficient to approach satisfaction of all the Hawaiian

retirements.

Both Admiral Kimmel and General Short had repeatedly requested

more equipment, and that their needs and requests were not ignored ^

is made clear by the improved situation effected during 1941.^ The

same requests made by the Hawaiian conunanders were coming from

many other commanders and many other quarters. As virtually all

witnesses have testified, alert commanders are always striving to

improve and increase their equipment, facilities, and personnel; and

it is doutful if at any time even during the war any commander

ever had all he wanted or thought he needed.

It is necessarily speculative as to how additional equipment in

Hawaii might have altered the situation on December 7 inasmuch as

the facilities which were available were not brought into the fight.^®

Transfer of Pacific Fleet Units to the Atlantic

In May of 1941 three battleships, one aircraft carrier, four cruisers,

and nine destroyers were detached from the Pacific Fleet and trans-

ferred to the Atlantic. This shift was contemplated by the Navy

basic war plan, WPL-46.^ In a letter to Admiral Stark dated Septem-

ber 12, 1941, Admiral Kimmel expressed concern regarding possible

further transfers from the Pacific to the Atlantic:\*^

The emphasis, in the President's speech, on the Atlantic also brings up the

question of a possible further weakening of this Fleet. A strong Pacific Fleet is

unquestionably a deterrent to Japan — a weaker one may be an invitation. I

cannot escape the conclusion that the maintenance of the status quo out here

is almost entirely a matter of the strength of this Fleet. It must not be reduced,

and, in event of hostilities, must be increased if we are to undertake a bold

offensive.^\*

« In an aide memoir concerning “Defense of Hawaii” submitted by the War Department to the Presi-

dent in May of 1941. the following observations were made:

\*\*Th€ Island of Oahu, due to its fortification, its garrison, and its physical characteristics, is believed to be

the strongest fortress in the world.

“To reduce Oahu the enemy must transport overseas an expeditionary force capable of executing a forced

landing against a garrison of approximately 36,000 men, manning 127 fixed coast defense guns, 211 anti-

aircraft weapons, and more than 3,000 artillery pieces and automatic weapons available for beach defense.

Without air superiority this is an impossible task.

\* \*Air Defense. W ith adequate air defense, enemy carriers, naval escorts and transports will begin to come

under air attack at a distance of approximately 750 miles. This attack will increase in intensity until when

within 200 miles of the objective the enemy forces will be subject to attack by all types of bombardment

closely supported by our most modem pursuit.

“Hawaiian Air Defense. Including the movement of aviation now in progress Hawaii will be defended

by 35 of our most modern flying fortresses, 35 medium range bombers, 13 light bombers, 150 pursuit of which

106 are of our most modem type. In addition Hawaii is capable of reinforcement by heavy bombers from

the mainlsind by air. W ith this force available a major attack against Oahu is considered impracticable.

“In point of sequence, sabotage is first to be expected and may, within a very limited time, cause great

damage. On this account, and in order to assure strong control. It would be highly desirable to set up a

military control of the islands prior to the likelihood of our involvement in the Far East.” Committee

exhibit No. 59.

As pointed out by Admiral Stark, “During 1940 and 1941, many of the shortcomings of Pearl Harbor

as a base, disclosed by the long stay of the Pacific Fleet, were remedied.” Committee record, p. 6587. See

in this connection the Annual Report of the Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, for the

year ending June 30, 1941. Committee record, pp. 5587-5589.

\*\* See testimony of Admiral Turner, committee record, p. 5254, concerning the insatiable desire of field

commanders for materiel. He said: “ • • ♦ you never have enough, you always want more and you

want things to be better.”

Admiral Turner testified he believed that the Pacific Fleet at Hawaii was sufficient on December 7,

1941, to have defeated or greatly reduced the eflect of the Japanese raid on Hawaii if it had been fully alerted.

Committee record, pp. 6258, 6259.

M See statement of Admiral Stark, committee record, p. 5591.

^ Committee exhibit No. 106. See testimony of Admiral Stark, committee record, p. 5591.

Admiral Kimmel commented in his prepared statement to the committee: “When I was in Washing-

ton in June 1941, it was seriously proposed to transfer from the Pacific to the Atlantic an additional detach-

ment to consist of three battleships, four cruisers, two squadrons of destroyers, and a carrier. I opposed this

strenuously. The transfer was not made.” Committee record, p. 6680.

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Replying on September 23, Admiral Stark wrote the commander in

chief of the Pacific Fleet:^\*

We have no intention of further reducing the Pacific Fleet except that pre-

scribed in Rainbow 5, that is the withdrawal of four cruisers about one month

after Japan and the United States are at war. The existing force in the Pacific

is all that can be spared for the tasks assigned your fleet, and new construction

will not make itself felt until next year.

The transfer of the Pacific Fleet units in May of 1941, it would

appear, had as its immediate objective the possibility of their engaging

in an expedition to take the Azores,®® in order that these vital Portu-

guese possessions might not fall into German hands. The occasion

for taking the Azores, however, did not materialize and, as stated by

Admiral Stark, “it just went on diplomatically there”.®^ The fleet

units, formerly attached to the Pacific Fleet, were not returned to

Pearl Harbor but were employed further to augment the Atlantic

Fleet, particularly in the vicinity of Iceland.

The record reflects that the transfer of a portion of the Pacific Fleet

to the Atlantic in May of 1941 was in line with the basic war plans

which recognized the Atlantic as the principal theater of operations

and was designed to forestall the possibility of an indispensable

strategic area falling into German hands. The transfer was an in-

extricable part of the over-all military policies prepared to meet the

Axis threat.®\*

“ABCD” Understanding?

A great deal of inquiry was made during the course of proceedings

to determine whether the Government of the United States had

entered into an agreement with Great Britain and the Netherlands

committing this Nation to war upon Japan in the event British or

Dutch possessions were attacked by the Japanese.®\*\* It is clear from

evidence before the Committee that no agreement was entered into

in this regard. The President and his Cabinet, while momentarily

expecting an attack by Japan, recognized and observed the constitu-

tional mandate that this Government could only be committed to

war by a declaration of the Congress.

Recognizing the inevitable consequences of the Tripartite Pact,

representatives of the War and Navy Departments participated during

1941 in a series of staff conversations with military and naval experts

Committee exhibit No. 106.

M In a letter to Admiral Kimmel of May 24, 1941, Admiral Stark stated, among other things, “Day before

yesterday afternoon the President gave me an overall limit of 30 days to prepare and have ready an expedition

of 25,000 men to sail for, and to take the Azores. Whether or not there would be opposition I do not know

but we have to be fully prepared for strenuous opposition. You can visualize the job particularly when

I tell you that the Azores recently have been greatly reinforced. The Army, of course, will be in on this but

the Navy and the Marines will bear the brunt.” Committee record, pp. 6607, 6608.

« Committee record, pp. 13977, 13978.

In the course of committee examination, Admiral Stark was asked: “How would you attack and take the

Azores without a declaration of war on Portugal? She owned them.”

He replied: “I can tell you one way. Suppose the Germans had taken Portugal. Would we have to

declare war on Portugal to take the Azores? I don’t think we would have.\* • \* I always construed that

situation, with regard to the Azores, as to have plans ready, and be readv if an emergency arose there.”

Committee record, p. 13979.

“ See Part I, pp. 10-13, supra, this report. It does not appear from the evidence that additional Fleet

units would have assisted in detecting the approaching Japanese striking force, in view of the dispositions

made by the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, or otherwise have materially aided in the defense

against an air attack. As previously suggested, had the major Fleet units transferred to the Atlantic in

May of 1941 been in Pearl Harbor on December 7 they, too, would in all probability have been destroyed.

See in the latter connection, Part II, pp. 69-72, this report.

w\* This inquiry appears to have been largely precipitated by a remark attributed to Prime Minister

Churchill during an address before the House of Commons on January 27, 1942. He is quoted as having

Stated: “On the other hand, the probability, since the Atlantic Conference at which I discussed these

matters with President Roosevelt, that the United States, even if not herself attacked, would come hito

the war in the Far East and thus make the final victo^ sure, seems to allay some of these anxieties, and that

expectations had not been falsified by the events.” Bee Committee record, p. 1286.

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of Great Britain, Canada, and the Netherlands.®\* The first of these

meetings, initiated by the Chief of Naval Operations and limited

to American and British representatives, was held in Washington

from January 29 to March 27, 1941. The official report of the con-

versations, referred to as “ABC-1,” points out specifically that the

discussions were held with a view “to determine the best methods by

which the armed forces of the United States and British Common-

wealth, with its present allies, could defeat Germany and the powers

allied with her, should the United States be compelled to resort to war.” ®®

The report states clearly that the plans to accomplish this purpose,

as embodied in the report, were subject to confirmation by the highest

military authorities in the United States and Great Britain and by

the governments of both countries as well.®® This was in accord with

the joint statement of the position the American representatives would

take, made by the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff

on January 27 at the outset of the conversations.®^

“ABC-1” was approved by the Chief of Naval Operations and the

Secretary of the Navy and by the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of

War,®\* thereafter being submitted to the President on June 2, 1941.

On June 7 the President returned “ABC-1” without formal approval,

pointing out that since the plan had not been finally approved by

the British Government, he would not approve it at that time but

that in case of war the report should be returned to him for approval.®\*

Shortly after the staff conversations in Washington mihtary and

naval representatives of the United States, Great Britain, and the

Netherlands conferred in April of 1941 at Singapore in order to draft

a plan for the conduct of operations in the Far East based on “ABC-

1.” In the instructions sent the commander in chief of our Asiatic

Fleet ®° prior to the Singapore conversations it was emphatically

pointed out that the results of such conversations were likewise subject

to ratification by the governments concerned and were to involve no

political commitment by the United States.\*^ The report of the conver-

sations,\*\* referred to as “ADB”, explicitly recognized that no political

commitments were implied.\*\* Nevertheless, the Chief of Naval

Operations and the Chief of Staff withheld their approval feeling that

Adir-iral Stark said: “In our planning, we assumed that if the United States was drawn into war, it

would be alined with Great Britain and against the Axis Powers. We also knew that while our most

immediate concern was with the war then in progress in the Atlantic and in Europe, we might also be

faced — perhaps concurrently— with a war in the Pacific. With these thoughts in mind, we held extensive

staff conversations with the British and Canadians early in 1941 and the report of these conversations was

embodied in a document known as ABC-1, dated March 27, 1941." Committee record, p. 5572.

Admiral Stark was asked: • \* it was in 1940, the fall of 1940 that you communicated with Admiral

Sir Dudley Pound of the British Navy, requesting that he send his naval experts to the United States to

discuss collaboration between the two navies?”

Admiral Stark: “That is correct, in case of war.”.

Question: “Upon whose responsibility was that message sent?”

Admiral Stark: “My own.”

Question: “Did you discuss the subject with the President?”

Admiral Stark: “I sent that on my own, and I did not notify the President until after I had done it.”

Committee record, p. 13927.

See committee exhibit No. 49 for a full report of the staff conversations.

•• Committee exhibit No. 49.

•7 Id.

See committee record, p. 2617.

M Id., at pp. 2619, 2620.

•0 Id., at p. 6320.

« Id., at p. 5123.

« For the report of the Singapore conversations, see committee exhibit No. 50.

•\* In testifying concerning the Singapore conversations. Admiral Turner said: “In none of these papers was

there ever a political commitment, or a definite military commitment. This was a plan of action, or thess

were plans of action based on assumptions that should the United States enter the war, then these papers

woula be effective, provided they were approved by the proper authorities.

“None of the ADB papers were ever presented to either the Secretary of the Navy or the Secretary of War

or the President, although all of those officers as well as the Secretary of State were aware that these conver-

sations were being held from time to time.” Committee record, p. 5122.

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some of the statements in the report had political implications.\*\*

One of the proposals of the Singapore conference, however, was sub-

sequently incoi^Orated as a recommendation in the joint meuMranda

of November 5 and 27 which the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval

Operations submitted to the President; i. e., that military counter-

action should be undertaken in the event Japan attacked or directly

threatened the territory or mandated territoiy of the United States,

the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies, or if the

Japanese moved forces into Thailand west of 100° east or south of 10°

north, Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty Islands.\*®

As elsewhere pointed out, it was mutually understood at the Atlan-

tic Conference in August of 1941 by President Boosevelt and Prime

Minister Churchill that the Governments of both the United States

and Great Britain needed more time to prepare for resistance against

possible Japanese attack in the Far East.\*\* It was agreed,, however,

that steps should be taken to make clear to Japan that further aggres-

sive action by her against neighboring countries would result in each

country being compelled to take all necessary measures to safeguard

the legitimate rights of its country and nationals and to insure its

country’s safety and security.\*^ Accordingly, upon returning to W ash-

ington the President on August 17, 1941 informed the Japanese Am-

bassador that if the Japanese Government took any further steps in

line with a program of military domination by force or threat of force

of neighboring countries, the Government of the United States would

be compelled to take any and all steps necessary toward safeguarding

its legitimate rights and interests and toward insuring the security of

the United States.®\*

During the latter half of 1941 negotiations to meet the American

objections to the “ADB” report proceeded slowly until discussions

were opened in the Far East in November between Admiral Hart,

commander in chief of our Asiatic Fleet, and Admiral Phillips, the

British Far Eastern naval commander. Soon after the out-break of

war, the two commanders completed arrangements for initial Ameri-

can and British naval dispositions to meet probable Japanese action

in the Far East. Admiral Hart’s report of his conversations with

Admiral Phillips was received in the Navy Department about lip. m.,

December 6, 1941, and was approved in a dispatch sent out by the

Chief of Naval Operations on December 7 after the attack on Pearl

Harbor.\*®

On December 6, 1941, Admiral Hart cabled the Chief of Naval

Operations concerning a report received from Singapore that the

United States had “assured British armed support under three or four

eventualities”.™ None of the witnesses who were questioned on this

M See committee exhibit No. 66. Also testimony of Admiral Turner, committee record, pp. 5118, 5119.

w See section, infra. Avoidance of War.

w See Part I, this report,

wid.

««Id.

See testimony of Admiral Stark before the joint committee.

Admiral Hart’s dispatch was based on a communication which he had received on December 6, 1941,

from Capt. John M. Creighton, who was a naval attach^ In Singapore, as follows: “Brooke Popham received

Saturday from War Department London Quote We have now received assurance of American armed sup-

port in cases as follows: Afirm we are obliged execute our plans to forestall Japs landing Isthmus of Kra or

take action in reply to Nips Invasion any other part of Siam; Baker if Dutch Indies are attacked and we go

to their defense; Cast if Japs attack us the British. Theeefore without reference to London put plan In

action if first you have good info Jap expedition advancing with the apparent intention of landing in Kra,

second if the Nips violate any part of Thailand Para if NEI are attacked put into operation plans agreed

upon between British and Dutch. Unquote.” Committee record, pp. 13520, 13521.

In the course of his testimony before the committee Captain Creighton stated he had no knowledge of an

agreement between the United States and Great Britain or the Dutch and that the report transmitted to

Admiral Hart must have come to him second-hand. Committee record, pp. 13516-13637.

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point, including Admiral Hart,^\* was aware of any evidence to sub-

stantiate the report. In his testimony, the Chief of Naval Operations

suggested that the report may have been based on a misconception

as to the state of negotiations following the Singapore conference.”

There is no evidence to indicate that Japanese knowledge of the

“ABC” and “ADB” conversations was an inducing factor to Japan’s

decision to attack the United States coincident with her thrust to the

south. Indeed, the idea of attacking us at Pearl Harbor was con-

ceived before these conversations were initiated.” Manifestly any

estimate which the Japanese made of American probable action was

based on this country’s long-standing Far Eastern policy and the

course of diplomatic negotiations, and not on nonpolitical, technical

discussions on a staff level.”

It should be noted f^at on November 7 the President took an in-

formal vote of his Cabinet as to whether it was thought the American

people would 8ui)port a strike against Japan in the event she should

attack England in Malaya or the Dutch in the East Indies. The

Cabinet was unanimous in the feeling that the country would support

sudi a move. The following sign&cant statement appears in the

diary of Secretfuy Stimson for December 2;

The President is still deliberating the possibility of a message to the Emperor,

although all the rest of us are rather against it, but in addition to that he is quite

settled, I think, that he will make a Message to the Congress and will perhaps

back that up with a speech to the country.''\*

From all of the evidence, as earlier indicated, there is no basis

for the conclusion that an agreement had been effected committing

the United States to war against Japan in the event of an attack

by her upon the British or the Dutch. It is indisputable that the

President and his Cabinet contemplated presenting the problem

to tbe Congress should our position m the Far East become intoler-

able.™ Further, the reports of the 1941 staff conversations contain

clear disclaimers of any political commitments and the voluminous

records relating to these conversations will be searched in vain for

any suggestion that an agreement binding the United States to go to

war was made. Additionally, all the witnesses who were questioned

on the point ” — including the ranking mUitary and naval leaders of

the country at the time — testified that in these meetings the constitu-

tional prerogative of the Congress to declare war was scrupulously re-

H Committee record, pp. 12785-12875.

w Id., at p. 6317.

71 See Part II. this report re Japanese plans for tbe attack.

74 Before the committee. General Marshall was asked; ^\*Let us assume first that they (the Japanese) knew

that we were going to go to war if they attacked Malaya or any portion of that land there. Let us assume on

tl^e other hand that they knew we were not going to participate unless we were directly attacked ourselves.

To what extent would their decisions as to action be affected by that knowledge?’\*

He replied: “Japanese psychology being what it is and the Japanese Army domination being what it was

their general scheme for the assumption of power throughout the Far East, particularly the Southwest

Pacific, being known now, I don’t think that would have had any particular effect one way or the other.’\*

Committee record, p. 13786.

74 See statement of Mr. Stimson. Committee record, p. 14427.

7\* Admiral Stark said: “Under our Constitution the Congress had to declare war, and we could not take

any independent action, so far as hostilities were concerned.” Committee record, p. 13875.

Again, “ \* \* • as to our striking after declaration of war on our part, if the situation became intolerable

to us, and our national safety, if the Japs had not struck and we thought then that our safety was imperiled,

if we did not fight, I think it would have been done in a constitutional manner.” Committee record, pp.

13802-13893.

Further, “ ♦ ♦ \* I do again make the statement, and I want it clear on the record, so far as my

thoughts were concerned, that if Japan had not attacked and if conditions had become intolerable to our

national safety because of what she was doing, and that would have been through the Congress.” Com-

mittee record, p. 13895.

77 See testimony of Secretary Hull, Sumner Welles, General Marshall, Admiral Stark, Admiral Turner,

Admiral IngersoU, General Gerow before, the committee.

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spected.’’^ The preliminaxy planning done at these conferences mani-

fested commendable foresight and indeed our military leaders would

have been inexcusably negligent had they not participated in these

\ conversations in the face of the clear pattern of conquest mapped out

by the AxisJ\* This planning saved precious time and lives once

Japan struck.

While no binding agreement existed, it would appear from the record

that the Japanese were inclined to the belief that the United States,

Britain and the Netherlands would act in concert. An intercepted

November 30 dispatch from Tokyo to Berlin stated in pertinent part: "

\* ♦ \* it is clear that the United States is now in collusion with those nations

(England, Australia, the Netherlands, and China) and has decided to regard

Japan, along with Germany and Italy, as an enemy.

A message of December 3 which was intercepted from the Washing-

ton Embassy to Tokyo related:\*^

Judging from all indications, we feel that some joint military action between

Great Britain and the United States, with or without a declaration of war is a

definite certainty, in the event of an occupation of Thailand.

There is nothing, however, in the foregoing intelligence having any

relationship to the Hawaiian situation; — to have advised the com-

manders there that the Japanese regarded an attack upon the British

or Dutch as tantamoimt to an attack upon the United States would

have added nothing — they had already been categorically warned

that hostile action by Japan against the United States itself was

possible at any moment.

Avoidance op War

As has been seen in considering the diplomatic background of the

Pearl Harbor attack, every effort was made compatible with national

honor to forestall the inevitable conflict with Japan. The policy of

the United States condemned aggression; the policy of Japan was

predicated on aggression. It was only a question of time, therefore,

before these two irreconcilable principles would engender war.“

Officials of our Government were faced with the problem of effecting

a delicate balance between gaining time to improve our military

preparedness on the one hand and not forsaking our principles, nation-

al honor, and Allies on the other.

That the certain prerogative of the Congress to declare war was recognized in discussions with other

TOvemments is revealed by the following dispatch from Ambassador winant to the State Department

dated November 30, 1941, transmitting a message from Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt:

\*Tt seems to me that one important method remains unused in averting war between Japan and our two

countries, namely a plain declaration, secret or public as may be thought best, that any further act of aggres-

sion by Japan will lead immediately to the gravest consequences. / realize your constitutional diMc^iet

but it would be tragic if Japan drifted into war by encroachment without having before her fairly and

squarely the dire character of a further aggressive step. I beg you to consider whether, at the moment

which you judge right which may be very near, you should not say that 'any further Japanese aggression would

compel you to place the gravest issues before Congress\* or words to that effect. We would, of course, make a

similar declaration or share in a joint declaration, and in any case arrangements are being made to synchro-

nize our action with yours. Forgive me, my dear friend, for presuming to press such a course upon you.

but I am convinced that it might make all the difference and prevent a melancholy extension of the war.’\*

Committee exhibit No. 24. See also testimony of General Marshall, committee record, pp. 2785, 2786.

In the course of counsel's examination. General Gerow was asked: \* has it been the practice

of the War Plans Di\ ision from time immemorial to make all sorts of plans about war operations on the con-

tingency that some day or other we might be involved in hostilities with other nations?"

He replied: "Oh, yes, sir. We had at all times kept current plans for operations against any major power

or combination of major powers, sir ' \* \* \* at one time I think we had plans against almost everyoody^

sir, and I think that is the practice of every general staff of every nation." Committee record, pp. 2673, 2674.

As stated by Admiral $tark, "It is our business to draw up plans for any oontingency." Committee

record, p. 13977.

M Committee exhibit No. 1 p. 205.

•I Id., at p. 227. For a full treatment of the matter, however, indicating that no agreement whatever

existed for military action on our part in the event of a Japanese invasion of Thailand, see committee exhibit

No. 169.

^ See Part I, supra, this report.

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In summing up the salient features of the situation as they appeared

to him in November of 1941, Mr, Stimson said:\*®

1. War with Germany and Japan would ultimately be inevitable.

2. It was vitally important that none of the nations who were then desperately

fighting Germany — England, Russia, or China — should be knocked out of the war

before the time came when we would be required to go in.

3. While we very much wanted more time in which to prepare, nevertheless we

felt we had a fair chance to make an effective fight against Japan for the Philip-

pines even if we had to enter the war at that time, in view of the air power that we

were building up in the Philippines.

4. If war did come, it was important, both from the point of view of unified

support of our own people as well as for the record of history, that we should not

be placed in the position of firing the first shot, if this could be done without

sacrificing our safety, but Japan should appear in her true role as the real aggressor.

It should be noted that in October of 1940 the President advised

Admiral Richardson that if the Japanese attacked Thailand, oi; the

Kra Peninsula, or the Dutch East Indies the United States would not

enter the war —

that if they even attacked the Philippines he doubted whether we would enter

the war, but that they (the Japanese) could not always avoid making mistakes

and that as the war continued and the area of operations expanded sooner or

later they would make a mistake and we would enter the war.“

On October 30, 1941, a message was received from Generalissimo

Chiang Kai-shek indicating his belief that a Japanese attack on

Kunming (Yunnan), located on the Burma Road, was imminent, and

that military support from outside sources, particularly by the use of

United States and British air units, was the sole hope for defeat of

this threat.\*® The Secretary of State requested the advice of jthe

Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations as to the attitude

which this Government should assume toward a Japanese offensive

against Kunming and the Burma Road. In a joint memorandum for

tiie President dated November 5 they set forth the following con-

clusions and recommendations, after reviewing the situation in China:\*\*

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff are in accord in the fol-

lowing conclusions:

(0) The basic militapr policies and strateOT agreed to in' the United States-

British Staff conversations remain sound. The primary objective of the two

nations is the defeat of Germany. If Japan be defeated and Germany remain

undefeated, decision will still have not been reached. In any case, an unlimited

offensive war should not be undertaken against Japan, since such a war would

greatly weaken the combined effort in the Atlantic against Germany, the most

dangerous enemy.

(6) War between the United States and Japan should be avoided while building

up defensive forces in the Far East, until such time as Japan attacks or directly

threatens territories whose security to the United States is of very great import-

ance. Military action against Japan should be undertaken only in one or more

of the following contingencies:

(1) A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the territory or mandated

territory of the United StateSy the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East

Indies;

(2) The movement of Japanese forces into Thailand to the west of 100 degerees

East or south of 10 degrees North; or into Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the

Loyalty Islands.

(c) If war with Japan cannot be avoided, it should follow the strategic lines of

existing war plans; i. e., military operations should be primarily defensive, with

the object of holding territory, and weakening Japan’s economic position.

»\* See statement of Mr. Stimson, committee record, p. 14385.

M Testimony of Admiral Richardson, committee record, pp. 683, 684.

M See committee exhibit No. 16A. similar messages were received through the American ambassador

Id Chungking, the Mas^der Mission and the United States naval attache. Exhibits Nos. 16, 16A.

•I Committee exhibit No. 16.

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(d) Considering world strategy, a Japanese advance against Kunming, into

Thailand except as previously indicated, or an attack on Russia, would not

justify intervention by the United States against Japan.

(e) Al^ossible aid short of actual war against Japan should be extended to the

Chinese (Jentral Government.

( /) In case it is decided to undertake war against Japan, complete coordinated

action in the diplomatic, economic, and military fields, should be undertaken

in common by the United States, the British Commonwealth, and the Nether-

lands East Indies.

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff recommend that the

United States policy in the Far East be based on the above conclusions.

Specifically, they recommend:

That the dispatch of United States armed forces for intervention against

Japan in China be disawroved.

That material aid to China be accelerated consonant with the needs of Russia,

Great Britain, and our own forces.

That aid to the American Volunteer Group be continued and accelerated to

the maximum practicable extent.

That no ultimatum be delivered to Japan.

The reply of the President to Chiang Kai-shek's message was

handed to the Chinese Ambassador on November 14 and followed

the recommendations of General Marshall and Admiral Stark. It

pointed out that it did not appear preparations by Japan for a land

campaign against Kunming had advanced to a point which would

indicate probable immediate imminence of an attack and observed,

among other things:®^

\* \* \* Under existing circumstances, taking into consideration the world

situation in its political,\* military, and economic aspects, we feel that the most

effective contribution which we can make at this moment is along the line of

Speeding up the flow to China of our lend-lease materials and facilitating the

building up of the American volunteer air force, both in personnel and in equip-

ment. We are subjected at present, as you know, to demands from many quarters

and in many connections. We are sending materials not only td China and Great

Britain, but to the Dutch, the Soviet Union, and some twenty other countries

that are calling urgently for equipment for self-defense. In addition, our pro-

gram for our own defense, especially the needs of our rapidly expanding Navy and

Army, calls for equipment in large amount and with great promptness. Neverthe-

less, I shall do my utmost toward achieving expedition of increasing amounts of

material for your use. Meanwhile we are exchanging views with the British

Government in regard to the entire situation and the tremendous problems which

are presented, with a view to effective coordinating of efforts in the most practicable

ways possible. ^

In a joint memorandum for the President, prepared under date of

November 27, 1941, General Marshall and Admiral Stark pointed out

that ‘‘if the current negotiations end without agreement, Japan may

attack; the Burma Road; Thailand; Malaya; the Netherlands East

Indies; the Philippines; the Russian Maritime Provinces."®® They

observed that:

The most essential thing now, from the United States viewpoint, is to gain time.

Considerable Navy and Army reinforcements have been rushed to the Philippines

but the desirable strength has not yet been reached. The process of reinforcement

is being continued. Of great and immediate concern is the safety of the Army con-

voy now near Guam, and the Marine Corps^ convoy just le^,ving Shanghai. Ground

forces to a total of 21,000 are due to sail from the United States by December 8,

1941, and it is important that this troop reinforcement reach the Philippines

before hostilities commence. Precipitance of military action on our part should be

avoided ^o long as consistent with national policy. The longer the delay, the more

positive becomes the assurance of retention of these islands as a naval and air base.

«id.

“ Committee exhibit No. 17.

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Japanese action to the south of Formosa will be hindered and perhaps seriously

blocked as long as we hold the Philippine Islands. War with Japan certainly wiU

interrupt our transport of supplies to Siberia, and probably will interrupt the

process of aiding China.

After consultation with each other, United States, British, and Dutch military

authorities in the Far East i^eed that joint military counteraction against Japan

Should be undertaken only in case Japan cUtacks or directly threatens the territory

or mandated territory of the hnited States^ the British Commonwealth^ or the Nether^

lands East Indies, or should the Japanese move forces into Thailand west of 100

degrees East or south of 10 degrees I^orth, Portuguese Timor ^ New Caledonia, or the

Loyalty Islands,^

Japanese involvement in Yunnan or Thailand up to a certain extent is advan-

tageous, since it leads to further dispersion, longer lines of communication, and an

additional burden on communications. However, a Japanese advance to the

west of 100 degrees East or south of 10 degrees North, immediately becomes a

threat to Burma and Singapore. Until it is patent that Japan intends to advance

beyond these lines, no action which might lead to immediate hostilities should

be taken.

It is recommended that:

Prior to the completion of the Philippine reinforcement, military counter-

action be considered only if Japan attacks or directly threatens United States,

British, or Dutch territory, as above outlined ;

In case of a Japanese advance into Thailand, Japan be warned by the

United States, the British, and the Dutch Governments that advance beyond

the lines indicated may lead to war; prior to such warning no joint military

opposition be undertaken;

Steps be taken at once to consummate agreements with the British and

Dutch for the issuance of such warning,®®

It is to be noted that the foregoing memorandum was dated Novem-

ber 27, 1941, the day after the Secretary of State had delivered our

Government's reply to the Japanese ultimatum of November 20.

The evidence shows, however, that the memorandum was considered

at an Army-Navy Joint Board meetii^ on the morning of November

26, following the meeting of the War Council on the preceding day at

which Secretary Hull had stated that there was practically no possi-

bility of an agreement being achieved with Japan.®^ The memoran-

dum of the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations conveys

two cardinal thoughts governing the approach of the military to the

negotiations; i. e., the most essential thing was to gain time, and the

precipitance of military action should be avoided so long as consistent

with national policy. In this connection General Marshall referred to

the reaction of the Army and Navy to the dropping of the thought of

a modus vivendi in the following terms:

My recollection is, and I have a fairly clear recollection of our disappointment

that from the militaty point of view, meaning Army and Navy, that we would

not gain any more time; our relationship to these discussions was on the one side

the desire to gain as much time as we possibly could and on the other to see that

commitments were not made that endangered us from a military point of view.

8» Osneral Marshall testified that this paragraph referred to the conference of military leaders held in

Singapore in April of 1941. He was asked: “When you sav that the Dutch, British, and the United States

milita-y autheities had agreed to that action did vou mean that they had made an agreement on behalf of

the United States, or a treed to recemmend it to their governments?”

Oeieral Marshall replied: \*\* Agreed to recommend it. They had no power whatever to agree for our govern-

ment and it was so stipulated \* • Committee record, pp 2784, 2785.

•0 See note 78, supra, and note 111, infra.

•\* With reference to the Marshall -Stark memorandum for the President dated November 27, 1941 (exhibit

No. 17), Admi al Enge’-soll recalled that he “• • \* presented at a Joint Board Meeting on apparently

Ihe dav bef )re this mem >rand im was sent, I presented at that meeting the arguments why we should not

f recipitate a war, and when I came back here to Washington 4 years later, I had forgotten completely that

had ever p-esented such a memorandum at the Joint Board Meeting. The only satisfaction I had waa

that it didn't sound silly after 4 years. And this was based on that.” Committee record, p. 11366.

w Committee record, p. 13775.

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In pointing out the distinction between his approach and that of

Secretary Stimson,” General Marshall said: “

He [Secretary Stimson] was very much afraid — he feared that we would find

ourselves involved in the developing situation where our disadvantages would be

so great that it would be quite fatal to us when the Japanese actually broke peace.

He also felt very keenly that, and thought about this part a great deal more

than I did, because it was his particular phase of the matter, that'we must not go

so far in delaying actions of a diplomatic nature as to sacrifice the honor of the

country. He was deeply concerned about that.

My approach to the matter, of course, was much more materialistic. I was

hunting for time. Hunting for time, so that whatever did happen we would be

better prepared than we were at that time, that particular time.

^ it was a question of resolving his views as to the honor, we will say, of the

United States, and his views of a diplomatic procedure which allowed the Japanese

to continue movements until we would be in a hopeless situation before the peace

was broken, and mine, which as I say, were much more materialistic, as I think

they should have been, that we should get as much time as we could in order to

make good the terrible deficiencies in our defensive arrangements.

It is apparent from the memorandum of November 27 that the

Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations desired more time

insofar as consistent with national policy and not at the expense of

forsaking the honor of the Nation. As General Marshall testified: “

Mine was, in a sense, a technical job. I was struggling with the means to

fight. \* \* \* I warded time, and the question was how much time could be

given to us and still maintain the honor of the United States and not get ourselves in

a hopeless position.

Further, the memorandum relates to the matter of precipitance of

war by the United States; that is, no aflSrmative steps should be taken

by the United States to bring about war with Japan — ^‘precipitance

of milita^ action on our part should be avoided so long as consistent

with national poUcy.”

As observed in reviewing the diplomatic backgroimd of the Pearl

Harbor attack, the November 26 note of our Government to Japan

was not a precipitant of war — it was merely a laudable restatement

of the principles for which we had stood for many years in the Orient.

There can, therefore, be no question that the dehvery to Japan of the

American note of November 26 was not in any way in contravention

of the expressed position of our own military. Furthermore, Tokyo

advised her emissaries in Washington on November 20 that a modus

vivendi would not be acceptable to Japan,®\* and in consequence had

our Govermnent submitted a modus vivendi to the Japanese, no more

time would have been afforded the Army and Navy. General Mar-

shall and Admiral Stark had themselves recommended that we take mili-

tary counter-action should Japan attack the very territory which she was

already poised to attack in the event she jailed to secure the demands con-

tained in the Japanese ultimatum of November 20.\*’’

Indeed, at the very time Japan’s ambassadors were discussing a

temporary truce, her military was continuing its move to the South.

Secretary Stimson’s diary for November 26, 1941, reflects the follow-

ing comments, among others: ®\*

M In this diary for November 27, Mr. Stimson commented: \*\*Knox and Admiral Stark came over and

conferred with me and General Gerow. Marshall is down at the maneuvers today and I feel his absence

very much. There was a tendency, not unnatural, on the part of Stark and Gerow to seek for more time.

I said that I was glad to have time but I didn’t want it at any cost of humility on the part of the United

States or of reopening the thing which would show a weakness on our part.” Committee record, p. 14422.

Committee record, p. 13821.

»« Id., at p. 13822.

•• Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 160.

\*7Id., No. 17.

M Committee record, p. 14420.

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. . . I talked to the President over the telephone and I a^kecthim whether he ?

had received the paper which I had sent him over last night about the Japanese .

having started a new expedition from Shanghai down towards Indo-China. He

fairly blew up — jumped up into the air, so to speak, and said he hadn’t seen it!

and that that changed the whole situation because it was an evidence of bad faith :

on the part of the Japanese that while they were negotiating for an entire truce —

an entire withdrawal (from China) — they should be sending this expedition down

there to Indo-China. I told him that it was a fact that had come to me through

G— 2 and through the Navy Secret Service and I at once got another copy of the

paper I had sent last night and sent it over to him by special messenger.

It is to be noted that Mr. Stimson’s diary for November 25, 1941,

describes a meeting at the White House attended by the President;

Secretaries Hull, Knox, and Stimson; General Marshall; and Admiral

Stark. It states, in part:\*® “There the President, instead of bringing

up the Victory Parade brought up entirely the relations with the

Japanese. He brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked

(as soon as) next Monday without warning, and the question was

what we should do. The question was how we should maneuver them

into the position oj firing the first shot without allowing too much danger

to ourselves. It was a difficult proposition.”

In referring to Mr. Stimson’s comment concerning maneuvering

the Japanese into the position of firing the first shot without too much

danger to ourselves,^"® General Marshall testified:

“\* ♦ \* they were trying to arrange a diplomatic procedure, rather than

firing off a gun, that would not only protect our interests, by arranging matters

so that the Japanese couldn’t intrude any further in a dangerous way| but also

anything they did do, they would be forced to take the ofifensive action, and what

we were to dio had to be prepared for the President by Mr. Hull. It was not a

military order. It was not a military arrangement.”

The Chief of Staff stated that Secretary Stimson was referring to

what the diplomatic procedure was to be; not the military procedme.\*®\*

On November 28 Secretary Stimson called upon the President

inasmuch as Military Intelligence had supplied him a summary of

the information in regard to the movements of the Japanese in the

Far East and “it amounted to such a statement of dangerous possi-

bihties that I decided to take it to the President before he got up.”

Referring to his conversation with the President on this occasion,

Mr. Stimson wrote in his diary:

He (the President) branched into an analysis of the situation himself as he

sat there on his bed, saying there were three alternatives and only three that he

could see before us. I told him I could see two. His alternatives were — first.

" Id., at p. 14418.

100 This was an office nickname for the General Staff strategic plan of national action in case of war in

Europe.

101 Mr. Stimson pointed out in this connection that our military and naval advisers had warned us that

we could not safely allow the Japanese to move against British Malaysia or the Dutch East Indies without

attempting to prevent it. Committee record, p. 14418.

10\* In the course of committee examination, Admiral Stark was asked: “Now, I want to know why. if

you know, there was a distinction between the Atlantic and the Pacflc about the firing of the first shot.\*'

He replied: “Germany had attacked and sunk one of our ships in June. She had attacked three de-

stroyers in the Atlantic, sinking one of them— I think it was in October or November, along in there, be-

tween September and October. And certainly the 1st of December she had attacked and wounded badly

one tanker, the Salinas, I believe it was, which got back to the Canadian coast. The Congress of the United

States had voted billions for material to go to Britain. We considered it our job to get that material through

not simply to use this money for material and let it be sunk without taking any action on it. There were

certain waters defined, and limits established, which, I believe, we called our waters. The President's

speech shows it very plainly, in which he stated, if the Germans came within that area they would do so

at their peril. They came in and attacked us. As a result, we got together what we called the hemispheric

defense plans, which I have outlined previously and which provided for shooting at any German combatant

ships which came within that area, and we did do it • • • I think that that situation is not comparable

to what was going on in the Pacific, where the Japs had not attacked our ships, unless you go back to the

Panay incident." Committee record, pp. 13981, 13982.

\*«\* Committee record, p. 13801.

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to do nothing; second, to make something in the nature of mn ultimatum again,

stating a point beyond which we would fight; third, to fight at once. 1 told him

my only two were the last two, because 1 did not think anyone would do nothing

in this situation, and he agreed with me. 1 sidd of the other two my choice was

the latter one.

Mr. Stimson set forth the following observations concerning the

War Council meeting on November 28:

It was the consensus that the present move (by the Japanese) — that there

was an Expeditionary Force on the sea of about 25,000 Japanese troops aimed

for a landing somewhere — completely changed the situation when we last discussed

whether or not we could address an ultimatum to Japan about moving the troops

which she already had on land in Indochina. It was now the opinion of every-

one that if this expedition was allowed to get around the southern point of Indo-

china and to go off and land in the Gulf of Siam, either at Bangkok or further

west, it would be a terrific blow at all of the three Powers, Britain at Singapore,

the Netherlands, and ourselves in the Philippines. It was the consensus of every-

body that this must not he allowed. Then we discussed how to prevent it. It

was agreed that if the Japanese got into the Isthmus of Kra, the British would

fight. It was also agreed that if the British fought, we would have to fight. And

it now seems clear that if this exF>edition was allowed to round the southern point

of Indochina, this whole chain of disastrous events would be set on foot of going.

It further became a consensus of views that rather than strike at the force as

it went by without any warning on the one hand, which we didn't thinly we could

do; or sitting still and allowing it to go on, on the other, which we didn't think

we could — that the only thing for us to do was to address it a warning that if it

reached a certain place, or a certin line, or a certain point, we should have to

fight. The President's mind evidently was running towards a special telegram

from himself to the Emperor of Japan. This he had done with good results at

the time of the Panay incident, but for many reasons this did not seem to me to

be the right thing now and I pointed them out to the President. In the first

place, a letter to the Emperor of Japan could not be couched in terms which

contained an explicit warning. One does not warn an Emperor. In the second

place it would not indicate to the people of the United States what the real nature

of the danger was. Consequently I said there ought to be a message by the Presi-

dent to the people of the United States and I thought that the best form of a

message would be an address to Congress reporting the danger, reporting what

we would have to do if the danger happened. The President accepted this idea

of a message but he first thought of incorporating in it the terms of his letter to

the Emperor. But again I pointed out that he could not publicize a letter to an

Emperor in such a way; that he had better send his letter to the Emperor separate

as one thing and a secret thing, and then make his speech to the Congress as a

separate and a more understandable thing to the people of the United States.

This was the final decision at that time and the President asked Hull, and Knox

and mvself to try to draft such papers.

Mr. Stimson’s diary for December 2, 1941, contains the following

comments concerning a meeting at the White House:

The President went step by step over the situation and I think has made up

his mind to \*go ahead. He has asked the Japanese through Sumner Welles what

they intend by this new occupation of southern Indo-China — just what they are

going to do — and has demanded a wick reply. The President is still deliberating

the possibility of a message to the Emperor, although all the rest of us are rather

against it, but in addition to that he is quite settled, I think, that he will make

a Message to the Congress and will 'perhaps hack that up with a speech to the country.

He said that he was going to take the maiters right up when he left us.

On December 6 President Roosevelt dispatched his appeal to the

Emperor; and, after the bombs had already fallen on Hawaii, our

Ambassador in Tokyo was informed that it was desired the Japanese

Memorandum of December 7, which was keyed for delivery to the

United States coincident with the attack on Pearl Harbor, be regarded

as the Emperor^s reply to the President.^®®

Id., at pp. 14424, 14425.

i” Id., at p. 14427.

\*« See Part I, supra, this report.

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It is clear from the evidence that the feeling of the President and his

advisers that the United States must fight u the British and Dutch

were attacked was predicated on the necessities of our ovm security

and not occasioned by reason of any formal commitment or agreement

requiring such action on the part of the United States.\*®® That our

Government was hoping to avoid war long after any real hope existed\*\*"

is made manifest by the fact that the President contemplated sending

a warning to Japan on “Tuesday afternoon or evening” (December 9;

if no answer was received from the Emperor by Monday (December

8).\*\*\* In referring to the appeal to the Emperor, Mr. Hull said:\*\*\*

The President was now making an additional last-minute appeal. He, of course,

knew that the huge Japanese armada had already left the jumping-off place in

Indochina which from our viewpoint meant that the danger of attack could not

have been more imminent. Nevertheless, the President bdieved that he should not

neglect even the slim chance that an additional last-minute appeal might save the

situation. It also served to make clear to the American people and to the world our

interest in maintaining peace up to the very last minute.

Intellioencb Available in Washington

THE “magic”

With the exercise of the greatest ingenuity and utmost resource-

fulness, regarded by the committee as meriting the highest commenda-

tion, the War and Navy Departments collaDorated in breaking the

Japanese diplomatic codes. Through the exploitation of intercepted

and decoded messages between Japan and her diplomatic establish-

ments, the so-called Magic, a wealth of intelligence concerning the

purposes of the Japanese was available in Washington.\*\*®

Both the Army and Navy maintained several stations throughout the

United States and in the Pacific for the purpose of intercepting Japan-

ese radio communications . These stations operated under instructions

emanating from Washington and forwarded the intercepted traffic to

Washington without themselves endeavoring to decode or translate

the material. The only exception to this procedure was in the case of

the Corr^idor station which had been provided with facilities for

exploiting many of the Japanese diplomatic messages in view of its

advantageous location from the standpoint of intercepting Tokyo

traffic.\*\*^

Imofar as the commanding officera in Haw;aii were concerned they

received none of the Magic save as it was supplied them by the War

and Navy Departments in the original, paraphrased, or captioned

form or, operationally, through instructions predicated on this source

of inteUigence. While the highest nulitaiy officials in Washington

did not know the precise nature of radio intelligence activities in

Hawaii, it is clear that those charged with handling the Magic did not

See statement of Mr. Stimson, committee record, p. 14418, Also committee exhibits Nos. 16, 17.

no Admiral Stark was asked: \*\*Was not that our intention (of doing anything possible to prevent war

with the Japanese) right up to December 7, if it could be done without sacrificing American honor and

principles?”

He replied: \*\*Yes, sir; and we had been working for months on that, and the record is complete in that

regard.” Committee record, p. 13915.

ui See committee record, pp. 13741, 13742.

n\* See Secretary Hull’s replies to committee interrogatories, committee record, p. 14266.

ns See committee exhibits Nos. 1 and 2. For a discussion of Magic and its great simificance to the prose\*

eation of the war see letters dated September 25 and 27, 1944, from General Marshall to Governor Dewey.

Committee record^ pp. 2979-2989.

n4 For a discussion of the mechanics of the Magic, see testimony of Admiral Noyes and Capts. L. F.

Safford and A. D. Kramer of the Navy, and Cols. Otis K. Sadtler and Rufus Bratton of the Army

before the committee.

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rely upon either the Army or Navy in Hawaii being able to decode the

diplomatic messages which were decoded in Washington. However,

both Admirals Stark and Turner testified that they were under the

impression that Japanese diplomatic messages were being decoded

by the Navy in Hawaii.^® No justification for this impression existed

4n fact apart from the failure of these officers to inform themselves

■ adequately concerning Navy establishments.^^® Under arrangements

existing during 1941 between the Army and the Navy in Washington

' the decoding and translating of Magic was divided between the Army

Signal Intelligence Service imder the direction of the Chief Signal

Officer and a imit in the Navy, known as OP-20-G, imder the control

of the Director of Naval Commimicationsf The responsibility for

decoding and translating messages was allocated between the two

services on the basis of the dates of the messages with each service

ordina,rily handling all messages originated on alternate days, the

Army being responsible for even dates and the Navy, for odd dates.

This procedure was flexible in that it was departed from in order to

expedite the handling of material as the occasion demanded or in the

case of any unusual situation that might prevail in one or the other

of the services.

POLICY WITH RESPECT TO DISSEMINATION OE MAGIC

The Magic intelligence was regarded as preeminently confidential

and the policy with respect to its restricted distribution was dictated

by a desire to safeguard the secret that the Japanese diplomatic codes

were being broken."^ Delivery of the English texts of the intercepted

messages was limited, within the War Department, to the Secretary

of War, the Chief of Staff, the Chief of the War Plans Division, and

the Chief of the Military Intelligence Division; within the Navy, to

the Secretary of Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of

the War Plans Division, and the Director of Naval Intelligence; to

the State Department; and to the President’s naval aide for trans-

mittal to the President. By agreement between the Army and Navy

in Washington, the Army was responsible for distribution of Magic

within the War Department and to the State Department; the Navy,

for distribution within the Navy Department and to the White House.

Any disclosure of the fact that the Japanese messages were being

decoded or any disclosure of information obtainable only from that

source would inevitably have resulted in Japan’s chan^g her codes

with attendant loss completely of the vital Magic. This fact was

responsible for the translated material being closely held among a

See committee record, p. .5095.

Admiral Stark testified: “I inquired on two or three occasions as to whether or not Kimmel could

read certain dispatches when they came up and which we were interpreting and sending our own messages

and I was told that he could. However, I want to make it plain that that did not influence me in the slightest

regarding what I sent. I felt it my responsibility to keep the commanders in the field and to see to it that

they were kept informed of the main trends and of information which (would) be of high interest to them.

Regardless of what dispatches I might have seen, they may have formed background for me but I saw that

afl^mative action was taken from the Chief of Naval Operations to the commanders in the field on matters

which I thought they should have.” Committee record, p. 5793.

During the course of his testimony, General Miles was asked: \*‘Who made the decision that these mes\*

sages should not be sent to Hawaii as they were intercepted and translated as far as the Army is concerned?”

He replied: “That followed from the general policy laid down by the Chief of Staff that these messages

and the fact of the existence of these messages or our ability to decode them should be confined to the least

possible number of persons; no distribution should be made outside of Washington. • • •

“The value of that secret, the secret that we could and did decode Japanese messages, in their best cod^,

was of incalculable value to us, both in the period when war threatened and most definitely diming oiir

waging of that war. That was the basic reason for the limitation on the distribution of those messages and

of the constantly increasing closing in, as I might express it, on any possible leaks in that secret.” Com-

mittee record, pp. 2092, 2093.

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few key individuals, in addition necessarily to those who processed

the messages.

The policy generally prevailed in the days before Pearl Harbor that

the Magic materials were not ordinarily to be disseminated to field

commanders.”® This policy was prescribed for the reason that (1) the

.Japanese might conceivably intercept the relayed Magic intelligence

and learn of our success in decrypting Japanese codes:”® (2) the volume

of intercepted trafiic was so great that its transmission, particularly

diming the critical period of diplomatic negotiations, would have over-

taxed communication facilities; and (3) responsibility for evaluation

of this material which was largely diplomatic in nature was properly

in Washington, where the Magic could be considered along with other

pertinent ^plomatic information obtained from the State Department

and other source. There was no inflexible rule, however, which pre-

cluded sending to theater commanders in proper instances, either in

its original form as paraphrased or in the form of estimates, conclu-

sions, or orders based wholly or in part upon Magic. Important , in-

formation derived therefrom was from time to time sent to the

Hawaiian commanders by the Navy Department in paraphrased form

or in the form of estimates.\*®® The War Department, on the other

hand, did not send the Magic to the field, for the reason that the Army

code was not believed to be as secure as that of the Navy.\*®\*

For purposes of the investigation Magic fell generally into two cate-

TOries: first, messages relating to diplomatic matters of the Japanese

Government;\*®® and second, messages relating to espionage activities

by Japanese diplomatic representatives, particularly with respect to

American military installations and establishments.\*®®

The decision not to endeavor to supply field commanders all of the

Magic intelligence as such was a reasonable one under the circum-

stances. However, it is incumbent to determine whether responsible

commanding officers were otherwise supplied the equivalent of intelligence

obtained from the Magic materials.

“Ships in Harbor” Reports

NATURE OP CONSULAR ESPIONAGE

In addition to the Magic materials relating strictly to diplomatic

negotiations, a great many messages between Japan and her diplo-

matic establishments were iatercepted reflecting espionage activities

by the consular staffs.\*®^ These intercepts related in the main to

instructions sent by -Tokyo and replies pursuant thereto concerning

the movement and location of American ships and the nature of mili-

tary and defensive installations.

R\* For a discussion concerning this matter, see letter dated April 22, 1941, from Ctmt. Arthur N. McCol-

lum in Washington to Capt. Edwin T. Layton, Pacific Fleet intelligence officer. Committee record, pp.

12917-12923.

This factor applied principally to the Army. See testimony of General Miles. Note 121, infra.

See committee exhibit No. 37, pp. 4-12, 40, 41.

1\*1 In testifying concerning the matter of distributing Magic to field commanders General Miles was asked:

\*\*I>o I understand from your answer that these messages intercepted and translated were not sent to Hawaii

by the Army?”

He replied: “They were not. In some cases the substance of some messages were sent to Hawaii, and al-

most al ways in naval code, I think always in naval code, because the naval code was considered to be mere

secure than the Army code.“ Committee record, pp. 2091, 2092.

n\* Committee exhibit No. 1

i«Id.,No.2.

iMId.

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The Hawaiian commanders have strongly insisted that messages

to and from the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu clearly indicated

Japan’s intention to attack the fleet at Pearl Harbor. They contend

they were wrongfully deprived of this information, basing this con-

tention to a great extent on an intercepted dispatch from Tokyo of

September 24, 1941 issuing the following instructions to ite

Honolulu Consulate:

Strictly secret.

Henceforth, we would like to have you make reports eoneeming vessels along

the foUowing lines insofar as possible:

1. The waters (of Pearl Harbor) are to be divided roughly into five subareas.

(We have no objections to your abbreviating as much as you like.)

Area A. Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.

Area B. Waters adjacent to the Island south and west of Ford Island. (This

area is on the omosite side of the Island from Area A.)

AreaC. East Loch.

Area D. Middle Loch.

Area E. West Loch and the communication water routes.

2, With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have you

report on those at anchor (these are not so important) tied up at wharves, buoys^

and in docks. (Designate types and classes briefiy. If possible we would like

to have you make mention of the fact when there are two or more vessels along

side the same wharf.)

The foregoing message. No. 83, has been CTatuitously characterized

throughout the proceedings as the ‘‘bomb plot message”, the “harbor

berthing plan”, and by similar terms. Three other intercepted mes-

sages rdate in a pertinent manner to the September 24 dispatch and

to Tokyo’s interest in the fleet at Pearl Harbor:

(1) In a message from ToWo to the Honolulu Consul, dated No-

vember 15, 1941 (translated December 3, 1941) it was stated:^^®

As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your

''ships in harbor report’^ irregular, but at a rate of twice a week. Although you

already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy.

(2) An intercept from Tokyo dated November 20, 1941 (translated

December 4) read:^^®

Please investigate comprehensively the fleet — bases in the neighborhood of the

Hawaiian military reservation.

(3) An intercept of November 29 (translated December 5) stated:

We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in futuye will

you also report even when there are no movements?

Referring to the indicated messages. Admiral Kimmel testified:

In no other area was the Japanese Government seeking information as to

whether two or more vessels were alongside the same wharf. Prior to the dispatch

of September 24, the information which the Japanese sought and obtained about

Pearl Harbor followed the general pattern of their interest in American Fleet

movements in other localities. One might suspect this type of conventional

espionage. With the dispatch of September 24, 1941, and those which followed,

there was a significant and ominous change in the character of the information

\*\*\* Translated October 9.

Committee exhibit No. 2, p. 12.

IV Some of the subsequent reports from the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu were made pursuant to the

instructions contained in the September 24 dispatch from Tokyo. See committee exhibit No. 2 pp. 13 and

14 .

iM Committee exhibit No. 2, p. 13,

»» Id., at p. 15.

Captain Kramer testified with respect to the blank, a garble, in this message between the words \*\*fi^t’\*

and “bases” that he believed the original Japanese version in ungarbled form if it were available would read:

“Please investigate comprehensively the fleet air bases.” Committee record, pp. 1162-1163.

Committee exhibit No. 2, 16 p,

>« Committee record, pp. 6779, 6780.

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'which the Japanese Government sought and obtained. The espionage then

■directed was of an unusual character andf outside the realm of reasonable suspicion.

It was no longer merely directed to ascertaining the general whereabouts of ships

•of the fleet. It was directed to the presence of particular ships in particular areas;

to such minute detail as what ships were double-docked at the same wharf. In the

period immediately preceding the attack, the Jap Consul General in Hawmi was

•directed by Tokyo to r^ort even when there were no movements of ships in and

■out of Pearl Harbor. These Japanese instructions and reports pointed to an attack

by Japan upon the ships in Pearl Harbor. The information sought and obtained,

■with such painstaking detail had no other conceivable usefulness from a military

viewpoint. Its utility was in planning and executing an attack upon the ships in

port. Its effective value was lost completely when the ships left their reported

’berthings in Pearl Harbor.

In the same connection General Short testified:

While the War Department G-2 may not have felt bound to let me know about

the routine operations of the Japanese in keeping track of our naval ships, they

should certainly have let me know that the Japanese were getting reports of the

■exact Ideation of the ships in Pearl Harbor, which might indicate more than just

keeping track, because such details would be useful orUy for sabotage, or for air or

■submarine attack in Hawaii. As early as October 9, 1941, G— 2 in Washington

knew of this Japanese espionage. This message, analyzed critically, is really a

bombing plan for Pearl Harbor.

In endeavoring to evaluate the intercepted dispatch of September

24 and related dispatches, it is to be home in mind that the Japanese

were insistent in their desire to secure information concerning the

location and movements of American vessels everywhere and not

merely at Pearl Harbor. There are no other dispatches before the

Committee, however, in which Tokyo manifested an interest concern-

ing the disposition of ships within a harbor, as in the case of the

^‘berthing plan,” as distinguished from the desire to know whether a

vessel was at a particular harbor. Viewing the September 24 instruc-

tions to her Honolulu consul in this light, it would appear that Tokyo

was manifesting an unusual interest in the presence of our Pacific

Fleet and the detailed location thereof in Pearl Harbor.

The evidence reflects, however, that no one in Washington attached

the s^nificance to the “berthing plan” which it is now possible to

read into it. To determine whether failure to appreciate the plan

represents a lack of imagination and a dereliction of duty, we consider

now the contentions of the ofiicers who saw this intelligence before

December 7, 1941, and the circumstances under which it was received

in Washington.

At the time the “berthing plan” was translated, the practice was

being followed by Captain Kramer of preparing a gist of intercepted

messages to expedite consideration of them by recipients.^®\* Asterisks

were employed along with the gist to provide an indication of the

significance of messages^ — one asterisk meant “interesting messages”;

two asterisks, “especially important or urgent messages.’”®\* The

gist relating to the berthing plan read:'®® “Tokyo directs special reports

on ships with (in) Pearl Harbor which is divided into five areas for the

purpose of showing exact location” and was indicated by one asterisk

•n Id., at p. 7989.

The practice of preparing gists is indicated to have been discontinued during the month of November

1941, for the reason that the President insisted on seeing the original messages “because he was afraid when

they tried to condense them, someone would change the meaning.” See testimony of Captain Saflord,

Hewitt Inquiry Record, p. 408; also Clarke Inquiry Exhibit No. 23,

Committee record, pp. 11206, 11207.

Id., at pp. 11207, 11208.

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as being an ‘^interesting mess^e’\ In explaining his estimate of the

message, Captain Kramer testified

\* \* \* Your interpretation, Senator, that this was a bombing map, I do not

believe, from conversations I had at the time in showing and going over days'

traffic with various recipients ; I do not believe it was interpreted by any of those

persons as being materially different than other messages concerning ship move-

ments being reported by the Japanese diplomatic service.

I recollect that this was interpreted. I am uncertain of the precise wording of

the interpretation. This was considered, and I believe it was, approximately ^ my

consideration at the time as being an attempt on the part of th e Japanese diplomati c

^ service to si inrdify rammnmeaiions. \*

That^ v iew is substantiated by many factors.

One is that the Japanese were repeatedly and continually directing their diplo-

matic service to cut down traffic. They were repeatedly preparing and sending

out abbreviations to be used with codes already in existence. Diplomatic codes

were frequently asking for additional funds for quarterly allotments, and so forth,

to cover telegraphic expenses. Those expenses were usually paid and furnished

in part when so requested by Tokyo. Those and other considerations I think

explain, probably, the handling of this particular message, sir.

Upon being asked what evaluation he placed on the harbor berthing

plan and related intercepts, Admiral Wilkinson testified:

The Japanese for many years had the reputation, and the facts bore out that

reputation, of being meticulous seekers for every scrap of information, whether

by photography or by written report or otherwise.

We had recently, as reported to me, apprehended two and I think three Japanese

naval officers on the west coast making investigations of Seattle, Bremerton, Long

Beach, and San Diego. In the reports that we had gotten from them there had

been indications of movements and locations of ships ; in the papers that they had

there were instructions for them to find out the movements and locations of ships

except in Hawaii and the Philippines, the inference being that these fellows that

were planted in America, these naval officers, were not to be responsible for move-

ments in Hawaii and the Philippines because there were agencies finding that

information there.

My general impression of adding all this reputation and this fact and these data

together was that these dispatches were part of the general information system

established by the Japanese. We knew also that certain information had been

sought in Panama and again in Manila. I did not, I regret now, of course attribute

to them the bombing target significance which now appears.

And again:

\* \* \* the location of the ship, whether it was alongside of a dock or else-

where, did give an inference of work going on aboard her which would be of value

to the question of when she might be moved, what her state of readiness was and

the inference that we drew from this was that they wanted to know everything

they could not only about the movement of the ships and those that were present

and, therefore, accounted for and not a threat to them in some other waters, but

also with reference to those that were present where they were located with refer-

ence to state of repair. For instance, the ships that were particularly in Pearl

Harbor might be in repair and not ready to go to sea, whereas those at anchor

in the stream would be ready, or would be so on short notice. Those at double-

banked piers might not be, particularly the inside one might take some time

to go out.

Admiral Wilkinson thought he had mentioned to one or more officers

that the Japanese seemed curious as to the lay-out in Pearl Harbor

and testified ‘‘at the time I thought that that was an evidence of their

nicety of intelligence.”

On the other hand, Admiral Stark, who stated he had no recollection

of having seen the berthing plan and accompanying messages prior

to the attack, testified:

>“ Id., at p. U60.

Id., at pp. 4620,'4621.

•» Id., at pp. 4622, 4623.

)» Id., at p. 4624.

Id., at pp. \*788, \*789.

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These messages are of a class of message which ^ves positions of ships in harbor,

gives locations. The message, however, Js distinctly difFerent from the usual

type of ship report, which simply would say, \*^So many ships” or give their names,

in Pearl Harbor. This dispatch is different in that it calls for the location of a

ship in the harbor in her particular berth.

I recall no such request from Tokyo to the field; that is, to the Japanese j^ople,

to report like that except for Pearl Harbor. There might have been. We did

not see it. I believe there are one or two places were ships were reported like

in Puget Sound, in a certain berth or a dock, alongside of a dock, but this dis-

patch while of a class is of a character which is different.

In the light of hindsight it stands out very clearly, with what we can read into

it now, as indicating the possibility or at least the ground work for a Japanese

raid on Pearl Harbor. That significance which we now have in the light of hind-

sight was not pointed out to me by anyone, nor do I have the slightest recollection

of anybody ever having given that significance at the time.

Asked if he felt signifijcance should have been attached to the plan

at the time it was received, Admiral Stark said:

It is very difficult to separate hindsight from foresight. I can only say that

it went through our people, it went through the Army, who were likewise vitally

interested in the defense of Pearl Harbor, and I do not recollect anyone having

pointed it out. There was literally a mass of material coming in. We knew the

Japanese appetite was almost insatiable for detail in all respects. The dispatch

might have been put down as just another example of their great attention to

detail.

If I had seen it myself I do not know what I would have done. I might have

said, \*\* Well, my goodness, look at this detail,” or I might have read into it because

it is different, I might have said, \*‘W^ell, this is unusual. I wonder why they

want it?” I might have gone on, and diagnosed it or I might not, J simply do

not know. We read it now in the light of what has happened.

Captain McCollum, who was not in Washington at the time the

harbor berthing plan was intercepted or translated, suggested certain

reasons why^the plan would not have been interpreted as a ‘^bombing

plot.\*'^^ He observed that beginning in 1935 the Japanese Navy was

apparently not satisfied with the type of intelligence forwarded by

the consular agents and in consequence undertook to set up an ob-

servation net of its own, particularly on the west coast of the United

States, but that it was his feeling the Japanese had been unable to

put naval observers into the consulate at Honolulu. Therefore, as he

testified:

As we estimated it, the consul general at Honolulu was receiving, through the

Foreign Office at the instance of the Japanese Naval Department, explicit direc-

tions of the type of intelligence that was needed, much more in detail than any of

the other key consulates on the west coast, because he did not have the benefit of

the services of a Japanese Naval Intelligence officer within his consulate.

Therefore this thing here, if I saw it, I am quite certain I would have felt it was

just another move to get explicit information, to cut down the frequently voluble

type of reports made by consular officials which the Jap Navy did not like.

Captain McCofium further pointed out that the matter of how

ships were anchored and where they were anchored was desired to

indicate the facihty with which the fleet was prepared to sortie^ con-

sidering that the anchorage at Pearl Harbor is ‘‘chopped up^' into a

number of more or less independent locks. He testified:

To give a general statement of where the ships were, the stuff they are requiring

here, would require a rather long-winded dispatch, where the same .device such as

breaking it up into areas A, B, and C, such a simple device could be used. With

»« Id., at pp. 5790, 6791.

Capt. Arthur N. McCollum, Chief of the Far Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence.

Captain McCollum left Washington on September 24 and did not return until October 11. Committee

record, p. 9195.

1\*\* Committee record, pp. 9140, 9141.

Id., at pp. 9178, 9179.

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this tu«a discovered, a rather simple and short dispatch would suffice to give the

essential information as to the location of the fleet and also an indication of their

readiness for sortie. I would suggest that that is a reasonable, tenable hypothesis

as to why they wished information, apparently, in this detail.

In summary, Captain McCollum stated he would not now neces-

sarily regard the harbor berthing plan as a “bombing plan” unless

“I had Imown Pearl Harbor had been bombed.”

It appears clear that there were many other messages between

Tokyo and her consulates, received in Washington, indicating a likely

Japanese purpose to attack at points other than at Hawaii?\*^

These messages indicate a definite interest in the state of defenses

at many points. A dispatch from Tokyo on October 16 to its Seattle

consul instructed “Should patrolling be inaugurated by naval planes,

report it at once.” \*■\*\* In the same message the Consulate was in-

structed to report on the movement and basing of warships at least

once every 10 days, “As long as there is no great change,” but a report

was to be submitted “Should more than 10 vessels of any type arrive

or depart from port at one time.” A June 23, 1941 dispatch from

Tokyo to Mexico instructed:\*\*® “Regarding the plans for procuring

maps of the Panama Canal and vicinity, please have career attach!

Kihara make an official trip to Panama ^ Have the maps

taken out by plane, and then have Sato, the naval attach^, bring

them to Tokyo with him when he returns.” While no instructions

from Tokyo to Panama are available subsequent to August 2, 1941,

the reports to Tokyo contain detailed information concerning the

location of airfields, air strength, ammunition, location and camowage

of petroleum supplv tanks, location and strength of artillery patrofe,

radar detectors and their range, map procurement and other matters

which would obviously be of interest only if an attack on the Panama

Canal were conteniplated.‘“ While some of these messages were

translated after December 7, they have a distinct bearing on whether,

before the event, the harbor berthing plan was reasonably designed

to be a harbinger of the December 7 attack,\*\*\*

With respect to other messages concerning defenses, Tokyo on

August 1 requested Manila to obtain information “regarding the

camouflage and distinguishing marks- of the American naval and

military aeroplanes in Manila”.\*\*® On October 4 Tokyo instructed

Manila “to make a reconnaissance of the new defense works along

the east, west, and southern coasts of the Island of Luzon, reporting

on their progress, strength, etc.” \*\*\* Tokyo instructed Manila on

November 5, pmsuant to a request of the “Naval General Staff”,

to obtain information with respect to each port of call concerning

“(1) conditions at airports on land”, “(2) types of planes at each, and

number of planes”, “(3) warships; also machinery belon^g to land

forces”, and “(4) state or progress being made on all equipment and

establishments.” \*\*\* On November 15 Tokyo requested Manila to

“make investigations again” as to the number of large bombers in

W« Id., at p. 9141.

See committee exhibit No. 2.

\*«Id., at p. 111.

Id., at p. 122. \*

iw Id., at pp. 31-52.

General Marshall stated he was always in fear of a surprise attack on United States territory but the

probabilities pointed to the Panama Canal and to the Philippines before Hawaii. Navy Court of Inquiry

record, p. 863.

iM Committee exhibit No. 2, p. 54.

Id., at p. 72.

w Id., at p. 82.

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tile Philippines.\*\*\* Some 50 messages between Manila and Tokyo

during the period August 1 to December 1, 1941, contained detailed

information concerning airfields, air s^-rength and activity, stren^h

and activity of land forces, location of antiaircraft gims, and other

items of defense.\*\*\*

Seattle advised ToWo on September 20 that a warship imder

repair at Bremerton, Wash, had “the upper part of the bridge and

left side of the bow spotted here and there with red paint”.\*\*^ A

message of September 6 from Tokyo to Singapore and Batavia

requested detailed information concerning various types of fishing

vessels should Japan “require the use of these fishing vessels”.\*\*\* On

October 22 a message from Tokyo to Singapore reflected a specific

request, on behalf of the vice cmef of the Japanese General Staff,

for information concerning the air forces stationed in the Federated

Malay States.\*\*\* Another dispatch from Tokyo to Batavia on the

same day stated that the Assistant Chief of Staff desired an inspection

and report “on the air force in the Dutch Indies” in regard to training,

formation, and aerial combat methods; organization, types, number,

and location of planes; and types and number of planes being sent

from England and the United States.\*\*®

The ediibits are replete with evidence of the interest of Tol^o not

only in the state of defenses but in ships as well, at many different

points. For example, an intercepted dispatch from Tokyo to San

rVancisco of November 29 read:'\*\* “Make full report beginning

December 1 on the following: Ship’s nationality, ship’s name, port

from which it departed (or at which it arrived), and port of destina-

tion (or from where it started), date of departure, etc., in detail of aU

foreign commercial and war ships now in the Pacific, Indian Ocean,

and South China Sea.” Nor was the Honolulu consul the only one

reporting the exact location of ships in harbor. Manila advised

To^o on November 12 that on the morning of the 12th, an American

cruiser of the Chester class entered port — “She is tied up at dock No.

7 \* \* \*\*\* And again on November 22, Manila advised Tolgro,

among other things, that a camouflaged British cruiser entered port

on the “morning of the 21st and anchored at pier No. 7 \* \* i«3

Other examples of such reports will be hereinafter set forth.

Even today, of course, we do not know as a matter of fact that the

“berthing plan” was a l^mb plot. On the basis of testimony before

the committee, the desire to know or the supplying of information

with respect to the location of vessels within a harbor is not of itself

conclusive that its only purpose was in contemplation of an attack

in^much as such information also has the value of indicating what

ships are under repair and the readiness of vessels for sortie.\*®\* For

example, Seattle advised Tokyo on September 20, “Saratoga class air-

craft carrier, 1 ship (tied up alongside the pier)” at Bremerton.\*®\* San

Francisco advised Tokyo on October 2, “One Oklahoma class battle-

\*» Id., at p. 91.

Id., at pp. 64-98.

Id., at p. 109.

Id., at p. 101.

>« Id., at p. 102.

Id., at p. 102.

Ml Id., at p. 115.

«« Id., at p. 87.

Ml Id., at p. 94.

iw See Committee record, pp. 4622, 4623, 9178, and 9179.

iM Committee exhibit No. 2, p. 109.

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sh^ has arrived in port and is moored in front ot the Bethlehem ship-

building yard . It may be argued that if obtaining information

concerning the location of ships within a harbor should be construed

as definitely indicating a purpose to attack the ships at harbor then

these messages would logically appear to indicate a purpose to attack

at Breinerton and at San Francisco.

In seeking to determine whether the harbor berthing plan was in

reality a “bomb plot” it is noted that in making his report of December

5 and his last repoit of December 6 \*\*\* to Tokyo concerning vessels

at Pearl Harbor, the Honolulu consul did not employ the system

established in the plan for indicating the location of ships within the

harbor. In the report of December 5, he said:

\* \* \* the following ships were in port on the afternoon of the 5th: 8 battle-

ships, 3 light cruisers, 16 destroyers \* \* \*.

In the last report, the constil said:

On the evening of the 5th, among the battleships which entered port were

(garble) and one submarine tender. The following ships were observed at anchor

on the 6th: 9 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 submarine tenders, 17 destroyers,

and'in addition there were 4 light cruisers, 2 destroyers lying at docks (the heavy

cruisers and airplane carriers have all left) \* ♦

Failure to use the plan for indicating the location of ships within

the harbor at the only time when it could have materially assisted the

attacking force in locating ships as targets for bombing, that is on

December 5 and 6 immediately before the attack, raises a serious

question as to whether the berthing plan was in reality a bomb plot

at aUi

Japanese interviewed since VJ-day have asserted that intelligence

obtained from the consulates was regarded as of little importance.

They did not include the intelligence imder discussion in listing the

information which the Task Force employed in planning and executing

the attack on December

The record reflects that no one in Washington interpreted the harbor

■berthing plan of September 24 and related dispatches as indicative of

an attack on the fleet at Pearl Harbor or was in any way conscious of

the significance of the messages which it is now possible to read into

them. There was in consequence no conscious or deliberate with-

Wding of this intelligence from the Hawaiian commanders. General

Marshall, and Admirals Stark, Turner, and Ii^rsoll testified they

had no recollection of having seen these dispatches.\*\*\*

The peculiar division of Pearl Harbor into many lochs, the insatiabls

desire of Japan for meticulous information concerning vessels of other

governments everywhere, the manner in which the berthing plan lent

itself to convenience of communications, the fact that Tokyo was

repeatedly instructing its consulates to cut down on traflfic, the feeling

in Washington that Tokyo had no naval observer in Honolulu and in

consequence more detailed instructions to its consulate there were

required, Japan’s natural interest in full information concerning our

Pacific Fleet base, the many intercepted dispatches indicating a likely

■•»Id.,atp. no.

Id., at p. 28.

1“ Id., at p. 29.

iM\* See Part II, this report concerning Japanese plans for the attack; also section “The Bole of Espionage

in the Attack”, Part III, this report.

iw Committee record, pp. 2912, 5788, 5108, and 11311. Admiral Stark said: “We have been over this

bomb plot thing from start to finish, all of us in the front office, and I still not only have no recollection of

having seen it, it is my honest opinion that I did not see it.“ Committee record, p. 13960.

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Japanese attack at points other than at Pearl Harbor — all of these

considerations necessarily entered into the appraisal of the berthing

plan. It may be contended that under such circumstances it would be

manifestly unfair to criticize an oflBcer with many other responsi-

bilities for failure to interpret properly a message, considered before

the critical turn in our negotiations with Japan, which we single out

after the event for minute analysis and conclude may have been

des^ned to assist the Japanese in the bombing of Pearl Harbor.”\*

Similarly, it may be argued that the absence of apparent interest

by Japan in the defenses at Hawaii when compared with the avid

intwest manifested in the defense facilities in the Philippines, Panama,

Singapore, Batavia, and on the west coast is indicative, in the days

before December 7, of the fact that Hawaii was a much less likely

point of attack than these other places; and that in this light, Tokyo’s

detailed interest in our ship locations and movemenj^s was subject to^

the reasonable construction that Japan desired to be warned in advance

of any contemplated action by om' fleet and was not seeking informa-

tion with a view to an attack upon it or, otherwise stated, that she

desired information with a view to the fleet’s availability for distant

operations rather than its susceptibility as a. target.\*” Fmther, that

Pearl Harbor was the base of the Pacific Fleet, the only substantial

deterrent to complete freedom of action by the Japanese Navy in

Pacific waters and that in consequence thereof an unusual interest by

Japan in the location of our fleet units would appear quite under-

standable. It may be proj>er to insist that since Pearl Harbor was

the fleet base, Japan could be reasonably sure that substantial fleet

imits would be located there at virtually all times; \*” and that, with

this in mind, failure to manifest an interest in the defenses of Hawaii

when compared with such an interest shown at other points has a

distinct bearing on whether the information exchanged between

Tokyo and Honolidu concerning ship locations and movements could

have pointed in any way to likelihood of an attack at Pearl Harbor.

In this connection, the evidence does reflect that none of the inter-

cepted messages tianslated before the attack, between Tokyo and

Honolulu for over a year prior to December 7, contain any reference

to the defenses of the Army or N avy in Hawaii as distinguished from

locations of fleet imits.

From these considerations it may be contended that a careful

comparison and evaluation of messages relating to espionage activi-

ties by Japan’s diplomatic establishments would not have reasonably

indicated m the days before December 7 any greater likelihood of an

attack on Pearl Harbor than was warned against in the dispatches

sent the Hawaiian commanders on November 27.\*”

CONCLUSIONS WITH RESPECT TO SHIPS IN HARBOR REPORTS

Despite the foregoing observations, we think there are certain cir-

cumstances which distinguish the request for detailed information on

See oommittee record, pp. 2131-2138.

General Miles observed: ♦ \* this mess^e taken alone would have been of great military signifi-

cance but it was not taken alone unless you look at it by hindsight, which focuses all light on the event which

did happen. It was one of a great number of messages being sent by the Japanese to vaiious parts of the

world in their attempt to follow the movements of our naval vessels, a matter which we knew perfectly well

they were doing, and which we ourselves wcie doing in regard to the Japanese.” Committee record, p. 2100.

See Hewitt Inquiry record, p. 407.

in This appears to be the premise assumed by the Japanese in planning and launching the attack. See

Part II, this report.

in Committee exhibits Nos. 32 and 37, pp. 9 and 36, respectively.

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tl;ie berthing of ships in Pearl Harbor from similar or other requests

for information concerning other points. War with Japan was admit-

tedly probable for months before it actually occurred. Many of our

highest military and naval authorities considered it all but inevitable..

As the imminence of war increased so increased the importance of our

Pacific Fleet, the home base of which was Pearl Harbor, for in tho

broad picture of the Pacific, the fleet was our strong arm of defense.

Safety and fitness of the Pacific Fleet was of prime importance, and

any communication or information bearing thereon should have been,

given prompt and full consideration by competent authority. We

realize the exceedingly great demands upon the intelligence divisions

of the War and Navy Departments occasioned by reason of the great

flood of intelligence coming in from all parts of the world in the days

before Pearl Harbor. Nor do we overlook the Japanese policy of

^acquirii^ detailed information of every kind from many points. It

^may be fair to attribute to this and other considerations the failure to

see anything of imusual significance in the request of September 24 for

detailed information as to the berthing of ships in Pearl Harbor; but it

is difficult to escape the feeling that, when the message of November

15 was translated on Decemb^er 3 referring to the critical relations

between Japan and the United States and requesting that the “ships

in harbor report” be made irregularly but at least twice a week and

directly that extra care be taken to maintain secrecy, it should have-

raised in someone’s mind the thought that this intelligence was highly

important because it dealt with that which was most vital to our

safety in the Pacific — the Pacific Fleet. The message of November

20, translated December 4, directing a comprehensive investigation of

“the fleet (garble) bases” in the neighborhood of the Hawaiian mili-

tary reservation should not have lessened such interest.\*”

It cannot be forgotten that a sui-prise attack by air on Pearl Harbor

had been listed and understood, both in Washington and Hawaii, as-

the greatest danger to that base. We must assume that military men

realized that in order to execute successfully such an attack the

Japanese would necessarily need detailed information as to disposi-

tions at the point of attack. It would seem to be a natural conse-

quence that if Japan undertook an attack on Pearl Harbor she would

seek to acquire such detailed information and in point of time as-

nearly as possible to the hour of such attempt.

We are imable to conclude that the berthing plan and related dis-

patches pointed directly to an attack on Pearl Harbor, nor are we

able to conclude that the plan was a “bomb plot” in view of the

evidence indicating it was not such.\*” We are of the opinion, however,,

that the berthing plan and related dispatches should have received

careful consideration and created a serious question as to their signifi-

cance. Since they indicated a particular interest in the Pacific

Fleet’s base this intelligence should have been appreciated and sup-

plied the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet and the commanding

general of the Hawaiian Department for their assistance, along with

other information and intelligence available to them, in making their

estimate of the situation.

It may be argued that the fact that a “war warning" had been sent the Fleet on November 27 along:

with the code destruction intelligence before these latter messages were translated had a be^ing on or

possibly conditioned the failure to attach significance to them.

Admiral Kimrael said: “These Japanese instructions and reports pointed to an attack by Japan upon

the ships in Pearl Harbor." Committee record, pp. 6779, 6780.

Qenejral Short said: “\* \* \* such details would be useful only for sabotage, or for air or submarine'

attack on HawaiL" Committee record, p. 7989.

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The ‘^Winds Cqde’'^^

On November 19, 1941, Tokyo set up a code designed to be em-

ployed in daily Japanese language short-wave news broadcasts or

general intelligence broadcasts in the event ordinary commercial

channels of communication were no longer available. Two circular

dispatches Nos. 2353 and 2354 were translated by the Navy Depart-

ment:^^®

From: Tokyo

To: Washington

19 November 1941

Circular #2353

‘^Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.

In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and the

cutting off of international communications, the following warnings will be added

in the middle of the daily Japanese language short-wave news broadcast. -

(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZEAME,^

(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations: KIT A NO KAZE KUMORI^

(3) Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KAZE HARE}

This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and

each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard destroy all code papers,

etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.

Forward as urgent intelligence.

1 East wind rain.

\* North wind cloudy.

\* West wind clear.

From: Tokyo

To: Washington

19 November 1941

Circular #2354

When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the follow-

ing at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts:

(1) If it Ls Japan-U. S. relations J%IGASHI^\

(2) Japan-Russia relations, ‘^KITA^^

(3) Japan-British relations (including Thai, Malaya, and N. E. I.), ''NISHI'\

The above will be repeated five times and included at beginning and end.

Relay to Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Mexico City, San Francisco.

These intercepts were confirmed by a dispatch from the commander

in chief of the Asiatic Fleet to the OflBce of Naval Operations dated

November 28, 1941;\*\*® a message directed to the State Department

from its diplomatic representative in Batavia dated December 4,

1941 ji 8 i dispatch from the Army’s military representative in

Batavia, reading as follows:\*\*®

Japan will notify her consuls of war decision in her foreign broadcasts as weather

report at end. East wind rain. United States. North wind cloudy, Russia.

West wind clear, England with attack on Thailand, Malay and Dutch East

Indies. Will be repeated twice or may use compass directions only. In this

case words will be introduced five times in general text.

The foregoing message was sent “deferred” by naval communica-

cations for General Miles of the War Department and was not decoded

until the morning of December 5, 1941.

Both the War and Navy Departments extended themselves in an

effort to monitor for a message in execution of the winds code. Exten-

A detailed record study of the winds code will be found set forth as Appendix E to this report.

1^\* The circular dispatches were designed for Japanese diplomatic establishments generally.

Committee exhibit No. 1, pp. 164, 155.

i»Id., No. 142.

ittld.

t«Id.

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sive evidence has been taken concerning the matter, the preponderate

weight of which indicates that no genuine execute message was inter-

cepted by or received in the War and Navy Departments prior to the

attack on Pearl Harbor. Investigation conducted in Japan strongly

indicates no execute message was dispatched before the attack and

the British and Dutch, who were also monitoring for an execute

message, have advised that no such message was intercepted.\*® A

reasonable construction of the code is that it was designed for use in

the event ordinary commercial chaimels of communication were no

longer available to Japan, a contemplation which did not materialize

prior to Pearl Harbor. The fact that a message “West wind clear,”

applying to England, was broadcast after the attack tends to confirm

this conclusion.\*® Inasmuch as the question of the winds code has

been one of the few disputed factual issues in the Pearl Harbor case,

• there has been set forth in Appendix E to this report a detailed study

of the matter.

Based on the evidence it is concluded that no genuine “winds" message

in execution of the code and applying to the United States was received

by the War or Navy Departments prior to the attack on December 7, 194-1.

It appears, however, that messages were received which were initially

thought possibly to be in execution of the code but were determined

not to be execute messages.

Granting for purposes of discussion that a genuine execute message

applying to the winds code was intercepted before December 7,

we believe that such fact would have added nothing to what was

already known concerning the critical character of our relations wuth

the Empire of Japan.

“Hidden Word” Code

In addition to the winds code the Japanese in a dispatch on Novem-

ber 27 established another emergency system of communications that

has been familiarly referred to as the “hidden word” code.\*® The

dispatch establishing this code, which was sent as a circular to all

diplomatic establishments, stated: “With international relations be-

coming more strained, the following system of despatches, using

INGO DENPO (hidden word, or misleading language telegrams) is

placed in effect” and further “in order to distmguish these cables from

others, the English word STOP will be added at the end as an indi-

cator.” Thereafter, a number of code words, apparently arbitrarily

chosen, were set forth with the meaning of each word placed opposite

thereto. Among the code words were: HATTORI meaning “Relations

between Japan and \* \* \* (blank) are not in accordance with expec-

tation”; meaning “England”; and MIN AMI meaning

“U. S. A.”

On the morning of December 7 a circular telegram from Tokyo was

intercepted reading:\*®

URGENT 92494 KOYANAGI RIJIYORI SEIRINOTUGOO ARUNITUKI

HATTORI MIN AMI KINENBUNKO SETURITU KIKINO KYOKAIN-

GAKU SIKYUU DENPOO ARITASS STOP— TOGO.

"inld!

i«Id.

iw Committee exhibit No. 1, pp. 186-188. The original code was supplemented by a dispatch of December

2 from Tokyo to Singapore which was translated after the attack. Committee exhibit No. 1, pp. 216-210.

186 Committee exhibit No. 142-B.

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The translation as made by the Navy of the foregoing hidden-word

message was distributed in Washington to authorized recipients of,

Magic at 11 a. m. on December 7 in the following form:’®^

Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectation.

This was not the complete message, which should have been

translated: “Relations between Japan and the following countries

are not in accordance with expectation: England, United States.”\*\*®

The reason for the message having been distributed on the morning

of December 7 with the words United States omitted is explained by

the fact that Captain Kramer in his haste occasioned by the necessity

of delivering other messages, including the “one o’clock message”,

overlooked the code word relating to the United States and translated

the message as meaning only that “relations between Japan and

England are not in accoraance with expectation.” He indicated that

he later discovered the error and telephoned at “a quarter of one or

1 o’clock” the correction to his superior and an officer of Military

Intelligence.\*®\*

It is clear that the hidden-word message as literally translated \*\*®

contained no information of any import not already greatly over-

shadowed, as will hereinafter appear, by other intelligence available

on the morning of December 7 even had the words United States been

included at the time of distribution.

The “Deadline Messages”

The following message, No. 736, from Tokyo to tjie Japanese

Emhassy in Washington, relating to the then current Japanese United

States negotiations, was intercepted on November 5, 1941: \*\*'

Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all arranjyements

for the signing of this agreement he completed by the 25th of this month, I realize that

this is a 'difficult order, but under the circumstances it is an unavoidable one.

Please understand this thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving the Japanese-

U. S. relations from falling into a chaotic condition. Do so with great determina-

tion and with unstinted effort, I beg of you.

This information is to be kept strictly to yoursejlf only.

On November 11, 1941 another message from Tokyo to Washington,

No. 762, was intercepted, referring to the deadline set in the message

of November 5:

Judging from the progress of the conversations, there seem to be indications

that the Utiited-Btates is still not fully aware of the exceedingly criticalness of the

situation here. The fact remains that the date set forth in my message #736\*\*is

absolutely immovable under present conditions. It is a definite dead line and therefore

it is essential that a settlement be reached by about that time. The session of Parlia-

ment opens on the 15th (work will start on [the following day?]) according to the

schedule. The government must have a clear picture of things to come, in pre-

senting its case at the session. You can see, therefore, that the situation is nearing

a climax, and that time is indeed becoming short.

I appreciate the fact that you are making strenuous efforts, but in view of the

above mentioned situation, will you redouble them. When talking to the Secretary

of State and others, drive the points home to them. Do everything in your power

Id.

iM The Army translation of the message supplied in March 1944 read as follows: “Relations between

Japan and .1 are approaching a crisis (on the verge of danger): England, United States.”

Committee exhibit No. 142-B.

iM Hewitt Inquiry record, pp. 133-136.

Id., at pp. 67^581.

Ml Committee exhibit No. I, p. 100.

Jw Id., at pp. 116 , 117

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to get a clear picture of the U. S. attitude in the minimum amount of time. At

the same time do everythii^g in your power to have them give their speedy approval

to our final proposal.

We would appreciate being advised of your opinion on whether or not they will

accept our final proposal A.

The deadline was again referred to in a dispatch of November 15

from Tokyo to Washington, stating:

It is true that the United States may try to say that since we made no particular

mention of the changed status of the talks, they were under the impression that

they were still of a preliminary nature.

Whatever the case may be, the fact remains that the date set forth in my message

§736 is an absolutely immovable one. Please, therefore, make the United States

see the light, so as to make possible the signing of the agreement by that date.

Referring to a dispatch from its Washington Ambassador, the fol-

lowing message from Tokyo was intercepted on November

I have read your #1090,^®\* and you may be sure that you have all my gratitude

for the efforts you have put forth, but the fate of our Empire hangs by the slender

thread of a few Says, so please fight harder than you ever did before.

What you say in the last paragraph of your message is, of course, so and I have

S \*ven it already the fullest consideration, but I have only to refer you to the fun-

imental policy laid down in my #725.‘\*\* Will you please try to realize what

that means. In your opinion we ought to wait and see what turn the war takes

and remain patient. However, I am awfully sorry to say that the situation

renders this out of the question. I set the dead line for the solution of these

negotiations in my #736, and there will be no change. Please try to understand

that. You see how short the time is; therefore, do not allow the United States to

sidetrack us and delay the negotiations any further. Press them for a solution

on the basis of our proposals, and do your best to bring about an immediate

solution.

Responding to requests of its Ambassadors,^®^ in an intercepted

message of November 22, 1941, Tol^o extended the deadline date

from November 25 to November 29 in the following terms: ^®®

To both you Ambassadors.

It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my #736. You

should know this; however, I know you are working hard. Stick to our fixed

policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the solution

we desire. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to

settle Japanese- Ameiican relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or

four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing can

he completed by the 29th, (let me write it out for you — ^twenty-ninth) ; if the pertinent

notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and

the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished, we have decided to wait

until that date. This time we mean it, that the dead line absolutely cannot be

changed. After that things are automatically going to happen. Please take tbis

into your careful consideration and work harder than you ever have before. This

for the present, is for the information of you two Ambassadors alone.

As a follow-up to the foregoing message, Tokyo on November 24, 1941,

advised its Ambassadors that the time hmit set in the message of

November 22 was in Tokvo time.'®®

It is clear from the foregoing messages that ^Hhings,RTO--auto-

matically going to hajppen^^ after November 29, Tokyo time. It is

equal^ cleaFTro^m information now available that the happening was

to be the contemplated departure of the Japanese task force to attack

»wid.,atp. 130.

««Id.,atpp. 137. 13S.

See committee exhibit No. 1, pp. 127t129.

iM Id., at pp. 92-94.

w Id., at p. 159.

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Pearl Harbor. But the q^uestion is not what the deadline messages are

«een now to mean but wnat th^ reasonably conveyed to officials in

Washington in the days before December 7.

Tokyo had indicated the extreme im^rtance of time as the dead line

approached:\*®® “The fate of our Empi re hangs by the slender thread^

•of a few days.” BuTdoes this~importanee-and tne fact of the dead-

linb~mdicate an attack at Pearl Harbor or, for that matter, an attack

upon the United States elsewhere? It must be recalled that on

August 17, following the Atlantic Conference, President Roosevelt

advised the Government of Japan that if she took any further steps

in pursuance of a program of domination by force or threat of force

of neighboring countries, the Government of the United States would

be compelled to take aiw and all steps necessary toward insuring the

security of the United States.\*®\* It is not unreasonable to conclude

that, failing to secure a satisfaction of her demands by November 29,

Japan had determined to launch a program of aggression which she

felt would involve her in war against the United States. The extensive

•deployment of her forces to the south after November 29, it would

reasonably appear, was regarded as the action to be taken upon expi-

ration of the deadline date. Washington had expressed this estimate

to Admiral Kimmel on November 27 :\*®\*

The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval \

task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, J

Thai, or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo.

One of the factors considered in dispatching the “war warning”^ to

Admiral Kimmel on November 27 was that of alerting the Fleet

before the cut-off date of November 29.\*®\* We believe that the dis-

patch of November 27 to Admiral Kimmel beginning, “This dispatch

is to be considered a war warning” and the dispatch to General Short

of the same date advising that “hostile action possible at any moment”

was the equivalent of and in fact was of greater significance than the

so-called “deadline messages” merely informing that things would

automatically happen after November 29.

Based on what is now known concerning the plan of the Japanese

Attack, it is believed that in contemplation of the future intelligence

such as the deadline messages could well be supplied field commanders

as an item of information for their assistance along with dispatches

•designed to alert and to supply them with an estimate of the situation.

Dispatches Indicating Fraudtji,ent Nature op Negotiations

After November 28, 1941

The following message (No. 844) from Tokyo to the Japanese

Embassy in Washington, intercepted on November 28, 1941, indi-

■cated that negotiations thereafter were to be a sham and fraud: \*®\*

Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts, but in spite of

this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal.

This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Govern-

ment can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a report

of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send

»«Id.,atp. 137.

“1 See Part I, supra, “Diplomatic Background of the Pearl Harbor Attack".

Committee euibit No. 37, p. 36.

\*\*) See testimony of Admiral TVmer. It also appears that the November 24 warning to the commander

In chief of the Pacific Fleet was sent with a view to the deadline date of November 25,

Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 195.

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you in two or three daySy the negotuUione will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable,

Jlowever, I do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off.

Merely say to them that you are awaiting instructions and that, although the

opinions of your Government are not yet clear to you, to your own way of thinking

the Imperifi Government has always made just claima and has borne great sacri-

fices for the sake of peace in the Pacific. Say that we have always demonstrated

a long-suffering and conciliatory attitude, but that, on the other hand, the United

States has been unbending, making it impossible for Japan to establish nego-

tiations. Since things have come to this pass, I contacted the man you told me

to in your #1180 and he said that under the present circumstances that you

suggest is entirely unsuitable. From now on do the best you can.

In the light of hindsight, an intercepted dispatch of November 29

(translated November 30) portrayed the extent of Japanese guile

in perpetrating the fraud: ^

Re my #844.

We wish you would make one more attempt verbally along the following lines:

The’ United States government has (always?) taken a fair and judicial position

and has formulated its policies after full consideration of the claims of both sides.

However, the Imperial Government is at a loss to understand why it has now ^

taken the attitude that the new proposals we have made cannot be made the basis

of discussion, but instead has made new proposals which ignore actual conditions

in East Asia and would greatly injure the prestige of the Imperial Government.

With such a change of front in their attitude toward the China, problem, what

has become of the basic objectives that the U. S. government has made the basis

of our negotiations during these seven months? On these points we would request

careful self-reflection on the part of the United States government.

(In carrying out this instruction, please be careful that this does not lead to

anything like a breaking off of negotiations.)

It is to be noted in passing that the foregoing dispatch, without

benefit of retrospection, conceivably sugested at the time of its

interception, the possibility that Japan was putting out a ‘‘feeler’\*

with a view to our withdrawing from the position assumed in Secretary

Hull's note of November 26.

In an intercepted dispatch from Tokyo to its Washington Ambassa-

dor on December 1 it was observed that the deadline date of November

29 had come and gone with the situation continuing to be increasingly

critical, however, “to prevent the United States from becoming imdulv

suspicious we have been advising the press and others that thougn

there are some wide differences between Japan and the United States,

the negotiations are continuing. (The above is for only your in-

formation.)\*’ ^

During a trans-Pacific telephone conversation between Yamamoto

in Tokyo and Kurusu on November 27 (translated November 28)

instructions were issued to Kurusu: “Regarding negotiations, don’t

break them off.”

The following significant trans-Pacific conversation was had between

Kurusu and Yamamoto on November 30:

Kurusu. It is all arranged for us to meet Hull tomorrow. We received a short

one from you, didn't we? Well, we will meet him in regard to that. There is a

longer one coming isn't there? In any case we are going to see him about the

short one (i. e., telegram. The longer one is probably Tokyo's reply to Mr.

Hull's proposals.)

Yamamoto. Yes. I see.

Kurusu. The President is returning tomorrow. He is hurrying home.

Y. Is there any special significance to this?

K. The newspapers have made much of the Premier's speech, and it is having

strong repercussions here.

W5 Id., at p. 199.

«« Id., at p. 208.

Id., at pp. 188-191.

Id., at pp. 206-207.

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Y. Is that so.

K. Yes. It was a drastic statement he made. The newspapers carried large

headlines over it; and the President seems to be returning because of it. There

no doubt are other reasons, but this is the reason the newspapers are giving.

(Pause.)

Unless greater caution is exercised in speeches by the Premier and others, it

puts us in a very difficult position. All of you over there must watch out about

these ill-advised statements. Please tell Mr. Tani.

Y. We are being careful.

K. We here are doing our best, but these reports are seized upon by the cor-

respondents and the worst features enlarged up. Please caution the Premier,

the Foreign Minister, and others. Tell the Foreign Minister that we had expected

to hear something different, some good word, but instead we get this. (i. e.

Premier's speech.)

(After a pause, Kurusu continues, using voice code.)

K. What about the internal situation? (In Japan.)

Y. No particular (one or two words faded out)

K. Are the Japanese-American negotiations to continue?

Y. Yes.

K. You were very urgent about them before, werenH you; but now you want them to

stretch out. We will need your help. Both the Premier and the Foreign Minister

will need to change the tone of their speeches! — Do you understand? Please all use

more discretion.

Y. When will you see them. The 2nd?

K. Let's see — ^this is Sunday midnight here. Tomorrow morning at ten.

That will be Monday morning here.

(Pause.)

Actually the real problem we are up against is the effects of happenings in the

South. You understand don't you?

Y. Yes. Yes. How long will it be before the President gets back?

K. I don't know exactly. According to news reports he started at 4:00 this

afternoon. He should be here tomorrow morning sometime.

Y. Well then — Goodbye.

Admiral Kimmel in testifying before the joint committee said: ^

The intercepted Japanese diplomatic dispatches show that on and after Novem-

ber 29, a Japanese plan of action automatically went into effect; that the plan was

of such importance that it involved the fate of the empire; and that Japan urgently

wanted the United States to believe that negotiations were continuing after the

deadline date to prevent suspicion as to the nature of the plan.

What was this plan? Why such elaborate instructions to stretch out negotia-

tions as a pretext to hide the operation of this plan? Anyone reading the Japanese

intercepted messages would face' this question.

Certainly the concealed Japanese plans which automatically went into effect on

November 29 would hardly be the Japanese movement in Indo-China \* \* \*

\*‘No effort was made to mask the movements or presence of the naval forces moving

southward, because physical observations of that movement were unavoidable

and the radio activity of these forces would provide a desirable semblance of

normalcy". (Testimony of Admiral Inglis, Cfommittee Transcript, page 453.)

The troop movements to southern Indo-China were the subject of formal diplo-

matic exchanges between the two governments of Japan and the United States.

Thus, it was apparent to the Japanese government from this formal representa-

tion of the United States that our government was aware of the movement in

Indo-China. The United States expressed its concern about potential Japanese

action against the Philippines, the East Indies, Malaya, or Thailand. There was,

therefore, very little reason for Japan to keep up a pretext of negotiations for the

purpose of disguising these objectives.

Consequently, as time went on after November 29, and as Japan insisted to her

envoys upon the continuance of negotiations as a pretext to divert the suspicion

of the United States, it must have been apparent to a careful student of the inter-

cepted dispatches that Japan on a deadline date of November 29 had put into

effect an operation, which was to consume a substantial time interval before its

results were apparent to this government, and which appeared susceptible of

effective concealment in its initial phases.

••• Committee record, pp. 6791-6793.

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The observations of Admiral Kitnmel are well taken, however, they

are colored by knowledge of subsequent events. He has stated that on

or after November 29 “A Japanese plan of action automatically went

into effect” whereas the Japanese had stated that after that date

“things are automatically ^ing to happen.” He comments that

“ne^tiations were continuing after the deadline date to prevent

suspicion as to the nature of the plan” whereas it is only after the

event that this ruse could be apparent. He refers to the “concealed

Japanese plans” and observes that Japan’s open move to the South

could not be the “automatic move.” This premise presupposes that

the “automatic move” was to be concealed, a fact which was not

and could not be known until after the attack.

Admiral Kimmel makes reference to the intensification of Japanese

activity to the South about November 29 but fails to consider that

this activity was subject to the reasonable construction that the

“automatic move” was the move to the South and the desire to

“stretch out” negotiations was a natural step in seeking to prevent a

thwarting of Japanese plans in that direction before she was fully

poised for attack. That the Japanese movement to the South

effectively diverted attention from other points and effectively dis-

guised the strike against Pearl Harbor is indisputable. But this is

known only after the attack.

With the benefit of hindsight it is possible to attach to the fraudu-

lent character of Japanese negotiations after November 28 the greatest

significance — to see that it clothed a Japanese action fraught with

typical treachery. But it is clear from the evidence that the salient

questions in the minds of responsible officials in Washington in the

few days before Pearl Harbor was not — Would the Japanese attack? —

but when and where would she attack? The fact that an attack would

come was the considered judgment of our military. The Tokyo

dispatch of November 28 did not supply the highly essential informa-

tion which was desired. Neither the intercepted dispatches from

Tokyo indicating the fraudulent nature of negotiations after Novem-

ber 28 nor the deadline messages supplied the when or where of the

attack. We do not believe that this mteUigence, if taken together,

would have predicted Pearl Harbor as a likely place of attack.

To have advised Admiral Kimmel and General Short on November

28 that negotiations thereafter were a Japanese fraud could not have

suggested itself strongly to officials in Washington who had only the

day before told these commanders; “This dispatch is to be considered

a war warning. Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabiliza-

tion of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move

by Japan is expected within the next few days” ; and “Japanese future

action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment.”

Status op Diplomatic Negotiations and the Army Dispatch op

November 27

It is to be recalled that the “war warning” dispatch of November

27 from the Chief of Naval Operations to Admiral Kimmel related,

with respect to the status of our diplomatic relations with the Japan-

ese, “Negotiations with Japan lool^g toward stabilization of condi-

««Id.

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tions in the Pacific have ceased \* \* The message from the

War Department to General Short, on the other hand, stated “Nego-

tiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes

with only the barest possiMLiiies that the Japanese might come back

and offer to continue.”

The statement has been made that the estimate of the diplomatic

situation given General Short was not accurate and left the impression

there was still a possibility of the negotiations continuing whereas

we were in reality at “sword’s point” with Japan.\*"

The message stated negotiations appeared to be terminated to all

pr^tical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese

might offer to continue. To be sure Secretary Hull had advised the

Secretary of War on the morning of November 27 that he had “broken

the whole matter off” — ^had abandoned the idea of a modus vivendi —

and that he had washed his hands of it and “it is now in the hands of \

you and Knox, the Army and Navy.” \*\*\* But this was precisely the )

duty of the Secretary of State — to advise the Army and Navy when j

the probabilities were that negotiations had passed beyond the diplomatic J

stage and were in the hands of the military. Secretary Hull was indb-^

eating that he had given up the idea of a temporary diplomatic truce

with Japan and was expressing his personal and official feeling that

the Japanese Government would not respond to our Government’s

note of November 26 in such manner as to permit further negotia-

tions. Mr. Hull did not know that Japan would not possibly reply

with a counter proposal nor did anyone in our Government in Wash-

ington at the time the November 27 dispatch was prepared.

In recounting the chcumstances attending the November 27 dis-

patch to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department

(as well as to Panama, the Western Defense Command, and the

Philippines) Secretary Stimson stated that he telephoned the President

on the morning of November 27 suggesting that a final alert be sent

pointing out that commanders be on the qui vive for any attack and

explaining the exact situation. He stated the President approved

this idea. As related by Mr. Stimson;\*^\* “Ordinarily, of course, there

would be no reason for me to participate in the sending of any such

message which was the normal function of the military staff.\*" As

the President himself, however, had now actually directed the sending

of the message, and as I wanted the message clearly to apprise the

commanding officers in the various areas as to exactly what the dip-

lomatic situation was, I undertook to participate in the forming of this

message myself. In order that it should be strictly accurate, I called

up Mr. Hull myself on the telephone and got his exact statement as

to the status of the negotiations, which was then incorporated in the

first sentence of the messages.”

See committee exhibit No. 167. The comment of the Army Pearl Harbor Board was: “This state-

ment on Japanese information is inadequate. It did not convey to Short the full import of the informa-

tion concerning the American-Japanese relations which was in the hands of the War Department. It was

misleading in that it stated that there was a bare possibility of the resumption of negotiations, which car-

ried with it the implication that such resumption would influence the Japanese- American relations, i. e,,

that war might not come. The War Department was convinced that war would come.”

See Part I, supra, section “Diplomatiq and Military Liaison in Washington.’\*

\*\*\* See statement of Mr. Stimson, committee record, p. 14395.

General Marshall who ordinarily would have prepared such a dispatch was in North Carolina on No-

vember 27 incident to troop maneuvers. It appears that prior to his departure from Washington he had

discussed generally with General Gerow the matter of sending a warning message to our outpost commanders.

The message was finally prepared by Secretary Stimson in collaboration with General Gerow, among others.

See statement of Mr. Stimson, committee record, pp. 14394, 14396.

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It is to be noted that, according to Mr. Stimson's diary, after

Secretary Hull had told him the matter was now in the hancte of the

Army and Navy, he called the President who gave him a little different

view — ^“He said they had ended up, but they ended up with a mag-

nificent statement prepared by Hull. I found out afterwards that

this was not a reopening of the -thing but a statement of our constant

and regular position.” It was later during the day, while in con-

ference with the Secretary of Navy and General Gerow incident to

preparing the warning dispatch, that Mr. Stimson called Mr. Hull

and “got the exact statement from him of what the situation was.”

And from information available on November 27 there was ordy the

barest possibility, precisely the statement in the warning, that Japan

would accept or respond with a counter proposal to the note of No-

vember 26.

It is to be noted that it was not until November 28 that a dispatch

from Tokyo to Washington was intercepted stating in part:\*\*®

\* \* \* with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American

proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de

facto ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I do not wish you to give the

impression that the negotiations are broken off.

While this message would indicate at the time and we now know it

to be a fact that Japanese negotiations were thereafter a fraud, on

the very next day, November 29, a dispatch from Tokyo to Washing-

ton was intercepted stating,\*\*® “We wish you would make one more

attempt verbally along the followingJines,” thereafter suggesting a line

of approach in the (Sscussions and concluding, “In carrying out this

instruction, please be careful that this does not lead to anything like

a breaking off of negotiations.” Here there is manifested more than

a “bare possibility” that the Japanese would continue the negotia-

tions and had this Magic message been supplied General Short there

is no doubt he would have concluded tiie same thing even after

November 27. Indeed, had Admiral Kimmel and General Short been

supplied all of the diplomatic messages reviewed bj this Committee

it is concluded that their estimate of the diplomatic situation would

not have gone beyond a belief that there was only the barest possi-

bility that Japan would continue the negotiations; for the messages

indicate throu^out a conflicting and variable disposition by Japan

with respect to pursuance of the negotiations and her desire for

peace.\*\*®

The message to General Short is regarded as more accurately stating

the status of the diplomatic negotiations than did the Navy message

advising flatly that negotiations had ceased. The action taken by the

Navy was with a view to making clear beyond question the serious-

ness \*\*\* of the situation whereas the Army message, as stated by Secre-

tary Stimson, sought to give General Short the exact diplomatic

situatioii. It is to be noted that General Short had available the

• «« Committee record, p. 14422.

. \*»• See testimony of Mr. Hull, committee record, p. 1188.

\*17 See Mr. Stimson’s diary, committee record, p. 14423; see also pp. 2686, 2687.

Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 195.

Id., at p. 199.

22® See in this connection the testimony of Admiral Leigh Noyes, committee record, pp. 12720-12722.

It should be noted that Captam McCollum said: “I discounted anything which showed that they were

not going to jump on us. Everything I tried to say is that I felt that they were going to jump on us, that

I was convinced that the situation between us and Japan was intensely acute. Had I not felt that way I

certainly should not have put my office on a 24-hour basis early in November.” Committee record, p.

9268.

221 See testimony of Admiral Turner, committee record, p. 5163.

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Nuvy estimate of the situation inasmuch as he saw the Vwar warning”

of November 27 just as Admiral Kimmel, in turn, saw the "War Depart-

ment warning of the same date.

Even conceding for pmrposes of discussion that the dispatch to

General Short should have contained the same statement as did the \*

Navy message; that is, “negotiations \* \* \* have ceased”, such

does not in any way alter the responsibilities in the case. Certainly

in any situation no commanding officer will determine his coiu^e of

action on the basis of the bare possibility that negotiations may be

continued. How much more is this true when in the same message

he is told that hostilities are possible at any moment and is given

orders indicating the necessity for defense against an attack from

without!

It is in fact believed that had the message been otherwise worded,

stating cnly that there was a possibility the negotiations would be rup-

tured and carrying the same orders, it was the duty of the Command-

ing General of the Hawaiian Department to gird his defense against

the implications of that possibility. General Short was advised

there was only the barest possibUity that negotiations were not

already ruptured^

Failure to Follow-Up on the Short Reply op November 28

It is to be recalled that General Short’s reply to the warning message

of November 27 signed “Marshall,” read:

Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy rcurad

four seven two twenty seventh.

The evidence reflects that it was the responsibility of the War Plans

Division of the War Department to prepare the warning and the orders

it contained for approval by the Chief of Staff or the Secretaiy of

War.^\* Having instructed the commanding general in Hawaii to

report measures taken, it was the responsibility of the War Plans

Division to review the report and to advise the Hawaiian commander

in the event the action taken by him was not in keeping with the de-

sires of the War Department. The brief report of action taken, as

sent by General Short, was initialed by General Gerow, Chief of the

War Plans Division and by the Secretary of War.“® The evidence is

not clear as to wheUier the report was seen by General Marshall inas-

much as it was not initialed by him although he did initial other reports

from overseas garrisons to which the Short report may have been

attached.”®

2K For reference convenience, this dispatch was as follows:

^‘Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibili-

ties that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpre-

dictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot be avoided the United States de-

sires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting

you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed

to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be

carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken.

Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in rainbow five so far as they pertain to Japan.

Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential oflScers.” (Committee exhibit

No. 32, p. 7.)

See exhibit No. 32, p. 12. This is the form of the message as paraphrased and reviewed in the War

Department. The message as sent read: “Reurad four seven two 27th. Report Department alerted to

prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy. Short." It was addressed to the Chief of Staff:

See testimony of General Gerow, committee record, p. 2687 et seq.

«\*Id.

mid.

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Graieral MarshaU testified: ^

I do not remember whether or not I saw General Short’s reply, but the pre-

sumption must be that I did. In any event that was my opportunity to intervene

which I did not do.

General Gerow testified that when the reply from General Short

came through he assumed it was in answer to the G-2 message that

was sent by General Miles to the Hawaiian Department; \*\*• concerning

the likelihood of subversive activities.\*^\* He stated that after seeing

the reply he sent it to Colonel Bimdy (now deceased) \*\*\*• who headed the

“plans group” and that “it is reasonable to assume that he may pos-

sibly have interpreted the message to mean, or the part of the message

which said ‘liaison with the Navy,’ that the commanding general out

there had instituted protective measures against sabotage and was

working with the Navy to arrange for other defensive measures,

including reconnaissance.” It should be noted that General Gerow

did not discuss the matter with Colonel Bundy but merely suggested

this as a reasonable assumption from the way the message was worded.

General Gerow said: “I think my executive officer, or the chief of

my plans group, might possibly have interpreted the message that

way, and that is why it was not brought back to me and my attention

invited to the fact that it did not explicitly cover the operation.” \*\*\*

He observed that the reference to a “No. 472” meant nothing to him

at the time since this number was put on the outgoing message by

the S^al Corps and was not the number assigned the document by

the War Plans Division.\*\*\*

General Gerow admitted that no inquiry was sent to General Short

with respect to his report of action taken and that in the light of

subsequent events, he felt “it might have been desirable to send such

an inquiry, and had such an inquiry been sent it would probably have

developed the fact that the commanding general in Hawaii was not

at that time carrying out the directive in the message signed

‘Marshall’.” \*\*\* He remarked that “if that had been done, there

would have been an opportunity to correct the situation” but that

he did not believe “the message could necessarily be interpreted as

meaning that sabotage measures only were being taken.” \*\*\* After

stating that he interpreted the rep>ort of General Short to be in reply

to the Miles message concerning subversive activities and noting that

such an interpretation left him without any reply whatever from the

Hawaiian Department with respect to the November 27 warning,

^ roramittee record, p. 3010. See also in this connection. Committee Record, pp. 2899 and 3088.

This message, addressed to G~2 Hawaiian Department, read: “Japanese negotiations have come to

practical stalemate. Hostilities may ensue. Subversive activities may be expected . Inform Commanding

General and Chief of Staff only.” Committee exhibit No. 32, p. 10.

Committee record, p. 2714.

Col. Charles W. Bundy was killed in a plane crash shortly after the attack while en route to Pearl

Harbor.

Id., at pp. 2713, 2714. In this connection Secretary Stimson said: “• \* • he (General Short) then

sent a reply message to Washington which gave no adequate notice of what he had failed to do and which

was susceptible of being taken, and was taken, as a general compliance with the main warning from Wa^-

ington. My initials show that this message crossed my desk, and in spite of my keen interest in the situa-

tion it certainly gave me no intimation that the alert order against an enemy attack was not being carried

out. Although it advised me that General Short was alert against sabotage, I had no idea that being ‘alerted

to prevent sabotage’ was in any way an express or implied denial of being alert against an attack by Japan’s

armed forces. The very purpose of a fortress such as Hawaii is to repel such an attack, and Short was the

commander of that fortress. Furthermore, Short’s statement in his message that ‘liaison’ was being carried

out with the 'Navy, coupled with the fact that our message of November 27 had specifically directed recon-

naissance, naturally gave the impression that the various reconnaissance and other defensive measures in

which the cooperation of the Army and the Navy is necessary, were under way and a proper alert was in

effect.” See statement of Mr. Stimson, committee record, pp. 14408, 14409.

w\* Committee record, pp. 2716, 2717.

Id., at p. 2715.

Id., at p. 2716.

\*MId.

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General Gerow explained: was handling a great many papers at

tibat time, and it was the responsibility of the ofl&cers in my division

to check the messages and correspondence and bring to my attention

anything of importance that required action on my part.'' He

further observed that it did not occur to him that General Short would

not take some reconnaissance and other defensive measures after

receiving the November 27 message — “he was an expeiienced com-

mander and it never entered ray mind that he would not take such

action." In the course of Counsel's examination reference was

made to the following comments by Secretary Stimson with respect

to the investigation conducted by the Army of the Pearl Harbor

disaster:

Again, as I have pointed out, General Short, in response to a message which had

been sent out containing a warning of possible hostilities and a request for a report

of actions, had sent a message to the War Department which was susceptible of

the interpretation that he was on the alert against sabotage only, and not on the

alert against an air raid or other hostile action.

While this interpretation was not necessarily to be had from the wording of his

message, nevertheless, a keener sense of analysis and a more incisive comparison

of the messages exchanged, would have invited further inquiry by the War Plans

Division of General Short and his failure to go on the necessary alert might well

have been discovered.

The Chief of this division and certain of his subordinates knew that a report of

the measures taken by General Short had been asked for. General Short's reply

was brought to the attention of the chief of the division. A clear and satisfactory

reply should have been required. This was not ddne, and a more efficient function-

ing of the division would have demanded that careful inquiry as to the meaning

of General Short's message be made and no room for ambiguity permitted.

General Gerow was asked if he felt the foregoing was a fair state-

ment of the situation. He replied:

Yes, sir; I do, and if there was any responsibility to be attached to the War

Department for any failure to send an inquiry to General Short, the responsibility

must rest on War Plans Division, and I accept that responsibility as Chief of War

Plans Division,

Upon being asked if it were not the function of the Chief of Staff

and the Secretary of War to follow up on General Short's report,

(^neral Gerow stated: -^®

No, sir; I was a staff adviser to the Chief of Staff, and I had a group of 48 officers

to assist me. It was my responsibility to see that those messages were checked,

and if an inquiry was necessary, the War Plans Division should have drafted such

an inquiry and presented it to the Chief of Staff for approval. As I said, I was

chief of that division, and it was my responsibility.

\*35 Committee record, p. 2717.

\* 3 « Id., at pp. 2719, 2720. .

\*37 Id., at pp. 2727, 2728. See also committee exhibit No, 157.

\*38 Committee record, pp. 2726-2729. In the course of Committee examination of General Marshall the

following questions were propounded and answers given:

Question: “Well, a large number of people saw it (the Short reply)? General Gerow saw it and General

Gerow testified here that when he saw it he thought first that it was in response to a telegram sent out by

Q-2 relating to sabotage ar d when his attention was called to the fact, when t asked counsel to ask horn some

further questions and his attention was called to the fact that this was a direct response to your telegram

No. 472 otthe 27th and was a idressed to the Chief of Staff, he then changed his position and said, ‘I as Chief

of Operations or Chief of War Plans assume full responsibilitv.’

“Now, I think it is only fair. General Marshall, in the conduct of this examination in ascertaining the

facts to find out whether or not, just as General Gerow testified here, whether you assume the same responsi-

bility that he did?”

Answer: “I said earlier in this hearing, Mr. Keefe, in relation to the very thing you are talking about,

when I was questioned in regard to General Gerow’s statement, that I thought there was a difference; that

he had a direct responsibility and I had the full responsibility. Is that an answer to your question?”

Question: “He had a direct responsibility?”

Answer: “And I had the full responsibility.”

Question: “And you had the full responsibility. Well, just what do you mean by that?”

Answer: “His was in concern to the handling of the details of the matter and he had a responsibility

there. I am responsible for what the General Staff did or did not do.”

See Committee Record, pp. 3727, 3728.

\*» Id., at p. 2729.

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As earlier pointed out, the War Plans Division had the duty of

issuing operational orders and directives; it directed an order to

General Short on November 27, instructing him to report measures

taken; it failed properly to supervise the report submitted by the

commandinggeneral pursuant to direction. General Gerow, the

head of the War Plans Division, saw the report of measures taken in

the Hawaiian Department and presumed it was in response to a

dispatch from Military Intelligence warning of the likelihood of sub-

versive activities. This is not a tenable premise, however, inasmuch

as the report by General Short was addressed to the Chief of Staff and

was therefore a reply to the warning of November 27, signed

“Marshall”; a reply to the message concerning subversive activities

would not have, been addressed to the Chief of Staff unless the latter

had signed the message, which was not the case.\*^® Furthermore, the

reference by General Short to the number of the message to which

he was replying necessarily entailed calling from file the original out-

going dispatch in the event there was any doubt or presumptions

necessary in gauging to what the commanding general’s report was

responsive. Knowing that a reply from General Short had been

called for, it was incumbent upon the War Plans Division to follow

closely the receipt of such reply and to insure that the action taken

was in accordance with that desired. While the reply from General

Short was ambiguous and n^isleading, it was nevertheless the duty of

War Plans to require a clear and unequivocal response. By its sheer

brevity and lack of detail alone, the report should have suggested the

possibility that the official mandate had not been adequately imple-

mented.

The supervision by the War Plans Division in this instance was

slipshod. General Gerow, as head of the Division, must bear his share

of responsibility for this serious error, a responsibility which he has

unhesitatingly assumed. The primary responsibility, however, rests

with the appropriate subordinates of General Gerow who had the duty

and responsibility for supervision of details.^\*\*

The “Berlin Message”

An intercepted message from Tokyo to Berlin dated November 30,

1941 (translated December 1) follows:

The conversations begun between Tokyo and Washington last April during

the administration of the former cabinet, in spite of the sincere efforts of the

Imperial Government, now stand ruptured — broken. (I am sending ^u an

outline of developments in separate message #986) In the face of this, our Empire

faces a grave situation and must act with determination. Will Your Honor,

therefore, immediately interview Chancellor HITLER and Foreign Minister

RIBBENTROP and confidentially communicate to them a summary of the

developments. Say to them that lately England and the United States have

taken a provocative attitude, both of them. Say that they are planning to move

military forces into various places in East Asia and that we will inevitably have

to counter by also moving troops. Say very secretly to them that there is extreme

danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan

. through some clash of arms and add that the time of the breaking out of this war may

come quicker than anyone dreams.

\*40 Id., at pp. 2721-2724.

\*41 See section “Nature of Responsibilities,” infra.

\* 4 \* Dispatch No. 986, committee exhibit No. 1, p. 204.

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Another message of the same date from Tokyo to Berlin read, in

part;\*®

Judging from the course of the negotiations that have been going on, we first

came to loggerheads when the United States, in keeping with its traditional idea-

logical tendency of managing international relations, re-emphasized her funda-

mental reliance upon this traditional policy in the conversations carried on between

the United States and England in the Atlantic Ocean. The motive of the United

States in all this was brought out by her desire to prevent the establishment of a

new order by Japan, Germany, and Italy in Europe and in the Far East (that is

to say, the aims of the Tri-Partite Alliance). As long as the Empire of Japan

was in alliance with Germany and Italy, there could be no maintenance of friendly

relations between Japan and the United States was the stand they took. From

this point of view, they began to demonstrate a tendency to demand the divorce

of the Imperial Government from the Tri-Partite Alliance. This was brought out

at the last meeting. That is to say that it has only been in the negotiations of the

last few days that it has become gradually more and more clear that the Imperial

Government could no longer continue negotiations with the United States^ It became

clear, too, that a continuation of negotiations would inevitably be detrimental to our

cause.

And again:

The proposal presented by the United States on the 26th made this attitude of

theirs clearer than ever. In it there is one insulting clause which says that no

matter what treaty either party enters into with a third power it will not be

interpreted as having any bearing upon the basic object of this treaty, namely the

maintenance of peace in the Pacific. This means specifically the Three-Power

Pact. It means that in case the United States enters the European war at any

time the Japanese Empire will not be allowed to give assistance to Germany and

Italy. It is clearly a trick. This clause alone, let alone others, makes it impossible

to find any basis in the American proposal for negotiations. What is more, before

the United States brought forth this plan, they conferred with England, Australia,

the Netherlands, and China — they did so repeatedly. Therefore, it is clear that the

United States is now in collusion with those nations and has decided io regard Japan,

along with Germany and Italy, as an enemy.

This valuable intelligence added to the total of information pointing

to the moimting tenseness of relations but does not materially add to

that which was supplied our Hawaiian outpost in the warnings of

November 27, insofar as the prime duties of the commanders there

were concerned. These messages merely confirmed the conclusions

already voiced three days earlier to the outpost commanders that war

was imminent; that negotiations had ceased to all practical purposes;

that hostile action was possible at any moment.

Code Destruction Intelligence

As has already been observed. Admiral Kimmel was advised by the

Navy Department concerning the intercepted messages relating to the

destruction of codes in various Japanese diplomatic establishments.\*®

While Admiral Kimmel failed to supply General Short this intelligence

it is apparent that the commanding general otherwise obtained sub-

stantially the equivalent of this information. He was not, however,

supplied such iniformatiop directly by the War Department.

In explaining the reason for the Army's not sending the code-

destruction intelligence to Hawaii, General Miles testified:\*®

The main reason was that the code experts apparently agreed, at least the

Navy was particularly strong on the point, that their code was much more secure

Dispatch No. 986, cpmmittee exhibit No. 1, p.p 205-206.

2<^Id.,atp.206.

See Part III, supra; also committee exhibit No. 37. For the original intercepted messages concerning

the destruction of codes see committee exhibit No. 1, pp. 209, 215, 216, 236, 249, among others.

Committee record, p. 2221.

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than ours. It was obviously, of course, of great importance in security that a

message be sent in only one code and not two and we had every reason to believe,

or thought we did, that a Navy message to Hawaii would be promptly trans-

mitted to the Araiy authorities there.

The reason advanced by General Miles is consistent with the general

practice of the Army not to distribute Ma^c to field commanders for

security reasons.\*^^ While it appears that in some instances the Navy

in Hawaii was specifically advised to inform the Army of messages

received, the failwe to instruct Admiral Kimmel to so inform General

Short concerning the Japanese destruction of codes did not by inference

or otherwise indicate that this intelligence should not be supplied the

Army. Considering that Hawaii was, a command by mviual coopera-

tion, the W ar Department was properly privileged to take for granted

that there Was a full exchange of information between the Army and

Navy comjnanders,\*" particmarly after General Short had specifically

stated in his reply to the Department's warning of November 27 that

he had established liaison with the Navy.

The overwhelming preponderance of testimony by Army and Navy

experts is to the effect that the destruction of codes and confidential

documents under the circumstances prevaihng in early December of

1941 meant war from a military standpoint.\*\*\* It is clear that Wash-

ington adequately discharged its responsibility in transmitting this

information to Hawaii. With the failure, however, of Admiral Kimmel

to read into this intelligence what it is agreed should have been self-

evident to him, it is beheved that in contemplation of the future the

intelUgence as well as the departmental appraisal and estimate thereof

should be supphed field commanders.\*®\*

The McCollum Dispatch

The Navy Department in Washington had available substantially

the information which was in the possession of Admiral Kimmel with

respect to radio intelligence concerning the location and movements of

Japanese vessels. It- knew, as did Admiral Kimmel, that substantial

carrier units of the Japanese Fleet could not be located. This infor-

mation was carefully considered by the Office of Naval Intelligence.\*®\*

Capt. Arthur McCollum, Chief of the Far Eastern Section of Naval

Intelligence, was particularly charged with handling radio intelligence

material and it was he who drafted the dispatch of November 24,

See section “The ‘Magic’ ”, supra.

See committee record, pp. 2220-2224. Secretary Stimson stated: “It was the rule that all such infor-

mation should be exchanged between the Army and Navy at Pearl Harbor, and the War Department had

a right to believe that this information communicated to Admiral Kimmel was also available to General

Short.” See statement of Secretary Stimson with respect to Army Pearl Harbor Board’s report, com-

mittee exhibit No. 157.

Admiral Turner, for example, stated: • • • the destruction of codes in that manner and in those

places in ray mind and experience is a definite and sure indication of war with the nations in whose capitals

or other places those codes are destroyed. • • • It indicates war within two or three days.” Committee

record, pp. 5294, 5295.

It is to be noted that Washington did not minimize the significance of the code destruction intelligence,

despite the fact there were indications this move by Tokyo might be in anticipation of the possibility that

the United States would close down her consulates. The following intercepted dispatch of December 3,

1941, from Washington to Tokyo is of pertinence in this regard: “// ue continue to increase our forces

in French Indo-China, it is expected that the United States will close up our Consulates, therefore consideration

should be given to steps to be taken in connection with the evacuation of the Consuls.” Committee exhibit No. 1,

p. 227.

Before the Roberts Commission, Admiral Kimmel said: “ • • • the Department sent me a mes-

sage that these codes were being burned, and I feel, while that was good information, that they might very

well have enlarged somewhat on what they believed it meant. I didn’t draw the proper answer. I admit

that. I admit that I was wrong. Nobody can gainsay the fact that if I had drawn different conclasions

from what I got we might have changed things. Nevertheless, such a dispatch as that, with no amplifica-

tion,, was not near as valuable as it would have been if they had amplified and drawn the conclusions.”

See Roberts Commission record, p. 589.

See committee record, pp. 9119, 9120.

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1941,“\* to the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet, a copy of which

was sent Admiral Kimmel for information, instructing that the com-

mandant of the Sixteenth Naval District serve in effect as a clearing-

house for data concerning Japanese naval movements inasmuch as

the information obtainable in the Philippine area was considered

most reliable.

Captain McCollum prepared a memorandum dated December 1,

1941, pointing out that Japanese ''service radio calls for units afloat

were changed at 0000, 1 December 194P\“\* He also prepared another

memorandum bearing the same date summarizing the generally critical

situation with respect to Japan.\*®^ At a meeting attended by Ad-

mirals Stark, Ingersoll, Turner and Wilkinson, among others, in the

Navy Department on the morning of December 1, Captain Mc-

Collum personally^ read his memorandum last-mentioned, pointing

•out the imminence of war or rupture of diplomatic relations. He

requested information as to whether the fleets in the Pacific had been

adequately alerted and testified: "I was ^ven a categorical assmance

by both Admiral Stark and Admiral Turner that dispatches fully

alerting the fleets and placing them on a war basis had been sent.^^

It is significant that at this time neither Admiral Wilkinson nor

Captain McCollum had knowledge of the "war warning’' message to

Admiral Kimmel.“^

About December 4, 1941, Captain McCollum prepared a dispatch

designed to alert naval outposts, based in part on his memorandum of

December 1 outlining the critical situation in the Far East. He

testified:\*^

Captain McCollum. ♦ \* ♦ i was put in the rather difficult position of

not personally knowing what had been sent out to the fleet. Possibly it was none

of my business. As I pointed out to you, the basis of this memorandum — the

information it was based on — was actually as of about the 28th of November.

As time went on we had sent out dispatches to our naval attaches in Tokyo,

Pieping, Bangkok, and Shanghai to destroy all of their codes, and to report by

the use of a code word, and those codes were destroyed.

We were getting reports from our observers of the Japanese task force which

was moving down the Kra Peninsula. Our planes were sighting forces moving;

our submarines were trailing them. We had some little information in addition.

I still did not know what had been sent to the fleet.

I drafted a rather brief dispatch, outlining the information pretty much as is

in this memorandum, but greatly condensed. I went further and stated that we

felt everything pointed to an imminent outbreak of hostilities between Japan and

the United States. That dispatch was taken by me to my Chief, Captain Hurd,

and together we went in to see Admiral Wilkinson. We did it in view of the fact

that the function of evaluation of intelligence; that is, the drawing of inferences

therefrom, had been transferred over to be a function of the War Plans Division.

I was directed to take that dispatch and present it for the consideration of

Admiral Turner, the Director of the War Plans Division, which I did.

Admiral Turner read the dispatch over. He then made a number of correc-

tions in it, striking out all except the information parts of it, more or less, and

then showed me for the flrst time the dispatch which he had sent on the 27th,

which I believe is referred to as the ‘Var warning^\* dispatch, and the one which

was sent, I believe, on the 24th — wasnT it?

Counsel. That is right.

Captain McCollum (continuing). Which preceded that dispatch, and said

•did not I think that was enough. I said, Well, good gosh, you put in the words

‘war waming\ I do not know what could be plainer than that, but, nevertheless

I would like to see mine go too.”

MS Dispatch No. 242239, committee exhibit No. 37, p. 33.

sn Committee exhibit No. 85.

M\* Id., No. 81.

Mt See testimony of Captain McCoUupm, oommittee record, p. 9112-9123; also testimony of Admiral W ilkin-

^on,

iM Committee record, pp. 9130-9134.

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He said, ‘'Well, if you want to send it, you either send it the w&y I corrected it,

or take it back to Wilkinson and we will argue about it^' — or words to that effect.

I cannot presume to remember precisely.

I took it back to Admiral Wilkinson and discussed it with him, and he said,

“Leave it here with me for a while,'\* and that is all.

Now, I would like it understood that merely because this was prepared on a

dispatch blank in no sense means it was an oflScial dispatch. It was merely my

recommendation to my superiors which they were privileged to throw in the

wastebasket, I imagine. It was in no sense a part of the official file. It is nothing

other than a recommendation for the dispatch oflScer. I have written dozens

of dispatches for the admiral, and he could either throw them away, or use them.

There is no record kept of that sort of thing.

Admiral Turner’s testimony with respect to the foregoing incident

is as follows:-\*^

Counsel. There is some evidence here that Captain McCollum sometime

between the 1st of December and the 7th of December indicated or showed a

view that some further warning ought to be sent to Pearl Harbor. Do you know

anything about that?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir; and I was here yesterday when Senator Ferguson

read my testimony from the Navy Court of Inquiry, and I was a little confused

in that. I had nothing to refer to, 1 had not received any warning of more than

2 or 3 days about the proceedings and since that time in going over it myself and

thinking about it I arrived at what I believe is a correct statement on that subject.

From time to time Captain McCollum would come to me with drafts of memo-

randa to the CNO concerning the situation and we would discuss them. I think

that he had such a memorandum about the 1st of December but I do not believe

that it was intended to go out as a dispatch but merely for the information of the

Chief of Naval Operations. Now, I have not seen such a memorandum but I

have a recollection of that.

Now, about the 1st or 2d of December — and this is sure, I am completely sure

of this, I remember it very distinctly — about the 1st or 2d of December Com-

mander McCollum came into my offfce and handed me a proposed dispatch

written on one sheet of paper and approximately the length of the dispatch of

November 27 which he proposed that the Chief of Naval Operations send out to

the fleets concerning the imminence of war. It covered the same ground approx-

imately as the CNO dispatches of the 24th and 27th.

Now, I know that Admiral Wilkinson and some other officers in ONI had seen

those two dispatches and I asked McCollum if he had seen them.

Counsel. You mean seen the officers or seen the dispatches?

Admiral Turner. If he had seen the two dispatches of the 24th and 27th, and

he said, “No." So I pulled the two dispatches out and handed them to him and

said, “Well, read these over and then see if you think your dispatch ought to go."

He sat down and read them over and handed ^them back to me and he said,

“No" and tore up his proposed dispatch. It had the same general coverage but

was not as specific as these two messages."

Counsel. Not as specific as those two that were sent?

Admiral Turner. Not quite; no, sir.

Counsel. Can you give us any information from your recollection as to what

his proposed dispatch contained?

Admiral Turner. I agreed with it entirely, he and I agreed on the situation

and he was afraid that a warning had not been sent out and he had prepared

himself a dispatch which he wanted to send out to the commander in chief. I

did not ask him not to send it but I just merely said, “See if you think it ought

to go after you read these dispatches" and he read the two dispatches and he

said, “No." He said, “That is enough."

Admiral Wilkinson had no independent recollection of the events

attending the McCollum dispatch.^®

It is regarded as extremely resettable that the proposed dispatch of

Captain McCollum is not in existence in order that an objective esti-

mate of its contents might be made. Captain Safford in testifying

before Admiral Hart, stated:

Id., at pp. 5217-5219.

Id., at pp. «565-4658.

Hart inquiry record, p. 360.

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\* \* \* On the 4th of December 1941-, Commander McCollum drafted a

long warning message to the Commanders in Chief of the Asiatic and Pacific

Fleets, summarizing significant events up to that date, quoting the “Winds

Message,” and ending with the positive warning that war was imminent. Ad-

miral Wilkinson approved this message and discussed it with Admiral Noyes in

my presence. I was given the message to read after Admiral Noyes read it, and

saw it at about three p. m., Washington time, on December 4, 1941. Admiral

Wilkinson asked, “What do you think of the message?” Admiral Noyes replied,

“I think it is an insult to the intelligence of the Commander in Chief.” Admiral

Wilkinson stated, “I do not agree with you. Admiral Kimmel is a very busy

man with a lot of things on his mind, and he may not see the picture as clearly as

you and I do. I think it only §air to the Commander in Chief that he be given this

warning, and I intend to see it if I can get it released by the front office.” Atd-

miral' Wilkinson then left and I left, a fiew minutes laW. At the time of the

Japanese attack on P^rl Harbor, I thought that this warning message had been

sent, and did not realize until two years later. When I studied the Roberts report

very carefully, that McCollum’s message had not been sent.

The statement by Captain Safford that the proposed dispatch

referred to an implementation of the “winds code” was contradicted

by Captain McCollum who categorically testified that his dispatch

contained no reference to a winds execut message and that, in fact,

to his knowledge no such message had been received.\*“ As elsewhere

pointed out, the conclusion is made from all of the evidence that no

execution message based on the “winds code” was ever received in the

War or Navy Departments prior to December 7.

The fact that Admiral Kimmel already possessed the vital intelli-

gence with respect to the “lost” Japanese carriers and the unusual

change in service calls on December 1 would necessarily have condi-

tioned any consideration of an additional warning to him based

thereon. However, considering aU of the significant intelligence avail-

able around December 1, Captain McCollum, not knowing of the

warnii^ dispatches, prepared at sometime between December 1 and

4 an alerting message which he felt should have been dispatched.

Admiral Turner looked with disfavor on this message for the reason

that he felt it added nothing to what had already been supplied the

fleet and the further fact that he regarded responsible commanders

as adequately alerted, an attitude which prevailed throughout the

War and Navy Departments. Captain McCollum, too, regarded the

“war warning” of November 27 as fully adequate but testified he

would also “like” to see his warning transmitted. There is no evidence

before the Committee indicating with any degree of accuracy the

contents of the so-called McCollum dispatch to assist in determining

whether it may have added anything to the warning dispatches of

November 27 to the Hawaiian commanders.\*®\*

Events op December 6 and 7, 1941

An extensive amount of testimony has been taken concerning the

events of December 6 and 7, 1941, attending the interception, dis-

tribution, and action taken with respect to four diplomatic dispatches

from Japan to her Washington ambassadors. These four dispatches,

each of which wUl elsewhere be discussed fully, were:

(1) The so-called “Pilot Message,” No. 901, on December 6

advising that a long 14-part memorandum for the United States

Committee record, p. 9134. , , , .

This same observation would apply with respect to a \^rnin|? dispatc h said to have been prepared

in the War Department by Colonel Otis F. Sadtler which allepecly w.as not sent for the reason that mili-

tary outposts were regarded as adequately alerted. The facts oonceming the “Sridtler message" are=

seriously in doubt.

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was to be sent as a result of the American proposal of November

26 and that instructions concerning the time of presentation to

the United States would be provided in a separate message.\*\*\*

(2) The 14-part memorandum, message No. 902 (transmitted

in English) to be presented to the Government of the United

States. Tne first thirteen parts were intercepted on December

6 and the fourteenth part on tho morning of December 7.\*\*®

(3) The message, No. 907, intercei>ted on December 7, directii^

the Japanese Ambassador to submit the 14-part memorandum

to the United States at 1 p. m., December 7, Washington time.\*\*\*

(4) Message No. 910, intercepted on December 7, directing

that the remaining cipher machine (in the Japanese Washington

Embassy) be destroyed along with all code machines and that

similar disposition be made of secret documents.\*\*\*

Considering the time that has elapsed there has been an imder-

standable amoimt of discrepancy with respect to the recollection of the

p^icipants as to the exact time of handling the foregoing messages in

Washington. However, as subsequently will appear, composite con-

sideration of all the testimony tends to present a reasonably satisfac-

tory pictme. It is to be recalled that in December of 1941 the Army

ana Navy cryptographic units were dividing the work incident to de-

coding and translating Japanese diplomatic messages, the Ma^c, with

the Army generally assmning responsibility for messages beanng even

dates of the month and the Navy, the odd dates.\*\*\* Immediately upon

decoding and translating messages both the War and Navy Depart-

ments each received copies. It Was the responsibility of the Army to

make distribution of Magic within the War Department and to the

Secretary of State, while the Navy was responsible for distribution

within the Navy Department and to the Wnite House.

THE “piIiOT message”

At 6:56 a. m. on December 6 there was filed in Tokyo and between

7:15 and 7:20 a. m. intercepted by a Navy monitormg station\*\*\* a

dispatch that has come to be known as the “Pilot Message”:\*\*\*

1. The Government has deliberated deeply on the American proposal of the

26th of November and as a result we have drawn up a memorandum for the United

States contained in my separate message #902 (in English). ■

2. This separate message is a very long one. I will send it in fourteen parte

and I imamne you will receive it tomorrow. However, I am not sure. The situation

is extremely ddieaie, and when you receive it I want you to please keep it secret for

the time being.

3. Concerning the time of presenting this memorandum to the United States,

I will wire you in a separate message. However, I want you in the meantime

to put in nicely drafted form and make every preparation to present it to the

Americans just as soon as you receive instructions.

A teletype sheet containing this message in Japanese code was re-

ceived by the Army from the Navy at 12:05 p. m., December 6.\*\*\*

There is no documentary evidence available as to the exact time of

decoding, translating, and typing of the pilot message by the Army

Committee exhibit No. 1, pp. 288» 280^

M Id., at pp. 289-24«i

Id., at p. 248.

»• Id., at p. 249.

M See Army Pearl Harbor Board reoord» pw 128;

^ See committee exhibit No. 41.

Committee exhibit No. 1, pp. 238> 83Q|

\*• Id., No. 41.

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apart from the fact that these operations were completed on December

6. Cant. Alwyn D. Kramer was primarily responsible for distribu-

tion of Magic on behalf of the Na\y. He initially testified before the

committee that he was quite certain the pilot message was contained

in the folder also containing the first 13 parts of the 14-part mem-

orandum which were distributed by him during the evening of De-

cember 6.\*^® Captain Kramer subsequently modified this testimony,

based on a study of records available in the Navy Department re-

lating to the Magic materials. He testified:®^'

Yesterday afternoon when being questioned concerning this so-called pilot

message I made the statement that I believed that the pilot message had arrived

sometime late Saturday afternoon, 6 December 1941, or Saturday evening, and

that I believed it was distributed Saturday evening with the Japanese note and

other papers. I find as a result of my study last night that the pilot meseage xoaa

not dieseminated, at teaat in the Navy, until Sunday morning subsequent to 10 o’clock,

at the time when the so-called hidden-word message and a number of other short

messages, including the 1 o’clock message, were disseminated.

It would seem in consequence, from the best testimony available,

that no distribution was made of the pilot message in the Navy De-

E artment or to the White House imtil the monung of December 7.

[owever, it is to be noted that Admiral Wilkinson testified he saw the

pilot message before leaving the Navy Department on December 6.\*”

It appears on the o^her hand that distribution of the message in

the War Department and to the State Department was made during

the afternoon of December 6. Col. Kufus Bratton, who was respon-

sible for distribution of Magic by the Army, testified:”®

Distribution of the so-called pilot message was made that afternoon (December

6) about 3 o’clock. I do not now recall whether I did it in person or whether one

of my assistants did it, but I do recall discussing the subject both with General

Miles and General Gerow Saturday afternoon.\*”\*

The military significance oi the pilot message will be treated in con-

nection with the discussion of the first 13 parts of the 14-part memo-

randum.

THE 14-FART MEMORANDUM

First IS Parts

The first 13 parts of the 14-part memorandum were received in the

Navy Department between 11:49 a. m. and 2:51 p. m. on Decem-

ber 6.”® They had been decoded and typed in the Navy Department

and were ready for distribution by approximately 9 p. m. on that

date. Copies were thereupon delivered to the War Department.”\*

Captain Kramer in making distribution of this material on behalf

of the Navy arrived at the White House between 9:30 and 10 p. m.,

delivering the first 13 parts to Commander Schulz,”® an assistant to

Admiral Beardall,®” the President’s naval aide, with the request they

be given the President at the earliest possible moment. Commander

Schulz did thereafter deliver the messages to the President who along

«• Committee reoord, p. 10677.

Id., at p, 10739.

\*» Id., at p. 4669.

Id., pp. 12049, 12060.

The evidence tends to indicate some doubt, however, as to whether the “Pilot Message” was seen

by General Marshall on December 6. See Committee record, p. 3472.

Committee exhibit No. 41.

See Army Pearl Harbor Board (top secret) record, pp. 162-171.

^ Lt. (now Commander) Lester Rotert Schulz.

^ Admiral John R. Beardall.

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with Mr. Harry Hopkins read their contents. Kramer then pro-

ceeded to the Wardman Park Hotel where delivery was made to

Secretary Knox, who read the dispatches. He then went to the

home of Admiral Wilkinson wher% a dinner party was in progress

attended by Admiral Beardall, General Miles, and of course. Admiral

Wilkinson, among others. The first 13 parts were read by these

oflScers.^™ Kramer returned to the Navy Department at approxi-

mately 1 a. m. and thereafter retired upon seeing that the four-

teenth part of the Japanese memorandum had not been received.\*^\*

Copies of the first 13 parts were delivered on the evening of December

6 by an unidentified representative or representatives of the Navy

Department to Admirals Ingersoll and Turner at their homes.\*®®

The testimony with respect to distribution of the 13 parts by the

Army is conflicting, the weight of the evidence indicating, however,

that no distribution was made to authorized recipients in the War

Department on December 6. The evidence is in dispute as to whether

they were delivered to a watch officer at the State Department on the

evening of that date.\*®®®

The evidence indicates that the first 13 parts were read on the even-

ing of December 6, by, particularly, the President, Mr. Har^ Hopkins,

Secretary Knox, Admiral Ingersoll, Admiral Turner, Admiral Wilkin-

son, Admiral Beardall, General Miles, Captai^ Kramer, and Colonel

Bratton.\*®\* It is concluded from the evidence of record that the

message was not seen by Secretary Hull, Secretary Stimsou, General

Marshall, Admiral Stark, or General Gerow \*®\* prior to the morning

of December 7.

Analysis and Significance of First IS Parts Proper

In view of the conflicting interpretations that have been placed on

the first 13 parts of the 14-part memorandum, they are being set

forth in their entirety: \*®\*

Committee record, pp. 4633-46610.

Id., at pp 10451 et seq«

\*wid„ at pp 6097; 111:96.'

\*\*• Colonel Bratton testified that the last of the 13 parts came into his office some time between 9 and 10

o’clock that night, and that he was in his office when the last of the 13 parts came in (committee record

12049). He further testified that he personally delivered the 13 parts to the night duty officer at the State

Department some time after 10 o’clock that night, telling the duty officer that it was a “highly important

message as far as the Secretary of State was concerned” and that it should be sent out to Secretary Hull’s

quarters, which he was assured would be done (committee record 12052-12053). Thi< testimony is directly

contrary to the affidavit of Col. Clyde Dusenbury, then Colonel Bratton’s chief assistant, in the Clausen

investigation. In his affidavit. Colonel Dusenbury stated that he specifically recalled the interested

message in question and that “it started coming in the night of 6 December 1941 when I was on duty. Colo-

nel Bratton was also on duty then and saw the message coming in and he remained until about half of it had

been received. Thereupon he left and went home at about 9 p.m. I stayed so he could go home and .sleep.

I waited for the remainder. The fourteenth part, being the final part of the message, was received about

that night. Thereupon I left and went home. I returned the next morning to begin the disirtbution of this

intercept consisting of the fourteen parts and I began ihe distribution of the fourteen parts comprising this intercept

about 9 a. m. on 7 December 1041 ani finished with the delivery to the State Department as Kurusu and

Nomura were meeting with the Secretary of State. When I delivered the copy for OPD that morning I banded

it to then Col. Thomas D. Handy, who, upon reading it, said to me: “This means war,” or words to that

effect. None of these parts comprising tt is intercept was delivered before the morn ing of 7 December 1941 because

the first half had been received while Colonel Bratton was on duty and he had seen this and had not had

it delivered that night” (Clausen Investigation, committee exhibit No. 148, p. 50).

Colonel Dusenbury’s statements in his affidavit are in accord with the testimony of Gen. Sherman

Miles, then Chief of ti e Military Intdligence Di . ision and the superi. r officer of Colonel Bratton and

Colonel Dusenbury, who stated that Secretary Hull, Secretary Stimson, and the others on the War De-

partment’s “magic” distribution 1st received on December 6 all intercepted Japanese messages that were

translated that day up to midnight \*‘exc pt the first IS parts of the 14-part message” (committee record 4123-

4124 ).

iBi Captain McCollum is indicated to have seen the first 6 or 7 parts before leaving his office on Deoem

ber 6. Committee record, ft232, 9233.

\*« See committee record, p. 2741 .

\*» Committee exhibit No. 1, pp. 239-246.

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Memorandum

(Part 1 of 14)

1. The Government of Japan, prompted by a genuine desire to come to an

amicable understanding with the Government of the United States in order that

the two countries by their joint efforts may secure the peace of the Pacific area

and thereby contribute toward the realization of world peace, has continued

negotiations with the utmost sincerity since April last with the Government of

the United States regarding the adjustment and advancement of Japanese-

American relations and the stabilization of the Pacific area.

The Japanese Government has the honor to state frankly its views, concerning

the claims the American Government has persistently maintained as well as the

measures the United States and Great Britain have taken toward Japan during

these eight months.

2. It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to insure the stability

of east Asia and to promote world peace, and thereby to enable all nations to

find each its proper place in the world.

Ever since the China affair broke out owing to the failure on the part of China

to comprehend Japan^s true intentions, the Japanese Government has striven for

the restoration of peace and it has consistently exerted its best efforts to prevent

the extension of warlike disturbances. It was also to that e.nd that in September

last year Japan concluded the tripartite pact with Germany and Italy.

(Part 2 of 14)

However, both the United States and Great Britain have resorted to every

possible measure to assist the Chungking regime so as to obstruct the establish-

ment of a general peace between Japan and China, interfering with Japan’s

constructive endeavors toward the stabilization of east Asia, exerting pressure on

the Netherlands East Indies or menacing French Indochina, they have attempted

to frustrate Japan’s aspiration to realize the ideal of common prosperity in co-

operation with these regions. Furthermore, when Japan in accordance with its

protocol with France took measures of joint defense of French Indochina, both

American and British Governments, willfully misinterpreted it as a threat to

their own possessions and inducing the Netherlands Government to follow suit,

they enforced the assets freezing order, thus severing economic relations with

Japan. While manifesting thus an obviously hostile attitude, these countries

have strengthened their military preparations perfecting an encirclement of

Japan, and have brought about a situation which endangers the very existence

of the empire.

(Part 3 of 14)

Nevertheless, facilitate a speedy settlement, the Premier of Japan proposed, in

August last, to meet the President of the United States for a discussion of im-

portant problems between the two countries covering the entire Pacific area.

However, while accepting in principle the Japanese proposal, insisted that the

meeting should take place after an agreement of view had been reached on funda-

mental— (75 letters garbled) — The Japanese Government submitted a proposal

based on the formula proposed by the American Government, taking fully into

consideration past American claims and also incorporating Japanese views.

Repeated discussions proved of no avail in producing readily an agreement of

view. The present cabinet, therefore, submitted a revised proposal, moderating

still further the Japanese claims regarding the principal points of difficulty in the

negotiation and endeavored strenuously to reach a settlement. But the American

Government, adhering steadfastly to its original proposal, failed to display in the

slightest degree a spirit of conciliation. The negotiation made no progress.

(Part 4 of 14)

' Thereupon, the Japanese Government, with a view to doing its utmost for

averting a crisis in Japanese- American relations, submitted on November 20 still

another proposal in order to arrive at an equitable solution of the more essential

and urgent questions which, simplifying its previous proposal, stipulated the

following points:

(1) The Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to dispatch

armed forces into any of the regions, excepting French Indochina, in the south-

extern Asia and Southern Pacinc area.

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(2) Both Governments shall coowrate with a view to securing the acquisition

in the Netherlands East Indies of those goods and commodities of which the two

countries are in need.

(3) Both Governments mutually undertake to restore commercial relations to

those prevailing prior to the freezing of assets.

The Government of the United States shall supply Japan the required quantity

of oil.

(4) The Government of the United States undertakes not to resort to measures

and actions prejudicial to the endeavors for the restoration of general peace

between Japan and China.

(5) The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now stationed

in French Indochina upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and

China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area and it is

prepared to remove the Japanese troops in the southern part of French Indochina

to the northern part upon the conclusion of the present agreement.

(Part 5 of 14)

As regards China, the Japanese Government, while expressing its readiness to

accept the offer of the President of the United States to act as ^‘introducer’' of

peace between Japan and China as was previously suggested, asked for an under-

taking on the part of the United States to do nothing prejudicial to the restoration

of Sino-Japanese peace when the two parties have commenced direct negotiations.

The American Government not only rejected the above-mentioned new pro-

posal, but made known its intention to continue its aid to Chiang Kai-Shek ; and in

spite of its suggestion mentioned above, withdrew the offer of the President to act

as the so-called “introducer” of peace between Japan and China, pleading that

time was not yet ripe for it. Finally, on November 26, in an attitude to impose

upon the Japanese Government those principles it has persistently maintained, the

American Government made a proposal totally ignoring Japanese claims, which is

a source of profound regret to the Japanese Government.

(Part 6 of 14)

4. From the beginning of the present negotiation the Japanese Government has

always maintained an attitude of fairness and moderation, and did its best to

reach a settlement, for which it made all possible concessions often in spite

of great difficulties.

As for the China question which constituted an important subject of the nego-

tiation, the Japanese Government showed a most conciliatory attitude. As for

the principle of nondiscrimination in international commerce, advocated by the

American Government, the Japanese Government expressed its desire to see the

said principle applied throughout the world, and declared that along with the

actu^ practice of this principle in the world, the Japanese Government would

endeavor to apply the same in the Pacific area, including China, and made it clear

that Japan had no intention of excluding from China economic activities of third

powers pursued on an equitable basis.

Furthermore, as regards the question of withdrawing troops from French

Indochina, the Japanese Government even volunteered, as mentioned above, to

carry out an immediate evacuation of troops from southern French Indochina as a

measure of easing the situation.

(Part 7 of 14)

It is presumed that the spirit of conciliation exhibited to the utmost degree by

the Japanese Government in all these matters is fully appreciated by the American

Government.

On the other hand, the Ameiican Government, always holding fast to theories in

disregard of realities, and refusing to yield an inch on its impractical principles,

caused undue delays in the negotiation. It is difficult to understand this attitude

of the American Government and the Japanese Government desires to call the

attention of the American Government especially to the following points :

1. The American Government advocates in the name of world peace those

principles favorable to it and urges upon the Japanese Government the acceptance

thereof. The peace of the world may be brought about only by discovering a

mutually acceptable formula through recognition of the reality of the situation

and mutual appreciation of one another’s position. An attitude such as ignores

realities and imposes one’s selfish views upon others will scarcely serve the purpose

of facilitating the consummation of negotiations.

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(Part 8 of 14)

Of the various principles put forward by the American Government as a basis

of the Japanese-American agreement, there ar 9 some which the Japanese Govern-

ment is ready to accept in principle, but in view of the world's actual conditions,

it seems only a Utopian ideal, on the part of the American Goverment, to attempt

to force their immediate adoption.

Again, the proposal to conclude a multilateral nonaggression pact between

Japan, the United States, Great Britain, China, the Soviet Union, The Nether-

lands, and Thailand, which is patterned after the old concept of collective security,

is far removed from the realities of east Asia.

The American proposal contains a stipulation which states: ‘‘Both governments

will agree that no a^eement, which either has concluded with any third powers,

shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose

of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the

Pacific area." It is presumed that the above provision has been proposed with

a view to restrain Japan from fulfilling its obligations under the tripartite pact

when the United States participates in the war in Europe, and, as such, it cannot

be accepted by the Japanese Government.

(Part 9 of 14)

The American Government, obsessed with its own views and opinions, may be

said to be scheming for the extension of the war. While it seeks, on the one hand,

to secure its rear by stabilizing the Pacific area, it is engaged, on the other hand,

in aiding Great Britain and preparing to attack, in the name of self-defense,

Germany and Italy, two powers that are striving to establish a new order in

Europe. Such a policy is totally at variance with the many principles upon which

the American Government proposes to found the stability of the Pacific area

through peaceful means.

3. Whereas the American Government, under the principles it rigidly upholds,

objects to settling international issues through military pressure, it is exercising

in conjunction with Great Britain and other nations pressure by economic power.

Recourse to such pressure as a means of dealing with international relations should

be condemned as it is at times more inhuman than military pressure.

(Part 10 of 14)

4. It is impossible not to reach the conclusion that the American Government

desires to maintain and stren^hen, in collusion with Great Britain and other

powers, its dominant position it has hitherto occupied not only in China but in

other areas of east Asia. It is a fact of history that one countr — (45 letters

garbled or missing)— been compelled to observe the status quo under the Anglo-

American policy of imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice the — es to the pros-

perity of the two nations. The Japanese Government cannot tolerate the

perpetuation of such a situation since it directly runs counter to Japan's funda-

mental policy to enable all nations to enjoy each its proper place in the world.

(Part 11 of 14)

The stipulation proposed by the American Government relative to French

Indochina is a good exemplification of the above-mentioned American policy.

That the six countries — Japan, the United States, Great Britain, The Netherlands,

China, and Thailand — excepting France, should undertake among themselves to

respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of French Indochina and equality

of treatment in trade and commerce would be tantamount to placing that territory

under the joint guarantee of the Governments of those six countries. Apart

from the fact that such a proposal totally ignores the position of France, it is

unacceptable to the Japanese Government in that such an arrangement cannot

but be considered as an extension to French Indochina of a system similar to

the n — (50 letters missed) — sible for the present predicament of east Asia.

(Part 12 of 14)

5. All the items demanded of Japan by the American Government regarding

China such as wholesale evacuation of troops or unconditional application of the

principle of nondiscrimination in international commerce ignore the actual con-

ditions of China, and are calculated to destroy Japan’s position as the stabilizing

factor of east Asia. The attitude of the American Government in demanding

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Japan not to support militarily^ politically, or economically any regime other

than the regime at Chungking, disregarding thereby the existence of the Nanking

government, shatters the very basis of the present negotiation. This demand

of the American Government falling, as it does, in line with its above-mentioned

refusal to cease from aiding the Chungking regime, demonstrates clearly the

intention of the American Government to obstruct the restoration of normal

relations between Japan and China and the return of peace to east Asia.

(Part 13 of 14)

5. In brief, the American proposal contains certain acceptable items such as

those concerning commerce, including the conclusion of a trade agreement, mutual

removal of the freezing restrictions, and stabilization of the yen and dollar ex-

change, or the abolition of extraterritorial rights in China. On the other hand,

however, the proposal in question ignores Japan’s sacrifices in the 4 years of the

China affair, menaces the empire’s existence itself and disparages its honour and

prestige. Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese Government regrets that

it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of negotiations,

6. The Japanese Government, in its desire for an early conclusion of the nego-

tiation, proposed that simultaneously with the conclusion of the Japanese-Ameri-

can negotiation, agreements be signed with Great Britain and other interested

countries. The proposal was accepted by the American Government. However,

since the American Government has made the proposal of November 26 as a

result of frequent consultations with Great Britain, Australia, The Netherlands

and Chungking, andnd (probably ^^and as”) presumably by catering to the wishes

. of the Chungking regime on the questions of Chtual ylokmmtt (probably ^\*China,

can but”) be concluded that all these countries are at one with the United States

in ignoring Jai>an’s position.

The foregoing message is a long and argumentative rehash of the

Japanese-American negotiations. The motives and proposals of the

Japanese Empire are clothed in language of the most flattering terms

whereas the purposes of the United States are assigned a base char-

acter. The language employed in the first 13 parts ife much stronger

than had theretofore been employed by Japan in her proposals. In

the thirteenth part it is stated, ‘‘Therefore, viewed in its entirety,

the Japanese Government regrets that it cannot accept the proposal

as a basis of negotiation.^' Taken from its context this statement

would indicate that Japan is rejecting the November 26 note of our

Government and would possibly suggest that the current negotiations

were to be broken off at some time in the near future. But as pointed

out by Admiral Wilkinson, “It is one thing to break off negotiations

and another thing to break off diplomatic relations. The same

negotiations, I believe, had been broken off earlier and. then re-

sumed."

Commander Schulz, who delivered the first 13 parts of the Japanese

reply to the President, testified that the President read the message

and “Mr. Hopkins then read the papers and handed them back to the

President. The President then turned toward Mr. Hopkins and said

in substance — I am not sure of the exact words, but in substance,

\*This means war\^ Mr. Hopkins agreed and thev discussed then for

perhaps 5 minutes the situation of the Japanese forces, that is, their

deployment."

Committee record, p. 4668.

Asked what his action would have been had he known of the President's remark, General Marshall

said: can't say. IdovJbtifJ would have sent anything on that statement of the President at that time.\*' Com-

mittee record, p. 13804.

Admiral Stark was asked: \*'♦ • \* if you had known that the President did say something in substance

‘This means war,’ about the 13-part message, was there anything you would have done that night except to

read the message? Is there anything you could now tell us you would have done, .in the way of backsight or

hindsight that you would have done that you did not do?"

He replied: "It would not be backsight or hindsight, because when I read it on Sunday morning I saw

nothing in it to cause me to take any further action on it.\*\* Committee record, pp. 13912, 13913.

Committee record, p. 12441.

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To the queiy as to whether he could recall what either the President

or Mr. Hopkins said, Commander Schulz testified as follows:\*”

Commander Schulz. In substance I can. There are only a few words that I

can definitely say I am sure of, but the substance of it was that — I believe Mr.

Hopkins mentioned it first, that since war was imminent, that the Japanese

intended to strike when they were ready, at a moment when all was most oppor-

tune for them — ^when all was most opportune for that. That is, when their forces

were most properly deployed for their advantage. Indochina in particular was

mentioned, because the Japanese forces had already landed there and there were

implications of where they should move next.

The President mentioned a message that he had sent to the Japanese Emperor

concerning the presence of Japanese troops in Indochina, in effect requesting their

withdrawal.

Mr. Hopkins then expressed a view that, since war was undoubtedly going to

come at the convenience of the Japanese it was too bad that we could not strike

the first blow and prevent any sort of surprise. The President nodded and said,

in effect, “No, we can’t do that. We are a democracy and a peaceful people.”

Then he raised his voice, and this much I remember definitely. He said, “But we

have a good record.”

The impression that I got was that we would have to stand on that record, we

could not make the first overt move. We would have to wait until it came.

During this discussion there was no mention of Pearl Harbor. The only

geographic name I recall was Indochina. The time at which war might begin

was not discussed, but from the manner of the discussion there was no indication

that tomorrow was necessarily the day. I carried that impression away because

it contributed to my personal surprise when the news did come.

Counsel. Was therje anything said. Commander, with reference to the subject

of notice or notification as a result of the pap>ers that were being read?

Commander Schulz. There was no mention made of sending any further warn-

ing or alert. However, having concluded this discussion about the war going to

begin at the Japanese convenience, then the President said that he believed he

would talk to Admiral Stark. He started to get Admiral Stark on the telephone.

It was then determined — I do not recall exactly, but I believe the White House

operator told the President that Admiral Stark could be reached at the National

Theater.

Counsel. Now, that was from what was said there that you draw the con-

clusion that that was what the White House operator reported?

Commander Schulz. Yes, sir. I did not hear what the operator said, but the

National Theater was mentioned in my presence and the President went on to

state, in substance, that he would reach the Admiral later, that he did not want

to cause public alarm by having the Admiral paged or otherwise when in the

theater where I believe the fact that he had a box reserved was mentioned and

that if he had left suddenly he would surely have been seen because of the position

which he held and undue alarm might be caused and the President did not wish

that to happen because he could get him within perhaps another half an hour

in any case.\*®^«

In considering the remark by the President to Mr. Hopkins that

the first 13 parts meant war it is significant that there was no indica-

tion as to when or where war m^ht be expected.\*\*\*® The testimony

of Commander Schulz should be considered with that of Admiral

Beardall, to which reference will hereafter be made, in seeking to

determine the reaction of the President to the full Japanese 14-part

memorandum.

“» Id., at pp. 12441-12444.

The evidence tends to Indicate that following his return home after the theater, Admiral Stark was

advised that the White House had called, and that he did thereupon call the White House. See testimony

of Capt. H. D, Krick, U. S. Navy, before the committee.

Referring to the comment made by the President, General Marshall testified; “He didn’t tell me, and

he dij^n’t tell the Secretary of War. So he made a statement offhand on reading the thing’’ (13 parts).

Committee record, p. 13803.

In connection with the remark attributed to the President it is to be noted that at a ipeeting of the

War Council on November 25, President Roosevelt warned that we were likely to be attacked, perhaps as

soon as the following Monday, for the “Japanese are notorious for making an attack without warning.”

See statement of Mr. Stimson, committee record, p. 14390.

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The estimate given the first 13 parts by witnesses before the com-

mittee who reviewed them on the night of December 6 follows: ^

Admiral Turner. However, when I saw the 13 parts, which I believe was

about 11:30 on the night of December 6, I inquired from the oflfi^r who showed

it to me and brought it to my house as to who had seen that dispatch, and he

informed me that Admiral Wilkinson and Admiral Ingersoll and Secretly Knox

had all seen it before it had been shown to me. I considered the dispatch very

important, but as long as those officers had seen it, I did not believe it was my

function to take any action.

Admiral Ingersoll.^\*® \* ♦ \* when I read the 13 parts there was nothing

on which the Navy Department as such could that night take action. The gist

of the 13 parts was a restatement of the Japanese position we had known, of course,

all along.

Admiral Wilkinson.\*®^.\* \* \* both General Miles and myself, and to some

extent Captain Kramer, felt that this was a diplomatic message; it was a mes-

sage that indicated, or that resembled the diplomatic white papers, of which we had

often seen examples, that it was a justification of the Japanese position.

The strain was largely in the 14th part which we discussed the next morning.

Admiral Wilkinson agreed that he, General Miles, and Admiral

Beardall discussed the first 13 parts and referred to it as more or less

a ‘‘white paper’' or diplomatic communication — “A justification for

the Japanese position”

General Miles.^®\* I called him for the purpose of finding out what had been

done, what was going to be done with these first 13 parts, but I wish to call your

attention, Senator, to the fact that the first 13 parts as such was not of great

military significance. We had already discounted through many days the fact

that in all probability the Japanese reply to our note of November 26 would be

unfavorable and that was all that the first 13 parts told us. When we got the

fourteenth part we saw quite a different picture, when we got the 1 p. m. message

we saw miite a different picture, but there was no reason for alerting or waking

up the Chief of Staff, we will say, or certainly Secretary Hull, on the night of

December 6 that I could see.

Captain Kramer.®®^ I have stated that the first part I recollect seeing is part

8. If you will refer to that you will see that there is nothing in that part — in

fact, the last half of that part quotes the United States note — ^that was materially

different than the general tenor of previous notes back and forth between the

United States and Japan.

When the first 13 parts were complete I did, however, have that distinct im-

pression, that this note was far anci appreciably stronger language than earlier

notes had been and that it indicated a strong probability that the Japanese were

concluding any further negotiations.

Colonel Bratton considered the presence of the 13 parts in

Washington relatively unimportant militarily that evening.

I did so consider it upon their receipt and I still consider it now. They con-

tributed no information, they contributed no additional information to the matters

that we already had from magic and other sources as to the impending crisis

with Japan.

The message was incomplete. ‘ It ended on the note, in the thirteenth part:

^'Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese government regrets that it

cannot accept the proposal as a basis of negotiation.''

This was primarily of interest, immediate interest to the Secretary of State,

not to the Secretary of War or the Chief of General Staff for it was not an ulti-

w» Committee record, p. 8097.

Id., at p. 11377.

\*•1 Id., at p. 4665.

\*« Id., at p. 4667.

m Id., at pp. 2482, 2483.

^ Id., at pp. 10445, 10446.

Id., at pp. 12057, 12058.

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matum, it was not a declaration of war, nor was it a severance of diplomatic

relations.

The committee has noted the emphasis, pubhcity and speculation

concerning the whereabouts of General Marshall, the Chief of Staff,

and Admiral Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations, on the evening

of December 6. General Marshall has testified that while he could

not recall his whereabouts with certainty he presumed he was at

home. Admiral Stark could not recall his whereabouts, but the

evidence establishes that he was at the National Theater seeing

The Stvdent Prince Similar emphasis has been placed on the

fact that the Chief of Staff was horseback riding on the morning of

December 7, as was his Sunday-morning custom. The first 13 parts

were neither delivered to nor read by either General Marshall or

Admiral Stark on the evening of December 6. In any event, the

question of their whereabouts on Saturday evening, December 6, is

% any construction unimportant inasmuch as both officers saw

nothing in the first 13 parts to serve as basis for additional warnii^

to our outposts when they read them on the morning of December

In this connection, it is to be noted that the evidence conclusively

establishes that no conferences were held at the White House or

elsewhere with respect to the Pacific situation by ranking military

and executive officials on the evening of December 6, 1941.

The consensus of testimony by officers of the War and Navy De-

partments is to the effect that the first 13 parts, as such, of the 14-

part message bore little or no military significance.\*®\* While they

revealed a position assumed by Japan to which our Government could

not subsenbe there was no statement that negotiations were to be

ruptured and certainly no intimation of the treacherous attack to be

delivered at Pearl Harbor the following morning. From the “pilot

message” it was clear that a fourteenth part was to be transmitted

and that it would probably be received on December 7. Considering

this fact and the further fact that the first 13 parts gave no indication

of immediate military action by Japan, there was no occasion on the

evening of December 6 to dispatch additional warnings to outposts,

already regarded as alerted, pn the basis of a message that was

manifestly not complete. It is clear there was no inteUigence con-

tained in the message itself which had not been known for some time.

Military Significance of Pilot" and IS-Part Messages Apart from

Messages Proper

An intercepted dispatch of November 28, 1941, from Tokyo to its

Washington ambassadors had stated, refenii^ to Mr. Hull’s note of

November 26:

Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite of this,

the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal.

This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Govern-

See note 287a, supra.

\*«» General Marshall said: • • the first 13 parts were not of the nature of a vital threat as the 14th

part. That was a message of direct importance to the Secretary of State and of related importance, of

course, to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of Navy who had been collaborating with him in hia

relationship in the dealings with Japan.’’ Committee record, p. 3095.

For Admiral Stark’s estimate of the first 13 parts, see Note 2^, infra.

Admiral Stark stated that he regarded the first 13 parts, when he saw them on the morning of December

7, as routine, a rehashing of the attitude of the Japanese towards the situation which had been accumulating

over a period of weeks or months. In other words, that the 13 parts by themselves carried no implication

other than indicated; that it was a r^ashing, a restatement of their attitude. Committee record, p. 13722.

Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 195.

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ment can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a report

of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will

send you in two or three days, the negotiations will he de facto ruptured. This is

inevitable.

In the foregoing dispatch the Japanese Government stated it would

send a reply to Nomura and Kmusu within 2 or 3 days. This

presupposes the presence and availability in Washington of these

ambassadors to receive the reply. Clearly, therefore, war between

Japan and the United States was not to eventuate until the reply

had beep received in Washington, otherwise the Japanese ambassadors

would not be available for the purpose of receiving such reply. By

the same token war would not eventuate until the ambassadors had

V an opportunity to deliver the reply, otherwise little or no purpose

would be served in sending it whatever.

Knowledge of this fact should have intensified alertness in the War

and Navy Departments to such a point that from the moment the

14-part reply started coming in, all hands should have been on the

qiii vive and additionally an adequate nmnber of responsible officers

should have been actuaUy at their stations with full authority to act

in any emergency throughout the night of December 6-7. This

statement is of course subject to the observation that Japan had

indicated in the pilot message that the full reply would not be received

until the following day, Sunday, December 7, and even that was not

certain; that instructions would be sent in a separate dispatch with

respect to the time of presentation and “the situation is extremely

delicate, and when you receive it (the reply) I want you to please

keep it secret for the time being.” Further, it is clear from the evidence

that the receipt of the pilot message and portions of the first 13 parts

of the 14-part memorandum served as basis for special measures

taken by the War and Navy Departments to insure prompt handling,

decoding, and distribution of this magic material on the evening of

December 6. The naval officers who received the first 13 parts on

the evening of December 6 appear to have regarded them as requiring

no action during the evening. Within the i^my the first 13 parts

were seen by the Chief of the Military Intelligence Division, who in

view of the fact' that the fourteenth part had not been received and

the further fact that the message appeared to him to be of interest

primarily to the State Department, decided that it required no further

distribution within the Army that evening but should be deUvered to

the State Department.®^\* But the fact that the message was being

received removed the last known barrier to Japan’s taking military

action.®\*

In consequence, it is not believed the War and Navy establishments

in Washington were sufficiently alerted on the evening of December 6

awa As has been indicated, the evidence is in dispute as to whether the first 13 parts were in reality delivered

to a watch oflBcer at the State Department on the evening of December 6. See Note 280a, supra.

2 M However, it should be notea that Ambassador Nomura in a dispatch to Tokyo of November 26, 1941,

stated: “The United States is using the excuse that she is at present negotiating with the various competent

countries. In view of the fact that she w ill propagandize that we are continuing these negotiations only

with the viewT of preparing for our expected moves, should we, during the course of these conversations,

deliberately enter into our scheduled operations, there is great danger that the responsibility for the rupture

of negotiations will be cast upon us. There have been times in the past when she could have considered

discontinuing conversations because of our invasion of French Indo-China. Now, should we, wi^put

clarifying our intentions, force a rupture in our negotiations and suddenly enter upon independent opera-

tions, there is great fear that she may use such a thing as that as counter-propaganda against us. They

might consider doing the same thing insofar as our plans for Thai are concerned . Nevertheless, such a thing

as the clarification of our intention is a strict military secret; consequently, I think that it might be the better

plan, dependent of course on the opinions of the Government, that the current negotiations be clearly and irrevoca-

bly concluded either through an announcement to the American Embassy in Tokyo or by dedarationfor internal

a nd external consumption, I would like, if such a course is followed, to make representations here at the same

time.'\* Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 183.

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with a view to receiving the Japanese reply. As events turned out,

however, there was nothing contained in the first 13-parts to have

served as basis for additional warnings to outposts already regarded

as adequately alerted. The information contained in the first 13-

parts of the 14-part message did not add to the sum total of informa-

tion already supplied the commanders in Hawaii who had been

warned of war and advised “hostile action possible at any moment.”

It did not point to Hawaii. It did not provide the essential where or,

with any degree of definitiveness, the when of the attack. There is

no intelligence contained in the first 13-parts which this Committee

can conclude could reasonably be expected to have changed the

decisions already made in Hawaii.

The Fourteenth Part

At 2:38 a. m., December 7, there was filed in Tokyo and inter-

cepted by a Navy monitoring station between 3:05 and 3:10 a. m.

the fourteenth and final part of Japan’s reply to Secretary Hull’s

note of Noyember 26.\*\*\* This message as subsequently decoded by

the Navy read as follows:

(Part 14 of 14)

7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with

Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan’s efforts toward the establish-

ment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and especially to

preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at

war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present

negotiations. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust

Japanese- American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific

through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.

The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government

that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot hut consider that it is

impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.

The fourteenth part was available in the Navy Department for

distribution at some time between 7:30 and 8:00 a. m.®\*\* Captain

Kramer inade deUvery within the Navy Department shortly after

8 a. m. The delivery to the White House and to Secretary Knox,

who was at the State Department for a 10 a. m. meeting with Secre-

taries Hull and Stimson, was made shortly before 10 a. m. Distribu-

tion of the fourteenth part within the War Department was begun at

9 a. m. with subsequent delivery to the State Department.

It is to be noted there is no statement that Japan intended to declare

war on the United States nor, indeed, that formal diplomatic relations

were to be broken — merely that the current negotiations cannot pro-

duce an agreement. The fourteenth part is much less severe than the

strongly worded first 13 parts would have indicated. Admiral Beard-

aU testified as follows with respect to delivery of the fourteenth part

to the President:

As I recollect it, I went into his room, early, about 10:00 o’clock on Sunday

morning, with a message or messages, which I presume, to the best of my recollec-

tion, was the Hth part of this 13-part message that came in the night before, which

I delivered to him.

Committee exhibit No. 41.

Id., No. I, p. 245. As forwarding instructions to the radio station handling the fourteenth part there

appeared at the beginning the plain English phrase “VERY IMPORTANT".

\*«» Committee record, pp. 10461-10463.

»wid., at pp. 14010, 14011.

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Asked if there was any discussion or conversation with the. President

when he made the delivery, Admiral Beardall testified:

No discussion. We never discussed magic. I do recollect him saying though,

which D^rks this in my mind, that it looked as though the Japs are going to sever

negotiations, break off negotiations.

Admiral Beardall further testified that at the time of delivering the

fourteenth part to the President there was nothi^ in the manner of

the President which would indicate he was expecting an attack within

a period of hours; that there “was no alarm, or no mention of this,

mention of war, or of any actions on his part that would indicate that

he was expecting an attack.”

As to the question whether termination of negotiations would indi-

cate certain war it is significant to note that the Japanese Ambassadors

themselves stated in a message to Tokyo dated November 26, 1941:

We suppose that the rupture of the present negotiations does not necessarily mean

war between Japan and the United States, but after we break off, as we said, the

military occupation of Netherlands India is to be expected of England and the

United States. Then we would attack them and a clash with them would be

inevitable ♦ \*

From a review of the fourteenth part it is clear that nothing is

added to what was already known with respect to Japan’s reaction to

Secretary Hull’s note. To be sure it is observed that the “hppe

\* \* \* to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through

cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost”

and “in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot

but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through

further negotiations.” But these facts had already been known for

several days and the only paramount considerations at this time were

when and where Japan would strike. A thorough consideration of the

fourteen-part message, when viewed in the light of all other intelligence

already available in Washington, reflects no added information,

particularly of a mihtary character, which would serve further to alert

outpost commanders who had already been supplied a “war warning”

and informed that “hostile action possible at any moment.”,®®® This

conclusion is partially modified to the extent that actual dehvery of

the fourteen part message to the American Government might be con-

strued as removing the last diplomatic obstacle, in the minds of the

Japanese, to launching an attack.

“One O’Clock” and Final Code Destruction Messages

Two messages intercepted on the morning of December 7 have

received paramount consideration — the celebrated “one o’clock” mes-

sage specifying the time for delivery of the Japanese. 14-part memo-

randum to the Government of the United States and the message

setting forth final instructions to the Japanese Embassy concerning

•«Id.

Committee record, p. 14047.

Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 181.

General Marshall stated: \*\*\* \* ♦ the particular part which affected me and caused me to act was

not the 14 parts. It was the one o\*doc^, which, unfortunately, they put on the bottom of the pile and I

read through everything before I came to that.” Committee record, p. 13806.

Referring to the Japanese 14-part memorandum. Admiral Turner said: “I did not consider that that

message and the fact that it appeared to be an ultimatum changed the over-all situation in the least degree,

because I was certain in my mind that there was going to be wer immediately between the United States

and Japan, and this was merely confirmatory. The full orders, and what I felt was the full picture of the

situation had been given to the fleet commanders in the dispatch of Nov^ber 27, and conflnned definitely

by the later dispatches regarding the destruction of the Japanese codes and the Navy Department's orders-

for our people to destroy codes in exposed positions.” Committee record, p. 5099.

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the destruction of codes and secret papers. The latter was as fol-

lows:

After deciphering part 14 of my #902 and also #907,\*\* #908,\*®\* and #909,\*\*\*

please destroy at once the remaining cipher machine and all machine codes.

Dispose in like manner also secret documents.

This message was intercepted shortly after the one o’clock messt^e

but from the evidence it appears that both these intercepts were- dis-

tributed at approximately the same time. The “one o’clock” message

read as follows:

Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if pos-

sible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1:00 p. m. on

the 7th, your time.

This dispatch was filed by the Japanese at 4:18 a. m. December 7,

and intercepted by a Navy monitoring station at 4:37 a. m.®‘\* It was

decrypted and available m the Navy Department at approximately

7 a. m. thereupon being sent to the Army for translation inasmuch as

there was no translator on duty in the Navy Department at that time.

Translated copies of the “one o’clock” message appear to have been

returned to the Navy at approximately 9 a. m. Captain Kramer

testified®\*® that upon hb return to the Navy Department at 10:20

a. m. he foimd the “one o’clock” message and thereafter, between

10:30 and 10:35 a. m., delivered it to the ofl&ce of the Chief of Naval

Operations, where a meeting was in progress. Delivery was then

made within approximately 10 minutes to an aide to Secretary Hull

at the State Department and thereafter within roughly another iO

minute, to a Presidential aide at the White House. In the course

of delivery to the oflBce of the Chief of Naval Operations and to

Secretary Hull’s aide mention was made of the fact that 1 p. m.,

Washington time, was about dawn at Honoliilu and about the middle

of the night in the Far East. No mention was made that the time indi-

cated an attack at Pearl Harbor?^\*

Delivery of the “one o’clock” message within the War Department

was made at some time between 9 and 10 a. m. General Marshall,

after being advised at his quarters that an important message had

been received, arrived at his oflBce at some time between 11:15 and

11:30 a. m. where he saw for the first time the 14-part memorandum.

General Gerow, General Miles, and Colonel Bratton, among others,

being present. After completion of his reading of the memorandum.

General Marshall came to the “one o’clock” message and appears to

have attached immediate sbnificance to it. He testified that he and

the oflBcers present in his oflBce were certain the hour fixed in the “one

o’clock” message had “some definite significance;” that “something

was going to happen at 1 o’clock;” that “when they specified a day,

W! Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 240.

The dispatch set forth, infra, concerning delivery at 1 p. m., December 7, of the 14-part memorandum.

•••No. 908, dated December 7, read: “All concerned regret very much that due to failure in adjusting

Japanese- American relations, matters have come to what they are now, despite all the efforts you two

Ambassadors have been making. I wish to take this opportunity to offer my deepest thamcs to you b oth

for your endeavors and bard work as well as for what all the members of the Embassy have done." Com-

mittee exhibit No. 1, p. 248.

•\*• No. 909, dated December 7, read: “(From Bureau Chief Yamamoto tor Commercial Attache Iguchi

and his staff as well as to Secretary Yuki) I, together with the members of the Bureau, deeply appreciate

and heartily thank you for your great effort which you have been making for many months in l^half of

our country despite all difficulties in coping with the unprecedented crisis. We pray that you will continue

to be in good health." Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 248.

•‘I Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 248.

•“Id., No. 41.

•“ Committee recor<L pp. 10470-10479.

•“ See testimony of Captain Kramer before the committee; also Captain McCollum, committee record,

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that of course had significance, but not comparable to an hour;” and,

again, that it was “a new item of information of a peculiar charac-

ter.” At 1 1 :30 or 1 1 :40 a. m. Gtoferd Marshall t^ephoned Admiral

Stark and, upon learning the latter had read the message, proposed

that a warning be sent immediately to aU theaters concerned. It

should be noted that the exact time of Admiral Stark’s arrival at the

Navy Department is not definitely established although it is known

that he was there by 10:30 a. m. on the morning of December 7, at the

very latest.\*\*^ Admiral Stark hesitated because he regarded the theater

commanders as already alerted and he was afraid of confusing them

further.\*\*® General Marshall nevertheless wrote in longhand the draft

of a warning message to the Western Defense Command, the Panama

Command, the Hawaiian Conunand, and the Philippine Command,

as fbliews: \*\*\*

The Japanese are presenting at 1 P. M. Eastern Standard Time, today, what

amounts to an ultimatum. Also they are under orders to destroy their code

machine immediately. Just what significance the hour set may have we do not

know, but be on alert accordingly.

He instructed Colonel Bratton to take the foregoing message imme-

diately to the message center to be dispatched by radio but as Colonel

Bratton was leaving the room. Admiral Stark called to request that

there be placed on the dispatch the “usual expression to inform the

naval oflicer”. The following was therefore added in handwriting by

General Marshall, “Inform naval authorities of this communica-

tion”.»“

EVENTS ATTENDING TRANSMITTAL OF THE DECEMBER 7 DISPATCH

By 11:50 a. m. the handwritten warning had been delivered by

Colonel Bratton to Colonel French,\*\*\* in charge of the message center.

When Colonel Bratton returned. Genera) Marshall inquired as to how

much time would be required to encipher and dispatch the message.

Not understanding the explanation, he instructed both Colonels

Bratton and Bundy to obtain a clearer picture from the message

center. These two officers upon returning advised that the message

would be in the hands of the recipients within thirty minutes. Still

not being satisfied. General Marshall is indicated to have sent the

Army Pearl Harbor Board (top secret) Report, pp. 7, 8; committee record, p. 13806.

See committee exhibit No. 58.

See committee record, p. 5813. The testimony of some witnesses indicates Admiral Stark arrived at

the Navy Department as early as 9 a. m.

See Army Pearl Harbor Board (top secret) record, pp. 7, 8. Admiral Stark said: “During the morning

of Sunday, 7 December 1941, we had information to the effect that the Japanese Ambassador was to present

his Government’s reply to the 10-point note to the Secretary of State at 1 p. m. that same day. I was dis-

cussing this note and the time of its presentation with the head of the Central Division (Captain Schuii^-

mann) when General Marshall called me on the phone to ask if I knew of it. I told him I did, and he asked

me what I thought about sending the information concerning the time of presentation on to the various

commanders in the Pacific. My first answer to him was that we had sent them so much already that I hesitated

to send more. I hung up the phone, and not more than a minute or two later I called him back, stating that

there might be some peculiar significance in the Japanese Ambassador calling on Mr. Hull at 1 p. m. and

that I would go along with him in sending the information to the Pacific. I asked him if his communications

were such that he could get it out quickly because our comunications were quite rapid when the occasion

demanded it. He replied that he felt they could get it through very quickly. I then asked him to include

in the dispatch instructions to his people to inform their naval opposites.” Committee record, p. 5676.

Committee exhibit No. 32, p. 21.

Id.

Col. Edward F. French.

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two officers back again and their report upon returning was regarded

as satisfactory; tiiat is, he felt-assured from-what he was told that the

warning would be received by the pertinent commanders before

1:00 p. m.®“

After receiving the message Colonel French personally took charge

of its dispatch. Learning that the War Department radio had been

out of contact with Honolulu since approximately 10:20 a. m. he

thereupon immediately decided that the most expeditious manner

of getting the message to Hawaii was by commercial facilities; that is,

Western Union to San Francisco, thence by commercial radio to,

Honolulu. The message was filed at the Army signal center at 12:01

p. m. (6:S1 a. m., Hawaii) ; teletype transmission to Western Union

coiftideted at 12:17 p. m. (6:47 a. m., Hawaii); received by RCA

Honolulu 1:03 p. m. (7:33 a. m.,. Hawaii); received by signal office,

Fort Shafter, Hawaii, at approximately 5:15 p. m. (11:45 a. m.,

Hawaii) after the attack. It appears that the teletype arrangement

between RCA in Honolulu and Fort Shafter was not operating at the

particular hour the message was received with the result that it was

dispatched by a messenger on a bicycle who was diverted from com-

pleting delivery by the first bombing.

CHOICE OF PACILiriES

Colonel French testified that important messages to be transmitted

immediately had previously been sent by commercial means when

there was interference on the Army circuit between Honolulu and the

War Department; that on the morning of December 7 Honolulu ap-

peared to be in touch with San Francisco ; that he had a teletype con-

nection from his office to the Western Union office in Washington

and knew Western Union had a tube connecting with RCA across the

street in San Francisco ; that RCA had 40 kilowatts of power whereas

his set had 10 kilowatts; and that he concluded the fastest means of

transmission would be via Western Union and RCA. He stated that

he acted within, his authority in deciding to send the message by com-

mercial means and did not tell General Marshall how the message

was going.®\*®

Colond French stated further that he had not considered using the

telephone; that the telephone was never used by the signal center;

that it was unsuitable for a classified message; and that, in any event,

“if they wanted to use the telephone that was up to the individuals

themselves. Chief of Staff, or whoever the individual concerned.” ®“

According to General Marshall, the telephone was not considered

as a means of transmission, or that it may have been considered but

would not have been used, he was quite certain, certainly not to Hawaii

first; that if he had thought he could put a telephone call through, he

would have called General MacArthur first, and then would have called

w Army Pearl Harbor Board Record, pp. 8-10, 14. There is some testimony indicating only two trips

were made by Colonel Bratton to the message center.

3M. Army Pearl Harbor Board Record, pp. 188, 195; Roberts Commission Record, pp. 1843, 1844, 1846.

Army Pearl Harbor Board (top secret) record, pp. 189-205.

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the Panama Canal. He observed that it was important to send the

message in code because it was not known what '‘one o’clock meant”

and that it might have meant only a termination of diplomatic rela-

tions or some action in southeast Asia. General Marshall pointed

out that there was no secrecy in the telephone and that he was trying

to gain time and yet had to be careful not to ‘‘precipitate the whole

business” or do anything vhich could be construed as an act of war;

that it was important not to disclose to the Japanese oiu\* reading of

their codes

With respect to the matter of using Navy radio facilities, Colonel

French stated that the Navy used more power than did the Army and

occasionally the Army asked the Navy to communicate messages

but that in practice they did not use the Navy for expediting traffic

to Honolulu. He considered the possible use of Navy transmission

of the warning message but decided against it since it would have

reqxiired time to determine whether the Navy was also having trouble

getting through to Hawaii and the message would have had to be

delivered from the Navy at Pearl Harbor to Fort Shafter.®^\*

General Marshall had no knowledge on the morning of December 7

that the Army radio coffid not establish contact with Hawaii nor

that the Navy had a more powerfid radio to Honolulu.®^^ It is to

be noted that the message got through to addressees other than

Hawaii prior to the attack.

After the event it is easy to find other means of conununication

which General Marshall might have employed. This will always be

the case. It is clear from the record, however, that he selected a

secme means dictated by the contents of the message and was assured

after two or three requests for verification that the message would

get through in adequate time. It did not reach Hawaii because of a

faUiu'e in communications concerning which he could not have known

and concerning which he was not advised. It was the failure of com-

munications and not the selection of an improper channel that occa-

sioned the delay.

While it is not regarded as contributing to the disaster, for reasons

hereinafter to appear, it is considered extremely regrettable that

Colonel French did not advise the Chief of Staff upon his inability to

employ the Army’s radio, the anticipated means of communication,

particiilarly when he realized the OTeat importance of the message

and the personal concern of the Chief of Staff for its expeditious

transmitt£il.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ‘‘ONE O’CLOCK” AND CODE DESTRUCTION

MESSAGES

No one knew or presumed to know definitely just what the time

“one o’clock” meant.“\* Indeed, the warning sent by the Chief of

«« Army Pearl Harbor Board (top secret) Record, pp. 10-14. See also Roberts Commission record, p. 1803,

w Army Pearl Harbor Board record, pp. 203, 204. Roberts Commission record, p. 1844.

Roberts Commission record, p. 1801.

Admiral Stark observed: “My first reaction was that we had sent so much out that— and as there was

no deduction from the message, as to what it meant, at least we had made none at that time, that it would be

Just as well not to send it. A few days previous, when we had a discussion whether to send out anything

more, the question came up, be careful not to send too much, it might create the story of \*wolT.” Committee

Record, page 581 5. In this regard it is to be noted that Admiral Smith, Chief of Staff to Admiral Klmmel,

said that he thought there had been too much “crying wolf” and that such warnings had been received

not only during Admiral KimmePs administration but also previously by Admiral Richardson. See

Hart Inquiry Record, page 64.

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Staff stated “just what significance the hour set may have we do not

know." Despite this fact the Hawaiian commanders have asserted

or implied that if they had received this information at the earliest

possime moment on the morning of December 7, they would have

anticipated a surprise air attack upon Pearl Harbor and have insti-

tuted appropriate defensive measures accordingly.\*®\* It is to be

noted, however, that one of the ^erted justifications by Admiral

Eimmel and General Short for their not having taken the necessary

defensive measures prior to Decern)^ 7 was the fact that the warn-

ings they had received, while indicating that war was imminent,

pomted to southeast Asia and not to Hawaii as the likely point of

attack.

There was nothing in the fact that the Japanese ambassadors were

to present their Government’s reply to the American note of Novem-

ber 26 at 1 p. m., December 7, pointing any more to an attack on

Hawaii than to any other point to which General Marshall directed

his dispatch: Panama, the west coast, the Philippines. The intelli-

gence contained in the “one o'clock” intercept indicated no more

than the distinct possibility that some Japanese military action

would take place somewhere at 1 p. m.

What Admiral Kimmel and General Short would have done upon

receiving this intelligence or the Marshall dispatch before the attack

is necessarily speculative.

Testifying before the Roberts Commission concerning that portion

of the December 7 warning pointing out that instructions had been

issued for the Japanese Embassy to destroy its code machine immedi-

ately, General Short was asked whether his dispositions would have

been changed if the message had reached him, say three hours before

the attack. He replied:\*\*®

General Short. Yes. Oh, yes. I would have gone immediately to either — to

at least an alert against an air attack, and I probably would have gone against a

complete attack, because it looked so significant.

The Chairman. Well, can you tell me what was in that message that would

have stirred you up?

General Short. The thing that would have affected me more than the other

matter was the fact that they had ordered the code machines destroyed, because

to us that means just one thing; that they are going into an entirely new phase,

and that they want to be perfectly sure that the code will not be broken for a

minimum time, say of 3 or 4 days. That would have been extremely significant

to me, the code machine, much more significant than just the ultimatum.

It is to be noted that when appearing before the Roberts Com-

mission, General Short insisted he had no knowledge concerning the

destruction by Japanese diplomatic representatives of codes and con-

fidential papers, prior to December 7. As has been seen, the evidence

before this committee reflects that he received substantially this

information on December 6.

Admiral Kimmel has likewise suggested that the fact the Japanese

Washington Embassy had been ordered to destroy its code machine

would have been of greater significance to him than information

received on December 3 that the Embassy, among others, had been

ordered to destroy “most of its codes.” \*\*\* With respect to the latter

General Short said: '‘This message (the one o’clock message) definitely pointed to an attack on Pearl

Harbor at 1 p. m., Washington time.” Committee Record, page 7992.

\*\*• Roberts Commission record, pp. 1619, 1620,

Committee record, pp. 7476, 7477.

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intelligence Admiral IQmmel has testified: “I didn’t consider

that of any vital imwrtance when I received it \* \* \*” Signi-

ficantly, however, on December 6 the commandant of the Fourteenth

Naval District advised the Navy Department: “believe local consul

has destroyed all hut one system \* \*

It is concluded that the information contained in the Japanese

intercept of December 7 instructing the Washington Embassy to

destroy its remaining code machine, added little if any information to

that already possessed by Admiral Kimmel concerning Japanese de-

struction of codes and confidential matter; and that if the intelligence

supplied him in this regard on December 3 did not serve to warn of

the imnaediate imminence of war the information concerning the

destruction of the Japanese code machine on the morning pf Decem-

ber 7 would not have effectively modified the situation. In the case

of General Short, as elsewhere pointed out, it appears that while

Admiral Blimmel did not supply him with the intelligence he had

received concerning the destruction of codes, the Commanding

General none-the-less received information of an equivalent character.

We believe, however, that the “one o’clock” intercept should have

been recognized as indicating the distinct possibility that some Japa-

nese mihtary action would occur somewhere at 1 p. m., December 7,

Washington time. If properly appreciated, this intercept should

have suggested a dispatch to <ul Pacific outpost commanders supply-

ing this information, as General Marshall attempted to do immedi-

ately upon seeing it.

Significant Messages Translated After the Attack

INTELLIGENCE CONCERNING HAWAIIAN DEFENSES

One of the most unfortunate circumstances attending the handling

of Magic is the fact that several very significant messages were not

translated until after the attack. After December 7, 13 messages

between Tokyo and Honolulu from November 24 to December 6 were

translated, several of these differing markedly from any of the messages

between these points translated prior to December 7. Three of the 13

messages were from Tokyo, two of which related to instructions and

interest concerning fleet’ lopatjpns and movements with the third,

however, containing for the first time an inquiry from Tokyo concern-

»» Id., at p. 7477.

S33 The extreme importance of codes being destroyed in the consulates was expressed by Admiral Ingersoll

In his testimony:

“1 considered that the information which we received regarding the destruction of the codes and which

was sent out to the fleets as one of the two most important messages that were sent out by the Chief of Naval

Operations during the entire period before Pearl Harbor, the other one being the dispatch stating that,

‘This is a war warning’ in effect and that all hope of negotiations had broken off . . .

“The importance of the messages regarding the destruction of the codes is this: If you rupture diplomatic

negotiations you do not necessarily have to burn your codes. The diplomats go home and they can pack up

their codes with their dolls and take them home. Also, when you rupture diplomatic negotiations you do

not rupture consular relations. The consuls stay on.

“Now in this particular set of dispatches they not only told their diplomats in Washington and London

to bum their codes but they told their consuls in Manila, in Hongkong, Singapore, and Batavia to bum their

codes and that did not mean a mpture of diplomatic negotiations, it meant war, and that information was

sent owtto the fleet as soon as we got it \* • •“ Committee record, pp. 11286, 11287.

M\* Committee exhibit No. 2, pp. 16-29.

. »»«Id.,atpp. 18, 26.

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ing the defenses of the fleet in port. The latter message dated Decem-

ber 2 (translated December 30) read:^^®

In view of the present situation, the presence in port of warships, airplane

carriers, and cruisers is of utmost imt^rtance. Hereafter, to the utmost of your

ability, let me know day by day. Wire me in each case whether or not there are

any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or if there are any indications that

they will be sent up. Also advise me whether or not the warships are provided

with antimine nets.

The messages translated after December 7 from Honolulu to Tokyo

also reflect for the first time that information relating to the defenses

at Pearl Harbor was being collected and supplied to Japan. In a

message of November 24, Tokyo was advised that on the preceding

night five mine layers had conducted mine-laying operations outside

the harbor.®®^ A November 28 message reported, ^ ‘there are eight

planes at Midway and the altitude range of their anti-aircraft

gims is (5,000 feet?)'' ; that “12,000 men (mostly marines) are expected

to reinforce the troops in Honolulu during December or January";

and that “there has usually been one cruiser in the waters about

(15,000 feet?) south of Pearl Harbor and one or two destroyers at

the entrance to the harbor."

Of extreme significance are two messages of December 6 (both

translated Dect«nber 8) one of which reads as follows:

Re the last part of your #123.\*^°

1. On the American Continent in October the Army began training barrage

balloon troops at Camp Davis, North Carolina. Not only have they ordered

four or five hundred balloons, but it is understood that they are considering the

use of these balloons in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. Insofar as Hawaii

is concerned, though investigations have been made in the neighborhood of

Pearl Harbor, they have not set up mooring equipment, nor have they selected

the troops to man them. Furthermore, there is no indication that any training

for the maintenance of balloons is being undertaken. At the present time there

are no signs of barrage balloon equipment. In addition, it is difficult to imagine

that they have actually any. However, even though they have actually made

preparations, because they must control the air over the water and land runways

of the airports in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, Hickam, Ford, and Ewa, there are

limits in the balloon defense of Pearl Harbor. I imagine that in all probability

there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against

these places.

2. In my opinion the battleships do not have torpedo nets. The details are

not known. I will report the results of my investigation.

The Ather message, of .December 6 from Honolulu to Tokyo r^orted,

among other things, “it appears that no air reconnaissance is being

conducted by the fleet air arm.”

Also of particular interest is a message from Honolulu on Decem-

ber 3 estabhshing a “number code” to indicate whether warships' of

a given categoiy were preparing to sortie or had departed. A system

Id., at p. 21. This message was transmitted from Hawaii and was translated by the Army in Wash-

ington, the translation bearing the notation, “This message was received on December 23.“

m Translated December 16, 1941, by the Army. Committee exhibit No. 2, p. 17.

Translated December 8, 1941, by the Army. Committee exhibit No. 2, p. 19.

»• Committee exhibit No. 2, pp. 27, 28. Army translation. The record indicates that this information urns

taken from material published in newspapers.

MO See committee exhibit No. 2, p. 21.

Ml Id., p. 29. Army translation.

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of houseli^hts, newspaper want ads and bonfires, in addition to the

use of a sail boat, was desired to indicate the code numbers. While

this system of commtmication did not relate to the defenses of Hawaii,

it was clearly in anticipation that the normal channels for trans-

mitting information regarding the movements of the fieet might be

cut off and that a visual means of communication, probably to sub-

marines offshore, was desired. It is also to be noted that no provision

was made in the code for transmitting information concerning the

departure of ships after December 6.

This message was decrypted and translated in rough form on

December 6 by a civilian translator in the Navy Department, it

having been received from a radio intercept station of the Anny at

Fort Hunt, Va. While Captain Kramer testified he had no positive

recollection of having seen the translation prior to the attack, the

evidence tends to indicate that the rough translation was shown to

him on the afternoon of December 6 but that on accoimt of the

pressure of work on other important diplomatic messages, including

the first 13 parts of the Japanese 14-part memorandum, no action was

taken on the translation until December 8.®® It is to be noted that

this intercept of December 3 was in a code system referred to as

“PA-K2” whereas the important Japanese 14-part reply which started

coming in on the afternoon of December 6 was in the so-caUed Purple

code system. T^e Purple was afforded first priority which, it appears,

explains Captain Kramer’s not giving undivided attention to the

PA-K2 dispatch of December 3 together with the fact that this

message was badly garbled and the civilian translator who handled it,

while proficient in Japanese, had not as yet had adequate experience

concerning the handling of the intercepted dispatches.®^

CONSIDERATIONS RESPONSIBLE FOR DELAY IN TRANSLATIONS

Of the 13 messages between Tokyo and Honolulu intercepted before

December 7 but not translated until after the attack, 5 were trans-

mitted on or after December 4. The evidence shows that because

of technical difiBculties a delay of 3 days in transmitting, decoding,

and translating such messages was not unusual or unreasonable.®\*\*

W Id., pp. 2a-24.

See Hewitt Inquiry Record, pp. 688, 589; also pp. 611-515.

Ca^in Safford stated that on the week end of December 6, 1941, his unit handled three times the normal traMc

on a busy day. Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 766.

\*\*\* See testimony of Captain McCollum, committee record, pp. 9283, 9284. The Deceniber 3 dispatch from

the Honolulu consul was obtained by the district intelligence ofllcer of the Navy in Hawaii and was turned

over on December 5, 1941, to the Radio Intelligence Unit for decryption and translation. Being in the more

simple PA-K2 system the unit in Hawaii while capable of breaking the message down did not decrypt add

translate it until after the attack.

In discussing the matter of delays in securing the translations of the Magic, General Miles stated:

♦ it was not only a question of personnel and facilities here in Washington for the decoding and

translation of those messages, but also very definitely out in the field. Those messages had to be picked out

of the air by intercepting stations. They were not all picked up by the same station. There was no one

station that could have picked them up.

'Tn fact, I understand now that the best intercepting station for the few messages emanating from Japan

itself was Manila.

“Now, some of those intercepting stations had teletype facilities by which they could promptly transmit

the message intercepted to Washington. Some did not. Some of the messages were received in Washing-

ton by air mail.

“So we had not only a question of personnel and facilities and a very rapidly growing traffic to handle it

in Washington but also the actual intercepting of the message in the field and the transmission of those

messages to Washington." Committee record, pp. 2111, 2112.

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The same difficulty partially explains the delays racing from 5 to 9

days in decoding and translating six of the eight messages transmitted

prior to December 4.

Of the remaining two messages, one dated November 24 was not

translated until 20 days after it had been received in Washington.

The key in which this mess^e was transmitted was not recovered

until about December 16. l^e other is the message from Tokyo,

dated December 2, revesting information as to observation balloons

and antimine nets at rearl Harbor. A transmission of this message

was intercept^ by a Navy station on the west coast on December 2

and was received by the Navy on December 6 by air mail. This

version of the intercept text, however, was badly garbled and the

actual decoding and translating was based on a copy obtained from

the Honolulu office of a radio corporation after the attack on Pearl

Harbor.

The two messages transmitted from Honolulu to Tokyo on Decem-

ber 6, reporting the absence of barrage balloons, torpedo nets, and air

reconnaissance, were intercepted by an Army station on the west

coast at 7:22 p. m. on December 6 and' 12:42 a. m. on December 6,

respectively (Washington time), but were not processed as rapidly as

were the diplomatic messages transmitted from Tokyo to Washington

on the same night. On the basis of experience as to the contents of

messages over particular circuits and in particular codes, the very

highest priority was given to messages between Tokyo and Washing-

ton transmitted in the most secure Japanese code, the so-called

purple, and the “pilot message” of December 6 had alerted the services

to what was coming on the Tokyo-Washington circuit.

The messages from Honolulu to Tokyo on December 6 were trans-

mitted in the PA-K2 code system, a relatively insecure Japanese code

and one past experience had shown was not ordinarily used for mes-

sages which Tokyo considered of the highest importance. The actual

content of any message could not of course be known until it had been

decoded and translated, and before the attack there was no reason to

suspect that the two messages sent from Honolulu to Tokyo on

December 6 would prove of unusual interest. It is to be noted,

however, that the low-grade PA-K2 system was virtually the only

code available to the Honolulu consul after he had destroyed his major

codes pursuant to instructions from Tokyo on December 2.^

Despite the unfortunate fact that these messages were not processed

prior to December 7, no basis exists for criticizing the system which

was set up for decrypting and translating the intercepted Japanese

messages and for determining the priorities in the processing of the

various classes of messages. The evidence shows that throughout the

period of tense relations between the United States and Japan in 1941,

the important diplomatic messages were intercepted, transmitted to

Washington, decoded and translated, and disseminated with utmost

speed. Not infrequently they were in the hands of the authorized

recipients of Magic in om Government as soon as they were in the

•M See exhibit No. 1, pp. 21S, 216.

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hands of the Japanese addressees. Many of the civilian and military

personnel engaged in handling the Magic worked long hours far in

excess of those prescribed with no additional compensation nor special .

recognition. T%e success achieved in reading the Japanese diplomatic

codes merits the highest commendation and all witnesses jamiliar with

Magic material throughout the war have testified that it contributed

enormously to the defeat of the enemy , greatly shortened the war, and

saved many thousands of lives?^'^

Conclusions With Kespect to Intelligence Available in

Washington Which Was Not Supplied Hawaii

Both Admiral Kimmel and General Short have complained that

they were wrongfully deprived of intelligence available to Washington

through the Magic which would have altered completely their esti-

mate of the situation and would have resulted, if it had been supphed

them, in a proper alert and appropriate dispositions consistent with

an adequate defense of the Hawaiian coastal frontier. In a prepared

statement, read before the committee. Admiral Kimmel said:

The question will arise in your minds, as it has in mine: Would the receipt of

this information have made a difference in the events of December 7? No man

can now state as a fact that he would have taken a certain course of action four

years ago had he known facts which were then unknown to him. All he can give

is his present conviction on the subject, divorcing himself from hindsight as far

as humanly possible, and re-creating the atmosphere of the past and the factors

which then influenced him. I give you my views, formed in this manner.

Had I learned these vital facts and the ''ships in harbor^’ messages on Novem-

ber 28th, it is my present conviction that I would have rejected the Navy Depart-

ment's suggestion to send carriers to Wake and Midway. I would have ordered

the third carrier, the Saratoga, back from the West Coast. I would have gone to

sea with the Fleet and endeavored to keep it in an intercepting position at sea.

This would have permitted the disposal of the striking power of the Fleet to meet

an attack in the Hawaiian area. The requirement of keeping the Fleet fuelled,

however, would have made necessary the presence in Pearl Harbor from time to

time of detachments of various units of the main body of the Fleet.

In the last analysis, however, there are only four messages or groups

of messages which the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet and the

commanding general of the Hawaiian Department contend pointed to

Pearl Harbor as a likely place of attack; i. e., the harbor berthing plan

and related dispatches,^ the deadline messages,^ the dispatches which

indicated the fraudulent nature of Japanese negotiations after Novem-

ber 28,^^®® and the dispatch specifying 1 p. m., December 7, as the time

for delivery of the Japanese memorandum to the Secretary of State

Referring to the berthing plan (and related dispatches) Admiral

Kimmel said,“®^ ^ ‘These Japanese instructions and reports pointed to

See note 113, supra.

See committee record, pp. 6805, 6806.

See section \*\* ‘Ships in Harbor’ Reports,” supra.

See section “The Deadline Messages,” supra.

\*5o« See section “Dispatches Indicating Fraudulent Nature of Negotiations after November 28, 1041,”

supra.

See section “Significance of the ‘One o’clock’ and Code Destruction Messages,” supra.

Committee record, pp. 6779, 6780.

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an attack by Japan upon the ships in Pearl Harbor.” Additionally,

he has indicated that the dispatches concerning the deadlines and

fraudul^t negotiations pointed to Pearl Harbor.

During the course of committee examination General Short? was

asked whether, “outide of the message carving up Pearl Harbor into

five divisions,” there was any information among the Magic intelli-

gence which pointed to an attack upon Pearl Harbor any more than

upon any other place. He replied:

That was the most definite thing, and then the fact that the delivery of the

message was at 1 p. m. Washin^on time, which would be shortly after dawn in

Honolulu, which I think was an indication.

At another point, referring to the “harbor berthing plan” and the

so-called “one o’clock” message, General Short said,®“^ “I think

those two things are the really definite things that pointed to Pearl

Harbor” and that the other intercepted messages related to the

“more tense situation as it developed.”

As heretofore pointed out, we are unable to conclude that the

berthing plan and related dispatches pointed directly to an attack on

Pearl Harbor, nor are we able to conclude that the plan was a “bomb

plot” in view of the evidence indicatir^ it was not such. We are

of the opinion, however, that the berthit^ plan and related dispatches

should have received careful consideration and created a serious

question as to their significance. Since they indicated a particular

interest in the Pacific Fleet’s base this intelligence should have bem

appreciated and supplied the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet

and the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department for their

assistance, along with other informatipn and intelligence available to

them, in making their estimate of the situation.

We believe that the deadline messages and the messages indicating

fraudulent Japanese diplomacy after November 28 in themselves no

more indicated Hawaii as a likely point of attack than any other point

in the Pacific. The equivalent of this intelligence was supplied Ad-

miral Kimmel in the dispatch of November 27 beginning, “This dis-

patch is to be considered a war warning” and advising, “negotiations

with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific

have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the

next few days.” It was supplied General Short in the November 27

warning, stating, “Japanese future action impredictablft but hostile

action possible at any moment.”

The “one o’clock intercept”, as previously indicated, was an un-

usual piece of intelligence suggesting the distinct possibility that some

See committee record, pp. 6791-6793.

Committee record, pp. 8126, §;127. At another point, when asked if his thought was that the Magic

messages that were not sent Hawaii would have been more important than the messages he did receive.

General Short said: “There were two that could hardly fail. The intercept which was the bombing plan

of Pearl Harbor and the message stating that the ultimatum would be delivered at 1 p. m. which could have

been smt to me 4 hours before the attack, and reached me 7 hours after the attack. These two messages

would have meant someth! :g to me.” Committee record, p. 8201.

«w/ Id., at pp. 8126-8128.

See section “ ‘Ships in Harbor\* Reports,” supra.

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Japanese military action would take place somewhere at 1 p. m. but

it did not reasonably ^int to Pearl Harbor any more than to any

other place in the Pa^c. This intelligence indented the need for

particular alertness at 1 p. m. to meet the dangers contemplated on

the basis of estimates already made as to where a Japanese attack

might come.

The burden of the statements of both Admiral Kimmel and General

Short to the committee is that Washington withheld vital informa-

tion from them. In fact, Admiral Kimmel has charged that the

Navy Department’s handling of Magic constituted an affirmative

misrepresentation. On the basis of the evidence before the com-

mittee, this charge is without foundation in fact.

Both Hawaiian commanders all but ignore the fact that they are

properly chargeable with possessing far more vital intelligence indi-

cating an attack on Hawaii than was in the hands of anyone in the

War or Navy Departments. They had, among other things, corre-

spondence with Washington and plans revealing the possible dangers

of air attack, the warning dispatches, the code-destruction intelligence,

radio intelligence concerning the “lost” Japanese carriers, the Mori

call, the report of sighting and subsequent attack on a Japanese

submarine in close proximity to Pearl Harbor, and radar detection

of the Japanese raiding force over 130 miles from Oahu on the morn-

ing of December 7. General Short assumed the Navy was con-

ducting distant reconnaissance. Admiral Kimmel assumed that

the Army would alert its aircraft warning service, antiaircraft guns,

and fighter planes. From these assumptions and the estimate and

action taken on the basis of information available to them, it is

problematical as to what steps would have been taken by the Hawaiian

commanders had they received all of the intelligence which they con-

tend was withheld from them.

Estimate op the Situation in Washington

The evidence reflects that virtually everyone in Washington was

surprised Japan struck Pearl 'Harbor at the time she did. Among

the reasons for this conclusion was the apparent Japanese purpose to

move toward the south — the Philippines, Thailand, the Kra Penin-

sula; and the feeling that Hawaii was a near-impregnable fortress

that Japan would not incur the dangers of attacking. The latter

consideration necessarily -contemplated that Hawaii was alert and

that the enemy would be met with the full weight of Army and

Navy power provided for defense. It is apparent, however, that an

attack on the fleet by Japan at some time was regarded as a distinct

possibility. The warning messages sent the Hawaiian commanders

contained orders retjuiring defensive measures against this possibility.

Admiral Turner, Director of War Plans in the Navy Department, is

the only officer in Washington in the higher echelons who indicated a

strong belief that Hawaii would be attacked — he testified that he

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r^arded such an attack as a “50-50 chance.” Asked if he had

gained this impression around December 1 as a resiilt of the Japanese

ship-location reports, he testified:\*\*\*

No. That had been the opinion all along, expressed by the Navy Department,

expressed in Hawaii, expressed by the War Department, expressed by everybody

else, that there was a strong possibility that there would be an attack, a raid, that

is, against Hawaii. That was merely following along the line the Navy officers

and Army officers had been thinking about for 25 years or more. There was no

change.

When asked why, around November 27, if the Navy felt in this

way about the chances of an air raid on the fleet in Pearl Harbor,

some further message was not sent suggesting this possibility, Admiral

Turner stated: ^

That had been in correspondence right along. The dispatch of November 27

fully covers it, in my opinion. I think on the 5th, the afternoon of the 5th of

December, after convassing the situation with officers in my Division, I went

into Admiral Ingersoirs office and we talked for an hour as to what more the

Navy Department could do to warn the forces in the field, the fleets, what ought

to be done, should we send any more dispatches, or what. We came, both, to

the conclusion that everything had been done covering the entire situation that

ought to be done and we then proceeded into Admiral Stark's office, discussed

the same question vdth him for 15 minutes, and it was the unanimous decision that

the orders that we had sent out for Admiral Kimmel to take a defensive deployment

there were sufficient

What was he going to take a defensive ieployment against? Just one thing, Thai

is the meat of that dispatch. It is all in there.

The foregoing thoughts expressed by Admiral Turner characterized

the feelings of all the ranking officers of the War and Navy Depart-

ments: that the Hawaiian commanders had been adequately alerted to

all contingencies. Admiral Stark stated, “We considered we had fully

alerted them (referring to the Var warning’ of November 27) with

the directives which were given both by the Army and by ourselves

♦ ♦ ♦ We felt we were fully alerted. Our plans were ready, if

XI It is to be noted that the record clearly indicates that Admiral Turner’s estimate of a possible attack

at Hawaii was not based on any intelligence which he possessed indicating such an attack but rather on

his persona] appraisal of possible Japanese action.

In this connection Captain McCollum said: \*\*I was not surprised at the Japanese attack, sir. I was

astonished at the success attained by that attack, sir. \* \* \* I do not mean by that statement to imply

that I had any knowledge that, the Japanese were going to attack Pearl Harbor, and I wish to state categori-

cally that there was no bit of intelligence that I had at my disposal that definitely to my mind indicate

that the Japanese would attack Pearl Harbor, but I had \* \* \* for many years felt that in the event

of an outbreak of hostilities between the United States and Japan that the Japanese would make a very

definite attempt to strike the fleet at or near the commencement time of those hostilities.” Committee

record, pp. 9259, 9260.

The following committee examination reflects the feeling of Captain McCollum with respect to a possible

Japanese attack on our fleet:

Question: ”And you always felt that if the Japs were going to strike with her fleets the place to start

was by attacking our fleet?”

Captain McCollum: “That is correct.”

Question: “The place they would start would be by attacking the fleet.”

Captain McCollum: “They not only would do that, but that there was historical precedent, if the

Japanese wished to start a war with us. Their war with China in 1896 was started that way; their war

with Russia in 1907 was started that way; their war against Germany in Tsingtao in 1914 was started in

that way. \* \* \* Attacking their fleet and timing a declaration ofwaron presentation of the final notes.”

Committee record, pp. 9275, 9276.

Radio Intelligence concerning the \* float” Japanese carriers.

M Committee record, p. 5200.

•“Id., at p. 6201.

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war broke, in all theaters.” General Marshall said, “In our opinion,

the commanders had been alerted.” As expressed by Mr. Stimson:\*\*^

We assumed that when he (General Short) had been warned that hostile acstion

was possible at any moment, it would not be necessary to repeat that warning

over and over again during the ensuing days. The fact was of course that General

Short did receive, not only from Washington but from other sources, repeated

intelligence of the impending crisis.

Captain McCollum, who had suggested (not knowing the “war

warning” had been sent) an additional warning dispatch, stated in

referring to the dispatch sent Admiral Kinunel on November 27:

It does not. come in the life of most naval officers tb receive or see a messa^

containing such words and my personal feeling is that a message containing the

information “This is a war warning,” indicated clearly that the Department

expected a war to break out there at any moment from then on.

^ I think that a commander to whom such a message as that is ad-

dressed must assume that war is going to break out over his forces and take the

steps necessary to cover it.

The consummate confidence that field commanders were adequately

alert on the basis of dispatches sent them is manifested by the reluct-

ance of Admiral Stark to dispatch a message based on the “one o’clock

intercept.” As stated by General Marshall: “I asked him if he had

read the final message referring to one o’clock. He stated that he had,

and I proposed an immediate message to all theaters concerned.

Admiral Stark hesitated, because he said (he) had alerted them all and

he was ajraid of confusing them further.”

As indicated, the record reflects the judgment of responsible oflScers

in both the War and Navy Departments that they had fully and

adequately alerted our military outposts before December 7.®\*® We

believe that Admiral Kimmel and General Short received sufficient

information to justify the expectation that they would be fully alert

to the implications of their military responsibilities in Hawaii. In

this connection it is to be noted that all other outpost commanders,

receiving the warning messages of November 27 in substantially the

same form as did Admiral Kimmel and General Short, took full and

ample measures to effect a state of readiness commensurate with the

fact that war was imminent. Hawaii was the only outpost that failed

to institute a proper alert.

«» Id., at pp. 13733, 13747.

w Id., at pp. 13792, 13793.

See Mr. Stimson’s statement, committee record, p. 14398.

3M Committee record, pp. 9194, 9195, 9281, 9282. McCollum said: “I had been given to understand that

they (the Fleet) had b^n thoroughly alerted \* \* \* and on their toes.” Committee i^ecord, p. 9156,

Army Pearl Harbor Board (top secret) record, pages 7, 8.

General Miles said: ”G-2 was charged with the dissemination of information. The essential informa-

tion contained ia the Chief of Staff's November 27 message, that hostilities might occur at any time on the

Initiative of the Japanese, held good right up to December 7. The information emphasized the increasing

tension of the crisis.

”But these things were known in Hawaii. That Fortress^ like a sentinel on post, had been warned of the

danger which was its sole reason for being. Angthing else was considered to be redundant.\*^ Committee record,

p.2216.

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Nature op Responsibilities

In seeking to make an assessment of responsibilities for the Pearl

Harbor disaster, apart from that which is forever Japan’s, it is impera-

tive that the duties and obligations existing in Hawaii be placed in the

proper perspective with respect to those attaching to Washington.

The responsibility of the commander in the field with his well-defined

scope of activity is manifestly to be distinguished from that of the

officerin Washington who is charged with directing the over-all opera-

tions of the military on a global basis.

DUTIES IN HAWAII

It has been a cardinal principle of military theory to select capable

commanders for our outposts, give them broad directives,’" and leave

to their discretion and good judgment the implementation of the De-

partmental mandate consonant with their more intimate and detailed

familiarity \vith the peculiar problems existing in their particular

commands.’\*’ Admiral Kimmel and General Short were selected

because of their impeccable records for two of the most important

field commands of the Navy and Army — Commander in Chief of the

Pacific Fleet and Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department.

These two officers were primarily and fundamentaUy responsible —

they were the men to whom Washington and the N.ation were properly

entitled to look — for the defense of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier.

With respect to Hawaii and the fleet, theirs were the obligations to

plan for war, to train for war, and to be alerted for war when it came.

The first two of these obligations they discharged in an exemplary

manner but in the case of the third, alertness for war, they faded.’®

All of the intelligence, thought, and energies of tl e field commander

are to be devoted to his command. He is to apply all information

and intelligence received to his particular situation. He is not priv-

deged to think or contemplate that he will not be attacked. On the

contrary, he is to assume and to expect that his particular post will

be attacked. He cannot wholly assume that others will inform him

wi It is to be recalled, as heretofore pointed out, that Admiral Kimmel said: \* \* the Department

itself is not too well informed as to the local situation, particularly with regard to the status of current out-

lying island development, thus making it even more necessary that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet,

be guided by broad policy ' and objectives rather than by categoriccl instructions.” Letter from Admiral Kimmel

to Admiral Stark, dated May 26, 1941. See committee exhibit No. 106.

Referring to the plans for the defense of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, Admiral Turner said: “After

reading these splendid plans that had been sent in by the Commander in Chief, and by the Fourteenth

Naval District, why, my feeling was that these people knew their business. They knew what to do about it,

probably a lot more than I did, or the rest of us here, because they were the ones that were on the .firing

line.’' Committee record, p. 5211. See also tCvStimony of General Gerow, committee record, p. 2719.

W3 In striking contrast with the failure to effect adequate readiness in Hawaii is the manner in which the

Russians prepared to meet in June and July of 1941 the possibility of a Japanese thrust aginst the Soviet

Union. An intercepted dispatch from Vladivostok to Tokyo on July 3, 1941, stated: “Since the beginning

of the German-Soviet war the naval authorities here have tightened up on watch and are engaged in naval

preparations by enforcing various exercises to meet any eventuality. However, naval exercises are limited

to only one section of the force for there are many ships which are undergoing repairs. Evidently the prepara-

tiQns are intended for defense against Japan.” Committee exhibit No. 2, p. 125. See also committee record,

pp. 7609-7612.

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when and where the foe will strike. He is “like a sentinel on duty in

the face of the enemy. His fimdamental duties are clear and precise.

It is not the duty of the outpost commander to speculate or rely on

the possibilities of the enemy attacking at some other outpost instead

of his own. It is his duty to meet him at his post at any time and to

make the best possible fight that can be made against him with the

weapons with which he has been supplied.”

The commanders in Hawaii were clearly and unmistakabljr warned

of war with Japan. They were given orders and possessed informa-

tion that the entire Pacific area was fraught with danger. They failed

to carry out these orders and to discharge their basic and ultimate re-

sponsibilities. They failed to defend the fortress they commanded —

their citadel was taken by surprise. Aside from any responsibilities

that may appear to rest in Washington, the ultimate and direct re-

^onsibihty for failure to engage the Japanese on the morning of

December 7 with every weapon at their disposal rests essentially and

properly with the Army and Navy commands in Hawaii whose duty

it was to meet the enemy against which they had been warned.

DUTIES IN WASHINGTON

The Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations

of the Navy had the over-all responsibility for supervision of our

military and naval operations and ^tablishments everywhere, in-

cluding Hawaii. Theirs was the obligation of determining that all

of the equipment available was supphed the field commander which

would assist him in discharging his responsibilities.\*\*® In supplying

equipment it was their duty to consider the demands for materiiu

from many quarters in the hghl of the commitments and interests ol

the United States — to estimate where the most dangerous and likely

point of enemy attack might be — and then to effect dispositions which

in their best judgment most nearly satisfied the exigencies of the hour.

They discharged this duty to the best of their ability.

They had the duty of alerting our outposts in view of the critical

situation in our relations with Japan in the days before December 7

and of informing them of probable enemy action.\*^ In the dispatch

of November 27, sent Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Hart, the com-

mander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet, there was outlined what at the

time was regarded and appeared to be the major strategic effort of

the enemy. The Japanese major effort did follow the course out-

lined in the dispatch. Pearl Harbor was not known to be a point of

Japanese attack but it was known that such an attack was a possi-

bility and both responsible commanders in Hawaii were accordingly

ordered to take action contemplated to meet this possibility.

M\* See statement of Mr. Stimson, committee record, p. 14406.

See committee record, pp. 2764-2771; 6594, 6595. Also see committee exhibit No. 42.

3M Admiral Turner said. 'My function was to give the major strategic over-all picture for the use of my

superiors and disseminate that.’’ Committee record, p. 5074.

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The officers in the intelligence and war plans divisions of the War

and Navy Departments han dlin g matters in the Pacific had a par-

ticiUar responsibility with respect to the magic inteUigence just as the

Hawaiian comnfanders had a particular responsibility for the defense

of the fleet and the Hawaiian coastal frontier. It was the duty of

these officers to evaluate and disseminate the magic in the form of

estimates, as originally obtained, or otherwise. This responsibility

they failed to discharge with that high degree of skill and imagination

which this intelligence warranted.®®^

In the case of the War Plans Division of the War Department,

once it had warned General Short of hostilities, issued order in con-

templation of this contingency, and directed him to report measures

taken, it thereby assumed responsibility for reviewing the report of

action and advising the commanding general in the event the meas-

ures taken by him were not in accordance with those desired.

While the report submitted by General Short was ambiguous and

disarmingly terse, it was the duty of the War Plans Division through

the exercise of proper supervision to require a reply reflecting with

clarity that there had been satisfactory compliance with the depart-

mental orders.®®\*

Hawaii was but one of many points of concern to General Marshall,

the Chief of Staff, and Admiral Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations.

As stated by the Chief of Staff, “the only place we had any assur-

ance about was Hawaii, and for that reason we had less concern about

Hawaii because we had worked on it very industriously, we had a'

tremendous amount of correspondence about it, and we felt reasonably

secure at that one point.” \*®\* Theirs was the obligation of mapping

the strategy of global war, of advising and counsming the President

and others on military and naval matters, of following and encourag-

ing the progress of jireparation for defense in the event of war, of

outlining and justifying to the Congress the manifold needs of the

Army and Navy, of over-all responsibility for many military and

naval outposts and interests, of disposing and allocating the scanty

As expressed by Mr. Stimson: “A keener and more imaginative appreciation on the part of some of

the officers in the War and Navy Departments of the significance of some of the information might have led

to a suspicion of an attack specifically on Pearl Harbor. I do not think that certain officers in the War

Department functioned in these respects with sufficient skill. At all times it must be borne in mind, how-

ever, that it is easy to criticize individuals in the light of hindsight, and very difficult to recreate fairly the

entire situation and information with which the officers were required to deal at the time of the event/'

See statement of the Secretary of War with respect to the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, com-

mittee exhibit No. 157.

In this connection, however, the marked distinction between the character of the responsibility resting

on the War Plans Division and that reposing in General Short was expressed by Mr. Stimson:

“It must clearly be borne in mind that in November and December 1941 the responsibilities of the War

Plans Division covered many fields and many theaters. Their preoccupation with the theaters most likely

to be threatened, such as the Philippines toward which the Japanese activities then appeared to be pointed,

may be subject to criticism in the light of the subsequent disaster, but it is understandable. All signs

pointed to an attack in that direction, and they were exercising particular care with respect to that theater.

Their conduct must be viewed in an entirely different light from that of the theater commander, such as

General Short, who was like a sentinel on post and whose attention and vigilance must be entirely con-

centrated on the single position which he has been chosen to defend and whose alertness must not be allowed

to be distracted by consideration of other contingencies in respect to whi<^ he is not responsible.” See

statement of the Secretary of War with respect to the report of ^the Army Pearl Harbor Board Com-

mittee exhibit No. 167.

»w Committee record, p. 13793.

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materials of war consistent with the overwhehning demands and re-

quirements from many quarters, and of performing the innumerable

fimctions of the Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations in a

democracy that was all too slowly preparing itself against the inevit- •

able day of war.\*^“ Such diversity and magnitude of responsibilities

is to be distinguished from that of the outpost commander with his

singleness of purpose and well-defined sphere of activity. It was the

duty of General Marshall and Admiral Stark to alert our military

and naval garrisons which they attempted to do and felt assured they

had done. To superimpose the administrative burden of supervising

details would be to enmesh them in such a confusing and bewildering

network of detail as to defeat the very purpose for which the positions

of Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations were created.

Unity op Command

The evidence adduced in the course of the various Pearl Harbor

investigations reveals the complete inadequacy of command by

mutual cooperation where decisive action is of the essence. Both the

Army and Navy commanders in Hawaii failed to coordinate and

integrate their combined facilities for defense in the crucial days

between November 27 and December 7, 1941. While they had been

able over a period of time to conceive admirable plans for the defense

of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier consistent with the system of mutual

cooperation, when the time came for the implementation of these

plans they remained hollow and empty contracts that were never

executed. Had the responsible commandei's conferred together in

such manner as to reach joint decisions consonant with their plans,

the system of mutual cooperation would have proved adequate. It is

clear, however, that this system pre^nts unnecessary and inevitable

opportunities for personal failures and shortcomings. The ubiquitous

tendency to “let George do it,” to assume the other fellow will take

care of the situation, is an inseparable part of command by mutual

coopetation.

The tragic assumptions made by Admiral Kimmel and General

Short concerning what the other was doing are a manifestation of this

fact. Eacli was the victim of the natural human reluctance to pry

into what is regarded as another’s business.®™" The commander in

chief assumed that the Army would be on a full alert — the antiaircraft,

the aircraft warning service, and the interceptor command — ^yet he

Mr. Stimson said: “Our General Staff ofiBcers were working under a terrific pressure in the face of a

global war which they felt was probably imminent. Yet they were surrounded, outside of the offices and

almost thioughout the country, by a spirit of isolationism and disbelief in danger which now seems incred- •

ible, • • \* The officers of the Army were then trying to do their duty in the deadening, if not actually

hostile, atmosphere of a nation that was not awake to its danger. We are now engaged in passing judgment

upon their actions in the wholly different atmosphere of a nation which has suffered some of the horrors of

the greatest and most malignant war in history. In my opinion, it would be highly unjust to them if thte

complete difference of atmosphere was not given the weight which it deserves.” Statement of Mr. Stimson

to the Committee. Committee record, pp. 14410, 14411.

370 o See testimony of General Short, Committee record, pp. 8122 , 8123 .

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did not inquire to determine whether this was the case, apparently

because it might not “sit very well” with General Short.®’'^ The

commanding general assumed that the Navy would be conducting

reconnaissance which would afford him adequate warning in order

properly to alert his command. Yet he did not inquire as to whether

the Navy was conducting the reconnaissance upon which he was relying

for his protection, presumably because he felt such an inquiry might

be “resented” by Admiral Kimmel.®”

The conduct of operations in this state of joint obhvion was possible

in a command by mviual cooperation; but none of these false and un-

warranted assumptions could have obtained under unity of command.

Under the latter system a single commander would have been charged

with complete responsibility; all of the warnings, intelligence, and

orders woiild have been his to interpret, estimate, and implement; it

would have been his duty only to effect a state of readiness commen-

surate with the realities of the situation. Conceivably, a single com-

mander might have arrived at the same estimate as did Admiral

Kimmel and General Short; namely, that Hawaii would not be

attacked. But such a decision would have been clear-cut and devoid

of all the anomalous and incompatible assumptions that are in strange

contradiction of the estimate made by the Hawaiian commanders that

their outpost was safe. He would not have arrived at a conclusion

concerning the defensive measures required on a fallacious assumption

with respect to the decisions and defensive measures of someone else,

nor could he have interpreted the same order at once in two different

and inconsistent ways.

Furthermore, in a conunand by mutual cooperation there is the

unfailing likelihood of conflicting and overlapping prerogatives. In

the case of the plans for the defense of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier,

it was the joint naission of the Army and Navy to hold Oahu as a main

outlying naval base, each being specifically charged with supporting

the other. It was necessary that the local coHunanders jointly agree

upon the existence of the appropriate emergency as a condition prece-

dent to the detailed allocation of specific missions as between the two

services. The Navy was primarily responsible for distant reconnais-

sance and long-range attacks against hostile vessels, while the Army

was chai’ged with short-range defense. In the case of each of these

defensive measures, one service was charged with supporting the forces

of the other service having primary responsibility; and particularly,,

in the case of air operations, the service having the primary responsi-

bility was to control the available planes of the other service. This

was a shding and shifting arrangement with respect to primary re-

sponsibility depending on the natme of the attack. The mutual

agreement required by such operations would necessarily be forth-

See Roberts Commission record, p. 631.

See Army Pearl Harbor. Board record, p. 363.

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coming only when a particular type of attack was sufficiently imminent

as to suggest the advisability of the Army or the Navy, as the case

might be, assiuning primary responsibility to meet the attack.®”

The completely ineffective liaison between the Army and the Navy in

Hawaii ai a time when the fullest exchange of intelligence was ahsolvUely

imperative dictates that military and naval intelligence, particularly,

must be consolidated.^\* The extraordinarily anomalous situation of

the one hand not knowing what the other hand knew or was doing

should never be permitted to exist again.

Invocation of unity of command was within the scope of the author-

ity of the responsible commanders in Hawaii, upon agreement as to

the service that should exercise command,®”® or of the Secretaries of

War and Navy, acting jointly.®” Inasmuch as there was a complete

failure of the system of mutual cooperation on December 7, 1941, and

unity of command had not been effected by or imposed upon the

Hawaiian commanders, it is proper to inquire as to the reason for

unity of command not having been invoked at least as soon as it was

known that hostilities were possible at any moment.

The evidence reflects that during the period from November 27 to

December 7 the leading subject of conferences between Admiral

Kimmel and General Short was the question and near-dispute as to

whether the Army or the Navy should exercise command over the

islands of Wake and Midway after the Marines on these islands were

relieved by Army troops.®” No agreement was concluded in this

regard before the outbreak of war. If neither would agree to the

See section, «i/pra, concerning plans for the defense of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, Part in, this

report.

General Marthall said he thought unitv of eonsolidaHon (sic) or centralization of milUarv and nasal inteQd^

gence wat very necessary. Committee record, p. 2D66.

Admiral Kimmel testified that he never had any discussions with the commanding general of the

Hawaiian Department on the desirability of putting unity of command into effect. He said he would not

have effected unity of command, or accepted responsibility for the Army actions, without reference to the

Navy Department. See Navy Court of Inquiry record, pp. 296, 297.

\*7\* See committee exhibit No. 44. General Gerow said: “A fact frequently lost sight of in consideration

of the method of coordination under the principle of mutual cooperation is that although the major operation

is being conducted under that principle, joint operations subordinate thereto may still be conducted under the

principle of unity of command if so agreed to by the Army and Navy commanders concerned. This method is

particularly applicable to joint operations by forces having similar combat characteristics, such as the air

forces of the two services."' See memorandum prepared by General Gerow for Chief of Staff dated Novem-

ber 17, 1941. Committee exhibit No. 48.

Admiral W. W. Smith testified: “He (Admiral Kimmel) had a shock, though, in the week preceding

Pearl Harbor, when we had orders from the Navy Department, and General Short had orders from the

War Department, to prepare a plan immediately for bringing all the marines off the outlying islands, and

replacing them with soldiers and with Army planes, and, as I remember it, practically the entire week

before Pearl Harbor was spent with the two Staffs together. The Army was undecided whether to put

P-39’s or P-40’s on these islands. We told them that any planes they put on Wake would remain their for

the duration, in case of w^ar, because they would have to be taken off from a carrier and could not come

back, and we had no means of putting a ship in there to bring them off, and during the discussion of this

with General Short and his staff, the Commanding General of the Army Air Force (General .Martin) and

Admiral Pye were present, and also Admiral Wilson Brown, the War Plans ofTcer, the Operations Officers

and I believe Admiral Bloch. Admiral Kimmel said, ‘What can I expect of Army fighters on Wake?" And

General Martin replied, ‘We do not allow them to go more than fifteen miles off shore." That was a shock to

all of us and Admiral KimmePsreply was, ‘Then, they will be no damn good to me." The exchangewas

never made because the war broke before-hand. The only dispute between the Army and Navy over that

^change was that General Short «aid, ‘7/ 1 have the man these islands, I shall havetocommandthem.\* Admiral

Kimmel replied, \*No, that won't do. If the Army commanded one of the islands, I wouldn't be able to get a ship

into one of the ports,' or words tothat effect, and General Short said, \*Mind you, I do not want to man these islands,

I think they are better manned by Marines, but if I man them, I must command them.' That was as near to a dis^

pute between General Short and Admiral Kimmel as I ever saw, but the plan was made and submitted but never

carried out," Hart inquiry record, pp. 40, 41.

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other’s commanding Wake or Midway, it is not in the least surprising

or unexpected that neither one of the commanders w’ould have agreed

to subordinate himself and his entire command to the other.

In the case of Washington, the matter of establishing unity of

command at our outposts was under consideration and discussion by

the War and Navy Departments throughout the year 1941 and

especially during the few weeks prior to December 7.®^^ No decision,

however, was reached concerning unity of command at Hawaii or at

any of our outposts until the responsible officials were confronted bv

war with powerful adversaries on two fronts and the bander of

departmental prerogative had been severely jolted by the Pearl

Harbor disaster. The Joint Board of the Army and Navy during 1941

had considered specific proposals for unity of command as made by

each of the services but prior to December 7 no effective agreement

was reached as to which service should exercise command at a par-

ticular outpost. It generally appears, however, that it was agreed

the system of mutual cooperation in the Caribbean, at Panama, and

at Hawaii should be replaced 1^ unity of command. The Navy pro-

posed that command in the Caribbean be vested in the Navy; at

Panama in the Army, except when major naval forces were based

there; and at Hawaii in the Navy, except when no major naval forces

were based there.®” The Army, on the other hand, proposed unity of

command in aU coastal frontiers, command to rest in the Army except

when a major portion of the fleet was operating against comparable

hostile forces within the range of possible support by Army aviation

and when the Army and Navy commanders should agree to transfer

command from one to‘the other.®”

In view of these conflicting proposals following virtually a year of

discussion. General Gerow, chief of War Plans in the War Depart-

ment, recommended to the Chief of Staff on November 17, 1941.

that the system of command in the outposts remain by mutual

cooperation, thereby suggesting abandonment of the idea of imity of

command.®®® In testifying before the committee. General Gerow

explained his action by stating he thought the only way to have

effective unity of connnand was for the heads of the Army and Navy

to say that “So and so is in command, and he is in connnand from

now on.” He observed that — ®®\* “You cannot vary that connnand

See committee record, pp. 2749-2761; also 2963 et seq.

Committee record, pp. 2750-2767. 1^ also committee exhibit No. 48.

«»Id.

Id. General Gerow recommended: “That coordination of Joint operations In the Caribbean, Panama

and Hawaiian Coastal Frontiers continue to be effected by mutual cooperation. If this recommendation is

approved, such a proposal will be discussed with the Navy section of the Joint Planning Committee.”

8^ memorandum prepared by General Gerow for Chief of Staff dated November 17, 1941. Committee

exhibit No. 48.

Referring to this memorandum. General Marshall stated in a memorandum for General Gerow dated

December 5, 1941: “I would like this matter of Coordination of Command discussed with the Naval Section

of the Joint Planning Committee. However, I think it is important that a general policy, or what might be

called an explanation, should first be decided on, expressed In carefully considered sentences, as to the

application of unity of command.

“A discussion of this runs through a series of paragraphs on your memorandum and you have covered it

orally to me, but no where is it presented in a concise form.” Committee exhibit No. 48A.

«i Committee record, p. 2757.

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from day to day depending on what the operation is. One man must

be responsible for preparing that place for operation, and he must

be responsible for commanding it after he has prepared it.’^ He

pointed out that the joint Army-Navy planning committee had

contemplated an arrangement whereby command would shift back

and forth from the Army to the Navy and from the Navy to the

Army depending on the nature of attack or defense.^®^ General

Gerow said that he thought the system of mutual cooperation would

be better than such a continual switching of command.®®® He com-

mented :

did not think either the Army or Navy Planning Group would

agree to say wholeheartedly ‘You take everything and it will be agree-

able to us.' Neither would agree to that." ®®^ He a^eed that it would

be necessary that “somebody at the top had to knock their heads

together and tell them what to do." ®®® General Marshall epitomized

the essentially human proclivities characterizing the situation: ®®®

I have said this before; I will repeat it again. It is a very simple thing to have

unity of command if you give it to the other man. But that also applied in all of our

dealings with the British and among ourselves and ^ways will continue to be so.

The ultimate result was that no agreement was reached between

the War and Navy Departments before Pearl Harbor for the establish-

ment of imity of command in our military and naval outposts. The

factors and considerations attending eventual invocation of imity of

command were expressed by the Chief of Staff in a letter dated Decem-

ber 20, 1941, to General Short's successor, Gen. Delos C. Emmons:

Instructions to the Army and Navy were issued a few days ago assigning unity

of command to the Navy in Hawaii. At the same time unity of command was

assigned to the Army in Panama.

For your confidential information, this action was taken in the following

circumstances: In the first place, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the

Navy were determined that there should be no question of future confusion as

to responsibility. Further, the efforts I have been making for more than a year

to secure unity of command in various critical regions have been unavailing.

All sorts of Naval details ^ such as the operations of ships and submarines, the coor^

dination of efforts to locate purely Naval objectives and similar matters had been

raised in objection to Army control wherever that was proposed, I must say at

the same\* time that some oj the Army staff brought up somewhat similar objections

to Naval control. Both Stark and I were struggling to the same end, but until

this crash of December 7th the difficulties seemed, at least under peacetime con-

ditions, almost insurmountable. However, the two decisions I have just referred

to have been made and further ones are in process of being made, all of which I

feel will add immeasurably to our security, whatever the local embarrassments.

Also, I regard these as merely stepping stones to larger decisions involved in oup

relations with Allies.

I am giving you this information in order that you may better appreciate the

problem and, therefore, be better prepared to assist me by endeavoring to work

with Nimitz in complete understanding.

M»Id.

Id., at p. 2768.

Id.

«» Id.

Committee record, pp. 2962, 2963.

See committee exhibit No, 48; also committee record, pp. 2769-2761.

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Whatever difficulties arise that cannot be adjusted locally, should be brought

to our attention here for consideration by Admiral Stark and myself. These

days are too perilous for personal feelings in any way to affect efficiency.

This is a very hasty note, but I' want General McCoy to take it off with him

this morning.

You have my complete confidence and I will do everything possible to support

you.

The foregoing considerations evince more than mere reluctance and

procrastination toward effecting action by command rather than by

joint agreement; they reveal that inherent in our system of separate

services there exists the basic deficiency of conflicting interests which

precipitate serious and urmecessary obstacles to the solution of pressing

military problems. It is to be necessarily noted, however, that while

considering the advisability of unity of command, Washington was

assuming that the system of mutual cooperation was working within

its limitations and that local commanders were fully discharging their

responsibilities. It was only in the wake of the Pearl Harbor disaster

that the inherent and intolerable weaknesses of command by mutual

cooperation were exposed.®\*®

As earlier indicated, the failure to integrate and coordinate Army-

Navy efforts in Hawaii appears to have been attributable to a feeling

on the part of each commander that he would intrude upon the

prerogatives of the other and thereby invite similar intrusion if he

inquired as to what the sister service was doing. In Washington,

the failure to impose unity of command was occasioned by the inability

of the Army and the Navy as entities to agree upon a basis for unified

command.

General Observations

THE “WYMAN MATTER”

The Committee has carefully reviewed the investigation conducted

by the Army Pearl Harbor Board with respect to the activities of

Col. Theodore Wyman, Jr., while district engineer in the Hawaiian

Department, insofar as his activities may have relationship to the

Pearl Harbor disaster.\*\*® The Army Pearl Harbor Board concluded

from the evidence that Wyman performed the duties of district engi-

neer in a wholly unsatisfactory manner. Under his administration,

engineering and construction work in the Hawaiian Department was

defective and was characterized by delays.

The activities of Wyman and his associates were not fuUy inquired

into by the Committee inasmuch as they did not appear to have con-

tributed in any material or proximate manner to the disaster for

In the course of counsers examination, General Marshall was asked: “Without asking you any ques-

tions about the unity of command, complete unity of command generally in the Army and Navy Depart

ments, limiting it to the question of posts like Hawaii, or Panama, for instance, do you want to express any

views as to the wisdom of maintaining such unity of command in peacetime as compared with war?”

The Chief of Staff replied: “/ think U i$ an imperative necessity, \

WJ See in this regard the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, Committee Exhibit No. 157,

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reasons heretofore set forth.®\*® It is recommended, however, that the

Wyman matter be investigated by an appropriate committee of the

Senate or the House of Representatives.

THE PHILIPPINE ATTACK

The Committee has considered in the course of its proceedings the

Japanese attack on the Philippines on December 7, 1941, and has

concluded that this attack bears no relevant relationship to the dis-

aster at Pearl Harbor, In consequence, the Philippine attack was

not made the' subject of detailed inquiry although the reader will

find an account of this attack in the committee’s record.®®^

PRIOR INQUIRIES CONCERNING THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

We have not presumed to pass judgment on the nature of or charges

of unfairness ®\*® with respect to seven prior inquiries and investigations

of the Pearl Harbor attack, feeling that by conducting a full and

impartial hearing our report to the Congress along with the Com-

mittee’s record would present to the American people the material

and relevant facts of the disaster. The Committee does desire to

observe, however, that charges to the effect that the original report

of the Roberts Commission was abridged, modified, or amended, or

portions deleted were found to be without foundation in fact.®\*® Mor

mvestigations were conducted during the course of the most devasta-

As has been seen the disaster was the failure , with attendant increase in personnel and material losses,

of the Army and Navy in Hawaii to institute measures designed to detect an approaching enemy force, to

effect a state of readiness commensurate with the realization that war was at hand, and to employ every

facility at their command in repelling the Japanese.

See in this regard, Committee record, pp. 14133-14173.

In referring to the inquiry conducted by the Roberts Commission, Admiral Kimmel has stated (Com-

mittee record, pp. 6S09 -6811):

fl) That he was told he was not on trial (Roberts Commission record, p. 581);

(2) That he was not permitted to be present at the testimony of other witnesses or to examine or

cross-examine them;

(3) That the Roberts Commission was informed of or impressed with the fact that Hawaii was given

all of the information available to the Navy Department (referring in this regard to committee record,

pp. 4893-5022);

(4) That it appeared the so-called Magic was freely discussed before the Commission and in conse-

quence the latter likely received the impression that the intercepted Japanese (Uplomatic messages

were either forwarded to Washington by Admiral Kimmel or available to him in Hawaii.

Testifying before the committee, Justice Roberts stated:

(1) That the Commission's investigation was not intended to be a trial. ''This seemed to me a

preliminary investigation, like a grand jury investigation, and I did not think, for our report, that

was to be taken as precluding every one of the men mentioned in it from a defense before his peers.

In other words, you would not conduct a proceeding without cross-examination and without publicity

and call it a trial. It was not a trial \* \* \* It was an investigation and it was the formation of a judg-

ment to be handed the President\*\* (Committee record, pp. 8801, 8802).

(2) That, as indicated, one would not conduct a proceeding without cross-examination and without

publicity and call it a trial. He observed the proceedings were closed and every witness asked to ob-

serve secrecy for the reason "that there were questions of broken codes. We were informed that the

Army and Navy were getting invaluable information every day; that the Japanese did not realize that

their codes were broken, and indeed the Navy was rather chary about even telling us about the thing

for fear there might be some leak from our Commission. Of course, if we held open hearings there was

a chance we might do a great damage to our forces, our military program" (id., at pp. 8788, 8789).

(3) That the Roberts Commission knew outposts were not getting the Magic. “We knew the oom-

manders weren’t given what was taken off the breaking of the code" (id., at p. 8813).

(4) That \*\*We were never shown one of the Magic messages\*\* nor the substance thereof (id., at pp. 8828,

8829) although the Commission did know codes were being broken and generally what was obtained

from the traffic (id., at p. 8829; also pp. 8836, 8846).

See testimony of Mr. Justice Roberts before the Committee. Committee record, pp. 8779-8908.

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ting war in history and within the necessary limitations of secrecy im-

posed by war and the national security. Public hearinp concerning

the disaster were properly deferred untfl the cessation of hostilities ; to

have done otherwise would have been to imperil the entire war effort.

Parties in interest during previous inquiries, who for necessary security

reasons did not have the full and ready access to information through-

out the war that may have been deseed, did have such information

available for consideration before the Committee, Admiral Kiminel

and General Shorty as well as others, have attested to the full, fair,

and impartial hearmg which they were afforded by the Committee.

It is believed that with the additional evidence developed since

VJ-Day and the greater accessibility of witnesses, together with the

greater scope of inquiry conducted, we are in a much better position

to form proper estimates and conclusions concerning responsibilities

relating to the disaster than has heretofore been possible because of

the proper and necessary restrictions within which other inquiries

and investigations were conducted during wartime.

Shortly after the disaster both Admiral Kimmel and General Short

were retired from active duty. Consideration was thereafter given

by the War and Navy Departments to the question of whether the

errors made in Hawaii j ustified proceedings by court martial. Admiral

Kimmel and General Short were requested in the interest of the

Nation’s war effort to waive their rights to plead the statute of

limitations in bar of trial by general court martial for the duration

of the war and 6 months thereafter.®\*\* Both these officers properly

and commendably did so waive their rights. It was the duty of the

Offices of the Judge Advocate General of the Army and the Navy to

consider the facts of the disaster as relating to the responsibilities of

the Hawaiian commanders, even though after inqxiiry and delibera-

tion it was determined that the errors were errors of judgment and

not derelictions of duty.

On the morning of December 7, 1941, Admiral Kimmel and General

Short were catapulted by the Empire of Japan into the principal roles

in one of the most publicized tragedies of all time. That improper

and incorrect deductions were drawn by some members of the public,

with consequent suffering and mental anguish to both officers, cannot

be questioned, just as erroneous conclusions were made by others with

respect to the extent and nature of responsibility in Washington.

But this is the result of the magnitude of public interest and specula-

tion inspired by the disaster and not the result of mistreatment of

anyone. The situation prevailing at Pearl Harbor on the morning

of December 7 in the wake of the Japanese attack cast everyone,

whether immediately or remotely concerned, beneath the white light

of world scrutiny.

See Committee exhibits Nos. 170, 171.

Part V

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

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PAKT V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CoNCLtrsiONS With Respect to Responsibilities

1. The December 7, 1941, attack on Pearl Harbor was an unpro-

voked act of aggression by the Empire of Japan. The treacherous

attack was planned and launched while Japanese ambassadors, in-

structed with characteristic duplicity, were carrying on the pretense

of negotiations with the Government of the United States with a

view to an amicable settlement of differences in the Pacific.

2. The ultimate responsibihty for the attack and its results rests

upon Japan, an attack that was well planned and skillfully executed.

Cfontributing to the effectiveness of the attack was a powerful striking

force, much more powerful than it had been thought the Japanese

were able to employ in a single tactical venture at such distance and

under such circumstances.

3. The diplomatic policies and actions of the United States provided

no justifiable provocation whatever for the attack by Japan on this

Nation. The Secretary of State fully informed both the War and

Navy Departments of diplomatic developments and, in a timely and

forceful manner, clearly pointed out to these Departments that rela-

tions between the United States and Japan had passed beyond the

stage of diplomacy and were in the hands of the military.

4. The committee has foimd no evidence to support the charges,

made before and during the hearings, that the President, the Secre-

tary of State, the Secretary of War, or the S jcretary of Navy tricked,

provoked, incited, cajoled, or coerced Japan into attackirs this

Nation in order that a declaration of war might be more easujr ob-

tained from the Congress. On the contrary, all evidence conclusively

points to th^ fact that they discharged their responsibilities with

distinction, ability, and foresight and in keeping with the highest

traditions of our fundamental foreign policy.

5. The President, the Secretary of State, and high Government

officials made every possible effort, without sacrificing our national

honor and endangering our security, to avert war with Japan.

6. The disaster of Pearl Harbor was the failure, with attendant

increase in personnel and material losses, of the Armj and the Navy

to institute measures designed to detect an approachmg hostile force,

to effect a state of readiness commensurate with the realization that

war was at hand, and to employ every facility at their command in

repelling the Japanese.

7. Virtually everyone was surprised that Japan struck the Fleet

at Pearl Harbor at the time that she did. Yet officers, both in

Washington and Hawaii, were fully conscious of the danger from

air attack; they realized this form of attack on Pearl Harbor by

Japan was at least a possibility; and they were adequately informed

of the imminence of war.

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8. Specifically, the Hawaiian commands faded—

(a) To dischai^e their responsibilities in the light of the warn-

ings received from Washington, other information possessed by

them,and the principle of command by mutual cooperation.

(6) To integrate and coordinate their facilities for defense and

to alert properly the Army and Navy establishments in Hawaii,

particularly in the light of the warnings and intelligence available

to them during the period Noyemlper 27 to December 7, 1941.

(c) To effect liaison on a basis designed to acquaint each of them

with the operations of the other, which was necessary to their

joint security, and to exchange fully all significant intelligence.

id) To maintain a more effective reconnaissance within the

limits of their equipment.

(e) To effect a state of readiness throughout the Army and

Navy establishments designed to meet all possible attacks.

if) To employ the facinties, materiel, and personnel at their

command, which were adequate at least to have greatly mini-

mized the effects of the attack, in repelling the Japanese raiders.

ig) To appreciate the significance of intelligence and other

information available to them.

9. The errors made by the Hawaiian commands were errors of

jutgment and not derelictions of duty.

10. The War Plans Division of the War Department failed to dis-

charge its direct responsibility to advise the commanding general ho

had not properly alerted the Hawaiian Department when the latter,

pursuant to instructions, had reported action taken in a message that

was not satisfactorily responsive to the original directive\*.

11. The Intelligence and War Plans Divisions of the War and Navy

Departments failed:

(cr) To give careful and thoughtful consideration to the inter-

cepted messages from Tokyo to Honolulu of September 24, Noi-

vember 15, and November 20 (the harbor berthing plan and re-

lated dispatches) and to raise a question as to then\* significance,

bince they indicated a particular interest in the Pacific Fleet’s

base this intelligence should have been appreciated and supplied

the Hawaiian commanders for their assistance, along with other

information available to them, in making their estimate of the

situation.

(b) To be properly on the qui vive to receive the “one o’clock”

intercept and to recognize in the message the fact that some Jap-

anese military action would very possibly occur somewhere at

1 p. m., December 7. If properly appreciated, this intelUgenco

should have suggested a dispatch to all Pacific outpost command-

ers supplying this infoi'mation, as General Marshall attempted to

do immediately upon seeing it.

12. Notwithstanding the fact that there were officers on twenty-

four hour watch, the Committee believes that imder all of the evi-

dence the War and Navy Departments were not sufficiently alerted

on December 6 and 7, 1941, in view of the imminence of war.

Recommendations

Based on the evidence in the Committee’s record, the following

recommendations are respectfully submitted:

That immediate action be taken to insme that unity of command

is imposed at all military and naval outposts.

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That there be a complete integration of Army and Navy intelli-

gence agencies in order to avoid the pitfalls of divided respon-

sibility which e^^erience has made so abundantly apparent;

that upK>n effecting a unified intelligence, officers be selected

for intelligence work who possess the background, penchant,

and capacity for such work; and that they be maintained in

the work for an extended period of time in order that they

may become steeped in the ramifications and refinements of

their field and employ this reservoir of knowledge in evaluat-

ing material received. Tbe assignment of an officer having an

aptitude for such work should not impede his progress nor

affect his promotions. Efficient intelligence services are just

as essential in time of peace as in war, and this branch of our

armed services must always be accorded the important role

which it deserves.

That effective steps be taken to insure that statutory or other

restrictions do not operate to the benefit of an enemy or other

forces inimical to the Nation’s security and to the handicap

of our own intelligence agencies. With this in mind, the

Congress should give serious study to, among other things,

the Communications Act of 1934; to suspension in proper

instances of the statute of limitations during war (it was

impossible during the war to prosecute violations relating to

the “Magic” without giving the secret to the enemy); to

legislation designed to prevent unauthorized sketching, photo-

graphing, and mapping of military and naval reservations in

peacetime; and to legislation fully protecting the security of

classified matter.

That the activities of Col. Theodore Wyman, Jr., while district

engineer in the Hawaiian Department, as developed by the

Army Pearl Harbor Board, be investigated by an appropriate

committee of the Senate or the House of Representatives.

That the military and naval branches of our Government give

serious consideration to the 25 supervisory, administrative,

and organizational principles hereafter set forth.

Supervisory, Administrative, and Organizational Deficiencies

IN Our Military and Naval Establishments Revealed by the

Pearl Harbor Investigation

The Committee has been intrigued throughout the Pearl Harbor

proceedings by one enigmatical and paramount question: Why, with

some of the finest intelligence available in our history, with the almost

certain knowledge that war was at hand, with plans that contemjolated

the precise type of attack that was executed by Japan on the morning of

December 7 — Why was it possible for a Pearl Harbor to occur? The

answer to this question and the causative considerations regarded as

having any reasonably proximate bearing on the disaster have been

set forth in the body of this report. Fundamentally, these considera-

tions reflect supervisoiy, admmistrative, and organizational deficien-

cies which existed in our Military and Naval establishments in the days

before Pearl Harbor. In the course of the Committee's investigation

still other deficiencies, not regarded as having a direct bearing on the

disaster, have presented themselves. Otherwise stated, all of these

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deficiencies reduce themselves to principles which are set forth, not

for their novelty or profimdity but for the reason that, by their very

self-evident simplicity, it is difficult to believe they were ignored.

It is recognized that many of the deficiencies revealedi by our

investigation may very probably have already been correctea as a

result of the experiences of the war. We desire, however, to submit

these principles, which ap grounded in the evidence adduced by the

Committee, for the consideration of our Army and Navy establish-

ments in the earnest hope that something constructive may be ac-

complished that will aid our national defense and preclude a repetition

of the disaster of December 7, 1941. We do this after careful and

long consideration of the evidence developed through one of ^he

most important investigations in the history of the Congress.

1. Operational and intelligence work requires centralization of authority

and clear-cut allocation of responsibility

Reviewing the testimony of the Director of War Plans and the

Director of Naval Intelligence, the conclusion is inescapable that the

proper demarcation of responsibility between these two divisions of

the Navy Department did not exist. War Plans appears to have

insisted that since it had the duty of issuing operational orders it

must arrogate the prerogative of evaluating intelligence; Naval Intel-

l^ence, on the other hand, seems to have regarded the matter of

evaluation as properly its function. It is clear that this intradepart-

mental misunderstanding and near conflict was not resolved before

December 7 and beyond question it prejudiced the effectiveness of

Naval Intelligence.

In Hawaii, there was such a marked failure to allocate res^nsi-

bility in the case of the Fourteenth Naval District that Admiral Bloch

testified he did not know whom the commander in chief would hold

responsible in the event of shortcomings with respect to the condition

and readiness of aircraft.\* The position of Admiral Bellinger was a

whoUy anomalous one. He appears to ha ve been responsible to every-

one and to no one. The pyramiding of superstructures of oi^anization

cannot be conducive to efficiency and endangers the very function of

our military and naval services.

Supervisory officials cannot safely take anything for granted in the

alerting of subordinates

The testimony of many crucial witnesses in the Pearl Harbor

investigation contains an identical note: “I thought he was alerted”;

“I took for granted he would understand”; “I thought he would

be doing that.” It is the same story — each responsible official seek-

ing to justify his position by reliance upon the fallacious premise that

he was entitled to rely upon the assumption that a certain task was

being performed or to take for granted that subordinates would be

properly vigilant. This tragic theme was particularly marked in

Hawaii.

The foregoing was well illustrated in Admiral Kimmel’s failure to

appreciate the significance of dispatches between December 3 and 6,

advising him that Japanese embassies and consulates, including the

> See Army Pearl Harbor Board record, p. 1522.

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Embassy in Washington, were destroying their codes. Navy De-

partment officials have almost imanimously testffied that instructions

to burn codes mean “war in any man’s language” and that in supplying

Admiral Kimmel this information they were entitled to believe he

would attach the proper significance to this intelligence. Yet the

commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet testified that he did not in-

terpret these dispatches to mean that Japan contemplated immediate

war on the United States. That the Navy Department was entitled

to rely upon the feeling that Admiral Kinunel, as a responsible in-

telligent commander, should have known what the burning of codes

meant appears reasonable; but this is beside the point in determining

standards for the future. The simple fact is that the dispatches were

not properly interpreted. Had the Navy Department not taken

for granted that Kimmel would be alerted by them but instead have

given him the benefit of its interpretation, there could now be no

argument as to what the state of alertness should have been based

on such dispatches. "W ith Pearl Harbor as a sad experience, crucial

intelligence should in the future be supplied commanders accompanied

by the best estimate of its significance.

S. Any doubt as to whether outposts should he given information should

always be resolved in favor of supplying the information

Admiral Stark hesitated about sending the “one o'clock” intelli-

gence to the Pacific outposts for the reason that he regarded them as

adequately alerted and he did not want to confuse them. As has

been seen, he was properly entitled to believe that naval establish-

ments were adequately alert, but the fact is that one — Hawaii — was

not in a state of readiness. This one exception is proof of the principle

that any question as to whether information should be supplied the

field should always be resolved in favor of transmitting it.

4- The delegation of authority or the issuance of orders entails the duty

of inspection to determine that the official mandate is properly exercised

Perhaps the most signal shortcoming of administration, both at

Washington and in Hawaii, was the faflure to follow up orders and

instructions to insure that they were carried out. The record of aU

Pearl Harbor proceedings is replete with evidence of this fundamental

deficiency in administration. A few illustrations should clearly

demonstrate this fact.

In the dispatch of November 27, 1941, which was to be considered

a “war warning,” Admiral Kimmel was instructed to “execute an

appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the

tasks assigned in WPL-46.” Very little was done piu^uant to this

order with a view to a defensive deplo 3 rment; the Navy Department

did nothing to determine what had been done in execution of the order.

Yet virtu^y every responsible Navy Department official has testi-

fied as to what he “assumed” Kimmel would do upon receipt of this

dispatch. While it appears to have been the policy to leave the

implemmtation of orders to the local commander, as a matter of

future practice it would seem a safer policy to recognize as impUcit

in the delegation of authority or the issuance of orders the responsi-

bility of inspecting and supervising to determine that thte delegated

authority is properly administered and the orders carried out.

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The story of Admiral Kimmel’s administration of the Pacific Fleet

and supervision of the Fourteenth Naval District as well as General

Short’s administration of the Hawaiian Department in the critical

days before December 7 is the epitome of worthy plans and purposes

which were never implemented. The job of an administrator is only

half completed upon the issuance of an order; it is discharged when

he determines the order has been executed.

5. The implemerUaiion of official orders must be followed unth closest

supervision

In the November 27 warning sent General Short he was ordered “to

undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem

necessary” and to “report measures taken.” The commanding

general reported: “Re your 472, Department alerted to prevent

sabotage. Liaison with Navy.” This message from General Short

was not clearly responsive to the order. Yet during the 9 days before

Pearl Harbor not one responsible officer in the War Plans Division of

the War Department pointed out to the commanding general his

failure to alert the Hawaiian Department consistent with instructions.

As a matter of fact, it does not afifirmatively appear that anyone upon

receipt of General Short’s reply “burdened” himself sufficiently to call

for message No. 472 in order to determine to what the report was

responsive.

6. The maintenance of alertness to responsibility must be insured through

repetitwn

It has been suggested, in explaining why additional warnings were

not sent to Admiral Kimmel and General Short, that it was desired

to avoid crying “wolf” too often lest the department commanders

become impervious to the significance of messages designed to alert

them. The McCollum message, for example, was not dispatched

for the reason that overseas garrisons were regarded as fully alerted.

Admiral Noyes is alleged to have referred to the proposed dispatch

as an insult to the intelligence of the commander in chief inasmuch

as he felt Admiral Kimmel had received adequate information.

Although the exact provisions of the McCollum dispatch are unknown,

it would seem to have been a safer practice to have sent this addi-

tional warning to intensify and insure alertness over a period of time

through repetition, particularly under the critical circumstances pre-

vailing between November 27 and December 7, 1941.

No consideration appears to have been given to the thought that

since nothing occurred for 9 days after the warnings of November 27

there would be a lessening of vigilance by reason of the simple fact

that nothing did occur for several days following such warnings. Of

course, this observation has little or no application to the Hawaiian

situation; for had Japan struck on November 28, the next day after

the warnings, the same lack of readiness would substantially have

prevailed as existed on the morning of December 7. There could have

been no lessening of alertness there for the reason that the Hawaiian

commands were at no time properly alert.

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7. Complacency and procrastination are out of place where sudden and

decisive action are of the essence

Beyond serious question Army and Navy officials both in Hawaii

and in Washington were beset by a lassitude born of 20 years of peace.

Admiral Kimmel admitted he was affected by the “peace psychology"

just like “everybody else.” As expressed by Admiral McMorris,

“We were a bit too complacent there.” The manner in which capable

officers were affected is to a dpgree imderstandable, but the Army

and the Navy are the watchdogs of the Nation’s secmity and they

must be on the alert at aU times, no matter how many the years of

peace.

As indicated in the body of this report, there was a failm-e in the

War and Navy Departments during the night of December 6-7 to

be properly on the qui vive consistent with the knowledge that the

Japanese reply to oiu: Government’s note of November 26 was being

received. The failiu-e of subordinate officials to contact the Chief

of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations on the evening of December 6

concerning the first 13 parts of the 14-pai t memorandum is indicative

of the “business as usual” attitude. Some prominent military and

naval officials were entertaining and, along with other officers, appar-

ently failed to read into the 13 parts the importance of and necessity

for greater alertness.

Of a similar tenor is the remark of Admiral Kimmel with respect to

the “lost” Japanese carriers — “Do you mean to say that they could

be rounding Diamond Head \* \*?” Or the observation attrib-

uted to General Short with respect to the transcript of the “Mori”

conversation — that it looked quite in order and was nothing to be

excited about.

The people are entitled to expect greater vigilance and alertness

from their Army and Navy — whether in war or in peace.

8. The coordination and proper evaluation of intelligence in times of

stress must be insured by continuity of service and centralization of

responsibility in competent officials ^

On occasion witnesses have echoed the sentiment that the Pearl

Harbor debacle was made possible, not by tbe egregious errors or poor

judgment of any individual or individuals but rather by reason of the

imperfection and deficiencies of the system whereby Army and Navy

intelligence was coordinated and evaluated. Only partial credence,

however, can be extended this conclusion inasmuch as no amount of

coordination and no system could be effected to compensate for lack

of alertness and imagination. Nevertheless, there is substantial

basis, from a review of the Pearl Harbor investigation in its entirety, to

conclude that the system of handling intelligence was seriously at

fault and that the security of the Nation can be insured only through

continuity of service and centralization of responsibility in those

charged with handling inteUigence. And the assignment of an officer

having an aptitude for such work over an extended period of time should

not impede his progress nor affect his promotions.

The professional character of intelligence work does not appear to

have been properly appreciated in either the War or Navy Depart-

ments. It seems to have heen regarded as just another tour of duty.

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as reflected by limitations imposed on the period of assignment to such

work, among other things. The committee has received the distinct

impression that there was a tendency, whether realized or not, to

relegate intelUgence to a role of secondary importance.

As an integrated picture, the Pearl Harbor investigations graphically

portray the imperative necessity, in the War and Navy Departments,

(1) for selection of men for intelligence work who possess the back-

ground, capacity, and penchant for such work; (2) for maintaining

them in the work over an extended period of time in order that they

may become steeped in the ramifications and refinements of their

field and epaploy this reservoir of knowledge in evaluating data re-

ceived; and (3) for the centralization of responsibility for handling

intelligence to avoid all of the pitfalls of divided responsibility which

experience has made so abundantly apparent.

9. The unapproachable or superior attitude oj officio^ is ^atal; there

should never he any hesitancy in asking for clarification of instructions

or in seeking advice on matters that are in doubt

Despite the fact that the record of testimony in the Pearl Harbor

proceedings is filled with various interpretations as to what War and

Navy Department dispatches meant, in not one instance does it

appear that a subordinate Requested a clarification. General Short

was ordered to undertake reconnaissance, yet he apparently ignored

the order assuming that the man who prepared it did not know of his

special agreement with the Navy in Hawaii whereby the latter was

to conduct distant reconnaissance. He chose to implement an order

which manifestly he did not understand, without the presumption

that the man who prepared it did not know what he was doing,

rather than request clarifying instructions. On November 27 Admiral

Kimmel received a message beginning with the words: “This dispatch

is to be considered a war warning.” Every naval oflBcer who has

testified on the subject has stated that never before in his naval

experience had he ever seen a dispatch containing the words “war

warning” ; Admiral Kimmel testified that never before in his some 40

yeArs as a naval oflBcer had he seen these words employed in an oflBcial

dispatch. In the same message there was another term, “defensive

deployment,” which the commander in chief manifestly did not clearly

understand. In spite of his apparent uncertainty as to the meaning

of the message. Admiral Kimmel, it can be presumed, chose to endeavor

to implement it without seeking advice from the Navy Department.

While there is an understandable disposition of a subordinate to

avoid consulting his superior for advice except where absolutely

necessary in order that he may; demonstrate his self-reliance, the

persistent failure without exception of Army and Navy oflBcers, as

revealed by the investigation, to seek amplifying and clarifying

instructions from their superiors is strongly suggestive of just one

thing: That the military and naval services failed to instill in their

personnel the wholesome disposition to consult freely with their

superiors for the mutual good and success of both superior and sub-

ordinate. One witness, upon being asked why an explanation was

not requested replied, in eflfect: “Well, I have found the asking is

usually the other way” ; that is, the superior asking the subordinate

Such a situation is not desirable, and the services should not be preju-

diced by walls of “brass.”

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10. There is no svhstiiutefor imagination and resourcefulness on the pari

supervisory aiM inielligence officii

As reflected by an examination of the situation in Hawaii, there was

a failure to employ the necessary imagination with respect to the

intelligence which was at hand. \*

Washington, like Hawaii, possessed imusually significant and vital

intelligence. Had OTeater imagination and a keener awareness of the

significance of intelligence existed, concentrating and applying it to

particular situations, it is proper to suggest that someone should have

concluded that Pearl Harbor was a likely point of Japanese attack.

The committee feels that the failure to demonstrate the highest

imagination with respect to the intelligence which was available in

Hawaii and in Washington is traceable, at least in part, to the failure

to accord to intelligence work the important and significant role

which it deserves. ,,

11. Communications must be characterized by clarity, Jorthrigktness, and

appropriateness

The evidence before the Committee reflects an unusual number of

instances where militarv officers in high positions of responsibility .

interpreted orders, intelligence, and other information and arrived

at opposite conclusions at a time when it was imperative for them to

estimate the situation and to arrive at identical conclusions.

Admiral Kimmel was ordered to execute an appropriate defensive

deployment. Everyone in Washington in testifying before the com-

mittee seems reasonably certain as to just what this meant; Admiral

Kimmel did not feel that it required his doing anythii^ greatly

beyond what he had already done, even though he knew that Wash-

ii^ton knew what he had previously done. In using the words “this

dispatch is to be considered a war warning” everyone in Wash-

ington felt the commander in chief would be sharply, incisively, and

emphatically warned of war; Admiral Kimmel said he had construed

all the messages he had received previously as tear warnings. Every-

one in Washington felt that upon advising Hawaii the Japanese were

destroying their codes it would be understood as meaning “war in any

man’s language” ; Admiral Kimmel said that he did not consider tlm

intelligence of any vital importance when he received it.

The War Department warned General Short that hostilities were

possible at any moment, meaning armed hostilities; General Short

f(Jt that sabotage was one form of hostilities and instituted an alert

against sabotage only. W ashington ordered the commanding general

to undertake reconnaissance; the latter took for granted that the

War Department had made a mistake and proceeded in effect to

ignore the order on the basis of this assumption. General Short was

instructed to report the measures taken by him pursuant to depart-

mental orders. He replied that his department was alerted i^ainst

sabot^e and that he had effected liaison with the Navy; the Director

of War Plans saw the reply and took for granted the commanding

general was replying to a different warning concerning subversive

activities, at the same time suggesting that some of his subordinates

may have interpreted the reply to mean that, in effecting liaison with

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the Navy, General' Short had necessarily carried out the order to

conduct reconnaissance.

General Short said he thought the order given Admiral Kimmel to

execute a defensive deployment necessaiily required distant recon-

naissance; the commander in chief did not so interpret the order.

Admiral Elimmel saw the warning General Short received and took for

granted the Army would be on a full alert designed to protect the

fleet base.

As has been seen, an objective consideration of the warnings re-

ceived by the Hawaiian commanders indicates they were adequate.

But on the basis of the disaster, in the future adeqyuicy cannot be re-

garded as suJEBcient. Dispatches must be unmistakably clear, forth-

right, and devoid of any conceivable ambiguity.

The committee feels that the practice, indulged by the Navy, of

sending to several commanders an identical dispatch tor action, evea

though the addressees may be located in decidemy different situations,,

is distinctly dangerous. In the preparation of messages to outposts

the dispatch to a particular officer should be appUcable to his peculiar

situation. What may well be characterized as the “lazy” practice

of preparing a single dispatch should be replaced by a more indus-

trious and effective system whereby a separate “individualized”^

dispatch is sent to each commander whose particular situation varies

E eatly from that of another commander' or there maybe reason for

m because of distance or other factors to beUeve so.

It is believed that brevity of messages was carried to the point of

being a fetish rather than a virtue. Dispatches must be characterized

by sufficient ampUtude to be meaningful not only to the sender but,

beyond reasonable doubt, to the addressee as well.

12. There is great danger in careless paraphrase of information received

and every effort should be made to insure that the paraphrased material

reflects the true meaning and significance of the original

To preserve the secmity of their own codes the War and Navy De-

partments followed the natural and proper practice of paraphrasu^

messages received. From a review of several messages as paraphrased

the committee is of the opinion that the utmost caution and care

should be employed in preserving the original meaning of material.

One classic example will serve to illustrate this point.

In replying to the War -Department’s directive of November 27,

1941, General Short said:

Be your 472. Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy.

As paraphrased upon receipt at the War Department, this message

read:

Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Nosy re your 472.

• 'It is to be recalled that the Army and Navy had entered

into a special agreement at Hawaii whereby the Navy assumed

responsibility, for long-range reconnaissance. Therefore, having

ordered General Short to undertake reconnaissance, a reasonable con-

struction of his message as paraphrased would be that the comman ding

general, through liaison with the Navy, had made the necessary

arrangements for reconnaissance as instructed in the War Depart-

ment’s warning of November 27. The message which Short actually

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sent, however, cannot so easily be afforded this construction. The

seriousness of this matter lies in the fact that failure to conduct long-

range reconnaissance at Hawaii was the prime factor responsible for

the Army and Navy having been caught flat-footed. Conceivably,

had the message as paraphrased not been misleading, the War Depart-

ment might well have followed u|) on General Short’s message, pointing

out that he had failed to take the necessary action to alert his

command.

IS. Procedures must be sufficiently flex'U>le to meet the exigencies of unusual

situations

Reviewing the Pearl Harbor evidence there are, in both the War

and Navy establishments, several illustrations of inflexible procedures

that could not be or at least were not subjected to sufficient alteration

to satisfy the exigencies of the situation. Everything seems perforce

to have followed a grooved pattern regardless of the demands for

distinctive action. 'The idea of proceeding “through channels” was

carried to an extreme.

Among the best illustrations of this fact was the failure of Admiral

Kimmel to advise Admiral Newton that the “war warning” had been

received. Admiral Newton was departing from Pearl Harbor with

smne of the most vital rmits of the Pacific Fleet, yet because the table

of organization indicated Admiral Brown to be Newton’s superior,

the commander in chief did not take it upon himself to insure that

Newton was fully informed as to the critical situation between the

United States and Japan, and relied upon the usual procedure whereby

Brown would keep Newton advised of developments.

14 . Restriction of highly confidential information to a minimum number

of officials, while often necessary, should not be carried to the point of

prejudicing the work of the organization

The Magic intelligence was preeminently important and the neces-

sity for keeping it confidential cannot be overemphasized. However,

so closely held and top secret was this intelligence that it appears the

fact the Japanese codes had been broken was regarded as of more

importance than the information obtained from decoded traffic. The

result of. this rather specious premise was to leave large numbers of

polic^p-making and enforcement officials in Washington completely

oblivious of the most pertinent information concerning Japan.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation, for example, was chained with

combating espionage, sabotage, and un-American activities within the

United States. On February 15, 1941, Tokyo dispatched to Wash-

ington a detailed outline as to the type of espionage information

desired from this country.\* The FBI was never informed of this vital

information necessary to the success of its work, despite the fact that

the closest liaison was supposed to exist among the FBI, Naval Intelli-

gence, and Military Intelligence.

Gen. Hayes A. Kroner, who was in chaige of the intelligence branch

of G-2, has testified that he at no time was permitted to avail himself

of the Magic. And this despite the fact that to effectively perform

Committee exhibit No. 2 , pp. 117, 118.

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his work he should have known of this intelligence and one of his sub-

ordinates, Colonel Bratton, Was “loaned” to General Miles to distribute

m^ic materials to authorized recipients.

While, as previously indicated, it is appreciated that promiscuous

distribution of highly confidential materid is dangerous, it neverthe-

less should be made available to all those whose responsibility cannot

adequately and intelligently be discharged without knowledge of such

confidential data. It would seem that though sufficient paraphrase

of the original material the source of the information could haVe been

adequately protected. Certainly as great confidence could be placed

in ranking officials of various departments and bureaus of the Govern-

ment as in the numerous technicians, cryptographers, translators, and

clerks required for the interception and processing of the Magic.

16. There is great danger of being blinded by the self-evident

Virtually every witness has testified he was surprised at the Japanese

attack on Pearl Harbor. This was essentially the result of the fact

that just about everybody was blinded or rendered myopic by what

seemed to be the self-evident purpose of Japan to attack toward the

south — ^Thailand, Malaysia, the Kra Peninsula, and perhaps the

Philippines and Guam. Japan had massed ships and amphibious

forces, had deployed them to the south, and had conducted recon-

naissance in that direction. So completely did everything point to the

south that it appears everyone was blinded to significant, albeit some-

what disguised, handwriting on the waU suggesting an attack on us

elsewhere.

The advice of the Army lieutenant to the radar operators to “forget

it” when they informed him of the approach of a large number of

planes appears to have been based on the self-evident assumption that

the planes were Army or Navy craft on patrol or the expected B-I7’s

due to arrive from the west coast.

16. Officials should at all times give subordinates the benefit of significant

information

Before the committee Admiral Turner testified that he regarded an '

attack on Pearl Harbor as a 50-50 possibility. Assinning this to be

correct, there can be little doubt, considering the position he held as

Director of War Plans in the Navy Department, that he could have

given the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet the benefit of his

conclusion had he been disposed to do so. As a matter of fact Admiral

Turner had the principal hand in preparing the November 27 “war

warning.”

As has been seen, the orders contained in the wax warning neces-

sarily carried the implication x>f an attack from without; however, the

dispatch did not reflect the likelihood of an attack upon the fleet with

the d^ree of likelihood manifested by Admiral Turner in indicating

to the committee his estimate of the situation. Admiral Turner’s

position would be indefmsible were his estimate based on any infor-

mation or intellig^ce he may have possessed. It appears, on the

other hand, that his conclusion was pr^ic|i.ted on a rather long-stand-

ing impression in the Navy that an attack on our Pacific Fleet by

Japan could be expected at one time or another. It is regarded as

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unfortunate, however, that Admiral Turner did not see fit to give to

the Pacific Fleet the benefit of his conclusions outlined, with benefit

of retrospection, in such detail before the committee.

17. An official who neglects to familiarize himself in detail with his

organization should forfeit his responsibility

It would seem that War and Navy Department oflBcials both m

Washington and Hawaii were so obsessed by an executive complex

that they could not besmirch their dignities by “stooping” to deter-

mine what was going on, or more especially what was not going on,

in their organizations. Examples should mustrate this observation.

Admirals Stark and Turner both have testified they “thought” the

commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet was receiving the Magic intelli-

f ence. Yet in a period of over 6 months, with relations between the

Jnited States and Japan mounting in tenseness and approaching a

crisis, neither of these ranking officers determined for a fact whether

the fleet was receiving this information.

In the case of Hawaii, the evidence indicates failures on the part of

the commanding general and the commander in chief to actually

determine what was going on in their organizations. Additionally,

in a command by mutual cooperation it was as important that Admiral

Kimmel know what General Short was doing, and vice versa, as that

he know what the fleet itself was doing. But, as has been heretofore

pointed out, neither of these officers really verified whether his as-

sumptions concerning what the other was doing were correct.

18. Failure can he avoided in the long run only by preparation for any

eventuality

The record tends to indicate that appraisal of likely enemy move-

ments was divided into mohahilities and possibilities. Everyone has

admitted that an attack by Japan on Pearl Harbor was regarded as at

least a possibihty. It was felt, however, that a Japanese movement

toward the south was a probability. The over-all result was to look

for the probable move and to take little or no effective precautions to

guard against the contingency of the possible action.

While it appears satisfactorily established that it is the basic re-

sponsibility of an outpost commander to prepare for the worst con-

tingency, it is believed that this premise has been applied more in

theory than in practice. The mditaiy and naval branches of the

Government must be continuously impressed by, and imbue their

personnel with, the realization that failure can be avoided over an

extended period of time only by preparation for any eventuality, at

least when hostilities are expected.

19. Officials, on a personal basis, should never countermand an official

instruction

On October 16, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent to the

commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet a dispatch concerning the

resignation of the Japanese Cabinet, pointing out, among other thongs,

that “since the U. S. and Britain are held responsible by Japan for

her present desperate situation there is also a possibility that Japan

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may attack these two powers.” But on October 17, referring to this

dispatch, Admiral Stark, in a letter to Admiral Kimmel, said: “Things

have been popping here for the last twenty-four hours but from our

dispatches you know about all that we do. Personally I do not believe

the Japs are going to sail into us and the message I sent you merely

stated the ‘possibility’; in fact, I tempered the message handed to me

considerably.”

It appears to have been a generally accepted practice in the Navy

for the Chief of Naval Operations to supplement official dispatches

by correspondence of a quasi-personal nature.® ’ Despite this fact, it

is regarded as an extremely da^erous practice for the Chief of Naval

Operations to express an opinion on a personal basis to an outpost

commander which has the inevitable effect of tempering the import

of an official dispatch:. Were it not for the fact that Admiral Stark

supplied the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet highly pertinent

and significant information after his letter of October 17 and before

December 7, the manner in which he emasculated the October 16

dispatch would be inexcusable. However, as has been seen in this

report, some of the most vital intelligence and orders relating to

Japan were supplied Hawaii during November and December of 1941.

20. Personal or official jealousy will wreck any organization

This principle is the result of the general impression obtained by

the committee concerning the relationship between the Army and

the Navy as well as concerning certain intraor^anizational situations

which existed. The relationship, understanding, and coordination

between the War Plans Division and the Office of Naval Intelligence

were wholly unsatisfactory. The War Plans Division, particularly,

appears to have had an overzealous disposition to preserve and en-

hance its prerogatives.

The whole story of discussions during 1941 with respect to unity

of command is a picture of jealous adherence to departmental pre-

rogatives and un\^lingness to make concessions in the interest of

both the Army and Navy. The same comment is applicable to the

near dispute between Admiral Kimmel and General Short as to which

of them should command Wake and Midway when the marines were

replaced by soldiers. It is proper to suggest that, had both the

commanding officers in Hawaii been less concerned between November

27 and December 7 about preserving their individual prerogatives

with respect to Wake and Midway and more concerned about working

together to defend the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier in the light of the

warnings they had received, the defensive situation confronting the

Japanese on the morning of December 7 might well have been entirely

different.

21. Personal friendship, without more, should never be accepted in lieu

of liaison or confused therewith where the latter is necessary to the

proper functioning of two or more agencies

One of the more “human” aspects of the testimony of both Admiral

Kimmel and General Short is the maimer in which each sought to

bring out their personal friendship for the purpose of demonstrating

» Admiral Stark said: “I might point out, in passing, that there was nothing unusual in this so-called

‘personal' correspondence between the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commanders in Chief— it was

a long-established custom when I took oflQce." Committee record, p. 66d4.

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the close relationship that existed between them. They played golf

together; they dined together — ^but they did not get together on

oflBcial business in such manner as to insure that each possessed the

same knowledge of the situation as the other and to effect coordina-

tion and integration of their efforts.

No considerations should be permitted os excuse Jor failure to perform

a fundamental task

Both the commanding officers in Hawaii have offered as explanation

and excuse for failure to perform various supervisory and adminis-

trative responsibilities in their commands the fact that they had

countless and manifold duties in their respective positions as com-

mander in chief of the Pacific Fleet and commanding general of the

Hawaiian Department. Additionally, Admiral Kimmel has referred

to the extraordinarily competent staff which he had in Hawaii. The

most fimdamental responsibility that both commanders had under

the circumstances, however, was to make certain beyond any rea-

sonable doubt that there was an integrated and coordinated em-

ployment of defensive facihties consistent with the principle of

command by mutual cooperation. No excuse or explanation can

justify or temper the failure to discharge this responsibihty which

superseded and surpassed all others.

2S. Superiors must at all times keep their subordinates adequately

informed and, conversely, subordinates should keep their superiors

informed

In Washington, Admiral Wilkinson, Director of Naval Intelligence,

and Captain McCoUum, Chief of the Far Eastern Section of that

Division, were not adequately and currently informed as to the nature

of the dispatches being sent to our outposts emanating froin the War

Plans Division. Subordinate officials in both the War and Navy

Departments failed to appreciate the importance and necessity of

getting to both General Marshall and Admiral Stark the first 13 parts

of the Japanese 14-part memorandum immediately on the evening of

December 6. Colonel French did not inform the Chief of Staff that

he had been unable to raise the Army radio in Hawaii on the morning

of December 7.

In Hawaii, Admiral Kimmel failed to insure that Admiral Bellinger,

who was responsible for Navy patrol planes, knew of the war warning

of November 27. Admiral Newton, as previously pointed out, was

permitted to leave Pearl Harbor with a task force completely oblivious

of any of the warning messages. General Short, construing the cau-

tion to disseminate the information in the warning of November 27

to “minimum essential officers” in a too-narrow manner, failed to

inform the essential and necessary officers of his command of the

acute situation in order that the proper alertness, might pervade the

Hawaiian Department.

The administrative organization of any establishment must be

designed to locate failures and to assess responsibility

The committee has been very much concerned about the fact that

there was no way in which it could be determined definitely that any

individual saw a particular message among the Magic materials. It

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does not appear that any record system was established for initialing

the messages or otherwise fixing responsibility. The system existing

left subordinate ofiicers charged with the duty of disseminating the

Magic at the complete mercy of superior officers with respect to any

question as to whether a particular message had been delivered to or

seen by them,

25. In a well-balanced organization there is close correlation of respon-

sibility and authority

Witnesses have testified rather fuUy as to what their responsibilities

were, both in Washington and at Hawaii. However, it does not appear

that any of them, except the highest ranking officers, possessed any

real authority to act in order decisively to discharge their respon-

sibilities. It cannot be presumed that it will be possible to meet

the exigencies of an emergency if the officer charged with the duty of

acting at the time the emergency arises does not possess the necessary

authority to follow through on the situation. There should be a

close correlation between responsibility and authority; to vest a man

with responsibility with no corresponding authority is an unfair,

ineffective, and unsatisfactory arrangement.

Alben W, Barkley, Chairman.

Jere Cooper, Vice Chairman.

Walter F. George.

Scott W. Lucas.

J. Bayard Clark.

John W. Murphy.

Bertrand W. Gearhart.

Frank B. Keefe (with additional views).

(Senators Brewster and Ferguson are filing

minority views.)

Additional Views of Mr. Keefe

INTRODUCTION

The committee report is divided into five parts. Part I deals with

the diplomatic background of the Pearl Harbor attack. Part II de-

scribes the actual attack and its aftermath. Part III discusses respon-

sibilities in Hawaii. Part IV discusses responsibilities in Washing-

ton, and Part V includes certain recommendations of the committee.

Scattered throughout the entire five sections of the committee report

are conclusions with respect to individuals in charge of carrying out

our diplomatic, military, and naval obligations prior to the attack on

Pearl Harbor. I find myself in aOTeement with most of these con-

clusions and recommendations. The voluminous facts contained in

the committee report have been accurately assembled from the enor-

mous record compiled by the committee. Any criticism which I may

have toward the marshaling of facts in the committee report is directed

to the manner in which such facts have been used to sustain the

various arguments and conclusions indulged in in the committee

report.

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It correctly states that both Washington and Hawaii were siu^irised

at the attack upon Pearl Harbor. It is apparently agreed that both

Washington and Hawaii expected the initial attack to come in the

Asiatic area. What was done in Washington as well as what was

done in Hawaii was admittedly done in the light of the universal

military behef that Hawaii was not in danger from an initial attack

by Japan. If this belief was unjustified, as I believe it was, then the

mistake lies on the Washington doorstep just as much as it does upon

that of Hawaii. Throughout the long and arduous sessions of the

committee in the preparation of the committee report, I continuously

insisted that whatever “yardstick” was agreed upon as a basis for

determining responsibilities in Hawaii should be applied to the high

command at Washington. This indicates in a general way my funda-

mental objection to the committee report. I feel that facts have been

martialed, perhaps unintentionally, with the idea of conferring blame

upon Hawaii and minimizing the blame that should properly be

assessed at Washington.

A careful reading of the committee report would indicate that the

analysis of orders and dispatches is so made as to permit criticism of

our commands in Hawaii while at the same time proposing a construc-

tion which would minimize the possibility of criticism of those in

charge at Washington.

I think it is true that none of the military chiefs at Washington or

Hawaii thought the attack would come at Pearl Harbor. I conclude

that they all thought it would come first in the Far East. Obviously

this was a fatal mistake, and I agree that the mistake was without

proper justification and that neither Hawaii nor Washington should

be excused from criticism for having made it. I think that the facts

in this record clearly demonstrate that Hawaii was always the No. 1

point of danger and that both Washington and Hawaii should have

known it at all times and acted accordingly. Consequently I agree

that the high command in Hawaii was subject to criticism for con-

cluding that Hawaii was not in danger. However, I must insist that

the sam.e criticism with the same force and scope should apply to the

high command in Washington, if is in this respect that I think the

tenor of the committee report may be subject to some criticism.

I fully agree with the doctrine relating to the placing of responsibility

on military officers in the field and their resulting duty under such

responsibilities. I agree that they must properly sustain this burden

in line with the high and pecuhar abilities wMch originally gave them

their assignments.

In the execution of their vitally important duties, however, the

officers at the front in the field are fairly entitled to all aids and help

and all information which can reasonably be sent to them from the

all-powerful high staff command in Washington. If both commands

are in error, both should be blamed for what each should have done

and what each failed to do respectively. The committee report, I

feel, does not with exactitude apply the same yardstick in measuring

responsibilities at Washington as has been applied to the Hawaiian

commanders. I cannot supress the feeling that the committee report

endeavors to throw as soft a light as possible on the Washington scene.

In order to clearly appraise the contentions herein expressed, I feel

compelled to restate some of the basic military aspects of the Pearl

Harl)or disaster as shown by the evidence.

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MILITARY ASPECTS OP THE PEARL HARBOR DISASTER

During tKe year 1941 the United States Pacific Fleet was based in

Pearl Harbor in the Hawaiian island of Oahu. It had proceeded to

the Hawaiian area for Fleet exercises in the spring of 1940. Its

scheduled return to its regular bases on the west coast was delayed

from time to time. From these delays there gradually emerged

evidence of the President's decision to retain the Fleet in the Hawaiian

area, to deter Japan from aggression in the Far East. The Com-

mander in Chief of the Fleet, Admiral J. O. Richardson, protested

this decision with a vigor which caused him to be relieved of command.

He believed that the readiness of men and ships of the Fleet for war

operations would impress Japan rather than its presence in Hawaii,

where facilities to render it ready for war were greatly inferior to those

available on the west coast. Richardson was succeeded in command

by Admiral H. E. Kimmel in February 1941. The appointment of

Kimmel was made on his record as capable officer. There was no

political or other favoritism involved. At this time the deciaon to

base the Fleet in Hawaii was an established fact. Pearl Harbor was

the only anchorage in the Hawaiian area offering any security. It

was then, however, an extremely deficient Fleet base. Its exposed

position rendered concealment of Fleet movements practically im-

possible in an area filled with Japanese agents. The Army’s equip-

ment for antiaircraft defense was meager. The local Army-Navy

defense forces did not have sufficient long-range patrol planes to

perform effective distant reconnaissance, even if the patrol planes of

the fleet were made available to augment the handful of Army recon-

naissance planes.

Under these circumstances, the position of the Fleet in the Hawaiian

area was inherently untenable and dangerous. The Fleet would

sacrifice its preparations for war, and its potential mobility in war,

if it concentrated its resources on the defense of its base. Moreover,

with only four tankers suitable for fueling ships at sea, ships of the

Fleet had to come into Pearl Harbor for refueling, to say nothiug of

maintenance and repair, and th# necessary rest and relaxation of

crews. Once the ships were in Pearl Harbor, with its single channel,

they were a target for any successfully launched air attack from carrier-

borne planes. The severity of the attack might be mitigated, but

damage to the ships found in port was inevitable. To prevent a hostile

carrier from successfully launching planes required that it be first

discovered and attacked. Discovery, other than bj; lucky accident,

required air reconnaissance of the perimeter of a circle of 800-mile

radius from Oahu. The Fleet did not at any time have patrol planes

sufficient in number to carry out such reconnaissance. The Japanese

task force which raided Oahu on December 7, 1941, was composed of

six carriers. The Pacific Fleet had on that date three carriers, one of

which was on the Pacific coast for repair, leaving only two immediately

available in the area of a prospective sea engagement. An engagement

at sea would have found the preponderant strength with Japan.

Although the Fleet was placed by the President in the Hawaiian

area in 1940 as an implement of diplomacy and as a deterrent to Japan,

its strength was appreciably reduced in Apriliand May of 1941. At

that time, one aircraft carrier, three battleships, four cruisers and

eighteen destroyers were detaclxed from the Pacific Fleet and trans-

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{erred to the Atlantic. The President directed the Chief of Naval

Operations to consult the British Chiefs of Staff on the proposal to

effect this transfer. They gave their opinion “that the consequential

reduction in the strength of the United States Pacific Fleet would not

unduly encourage Japan” (exhibit 158, letter from Admiral Danck-

werts to Admiral Turner, April 28, 1941). The transfer to the Atlantic

was then carried out. The Conunander in Chief of the United States

Pacific Fleet was not asked for his opinion. The Chief of Naval

Operations wrote him about the proposed transfer stating “I am tell-

ing you, not arguing with you” (exhibit 106, letter from Admiral Stark

to Admiral Kimmel, dated April 19, 1941).

The primary mission assigned the Pacific Fleet under existing Navy

War Plans was the making of raids on the Marshalls. These were to

divert Japanese strength from the so-called Malay barrier. No exist-

ing War Plan of the United States in 1941 contemplated that the

Pacific Fleet would go to the rescue of the Philippines or resist Japan-

ese naval forces attacking the Philippines. The Pacific Fleet was so

inferior to the Japanese Navy in eveiy category of fighting ship that

such a imssion was considered too suicidal to attempt. The Ameri-

can public m 1941 was deluded about the fighting strength of our Fleet

in the Pacific, by irresponsible utterances from men in authority.

Japan was under no such misconception. Her consular agents in the

Hawaiian islands needed only their eyesight, and possibly binoculars,

to appraise correctly the strength of the Fleet.

An inferior Fleet, under enemy surveillance in an exposed naval

base without resources to protect it could only avert disaster by

receiving the best possible evidence of the intentions of its potential

enemy. The Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet in 1941 recognized

that mformation was essential to his making appropriate disposition

to meet any crisis. He formally requested the Chief of Naval Opera-

tions that he “be immediately informed of all important develop-

ments as they occur and by the quickest secure means available”

(exhibit 106, Official Letter CINCPAC to CNO, dated May 26,

1941).

The best evidence of Japanese intentions in the year 1941, avail-

able to the United States Government, were messages exchanged

between the Government of Japan and her diplomatic consular agents

abroad. These were intercepted by the Army and Navy. They

were decoded and translated in Washington. The President, the

Secretaries of State, War and Navy, the Chief of Staff, and Chief of

Naval Operations regularly received these intercepted messages.

The President and the other officials receiving the intercepted

messages in Washington prior to December 7, 1941, considered it

likely that Japan would attack the United States. At a meeting of

the President and his so-called War Council on November 25, 1941,

cwcording to Mr. Stimson’s notes the President stated: “that we were

likely to be attacked perhaps (as soon as) next Monday” (Stimson

Statement, page 47). There was abundant evidence in the inter-

cepted messages that Japan intended to attack the United States.

Japan had fixed a deadline date of November 25, extended to Novem-

ber 29, for reaching a diplomatic agreement with the United States.

There were at least six Japanese messages emphasizing this deadline.

If the deadline date passed without agreement, the Japanese govern-

ment advised her Ambassadors in Washington: “Things are auto-

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matically going to happen.” The necessity for agreement by the

deadline date was stressed by Japan in these terms: “The fate of our

Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days”; “We gambled

the fate of our land on the throw of this die” (exhibit 1, page 137, 93).

On November 26, 1941, prior to the advanced “deadline” date, the

United States government delivered to Japan a diplomatic note,

which the intercepted messages revealed Japan considered to be a

“humiliating proposal”, impossible of acceptance (exhibit 1, p. 195).

The intercepted diplomatic messages further revealed that Japan

expected to “rupture” negotiations with the United States when she

replied to the American note of November 26 (exhibit 1, p. 195). To

prevent the United States from becoming unduly suspicious Japan

instructed her envoys in Washington to keep up a pretext of continu-

ing negotiations until this Japanese reply was ready for delivery

(exhibit 1, p. 208). A message from the Japanese government to its

Ambassador in Berlin, sent on November 30, was intercepted and

translated by the Navy in Washington on December 1 (exhibit 1,

p. 204). In this message the Japanese Ambassador was instructed

to —

immediately interview Chancellor Hitler and Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and

confidentially communicate to them a summary of developments. \* ♦ \*

Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break

out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some dash of arms and add

the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams. [Italics

supplied.]

The President regarded this message as of such interest that he re-

tained a copy of it, contrary to the usual practice in handling the

intercepted n^essages (R. 10887). On December 2, 1941 elaborate

instructions from Japan were intercepted dealing in precise detail with

the method of internment of American and British nationals in Asia

“on the outbreak of war with England und thie United States” (exhibit

1, p. 198). '

In the “bomb plot” or “ships in harbor” message of September 24

the Japanese government gave detailed instructions to its Consul-

General in Hawaii as to the character of report it required concerning

vessels in Pearl Harbor. Pearl Harbor was to be divided into five

sub areas. An alphabetical symbol was given each area. The Japa-

nese government instructed the consul:

With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have you report

on those at anchor (these are not so important) tied up at wharves, buoys, and in

docks. (Designate types and classes briefly.) If possible we would like to have

you make mention of the fact when there are two or more vessels alongside the

same wharf.

This despatch was decoded and translated in Washington on October

9, 1941 (exhibit 2, p. 12).

On September 29, 1941, the Japanese Consul in Hawaii replied to

his government. He established a system of symbols to be used in

designating the location of vessels at key points in Pearl Harbor.

This despatch was decoded and translated in Washington on October

10, 1941.

On November 15, 18, 20, and 29 the Japanese government urgently

called for information about the location of ships in Pearl Harbor

(exhibit 2, pp. 13 and 15). On November 15 the Japanese Consul

in Honolulu was directed to make his “ships in harbor report” irregu-

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lar but at the rate of twice a week (exhibit 2, p, 13). The reports

were to give vessel locations in specific areas of the harbor, using the

symbols established in September (exhibit 2, p. 15). The greatest

secrecy was enjoined, becaiise relations between Japan and the United

States were described as “most critical.” On November 18, the

Japanese Consul General reported to Tokyo the locations of the ships

in the various sub areas of Pearl Harbor, giving minute descriptions of

the courses, speed and distances apart of destroyers entering the har-

bor (exhibit 2, p. 15). On November 29 reports were requested even

though there were no movements of ships. These despatches were

intercepted, decoded and translated in Washington on December

3, 4, 5, and 6, 1941.

The “bomb plot” or “ships in harbor” message, and those messages

relating to Pearl Harbor which followed it, meant that the ships of

the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor were marked for a Japanese attack.

No other American harbor was divided into sub areas by Japan.

In no other area did Japan seek information as to whether two or

more vessels were alongside the same wharf. Prior to this message

Japanese espionage in Hawaii was directed to ascertain the general

whereabouts of the American Fleet, whether at sea or in port. With

this message Japan inaugm-ated a new policy directed to Pearl Harbor

and to no other place, in which information was no longer sought

merely as to the general whereabouts of the Fleet, but as to the pres-

ence of particular ships in particular areas of the harbor. In the

period immediately preceding the attack Japan required such reports

even when there was no movement of ships in and out of Pearl Harbor.

The reports which Japan thus sought and received had a useful pur-

pose only in planning and executing an attack upon the ships in port.

These reports were not just the work of enthusiastic local spies gath-

ering meticulous details in an excess of zeal. They were the product

of instructions emanating from the government of Japan in Tokyo.

OflBcers of the high command in Washington have admitted before us

that this message, if correctly evaluated, meant an attack on ships of

the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor (R. 3036, 4014; 4874; 2100-2102;

11313-11314; 6390, 6394; 5378).

Lt. Commander Kramer of Naval Intelligence in Washington

P romptly distributed the Pearl Harbor “bomb plot” message to the

’resident, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations,

Admiral Stark, the Director of Naval Communications, the Director

of War Plans, and the Director of Naval Intelligence (R. 11209).

It bore the notation “interesting message” (R. 11207). It was ac-

companied by a summary of its contents as follows;

Tokyo directs special reports on ships in Pearl Harbor which is divided into

five areas for the purpose of showing exact locations (R. 11207).

Military Intelligence through Colonel Bratton delivered the “bomb

plot” message to the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, and the

Chief of the War Plans Division (R. 12083). The message was

discussed several times by Colonel Bratton, Chief of the Far Eastern

Section, Military Litelligence Division, War Department General

Staff, with his opposite numbers in the Navy Department (R. 12105).

They discussed possible significance of the message, as indicating a

plan for an air attack on ships in Pearl Harbor (R. 12105). In the

course of these discussions Officers in Naval Intelligence stated that

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the Japanese were wasting their time in getting such meticulous

detail about the location of ships in Pearl Harbor because the Fleet

would not be in Pearl Harbor when the emei^ency arose (R. 12105).

Despite the fact that the “bomb plot” message and related intercepts

dealing with the berthing of ships in Pearl Harbor were delivered to

General Marshall and Admiral Stark, they testified before the Com-

mittee that they have no recollection of ever seeing them (R. 291 1-2912 :

5787-5792). No intimation of these messages was given to General

Short or Admiral Kimmel in Hawaii. On the contrary, Admiral

Kimmel had been advised by the Navy Department on February 1,

1941:

\* \* \* no move against Pearl Harbor appears imminent or planned for in the

foreseeable future (exhibit 15).

In the days immediately preceding Pearl Harbor, Japan made no

effort to conceal the movements or presence of her naval forces in

Southeast Asia (R. 453). The movements of her troops in Indo-

China at that time were the subject of diplomatic exchanges between

the United States and Japan (Foreign Relations of the United States,

Japan, 1931-41, vol. II, p. 779). Yet, the intercepts showed that

some Japanese plan went into effect automatically on November 29,

from which Japan hoped to divert American suspicion by a pretext

of continued negotiations. Wliat was its nature? Only the President

and his top advisers in Washington had this infonnation.

Despite the elaborate and labored arguments in the report and

despite the statements of high ranking military and naval ofldcers to

the contrary, I must conclude that the intercepted messages received

and distributed in Washington on the afternoon and evening of De-

cember 6 and the early hours of December 7, pointed to aix attack on

Pearl Harbor:

1. The “Pilot Message”. This was a message from Japan to her

Ambassadors in Washington advising them that the Japanese reply

to the American note of November 26 was ready and being sent to

them in fourteen parts; that it was to be treated with great secrecy

pending instructions as to the time of its delivery; and that the time

for its delivery was to be fixed in a separate message (exhibit 1, p. 238).

2. The first thirteen parts of the Japanese reply. This included all

but the last paragraph of the Japanese note handed to the Secretary

of State on December 7 (exhibit 1, pp. 239-244).

3. The fourteenth and last paragraph of the Japanese reply, and

the message to the Japanese Ambassadors which fixed the time for

delivery of the Japanese note as 1 p. m., Washington time, December

7 (exhibit 1, p. 248).

The “Pilot Message” was filed in Tokyo at 6:56 A. M. Washington

time December 6; it was intercepted by the Navy by 7:20 A. M.

Washington time December 6 and forwarded to the Navy Department.

It was sent by the Navy to the Army for decryption and translation

about noon, Washington time, on December 6 (exhibit 41). It was

decrypted, translated, and distributed about 3 P. M. Washington

time by the Army to Mr. Hull, Mr. Stimson, General Marshall, the

Chief of the War Plans Division, General Gerow, and the Chief of

Military Intelligence, General Miles (R. 12050). In the Navy

Department the Director of Naval Intelligence, Admiral Wilkinson,

received the so-called Pilot Message prior to 6 P. M. Washington time

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on Dec«nber 6 (R. 4658). He had previously told his subordinates

to be on the lookout for the Japanese reply and felt sure that he gave

instructions that the Pilot Message was to be delivered to Admiral

Stark (R. 4661-4662). Admiral Turner, Chief of the War Plans

Division in the oflBce of the Chief of Naval Operations, received the

“Pilot Message” in the evening of December 6 (R. 5440-5442),

Admiral Stark and General Marshall each deny that on December 6

he had knowledge of the Pilot Message (R. 3473; 5813). We find on

the testimony of General Miles and Colonel Bratton that the “Pilot

Message” was delivered to General Marshall during the afternoon of

December 6, 1941 (R. 3589-3590; 12049-12050). This Pilot Message

said that Japan’s reply to the American note of November 26 was

about to be sent from Tokyo to Washington, and indicated that a

rupture of diplomatic relations or war was a matter of hours.

On the evening of December 6, between 9 P. M. and midnight,

Washington time, the first thirteen parts of the Japanese reply to the

United States were delivered to the President, Mr. Knox, the oflBce

of the Secretary of State and the Chiefs of Army and Navy Intelli-

gence (R. 10453-10455; 12052-12054). After reading this message

the President stated “This means war” (R. 12441). He later tele-

phoned Admiral Stark about the critical turn of events (R. 14757-

14759). When Mr. Knox received the message he called Mr. Stimson

and Mr. Hull and arranged a conference with them for Sunday

morning (R. 10675-10681).

Mr. Stimson asked the Navy Department on Saturday evening to

furnish him by 9 A. M. Sunday morning the following information:

Compilation of men of war in Far East; British, American, Japanese, Dutch,

Russian; also 'compilation of American men of war in the Pacific Fleet, with

locations, and a list of American men of war in the Atlantic without locations

[Italics supplied, R. [13988.]

Admirals Stark, Ingersoll and the Secretary of the Navy were consulted

about this request. The Secretary of the Navy directed that the

information be compiled and delivered prior to 10 o’clock Sunday,

December 7 (R. 13988). This was done. The compilation showed

that practically all the ships of the Pacific Fleet were in Pearl Harbor

(exhibit 176).

In the early morning of December 7, 1941, about 5 A. M. Washing-

ton time, the message fixing the hour for delivery of the Japanese note

as 1 P. M. Washington time was available in the Navy Department in

Washington (R. 10694-10701)'. This was eight and one-half hours

before the attack on Pearl Harbor. Admiral Stark and his principal

subordinates have testified before us that they had knowledge of this

message about 10:30 A. M, (R. 4675, 9146-9148, 10469). Thk was

five and one-half horns after it had been received in the Navy Depart-

ment. It was about three hours before the attack. The relation of

1 P. M. Washington time to early morning in Hawaii was pointed out

to Admiral Stark. (R. 9146-9148; 9154-9156; 9236-9254; 4679;

4685). Admiral Stark was urged by the Director of Naval Intelli-

gence to send a warning to the Fleet (R. 4673). The chief intelligence

oflBcers of the Aimy had the “1 pm message” by 9 A. M. Washington

time, immediately appreciated its significance, but did not succeed in

bringing it to General Marshall’s attention imtil nearly several hours

later (R. 12077-12078; 12079-12081). Marshall was horseback riding

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in Virginia. No action was taken by the Army until he saw and read

the 1 P. M. message and related intercepts, at which time he sent a

message to General Short which went over commercial facilities and

was received after the Pearl Harbor attack (R. 2935-2939; 8396).

Admiral Stark took no action on this information except to agree to

the inclusion in the belated Army message of instructions to General

Short to advise Admiral Kimmel of its contents (R, 5814-5816).

Mr. Hull, Mr. Stimson, and Mr. Knox had the 1 P. M. message at

their conference about 10:30 A. M. Washington time December 7

(R. 10473). The relation of Washington time to time in Hawaii and

the Philippines was brought to their attention (R. 10473-10475).

Mr. Stimson’s notes describing the Sunday morning conference state:

Today is the day that the Japanese are going to bring their answer to Hull,

and everything in MAGIC indicated they had been keeping the time back until

now in order to accomplish something hanging in the air. Knox and I arranged

a conference with Hull at 10:30 and we talked the whole matter over. Hull is very

certain that the Japs are planning some deviltry and we are all wondering where

the blow will strike (Stimson statement, p. 59) .

The 1 P. M. message was deUvered to the President about 10:30

A. M. (R. 10476).

Why did the high command in Washington fail to disclose promptly

to Admiral Khnmel, General Short, and other American commanders

in the field the information available in Washington, Saturday night

and early Sunday morning? In seeking the answer to this question

we have encountered failures of memory and changes in sworn testi-

mopy. I am constrained to reach these conclusions:

As a result of his conversation with the President late Saturday

night December 6, Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, did

receive notice of a critical turn in Japanese-American relations (R.

14757-14759). Even if it be assumed that he had no inkling until

that time of vital information which had been available to him for

at least six hours, the call from the President should have provoked

his active and immediate efforts to elicit from his subordinates tKe

data which they possessed as to the immediacy of war. He Jailed to

make such efforts. Sunday morning, when the Saturday messages are

known to have come to his attention together with the 1 P. M. mes-

sage, he again did not take action, despite the recommendations of

the Chief of Naval Intelligence that a warning be sent to the Fleet.

He failed to exercise the care and diligence which his position required.

General Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Arn^, had the “Pilot Mes-

asge” available to him on the afternoon of Saturday, December 6.

Tms placed on him an obligation to make sure he would promptly

receive the subsequent information which the Pilot message mdicated

would be soon forthcoming. He did not do so. In placing himself

outside of effective contact with his subordinates for several hours on

Sunday morning, he failed to exercise the care and diligence which

his position required.

The alleged failure of tho chief subordinates of Admiral Stark and

General Marshall to furnish them promptly with the intercepted mes-

sages on Saturday night was unusual for two reasons. First, it was a

departure from the usual routine for the distribution of intercepts.

Second, these two were the only usual recipients of intercepts who

testified that the messages were not brought to their attention on

Saturday night. Neither Admiral Stark nor General Marshall made

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any effort thereafter to ascertain why such a colossal breakdown

should occm\* in the hinctioniug of their staffs on the eve of war (R.

3490-3491; 6215).

I have pointed out that during the critical period prior to the attack,

the Administration in Washington made certain over-all policy deci-

sions as to how to deal with the Japanese crisis. One decision was

that Japan should comnut the first overt act against the United States

and thus resolve the ^eiiuna in which the Administration's secret

diplomacy had placed it. The other was to be in instant readiness to

strike at Japan to check her further aggression against the British and

Dutch in Far East Asia. Certainly the information and orders sent

to General Short and Admiral Kinunel prior to the attack refiected

the policy adopted in Washington.

General Short and Admiral Kimmel were not informed about the

most important diplomatic steps in 1941. They were not informed

of the parallel action agreement at the Atlantic Conference or the

warning to Japan which followed. They were not informed of the

significant terms of the American note to Japan of November 26.

They were not informed of the commitment made to Great Britain,

as set forth in the Brooke-Popham telegram of December 6. They

did not receive the vital intercepted Japanese messages or any con-

densation or summary of them. In response to Admiral Einunel’s

request for information in his letter of May 26, 1941, he did receive

in July 1941 from the Navy Department the actual text of seven

intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages (exhibit 37, pp. 6-12). In

the week before the attack he received the text of another intercepted

message describing the Japanese intrigue in Thailand. Kimmel testi-

fied that he beheved that he was getting aU pertinent information

affecting the Pacific Fleet. This was the assurance Admiral Stark

had given in response to the definite request in the letter of May 26,

1941. The Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet, Captain Layton,

wrote to Captain McCollum, his opposite niunber in Naval InteUi-

gence in Washington, on March 11, 1941, to urge that intercepted

Japanese diplomatic traffic be sent to the Fleet. McCollum’s reply

satisfied Layton that the Fleet would receive diplomatic traffic which

affected its actions (R. 12923). But the vital intercepts were not

sent to Admiral Kimmel or General Short. The fact that a few inter-

cepts were sent to Admiral Kimmel shows that the withholding of

others was not attributable to fear of the security of Naval communica-

tions and consequent prejudice to the Secret of Magic. The “bomb

plot” message and related intercepts would have been of incalculable

value both to General Short and Admiral Kimmel. Yet they were

given no intimation of their existence.

The message of November 27 to Admiral Kimmel warned him of

the threatened Japanese move in southeast Asia, and ordered him

to be ready to execute a Fleet offensive against the Marshalls required

by War Plans. Readiness for an offensive at some distance from

Hawaii precluded concentrating the limited resources of the Fleet

upon the defense of its base, which no despatch from the Navy Depart-

ment mentioned as a point of attack. The offensive missions pre-

scribed by the War Plans required the full use of the patrol planes of

the Fleet. These planes were recently acquired and required altera-

tions and maintenance work to put them in shape for war. The

planes were too few for full distant searches from Hawaii. Partial

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searches were properly considered of doubtful value and involved

the risk of making the planes useless for the reconnaissance required

in the raids on the Marshalls at the time when they would be needed;

Task forces at sea and patrol planes going to and from outlying islands

carried out such distant reconnaissance as was feasible. As suggested

by the Navy Department on November 27, the two carriers of the

Pacific Fleet were sent on missions to outlying islands. Lacking air

protection the battlesWps appeared better disposed in poit than at

sea. The fuel linaitations and other loristic deficiencies of the Pacific

Fleet were so acute that it was physically impossible to keep the whole

Fleet, or major portions of it, at sea for extended intervals. The

disposition of the ships and the use of patrol planes on and after

November 27 were logical and reasonable in view of the message of

that date.

On the evening of December 6, in response to Secretary Stimson’s

request and at the direction of Secietary Knox, the Navy Department

compiled from its records a summary showing that all the major

ships of the Pacific Fleet were in Pearl Harbor. At this time the

in formation available in Washington showed that war was only hours

away. Yet the two Secretaries and the high command made no

effort to direct any change in the dispositions of the Fleet as shown

in the Navy Department smnmary. They took no steps to furnish

Admiral Kimmel the information which they possessed as to the

imminence of war. Consequently they deprived him of any chance

to alter his dispositions in the light of that information. I conclude

that Secretaries Stimson and Knox and the high command in Wash-

ington knew that the major units of the Fleet were in Pearl Harbor

on December 6-7, 1941, and were satisfied with that situation.

The message of November 27 to Admiral Kimmel illustrates one

feature of the pre-Pearl Harbor plan of action of the Administration.

The Fleet was to be in readiness for offensive raids on the Marshalls

to counter the Japanese advance in southeast Asia. The message

sent to General Short by General Marshall on November 27, 1941

shows the other feature of the Administration’s plan of action — to

make sure that the Japanese would strike first so that the offensive

by the Fleet would be approved by the American public. The

message to General Short stated;

If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot be avoided the United States desires that

Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed

as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior

to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and

other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out

so as no, repeat not, to alarm the civil population or disclose intent (exhibit 32,

p. 7).

General Marshall testified that instructions about the “overt act” were

put into the message on the personal order of the President (R. 3443-

3447). In addition the War Department sent three other messages

to the Army and Army Air Forces in Hawaii, on November 27 and 28,

aU of which were directed to sabotage and subversive activities. One

of these messages from the War Department on November 28 stated:

Protective measures should be confined to those essential to security, avoiding

unnecessary publicity and alarm (exhibit 32, p. 13).

The Navy Department also cautioned Admiral Kimmel against com-

mitting the first overt act. On November 29 he received from the

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Navy Department the substance of the Army’s message to General

Short with the additional directive —

Undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act (exhibit

37, p. 38).

On November 27, 1941, General Short reported to General Marshall

the measures he had taken in response to General Marshall’s message.

His reply specifically referred to General Marshall’s message by its

number: It stated: ‘^Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage

Liaison with the Navy. Reurad four seven two twenty-seventh” (ex-

hibit 32, p. 12). The Chief of the War Plans Division of the Army,

General Leonard T. GeroW, saw General Short’s reply, noted and ini-

tialled it (exhibit 46). This reply was routed by General Gerow to

General Marshall, Chief of Staff. Some question has arisen as to

whether General Marshall in fact actually saw General Short’s reply.

In order that the reader may have the exact facts, I desire to report

the evidence, question and answer, beginning page 1420 of the

printed record:

Mr. Keefe. Now with the country on the brink of war, General Marshall, you

having the then impression as you have stated it a few moments ago, that Japan

was liable to precipitate war by attacking any time, any place, it would be highly

important to the Chief of Staff to see to it that the orders which he had given

were carried out, would it not?

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Now when General Short^s message came back the evidence in-

dicates, somewhat inconclusively perhaps, tha: it was part of three or four papers,

the top one being the reply of MacArthur, then Short, then a route sheet, the

MacArthur message being on top and that bears your endorsement with your

initials.

General Marshall. Correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Your initials do not appear on the Short message but they do

show the initials of the Secretary of War and the War Plans Department, General

Gerow. Now am I correct in the assumption from an understanding of your

evidence on that point that you think you must have seen the Short message al-

though you did not initial it, having initialed the top one?

General Marshall. That was my assumption, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Well, is that a mere assumption or is it a fact?

General Marshall. I stated I did not recall, sir; that I must assume that I had

seen it.

Mr. Keefe. Well, if you saw that Short message. General Marshall, as Chief

of Staff it imposed some responsibility upon you, did it not?

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe. It was addressed to you as Chief of Staff, was it not?

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And the very telegram itself indicates that it is in response to the

command order which you had issued to him?

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And it was a message which attempted on the part of Short to

convey to you as Chief of Staff the nature of the alert under which he was

operating?

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe. That was his response to your order?

General Marshall. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Now, I have read the various statements. General Marshall, that

you have made at various times in connection with this .matter. You recall

that when you were before the Army board first you were somewhat confused

about those things because you thought that at some time in November there

had been a change in alert numbers. Do you remember that?

General Marshall. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Now, it is perfectly clear now that a reading of this message indi-

cates that there isn’t any alert number specified in Short’s wire.

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe. So that puts that out of the picture, doesn’t it?

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General Marshall. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. So we get down to the simple fact that here is a message from your

commanding general in the bastion of defense in the Pacific to which all of our

defenses, as you have testified, were tied, in which he tells you that he is alerted

to prevent sabotage; liaison with Navy. Now in all fairness. General Marshall,

in the exercise of ordinary care as Chief of Staff ought you not to have proceeded

to investigate further and give further orders to General Short when it appeared

that he was only alerted against sabotage?

General Marshall. As I stated earlier, that was my opportunity to intervene

and I did not do it.

Mr. Keefe. Well, now, you say that was your opportunity. That was your

responsibility, was it not?

General Marshall. You can put it that way, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Well, I donT want to put it that way. I am asking you. You

used the words “that was your opportunity,’’ I do not want an opportunity to

arise in the future discussion of this matter to have a confiict of words and not to

be able to understand just want you meant. Do I understand that your use of

the word “opportunity” is synonymous with responsibility?

General Marshall. Mr. Keefe, I had an immense number of papers going

over my desk every day informing me what was happening anywhere in the world.

This was a matter of great importance. It had gone into the machine, it had been

sent out, the acknowledgments had come back. They passed the important mes-

sages over my desk. I noted them and initialed them; those that I thought the

Secretary of War ought specifically to see l put them out for him to see, to be sure

that he would see it in case by any chance he did not see the same message.

I was not passing the responsibility on to the Secretary of War. I merely

wanted him to know.

Now the same thing related to these orders of the War Department. I was

responsible. I was responsible for the actions of the General Staff throughout on

large matters and on the small matters. I was responsible for those, but I am not

a bookkeeping machine and it is extremely difficult, it is an extremely difficult

thing for me to take each thing in its turn and give it exactly the attention that

it had merited.

Now in this particular case a very tragic thing occurred, there is no question

about that, there is no question in regard to my responsibility as Chief of Staff.

I am not attempting to evade that at all, but I do not think it is quite characterized

in the manner that you have expressed yourself.

Mr. Keefe. Well, now, let me put it in another way. You have now stated

it was your responsibility as Chief of Staff to see to it that General Short out there

in Hawaii, which you have described as being your bastion of defense, to see

that he was alerted, and if he misinterpreted your order to see that that order

was carried out.

General Marshall. That is my responsibility, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Now, I have stated it correctly, haven’t I?

General Marshall. Yes, sir, you have.

.^Subsequently, In the same examination (printed record pp. 1422—

1423) General Marshall stated that General Gerow had a direct

responsibility in this matter and that he had full responsibility as

Chief of Staff. General Marshall was very fair. He admitted that a

tragic mistake had been made, and while it was the direct responsi-

bility of General Gerow, Chief of War Plans, to have ‘'caught'^

General Short^s reply and to have immediately advised his Chief of

Staff, jet General Marshall as Chief of Staff did assume over-all

responsibility for failure of the Washington headquarters to interpret

and evaluate General Short’s reply and to see to it that he was on an

all-out alert in accordance with the command directive issued in the

message from Marshall to Short on November 27. The Secretary of

War saw, noted and initialled General Short’s reply. (Exhibit 46).

It was the responsibility of General Marshall to see that General

Short was properly alerted (R. 3723). General Short, after being

ordered to report his state of readiness to General Marshall, was en-

titled to assume that this state of readiness was satisfactory to the

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Chief of Staff unless he heard to the contrary (R. 3443). Neither

General Marshall, General Gerownor Secretary.of War Stimson made

any criticism or suggestion to General Short al)out the condition of his

alert in Hawaii in the ten-day period prior to the attack. Because of

their silence General Short was led to believe that the Chief of Staff ap-

proved his alert against sabotage. I believe that Secretary Stimson,

and Generals Marshall and Gerow, understood the nature of his alert

which was plainly indicated in the reply itself. I further believe

they were satisfied with General Short’s alert until the blow fell on

Hawaii.

On Jime 17, 1940, General Marshall had placed the Hawaiian

Department on all-out war alert by the following message (exhibit 52):

Immediately alert complete defensive organization to deal with possible trans-

pacific raid comma to greatest extent possible without creating public hysteria or

E rovoking undue curiosity of newspapers or alien ^ents. Suggest maneuver

asis. Maintain alert until further orders. Instructions for secret communica-

tion direct with Chief of Staff will be furnished you shortly. Acknowledge.

General Marshall followed up this alert with great care and received

considerable detailed information about it. (Exhibit 52.) He

described the information which caused the alert in 1940 in a letter to

the Commanding General in Hawaii, General Herron, as follows:

You have no doubt wondered as to the alert instructions sent to you on the 17th.

Briefly, the combination of information from a number of sources led to the

deduction that recent Japanese-Russian agreement to compose their differences

in the Far East was arrived at and so timed as to permit Japan to undertake a

trans-Pacific raid against Oahu, following the departure of the U. S. Fleet from

Hawaii.

Presumably such a raid would be in the interest of Germany and Italy, to force

the United States to pull the Fleet back to Hawaii.

Whether the information or deductions were correct, I cannot say. Even if

they were, the precautions you have taken may keep us from knowing they were

by discouraging any overt act (exhibit 52, p. 13).

On November 27, 1941, the information which General Marshall

had showed a far more severe crisis in Japanese-American relations

than existed in June of 1940. As his letter to General Herron shows,

he felt that this all-out alert in Hawaii in 1940 may have discouraged

the Japanese from attacking that area. Yet he did not repeat on

November 27, 1941, his message of Jime 17, 1940, to Hawaii with its

clear-cut order: “Immediately alert complete defensive organizalion to

deal wiUi possible trans-Pad^ raid.” He assigned as a reason for

not doing so, the fact that in the message of November 27, 1941,

“you had to include instructions of the President regarding overt

acts” (R. 3975).

Mr. Stimson describes the preparation of the Army message of

November 27 to General Short as follows:

If there was to be war, moreover, we wanted the Japanese to commit the first

overt act. On the other hand, the matter of defense against an attack by Japan

was first consideration. In Hawaii because of the large numbers of Japanese

inhabitants, it was felt desirable to issue a special warning so that nothing would

be done, unless necessary to defense, to alarm the civil population and thus pos-

sibly precipitate an incident and give the Japanese an excuse to go to war and

the chance to say that we had committed the first overt act (Stimson statenlent,

pp. 21-22).

Again on December 7, Mr. Stimson noted in his diary:

When the news first came that Japan had attacked us, my first feeling was of

relief that the indecision was over and that a crisis had come in a way which would

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unite all our people. This continued to be my dominant feeling in spite ofjthe

news of catastrophes which quickly developed (Stimson statement, p. 62) .

The same fear of publicity, alarm, or anything which might savor of

a first overt act by the United States, rather than by Japan, is reflected

in the President’s message to High Commissioner Sayre in the Philip-

pines on November 26, 1941. After describing the crisis in Japanese-

American relations, the President directed Mr. Sayre to impress

upon the President of the Philippines “the desirability of avoiding

public pronouncement or action gince that might make the situation

more difficult” (R. 13861-13862).

On Saturday night December 6 the President read the first 13 parts

of the final Japanese diplomatic note, remarked “This means war,”

and decided to get in touch with the Chief of Naval Operations (R.

12442, 12443). He learned that the Chief of Naval Operations was

at the theater. He then stated that he would reach the Admiral

later, that he did not want to cause public alarm by having the

Admiral paged. The fact that the Admiral had a box reserved was

mentioned. The President did not wish him to leave suddenly

because he would surely be seen and undue alarm might be caused

(R. 12444).

General Marshall failed to use the scrambler telephone on his desk

to call General Short in Hawaii on Sunday; morning December 7,

nearly two horns before the attack, and give him the same information

which he sent in the delayed telegram which reached General Short

after the attack. General Marshall testified that among the possible

factors which may have influenced him against using the scrambler

telephone was the possibility that the Japanese coiud construe the

fact that the Army was alerting its garrisons in Hawaii as a hostOe

act (R.\*3390).

The Japanese would have grasped at most any straw to bring to such portions

of our public that doubted our integrity of action that we were committing an

act that forced action on their part (R. 3193).

The concept of an “incident” as a factor which would unify public

opinion behind an all-out war effort either in the Atlantic or Pacific

had influenced the thinking of officials in Washington for a long time.

Many plans which might have produced an incident-were from time

to time discussed and considered. As early as October 10, 1940,

Secretary Knox had advised Admiral Richardson, then Commander-

in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, of a plan the President was considering

to shut off all trade between Japan and North and South America.

This would be accomplished by means of a patrol of American ships

in two lines extending from Hawaii westward to the Philippines, and

from Samoa toward the Dutch East Indies (R. 792). This plan was

to be instituted in the event Japan retaliated against Great Britain

upon the reopening of the Burma Road scheduled for October 17,

1940 (R. 792). Admiral Richardson was amazed at this proposal and

stated that the Fleet was not prepared to put such a plan into effect,

nor for the war which would certainly result from such a course of

action (R. 793).

On February 11, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations in a Memo-

randum for the President, described the President as considering a

plan to send a detachment of vessels to the Far East and perhaps

to permit a “leak” that they were going out there (exhibit 106). He

quoted the President in the same memorandum as stating that he

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would not mind losing one or two cruisers, but that he did not want

to take a chance on losing five or six. Again, in a letter of April

19, 1941 the Chief of Naval Operations quoted the President as saying

to him:

Betty, just as soon as those ships come back from Australia and New Zealand,

or perhaps a little before, I want to send some more out. I just want to keep

them popping up here and there and keep the Japs guessing (exhibit 106),

On May 24, 1941, Admiral Stark wrote Admiral Kimmel —

Day before yesterday the President gave me an overall limit of 30 days to

prepare and have ready an expedition of 25,000 men to sail for and to take the

Azores. Whether or not there would be , opposition I do not know but we have

to be fully prepared for strenuous opposition (exhibit 106).

On July 25, 1941 the Chief of Naval Operations wrote Admiral

Kimmel to the effect that he might be called upon to send a carrier-

load of planes to Russia via one of the Asiatic Russian ports (exhibit

106). ‘‘I don’t know that you will, but the President has told me to

be prepared for it, and I want you to have the thought.” Admiral

Kimmel replied to this suggestion as follows:

I entertain no doubt that such an operation, if discovered (as is highly probable),

will be tantamount to initiation of a Japanese- American war. If we are going to

take the initiative in commencing such a war, I can think of more effective ways

for gaining initial advantage. In short, it is my earnest conviction that use of a

carrier to deliver aircraft to Asiatic Russian ports in the present period of strained

relations is to invite war. If we have decided upon war it would be far better to

take direct offensive action. If for reasons of political expediency, it has been

determined to force Japan to fire the first shot, let us choose a method which will

be more advantageous to ourselves (exhibit 106).

On July 31, 1941, Admiral Stark sent Admiral Kimmel a copy of a

letter to Captain Charles M. Cooke as follows:

Within 48 hours after the Russian situation broke I went to the President,

with the Secretary's approval, and stated that on the assumption that the coun-

try's decision is not to let England fall, we should immediately seize the psycho-

logical opportunity presented by the Russian-German clash and announce and

start escorting immediately, and protecting the Western Atlantic on a large scale;

that such a declaration, followed by immediate action on our part, would almost

certainly involve us in the war and that I considered every day of delay in our

f etting into the war as dangerous and that much more delay might be fatal to

Britain's survival. I reminded him that I had been asking this for months in the

State Department and elsewhere, etc., etc., etc. . I have been maintaining that

only a war psychology could or would speed things up the way they should be

speeded up; that strive as we would it just is not in the nature of things to get

the results in peace that we would, were we at war.

The Iceland situation may produce an ^'incident". You are as familiar with

that and the President's statements and answers at press conferences as I am.

Whether or not we will get an “incident" because of the protection we are giving

Iceland and the shipping which we must send in support of Iceland and our

troops, I do not know — only Hitler can answer (exhibit 106).

Again Admiral Kelly Turner, War Plans OflScer for the Chief of

Naval Operations stated, in describing United States-Biitish Staff

conversations on War Plans in 1941:

It was felt by the Naval Department that there might be a possibility of war

with Japan without the involvement of Germany, but at some length and over a

considerable period this matter was discussed and it was determined that in such

a case the United States would, if possible, initiate efforts to bring Germany into

the war against us in order that we would be able to give strong support to the United

Kingdorn, in Europe (testimony of Admiral R. K. Turner before Admiral Hart,

pp. 251, 252, question 10, exhibit 144). [Italics supplied.]

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On November 29, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a

despatch to the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet which com-

menced with this imusual statement:

President directs that the following be done as soon as possible and within two

days if possible after receipt this despatch (exhibit 37, p. 30).

The President's directions were that the 'Commander in Chief of the

Asiatic Fleet was to charter three small vessels to form a “defensive

information patrol.” The minimum requirements to establish these

ships as United States men of war would suffice in manning them.

These requirements were: command by a Naval officer and the

mounting of a small gim and one machine gun. The employment of

Filipino crews with the minimum number naval ratings was author-

ized. The s hip s were to observe and report by radio Japanese move-

ment in the West China Sea and Gulf of Siam. The President pre-

scribed the point at which each vessel was to be stationed. One

vessel was to be stationed between Hainan and Hue; one between

Camranh Bay and Cape St. Jaques; one off Pointe De Camau (ex-

hibit 37, p. 39). All these points were clearly in the path of the

Japanese advance down the coast of Indo-Chma, and towards the

Gulf, of Siam. The Navy Department did not originate this plan

(R. 11351). The Navy Department would not hive directed it to

be done imless the President had specifically ordered it (R. 11351).

Admiral Hart was already conducting recoimaissance off that coast

by planes from Manila (R. 11350). So far as the Na'^ Department

was concerned, sufficient information was being received from this

air recoimaissance (R. 11351). Had the Japanese fired upon any

one of these three small vessels, it would have constituted an overt

act on the part of Japan (R. 11352).

AFTERMATH OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Eleven days after Pearl Harbor, the Roberts Conunission was

appointed by the President to find the facts about the Pearl Harbor

attack. Its duty was:

to provide bases for sound decisions whether any derelictions of duty or errors

of judgment on the part of United States Army or Navy personnel contributed

to such successes as were achieved by the enemy ♦ ♦ ♦ and, if so, whait

theb^ derelictions or errors were, and who were responsible therefor.

General Marshall and Admiral Stark were witnesses at the first

meeting of the Commission. Their testimony was not given under

oath and was not recorded. Neither was that of their chief sub-

ordinates, Admiral Turner and General Gerow. The Commission

examined General Short and Admiral Kimmel under oath in Hawaii.

They were not permitted to be present during the testimony of other

witnesses, to examine or cross-examine them, or to know what evidence

had been presented.

The Commission knew that Japanese messages had been intercepted

and were available, prior to the attack, to the high command in

Washington. It did not inquire about what information these inter-

cepts contained or who received them. Mr. Justice Roberts testified

before this Committee: “I would not have bothered to read it (the

intercepted Japanese traffic) if it had been shown to us” (R., vol. 47,

E . 8836). Misleading statements made to the Roberts Commission

y high ranking naval officers in Washington to the effect that

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Admiral Kimmel had all the information available to the Navy

Department (R. 4891-4900, 4893-4895, 5021—5022) went unchallenged.

The Roberts Commission’s failure to inq^uire into the Japanese

intercepts and their distribution and evaluation in Washington, pre-

vented it from correctly assessing responsibility for the disaster.

The facts were then fresh in the minds of key witnesses in Washington.

They could not then have honestly foigotten their whereabouts at

important times. When the Roberts Commission bypassed the facts

about the intercepted messages, it nearly buried the ^th about Pearl

Harbor. Its report became the indictment of two officers based upon

incomplete evidence.

The Roberts report was published January 25, 1942. General

Short, readjng it in the press, was dumbfoimded and immediately

called his friend General Marshall on the telephone to-inquire whether

he should retire. Marshall advised him to “stand pat,” but told

Short he would consider the telephone conversation “authority” for

Short’s retirement if it became necessary (R. 8446). On the same

day, the Secretary of the Navy directed that Admiral Kimmel in

San Francisco be informed that Short had submitted a request for

retirement (exhibit 121). This information was immediately tele-

phoned to Kimmel. Kimmel, who had not previously thought of

retiring, construed the telephone message as a request that he do so,

and submitted a formal request for retirement dated January 26,

1942. General Short, who thought it was not fair to General Marshall

to have to act only on the basis of a telephone conversation, sent to

Marshall a formal request for retirement in writing, addressed to the

Adjutant General dated January 25, 1942. On January 26 General

Marshall recommended to Secretary of War Stimson that General

Short’s appheation for retirement be accepted “today” but that it

be done “quietly without any publicity at the moment” (R. 8459).

Admiral Stark requested the Army to keep him advised about Short’s

retirement as he proposed to “communicate this fact to Admiral

Kimmel in the hope Kimmel will likewise apply for retirement” (R.

8459). However, on January 28, 1942, he sent a telephone message

to Kimmel to the effect that the previous telephone notification

about Short’s retirement was not intended to influence him. There-

upon Admiral Kimmel subiiiitted his letter of January 28, 1942, to

the Secretary of the Navy, in which he stated: “I desire my request

for retirement to stand, subject only to determination by the Depart-

ment as to what course of action will best serve the interests of the

country and the good of the service” (exhibit 121).

The President personally directed the method of handling the re-

quests for retirement of Kimmel and Short. On January 29, 1942,

he instituted a three-point program for dealii^ with the matter.

The Army and Navy were to act together. After a week’s waiting

they were to announce that Kimmel and Short had applied for retire-

ment and that their applications were under consideration. After

another week had passed, public announcement was to be made that

the applications had been accepted with the condition that acceptance

did not bar subsequent court-martial proceedings. Court-martial

proceedings, however, were to be described as impossible without the

disclosure of military secrets. The wording of the condition in the

acceptance was troublesome to the Administration. The President,

Secretary Stimson, Secretary Knox, and Attorney General Biddle

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labored over the language (R. 8462, 8464, exhibit 171). The Admin-

istration wanted to avoid public criticism for having barred court-

martial proceedings. On the other hand, it did not wish to stimulate

the public or the two officers to expect or demand court-martial pro-

ceedings (R. 8464, 8467). Finally language as suitable as possible

was agreed upon. The phrase to be used in accepting the retirement

apphcations was “without condonation of any offense or prejudice to

future disciplinary action.” Admiral Kimmel and General Short

were each retired by letters so worded, dated respectively, February

16 and February 17, 1942. The Secretary of the Navy, in announcing

the Navy’s action, stated that he had directed the preparation of

charges for court martial of Admiral Kimmel alleging dereliction of

duty. The public were informed that a trial could not be held until

such time as the public interest and safety would permit.

The pubUc reaction was as planned. Kimmel and Short were con-

sidered solely responsible for Pearl Harbor. The Roberts report,

considered by Justice Roberts as only an indictment, became, in

effect, a conviction. The two officers were helpless. No court

martial could be had. They had no way of defending themselves.

They remained in ignorance of what evidence the Roberts Commission

had heard. Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Kdmmel on February

21, 1942:

Pending something definite, there is no reason why you should not settle yourself

in a quiet nook somewhere and let Old Father Time help the entire situation,

which I feel he will — if for no other reason than he always has (exhibit 121).

The high civilian and mihtary officials in Washington who had skill-

fully maneuvered Kimmel and Shoit into the position of exclusive

blame knew at the time all the hidden facts about Pearl Harbor, at

least as much and probably moie than this investigation has been

able to imcover. As the two-year statutory period for institutii^

court-martial proceedings was about to expire, Kimmel and Short

were requested by the Secretaries of War and Navy to waive the

Statute of Limitations. Admiral Kinmel did so but with the pro-

vision that any court martial be held in “open court” (exhibit 171).

General Short did likewise (R. 8496-8499). Similar requests were

not made of other officers, not even of those who before this Committee

publicly accepted responsibihty for certain failures of the high com-

mand in Washington.

In June of 1944 the Confess directed the Secretaries of War and

Navy to conduct investigations into the Pearl Harbor attack. The

War Department denied the- Army Board of Investigation access to

the intercepted messages. General Miles, Director of Mihtary In-

telhgence, at the time of Pearl Harbor, was ordered by General

Marshall not to testify on the subject of the intercepts (R. 11843).

For a considerable period the Navy Court of Inquiry was denied

access to the same material (exhibit 195). After repeated demands

by Admiral Kimmel, the Navy Department released this restriction

upon its own Court. The War Department finally followed the same

course. For the first time, late in the Board’s proceedings. Army

officers were permitted to testify before the Army Board as to all

details regarding the intercepts (R. 12035). But many important

Army witnesses had already testified under the limitations previoudy

■ordered.

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In the fall of 1944 the Army Board and Navy Court made their

reports to the Secretaries of the War and Navy. These ret>orts were

critical of the conduct of Admiral Stark and General Marshall. The

findings were not made pubhc. The Navy Court exonerated Admiral

Kimmel. Admiral Kimmel’s request to read its report was refused

by the Secretary of the Navy (R. 6811). The Secretaries of War and

Navy instituted further secret investigations dispensing with the

services of the three-man Board and Court previously established, and

each entrusting the conduct of proceedings to a single officer. Admiral

Kimmel’s request to be present at the further Navy investigation, to

introduce evidence, to confront and cross-examine witnesses was

denied by the Secretary of the Navy (R. 6812). The affidavits and

testimony at the further investigations contain many instances where

witnesses gave evidence materially different from that which they

had previously sworn to before the Army Board and the Naval Court.

These changes were especially marked in testimony of certain key

witnesses on the subject of the dissemination and evaluation of the

intercepted messages in Washington. Again, before this Committee

these same witnesses fiu’ther changed their testimony from that

sworn to twice previously, or pleaded lapses of memory.

The record of the high military and civilian officials of the War and

Navy Departments in dealing with the Pearl Harbor disaster from

beginning to end does them no credit i It will have a permanent bad

effect on the morale and integrity of the armed services. The Ad-

ministration had ample opportunity to record and preserve all the

facts about Pearl Harbor, even if their public disclosure needed to wait

upon the war’s end. This was not done. The policy adopted was to

place the public responsibility for the disaster on the commanders in

the field, to be left there for all time. The policy failed only because

suppression created public suspicion, and the Congress was alert.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This investigation has not brought to light all the facts about Pearl

Harbor. We have been denied much vital information. Mr. Stimson

did not answer certain important intei rogations which, in con-

sideration of the state of his health, were submitted to him in writing.

He has also denied to the Committee his diary entiies for the days

December 2 to December 6, 1941. These were significantly omitted

from his written statement. Mr. Hull’s health permitted only a brief

appearance before us and no examination by the minority members of

the Committee. Written interrogatories were submitted as to when

he first saw or obtained information as to the contents of certain vital

intercepted messages, including the 1 P. M. message. Mr. Hull

answered: “I do not recall the exact times that I first saw or learned

of the contents of the messages you cite” (R. 14316). “I do not

recall” was an answer frequently received from other important

witnesses. Messrs. Maxwell Hamilton, Eugene Dooman and Stanley

Hornbeck, State Department officials who played important roles in

1941 in our Far Eastern diplomacy, have not testified. We have been

denied Ambassador Grew’s diary. In December 1941 General Bedell

Smith was secretary to the General Staff of the Army. He did not

testify. His possible knowledge of the distribution of intercepted

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messages to General Marshall on Saturday evening, December 6, was

not investigated. Admiral (then Captain) Glover was the duty

ofl&cer in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations on December 6,

1941. His log for that night contained the vital information about

Mr. Stimson’s interest in precise locations of the ships of the Pacific

Fleet. Admiral Glover sent the Committee a telegram but did not

testify. Mr. Welles’ memoranda of Atlantic Charter conferences

was obtained from State Department only after his oral testimony

before us had been completed.

On the evidence before us I concxn in the findings of the committee

with respect to responsibilities of our commanders in Hawaii. I be-

lieve that the “mistakes of judgment” referred to in the committee

report are directly related to the failures of the high commands in

Washington to have their organizations fuUy alerted and on a war

footing and that those in command at the Washington level must

bear their full share of the responsibility for the tragedy of Pearl

Harbor.

I further conclude that secret diplorhacy was at the root of the

tragedy. The United States had warned Japan that an advance to

Malaya or the Dutch East Indies would mean war with this nation.

The President gave Great Britain assurances of oiu\* armed support in

such event. What Japan and Britain knew, our commanders in the

field and our own people did not know. Washington feared that

national unity could not be attained unless Japan committed the first

overt act. Accordingly, the Army in Hawaii was put on an anti-

sabotage alert, a defensive posture containing the least possible risk

of incident in Hawaii which Japan might claim was an overt act hy

the United States. The mobilization of American public opinion in

support of an offensive by the Pacific Fleet against Japan was to be

accomplished, if at all, by a message to Congress “at the last stage of

our relations, relating to actual hostilities.” This message was to be

the prelude to hostilities by the United States if Japan attacked the

British and the Dutch at the outset of the war and did not attack

this nation. A direct attack by Japan against the United States at

the outset of hostiUties would make such a message unnecessary.

Mr. Stimson’s diary describes the plan succinctly: “The question was

how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot

without allowing too much danger to ourselves.” In formulating this

plan undoubtedly Washington was influenced by public promises to

keep us out of war unless attacked.

With full knowledge of Japan’s intentions prior to the attack,'

Washington had one plain duty to the American people. That duty

was to inform them of their peril. This was not done. Washington

had a further duty to make sure that our forces were ready to meet

the attack by furnishing their commanders afield and afloat with all

available information, or by evaluating that information and giving

them appropriate clear and categoric instructions.

Those who find in various instances of poor coordination between

the services the causes of Pearl Harbor are satisfied with a superficial

explanation. The state of readiness of our armed forces in the field

was a reflection of over-all policy adopted on the highest level in Wash-

ington. The President had delivered to him the Japanese intercepted

messages and possessed much more information about Japanese plans

and intentions than any field commander. He gave most minute

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directions to commanders in the field, even as to the scouting positions

of individual ships, when he thought such directions necessary. A

merger ot the armed forces and unity of command in Hawaii in No-

vember and December, 1941, could not have eliminated the da^ers

in the policy of maneuvering Japan into striking the first blow. That

policy would still have shaped the orders ^ven, as well as the infor-

mation sent to a single commander in the field.

Those who find American public opinion responsible for Pearl

Harbor accept an entirely false theory. Enlightened public opinion

is based on accurate public information. The American people, if

kept well informed of their real diplomatic position, do not need an

in<ddent to imite them. If foreign policy and diplomatic repfeseixta-

tions are treated as the exclusive, secret information of the President

and his advisers, public opinion will not be enlightened. The very

nature of the consequent public alarm places the armed forces of the

Nation in effective readiness ar.d may even deter an enemy from ex-

ecuting its plaimed attack. The best deterrent to a predatory Japan

in late 1941 was a thoroughly informed and obviously alerted America.

In this connection it will be noted that when the reports of the

Army Board and the Navy Court of Inquiry were submitted to

President Truman on August 30, 1945, he made the following

statement:

I have read it (the Pearl Harbor reports) very carefully, and I came to the

conclusion tjiat the whole thing is the result of the policy which the country itself

pursued. The country was not ready for preparedness. Every time the President

made an effort to get a preparedness program through the Congress, it was stifled.

Whenever the President made a statement about the necessity of preparedness,

he was vilified for doing it. I think the country is as much to blame as any

individual in this final situation that developed in Pearl Harbor.

An examination of the facts ought to compel any person to reject

this conclusion. The record clearfy demonstrates how the Army and

N avy get the funds needed for national defense. The Army and N avy

are required to submit their respective estimates each year to the

Bureau of the Budget. This Bureau acting for the President conducts

heeurings and finally makes recommendations to the President as to

the amounts to be recommended to the Congress for appropriation.

The Congress is in effect the people of America. The record discloses

that in the fiscal years 1934 to 1941, inclusive, the Army and Navy

jointly asked for $26,580,145,093. This is the combined total of Army

and Navy requests made to the Bureau of the Budget. In the same

period the President recommended to the Congress that it appropriate

to the combined services $23,818,319,897. The Congress actually

made available to the Army and Navy in this period $24,943,987,823.

Thus it is apparent that the President himself n^mmended to the

Congress in the fiscal years 1934 to 1941, inclusive, that it appropriate

for the Army and Navy $2,761,826,033 less than had been requested

by the Army and Navy. The people’s representatives in the Congress

gave to the Army and Navy in the form of appropriations and author-

izations for expenditure $1,256,667,926 more than the President had

recommended in his budget messages to the Congress.

The mere recital of these undisputed figures should dispose ot the

contention that “the country is as much to blame as any individual in

this final situation that developed in Pearl Harbor.” I am including

herein for ready reference a complete statement;

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Asked

Budget

CJongress

1934

$320,900,513

305, 271,321

361,351, 154

467, 022, 915

468, 204, 851

630,803, 130

1,019,342,730

13,612,977,763

$280,746,841

288,960,155

331, 799,277

391,065, 510

436,495,336

598,016,016

995, 442, 760

13,067,553, 812

$280,066,381

283,862,004

363,224,967

401, 914, 646

439, 872,423

611,848,391

970, 822,098

13, 487,184,058

1935-

1936

1937

1938 -

1939

1940 -

1941 -

Total - - - -

17,185,874,377

16,390,079,707

16,828, 795,047

Total both services

\ 17,185,874,377

/ 9,394,271,553

16,390,079,707

7,428,240,190

16,828,795,047

8, 115, 192, 776

26, 580, 145, 930

23, 818,319,897

24,943,987,823

Roosevelt cut: $2,761,826,033.

Congress restored: $1,266,667,926 of the Budget cut.

Another subject that has been bandied about the country for a

number of years relates to what has been frequently referred to as the

failure or refusal of Congress to fortify the island of Guam. The

contention has been made that Congress refused to appropriate money

to fortify the island of Guam and that as a result of such failure the

entire war in the Pacific in its initial stages was lost to the Japanese.

The fact is that no proposal was ever submitted to the Confess

involving the fortification of Guam. The Navy did request an

appropriation of five million dollars for the purpose of dredging the

harbor at Guam (wStark testimony, record pp. 6546-6547).\* The first

request of the Navy was rejected by the Congress. Thereafter, the

appropriation requested by the Navy was passed with only one vote

against it. The dredging operation was being carried on when war

broke out with Japan.

It is interesting to note that “Rainbow No. 5”, which is the Joint

Chiefs’ of Staff worldwide war plan, placed the island of Guam in

Category “F” (record p. 6535). The following questions and answers

tell the story:

Mr. Keefe, Now, I would like to ask a question which bothered me with

respect to your Rainbow No. 5, which places the island of Guam in what is

called Category F.

Admiral Stark. I have the category here. .

Mr. Keefe. Now will you state for the record what Category F means?

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. We have that, I am sure. This is out of Joint

Action, Army and Navy, and refers to degrees of preparation, and they are put

in categories of defense. A, B, C, D, E, and F.

Mr. Keefe. Well, take Guam to start with. That is in F. Now give us

what Category F means.

Admiral Stark. Category F: ^‘Positions beyond the continental limits of the

United States which may be subject to either minor or major attack for the

purpose of occupation but which cannot be provided with adequate defense

forces. Under this category the employment of existing local forces and local

facilities will be confined principally to the demolition of those things it is desirable

to prevent failing into\* the hands of the enemy.

^tr. Keefe. Then, so far as Guam was concerned, at the time this basic war

plan was devised it was the considered opinion of both the Army and Navy that

it could not be defended and it therefore w^as placed in Category F that required

those on the island, through demolition or otherwise, to destroy anything of

value to the enemy and to permit it to be taken?

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And to surrender?

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. That is right, is it not?

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Admiral Stark. That is correct, yes, sir (record, p. 6537).

Mr. Keefe. Now, at the time of the attack on Guam and the capture of Guam

by the Japs were improvements on the harbor being made at that time or had they

been completed?

Admiral Stark. They had not been completed. Of course, I recall very clearly

the legislation with regard to that. I do not know just what their status was at

this moment. I had obtained from Congress the appropriation, I believe it was

$6,000,000, for certain improvements to the harbor. You recall the first year

I lost it by six votes, and the following year it went through almost unanimously,

only one vote being opposed to it. Just how far we had gotten along with that

I do not recall at the moment.

Mr, Keefe. With those improvements completed, Guam would still be in

Category F, would it not?

Admiral Stark. In the same category. Category F. The improvements were

not such as improved the defense of Guam but very little. '

Mr. Keefe. Even with the improvements that were requested and contem-

plated the Island of Guam, in the opinion of the Joint Army and Navy Board,

could not be successfully defended due to the power that Japan had in the man-

dated islands surrounding it, is that right?

Admiral Stark. That is correct (record, p. 6547).

These simple facts as disclosed to the public for the first time in these

hearings should effectively dispose of the contention that ‘‘Congress

refused to fortify the Island of Guam, and hence the United States

suffered tremendous loss in the initial stages of the war with Japan.’’

In the future the people and their Congress must know how close

American diplomacy is moving to war so that they may check its

advance if imprudent and support its position if soimd. A diplomacy

which relies upon the enemy’s first overt act to insure effective popular

support for the nation’s final war decision is both outmoded and dan-

gerous in the atomic age. To prevent any future Pearl Harbor more

tragic and damaging than that of December 7, 1941, there must be

constant close coordination between American public opinion and

American diplomacy.

Appendix A

PRIOR INVESTIGATIONS CONCERNING THE

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Appendix A

PRIOR INVESTIGATIONS CONCERNING PEARL HARBOR

ATTACK

The Roberts Commission

The Roberts Commission was organized under an Executive order,

dated December 18, 1941, of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, which

defined the duties of the Commission thus: “To ascertain and report

the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon

the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941. The purposes of the

required inquiry and report arc to provide bases for sound decisions

whether any derelictions of duty or errors of judgment on the part

of United States Army or Navy personnel contributed to such suc-

cesses as were achieved by the enemy on the occasion mentioned;

and, if so, what these derelictions or errors were, and who were

' responsible therefor.” This inquiry was commenced on December 18,

1941, and was concluded on January 23, 1942. The record of its

proceedings and exhibits covers 2,173 printed pages. Members of

the Commission were Mr. Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States

Supreme Court, Chairman; Admiral William H. Standley, United

States Navy, retired; Rear Adm. Joseph M. Reeves, United States

Na^, retired; Maj. Gen. Frank R. McCoy, United Stateei Army»

retired; and Brig. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney, United States Army.

The Hart Inquiry

The inq^uiry conducted by Admiral Thomas C. Hart, United States

Navy, retired, was initiated by precept dated February 12, 1944, from

Secreta ^ of the Navy Frank Knox to Admiral Hart “For an Examina-

tion of Witnesses and the Taking of Testimony Pertinent to the Jap-

anese Attack on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii.” The precept

stated “\* \* \* Whereas certain members of the naval forces,

who have knowledge pertinent to the foregoing matters, are now or

soon may be on dangerous assignments at great distances from the

United States \* \* \* it is now deemed necessary, in order to

prevent evidence being lost by death or unavoidable absence of those

certain members of the naval forces, that their testimony, pertinent

to the aforesaid Japanese attack, be recorded and preserved, \* \* \*”

This inquiry was commenced on February 12, 1944, and was con-

cluded on June 15, 1944. The record of its proceedings and exhibits

covers 565 printed pages.

The Army Pearl Harbor Board

The Army Pearl Harbor Board was appointed pursuant to the

provisions of Public Law 339, Seventy-eighth Congress, approved

June 13, 1944, and by order dated July 8, ,1944, of The Adjutant

General, War Department. The board was directed “to ascertain

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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed

forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941, and to

make such recommendations as it may deem proper.” The board

held sessions beginning July 20, 1944, and concluded its investigation

on October 20, 1944. The record of its proceedings and ediibits

covers 3,367 printed pages. Members of the board were Lt. Gen.

George Grunert, president; Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell and Maj.

Gen. Walter A. Frank.

The Navy Court op Inquiry

The Navy Court of Inquiry was appointed pursuant to the provisions

of Public Law 339, Seventy-eighth Congress, approved June 13, 1944,

and by order dated July 13, 1944, of the Secretary of the Navy James

Forrestal. The court was ordered to thorough^ “inquire into the

attack made by Japanese armed forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of

Hawaii, on 7 December 1941 \* \* ♦ and will include in its find-

ings a full statement of the facts it may deem to be established. The

court will further give its opinion as to whether any offenses have been

committed or serious blame incurred on the part of any person or

persons in the naval service, and in case its opinion be that offenses

have been committfed or serious blame incurred, will specifically recom-

mend what further proceedings should be had.” The court held

sessions beginning July 24, 1944, and concluded its inquiry on October

19, 1944. The record of its proceedings and exhibits covers 1,397

printed pages. Members of the court were Admiral Orin G. Murfin,

retired, president; Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, retired, and Vice

Adm. Adolphus Andrews, retired.

The Clarke Inquiry

The investigation conducted by Col. Carter W. Clarke “regarding

the manner m which certain Top Secret communications were

handled” was pursuant to oral instructions of Gen. George C. Marshall-

Chief of Staff, United States Am^. Colonel Clarke was appointea

by Maj. Gen. Clayton Bissell, Chief of the Military Intelligence

Division, War Department, under authority of a letter dated Sep-

tember 9, 1944, from The Adjutant General. This investigation was

conducted from September 14 to 16, 1944, and from July 13 to August

4, 1945. Testimony was taken concerning the handling of inter-

cepted Japanese messages known as Magic, the handling of intelligence

material by the Military Intelligence Division, War Department, and

the handling of the message sent by General Maishall to Lt. Gen.

Walter C. Short at Hawaii on the morning of December 7, 1941.

The record of the proceedings of this investigation, together with its

exhibits, covers 225 printed pages.

The Clausen Investigation

Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson announced on December 1,

1944, that the report of the Army Pearl Harbor board had been sub-

mitted to him, and that: “In accordance with the opinion of the Judge

Advocate General, I have decided that my own investigation should

be further continued until all the facts are made as clear as possible,

and until the testimony of every witness in possession of material

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

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facts can be obtained, and I have given the necessary directions to

accomplish this result.” By memorandum dated February 6, 1945,

for Army personnel concerned. Secretary Stimson stated that “Pur-

suant to my directions and in accordance with my pubhc statement of

1 December 1944, Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, is conducting

for me the investigation supplementary to the proceedings of the

Army Pearl Harbor Board.” This investigation was commenced on

November 23, 1944 and was concluded on September 12, 1945. The

record of its proceedings and exhibits covers 695 printed pages.

The Hewitt Inquiry

The inquiry conducted by Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, United States

Navy, was initiated under precept dated May 2, 1945, from Secretary

of the Navy James Forrestal to conduct “Further investigation of

facts pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Territory of

Hawaii, on 7 December 1941.” The precept stated that upon review

of the evidence obtained by the examinations conducted by Admiral

Thomas C. Hart and by the Navy Court of Inquiry, “the Secretary

(of Navy) has found that there were errors of judgment on the part

of certain oflScers in the Naval Service, both at Pearl Harbor and at

Washington. The Secretary has further found that the previous

investigations have not exhausted all possible evidence. Accordingly

he has decided that the investigation directed by Public Law 339 of

the 78th Congress should be further continued until the testimony of

every witness in possession of material facts can be obtained and all

possible evidence exhausted. \* \* \* You are hereby detailed

to make a study of the enclosures (Proceedings of Hart Inquiry and

Navy Court of Inquiry) and then to conduct such further investiga-

tion, including the examination of any additional persons who may

have knowledge of the facts pertinent to the said Japanese attack, and

to reexamine any such person who has been previously examined, as

may appear necessary, and to record the testimony given thereby.”

This inquiry commenced on May 14, 1945, and was concluded on

July 11, 1945. The record of its proceedings and exhibits covers

1,342 printed pages.

AppEaroix B

NAMES AND POSITIONS OF PRINCIPAL ARMY

AND NAVY OFnCIALS IN WASHINGTON AND AT

HAWAH AT THE TIME OF THE ATTACK ALONG

WITH THE LEADING WITNESSES IN

THE VARIOUS PROCEEDINGS

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Appendix B

NAMES AND POSITIONS OF PRINCIPAL ARMY AND NAVY

OFFICIALS IN I^ASHINGTON AND AT HAWAII AT THE

TIME OF THE ATTACK ALONG WITH THE LEADING

WITNESSES IN THE VARIOUS PROCEEDINGS

Organization and Personnel War Department Dec. 7 , 1941

Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson.

Chief of Staff, Gen. Geoi^e C. Marshall'.

Deputy Chiefs of Staff:

General Administration and Ground Forces, Maj. Gen. William

Bryden.

Armed Forces and Suwly, Maj. Gen. Richard C. Moore.

Air, Maj. Gen. Henry H. Arnold.

Secretary, General Staff, Col. Walter Bedell Smith.

Assistant Secretaiy, General Staff, Col. John R. Deane.

G-1 (Personnel Division), Brig. Gen. Wade H. Haislip.

G-2 (Intelligence Division), Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles.

Administrative Branch, CoL Ralph C. Smith.

Counterintelligence Branch, Lt. Col. John T. Bissell.

Intelligence Branch, Col. Hayes A. Kroner.

Administrative Section, Lt. Col. Moses W. Pettigrew.

Situation Section, Lt. Col. Thomas J. Betts.

Far Eastern Section, Col. Rufus S. Bratton.

Assistant, Col. Carlysle C. Dusenbuix

Gr-3 (Operations and Training Division), Brig. Gen. Harry L. Twaddle.

G-4 (Supply Division), Brig. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell.

War Plans Division, Brig. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow.

Executive officer, Mai. Charles K. Gailey, Jr.

Plans Group, Col. Charles W. Bundy.

Projects Group, Col. Robert W. Crawford.

Chief Signal Officer, Maj. Gen. Dawson Olmstead.

Operations Branch, Col. Otis K. Sadtler.

Traffic Division and Signal Center, Col. Edward T. French.

Signal Intelligence Service, Col. Rex W. Minckler.

Principal Cyptanalvst, William F. Friedman.

Communication Liaison Division, Lt. Col. W. T.;,Guest.

ARMT AIR FORCES

(Under over-all command of General Marshall)

Commanding General, Maj. Gen. Henry H. Arnold.

Chief of Air Staff, Brig. Gen. Martin F. Scanlon.

Air Forces Combat Command, Lt. Gen. Delos C. Emmons.

Air Corps, Maj. Gen. George feett.

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Organization and Personnel, Navt Department, Dec. 7, 1941

Secretary oi the Navy, Frank Knox.

Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Harold R. Stark.

Administrative aide and flag secretary, Capt. Charles ‘Wellborn,

Jr.

Aide, Capt. John L. McCrea.

Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, R-ear Adm. Royal E. Ingersoll.

War Plans Division, Rear Adm. Richmond K. Turner.

Pacific Ocean and Asiatic Areas Section, Capt. Robert O. Glover.

Central Division (State Department liaison), Capt. R. E. Schuirmann.

Ship Movements Division, Vice Adm. Roland M. Brainard.

War Information Room, Rear Adm. F. T. Leighton.

Intelligence Division, Rear Adm. Theodore S. Wilfinson.

Domestic Branch and Assistant, Rear Adm. Howard F. Kingman.

Foreim Branch, Capt. William A. Heard.

Far Eastern Section, Capt. Arthur H. McCollum.

Communications Division, Rear Adm. Leigh Noyes.

Assistant, Capt. Joseph R. Redman.

Security (Intelligence) Section, Capt. L. F. Safford.

Translation Section, Lt. Comdr. A. D. Kramer (on loan from Far

Eastern Section, Intelligence Division).

Cryptographic Research:

(Decrypting) Section:

Senior watch oflS.cer, Lt. (jg) George W. Lynn.

Watch officers, Lt. (jg) Alfred V. Pering, Lt. (jg) F. M.

Brotherhood, Lt. (jg) Allan A. Murray.

Correlating and Dissemination Section, Lt. Fredrick L. Freeman.

Organization and Personnel, Hawaiian Department, Dec. 7,

1941

Commanding General, Lt. Gen. Walter C. Short.

Chief of Staff, Col. Walter C. Phillips.

G“1 (Personnel), Lt. Col. Russell C. Throckmorton.

G-2 (Intelligence), Lt. Col. Kendall J. Fielder.

Assistant G-2, Lt. Col. George W. Bicknell.

Gr-3 (Operations and Training), Lt. Col. William E. Donegan.

G-4 (Supply), Col. Morrill W. Marston.

Assistant G-4, Maj. Robert J. Fleming.

Adjutant General, Col. Robert H. Dunlop.

Chemical Warfare, Lt. Col. G. F. Unmacht.

Ordnance, Col. W. A. Capron.

Judge Advocate General, Col. T. H. Green.

Provost Marshal, Lt. Col. Melvin L. Craig.

Engineer, Col. A. K. B. Lyman.

Quartermaster, Col. William R. White.

F^inance, Col. E. S. Ely.

Signal Corps, Lt. Col. Carrol A. Powell. '

Inspector General, Col. Lathe B. Row.

Surgeon General, Col. Edgar King.

Twenty-fourth Infantry Division, Brig. Gen. Durward S. Wilson.

Twenty-fifth Infantry Division, Maj. Gen. Maxwell Murray.

Coast Artillery Command, Maj. Gen. Henry T. Birrgin.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

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HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE

(Under over-all command of General Short)

Commanding General, Maj, Gen. Frederick L. Martin.

CUef of Stan, Col. James A. MoUison.

Intelligence, Col. Edward W. Raley.

Signal Officer, Lt. Col. Clay I. Hoppough.

Eighteenth Bombardment Wing, Brig. Gen. Jacob H. Rudolph.

Fourteenth Pursuit Wi^, Brig. Gen. Howard C. DaVidson.

Hickam Field, Col. W. E. Farthing.

Wheeler Field, Col. William J. Flood.

Bellows Field, Lt. Col. Leonard D. Weddington.

Staff of Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and U. S. Pacific

Fleet, Dec. 7, 1941

Commander in chief, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel.

Chief of Staff and personal aide, Capt. W. W. Smith.

Flag Secretary and personal aide, Lt. Comdr. P. C. Crosley.

Operations Officer and Assistant Chief of Staff, Capt. W. S. DeLany.

First assistant operations officer. Commander R. F. Good.

Second assistant operations officer, Lt. Comdr. H. L. Collins.

War Plans Officer, Capt. Charles H. McMorris.

Assistants, Commander V. R. Murphy, Commander L. D.

McCormick, Lt. F. R. DuBorg.

Assistant War Plans and Marine Officer, Col. O. T. Pheifer,

United States Marine Corps.

Communications officer. Commander M. E. Curts.

Assistant, Lt. (jg) W. J. East, Jr.

Security officer, Lt. Allan Reed.

Radio officer, Lt. Comdr. D. C. Beard.

Public Relations officer, Lt. Comdr. W. W. Drake.

Assistant, Lt. (jg) J. E. Bassett.

Maintenance officer. Commander H. D. Clark.

Medical officer, Capt. E. A. M. Gendreau, United States Marine

Corps.

Gunnery officer. Commander W. A. Kitts III.

Aviation officer. Commander Howard C. Davis.

Aerologist and personnel officer, Lt. Comdr. R. B. Black.

Commander, Navy Pacific Fleet Air Wing, Rear Adm. P. N. L.

Bellinger. Also commander Hawaiian Based Patrol Win^ 1 and

2; commander. Fleet Air Detachment, Ford Island, Pearl Harbor;

commander. Naval Base Defense Air Force (under commandant,

Fourteenth Naval District as naval base defense officer. Pacific

Fleet.)

Operations officer, Capt. Logan C. Ramsey.

Commander Battle Force (Task Force 1), Vice Adm. W. S. Pye.

Commander Aircraft, Battle Force (Task Force 2), Vice Adm.

Wffiiam F. Halsey.

Commander Scouting Force (Task Force 3), Vice Adm. Wilson Brown.

Commander Task Force 4, Rear Adm. Claude C. Bloch.

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Commander Submarines’ Scouting Force (Task Force 7), Rear Adm.

Thomas Withers.

Commander Task Force 9, Rear Adm. P. N. L. Bellinger.

Commander Base Force (Task Force 15), Rear Adm. W. L. Calhoun.

Organization and Personnel, Fourteenth Naval District,

Dec. 7, 1941

Commandant (also commander' Hawaiian Naval Coastal Sea Fron-

tier; commandant. Pearl Harbor Navy Yard; commander of local

defense forces, and, as an officer of Pacific Fleet, the naval base

defense officer; commander Task Force 4, United States Pacific

Fleet), Rear Admiral Claude C. Bloch.

Chief of Staff, Capt. J. B. Earle.

Intelligence officer, Capt. Irving H. Mayfield.

Counterespionage Section, Lt. Wilham B. Stephensen.

Communications Security (Intelligence) Unit, Commander Joseph

J. Rochefort.

Translator, Col. Alva B. LassweU, United States Marine Corps.

Cryptanalyst, Lt. (jg) F. C. Woodward, Commander Wesley A.

Wright (on loan from staff of Admiral Kimmel, where he was

assistant communications officer).

List op Witnesses Appearing Before the Joint Committee and

Their Assignments as op December 7, 1941

BeardaU, John R., rear admiral; naval aide to President Roosevelt.

Beatty, Frank E., rear admiral; aide to Secretary of the Navy Frank

Knox.

Bellinger, P. N. L., vice admiral, commander Hawaiian Naval Base

Air Force (commander Patrol Wing 2).

Bicknell, George W., colonel, assistant chief. Military Intelligence

Service, Hawaiian Department.

Bratton, Rufus S., colonel, chief. Far Eastern Section, Military

Intelhgence Service, War Department.

Clausen, Hen^ C., lieutenant colonel,^ Judge Advocate General’s

Office, assisting Army Pearl Harbor Board and conducting supple-

mental investigation for Secretary of War.

Creighton, John M., captain, U. S. N., naval observer, Singapore.

Dillon, John H., major, U. S. M. C., aide to Secretary Knox.

EUiott, George E., sergeant, A. U. S., operator at Opana radar detector

station, Oahu, 'T. H.

Gerow, Leonard T.-\* major general. Chief, War Plans Division, Army

General Staff, War Department.

Grew, Joseph C., United States Ambassador to Japan.

Hart, Thomas C., admiral, commander in chief, Asiatic Fleet.

HuU, Cordell, Secretary of State.

IngersoU, Royal E., admiral. Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, Navy

Department.

Inglis, R. B., rear admiral,\* presented to committee Navy summary

of Pearl Harbor attack.

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Kimm el, Husband E., rear admiral, commander in chief, United

States Fleet; commander in chief, Pacific Fleet.

Kramer, A. D., commander, Section Chief, Division of Naval Com-

munications, handling translations and recovery of intercepted

Japanese codes.

Krick, Harold D., captain, U. S. N., former fiag secretary to Admiral

Stark.

Leahy, William D., admiral. Chief of Staff to ^the President.

Layton, Edwin T., captain, U. S. N., fleet inteUigence oflScer, Pacific

fleet.

Marshall, George C., general. Chief of Staff, United States Army,

War Department.

McCollum, Arthur N., captain, U. S. N., Chief, Far Eastern Section,

Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department.

Miles, Sherman, major general, Cl]^f, Military Intelligence Service,

Army General Staff, War Dejjartment.

Noyes, Leigh, rear admiral. Chief, Office of Naval Communications,

Navy Department.

Phillips, Walter C., colonel. Chief of Staff to General Short.

Richardson, J. O., admiral, former commander in chief. United States

Fleet and Pacific Meet.

Roberts, Owen J., Mr. Justice^^ Chairman, Roberts Commission.

Rochefort, Joseph John, captam, U. S. N., communications intelli-

gence officer. Pacific Meet.

Sad tier, Otis K., colonel. Chief, Military Branch, Army Signal Corps,

War Department.

Safford, L. F., captam, U. S. N., Chief, Radio Intelligence Unit,

Office of Naval Communications, Navy Department.

Schukraft, Robert E., colonel. Chief, Radio Intercept Unit, Army

Signal Corps, War Department.

Schulz, Lester Robert, commander, assistant to Admiral BeardaU.

Short, Walter C., major general, commanding general, Hawaiian

Department.

Smith, William W., rear admiral. Chief of Staff to Adnmal Kimmel.

Sonnett, John F., lieutenant commander,\* Speciid Assistant to the

Secretary of the Navy, and assistant to Admiral H. K. Hewitt

in his inquiry.

Stark, Harold R., admiral. Chief of Naval Operations, Navy De-

partment.

Stimson, Henry L., Secretary of War (sworn statement and sworn

replies to interrogatories only).

Thielen, Bernard, colonel,\* presented to committee Army summary

of Pearl Harbor attack.

Turner, Richmond K., rear admiral. Chief, War Plans Division,

Navy, Department.

Welles, Sumner, Under Secretary of State.

Wilkinson, T. S., rear admiral. Chief, Office of Naval Intelligence,

Navy D^artment.

Zacharias, EUis M., captain. United States Navy, commanding officer,

U. S. S. Salt Lake City, Pacific Fleet.

1 Denotes witness whose conn^tion with this investigation relates to his assignment after December 7«

1941.

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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

List op Leading Witnesses in Prior Proceedings Who Did Not

Testify Before the Joint Committee, and Their Assignments

AS OP December 7, 1941

Arnold, H. H., general, commanding general. Army Air Forces, War

Department.

Bissell, John T., colonel, executive oflBcer, Counter Intelligence

Group, Military Intelligence Division, War Department.

Bloch, Claude C., admiral, commandant. Fourteenth Naval District;

commander, Hawaiian Sea Frontier; Pearl Harbor Naval Base

defense officer.

Brotherhood, Francis M., lieutenant (junior grade), watch officer,

Security Section, Office of Naval Communications, Navy Depart-

ment.

Brown, Wilson, rear admiral, commander. Scouting Force (Task

Force 3) Pacific Fleet.

Calhoun, W. L., vice admiral, commander Base Force, Pacific Fleet.

Crosley, Paul C., commander; flag secretary to Admiral Kimmel.

Curts, M. E., captain, U. S. N., communication officer. Pacific Fleet,

and liaison officer. Radio and Sound Division.

Davidson, Howard C., major general, commanding general. Four-

teenth Pursuit Wing, Hawaiian Air Force.

Davis, Howard C., rear admiral, fleet aviation officer. Pacific Fleet.

DeLany, Walter S., rear admiral, Chief of Staff for Operations, staff

of commander in chief, Pacific Fleet.

Dusenbury, Carlisle Clyde, colonel, assistant to Col. R. S. Bratton,

Far Eastern Section, Military Intelligence Division, War Depart-

ment.

Fielder, Kendall J., colonel. Chief, Military Intelligence Division,

Hawaiian Department.

French, Edward F., colonel, officer in chaise. Traffic Division and

Signal Center, Signal Coips, War Department.

Friedman, William F., principal cryptanalyst. Signal Ii^ellitence

Service, Si^al Corps, War Department.

Halsey, William F., admiral, commander Aircraft Battle Force

(Task Force 2), Pacific Fleet.

Hamilton, Maxwell M., Chief, Division of Far Eastern Affairs, State

Department.

Heard, William A., captain U. S. N., Chief, Foreign Branch, Office of

Naval Intelligence, Navy Department.

Herron, Charles D., major general, former commanding general,

Hawaiian Department.

Hornbeck, Stanley K., adviser on foreign relations. State Department.

Kitts, Willard A., HI, rear admiral, fleet gunnery officer, st^ of com-

mander in chief. Pacific Fleet.

Kroner, Hayes A., brigadier general. Chief, Intelligence Branch, Mili-

tary Intmigence Division, W ar Department.

Lockard, Joseph L., lieutenant A. U. S., operator OPAN radar detec-

tor station, Oahu, T. H.

Ljmn, George W., lieutenant commander, senior watch officer. Secur-

ity Section, Office of Naval Communications, Navy Department.

MacArthur, Douglas, general, commanding general. United States

Army Forces in the Far East.

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Martin, F. L.\*, major general, commanding general, Hawaiian Air

Force.

Mayfield, Irving H., captain U. S N., Chief, OflBce of Naval Intelli-

gence, Fourteenth Naval District.

McDonald, Joseph P., sergeant. Five Hundred and Eightieth Aircraft

Warning Company, assigned as telephone switchboard operator,

operations center. Aircraft Warning Service, Hawaiian Department.

McMorris, C. H., rear admiral, war plans officer, staff of commander

in chief, Pacific Fleet.

Murray, Allan A., lieutenant commander, watch officer. Cryptographic

(Decrypting) Unit, Security Section, Office of Naval Communica-

tions, Navy Department.

Newton, J. H., vice admiral, commander. Cruisers Scouting Force,

Pacific Fleet.

Nimitz, C. W., admiral. Chief, Bureau of Navigation (now Personnel),

Navy Department.

O’Dell, Robert H., lieutenant A. U. S., assistant military attach^,

American Legation, Melbourne, Australia, under Col. Van S. Merle-

Smith, military attach^.

Pering, Alfred V., heutenant commander, watch officer. Security

Section, Office of Naval Communications, Navy Department.

Pettigrew, Moses W., colonel, executive officer. Intelligence Group,

MiUtary Intelligence Division, War Department.

Poindexter, Joseph B., governor. Governor of the Territory of Hawaii.

Powell, C. A., colonel, chief signal officer, Hawaiian De^iartment.

Pye, William S., vice admiral, commander Battle Force (Task Force

1), Pacific Fleet.

Ramsey, Logan C., captain U. S. N., operations officer. Commander

Patrol Wing 2 (Admiral Bellinger), Pacific Fleet, and Commander

Patrol Wings, Hawaiian Area.

Redman, Joseph R., rear admiral. Assistant Director, Office of Naval

Communications, Navy Department.

Schuirmann, R. E., rear admiral. Director, Central Division, Office of

Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department.

Shivers, Robert L., special agent in charge. Federal Bureau of Investi-

gation, Department of Justice, Honolulu, T. H.

Smith-Hutton, H. H., captain U. S. N., naval attach^, United States

Embassy, ToWo, Japan.

Stimson, Henij L., Secretary of War.

Sutherland, Richard K., lieutenant general, Chief of Staff to General

MacArthur.

Taylor, William E. G., commander, temporary duty with Army

Interceptor Command, Hawaiian Air Force, as adviser for establish-

ment of aircraft warning service.

Tyler, Kermit A., lieutenant colonel, executive officer, Eighth Pursuit

Squadron, Hawaiian Air Force, on duty December 7, 1941 at in-

formation center. Aircraft Warning Service, Hawaiian Department.

Willoughby, C. A., major general. Chief, Military Intelligence Divi-

sion, staff of General MacArthur.

Wilson, Durward S., major general, commanding general. Twenty-

fourth Division, Hawaiian Department.

Withers, Thomas, rear admiral, commander submarines. Pacific Fleet.

Appendix C

COMMUNICATIONS FROM THE PRESIDENT

OF THE UNITED STATES RELATING TO

THE PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATION

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Appendix C

COMMUNICATIONS FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE

UNITED STATES RELATING TO THE PEARL HARBOR

INVESTIGATION

The White House,

Washington, October IS, 1945.

Hon. Alben W. Barkley,

United States Senate, Washiiigton, D. C.

Dear Senator Barkley: Replyii^ to your letter of the 5th,

regarding the appointment of someone in the Executive Offices to

consult with the committee and its counsel, I am anointing Judge

Latta, who has been in chaise of all the files in the VS^te House for

the past 28 years.

Any information that you want will be cheerfully supplied by him.

For your information all the files of the previous administration

have been moved to the Archives Building and Hyde Park. If there

is any difficulty about your having access to them I’ll be glad to issue

the necessary order so that you may have complete access.

Sincerely yours,

Harry S. Truman.

[Copy]

August 28, 1945.

Memorandum for —

The Secret xj of State.

The Secretary of War.

The Secretary of the Navy.

The Attorney General.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Director of the Budget.

The Director of the Office of War Information.

Appropriate departments of the Government and the Joint Chiefs

of Staff are hereby directed to take such steps as are necessary to

prevent release to the public, except with the specific approval oi the

President in each case, of —

Information regarding the past or present status, technique or pro-

cedures, degree of success attained, or any specific results of any

cryptanalytic unit acting under the authority of the United States

Government or any Department thereof.

Harry S. Truman.

Restricted.

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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Memorandum for —

The Secretary of State.

The Secretary of War.

The Secretary of Navy.

The Joint Cmefs of Staff.

In order to assist the Joint Congressional'Committee on the Investi-

gation of the Pearl Harbor Attack in its desire to hold public hearings

and make public pertinent evidence relating to the circumstances of

that attack, a specific exception to my memorandum dated August 28,

1945, relating to the release of information concerning cryptanalytic

activities, is hereby made as follows:

The State, War, and Navy Departments will make available to the

Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, for

such use as the committee may deteimine, any information in their

possession material to the investigation, and wiU respectively author-

ize any employee or member of the armed services whose testimony is

desired by the committee to testify publicly before the committee

concerning any matter pertinent to the investigation.

(Signed) Harry S. Truman,

Harry S. Truman.

Approved October 23, 1945.

The White House,

Washington, November 7, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF EXECUTIVES OF ALL EXECUIIVE DE-

PARTMENTS, AGENCIES, COMMISSIONS, AND BUREAUS, INCLUDING

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Section 3 of the concurrent resolution creating the Joint Con-

gressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack

reads as follows:

Sec. 3. The testimony of any person in the armed services, and the fact that

such person testified before the joint committee herein provided for, shall not be

used against him in any court proceeding or held against him in examining his

military status for credits in the service to which he belongs.

In order to assist the joint committee to make a, full and complete

investigation of the facts relating to the events leading up to or

following the attack, you are requested to authorize every person in

your respective departments or agencies, if they are interrogated by

the committee or its counsel, to give any information of which they

may have knowledge bearing on the subject of the committee's investi-

gation.

You are further requested to authorize them whether or not they

are interrogated by the committee or its counsel to come forward

voluntarily and disclose to the committee or to its counsel any infor-

mation they may have on the subject of the inquiry which they may

have any reason to think may not already have been disclosed to the

committee.

This directive is applicable to all persons in your departments or

agencies, whether they are in the armed services or cot and whether

or not they are called to testify before the joint committee.

Harry S. Truman.

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MEMORANDUM FOB THE CHIEF EXECU1IVE8 OF ALL EXECUTIVE DEPABT-

MEKTS, AGENCIES, COMMISSIONS, AND BUREAUS, INCLUDING THE

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

With further reference to my letter of November 7, 1945, addressed

to the above executives, you are requested further to authorize every

person in your respective departments or agencies, whether or not

they are interrogated by the committee or its counsel, to come for-

ward and disclose oraUy to any of the members of the Joint Con-

gressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack

any information they may have on the subject of the inquiiy which

they may have any reason to think has not already been disclosed

to the committee.

This does not include any files or written material. ‘

(Handwritten) O. K.

H. S. T.

Appendix D

REVIEW OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONVERSATIONS

BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN, AND

RELATED MATTERS, FROM THE ATLANTIC CON-

FERENCE IN AUGUST 1941 THROUGH

DECEMBER 8, 1941

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Appendix D

REVIEW OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN

THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN, AND RELATED MAT-

TERS, FROM THE ATLANTIC CONFERENCE IN AUGUST,

1941 THROUGH DECEMBER 8, 1941

Intkodttctory Statement

This appendix reviews, upon the basis of the record before the Com-

mittee and in greater detail than in Part I of the report to which it is

annexed, the mplomatic conversations between the United States and

Japan, and related matters, from the Atlantic Conference in August

1941 though December 8, 1941. While it is not to be regarded as

including aU of the material contained in the record before the Com-

mittee Inat touches upon those conversations during that period, it

does attempt to set forth the material facts in connection therewith.

Prior to the Committee’s investigation, nearly all of the information

concerning the diplomatic conversations d\mng 1941 between the

United States and Japan that had been made public was contained in

the official State Department publications, “Peace and War” (ex. 28)‘

and “Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941”

(ex. 29), together with former Ambassador Joseph C. Grew’s book,

“Ten Years in Japan” (ex. 30), which were pubUshed d\irmg the war

and were subject to wartime restrictions. To the basic material

contained in those pubUcations, the Committee has added hundreds

of documents, personal as well as official, from the files of the State

Department and of the late President Franklin D. Roosevelt. In

addition, the Committee has received in evidence hundreds of mes-

sages between the Japanese Fore^ Office in Tokyo and the Japanese

Ambassadors in Washington, as intercepted, translated, and available

at the time to high officials in the United States Government in

Washington, including President Roosevelt and Secretary of State

Cordell Hull. There is also before the Committee testimony of former

Secretary of State Hull and of former United States Ambassador in

Japtm Joseph C. Grew, a prepared statement and answers to interrog-

atories submitted by former Secretaiy of War Henry L. Stimson, and

collateral (regarding diplomatic matters) testimony of Gen. George

C. Marshall, Admiral Harold R. Stark, and other high-ranking officers

of the Army and Navy. The record before the Committee also con-

tains himdreds of captured Japanese documents, as well as reports of

interrogations conducted in Japan for the supreme allied commander,

Gen. Douglas MacArthur, at the request of the Conunittee, many of

which are directly concerned with the diplomatic events immediately

preceding Pearl Harbor, including an authoritative translation of the

memoirs of Prince Fumimaro Konoye, Premier of Japan until October

1 All references in this appendix indicated in this manner are to exhibits introduced at the hearings before

the Committee.

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16, 1941. This mass of testimony and documentarjr evidence, from

so many different and independent sources, and including official docu-

ments of the Japanese and other governments, as well as of the United

States Government, affords countless opportunities for verification by

cross-checking.

By interweaving the diplomatic material contained in the docu-

mentary evidence and testimony before the Committee, this appendix

attempts to reconstruct chronologically the significant events in the

diplomatic conversations between the United States and Japan dur-

ing the 4 months that immediately preceded the Japanese attack on

Pearl Harbor. Only thus, for example, can the intercepted Japanese

diplomatic messages between Tokyo and Washington be examined in

the surrounding circumstances in which they were first seen by high

officials in the United States Government, for those messages were the

day-to-day instructions sent by the Japanese Foreign Office in Tokyo

to the Japanese Ambassadors in Washington for the purpose of guid-

ing them in their conversations with Secretary Hull and President

Roosevelt, and the Ambassadors’ reports and comments to the Japa-

nese Foreign Office concerning those conversations. While in Ameri-

can hands the diplomatic messages between Tokyo and Washington

not only provided Secretary HuU and President Roosevelt with ad-

vance Imowledge of the Japanese plans for the conduct of the con-

versations but also were one of the most important and significant

types of intelligence information available to the Army and Navy in

Washington, they did not contain any information pointing toward

Pearl Harbor as a possible target of Japanese attack.

Since the report to which this appendix is aimexed discusses in

detail the mihtary aspects and implications of the diplomatic con-

versations between the United States and Japan and of the intercepted

Japanese diplomatic messages between Tokyo and Washington, no

attempt is made here to tie in the events on the “diplomatic front”

with the various warning messages sent by the Army and Navy from

Washington to the commanders in the Pacific, although the latter

' messages were to a considerable extent based upon the state of

Japanese-American diplomatic relations at the time they were dis-

patched. Neither does this appendix attempt to describe the process

of building up American military strength in the Pacific area which

was underway during the period in question, although by taking up

the Marshall-Stark joint memoranda of November 5 and. November

27 in connection with the events that gave rise to each, it does indicate

in general terms the over-all milita^ and naval considerations that

affected American policies in the Pacific during the latter part of 1941.

Parenthetically, it may be noted here that the inherent relationship

between diplomatic policies and military and naval power was suc-

cinctly stated by Secretary Hull when he testified before the Committee

that soon after he came to the State Department he learned that the

representatives of the aggressor nations with whom he talked “were

looking over my shoulder at our Navy and om\* Army,” and that tlie

diplomatic strength of the United States went up or down with thuir

estimate of what the United States Army and Navy “amounted to.”

The record before the Committee shows that the United States

Government participated in the conversations with Japan in an effort

to dissuade the Japanese Government from its course of military

aggression and its Axis ties with Germany and Italy. The fact that

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the United States was engaging in such conversations with Japan was

believed to strengthen the position of the elements in that country

who disapproved of the policies of those who dominated the Japanese

Grovernment; success in negotiations with Japan on the basis of the

principles to which the United States Government adhered would

have had many material and other advantages for both the United

States and Japan. American participation in the conversations had

the further purpose of giving the United States Army and Navy more

time to prepare their defense of areas in the Pacific regarded as vital

to the safety and security of the United States. Recognition of this

dual purpose is the key to an imderstanding of the day-to-day course

of the conversations. Every action taken, every move made, on the

American side must be considered in the light of those objectives.

Brief R£sum£ of the Japanese-American Conversations Prior

TO the Atlantic Conference

This narrative begins in Au^st, 1941 with the President of the

United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, in conference

on a warship off the coast of Newfoundland, discussing how to pre-

vent the outbreak of war with Japan. It ends on December 7-8, 1941,

with Japanese bombs falling on ships of the United States Pacific Fleet

in Pearl Harbor, with Japanese troops invading Thailand and British

Malaya, and with other Japanese attacks on Singapore, Hong Kong,

the Phiuppine Islands, Guam, Wake, and Midway.

Into the intervening 4 months were crowded events the causes of

which lay deeper and were more fundamental than the Japanese

occupation of southern French Indochina in July or the breaking off of

the Japanese-American conversations and the freezing of Japanese

assets m the United States which had immediately followed that

Japanese move. By August 1941, there was but a slim chance that

the Japanese Government would “reverse the ei^ine,” as Ambas-

sador Grew expressed it, and abandon the course of aggression through

force of arms to which it had been committed. Although it was true

that the infoimal conversations in Washin^on between the new

Japanese Ambassador, Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura, had revealed an

apparent wiUin^ness on the part of the Japanese Government to go

along with certain of the peaceful principles to which the United States

was committed, provided those principles were staged in sufficiently gen^

eral terms to make their application in specific situations wholly unpre-

dictable, those conversations had disclosed three crucial points of

difference between the two Governments: the question of nondis-

crimination in international trade, the question of the withdrawal of

Japanese troops from China, and the question of Japan’s obligations

under the Tripartite Pact.

During the latter part of January 1941, throu^ private Japanese

and American citizens, the suggestion had reached President Roosevelt

and Secretary Hull that the Japanese Government would welcoine an

opportunity to alter its political alignments and modify its attitude

toward the “China Incident’’ (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 328-r329; ex. 179).

The initial reaction of the United States Government had been one

of caution (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 330). Secretary HuU testified that —

In the light of Japan’s past and current record and in view of the wide diver-

gences between the policies which the United States and Japan had been pursuing

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in the Far East, I estimated from the outset that there was not 1 chance in 20 or

1 in 50 or even 1 in 100 of reaching a peaceful settlement. Existing treaties re-

lating to the Far East Were adequate, provided the signatory governments lived

up to them. We were, therefore, not calling for new agreements. But if there

was a chance that new agreements would contribute to peace in the Pacific, the

President and I believed tnat we should not neglect that possibility, slim as it was.

We had in mind doing everything we could to bring about a peaceful, fair

and stabilizing settlement of the situation throughout the Pacific area. Such a

course was in accordance with the traditional attitudes and beliefs of the Amer-

ican people. Moreover, the President and I constantly had very much in mind

the advice of our highest military authorities who kept emphasizing to us the

imperative need of having time to build up preparations for defense vital not

only to the United States but to many other countries resisting aggression. Our

decision to enter into the conversations with the Japanese was, therefore, in line

with our need to rearm for self-defense.

The President and I fully realized that the Japanese government could not, even

if it wished, bring about an abrupt transformation in Japan’s course of agression.

We realized that so much was involved in a reconstruction of Japan’s position \*that

implementation to any substantial extent by Japan of promises to adopt peaceful

courses would require a long time. We were, therefore, prepared to be patient

in an endeavor to persuade Japan to turn from her course of aggression. We

carried no chip on our shoulder, but we were determined to stand by a basic

position, built on fundamental principles which we applied not only to J^apan but

to all countries (tr. 1101-1102).i

In his early conversations with Ambassador Nomura, who reached

Washington m February 1941, Secretary Hull had expressed the hope

that the Japanese Government might have something definite in mind

that would offer a practical approach to a general settlement of the

f roblems in the Pacific, and had indicated the willingness of the

Fnited States Government to consider any proposal which the

Japanese Government might offer that was consistent with the

principles to which, the Secretary had made it clear, the United

States was committed (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 331-332). Secretary Hull

testified as follows regarding his meetmg on April 16, 1941, with

Ambassador Nomura:

On April 16, I had a further conversation with the Japanese Ambassador. I

pointed out that the one paramount preliminary question about which our Govern-

ment was concerned was a definite assurance in advance that the Japanese Government

had the willingness and power to abandon its present doctrine of conquest by force

and to adopt four principles which our Government regarded as the foundation upon

which relations between nations should rest, as follows:

(1) Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all

nations;

(2) Support of the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other

countries;

(3) Support of the principle of equality, including equality of commercial

opportunity;

(4) Nondisturbance of the status quo in the Pacific except as the status quo

may be altered by peaceful means.

1 told the Japanese Ambassador that our Government was willing to consider

any proposal which the Japanese Government might offer such as would be con-

slstent with those principles (tr. 1103-1104).

As the result of these early conversations, on May 12 (Washington

time), the Japanese Ambassador had presented to Secretary Hull,

upon instructions from his Government, a document (Aimex A at-

tached hereto) containing a proposal for a general settlement between

the United States and Japan (ex. 29, vol II, pp. 418--425). This

document had revealed authoritatively for the &«t time what the

Japanese Government had in mind as the basis for an agreement

1 All references in this appendix indicated in this manner are to pages of the transcript of the heftring a

before the Committee.

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between the United States and Japan (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 332). Be-

tween May 12 and June 21, there had taken place a number of confer-

ences between Secretary Hull and the Japanese Ambassador at

which the Japanese proposal and related matters were discussed.

In the meantime a counterproposal by the United States had been

prepared, and on Jime 21 (Washington time) this counterproposal

(Annex B attached hereto) had been handed to the Japanese Ambas-

sador (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 483-492).

On June 22, 1941, (lerman^ had invaded Russia. The German

attack upon Russia had precipitated a series of events in Japan which

were to have far-reaching effects upon Japanese-American relations.

It had quickened the appetites of those in the Japanese Government

who believed that then, or never, Japan’s destiny was in her own

hands. Intensive consideration had immediately been given in

Tokyo to the question whether Japan should not attack Russia at

once (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 16). Foreign Minister Matsuoka

in particular had urged this course. According to the memoirs of

Prince Fumimaro Konoye, the Japanese Premier at the time, the

attention of the Government became so centered upon this question

that the American counterproposal of Jime 21, which by that time

had been received in Tokyo from the Japanese Ambassador in Wash-

ington, became completely side-tracked imtil after an Imperial Con-

ference with Emperor Hirohito on July 2 (Japan time) (ex. 173,

Konoye Memoirs, pp. 16, 18). At that conference the question of

war with Russia had been temporarily shelved in favor of “an advance

into the southern re^ons,” and it had been decided that, first of all, the

rians “which have been laid with reference to French Indo-China and

^ai will be prosecuted, with a view to consolidating our position in the

southern territories” (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 70; cf. ex. 1,

pp. 1-2.) It is now known that at the Imperial Conference on July 2

(Japan time) it was also decided that, in case the diplomatic negotia-

tions with the United States should break down, “preparations for a

war with England and America will also be carried forward”; that all

plans, including the plan to use Japan’s military strength to settle the

Soviet question if the German-Russian war should develop to Japan’s

advantage, were to be carried out —

in such a way as to place no serious obstacles in the path of our basic military

preparations for a war with England and America;

and that —

In case all diplomatic means fail to prevent the entrance of America into the

European War, we will proceed in harmony with our obligations under the Tri-

partite Pact. However, with reference to the time and method of employing

our armed forces we will take independent action (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs,

p. 71).

The following report of the Imperial Conference on July 2 (Japan

time) had been cabled by the Japanese Foreign Minister to the

Japanese Ambassadors in the United States, Germany, Italy, and

Russia, the same day;

(National Secret)

At the conference held in the presence of the Emperor on July 2nd “The Princi-

pal Points in the Imperial Policy for Coping with the Changing Situation” were

decided. 'This Policy consists of the following two parts. The first part “The

Policy” and the second part “The Principal Points.” (I am wiring merely the gist

of the matter.) Inasmuch as this has to do with national defense secrete, keep

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the information only to yourself. Please also transmit the content to both the

Naval and Military Attach4s, together with this precaution.

The Policy.

1. Im^rial Japan shall adhere to the policy of contributing to world peace by

establishing the Great East Asia Sphere of Co-proepeiity, regardless of how the

world situation may change.

2. The Imperial Government shall continue its endeavor to dispose of the

China incident, and shall take measures with a view to advancing southward in

order to establish firmly a basis for her self-existence and self-protection.

The Principal Points.

For the purpose of bringing the CHIANG Regime to submission, increasing

pressure shall be added from various points in the south, and by means of both

propaganda and fighting plans for the taking over of concessions shall be carried

out. Diplomatic negotiations shall be continued, and various other plans shall

be speeded with regard to the vital points in the south. Concomitantly, prepara-

tions for southward advance shall he reenforced and the policy already decided upon

with reference to French Indo-China and Thailand shall he executed. As regards

the Russo-German war, although the spirit of the Three-Power Axis shall be

maintained, every preparation shall be made at the present and the situation shall

be dealt with in our own way. In the meantime, diplomatic negotiations shall be

carried on with extreme care. Although every means available shall be resorted to

in order to prevent the United States from joining the war, if need be, Japan shall

act in accordance with the Three-Power Pact and shall decide when and how force will

be employed (ex. 1, pp. 1-2).\*

It is worthy of note that this intercepted Japanese message, which

was translated and available in Washington\* on July 8 (Washington

time), did not mention the decisions at the Imperial Conference re-

specting the United States. j

Commencing immediately after the Imperial Conference, Japan ■

had proceeded with military preparations on a vast scale, calling up

from 1 to 2 million reservists and conscripts, recalling Japanese i

merchant vessels operating in the Atlantic Ocean, imposing restric-

tions upon travel in Japan, and carrying out strict censorship of mail

and communicatipns. The Japanese press had dwelt constantly on

the theme that Jai>an was being faced with pressme directed against :

it never equalled in all Japanese history. The United States had

been charged with using the Philippine Islands as a "pistol aimed at

Japan’s heart.” The Japanese press had warned that if the United

States took further action in the direction of encircling Japan,

Japanese-American relations would face a final crisis (ex. 29, vol. II, i

pp. 339-340). '

Largely as a result of disagreements within the Japanese Govern-

ment regarding the reply to be made to the American proposals of

June 21, Premier Konoye and his entire Cabinet had resigned en bloc

on July 16 (Japan time) (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, pp. 20-24).

Prince Konoye had then been ordered by Emperor Hirohito to or-

ganize the new Cabinet, which he had done, the on^ important

change being the appointment of Admiral Toyoda as Foreign Min-

ister, in place of Yosuke Matsuoka (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 25).

The views of the latter had been one of the principal causes of the

disagreements within the Government regarding its reply to the

1 Unless otherwise noted, all italics in this appendix have been supplied.

\* The expression “translated and available in Washington,” as used in this appendix, means that English

translations of the particular intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages were available at the time stated

to those officials of the United States Government in Washington to whom the Army and Navy were dis-

tributing “Magic” at the time. It should be borne in mind that all such messages to which reference is

made in this appendix were so available; specific reference has been made to the date when a message be-

came available only in those instances where knowledge of the exact date is important.

While the information contained in the intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages was available at the

time, the information contained herein which is derived solely from captured Japanese documents (ex-

hibits 8 and 132) and from the memoirs of Prince Konoye (exhibit 173) was not, of course, available at the

time.

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American proposals of June 21. Following this Cabinet change,

while Premier Konoye and the new Foreign Minister in Tokyo and Am-

bassador Nomura in Washington had made emphatic and repeated

protestations of Japan’s desire for peace and an equitable settlement

of Pacific problems, the messages from Tokyo to Washington had

contained such statements as “there is more reason than ever before to

arm ourselves to the teeth for all-out war” (ex. 1, p. 8). The bombing

of American property in China had continued, including bursts which

damaged the American Embassy and the U. S. S. TiMuUa at Chung-

king (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 343). An intercepted message of July 19

(Japan time) from Tokyo to Berhn had contained the following esti-

mate of the change in the Japanese Cabinet:

The Cabinet shake-up was necessary to expedite matters in connection with

National Affairs and has no further significance. Japan’s foreign policy will not

be changed and she will remain faithful to the principles of the Tripartite Pact

(ex. 1, p. 3).

In the meantime, the movement of Japanese troops and ships in

accordance with the Japanese plans for the “southward advance”

had begun in earnest, (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 340; ex. 173, Konoye Mem-

oirs, p. 26). Those military and naval movements, plus the failure

as yet of the Japanese Government to make any reply to the American

proposals of June 21, had led Under Secretary Welles, upon instruc-

tions from the Secretary of State, to inform Ambassador Nomura on

July 23 (Washington time) that Secretary Hull “could not see that

there was any basis now offered for the pursuit of the conversations in

which he and the Ambassador had been engaged” (ex. 29, vol. II,

p. 525). About this time. Colonel Hideo Iwakuro and Mr. Tadao

Wikawa, who had been advising Ambassador Nomura in the con-

versations, left Washington and returned to Japan. On July 24

(Washington time), in a conference with the Japanese Ambassador

attended by Under Secretary Welles and Admiral Harold K. Stark

Chief of Naval Operations, President Roosevelt had proposed that,

if the Japanese Government would withdraw its forces from French

Indochina, he would endeavor to obtain from the British, the Chinese,

and the Netherlands Governments, and the United States Govern-

ment itself would give, a solemn and binding declaration to regard

French Indochina as a neutralized country, provided the Japanese

Government would give a similar commitment (ex. 29, vol. II, pp.

527-530). Nevertheless, the Japanese troop movements into French

Indochina had continued, and on July 26 (Washington time) President

Roosevelt had issued an Executive order freezing aU Japanese assets

in the United States (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 267). The effect of this order

- had been to bring about very soon the virtual cessationjof trade between

the United States and Japan (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 343).

In a message dated July 31 (Japan time), which was translated and

available in Washington on August 4 (Washington time), the new

Foreign Minister had advised Ambassador Nomura that since the

Imperial Conference on July 2 (Japan time) the Japanese Govem-

liient had been devoting every effort to bring about the materialization

of the pohcies there decided upon. He told the Ambassador:

Commercial and economic relations between Japan and third countries, led by

England and the United States, are gradually becoming so horribly strained that

we cannot endure it much longer. Consequently, our Empire, to save its very life,

must take measures to secure the raw materials of the South Seas. Our Empire

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must immediately take steps to break asunder this ever-strengthening chain of

encirclement which is being woven under the guidance and with the paHicipation

of England and the United States, acting like a cunning dragon seemingly asleep.

That is why we decided to obtain military bases in French Indo-China and to have

our troops occupy that territory.

That step in itself, I dare say, gave England and the United States, not to

mention Russia, quite a set-back in the Pacific that ought to help Germany, and

now Japanese-American relations are more rapidly than ever treading the evil

road. This shows what a blow it has been to the United States.

♦ \* \* ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦

We are expending our best efforts to cooperate with Germany. She knows it

and ought to understand our actions.

6. Well, the formula for cooperation between Tokyo and Berlin, in order to

realize the fundamental spirit of the Tripartite Pact, should be for each country

to have a certain flexibility in its conduct. What I mean to say is that each should

understand that real cooperation does not necessarily mean complete symmetry

of action. In other words, we should trust each other and while striving toward

one general objective, each use our own discretion within the bounds of good

judgment.

Imis, all measures which our Empire shall take will be based upon a determina-

tion to bring about the success of the objectives of the Tripartite Pact. That this

is a fact is proven by the promulgation of an Imperial rescript. We are ever

working toward the realization of those objectives, and now during this dire

emergency is certainly no time to engage in any light unpremeditated or over-

speedy action. (Ex. 1, pp. 9-10.)

In the meantime, a reply to the American proposals of June 21

had been transmitted on July 25 (Japan time) to Ambassador No-

mura in Washington (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 26). He had

not presented it to Secretary Hull, however, because of the change in

Japanese Cabinets, because he thought it woiild not bo acceptable to

the United States Government, and because he had received no in-

structions from the new Cabinet as to how to proceed under the

circumstances (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 26). Still another

proposal had then been drawn up in Tokyo and this new proposal

lad been presented to Secretary Hull on August 6 by Ambassador

S^omura with the statement that it was intended to be responsive to

! President Roosevelt’s suggestion for the neutralization of French

Indochina (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 546-550). The new Japanese proposal

' lad asked, either expressly or by implication, that the United States —

(1) remove the restrictions it had imposed upon trade with Japan; (2) suspend

its defensive preparations in the Philippines; (3) discontinue furnishing military

equipment to Great Britain and the Netherlands for the arming of their Far

Eastern possessions; (4) discontinue aid to the Chinese Government; and (5)

assent to Japan’s assertion and exercise of a special military position and a per-

manent preferential political and economic status in Indochina, involving, as

this would, assent to procedures and disposals which menaced the security of the

United States and which were contrary to the principles to which this Government

was committed. In return the Japanese Government offered not to station

Japanese troops in regions of the southwestern Pacific other than Indochina. It pro-

posed to retain its military estabKshment in Indochina for an indeterminate period.

There thus would still have remained the menace to the security of the United

States, already mentioned, as well as the menace to the security of British and

Dutch territories in the southwestern Pacific area (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 344).

About this time, in Tokyo, Premier Konoye had determined to pro-

pose a personal meeting between himself and President Roosevelt

(ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 29). It is now known that he had pre-

sented this idea to the Ministers of War and Navy on August 4

(Japan time). Before that day ended, the Navy Minister had ex-

pressed complete accord and had even anticipated the success of the

proposed coherence (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 30). The Minister

of War, General Tojo, however, had replied in writing as follows:

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If the Prime Minister were to personally meet with the President of the United

States, jkhe existing diplomatic relations of the Empire, which are based on the

Tripartite Pact, would unavoidably be weakened. At the same time, a consider-

able domestic stir would undoubtedly be created. For these reasons, the meeting

is not considered a suitable move. The attempt to surmount the present critical

situation by the Prime Minister's offering his personal services, is viewed with

sincere respect and admiration. If, therefore, it is the Prime Minister’s intention

to attend such a meeting with determination to firmly support the basic principles

embodied in the Empire\* s Revised Plan to the Plan and to carry out a war against

America if the President of the Lnited States still fails to comprehend the true irtten-

tions of the Empire even after this final effort is madSf the Army is not necessarily in

disagreement.

However, (1) it is not in favor of the meeting if after making preliminary

investigations it is learned that the meeting will be with someone other than the

Pr^ident, such as Secretary Hull or one in a lesser capacity. (2) You shall not

resign your post as a result of ihe meeting on the grounds that it was a failure; rather ,

you shall be prepared to assume leadership in the war against America (ex. 173,

Konoye Memoirs, pp. 30-31).

On August 7 (Japan time) Premier Konoye had been instructed by

Iknperor Hirohito to proceed immediately with arrangements for

the meeting (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 31). That day the Premier

had sent a telegram to Ambassador Nomura, which was translated

and available in Washington on August 8 (Washington time), direct-

ing him to propose such a meeting (ex. 1, pp. 12-13).

Ambassador Nomura and Secretary Hull had met on August 8

(Washington time), and at that meeting the Ambassador had pre-

sented the proposal for a meeting between President Roosevelt and

Premier Konoye. Secretary Hull had informed the Ambassador that

the new Japanese proposal of August 6 was not responsive to Presi-

dent Roosevelt’s suggestion of Ju^ 24 (Washington time) mentioned

above, and, regarding the proposal for a meeting between the Presi-

dent and Premier Konoye, had said that it remained for the Japanese

Government to decide whether it could find means of shaping its

policies along lines that would make possible an adjustment of views

between the two Governments (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 550-551).

The next day, August 9 (Washington time). Secretary Hull had

conferred with Lord Halifax, the British Ambassador, who had in-

quired about the amount of aid the United States Government would

be able to give in case the Japanese should attack Singapore or the

Dutch East Indies. Secretary Hull recorded:

I replied that I myself have visualized the problem and issue in a broader way

and tl^t issue is presented by the plan of the Japanese to invade by force the

whole of the Indian Ocean and the islands and continents adjacent thereto,

isolating China, sailing acroiw probably to the mouth of the Suez Canal, to the

Persian Gulf oil area, to the Cape of Good Hope area, thereby blocking by a

military despotism the trade routes and the supply sources to the British. I

added that this broad military occupation would perhaps be more damaging to

British defense in Europe than any other step short of the German crossing of the

Channel. I said that this Government visualizes these broad conditions and the

problem of resistance which they present; that the activities of this Government

in the way of discouraging this Japanese movement and of resistance will be more

or less affected by the British defensive situation in Europe and hence by the

question of the number of American nhval vessels and other American aid that

may be needed by Great Britain at the same time. I said that in the event of

further Japanese movements south this Government and the British Government

should naturally have a conference at once and this Government would then be

able to determine more definitely and in detail its situation pertaining to resistance,

in the light of the statement I had just made (ex. 28, pp. 710-711).

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Except that President Roosevelt had left Washington for the

Atlantic Conference meeting with Prime Minister Churchill before

either of the two last-mentioned conferences,\* the foregoing sum-

marizes briefly the immediate background for that Conference so far

as relations between the United States and Japan were concerned.

The Japanese move into southern French Indochina while at the same

time in Washington Ambassador Nomura was engaging in conversa-

tions with Secretary Hull looking toward a peaceful settlement of

problems in the Pacific, and the consequent breaking off of those

conversations, together with the freezing of Japanese assets in the

United States, had brought relations between the two countries to a

critical stage. Moreover, French Indochina, where the Japanese

forces were estabhshing themselves, was an area of great strategic

importance. From it, those forces could strike in many directions,

toward major objectives. To the east, across the South China Sea,

lay the Philippines. To the west and northwest, across Thailana

and the Chinese province of Yimnan, lay Rangoon, Kunming, and

the Burma Road, over which American supplies for China were

moving. To the south, at the tip of the Malay Peninsula, lay the

British naval base at Singapore. Beyond Singapore and the Philip-

pines lay the Netherlands East Indies, with rubber, oil, and other

materials needed by Japan for the purposes to which the Japanese

Government was committed.

When Under Secretary Welles informed Ambassador Nomura on

July 23 (W ashii^ton time) that the conversations were at an end, he

said that the United States could only assume, first —

that the occupation of Indochina by Japan constituted notice to the United

States that the Japanese Government intended to pursue a policy of force and of

conquest, and, second, that in the light of these acts on the part of Japan, the

United States, with regard to its own safety in the light of ita own preparations

for self-defense, must assume that the Japanese Government was taking the last

step before proceeding upon a policy of totalitarian expansion in the South Seas

and of conquest in the South Seas through the seizure of additional territories in

that region (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 525).

The Atlantic Conference

{August 9-14, 1941)

The meeting between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister

Churchill, each accompanied by high officials of their respective Gov-

ernments, took place at sea near Argentia, Newfoundland, daring the

second week in Auguist 1941. At it the President and the Prime

Minister agreed upon the joint declaration of principles which has

since become known as the Atlantic Charter (tr. 1359-1364).

Their conversations also dealt with steps which Great Britain and the

United States were taking for their safety in the face of the policies of

aggression of the German Government and other governments asso-

ciated with the German Government. They discussed such matters

as the proposed occupation of the Canary Islands by the British

Government to guard the southern Atlantic convoy route into the

1 Former Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles testified, however, that he believed he (Welles) left

Washington for the Atlantic ^Conference the evening of August 8 (Washington time) (tr. 1254).

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British Isles, a proposal that the Portuguese Government request the

Government of the United States for assistance in the defense of the

Azores as a means of assurance that those islands would not be occu-

pied by Germany, and the protection of the Cape Verde Islands against

Axis agCTessors (ex. 22-C).

The President and the Prime Minister also discussed the situation

in the Far East. During those discussions Mr. Churchill submitted a

proposal for parallel dedarations by the United States, British, and

Dutch Governments warning Japan against new moves of military

aggression.\* This proposal also contemplated that the Russian Gov-

ernment would be kept fully informed of such steps (ex. 22). The

final discussion of Mr. Churchill’s proposal occurred on August 11

(ex. 22-C). According to Under Secretary Welles’ record of that

discussion —

The President gave Mr. Churchill to read copies of the two statements handed

to Secretary Hull by the Japanese Ambassador on August 6.

The Prime Minister read them carefully and then remarked that the implica-

tion was that Japan, having already occupied Indochina, said that she would

move no further provided the United States would abandon their economic and

financial sanctions and take no further military or naval defensive measures and

further agree to concessions to Japan, including the opportunity for Japan to

strangle the Chinese Government, all of which were particularly unacceptable

(ex. 22-C).

The President replied that that was about the picture as he saw it,

and after expressing his strong feeling that “every effort should be

made to prevent the outbreak of war with Japan,” he stated the pro-

cedure with respect to Japan that he intended to follow upon his

return to Washington. He told the Prime Minister that he would

inform Ambassador Nomura that if the Japanese Government would

give satisfactory assurances that it would not further station its troops

in the Southwestern Pacific areas, except French Indochina, and that

the Japanese troops now stationed in French Indochina would be

withdrawn, the United States Government would resume the informal

conversations with the Japanese Government. He said that he would

further state that if Japan should refuse to consider this procedime arid

should undertake further steps in the nature of military expansions, in

his belief various steps would have to be taken by the United States

notwithstanding his realization that the taking of such measures

might result in war between the United States and Japan (ex. 22-C).

Mr. Churchill immediately concurred in this procedure (ex. 22-C).

There was then discussed —

the desirability of informing Russia of the steps which would be taken as above

set forth and of possibly including in the warning to Japan a statement which

would cover any aggressive steps by Japan against the Soviet Union (ex. 22-C),

Under Secretary Welles expressed the view that the real issue

involved was whether or not Japan would continue its policy of

conquest by force in the entire Pacific and suggested that the state-

ment which the President intended to make —

might more advantageously be based on the question of broad policy rather than

be premised solely upon Japanese moves in the southwestern Pacific area (ex.

22-C).

> The record before the Committee also shows that in February 1941, just before the Lend-Lease Act-

described by Prime Minister Churchill as “the Bill on which our hopes depend”— was enacted by Congress,

the Prime Minister and Lord Halifax, the British Ambassador, had urged upon President Roosevelt and

Secretary Hull their desire for some action by the United States “to deter the Japanese” (ex. 168).

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The President and Mr. Churcliill both agreed to this, and “it vxm

decided that the step to be taken by the President \* would be taken in

that sense” (ex. 22-C).

Consideration was then given the question whether or not President

Roosevelt should include in his statement to Ambassador Nomura a

statement with respect to British policy concerning French Indo-

china and Thailand (ex. 22-C). However, since the statement ulti-

mately made by the President to Ambassador Nomura did not mention

British policy concerning those countries this latter proposal appears

to have been dropped (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 554-559).

Under Secretary Welles returned to Washington from Argentia

several days before President Roosevelt, at the latter’s request. Upon

his arrival, he advised Secretary Hull of what had transpired there,

and, at the President’s further request, he prepared the initial draft

(ex. 22) of the proposed warning to Japan from notes he had made of

his final conversation with the President before leaving Argentia

(tr. 1259) . A revised draft was given to Secretary Hull by Mr. Welles

on August 16, 1941 (ex. 22-A), and was further revised by the Secre-

tary and his advisors on Far Eastern affairs before being communi-

cated to Ambassador Nomura by the President (tr. 1272).

President Roosevelt Warns Japan Against Further Aggression

AND AT THE SaME TiME OfFERS TO ReSUME THE JapANESE-AMER-

icAN Conversations

{August 17, 1941 )

President Roosevelt returned to Washington Sunday morning, Au-

gust 17 ^ ashington time) . Late that afternoon, Ambassador Nomura

met with the President and Secretary Hull at the White House, at the

President’s request (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 554 et seq.; ex. 124).\* Mr.

Roosevelt read and then handed to Admiral Nomura the document

1 The evidence before the Committee is conflicting as to whether or not Prime Minister Churchill prom-

ised President Roosevelt that the British Government would take action parallel to that to be taaen by

the United States Government.

The only contemporaneous records of the Atlantic Conference before the Committee are three memo-

randa prepared by Under Secretary Welles (ex. 22-B, 22-C, 22-D). Those memoranda show that the pro-

cedure outlined by President Roosevelt dilTered substantially from that envisaged in Prime Minister

Churchill’s proposal. As there described by Mr. Welles, the President’s procedure did not call for parcel

action by either the British or Dutch Governments, or for keeping Russia informed, as Mr. Churchill had

proposed. Nor, as in the case of Mr. Churchill’s proposal, was the precise phraseology of the warning to

Japan prescribed, it being left entirely up to the President. Mr. Welles testified that the promise given

by the President to Mr. Churchill “was limited to the fact that a warning would be given’\* (tr. 1422),

and that the only agreement reached between the President and the Prime Minister was “that the Presi-

dent made the promise to Mr. Churchill that the Government of the United States, in its own words and

in its own way, would issue a warning to the Japanese Government of the character which actusdly was

made by the President on August 17’’ (tr. 1428).

While it is true that Mr. Welles testified that the promise made by President Roosevelt was to “take

parallel action with the British Government in warning the Japanese Government’’ (tr. 1235-6) and that

he\* “took it for granted Mr. Churchill must have made that statement’\* (i. e., promised to make a parallel

warning) to the President (tr. 1446), it is also true that when asked directly whether the President had told

him that Mr. Churchill had promised to make a parallel warning, Mr. Welles said, “the President in his

conversation with me, so far as I remember, did not make that specific statement’’ (tr. 1446) . Moreover,

as previously noted, the Welles’ memoranda neither state nor indicate that any such promise was made

by Mr. Churchill (ex. 22-B, 22-C, 22-D), and there is no evidence before the Committee showing that

action parallel to the President’s warning to Japan was ever taken by the British Government. On the

other hand, both “Peace and War’’ (ex. 28, p. 129) and “Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan

1931-1941’’ (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 345) refer to an “agreement’’ to take parallel action made by President Roosevelt

and Prime Minister Churchill, though, of course, neither of these purports to be a contemporaneous ac-

count of the Atlantic Conference. Likewise, in his testimony before the Committee, Secretary Hull referred

to such an “agreement,’’ though again Secretary Hull did not attend the Atlantic Conference (tr. 1116).

\* This discussion of the meeting referred to in the text, and the discussions in this appendix of other meet-

ings in Washington or Tokyo between representatives of the United States Government and the Japanese

Government, are based primarily upon the official State Department records of such meeting appearing

in Volumes I and II of “Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941’’ (ex. 29) and upon inter-

cepted Japanese messages between W ashington and Tokyo re^rting .such meetings, the Committee exhibits

in which such messages appear being indicated in all cases. Reference is made to such records and reports,

only the material portions of which have been quoted or summarized here.

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drafted by Mr. Welles and the Secretary. It noted that notwith-

standing the protracted conversations engaged in by the United States

and Japanese Governments looking toward a peaceful settlement in

the Pacific and the President’s suggestion on July 24, 1941, for the

“neutralization” of French Indochina, the Japanese Government had

continued to dispose its armed forces at various points in the Far

East and had occupied French Indochina. Reading from the docu-

ment, President Roosevelt said that the United States Government

felt that at the present stage “nothing short of the most complete

candor on its part in the light of the evidence and indications” in its

possession would tend to further the objectives sought. He then

warned Japan against further aggression, saying:

Such being the case, this Government now finds it necessary to say to the Govern-

ment of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes any further steps in pursu-

ance of a policy or program of military domination by force or threat of force of

neighboring countries, the Government of the United States will be compelled

to take immediately any and all steps which it may deem necessary toward safe-

guarding the legitimate rights and interests of the United States and American

nationals and toward insuring the safety and security of the United States (ex. 29,

vol. II, pp. 556-557).

On behalf of his Government, Ambassador Nomura reasserted the

sincerity of its desire to bring about an adjustment of Japanese-

American diplomatic relations. He expressed his Government’s de-

sire to be advised as to the possibility of arranging a meeting between

President Roosevelt and Premier Konoye and of resuming the infor-

mal conversations which had been terminated by the United States

in July because of the Japanese occupation of southern French Indo-

china. He stated, however, that he felt no further e^lanations

regarding his Government’s actions in French Indochina, in addition

to the views already expressed to Secretary Hull, were necessary.

The President then read and handed to Ambassador Nomura a

second document. It opened with a reference to the Japanese pro-

posal of August 8 (Washington time) for a meeting between himself

and Premier Konoye and to the Japanese desire for resumption of the

informal conversations. The President said that the United States

Government would be prepared to resume the conversations provided

the Japanese Government felt that Japan desired and was in a position

to suspend its expansionist activities, and to embark upon a peaceful

program for the Pacific along the lines of the program to which the

United States was committed. His statement concluded:

the Government of the United States, however, feels that, in view of the circum-

stances attending the interruption of the informal conversations between the

two Governments, it would be helpful to both Governments, before undertaking

a resumption of such conversations or proceeding with plans for a meeting, if the

Japanese Government would be so good as to furnish a clearer statement than has

yet been furnished as to its present attitude and plans, just as this Government

has repeatedly outlined to the Japanese Government its attitude and plans (ex. 29,

vol. II, p. 559).

In Ambassador Nomura’s report to Tokyo on this meeting, he

emphasized the “CTaveness with which he (President Roosevelt) views

Japanese-U. S. relations.” The Ambassador expressed the view that

the Japanese proposal for a “leaders’ conference” between President

Roosevelt and Premier Konoye had “considerably eased” the attitude

of the United States Government and that there was no room for

doubt “that the President hopes that matters will take a turn for the

better” (ex. 124).

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The next day, August IS.^ashiMton time), President Roosevelt

sent a message to Prime Minister Churchill descrihing his meeting

with Ambassador Nomura. This message indicates that the Presi-

dent did not learn until after his return to Washington of the Ambas-

sador’s request on August 16 (Washington time) for a resumption of

the informal conversations. In his message, the President told Mr.

Churchill that —

I made to him (Admiral Nomura) a statement covering the position of this Gov-

ernment with respect to the taking by Japan of further steps in the direction o‘

military domination by force along the lines of the proposed statement such as

you and I had discussed. The statement I made to him was no less vigorous

than and was substantially similar to the statement we had discussed (ex. 70).

The evidence before the Committee does not show whether or not

the British Government took “parallel action” to the warning given

Japan by President Roosevelt. Under Secretary Welles testified

before the Committee that he took it for granted that ‘the British

Government took such parallel action and that the records of the

State Department would probably show that (tr. 1279), but Secretary

HuU testified, and the State Department has advised the Committee,

that its files contain no record of any such action (tr. 14, 306; 4480).

Furthermore, as late as November 30 (Washington time). Prime

Minister Churchill sent a message to the President saying that “one

important method remains unused in averting war between Japan

and our two countries, namely a plain declaration, secret or public as

may be thought best, that any further act of aggression by Japan

will lead immediately to the gravest consequences. \* \* \* We

would, of comse, make a similar declaration or share in a joint declara-

tion” (ex. 24) ; and the evidence further shows that on December 7

the Prime Minister submitted to President Roosevelt a draft of a

proposed warning to Japan (tr. 13738-13740). On the other hand,

on August 25, 1941, in an address reporting to Parliament on the

Atlantic Conference, the Prime Minister said:

But Europe is not the only continent to be tormented and devastated by

aggression. For five long years the Japanese military factions, seeking to emu-

late the style of Hitler and Mussolini, taking all their posturing as if it were a

new European revelation, have been invading and harrying the 500,000,000 in-

habitants of China. Japanese armies have been wandering about that vast land

in futile excursions, carrying with them carnage, ruin and corruption, and call-

ing it ‘^the Chinese incident.'' Now they stretch a grasping hand into the south-

ern seas of China. They snatch Indo-China from the wretched Vichy French.

They menace by their movements Siam, menace Singapore, the British link with

Australasia, and menace the Philippine Islands under the protection of the United

States.

It is certain that this has got to stop. Every effort will be made to secure a

peaceful settlement. The United States are laboring with infinite patience to

arrive at a fair and amicable settlement which will give Japan the utmost re-

assurance for her legitimate interests. We earnestly hope these negotiations will

succeed. But this I must say: That if these hopes should fail we shall, of course,

range ourselves unhesitatingly at the side of the United States (tr. 1355-1356;

4480-4481).

While Secreta^ Hull testified that he knew of no parallel action

taken by the British other than this address (tr. 14306), which was

broadcast by radio. Under Secretary Welles testified that in his

opinion this address did not constitute “parallel action” of the kind

proposed by Mr. Churchill to the President, and that in Mr. Welles’

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judgment such action would necessarily have had to have been in the

form of an exchange of diplomatic notes (tr. 1356).^

On August 21 (Washington time) President Roosevelt sent a mes-

sage to Congress describing the meeting at Argentia (tr. 1359-1364).

Tms message embodied the text of the “Atlantic Charter” and referred

in general terms to other matters discussed at the meeting, but made

no specific mention of the proposal to issue a warning to Japan.

Under Secretary Welles testified that publication of the proposal to

issue a warning to Japan or of the President’s warning, itself, would

not have been conducive to a successful result in attempting ,to find

a peaceful solution, as it would have inflamed public opinion in Japan

(tr. 1277).

Japan Protests United States Shipments of Oil to Russia

{August 27, 1941)

The Japanese reply to President Roosevelt’s request on August 17

(W ashington time) for a “clearer statement than has yet been furnished

as to its present attitude and plans” was not received until August 28

(Washington time). During the interval between those dates.

Ambassador Nomura reported to the Japanese Foreign OflSce an

increasing interest on the part of President Roosevelt in participating

in the resumption of the Japanese-American negotiations and stated

that, in his opinion, “the President is the one who shows the most

interest in the ‘leaders conference’ ” (ex. 124). About the same time

the Ambassador received a report from Tolg^o concerning the Foreign

Minister’s talk with Ambassador Grew on August 18 (Japan time) at

which Ambassador Grew indicated that he would give the proposed

meeting his personal support (ex. 124). On August 23 (Japan time)

the Foreign Minister cabled Ambassador Nomura that “everything

in our power” was being done “to rush our reply to the United States

and at the same time to bring about the ‘leaders conference’ at an

earlier date” (ex. 124). The next day Ambassador Nomura called

•on Secretary Hull and reported that his Government wanted the

“leadei-s conference” to take place before October 15. The reason he

gave for, this was the fear in Tokyo that the impression would be

created that Japan “had given in in the face of the threat of ‘encircle-

ment’ ” if the proposed Roosevelt-Konoye meeting should follow a

reported British-U. S.-Soviet conference to be held at an earlier date

(ex. 124; ex. 29, vol. II, p. 568).

At about this time the German Ambassador in Japan, General Ott,

received intelligence reports that the United States was preparing to

ship oil to Russia via Vladivostok, that the first of the transporting

vessels had already sailed, that they would soon sail in rapid succes-

sion, and that the oil would imdoubtedly be used by Russia for an

attack upon Japan. General Ott repeated this information to the

Vice Ministei’ for Foreign Affairs during an interview on August 19

(Japan time), and in reply the Vice Minister said that the problem

of American oil was receiving very cai’eful attention (ex. 132-A, item

C). The next day, and again on August 22 (Japan time), the Foreign

> There is also before the Committee a memorandum of Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck, Political Advisor to

Secretary Hull, dated, however, February 28, 1944, in which it is stated that toward the end of August 1941,

the British and American Governments “served on Japan a strong warning” against further extending

her courses of aggression (ex. 108).

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Minister cabled Ambassador Nomura requesting him to call the at-

tention of the United States authorities to the fact that if it should

become known in Japan that the United States was shipping iron,

airplanes, and other materials to Russia by way of Japanese coastal

waters, this might have' an adverse effect upon Japanese-American

relations (ex. 1, p. 19; ex. 124). Ambassador Nomura told Secretary

Hull during their conversation on August 23 (Washington time) that

the shipment of oil by the United States to Russia through Japanese

waters “would naturally give the Japanese real concern at an eariy

date”, (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 566). A more urgent message concerning

this matter was sent from Tokyo to Ambassador Nomura on August

26 (Japan time) requesting him to “make representations again to

the Secretary of State in order that he may reconsider ain immediate

cessation of these measures from the general viewpoint' of the current

Japan-American diplomatic relations” (ex. 1, p. 21). Representations

of this nature were made to Ambassador Grew in Tokyo the next day

(ex. 29, vol. II, p. 569), and on August 27 (Washington time) Ambas-

sador Nomura orally protested to Secretary Hull against American

shipments of oil to Russia through Japanese waters. Secretary H\iU

stated that only two tankers were involved and that the shipments

Were entirely valid under all the laws of commerce (ex. 29, vol. II,

p. 570).

Premier Konoye Sends a Personal Message to President

Roosevelt Urging the Proposed “Leaders Conference”

{August 28, 19^1)

Premier Konoye replied to President Roosevelt’s statement of

August 17 (W ashington time) in a personal message which Ambassador

Nomura handed to the President at a conference at the White House

on the morning of August 28 (Washington time). The Premier’s

message was accompanied by a statement which the Japanese Gov-

ernment intended to be responsive to the President’s suggestion that

it would be helpful if that Government would furnish a clearar

statement of its present attitude and plans than had as yet been given

(ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 571-572).

In his message to President Roosevelt, Premier Konoye urged that

the meeting between himself and the President be arranged “as soon

as possible.” He said that while the preliminary informal negotiations

that were terminated in July had been “quite appropriate both in

spirit and content,” nevertheless —

the idea of continuing those conversations and to have their conclusion confirmed

by the responsible heads of the two Governments does not meet the need of the

present situation which is developing swiftly and may produce unforeseen con-

tingencies.

I consider it, therefore, of urgent necessity that the two heads of the Govern-

ments should meet first to discuss from a broad standpoint all important problems

between Japan and America covering the entire Pacific area, and to explore the

possibility of saving the situation. Adjustment of minor items may, if necessary,

be left to negotiations between competent officials of the two countries, following

the meeting (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 573).

The statement which accompanied Premier Konoye’s message

referred, among other things, to the —

principles and directives set forth in detail by the United States Government and

envisaged in the informal conversations as constituting a program for the Pacific

area —

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and continued —

Hie Japanese Government wishes to state that it considers these principles and

the practical application thereof, in the friendliest manner possible, are the prime

requisites of a true peace and should be applied not only in the Pacific area but

throughout the entire world. Such a program has long been desired and sought

by Japan itself (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 575).

However, while the statement contained many assurances regarding

Japan’s peaceful intentions, the more important assurances were

qualified or conditional. Thus, the Japanese Government was pre-

pared to withdraw its troops from Indochina, but only “as soon as the

China incident is settled or a just peace is established in East Asia”;

concerning Soviet-Japanese relations it was said that Japan would

take no military action “as long as the Soviet Union remains faithful

to the Soviet-Japanese neutrality treaty and does not menace Japanese

Manchukuo or take any action contrary to the spirit of the said

treaty”; the Japanese Government had no intention, it was said, of

using, “without provocation” military force against any neighboring

nation (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 573-575).

Ambassador Nomura reported to his Government that President

Roosevelt “was well pleased” with the Premier’s message (ex. 124).

The President had said, he cabled, “I am looking forward to having

approximately three days talk with Prince Konoye”, but that Hawaii

was out of the question as a meeting place and that he would prefer

Jimeau, Alaska. The Ambassador quoted the President as having

“smilingly and cynically” said during his reading of the message:

Though I am looking forward to conversations with Prince Konoye, I wonder

whether invasion of Thailand can be expected during those conversations just

as an invasion of French Indo-China occurred during Secretary HulPs conversa-

tions with your Excellency (ex. 124).

The eveniug of the same day, August 28 (Washington time). Am-

bassador Nomura called on Secretary Hull and outlined to the

Secretary his ideas concerning the arrangements for the proposed

Roosevelt-Konoye meeting. During this conversation, the Secretary

pointed out to Ambassador Nomura the desirability of there being

reached in advance of the proposed meeting “an agreement in prin-

ciple on the principal questions which were involved in a settlement

of Pacific questions between the two nations.” The Secretary said

that if the proposed meeting should fail to result in an agreement,

serious consequences from the point of view of both Governments

would ensue. He expressed the view that therefore the purpose of

the proposed meeting should be “the ratification of essential points

SCTeed upon in principle” (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 576-577). Ambassador

Nomura concluded his report of this meeting to Tokyo with the

comment:

In general, it may be said that the Secretary of State is an exceedingly cautious

person. There are indications that he is considering this matter from many

angles. I feel that unless we are in fairly close agreement the “leaders conference’’

will not materialize (ex. 124).

Germany Suspects Treachery

{August 29-SO, 1941)

It became known to the American press, soon after Ambassador

Nomura left the White’ House following his conference with President

Roosevelt and Secretary Hull on August 28 (Washington time), that

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the Ambassador had delivered a personal message to the President

from Premier Konoye. Whether this information was given out by

Secretary Hull or by Ambassador Nomura is not clear from the rec-

ord before the Committee (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 582-583; ex. 124);

however, as a result of the disclosure. Foreign Minister Toyoda be-

came greatly concerned that the proposed “leaders conference” should

be kept absolutely secret, fearing the project would fail if news of it

should leak out before a settlement was reached. The Foreign Min-

ister cabled Ambassador Nomura twice on August 29 (Japan time)

urging him “to take every precaution” to guard against leaks (ex.

124). \_

This concern in Tokyo over the effect of publicity on the conver-

sations and the proposed “leaders conference” was a major reason for

calls by the Director of the American Bureau of the Japanese Foreign

OflBce on Ambassador Grew on August 29 and September 3 (Japan

time) and for a call by Ambassador Nomura on Secretary Hull on

September 1 (Washington time) (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 579-582, 586-

587, 583-585). During his first conversation with Ambassador Grew,

the Director, Mr. Terasaki, dwelt at some length on the unfortunate

effects of the publicity in Washington about Premier Konoye’s mes-

sage to President Roosevelt, and then communicated to the Ambas-

sador an appeal from Foreign Minister Toyoda that (1) the proposed

Roosevelt-Konoye meeting be arranged without delay and (2) pend-

ing the outcome of the proposed meeting, the United States postpone

the sending oil tankers to the Soviet Union and suspend the order

freezing Japanese assets in the United States. Ambassador Grew’s

memorandum of this meeting noted that he left Mr. Terasaki “under

no illusion” that the United States Government would find it possible

to agree to either of the “preposterous requests” contained in (2)

above (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 582). Ambassador Nomura’s conference

with Secretary Hull on September 1 (Washington time) was concerned

largely with discussion of the effect upon the conversations of the

positions taken by the press in Japan and the United States. The

Secretary took advantage of the occasion to ask the Ambassador what

would happen if an agreement should not be reached at the proposed

“leaders conference,” and to repeat his suggestion that an effort be

made to reach an agreement in principle on fundamental questions

before the meeting (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 583-585).

As a result of the fear in Tokyo of publicity. Ambassador Nomura

wrote a brief note to Secretary Hull on August 29 (W ashington time)

requesting his cooperation in keeping the conversations secret. The

Secretary replied on September 2 (Washington time) saying that he

would “be glad to conform to the desires of yourself and your Gov-

ernment in the foregoing respect, to every extent practical” (ex. 29,

vol. II, pp. 579, 586). However, apparently believing that some

official comment was needed in view of the rumors and speculation

in Tokyo about Ambassador Nomura’s meeting with President Roose-

velt, at 2:30 p. m. on August 29 (Japan time), the Japanese Foreign

Office released an official statement that Ambassador Nomura had

called on President Roosevelt on August 28 and had delivered to the

President a message from Premier Konoye stating “Japan’s view

regarding Pacific problems which are pending between Japan and the

United States” (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 579). Ambassador Grew advised

Secretary Hull of this annoimcement later the same afternoon (ex. 29,

vol. II, p. 579).

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Foreign Minister Toyoda feared publicity because of “the exceed-

ingly complex domestic situation” and the consideration which had

to be given to “our relations with Germany and Italy” (ex. 124).

What the Foreign Minister had in miud in the first connection is

indicated by his cable to Ambassador Nomura on September 3 (Japan

time), in which he said:

Since the existence of the Premier’s message was inadvertently made known

to the public, that gang that has been suspecting that unofficial talks were taking

place, has really begun to yell and wave the Tripartite Pact banner (ex. 1, p. 25).

In the second connection, it is now known from captured Japanese

documents that less than 4 hours after the Tokyo announcement of

Premier Konoye’s message to President Roosevelt, General Ott, the

German Ambassador, called on the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs,

Mr. Amau, and demanded to know whether the Premier’s message

departed from the policy determined at the Imperial Conference on

July 2, which had been secretly communicated to the German Gov-

ernment, and whether the Cabinet was contemplating anj change in

that regard (ex. 132-A, item C). The Vice Minister replied that the

message did not mean that there had been “a change in Japan’s

policy, nor that we are contemplating any change in our relations

with the Axis.” The reason for sending the message, he told the

Ambassador, “was to clarify the atmosphere in the Pacific” and to

attempt “to start conversations between the two parties.” Ambas-

sador Ott suggested that “precautions must be taken against America’s

scheme to prolong these negotiations, so that this might work to her

advantage,” to which the Vice Minister replied that “we have given

the matter careful thought so that the carrying on of negotiations by

Japan with America might not have any disadvantageous conse-

quences upon Germany and Italy.” “Our aim,” he said, “is to keep

her (America) from Joining in the war.” The German Ambassador

then requested an interview with Foreira Minister Toyoda, which took

place on the afternoon of August 30 (Japan time). • At that interview

General Ott again demanded to know whether the intentions of Japan

were still as secretly communicated to Germany on July 2. The

Foreign Minister denied that there had been any change in Japan’s

intentions, and stated that Japan’s preparations to avail herself of

any new developments “are now making headway.” The German

Ambassador said:

In Foreign Minister Matsuoka’s time the Japanese government authorities

thought that what America was planning to do was to get Japan to take an atti-

tude in conflict with the Tripartite Pact, that is, to ^ve up taking any positive

action in the Pacific area no matter what occasion might arise, and Germany is

very grateful that at the time the Japanese government resolutely resisted these

American designs, and we hope that it will continue to take that “line.” I would

like to ask what Your Excellency’s views are concerning this point (ex. 132-A,

item C).

Admiral Toyoda replied:

In a word I may say that the purpose of the Tripartite Pact is to prevent

American participation in the war, and that this view is the same as in the past;

nor will it change in the future (ex. 132-A, item C).

The Japanese Ambassador iu Berlin reported to Tokjro on October

1, 1941, that because of the Japanese-American negotiations everyone

in the German Foreign Office was “thoroughly disgusted with Japan.”

He said that the fact that the feeling of German leaders and people in

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general toward Japan was getting bad could not be covered up, and

that if Japan were to go ahead with the negotiations without consult-

ing Germany, “there is no teUrng what steps Germany may take

without consulting Japan” (ex. 1, pp. 48-49).

In Italy, the impression created by the Japanese-American talks

was not enthusiastic, as the Japanese Ambassador in Rome reported

to the Foreign Office on September 30:

Our recent negotiations with the United States have put a bad taste in the

mouths of the people of this country. Our attitude toward the Tripartite Alli-

ance appears to them to be faithless. Recently the newspapers have been grow-

ing more critical in tone where we Japanese are concerned. Official comment,

too, has been none too complimentary. As for Italy’s attitude toward the recent

celebration of the first anniversary of the conclusion of the Japanese-Gennan-

Italian Tripartite Alliance, its coolness reflects the attitude of the whole Italian

people (ex. 1, p. 44).

President Roosevelt Replies to Premier Konoye’s Message

{September 3, 1941)

President Roosevelt handed to Ambassador Nomura his reply to

Premier Konoye at a conference at the White House on the afternoon

of September 3 (Washington time) (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 588-592). The

President’s reply mentioned the reference in the statement which

had accompanied the Premier’s message to the basic principles to

which the United States Government had long been committed and

the President’s desire to collaborate in making these principles effec-

tive in practice. The President stated that his deep interest in this

matter made it necessary for him to observe and take account of

developments both in the United States and Japan which had a

bearing on Japanese-American relations, and that he could not avoid

taking cognizance of indications —

of the existence in. some quarters in Japan of concepts which, if widely entertained,

would seem capable of raising obstacles to successful collaboration between you

and me along the line which I am sure both of us earnestly desire to follow (ex

29, vol. II, p. 692).

The President then su^ested:

that it would seem highly desirable that we take precaution, toward ensuring that

our proposed meeting shall prove a success, by endeayoring to enter immediately

upon preliminary discussion of the fundamental and essential questions on which

we seek agreement. The questions which I have in mind for such preliminary

discussions involve practical application of the principles fundamental to achieve-

ment and maintenance of peace which are mentioned with more specification in the

statement accompanying your letter. I hope that you will look favorably upon

this suggestion (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 592).

The President also read and handed to Ambassador Nomura a

statement which referred to the American proposals of June 21

(Washington time) and to the fact that subsequent conversations had

disclosed that there were divergences of view between the two Gov-

ernments with respect to certain fundamental questions dealt with

in those proposals. Reading from the statement, the President

expressed the desire of the United States Government “to facilitate

progress toward a conclusive discussion” and its belief —

that a community of view and a clear agreement upon the points above mentioned

are essential to any satisfactory settlement of Pacific questions. It therefore

seeks an indication of the present attitude of the Japanese Government with

regard to the fundamental questions under reference (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 591),

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Iq connection with this statement, it will be remembered that the

second Konoye Cabinet had resided on July 16 (Japan time) and

had been replaced by the third Konoye Cabinet the next day (ex.

173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 24).

In his memorandum of the conversation with Ambassador Nomura,

Secretary Hull wrote:

Both the President and I repeatedly emphasized the necessity for his (i. e.,

Ambassador Nomura's) Government to clarify its position on the question of

abandoning a policy of force and conquest and on three fundamental questions

concerning which difficulties had been encountered in our discussion of the Japan-

ese proposal of May twelfth and the discussion of which we had not pursued after

the Japanese went into Indochina (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 588).

Japan Presents New Proposals in a New Form

(September 6, 1941)

■ It is now known that about the time President Roosevelt was meet-

ing with Ambassador Nomura, new Japanese proposals were being

discussed at a Joint Conference of Japanese Foreign Office and War

and Navy officials in Tokyo. According to Premier Konoye, these

new proposals were intended by the Foreign Office to bring up only

“immediate and concrete problems” and to focus the proposed meet-

ing between President Roosevelt and the Premier on those problems.

The Foreign Office took the position that it was difficult to predict

how long it would take to consider all of the important fundamental

principles dealt with in jthe proposals which had been under considera-

tion by the two Governments before the freezing orders, and that con-

sequently “the present crisis might not be averted” if it should be

necessary to consider all of those principles (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs,

p. 37). The new proposals were approved at the Joint Conference

mentioned above and were given to Ambassador Grew by Foreign

Minister Toyoda the next day, September 4 (Japan time), with the

request that they be transmitted to Secretary Hull by the Ambassador

to overcome any possibility of inaccuracy in handling by Ambassador

Nomina (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 593).

Ambassador Nomura presented the new proposals to Secretary Hull

at a meeting on September 6 (Washington time). He explained that

although the new proposals had been prepared by the Japanese Gov-

ernment before it received President Roosevelt’s reply of September 3

(Washington time), nevertheless his Government believed that the

contents of the new proposals constituted a reply to the President.

He said that the proposals were also in response to the view expressed

by Secretary Hull at the conference with him on the evening of August

28, namely, that it would be desirable for the two Govemmente to

reach an agreement in principle’ on the fundamental questions in-

volved before making arrangements for the proposed Roosevelt-

Konoye meeting (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 606-607). As presented to

Secretary Hull, the new Japanese proposals were as follows:

Draft Proposal Handed bt The Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the

Secretary of State on September 6, 1941

The Government of Japan undertakes:

(a) that Japan is ready to express its concurrence in those matters which

were already tentatively ^reed upon between Japan and .the United States

in the course of their preliminary informal conversations;

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(b) that Japan will not make any military advancement from French

Indo-China against any of its adjoining areas, and likewise will not, without

any justifiable reason, resort to military action against any regions lying

south of Japan;

(c) that the attitudes of Japan and the United States towards the European

War will be decided by the concepts of protection and self-defense, and, in case

the United States should participate in the European War, the interpretation

and execution of the Tripartite Pact by Japan shall be independently decided;

(d) that Japan will endeavour to bring about the rehabilitation of general

and normal relationship between Japan and China, upon the realization of

which Japan is ready to withdraw its armed forces from China as soon as

possible in accordance with the agreements between Japan and China;

(e) that the economic activities of the United States in China will not be

restricted so long as pursued on an equitable basis;

(f) that Japairs activities in the Southwestern Pacific Area will be carried

on by peaceful means and in accordance with the principle of nondiscrimina-

tion in international commerce, and that Japan will cooperate in the pro-

duction and procurement by the United Spates of natural resources in the

said area which it needs;

(g) that Japan will take measures necessary for the resumption of normal-

trade relations between Japan and the United States, and in connection

with the above-mentioned, Japan is ready to discontinue immediately the

application of the foreigners' transactions control regulations with regard to

the United States on the basis of reciprocity.

The Government of the United States undertakes:

(a) that, in response to the Japanese Government's commitment expressed

in point (d) referred to above, the United States will abstain from any

measures and actions which will be prejudicial to the endeavour by Japan

concerning the settlement of the China Affair:

(b) that the United States will reciprocate Japr n's commitment expressed

in point (f) referred to above;

(c) that the United States will suspend any military measures in the Far

East and in the Southwestern Pacific Area;

(d) that the United States will immediately (upon settlement) reciprocate

Japan's commitment expressed in point (g) referred to above by discontin-

uing the application of the so-called freezing act with regard to Japan and

further by removing the prohibition against the passage of Japanese vessels

through the Panama Canal (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 608-609).

Secretary Hull testified that these new Japanese proposals —

were much narrower than the assurances given in the statement communicated

to the President on August 28. In the September 6 Japanese draft the Japanese

f ave only an evasive formula with regard to their obligations under the Tripartite

'act. There was a qualified undertaking that Japan would not \*\* without any

justifiable reason" resort to military action against any region south of Japan.

No commitment was offered in regard to the nature of the terms which Japan

would offer to China; nor any assurance of an intention by Japan to respect

China's territorial integrity and sovereignty, to refrain /rcm interference in

China's internal affairs, not to station Japanese troops indefinitely in wide areas

of China, and to conform to the principle of nondiscrimination in international

commercial relations. The formula contained in that draft that \*\*the economic

activities of the United States in China will not be restricted so long as pursued

on an equitable basis" clearly implied a concept that the conditions under which

American trade and commerce in China were henceforth to be conducted were

to be a matter for decision by Japan (tr. 1118-1119).

On September 9 (Washington time) Secretary Hull cabled to Am-

bassador Grew a series of questions to be submitted to Foreign Min-

ister Toyoda regarding the intentions of the Japanese Government

in offering certain of the new proposals, especially those relating to

China (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 610-613). The Foreign Minister’s replies

to these questions were received by Ambassador Grew on September

13 (Japan time) and promptly cabled to Washington (ex. 29, vol.

II, pp. 620-624).

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On September 15 (Washington time) Ambassador Nomura cabled

Foreign Minister Toyoda that it seemed that’ the matter of the pre-

liminary conversations had been entrusted to Secretary Hull. He said

that in such conversations the United States would want to be advised

of the peace terms Japan would propose between Japan and China

and would refuse to act as intermediary unless the terms were fair and

just; therefore, he said, it would be necessary to outline the terms in

advance of the proposed “leaders conference.” He also reported that

the United States wanted to arrange matters with Britain, China,

and the Netherlands in advance of the proposed conference, so that

those countries would not get the impression the United States was

trading them off (ex. 1, p. 27). Two days later. Ambassador Nomura

cabled that there were “considerable signs of anticipation of a Japanese-

U. S. conference” at a recent United States Cabinet meeting, and that

“there is no mistaking the fact that the President is prepared to attend

the meeting if the preliminary arrangements can be made” (ex. 1,

p. 28). On September 22 (Washington time), he cabled a long report

to the Foreign Minister concerning conditions and attitudes in the

United States generally. His report concluded with the following

estimate:

Finally, though the United States Government does not wish to compromise

with Japan at the expense of China, should Japan give up forceful aggressions.

Japanese- American trade relations could be restored, and the United States would

even go so far as to render economic assistance to Japan (ex. 1, p. 31).

In the meantime, in Tokyo at Joint Conferences on September 6

and 13 (Japan time), the Japanese Government had determined the

basic peace terms which it was prepared to offer to China ^x. 132-A,

item D). A document containing those terms (Annex C attached

hereto) was handed to Secretary HuU by Ambassador Nomura on

September 23 (Washington time), having been communicated by the

Foreign Minister to Ambassador Grew in Tokyo on September 22

(Japan time) (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 631-633). During this conference

with Secretary Hull, Ambassador Nomura reiterated the desire of

his Government to have the Roosevelt-Konoye meeting take place

at the earliest possible opportunity. He told the Secretary that the

several dociunents which he had now presented were a full expression

of everything the Japanese Government desired to say, and that any-

thing further pertaining to the Tripartite Pact might best be left to

the proposed meeting of the heads of the two Governments (ex. 29,

vol. II, pp. 634-635) . However, on September 27 (Washington time) ,

he delivered to Secretary Hull a further document (Annex D attached

hereto), which had been prepared in the form, and along the lines, of

the American proposals of June 21 (Washington tune) and had been

approved at a Joint Conference on September 20 (Japan time). The

new document, it was said, incorporated all that the Japanese Govern-

ment had communicated to the American Government since June 21.

A similar document had been delivered to Ambassador |Greiiy on

September 25, 1941 (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 636-641).

On September 27 (Japan time) ceremonies were held in Tokyo

celebrating the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact. That day

Foreign Minister Toyoda requested Ambassador Grew to call on him,

and asked the Ambassador to convey to President Roosevelt, through

Secretary Hull, the anxiety of Premier Konoye and the entire Cabinet

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lest the proposed Roosevelt-Konoye meeting might be indefinitely de-

layed, stating that all preparations had been made by the Japanese

Government. During this conference he described to Ambassador

Grew in considerable detail his Government’s position regarding the

conversations (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 641-645). The Foreign Minister

cabled his remarks to Ambassador Nomma, saying that “in view of

internal and external circumstances in our country, we cannot keep

postponing matters forever” (ex. 1, p. 33). Ambassador Nomura

communicated the gist of the Foreign Minister’s remarks to Secretary

Hull on September 29 (Washington time). He said that while he was

well aware of the United States Government’s position and had com-

municated it to Tokyo, nevertheless, his Government had instructed

him to press for an answer to the Japanese proposal. As his personal

opinion, he judged that if nothing came of the proposal for a meeting

between the heads of the two Governments, it might be difficult for

Premier Konoye to retain his position and that he then would be likely

to be succeeded by a less moderate leader (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 652).

Ambassador Grew Supports the Proposed “Leaders

Conference”

{August-September 1941)

In Tokyo Ambassador Grew had reached the conclusion that if

the Roosevelt-Kon^e meeting should not be held, or if it should be

long delayed, the Konoye Cabinet might fall. He had first learned

of the proposed “leaders conference” at a meeting with Foreign

Minister Toyoda on August 18 (Japan time.) During the Foreign

Minister’s lengthy remarks concerning the proposed meeting. Am-

bassador Grew had commented on Japan’s progressive southward

advance and the fact that, in spite of all peaceful assurances, the

United States Government in the light of the steps Japan had taken

“could only be guided by facts and actions and not words.” Not-

withstanding the doubts reflected in these statements, at the con-

clusion of the Foreign Minister’s reniarks Ambassador Grew had said

“that in the interests of peace, (he) would give the proposal (for a

meeting) his own personal support” (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 559-564).

Ambassador Grew reported the Foreign Minister’s remarks to Sec-

retary Hull the following day in a message which included the follow-

ing, as paraphrased in the State Department;

that naturally he is not aware of the reaction President Roosevelt will have to

the proposal made today orally by the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The Ambassador urges, however, with all the force at his command, for the sake

of avoiding the obviously growing possibility of an utterly futile war between

Japan and the United States, that this Japanese proposal not be turned aside

without very prayerful consideration. Not only is the proposal unprecedented in

Japanese history, but it is an indication that Japanese intransigence is not crys-

tallized completely owing to the fact that the proposal has the approval of the

Emperor and the highest authorities in the land. The good which may flow

from a meeting between Prince Konoye and President Roosevelt is incalculable.

The opportunity is here presented, the Ambassador ventures to believe, for an

act of the highest statesmanship, such as the recent meeting of President Roosevelt

with Prime Minister Churchill at sea, with the pmssible overcoming thereby of

Apparently insurmountable obstacles to peace hereafter in the Pacific (ex. 29,

vol. II, p. 565). ' •

A month later, in a personal lettm\* dated September 22 (Japan, time)

to President Roosevelt, which apparently did not, however, reach

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Washington iintil after the fall of the Konoye Cabinet, he referred to

his conversations with Premier Konoye ^-who,^’ he said —

in the face of bitter antagonism from extremist and pro- Axis elements in the coun-

try is courageously working for an improvement in Japan's relations with the

United States. He bears the heavy responsibility for having allowed our relations

to come to such a pass and he no doubt now sees the handwriting on the wall and

realizes that Japan has nothing to hope for from the Tripartite Pact and must

shift her orientation of policy if she is to avoid disaster; but whatever the incentive

that has led to his present efforts, I am convinced that he now means business

and will go as far as is possible, without incurring open rebellion in Japan, to reach

a reasonable understanding with us. In spite of all the evidence of Japan's bad

faith in times past in failing to live up to her commitments, X believe that there is

a better chance of the present Government implementing whatever commitments

it may now undertake than has been the case in recent years. It seems to me

highly unlikely that this chance will come again or that any Japanese statesman

other than Prince Konoye could succeed in controlling the military extremists in

carrying through a policy which they, in their ignorance of international affairs

and economic laws, resent and oppose. The alternative to reaching a settlement

now would be the greatly increased probability of war ♦ \* ♦ j therefore

most earnestly hope that we can come to terms, even if we must take on trust, at

least to some degree, the continued good faith and ability of the present Govern-

ment fully to implement those terms." (Ex. 178.)

A week later, on September 29 (Japan time), following his meeting

with Foreign Minister Toyoda on Septenjber 27 referred to above,

Ambassador Grew cabled a long report to Secretary Hull, in which

‘‘in all deference to the much broader field of view of President

Roosevelt and Secretary Hull and in full awareness that the Ambas-

sador's approach to the matter is limited to the viewpoint of the

American Embassy in Japan, he stated at length his appraisal of the

existing situation (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 645-650). The most significant

part 01 this report was the following, as paraphrased in the State

Department:

8. Should the United States expect or await agreement by the Japanese Govern-

ment, in the present preliminary conversations, to clear-cut commitments which

will satisfy the United States Government both as to principle and as to concrete

detail, almost certainly the conversations will drag along indefinitely and un-

productively until the Konoye Cabinet and its supporting elements desiring

rapprochement with the United States will come to the conclusion that the

outlook for an agreement is hopeless and that the United States Government is

only playing for time. If the abnormal sensitiveness of Japan and the abnormal

effects of loss of face are considered, in such a situation Japanese reaction may and

probably will be serious. This will result in the Konoye Government's being

discredited and in a revulsion of anti-American feeling, and this may and probably

will lead to unbridled acts. The eventual cost of these will not be reckoned, and

their nature is likely to inflame Americans, while reprisal and counter-reprisal

measures will bring about a situation in which it will be difficult to avoid war.

The logical outcome of this will be the downfall of the Konoye Cabinet and the forma-

tion of a military dictatorship which will lack either the disposition or the temperament

to avoid colliding head-on with the United States, There is a question that such a

situation may prove to be more serious even than the failure to produce an

entirely satisfactory agreement through the proposed meeting between President

Roosevelt and Prince Konoye, should it take place as planned (ex. 29, vol. II^

pp. 648-649).

In connection with Ambassador Grew^s reference to the “viewpoint

of the American Embassy in Japan, in his testimony before the

Committee he said :

I may say here that we in our Embassy in Tokyo did not have access to any

of the secret documents or intercepted telegrams. We didn't even know that

they existed (tr. 1481).

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And again:

I just want to say once more everything I have said today represents the point

of view of one spot, our Embassy in Tokyo, and we were deprived of a great

deal of the information which was available to the President and Mr. Hull. We

had none of the secret intercepts or telegrams, we had none of the documents

that have come into the State Department from time to time, documents of a

secret nature, so of course the President and Mr. Hull saw the picture with a

great deal more information than we had available to us (tr. 1903-1904).

Japan Determines Its Minimum Demands and Its Maximum

Concessions in the Negotiations With the United States

{September 6, 1941)

It is now known that in the meantime, in Tokyo, far-reaching deci-

sions had been made. The “Policy of the Imperial Government”

which was decided upon at the Imperial Conference on July 2 (Japan

time) had provided that in carrying out a southward advance the

Government would not be deterred “by the possibility of being in-

volved in a war with England and America.” It had also been

decided at that conference that in carrying out Japan’s preparations

for war with Russia and in the use of Japan’s military strength against

Russia in case the German-Soviet war “should develop to our ad-

vantage,”

all plans, especially the use of armed forces, will be carried out in such a way as

to place no serious obstacles in the path of our basic military preparations for a

war with England and America (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, pp. 70-71).

When the Japanese advance into southern French Indochina during

the latter part of July had brought about the termination of the

conversations between Secretary Hull and Ambassador Nomura and

the American freezing order. Premier Konoye had come forward

early in August with his proposal for a “leaders conference” between

President Roosevelt and himself. While this proposal had received

the support of the Japanese Navy, it had been supported by the

Japanese Army only provided the Premier intended

to carry out a war against America if the President of the United States still fails

to comprehend the true intentions of the Empire (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 31).

As tension increased in Tokyo, the Japanese Army General Staff began

advocating the immediate breaking off of negotiations with the United

States and the opening of Japanese-American hostilities, and Premier

Konoye discussed this question at innumerable conferences with the

Army and Navy Ministers during the latter part of August (ex. 173,

Konoye Memoirs, p. 39-40).

It is now known that durmg those conferences there were developed

“Plans for the Prosecution of the Policy of the Imperial Government”

which set forth the manner in which the Government would proceed

'in carrying out the plans “for the southern territories” decided upon

at the Imperial Conference on July 2 (Japan time). Premier Konoye

submitted these new “Plans” to the Emperor informally on September

5 (Japan time) in the form of an agenda for an Imperial Conference

the next day, as follows :

1. Determined not to be deterred by the possibility of being involved in a war

with America (and England and Holland), in order to secure our national exist-

ence, we will proceed with war preparations so that they be completed approximately

toward the end of October.

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2. At the same time, we mil endeavor bp every possible diplomatic means to have

our demands agreed to by America and England. Japan’s minimum demands in

these negotiations with America (and England), together with the Empire’s

maximum concessions are embodied in the attached document.

3. If by the early part of October there is no reasonable hope of having our demands

agreed to in the diplomatic negotiations mentioned above, we will immediately make

up our minds to get ready for war against America (and England and Holland) .

Policies with reference to countries other than those in the southern territories

will be carried out in harmony with the plans already laid. Special effort will

be made to prevent America and Soviet Russia from forming a united front

against Japan (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 77).

According to Premier Konoye, on examining the “Plans”, Emperor

Hirohito was impressed by the fact that the document seemed “to

give precedence to war over diplomatic activities.” The Premier

explained that the order of business in the agenda did not indicate

any differences in degree of importance. The Emperor then sum-

moned the Chiefs of the Army and Navy General Staffs. When they

came, he questioned them sharply concerning the probable length of

hostilities m the event of a Japanese-American conflict, and then asked

whether it was not true that Doth of them “were for giving precedence

to diplomacy.” Both answered in the affirmative (ex. 173, Konoye

Memoirs, pp. 40-41).

At the Imperial Conference the next day, September 6 (Japan time)

the “Plans” were decided upon and approved (ex. 173, Konoye

Memoirs, p. 40) . However, at the Conference first the President of the

Privy Council and then Emperor Hirohito asked for a clarification of the •

views of the Government as to whether the emphasis was not being

placed by the Government upon war rather than diplomacy. When

none of the Supreme Command replied, and only the Navy Minister

representing the Government, the Emperor is reported to have

rebuked the Supreme Command by indicating that he was striving

for international peace. After this the Chief of the Navy General

Staff assured the Emperor that the Chiefs of the Supreme Command

were conscious of the importance of diplomacy, and “advocated a

resort to armed force only when there seemed no other way out.”

According to Premier Konoye, the Conference adjourned “in an

atmosphere of unprecedented tenseness” (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs,

P-41)-

Japan’s “minimum demands” in the negotiations . with America

and England, as approved at the Imperial Conference on September 6

(Japan time), were as follows, accordmg to Premier Konoye’s memoirs :

1. America and England would be required to agree not to

intervene in, or obstruct, the settlement by Japan of the “China

Incident”, to close the Burma Road, and to cease all aid of any

kind to (Dhina.

2. America and England would be required to agree to take no

action in the Far East which offered a threat to the Japanese

Empire, and not to establish military bases in Thailand, the

Netherlands East Indies, China, or Far Eastern Soviet Russia or

increase their existing Far Eastern military forces over their

present strength. In this connection Japan would not consider

any demands “for the liquidation of Japan’s special relations with

French Indo-China.”

3. America and England would be required to agree to cooper-

ate with Japan in her attempt to obtain needed raw materials;

to restore trade relations with Japan and “furnish her with the

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I (T raw materials she needs” from British and American territories iu

the Southwest Pacific; and to assist Japan in establishing close

IHIP economic relations with Thai and the Netherlands East Indies

(ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, appendix V, pp. 77-78).

The “maximum concessions” Japan was prepared to make in return

for agreement to her “minimum demands” were as follows;

1. Japan would not use French Indochina as a base for opera-

tions against any neighboring countries “with the exception of

China.”

2. Japan would be prepared to withdraw her troops from

French Indochina “as soon as a just peace is established in the

Far East.”

3. Japan would be prepared to guarantee the neutrality of the

Philippine Islands (ex. 173, Konoye Memoire, appendix V, p. 78).

In other words, in an effort to take all possible advantage of the

world situation, the Japanese Government determined at the Imperial

Conference on September 6 (Japan time) that the least Japan would

accept from America and England in return for the withdrawal of her

troops from French Indochina would be the agreement of America

and England to cease all aid to China, to accept a military and naval

status in the Far East inferior to Japan, Rnd to furnish all possible

material aid to Japan. Furthermore, Japan did not intend to per-

form her part of the “bargain” until after “a just peace” had been

established in the Far East. From the Japanese standpoint, this

latter qualification meant after the settlement of the “China Inci-

dent” by Japan on her own terms. The substance of these “mini-

mum demands” was contained in the ultimatum which the Japanese

Government later delivered to the United States on November 20

(Washington time).

The evening of the same day, September 6 (Japan time). Premier

Konoye, with the knowledge and approval of the Japanese Ministers

of War, Navy, and Foreign Affairs met with Ambassador Grew at a

private house under conditions of extraordinary secrecy. In his

notes of the meeting. Ambassador Grew wrote that the Premier had

requested that his statements be transmitted personally to President

Roosevelt in the belief that they might amplify and clarify the ap-

proach which he haS made through Ambassador Nomura. Ambas-

sador Grew noted that the Premier and, consequently, the Govern-

ment of Japan, conclusively and wholeheartedly agreed with the

four principles put forward by Secretary Hull as a basis for the

rehabilitation of Japanese-American relations.^ In his memoirs, how-

ever, Prince Konoye stated that when at this meeting Ambassador

Grew asked for his views regarding Secretary Hull’s mur principles

he said “that they were splendid as principles but when it came down

to actual application a variety of problems arose” and that it was in

order to solve those very problems that he deemed it necessary to

hold the meeting with President Roosevelt (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs,

p. 42). Ambassador Grew noted that Premier Konoye had strongly

urged that no better opportunity for the improvement of Japanese-

American relations would be presented, and that the Premier had

1 In a memorandum dated October 7 (Japan time) recording a conference which he had on that date with

the Japanese Foreign Minister, Ambassador Grew noted that the Forei^ Minister told him that Ambas-

sador Nomura had been instructed to inform Secretary Hull that the statement in the United States memo-

randum of October 2 (Washington time) {see infra) that Premier Konoye “fully subscribed” to the four

principles should be modified to indicate that the Premier subscribed \*\*in principle” (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 664).

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said that he had the full support of the responsible chiefs of the Army

and Navy, who were already choosing their delegates to the proposed

conference. Premier Konoye had said, he noted, that he could con-

trol any opposition from within the Government, and that he was

determined to spare no effort, despite all elements and factors oppos-

ing him to crown his present endeavors with success. The Ambassa-

dor wrote that dming the conversation he had outlined in general

terms —

the bitter lessons of the past to our Government as the result of the failure of the

Japanese Government to honor the promises given to me by former Japanese

Ministers for Foreign Afifairs apparently in all sincerety —

and had stated that, as the result —

the Government of the United States had at long last concluded that it must

place its reliance on actions and facts and not on Japanese promises or assurances.

He noted that Premier Konoye had expressed the earnest hope that in

view of the present internal situation in Japan the projected meeting

with the President could be arranged “with the least possible delay”

(ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 604-606).

The United States Asks Japan to Clarify Its New Proposals

{October 2, 1941)

Thus, as September ended the Japanese Government, on the one

hand, was vigorously asserting the urgent and pressing need to go

forward with the proposed Roosevelt-Konoye meeting at the earliest

possible moment. It is now known that this desire for haste reflected

the decision of the Imperial Conference on September 6 (Japan time)

that —

If by the early part of October there is no reasonable hope of having our demands

agreed to in the diplomatic negotiations \* \* \*, we will immediately make up

our minds to get ready for war against America (and England and Holland) (ex

173, Konoye Memoirs, p, 77).

On the other hand, the United States Government, knowing nothing

of these plans but nonetheless skeptical of Japan’s peaceful intentions,

was insisting that before the proposed Roosevelt-Konoye meeting

should take place the two Governments should preliminarily agree

upon the fundamental matters under consideration when the conversa-

tions were broken off in July after the Japanese military occupation of

southern French Indochina. This latter position had been taken in

the reply to Premier Konoye which President Roosevelt handed to

Ambassador Nomura on September 3, and had been repeated many

times by Secretary Hull in his subsequent conversations with the

Ambassador.

The Committee has obtained from the files of President Roosevelt

a memorandum in Secretary Hull’s handwdting, on White House

stationery, apparently written by the Secretary for the President

before the latter left Washington for Hyde Park about September 25

(Washington time) (ex. 179; ex. 1, p. 40). This memorandum sum-

marized Secretary Hull’s views at the time:

My suggestion on Jap situation — ^for you to read later.

C. H.

When the Jap Prime Minister requested a meeting with you, he indicated a

fairly basic program in generalities, but left open such questions as getting troops

out of China, Tripartite Pact, nondiscrimination in trade in Pacific.

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We indicated desire for meeting, but suggested first an agreement in principle

on the vital questions left open, so as to insure the success of the conference.

Soon thereafter, the Japs narrowed their position on these basic questions, and

now continue to urge the meeting at Juneau.

My suggestion is to recite their more liberal attitude when they first sought

the meeting with you, with their much narrowed position now, and earnestly

ask if they cannot go back to their original liberal attitude so we can start dis-

cussions again on agreement in principle before the meeting, and reemphasizing

your desire for a meeting (ex. 179). [Italics in original.]

President Roosevelt sent his comments to Secretary Hull from Hyde

Park in the following memorandum dated September 28 (Washington

time) :

Memorandum for the Secretary of State

I wholly agree with your penciled note — to recite the more liberal original

attitude of the Japanese when they first sought the meeting, point out their much

narrowed position now, earnestly ask if they cannot go back to their original

attitude, start discussions again on agreement in principle, and reemphasize my

hope for a meeting.

F. D. R.

(ex. 179.)

On October 2 (Washington time), Secretary Hull handed to Am-

bassador Nomura the United States’ reply to the Japanese Govern-

ment’s proposals of September 6 and its subsequent statements of

September 23 (Annex C) and September 27 (Annex D). This reply

briefly reviewed the course of the conversations thus far, pointing

out that developments from early August up to September 6 had

seemed to justify the United States Government in concluding that

the Japanese Government might be expected to adhere to and to

give practic^fl application to a broad progressive program covering

the entire Pacific area. The reply continued:

It was therefore a source of disappointment to the Government of the United

States that the proposals of the Japanese Government presented by the Japanese

Ambassador on September 6, 1941, which the Japanese Government apparently

intended should constitute a concrete basis for discussions, appeared to disclose

divergence in the concepts of the two Governments. That is to say, those pro-

posals and the subsequent explanatory statements made in regard thereto serve,

in the opinion of this Government, to narrow and restrict not only the application

of the principles upon which our informal conversations already referred to had

been based but also the various assurances given by the Japanese Government

of its desire to move along with the United States in putting into operation a

broad program looking to the establishment and maintenance of peace and

stability in the entire Pacific area (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 658-659).

It was then noted that the Japanese assurances of peaceful intent

continued to be qufdified by phrases the need for which was not

readily apparent; that in the economic sphere the new proposals were

restricted to the coimtries of the Southwest Pacific area, rather than

the entire Pacific area, as before; and that a clear-cut manifestation

of Japan’s intention in regard to the withdrawal of Japanese troops

from China and French Indochina would be most helpful in making

known Japan’s peaceful intentions, as would additional clarification

of the Japanese Government’s position with respect to the European

war. The reply continued by stating that from what the Japanese

Government had so far indicated in regard to its purposes, the United

States Government had derived the impression that Japan had in

mind a program by which the liberal and progressive principles ad-

hered to by the United States would be circumscribed in their apphca-

tion by qualifications and exceptions. The Japanese Government was

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then asked whether, under such circumstances, it believed the pro-

posed Roosevelt-Konoye meeting would be likely to contribute to

the high purposes “which we have mutually had in mind.” The

reply concluded by stating that it was the belief of the United States

Government that renewed consideration of tke fundamental prin-

ciples which it had long advocated would aid in reaching a meeting

of minds in regard to the essential questions on which agreement was

sought and would thus lay a firm foimdation for the proposed meeting,

and that it was the President’s earnest hope that a discussion of the

fundamental questions might be so developed that the meeting could

be held (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 656-661). After reading the reply. Ambas-

sador Nomura conunented that he thought his Government would be

disappointed because of its very earnest desire to hold the meeting,

but that in any case he would transmit it to his Government, which

he did the same day (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 655; ex. 1, p. 50). He added

that he was convinced that the Japanese Government was entirely

sincere in this matter and had no ulterior purpose. He said, however,

that in view of the difficxilties of the internal situation in Japan, he

did not think his Government could go any further at this time (ex. 29,

vol. II, p. 655).

In a memorandum bearing the same date, October 2 (Washington

time), which was distributed to President Roosevelt and Secretary

Hull in addition to Secretary Stimson, General Marshall and other

high oflScera in the War Department, Colonel Hayes A. Kronor,

Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, reached the following conclusions;

10. This Division is of the opinion that neither a conference of leaders nor

economic concessions at this point would be of any material advantage to the

United States unless a definite commitment to withdraw from the Axis were ob-

tained prior to the conference. \* ♦ ♦

11. Since it is highly improbable that this condition can be met by the Japanese

Government at the present time our course lies straight before us. This Division

still believes that forceful diplomacy vis-a-vis Japan, including the application of

ever increasing military and economic pressure on our part, offers the best chance

of gaining time, the best possibility of preventing the spread of hostilities in the

Pacific Area, and the best hope of the eventual disruption of the Tripartite Pact.

The exercise of increasingly strong “power diplomacy” by the United States is

still clearly indicated (ex. 33).

The following undated note, in Secretary Stimson’s handwriting,

appears at the end of his copy of the above memorandum:

Quite independently I have reached similar conclusions and hold them strongly.

I believe however that during the next three months while we are rearming the

Philippines great care must be exercised to avoid an explosion by the Japanese

Army. Put concretely this means, that while I approve of stringing out negotia-

tions during that period, they should not be allowed to ripen into a personal con-

ference between the President and P. M.' I greatly fear that such a conference

if actually held would produce concessions which would be highly dangerous to

our vitally important relations with China (ex. 33- A) .

Admiral Stark testified before the Committee that he neither opposed

or approved the proposal for a meeting between President Roosevelt

and Premier Konoye. He continued:

I do recall when it was discussed my own personal opinion was that the President

and Mr. Hull were right in not just going out to discuss something with the Prime

Minister without some preliminary agreement regarding the agenda and some-

thing which might be accomplished (tr. 6308).

I Prime Minister Konoye.

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In his testimony before the Committee, Secretary Hull set forth at

length the considerations which were taken into account in determin-

ing the position to be taken by the United States Government regard-

ing the proposed “leaders conference" (tr. 1120-1124).

The next day, October 3 (Washington time), after he had forwarded

the United States reply to Tokyo, Ambassador Nomura cabled

Foreign Minister Toyoda a long report on the situation in the United

States as he saw it. His report began by stating —

although there is a feeling that the Japanese-U. S. talks have finally reached a

deadlock, we do not believe that it should be considered as an absolutely hopeless

situation. We are of the impression that the United States worded their memo-

randum in such a way as to permit a ray of hope to penetrate through (ex. 1,

p. 51-52).

He expressed the view that an “understanding” between Japan and

the United States hinged on one point, the problem of the evacuation

of the Japanese troops from China (ex. 1, p. 53).

During the next 2 weeks the Japanese Foreign Office made repeated

efforts both in Washington and in Tokyo to have the United States

Government state what further assurances it desired from the Jap-

anese Government, emphasizing that the position of Premier Konpye

was daily growing more difficult. Also during this period. Ambas-

sador Nomura appears to have incurred the displeasure of Foreign

Minister Toyoda. In a message to the Foreign Minister on October 8

(Washington time), the Ambassador indicated that he agreed with

many of Secretary Hull’s criticisms of the Japanese proposals of

Septeinber 6, which the Foreign Office had prepared. He expressed

the opinion that —

In our proposal of the 6th and in the explanation thereof, not only did we limit

them and narrow what we had discussed in our informal conversations thus far,

but we also curtailed extremely the guarantees we offered concerning the afore-

mentioned principles. We equivocated concerning guarantees that we would

not engage in armed aggression. We limited the area to which the principle of

nondiscriminatory treatment would apply in the Pacific, and on the excuse that

China was geographically near to us, we limited the very principle itself. On the

?uestion of stationing and evacuating troops in and from China (including French

ndo-China), the Americans are making some demands which we in principle have

objections to. Moreover, they figure that they must be much surer of our atti-

tude toward the three-power pact. These points you probably already know

(ex. 1, p. 59).

As the result of repeated instructions from the Foreign Minister to

obtain from Secretary Hull an expression of his views regarding the

three major points of difference between the two Governments, i. e.,

which had developed in the earlier conversations, namely, (1) the with-

drawal of troops from China, (2) Jean’s obligations under the Tri-

partite Pact, and (3) nondiscrimination in international trade. Ambas-

sador Nomura called on Secretary Hull on October 9 (Washington

time) (vol. II, pp. 670-672). The Ambassador’s report of this naeet-

ing (ex. 1, p. 61) was plainly unsatisfacto^ to Foreign Minister

Toyoda, for on October 10 (Japan time) the Foreign Minister cabled

Ambassador Nomura that he was well aware of the Ambassador’s

opinions and that what he wanted was “the opinions of the American

officials and none other.” Saying that “slowly but surely the ques-

tion of these negotiations has reached the decisive stage,” and that he

was doing his utmost “to bring about a decision on them and the

situation does not permit of this senseless procrastination,” he told

Ambassador Nomura:

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You do not tell me whether or not we have a chance to proceed with these

parleys. You do not tell me how Hull answers. You do not tell me anything else

I need to know for my future consideration. You must wire me in detail and

immediately the minutes of these conversations, what they say and the prospect

for negotiations. Hereafter, when you interview Hull or the President of the

United States, please take Wakasugi or Iguchi with you and please send me without

delay the complete minutes of what transpires (ex. 1, p. 63).

On the same afternoon, October 10 (Japan time), Foreign Minister

Toyoda requested Ambassador Grew to call on him, and during their

conversation told Ambassador Grew that Ambassador Nomura had

been ‘^imable to provide the information^' he had asked for and that —

a week of very valuable time had been wasted in an endeavor to elicit through

the Japanese Ambassador information which, had it been received, would have

measurably accelerated the present conversations (ex. 30, p. 454).

The Foreim Minister told Ambassador Grew that in order to prevent

further delav he was requesting the Ambassador to ask his Govern-

ment to reply to the following question:

The Government of Japan has submitted to the Government of the United

States with reference to certain questions proposals which are apparently not

satisfactory to the Government of the United States. Will the American Govern-

ment now set forth to the Japanese Government for its consideration the under-

takings to be assumed by the Japanese Government which would be satisfactory

to the American Government (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 678)?

He continued by saying that since —

he had the impression that the Japanese Ambassador in Washington was appar-

ently very fatigued, serious consideration was being given to the question of send-

ing to W'ashington a diplomat of wide experience to assist the Ambassador in

carrying on the present conversations. Admiral Toyoda said he had in mind a

high-ranking diplomatic official with the personal rank of Ambassador, but he

had not yet approached the official in question and was therefore uncertain as to

whether he would agree to undertake to accept the mission. It would be of great

assistance to the Minister to ascertain whether the Government of the United

States, in the event that it was decided to send the official in question to Wash-

ington, would be prepared to make available a reservation for him on the airplane

from Manila to San Francisco. Admiral Toyoda said that the official in question

would not be accredited to the Government of the United States but would be

temporarily and unofficially attached to the Japanese Embassy in Washington.

I told the Foreign Minister that I would transmit his inquiry to my Government.

In concluding the conversation, the Minister several times stressed to me, in

view of the importance of the time factor, the necessity\* of expediting the progress

of the conversations (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 679).

Ambassador Nomura replied to Foreign Minister Toy oda's message

of October 10 (Japan time) on the same date (Washington time):

What they want is the maintenance of peace in the Pacific, and they claim that

our policy is semipacific and semiaggressive. They say that our proposal of

September 6 diverged greatly from preceding statements and that it will be out

of the question to agree on any preparatory talks on the basis of such a proposal.

In addition to the three matters mentioned in your message, it seems that there

are many other objections. I have repeatedly\* asked them to clarify what I do

not understand, but they won’t answer. At any rate, however, I feel safe at

least in saying that they are demanding that we compromise in accordance with

the lines laid down in their memorandum of October 2. I am sure that there is not

the slightest chance on earth of them featuring a conference of leaders so long as we do

not make that compromise.

In other words, they are not budging an inch from the attitude they have

always taken; however, they act as if they were readv to consider at anv time any

plan of ours which would meet the specifications of their answer of the 2nd (ex. 1,

p. 63).

On October 13 (Japan time) Foreign Minister Toyoda cabled in-

structions to the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy in Washington,

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Mr. Wakasugi, who had just returned to Washington after 2 weeks

in Japan, to call upon Under Secretary Welles. In his message, the

Foreign Minister said that he was particularly anxious to be advised

as soon as possible as to whether he could assume that the United

States had no particular disagreements other than the three major

points and whether the United States would submit a coimterproposal

to the Japanese proposals of September 27. He said:

The situation at home is fast approaching a crisis, and it is becoming abso-

lutely essential that the two leaders meet if any adjustment of Japanese-U. S.

relations is to be accomplished (ex. 1, p. 64).

Counselor Wakasugi talked with Under Secretary Welles on the

afternoon of October 13 (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 68()-686). Admiral

Nomura sent two reports of that meeting to Tokyo, on the same day

(ex. 1, pp. 66-68). His first report stated that so far as Mr. Welles

knew there were no obstacles to the materialization of the leaders’

conference other than the three major points, though there might be

one or two others, and that the United States had no intention of sub-

mitting any counterproposal other than those of June 21 and October

2. His second report was a more detailed description of the Welles-

Wakasugi meeting. In reply, the Foreign Minister said that these

reports had “clarified many points” and “that there is no need for us

to make any further move imtil the other side decides that it is im-

possible to clarify the concrete proposal any further” (ex. 1, pp.

69-70).

In Tokyo, the Japanese Government also made frequent over-

tures to the officials at the American Embassy. Thus, early on Octo-

ber 7 (Japan time), the Premier’s private secretary, Mr. Ushiba,

called on Counselor Dooman (ex. 29, vol II, pp. 662-663) and com-

plained that the failure of the preliminary conversations to make any

progress had made the Premier’s position difficult. He concluded

his remarks with tl^e comment that —

the only thing left for the Japanese Government was to ask the American Govern-

ment to give specifications with regard to the character of the undertakings which

Japan was desired to give, and that if a clear-cut reply was not forthcoming to

bring the conversations to a close (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 663).

This meeting appelRrs to have been preliminary to a meeting the

same morning between Ambassador Grew and the Foreign Minister,

at the latter’s request. At that meeting, as on the occasion of subse-

quent calls by Mr. Terasaki on Counselor Dooman and Ambassador

Grew on October 8 and 9, the Japanese endeavored to obtain comments

on the American reply of October 2. It was again indicated that the

Japanese Government wished to know more definitely what under-

takings the United States Government wanted it to give. These

efforts culminated in Foreign Minister Toyoda’s request of Ambassador

Grew on October 10 that he submit that question to Secretary Hull.

On that occasion Ambassador Grew commented at length on the

opinion he had conveyed the day before to the Foreign Minister, that

the reports he had received of plans to dispatch additional Japanese

troops to Indochina in substantial numbers “could not but seriously

and adversely affect these conversations (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 679).

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Germany Demands That Japan Warn the United’ States That

War Between Germany and Italy and the United States

Would Lead to War Between Japan and the United States

Pursuant to the Tripartite Pact

{October 19 41 )

The intercepted Japanese messages show that during the latter

part of September and the early part of October both the German

and Itahan Ambassadors sought to obtain from Foreign Minister

Toyoda confidential information regarding the Japanese- American

conversations. In contrast with the policy followed by his predecessor,

Foreim Minister Matsuoka, from whom the Axis partners had ob-

tained such information, Foreign Minister Toyoda declined to give

them any (ex. 1, p. 71).

Failing in this, after the German attacks on American merchant

vessels and the movement in the United States for revision of the

Neutrality Act, the Germans took a stronger line. This became

known to the United States not only from intercepted messages but

also through statements made by the Japanese Vice Minister for

Foreign Affairs, Mr. Amau, to Ambassador Grew in Tokyo on October

15 (Japan time). Mr. Amau told Ambassador Grew —

•that the German Government is insistently pressing for the issuance of a state-

ment by the Japanese Government in confirmation of the interpretation given

to the Tripartite Pact by Mr. Matsuoka, to the effect that Japan will decl&re

war on the United States in the event of war occurring between Germany and

the United States. As a reply, although it has not yet been decided when or

whether such reply will be rendered to the German Government, the Japanese

Government is considering a formula of a noncommittal nature to the effect that

maintenance of peace in the Pacific is envisaged in the Tripartite Pact and that

the attention of the American Government has been sought for its earnest con-

sideration of Japan^s obligations under the Pact (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 686) .

The following day, however. Foreign Minister Toyoda cabled

Ambassador Nomura that early in October—

the German authorities demanded that the Japanese Government submit to the

American Government a message to the effect that the Japanese Government

observes that if the ROOSEVELT Administration continues to attack the Axis

Powers increasingly, a belligerent situation would inevitably arise between Ger-

many and Italy, on the one hand, and the United States, on the other, and this

would provide the reasons for the convocation of the duties envisioned in the

Three rower agreement and might lead Japan to join immediately the war in

opposition to the United States. We have not as yet submitted this message

because, in view of the Japanese- American negotiations, we found it necessary

to consider carefully the proper timing as well as wording of the message. The

German authorities have been repeatedly making the same request, and there

:are reasons which do not permit this matter to be postponed any longer. While

Japan, on the one hand, finds it necessa^ to do something in the way of carrying

•out the duties placed upon her by the Three Power Alliance she h^ concluded

with Germany, on the other hand, she is desirous of making a success of the

Japanese- American negotiations. Under the circumstances, we can do no other

than to warn the United States at an appropriate moment in such words as are

given in my separate telegram #672 and as would not affect the Japanese- American

negotiations in one way or another. This message is a secret between me and

you (ex. 1, p. 71).

The proposed ‘^warning’’ to the United States sent to Ambassador

Nomura in the Foreign Minister's separate telegram #672 was as

follows:

The Imperial Japanese Government has repeatedly affirmed to the American

Government that the aim of the Tripartite Pact is to contribute toward the

prevention of a further extension of tne European war. Should, however, the

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recent tension in the German-American relations suffer aggravation, there would

arise a distinct danger of a war between the two powers, a state of affairs over

which Japan, as a signatory to the Tripartite Pact, naturally cannot help enter-

tain a deep concern. Accordingly, in its sincere desire that not only the German-

American relations will cease further deterioration but the prevailing tension will

also be alleviated as quickly as possible, the Japanese Government is now request-

ing the earnest consideration of the American Government (ex. 1, p. 71).

Foreign Minister Toyoda never had an opportunity to select the

“appropriate moment” for the delivery of this warning, because the

next day Premier Konoye and his entire Cabinet resigned en bloc.

The German Ambassador continued to press for action by Foreign

Minister Togo, Admii-al Toyoda’s successor, hut by November 11

(Japan time) when the Foreign Minister communicated with Ambas-

sador Nomura concerning it, far more vigorous measures were con-

templated by the Japanese. Foreign Minister Togo’s reply erred on

the side of understatement:

1 explained (to the German Ambassador) that there is a good chance that it

would be more effective, under the present circumstances, for us to present a

determined attitude rather than to merely make representations to the United

States. It is exceedingly doubtful, I pointed out, whether a mere representation

would bear any fruit (ex. 1, p. 117).

The Konoye Cabinet Falls, and Ambassador Nomura Asks

Permission to Return to Japan

{October 16, 1941; October 18-November 6, 1941)

The attitude of the Japanese representatives in the conversations

in W ashington and in Tokyo during the latter part of September and

the early part of October reflected developments within the Japanese

Government during that period. In turn, the course of those develop-

ments was directly affected by the far-reaching decisions which had

been made at the Imperial Conference on September 6 (Japan time).

As has been seen, it is now known that at that conference it had been

decided that if “by the early pai-t of October” there should be “no

reasonable hope” of having the Japanese “demands” agreed to in the

diplomatic negotiations —

we will immediately make up our minds to get ready for war against America

(and England and Holland) (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs,' p. 77).

This decision, according to Premier Konoye, had established a

(dead line “beyond which negotiations could not proceed.” The

Japanese Government “came more and more to feel that we were

approaching a show-down” (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 43).

As Ambassador Nomura had told Secretary Hull, with the pre-

sentation of its new proposals of September 6, its proposals for basic

peace terms with China on September 23, and its revision of the

American proposals of June 21 which had been delivered to Secre-

tary Hull on September 27, the Japanese Government took the posi-

tion that there was nothing more that it desired to say and that the

next move was up to the United States. In his memoirs. Premier

Konoye criticizes the action of the Japanese Foreign Office in sub-

mitting three proposals during September without deciding that it

would proceed with the September 27 plan “alone, in complete dis-

regard of the plans of the past” (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 46).

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This action, which left the Japanese intentions confu^d, was largely

responsible for the fact that the United States Government, in its

reply of October 2 (Washington time), had asked for a further clarifi-

cation of the Japanese intentions.

It is now known that before the United States’ reply of October 2

was received in Tokyo and as a result of the fact that the dead

line set on September 6 was approaching at a faster rate than

the conversations were progressing, Premier Konoye began frequent

conferences with members of his Cabinet. He conferred on Septem-

ber 24 and 25 (Japan time) with the War Minister, Navy Minister,

Foreign Minister, and President of the Navy Planning Board. From

September 27 to October 1 (Japan time) he had discussions with the

Navy Minister “concerning the atmosphere in his circle.” On Oc-

tober 4 (Japan time), after receipt of the United States reply of

October 2, Premier Konoye had an audience with Emperor Hiromto,

following which there was a Joint Conference attended by the chiefs

of the Japanese High Command. On the evening of October 5 (Japan

time) he conferred with General Tojo, the War Minister, to whom

he expressed the opinion “that he would continue negotiations (with

the United States) to the very end” (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 49).

On the evening of October 7 (Japan time). General Tojo called on

Premier Konoye and declared that the Army would find it difficult

to submit to the withdrawal of its troops from China. In view of

this attitude, on October 8 (Japan time) Premier Konoye conferred

with the Navy Minister and the Foreign Minister concerning “methods

of avoiding a crisis.” He met twice with Foreign Minister Toyoda

on October 10 (Japan time), the day on which the Foreign Minister

asked Ambassador Grew to inquire from the United States Govern-

ment what additional assurances it desired the Japanese Government

to give. A Joint Conference was held on October 1 1 (Japan time)

(ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 49).

On Sunday, October 12 (Japan time), Premier Konoye called a

meeting attended by himself and the Ministers of War, Navy, and

Foreign Affairs, together with the President of the Planning Board,

which he described in his memoirs as “almost the last conference

relative to peace or war.” Before the meeting he had learned that the

Navy, although not desiring a rupture in the negotiations, and wishing

as much as possible to avoid war, nevertheless was unwilling to state

this publicly, and would therefore leave the question of peace or war

up to the Premier. At the meeting, according to Premier Konoye’s

memoirs, the Navy Minister stated:

We have now indeed come to the crossroads where we must determine either

upon peace or war. I should like to leave this decision entirely up to the Premier.

And, if we are to seek peace, we shall go all the way for peace. Thus, even if we

make a few concessions, we ought to proceed all the way with the policy of bring-

ing the negotiations to fruition. \* \* ♦ jf are to have war, we must

determine upon war here and now. Now is the time. We are now at the final

moment of decision. If we decide that we are not to have war, I should like to

have us proceed upon the policy that we will bring negotiations to fruition no

matter what happens (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 50).

In reply to this, Premier Konoye said:

If we were to say that we must determine on war or peace here, today, I my-

self would decide on continuing the negotiations (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs,

p. 60).

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General Tojo, the Minister of War, objected, saying:

This decision of the Premier’s is too hasty. Properly speaking, ought we not

to determine here whether or not there is any possibility of bringing the negotia-

tions to fruition? To carry on negotiations for which there is no possibility for frui-

tion, and in the end to let uip the time for fighting, would he a matter of the greatest

consequence (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 50).

General Tojo then asked Foreign Mister Toyoda whether he

thought there was any possibility of brin^g negotiations to fruition.

In answer to this question, the Fore^ Minister replied that the most

difficult problem w;as the question of the withdrawal of troops from

China. He continued:

if in this regard the Army says that it will not retreat one step from its former

assertions, then there is no hope in the negotiations. But if on this point the

Army states that it will be all right to make concessions, however small they may

be, then we cannot say that there is no hope of bringing the negotiations to

fruition (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 50).

General Tojo, however, would not yield, saying:

The problem of the stationing of troops, in itself means the life of the Army,

and we shall not be able to make any concessions at all (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs,

p. 50).

According to Premier Konoye, although the conference lasted 4

hours, no conclusion was arrived at before the meeting adjoiumed.

The following day, October 13 (Japan time). Premier Konoye reported

the situation to Emperor Hirohito and Marquis Kido, the liord Keeper

of the Privy Seal and a leader of the “senior statesmen.” The next

day the Premier met with General Tojo before the Cabinet meeting

and again asked his considered opinion concerning the problem of the

stationing of troops in China, saying that he had a very ^eat respon-

sibility for the “China Incident,” wmch was still imsettled, and that he

foimd it difficult to aCTee “to enter upon a greater war the future of

which I cannot at all foresee.” He then urged, according to his

memoirs, that Japan “ought to give in for a time, grant to the United

States the formality of withdrawing troops, and save ourselves from

the crisis of a Japanese- American war” (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs,

p. 51).

In response to this. General Tojo declared —

if at this time we yield to the United States, she will take steps that are more and

more high-handed, and will probably find no place to stop. The problem of

withdrawing troops is one, you say, of forgetting the honor and of seizing the

fruits, but, to this, I find it difiScult to agree from the point of view of maintaining

the fighting spirit of the Army (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 51).

Premier Konoye records that thus General Tojo did not move from

the position he had taken, and the talk ended at odds. Accordi^ to

his memoirs, at the Cabinet meeting which followed. General Tojo

at the outset “strongly and excitedly set forth the reasons why the

Japanese-American negotiations should no longer be continued.”

No further reference to the question of continuing the negotiations was

made at the Cabinet meeting, as none of the Cabinet ministers would

answer General Tojo (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 51.)

That evening General Tojo is reported to have sent a message to

Premier Konoye in which he said, in effect, that if the Navy’s de-

cision to entrust the question of peace or war to the Premier was due

to a desire on the part ol the Navy not to have a war, then the Im-

perial Conference on September 6 “will have been fundamentally

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overturned,” as the decisions reached at that conference would not

have taken into account such an attitude on the part of the Navy. He

then expressed the belief that the entire Cabinet should resign and

“declare insolvent everything that has happened up to now and recon-

sider our plans once more.” He said that it was very hard for him to

ask the Premier to resign but that, as matters had come to pass, he

could not help but do so, and begged the Premier to exert his efforts

toward having the Emperor designate Prince Higashikuni, the Chief of

the General Staff, as the next Premier, in the belief that only an im-

perial prince would have power to keep control of the. Army and the

Navy and to refashion a plan (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 52).

The next day, October 15 (Japan time). Premier Konoye was

received by Emperor Hirohito, to whom the Premier reported the

foregoing developments. The Emperor expressed doubts concern-

ing the desirability of naming Prince Higashikimi the next Premier,

saying, according to Premier Konoye:

In time of pteace it would be all right, but in a situation in which we fear that

there may be war, and when we also think further of the interests of the Im-

perial House, I question the advisability of a member of royalty standing forth

(ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 52).

That evening the Premier secretly discussed the situation with

Prince Higashikuni, who said he desired several days to think the

matter over. However, according to Premier Konoye’s memoirs,

the situation would not permit further delay, and the following

morning all of the Cabinet members submitted their resignations.

The next day the “senior statesmen” met in consultation regarding

the selection of the next Premier, but Prince Konoye did not attend

(ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, pp. 52-53). Instead, he submitted a long

letter explaining in detail the chain of events leading to the resigna-

tion of his Cabinet (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, appendix IX, pp.

87-91).

Several of the intercepted Japanese messages confirm Prince

Konoye’s emphasis upon the Army’s stand regarding the withdrawal

of Japanese troops from China as one of the main causes of the resig-

nation of the Konoye Cabinet. Thus, on October 15 (Washington

time), shortly after the Cabinet meetings in Tokyo at wliich General

To jo refused to make any concessions regarding the evacuation of

troops from China, Ambassador Nomina reported to the Forei^

Oflfice that the Japanese military attach^ at the Japanese Embassy in

Washington had been —

instructed by the Headquarters in Tokyo to advise us not to yield an inch in our

stand regarding the question of the evacuation of troops. They are apprehensive

that we have not emphasized enough our stand regarding it and urge us to lay

special stress on this point (ex. 1, p. 70).

On October 17 (Japan time), Foreign Minister Toyoda cabled

Ambassador Nomura that the Cabinet had resigned, saying:

The resignation was brought about by a split within the Cabinet. It is true

that one of the main items on which opinion differed was on the matter of station-

ing troops or evacuating them from China. However, regardless of the make-up

of the new Cabinet, negotiations with the United States shall be continued along

the lines already formulated. There shall be no changes in this respect.

Please, therefore, will you and your staff work in unison and a single purpose,

with even more effort, if possible, than before (ex. 1, p. 76).

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The Imperial Command to form a new Cabinet was given on October

17 (Japan time) to General Hideki Tojo, who not only became

Premier but also took the portfolios of the War and Home Ministries.

In addition to having been War Minister in the preceding Cabinet

of Premier Konoye, General Tojo was an Army officer on the active

list. The same day, Premier Konoye^s private secretaiy, Mr.

Ushiba, called on Counselor Dooman at the American Embassy in

Tokyo, and through him conveyed to Ambassador Grew from the

Premier

a very interesting explanation of the circumstances which had led to the fall of

the cabinet and the successful efforts of the Prime Minister to ensure the anoint-

ment of a successor who would continue the conversations with the United States.

The circumstances were extraordinarily dramatic and constitute what may in

future be regarded as one of the really big moments in Japanese history (ex. 30,

p. 458).

Mr. Ushiba also delivered to Ambassador Grew a letter from Prince

Konoye in which he stated that he felt certain —

that the Cabinet which is to succeed mine will exert its utmost in continuing to a

successful conclusion the conversations which we have been carrying on up till

today (ex. 30, p. 457).

The following week, a ‘‘rehable Japanese informant’' gave Ambassa-

dor Grew the following account of the events leading up the resigna-

tion of the Konoye Cabinet:

The informant called on me at his own request this evening. He told me that

just prior to the fall of the Konoye Cabinet a conference of the leading members of

the Privy Council and of the Japanese armed forces had been summoned by the

Emperor, who inquired if they were prepared to pursue a policy which would

guarantee that there would be no war with the United States. The representa-

tives of the Army and Navy who attended this conference did not reply to the

Emperor^s question, whereupon the latter, with a reference to the progressive

policy pursued by the Emperor Meiji, his grandfather, in an unprecedented action

ordered the armed forces to obey his wishes. The Emperor^s definite stand neces-

sitated the selection of a Prime Minister who would be in a position effectively

to control the Army, the ensuing resignation of Prince Konoye, and the appoint-

ment of General Tojo who, while remaining in the Army active list, is committed

to a policy of attempting to conclude successfully the current Japanese- American

conversations (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 697).

On October 16 (Washington time), in a conversation with Lord

Halifax, the British Ambassador in the United States, Ambassador

Nomura said:

The resignation of the Japanese Cabinet was due to internal differences between

on the one hand the Prime Minister and those who wished to reach agreement

with the United States by not insisting on the third point mentioned above (the

right to station troops in China), and on the other hand those who thought that

not to insist on this point would involve too great a loss of face.

But the Ambassador did not anticipate any sudden change of policy. The

Emperor was in favour of peace, and even if a general were made Prime Minister,

it was unlikely that the Emperor^s wishes would be disregarded.

The outburst of a Japanese Navy spokesman as reported in the United States

press today was of no impoHance, and might be disregarded.

Everybody in the Japanese Cabinet wanted understanding with the United

States, and the only difference was as to the price that should be paid for it

(ex. 158).

Two days later, on October 18 (Washington time), Ambassador

Nomura cabled his congratulations to the new Foreign Minister,

Shigenori Togo, at the same time expressing his fear that he would

not ‘^be able to accomplish much in the future” and asking the new

Foreign Minister’s approval of his returning to Japan ‘‘in the near

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future so that I may personally report the situation here” (ex. 1,

p. 79). He expressed similar views in a message (ex. 1, p. 80) to the

Japanese Navy Minister on October 20 (Washington time),, and in

a message to the new Foreign Minister 2 days later in which he said:

I am sure that I, too, should go out with the former cabinet. ♦ ♦ ♦ Nor

do I imagine that you all have any objection. I don’t want to be the bones of a

dead horse. I don’t want to continue this hypocritical existence, deceiving other

people. No, don’t think I am trying to flee from the field of battle, but as a

man of honor this is the only way that is open for me to tread. Please send me

your permission to return to Japan. Most humbly do I beseech your forgive-

ness if I have injured your dignity and I prostrate myself before you in the depth

of my rudeness (ex. 1, p. 81).

On October 23 (Japan time), Foreign Ministw Togo cabled Ambas-

sador Nomura that the outcome of the negotiations would “have a

great bearing upon the decision as to which road the Imperial Govern-

ment will pursue,” and expressed the hope that the Ambassador

would see fit “to sacrifice all of (his) personal wishes and remain at

(his) post” (ex. 1, p. 82). On November 4 (Japan time), the Foreim

Minister cabled Ambassador Nomura to “compose yourself and make

up your mind to do your best.” Finally, on November 5 (W ashington

time). Ambassador Nomura cabled the Foreign Minister that after

careful consideration “I have decided to continue to put forth my

best efforts, however feeble they may be” (ex. 1, p. 100).

The Tojo Cabinet Formulates Its “Absolutely Final Proposal”

{November 5, 1941)

As the result of the Cabinet crisis in Japan, the State Department

in Washington considered the dispatch of a personal message from

President Roosevelt to Emperor Hirohito u^ing Japan to join with

the United States to preserve peace in the Pacific area, but stating

that if Japan should start new military operations the • United

States “would have to seek, by taking any and all steps which it m^ht

deem necessary, to prevent any extension” of the war (ex. 20). Such

a message was not sent, however, pending clarification of the situation

in Japan and the policies of the new Japanese Government (ex. 20;

tr. 4494-4501).

Commencing October 17 (Japan time) the Tojo Cabinet engaged

in preparations for a formal determination of the policies it would

follow, and such a determination was made at an Imperial Conference

on November 5 (Japan time). During the interval between those

dates. Ambassador Nomura received only general instructions from

the Japanese Foreign Office concerning the course he should follow

in further talks with the Americans. He was, however, advised on

October 21 (Japan time) that

the new cabinet differs in no way from the former one in its sincere desire to adjust

Japanese-United States relations on a fair basis. Our country has said practically

all she can say in the way of expressing of opinions and setting forth our stands.

We feel that we have now reached a point where no further positive action can be

taken by us except to urge the United States to reconsider her views.

We urge, therefore, that, choosing an opportune moment, either you or Waka-

sugi let it be known to the United States by indirection that our country is not

in a position to spend much more time discussing this matter. Please continue

the talks, emphasizing our desire for a formal United -States counter proposal to

pur proposal of 27 September (ex. 1, p. 81),

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These instructions were concurred in by the Japanese War and Navy

Ministers (ex. 1, p. 84).

In accordance with the Foreign Minister’s instructions, Minister

Wakasugi called on Under Secretary Welles on October 24 (Washing-

ton time). The Minister told the Under Secretary that the new

Japanese Government desired to follow the pohcy of the preceding

Government and to continue the conversations without delay, adding

that in his behef the new Government —

had taken office under such circumstances and was pressed by tense public opinion

to such an extent as to make it imminently desirable that the conversations be

pressed to a satisfactory conclusion speedily (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 693).

He then asked whether the United States had as yet any counter-

proposals to make to the suggestions offered by the Japanese Govern-

ment on September 27. In reply, Mr. Welles made it clear that the

United States would be glad to continue the conversations, but sug-

gested that recent belligerent pubhc statements by high Japanese

officials and the tone of the Japanese press were not helpful to the

atmosphere in which the conversations would take place. When

Minister Wakasugi pointed to a recent speech by Secretary of the Navy

Knox in which Knox had said that a Japanese-American war was

inevitable and that the United States Navy was on a “24-hom: basis,”

Mr. Welles said that this simply showed the effect on- the Navy of the

statements being made in Japan. In reply to the Minister’s inquiry

regarding the possibility of counterproposab being submitted by the

United States, Mr. Welles said that the United States position was

fuUy set forth in its draft proposals of Jime 21 and the statement de-

livered to Ambassador Nomura on October 2, and that for this reason

he did not think any counterproposals by the United States were

called for. The conversation concluded with a discussion of the pos-

sibility of taking up the three major points of disagreement in the

following order: (1) Economic nondbcrimination, (2) Japan’s status

under the Tri-Partite Pact, and (3) the China question (ex. 29, vol. II,

pp. 692-697). A full report on thb conversation was immediately

sent to Tokyo by Ambassador Nomura (ex. 1, pp. 82-84).

Four days later Minister Wakasugi cabled hb own lengthy appraisal

of the general attitude of the United States (ex. 1, pp. 86-87). The

basic United States policy, he said, was the crushing of the so-caUed

Hitlerbm, which he defined as “the establishment of a new order

through the force of arms.” Because the United States “presumed”

that Japan intended to develop the French Indo-China and Thailand

area “under the principle of our military’s coprosperity sphere, in a

monopolistic manner, and through the force of arms,” as contrasted

with America’s principle of economic nondbcrimination, there had

arben “a clash of ideologies.” He said that there was every indication

that the United States Government was “anxious to adjust the rela-

tionship between the two nations,” but that he doubted that it would

make any concessions from its proposals of June 21 and October 2.

He expressed the opinion that the United States had completed its

preparations “in the event of the worst,” and that “a course of eco-

nomic pressme plus watchful waiting” had been decided on. He

felt, however, that all was not hopeless and that by “good-naturedly”

continuing the talks there would be opened up “ways of breaking

down differences if we make the best use of world developments.”

He concluded hb’report by^saying:

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However, if we depend on immediate settlement by settling local differences by

insisting upon our freedom of action (sic), we must have our minds made up that

not only will these negotiations be terminated, but that our national relations will

be severed.

The United States has expressed its interest in continuing with the talks after

she has been advised of the attitude and policy of the newly formed Cabinet of

Japan. I urge, therefore, that the new Cabinet establish its basic policy as

sp^ily as possible, so that we may lay our cards on the table for them to see.

I sincerely believe that that would be to our best interest (ex. 1, p. 87).

On October 30 (Japan time) in Tokyo the new Foreign Minister

received the diplomatic corps individually, and during the course of

his talk with Ambassador Grew he expressed his desire that the

Japanese-ximerican conversations be continued and be successfully

brought to a conclusion without delay, and he ashed Ambassador

Grew’s cooperation to that end (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 699-700). Am-

bassador Grew noted that, compared with Admiral Toyoda who

had preceded him, the new Foreign Minister was ^‘grim, unsmiling,

and ultra-reserved^' (ex. 30, p. 465). The Foreign Minister cabled

Ambassador Nomura that he had told Ambassador Grew that if

Japanese- American relations got worse, unfortunate results would

ensue, a statement substantially similar to the statement he had made

to Sir Robert Craigie, the British Ambassador, on October 26 (Japan

time) (ex. 1, p. 91).

The great activity in Tokyo during the period immediately after

the formation of the Tojo Cabinet, and the attitude with which that

Cabinet approached the continuance of the Japanese-American

conversations, is illustrated by Foreign Minister Togo's message

No. 725 of November 4 (Japan time) to Ambassador Nomura:

1. Well, relations between Japan and the United States have reached the edge,

and our people are losing confidence in the possibility of ever adjusting them.

In order to lucubrate on a fundamental national policy, the Cabinet has been

meeting ivith the Imperial Headquarters for some days in succession. Conference

has followed conference, and now we are at length able to bring forth a counterproposal

for the resumption of Japanese-American negotiations based upon the unanimous

opinion of the Government and the military high command (ensuing Nos. 726 and

727). This and other basic policies of our Empire await the sanction of the

conference to be held on the morning of the 5th.

2. Conditions both within and without our Empire are so tense that no longer

is procrastination possible, yet in our sincerity to maintain pacific relationships

between the Empire of Japan and the United States of America, we have decided,

as a result of these deliberations, to gamble once more on the continuance of the

parleys, but this is our last effort.. Both in name and spirit this counterproposal

of ours is, indeed, the last. 1 want you to know that. If through it we do not

reach a quick accord^ I am sorry to say the talks will certainly be ruptured. Then,

indeed, will relations between our two nations be on the brink of chaos. I mean that

the success or failure of the pending discussions will have an immense effect on

the destiny of the Empire of Japan. In fact, we gambled the fate of our land on the

throw of this die.

When the Japanese-American meetings began, who would have ever dreamt

that they would drag out so long? Hoping that we could fast come to some under-

standing we have already gone far out of our way and yielded and yielded. The

United States does not appreciate this, but through thick and thin sticks to the

self-same propositions she made to start with. Those of our people and of our

officials who suspect the sincerity of the Americans are far from few. Bearing

all kinds of humiliating things, our Government has repeatedly stated its sin-

cerity and gone far, yes, too far, in giving in to them. There is just one reason

why we do this — to maintain peace in the Pacific. There seem to be some

Americans who think we would make a one-sided deal, but our temperance, I can

tell you, has not come from weakness, and naturally there is an end to our long-

suffering. Nay, when it come to a question of our existence and our honor,

when the time comes we will defend them without recking the cost. If the

United States takes an attitude that overlooks or shuns tMs position of ours,

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there is not a whit of use in ever broaching the talks. This time we are showing

the limit of our friendship; this time we are making our last pos sihle bargain, and I

hope that we can thus settle all our troubles with the United States peaceablv.

3. It is to be hoped earnestly that looking forward to what may come at the

end — at the last day of Japanese- American negotiations — ^the Government of the

United States will think ever so soberly how much better it would be to make

peace with us; how much better this would be for the whole world situation.

4. Your Honor will see from the considerations above how important is your

mission. You are at a key post, and we place great hopes in your being able

to do something good for our nation^s destiny. Will you please think deeply on

that and compose yourself and make up your mind to continue to do your best?

I hope you will. Now just as soon as the conference is over, I will let you know

immediately, and I want you to go and talk to President ROOSEVELT and

Secretary HULL. I want you to tell them how determined we are and try to

get them to foster a speedy understanding.

5. In view of th# gravity of these talks, as you make contacts there, so I will

make them here. I will talk to the American Ambassador here in Tokyo, and

as soon as you have got the consensus of the American officials through talking

with them, please wire me. Naturally, as these things develop, in case you take

any new steps, I want you to let me know and get in contact with me. In this

way we will avoid letting anything go astray. Furthermore, lest anything go

awry, I want you to follow my instructions to the letter. In my instructions, I

want you to know there will he no room for personal interpretation (ex. 1, pp. 92-03).

The day the Foreign Minister sent the long message quoted above,

he cabled Ambassador Nomura the substance of two Japanese coun-

terproposals to be used in the conversations, if they should be ap-

proved at the Imperial Conference on November 5 (Japan time).

The first proposal was designated ‘^Proposal and was described

as ^^our revised ultimatum^^ ; its provisions were referred to as “our

demands^^ (ex. 1, pp. 94-95). The second proposal, designated “Pro-

posal B,’’ was to be used in case of “remarkable’^ differences between

the Japanese and American views, “since the situation does not permit

of delays.” It was advanced, the Foreign Minister said, with the

idea of making “a last effort to prevent something happening^ ^ (ex. 1,

p. 96-97).

At the Imperial Conference in Tokyo on November 5 (Japan time),

the counterproposals developed in the conferences and discussions

which had gone before were taken up and approved in the form

previously sent to Ambassador Nomura. Foreign Minister Togo

immediately cabled the Ambassador that he should resume the

conversations, and instructed him to submit “Proposal A” first.

The Foreign Minister told the Ambassador that if it should become

apparent that an a^eement based upon “Proposal A” could not be

reached, “we intend to submit our absolutely final proposal, Proposal

B.” He continued:

4. As stated in my previous message, this is the Imperial Government's final

step. Time is becoming exceedingly short and the situation very critical. Absolutely

no delays can be permitted. \* ♦ \*

5. We wish to avoid giving them the impression that there is a time limit or

that this proposal is to he taken as an ultimatum. In a friendly manner, show them

that we are very anxious to have them accept our proposal (ex. 1, p. 99).

The intercepted messages show that the Japanese Government

intended to insist not omy on a written agreement signed by the

United States but also to require the United States to “make Great

Britain and the Netherlands sign those terms in which they are

concerned” (ex. 1, pp. 98-99). Although the Foreign Minister

instructed Ambassador Nomura to avoid giving the Americans the

impression that “there is a time limit,” he made it clear to the

Ambassador (No. 736) that stioh a dead fine had been fixed;

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Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that arrangements

for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 26th of this month, I realize

that this is a difficult order, but under the circumstances it is an unavoidable one.

Please understand this thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving the Japanese-

V, S. relations from falling into a chaotic condition. Do so with great determina-

tion and with unstinted effort, I beg of you (ex. 1, p. 100).

The record before the Committee does not show whether or not the

decision to submit the foregoing counterproposals was the only decision

made at the Imperial Conference on November 5. It is now known,

however, that on that date the Navy promulgated its '‘Combined

Fleet Top Secret Operation Order No, 1” to afl Japanese Fleet and

task force commanders (tr. 482). The record does not show whether

the issuance of this order was made known to the Japanese Foreign

Office.

Order No. 1, itself, was brief:

Combined Fleet Ordeb

Combined Fleet Operations in the War Against the UNITED STATES

GREAT BRITAIN, and the NETHERLANDS will be conducted in accordance

with the Separate Volume (ex. 8).

The separate volume, which was attached to Order No. 1, prescribed

the operations to be conducted (a) in case war with the United States,

Great Britain, and the Netherlands “begins during the China Opera-

tions,” and (b) in case war with Russia “begins during the War with

the United States, Great Britain, the Nethenands and China” (ex. 8).

It stated: “The Empire is expecting war to break out with the United

States, Great Britain and the Netherlands,” and provided that, in

such event, “In the east the American Fleet will be destroyed” (ex. 8).

Order No. 1 had been in course of preparation since the latter part

of August. From September 2-13 (Japan time) a war plans conference

had been held continuously at the Naval War College in Tokyo.

It was during this same period, on September 6 (Japan time), that an

Imperial Conference decided:

If by the early part of October there is no reasonable hope of having our demands

agreed to in the diplomatic negotiations \* \* \*, we will immediately make

up our minds to get ready for war against America (England and Holland) (ex.

173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 77).

On September 13 (Japan time) an outline containing the essential

points of Order No. 1 had been completed at the Naval War College,

bu-t the Order itself was not promulgated until immediately after the

Imperial Conference on November 6 (Japan time) (ex. 8).

Ambassador Grew Warns That War With Japan May Come

“With Dramatic and Dangerous Suddenness”

{November S, 1941)

During the period which immediately preceded the Imperial Con-

ference on November 5 (Japan time) , Ambassador Grew was endeavor-

ing to determine what the policies of the To jo Government would be.

Among the sources of his information was “a reliable Japanese inform-

ant” who called on the Ambassador on October 25 (Japan time) and

again on November 3 (Japan time). On both occasions the informa-

tion imparted by the informant fell short of disclosing to Ambassador

Grew the actual decisions affecting the United States which were

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being made by the Tojo Cabinet, as described above, but was sufficient

to convince the Ambassador that the situation was approaching a

crisis. He recorded that bn November 3 he was told that the new

Japanese Government “had reached a definite decision as to how far it

was prepared to go in implementing the desires of the Emperor for an

adjustment of relations with the United States,” and that “this infor-

mation had been commimicated by the Prime Minister to the Emperor

on the afternoon of November 2” (Japan time) (ex. 29, vol. II, p.

701). In his testimony before the Committee, Ambassador Grew

said, referring to the period immediately following the fall of the

Konoye Cabinet:

I took about two weeks to size up the new situation. I was not quite sure what

Tojo’s policy was going to be. I had been assured he was going to try to keep

on the conversations, going to do his best to come to an agreement with us, and

all. the rest of it. Frankly, I had my fingers crossed. I was waiting to size it

up, and after I had sized it up I sent the telegram of November 3 (tr. 1908).

In the telegram of November 3 (Japan time) to which Mr. Grew

referred, he warned Secretary Hull and Under Secretary Welles that —

Japan’s resort to measures which might (make) war with the United States

inevitable may come toith dramatic and dangerous suddenness (ex. 15).

The telegram summarized his opinions on the general situation in

Japan. In it he noted that the strong policy wmich he had recom-

mended in his telegram of September 12, 1940 (ex. 26), called the

“green light” telegram because it gave the go-ahead signal for economic

sanctions against Japan, together witji the impact upon Japan of

political developments abroad had brought the Japanese Government

“to seek conciliation with the United States.” If those efforts should

fail, he foresaw a probable swing of the pendulum in Japan back once

more to its former position “or still further back,” leading —

to what I have called an “all out, do or die” attempt to render Japan impervious

to foreign economic embargoes, even risking national hara kiri rather than cede

to foreign pressure. \* ♦ \* such a contingency is not only possible but prob-

able (ex. 16).

Ambassador Grew went on t5 express his opinion that the view that

the progressive imposition of drastic economic measures, while at-

tended with some risk of war, would probably avert war, was

a dangerously uncertain hypothesis upon which to base the considered policy and

measures of the United States (ex. 15^

Conceding that in discussing the “grave and momentous” subject of

whether American needs, pohcies, and objectives justified war with

Japan if diplomacy should fail, he was “out of touch with the Admin-

istration’s thoughts and intentions thereon,” and that his purpose

was only to “ensure against my country’s getting into war with

Japan through any possible misconception of the capacity of Japan

to rush heaffiong into a suicidal conflict with the United States,”

he warned that —

it would be shortsighted to underestimate Japan’s obvious preparations for a pro-

gram to be implemented if her alternative program for peace should faO. It

would be similarly shortsighted to base our policy on the belief that .these prepara-

tions are merely in the nature of saber rattling (for) the exclusive purpose of giving

moral support to Japan’s high pressure diplomacy. Japan’s resort to measures

which might {make) war with the United States inevitable may come with dramatic

and dangerous suddenness (ex. 15).

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The State Department file copy of Ambassador Grew’s telegram of

November 3 (Japan time) bears the following handwritten note:

Paraphrase of this telegram in full given to Commander Watts, ONI, by tele-

phone on November 8, 1941 (ex. 15).

On November 17 (Japan time) Ambassador Grew cabled Secretary

Hull and Under Secretary Welles as follows, referring specifically to

the last sentence of his November 3 warning:

In emphasizing need for guarding against sudden military or naval actions by

Japan in area^ not at present involved in the China conflict^ I am taking into account

as a probability that the Japanese would exploit all available tactical advantages^

including those of initiative and surprise. It is important, however, that our

Government not (rep>eat not) place upon us, including the military and naval

attaches, major responsibility for giving prior warning.

' ]|c Hf. 3|e 4c ♦

We fully realize that possibly our most important duty at this time is to watch

for premonitory indications of military or naval op>erations which might be forth-

coming against such areas and we are taking every precaution to guard against

surprise. However, our field of military and naval observation is almost literally

restricted to what can be seen with our own eyes, which is negligible. We would,

therefore, advise that our Government, from abundance of caution, discount as

far as possible the likelihood of our being able to give substantial warning (ex. 15).

Ambassador Grew testified that he had no knowledge or indication

whatever of the assembling of the Japanese naval strikmg force for the

attack on Pearl Harbor, or that at the war games conducted by Ad-

miral Yamamoto at the Naval War College m Tokyo between Sep-

tember 2 and 13 (Japan time) the final plans were being formulated

for the attack (tr. 1481). He further testified that although he knew

that a meeting of the Japanese Cabinet took place on December 1,

he “did not (know) and could not have guessed” that the Cabinet

had discussed the attack on Pearl Harbor (tr. 1615), and that, with the

single exception of the information upon which his message of January

27, 1941 (Japan time) (ex. 15) was based, he had no information of

any character prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor which indicated

the possibility of such an attack by the Japanese (tr. 1477).

Genebalissimo Chiang Kai-shek Appeals to Great Britain and

THE United States for Aid

{October 28-November 4, 194i)

During the latter part of October, the Japanese began extensive

troop concentrations at Haiphong on the coast of northern French

Indochina, and steady streams of Japanese military supplies and

naaterials were reported arriving at Hainan (off the northern coast of

French Indochina) and at Formosa. As a result of these and other

Japanese military movements, which were interpreted in Chungking

as foreshadowing an early invasion of Yunnan Province for the pur-

pose of taking the city of Kunming and severing the Burma Road,

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek made strenuous efforts to obtain

British and American air support for his ground forces in that area.

On October 28 at his first meeting in Chungking with General

Magruder, the head of the recently arrived United States military

mission to China, the Generalissimo asked General Magruder to

1 Ambassador Qrew’s message of January 27, 1941 (Japan time) follows: “My Peruvian colleague told a

member of my staff that he had heard from many sources including a Japanese source that the Japanese

military forces planned, in the event of trouble with the United States, to attempt a surprise mass attack

on Pearl Harbor using all of their military facilities. He added that although the project seemed fantastic

the fact that he had heard it from many sources prompted him to pass on the information” (ex. 16). Para-

phrased copies were promptly sent by the State Department to Military Intelligence Division (Army)

and Office of Naval Intelligence (Navy) (ex. 15).

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inform Washington at once of the threatening situation, and urged

that President Roosevelt “intercede with London to make available

the Singapore air forces to support his defense.” He pled with

General Magruder that the President “be ui^ed to bring diplomatic

pressure on Japan and to. appeal as well to Britain jointly to warn

Japan that an attack upon Kunming would be considered inimical

to our interests.” He insisted that if the Japanese should take Kim-

mmg and thus sever the Burma Road, Chinese resistance would end

and a Japanese attack on the Malay Peninsula would inevitably

follow. He believed his land forces could resist the anticipated

attack only with air support, which he did not have and which only

the British air forces at Singapore could furnish in time. General

Magruder immediately radioed the Generalissimo’s plea to Secretaiy

Stimson and General Marshall, after discussing the interview with

Ambassador Gauss (ex. 47).

In Washington, on the morning of October 30 (Washington time),

Mr. T. V. Soong handed to Secretary of the Treasury Morgen thau, a

message from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek which repeated the

substance of what the Generalissimo had said to General Magruder.

Chiang’s message mged the United States “to use strong pressme on

Britain to send Singapore Air Force to cooperate with Colonel Chen-

nault in order to save democratic position in Far East” and stressed

the critical nature of the situation (ex. 16-A). Secretary Morgenthau

sent the Generalissimo’s message to President Roosevelt on the same

day, without written comment, and the President forwarded it to

Secretary Hull with this handwritten note:

C. H. Can we do anything along these lines? How about telling Japan a move

to close Burma Road would be inimical? F. D. R. (ex. 16-A).

On November 1 (Washington time), Secretary Hull called a con-

ference at the State Department which was attended by, among others,

the Secretary, Under Secretaiw Welles, and Dr. Stanley K. Hombeck,

for that Department, and by General Leonard T. Gerow, Chief of War

Plans Division, for the War Dep^tment and Admiral R. E. Schuir-

mann. Director of the Central Division, for the Navy Department.

The conference was called for the purpose of discussing what action

should be taken in response to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek’s plea.

Secretary Hull expressed the opinion that “there was no use to issue

any additional warnings to Japan if we can’t back them up,” and the

Secretary therefore desired to know whether “the military authorities

would be prepared to support further warnings by the State Depart-

ment.” A second meeting in the same connection was held at the

State Department the following day (ex. 16).

General Gerow submitted a report oh these meetings to General

Marshall on November 3 (Washington time) in which he pointed out

that the Military Intelligence Division’s (G-2’s) latest estimate did

not support Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek’s conclusions as to the

imminence of a Japanese move toward Kunming, though agreeing

that the fall of Kunming would seriously affect Chinese resistance to

Japan. After reviewing the strength of the United States forces in the

Philippines and concluding that the dispatch of any considerable

portion of the air garrison there would leave the island of Luzon open

to serious risk of capture, General Gerow’s report summarized certain

“strong” opinions of the War Plans Division, which were stated Jls

follows:

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a. The policies derived in the American-British Staff conversations remain

sound; viz:

(1) The primary objective is the defeat of Germany.

{£) The principal objective in the Far East is to keep Japan out of the war.

(3) Military counter action against Japan should be considered only in

case of any of the following actions by Japan (which were then enumerated).

\* \* \* \* \* • •

d. Political and economic measures should he used wherever effective to deter

Japanese action.

g \* \* ♦ Strong dipUfmatic and economic pressure may he exerted from the

military viewpoint ^ atthe earliest^ about the middle of December 1941^ when the Philip-

pine Air Force will have become a positive thfeat to Japanese operations. It

would be advantageous, if practicable, to delay severe diplomatic and economic

pressure until February or March 1942, when the Philippine Air Force will have

reached its projected strength, and a safe air route, through Samoa, will be in

operation, (ex. 16).

The weekly meeting of the Army-Navy Joint Board scheduled for

November 5 (TVashington time) was held on the afternoon of Novem-

ber 3 ('Washington time). The question of aid to Generalissimo

Chiang Kai-shek received more attention than any other item on the

agenda (ex, 16). Admiral Royal E. IngersoU presented the situation

as the Navy saw it and General Marsh^ gave the Army’s viewpoint.

Admiral Schuirmann reported on the two meetings at the State

Department and read a memorandum (tr. 5520-5523) prepared by

Dr. Hombeck in which the latter stated his personal opinion in

favor of a firm representation to Japan, even though war might result.

Among other things, General Marshall said that it was his information

that ‘^the Japanese authorities might be expected to decide upon the

national policy by November 5,” ^parently referring to the inter-

cepted Japanese messages between Washington and Tokyo regarding

the Imperial Conference to be held in Tokyo on that date. He ex-

pressed the view that —

Until powerful United States Forces had been built up in the Far East, it

would take some very clever diplomacy to save the situation. It appeared ihcU

the basis of U. S. policy should he to make certain minor concessions which the J apa-

nese could use in saving face. These concessions might be a relaxation on oil restrictions

or on similar trade restrictions (ex. 16).

Following these discussions the Joint Board decided that —

War Plans Division of the War and Navy Departments would prepare a memo-

randum for the President, as a reply to the State Department’s proposed policy in

the Far Eastern situation. The memorandum would take the following lines:

Oppose the issuance of an ultimatum to Jap^n.

Oppose U. S. military action against Japan should she move into Yunnan.

Oimose the movement and employment of U. S. military forces in support of

Chiang Kai-shek.

Advocate State Department action to put off hostilities with Japan as long as

possible.

Suggest agreement with Japan to tide the situation over for the next several

months.

Point out the effect and cost a U. S.-Japanese war in the Far East would have on

defense aid to Great Britain and other nations being aided by the U. S.

Emphasize the existing limitations on shipping and the inability of the U. S. to

engage in a Far Eastern offensive without the transfer of the major portion of

shipping facilities from the Atlantic to the Pacific (ex. 16) .

That evening, November 3 (Washington time), the State Depart-

ment received a telejpam from Ambassador Gauss in Chungking to

the effect that while it was not yet certain that Japan would under-

take an invasion of Yupnan from Indochina, it was believed certain

thiit in any case large Japanese air forces would operate against the

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Burma Road and any volunteer air forces in China, and that accord-

ingly, if Anglo-Amferican air imits were sent into Yunnan, they should

be in sufficient force to maintain themselves against heavy Japanese

air concentrations. “Half or token measures,” the Ambassador advised,

“would prove dangerous” (ex. 47).

The next morning, November 4 (Washington time), the State

Department received from the Chinese Embassy a personal message

to President Roosevelt from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek (ex. 47).

This message quoted a lengthy message which the Generalissimo had

sent directly to Prime Minister Churchill, in which the Generalissimo

expressed substantially the same views as those he had communicated

to General Magruder, and urged that the British air force in Malaya,

“with American cooperation,” be sent to his assistance to resist the

anticipated assault on Yunnan and Kunming. The Generalissmo

then urged the United States “to draw on its air arm in the Philippines

to provide either an active unit or a reserve force in the combined

operation,” saying that —

unless Japan is checked sharply and at once, she is on the verge of winning a

position from which she can deal with each of us separately and in her own time

(ex. 47).

Neither the Generalissimo’s message addressed to the Prime

Minister nor his message addressed to the President made any further

reference to the proposal that a warning to Japan be issued by Britain

or the United States. On the 4th Secretary Hull held separate con-

ferences at the State Department with Secretary Elnox, and with

General Marshall and Admiral Ingersoll (tr. 1171, 1173).

The next day, November 5 (Washington time). President Roosevelt

received the following message from Prime Minister Churchill:

I have received Chiang Kai-shek’s attached appeal addressed to us both for air

assistance. You know how we are placed for air strength at Singapore. None-

theless, I should be prepared to send pilots and even some planes if they could

arrive in time.

What we need now is a deterrent of the most general and formidable character.

The Japanese have as yet taken no fipal decision, and the Emperor appears to be

exercising restraint. When we talked about this at Argentia you spoke of gaining

time, and this policy has been brilliantly successful so far. But our joint embargo

is steadily forcing the Japanese to decisions for peace or war.

It now looks as if they would go into Yunnan cutting the Burma Road with

disastrous consequence for Chiang Kai-shek. The cofiapse of his resistance

would not only be a world tragedy in itself, but it would leave the Japanese with

large forces to attack north or south.

The Chinese have appealed to us, as I believe they have to you, to warn the

Japanese against an attack on Yunnan. I hope you might remind them that such

an attack, aimed at China from a region in which we have never recognized that

the Japanese have any right to maintain forces, would be in open disregard of the

clearly indicated attitude of the United States Government. We should, of

course, be ready to make a similar communication.

No independent action by ourselves will deter Japan because we are so much

tied up elsewhere. But of course we will stand with you and do our utmost to

back you in whatever course you choose. I think, myself, that Japan is more

likely to drift into war than to plunge in. Please let me know what you think

(ex. 158).

President Roosevelt did not reply to Prime Minister Churchill

until 2 days later. In the meantime. General Marshall and Ad-

miral Stark submitted to him, imder date of November 5 (Wash-

ington time), a joint memorandum (ex. 16) pursuant to the action

of the Joint Board referred to above. In thw joint memorandum

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General Marshall and Admiral Stark referred to the various com-

munications from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek which have been

mentioned above, and to Secretary HuU's request for advice “as to

the attitude which this Government should take” toward a Japanese

offensive against Kunming and the Burma Road, and stated that

the question they had considered was —

whether or not the United States is justified in undertaking offensive military

op>erations with U. S. forces against Japan, to prevent her from severing the

Burma Road. They consider that sucn operations, however well disguised,

would lead to war.

In answering this question. General Marshall and Admiral Stark

then advised the President:

At the present time the United States Fleet in the Pacific is inferior to the Jap-

anese Fleet and cannot undertake an unlimited strategic offensive in the Western

Pacific. In order to be able to do so, it would have to be strengthened by with-

drawing practically all naval vessels from the Atlantic except those assigned to

local defense forces. An unlimited offensive by the Pacific Fleet would require

tremendous merchant tonnage, which could only be withdrawn from services

now considered essential. The result of withdrawals from the Atlantic of naval

and merchant strength might well cause the United Kingdom to lose the Battle

of the Atlantic in the near future.

The current plans for war against Japan in the Far East are to conduct defen-

sive war, in cooperation with the British and Dutch, for the defense of the Philip-

pines and the British and Dutch East Indies. The Philippines are now being

reinforced. The present combined naval, air, and ground forces will make

attack on the islands a hazardous undertaking. By about the middle of Decem-

ber 1941, United States air and submarine strength in the Philippines will have

become a positive threat to any Japanese operations south of Formosa. The

U. S. Army air forces in the Philippines will have reached the projected strength

by February or March, 1942. The potency of this threat will have then increased

to a point where it might well be a deciding factor in deterring Japan in operations

in the areas south and west of the Philippines. By this time, additional British

naval and air reinforcements to Singapore will have arrived. The general defen-

sive strength of the entire southern area against possible Japanese operations will

then have reached impressive proportions.

Until such a time as the Burma Road is closed, aid can be extended to Chiang

Kai-shek by measures which probably will not result in war with Japan. These

measures are: continuation of economic pressure against Japan, supplying

increasing amounts of munitions under the Lend-Lease, and continuation and

acceleration of aid to the American Volunteer Group.

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff are in accord in the fol-

lowing conclusions:

(а) The basic military policies and strategy agreed to in the United States-

British Staff conversations remain sound. The primary objective of the two

nations is the defeat of Germany. If Japan be defeated and Germany remain

undefeated, decision will still have not been reached. In any case, an unlimited

offensive war should not be undertaken against Japan, since such a war would

greatly weaken the combined effort in the Atlantic against Germany, the most

dangerous enemy.

( б ) War between the United States and Japan should he avoided while build’-

ing up defensive forces in the Far East, until such time as J apan attacks or directly

threatens territories whose security to the United' States is of very great importance.

Military action against Japan should be undertaken only in one or more of the

following contingencies:

(1) A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the territory or

mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the

Netherlands East Indies;

(2) The movement of Japanese forces into Thailand to the west of 100°

East or south of 10° North; or into Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or

the Loyalty Islands.

(c) If war with Japan can not be avoided, it should follow the strategic lines of

existing war plans; i. e., military operations should be primarily defensive, with

the object of bolding territory, and weakening Japan’s economic position.

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(d) Considering world strategy, a Japanese advance against Kunming, into

Thailand, except as previously indicated, or an attack on Russia, would not justify

intervention by the United States against Japan.

(e) All possible aid short of actual war against Japan should be extended to

the Chinese Central Government.

(f) In case it is decided to undertake war against Japan, complete coordinated

action in the diplomatic, economic, and military fields, should be undertaken in

common by the United States, the British Commonwealth, and the Netherlands

East Indies.

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff recommend that the

United States policy in the Far East be based on the above conclusions.

Specifically, they recommend:

That the dispatch of United States armed forces for intervention against Japan

in China be disapproved.

That material aid to China be accelerated consonant with the needs of Russia,

Great Britain, and our own forces.

That aid to the American Volunteer Group be continued and accelerated to the

maximum practicable extent.

That no vUimatum be delivered to Japan (ex. 16).

Secretary Hull testified that he —

was in thorough accord with the views of the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval

Operations that United States armed forces should not be sent to China for use

against Japan. I also believed so far as American foreign policy considerations

were involved that material to China should be accelerated as much as feasible,

and that aid to the American Volunteer Group should be accelerated. Finally,

I concurred completely in the view that no ultimatum should he delivered to Japan.

I had been striving for months to avoid a showdown with J apan, and to explore every

possible avenue for averting or delaying war between the United States and Japan.

That was the cornerstone of the effort which the President and I were putting forth

with our utmost patience, (tr. 1130).

On November 7 (Washington time). President Roosevelt sent the

following reply, prepared in the State Department, to Prime Minister

ChurchiS's message of the 5th:

We have very much in mind the situation to which Chiang Kai-shek's appeal

is addressed. While we feel that it would be a serious error to underestimate the

gravity of the threat inherent in that situation, we doubt whether preparations

for a Japanese land campaign against Kunming have advanced to a point which

would warrant an advance by the Japanese against Yunnan in the immediate

future. In the meantime we shall do what we can to increase and expedite lend

lease aid to China and to facilitate the building up of the American volunteer air

force, both in personnel and in equipment. We have noted that you would be

pr^ared to send pilots and some planes to China.

We feel that measures such as the foregoing and those which you have in mind

idong the lines we are taking, together with continuing efforts to strengthen our

defenses in the Philippine Islands, paralleled by similar efforts by you in the

Singapore area, will tend to increase Japan's hesitation, whereas in Japan's present

'mood new formalized verbal warning or remonstrances might have, with at least

even chance, an opposite effect.

This whole problem will have our continuing and earnest attention, study, and

effort.

I shall probably not, repeat not, make e:q)ress reply to Chiang Kai-shek before

the first of next week. Please keep within the confidence of your close official

circle that I have said above (ex. l^B).

The record shows that on November 8, Secretary Hull conferred

at the State Department with General Miles, head of the Military

Intelligence Division (G-2), General Staff (tr. 1173), and on November

10 with Secretary Knox (tr. 1171). On the latter date he sent to

President Roosevelt a draft of a proposed reply to Generalissimo

Chiang Kai-shek. The next day the President dictated the following

brief note to his aide, General Watson, which was attached to the

Secretary's draft and read;

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I want to see Hu Shih for five minutes on Wednesday, and give this to me when

he comes (ex. 16).

Written on the same sheet of paper, below the typewritten note to

General Watson and apparently after the conference with Dr. Hu

Shih, the Chinese Ambassador, appears the following, in the President’s

handwriting:

C. H. O. K. to send. F. D. R. (ex. 16).

The draft was then returned to the State Department, where the

message in final form was handed to Dr. Hu Shih late in the afternoon

of November 14 (Washington time) for transmittal to Generalissimo

Chiang Kai-shek. In it President Roosevelt described briefly the

intensive consideration that had been given to the Generalissimo’s

appeal, and continued:

Under existing circumstances, taking into consideration the world situation in

its political, military, and economic aspects, we feel that the most effective con-

tribution which we can make at this moment is along the line of speeding up the

flow to China of our Lend-Lease materials and facilitating the building up of the

American Volunteer air force, both in personnel and in equipment. We are sub-

jected at present, as you know, to demands from many quarters and in many

connections. We are sending materials not only to China and Great Biitain,

but to the Dutch, the Soviet Union, and some twenty other countries that are

calling urgently for equipment for self defense. In addition, our program for

our own defense, especially the needs of our rapidly expanding Navy and Army,

calls for equipment in large amount and with ^eat promptness. Nevertheless,

I shall do my utmost toward achieving expedition of increasing expedition of

increasing amounts of material for your use. Meanwhile we are exchanging

views with the British Government in regard to the entire situation and the

tremendous problems which are presented, with a view to effective coordinating

of efforts in the most practicable ways possible.

I believe that you will share my feeling that measures such as the foregoing,

together with such as the British doubtless are considering, adopted and imple-

mented simultaneously with your intensive efforts to strengthen the defenses of

Yunnan Province are sound steps toward safeguarding against such threat of an

attack upon Yunnan as may be developing. Indirectly influencing that situation:

American military and naval defensive forces in the Philippine Islands, which

are being steadily increased, and the United States Fleet at Hawaii, lying as they

do along the flank of any Japanese military movement into China from Indo-

china, are ever present and significant factors in the whole situation, as are the

increasing British and Dutch defensive preparations in their territories to the

south.

This Government has on numerous occasions pointed out to the Government of

Japan various consequences inherent in pursuit of courses of aggression and

conquest. We shall continue to impress this point of view upon Japan on every

appropriate occasion (ex. 16).

In accordance with the joint reconunendation that had been made by

General Marshall and Adoriral Stark, no warning was delivered to

Japan as Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had urged.

It is cleat that the movement of additional Japanese troops into

northern French Indocl^a had a twofold purpose. On the one

hand the troops were an immediate threat to China by their proximity

to Yunnan Province, the Burma Road, and Kunming on the nortn

and northwest. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek’s appeal for aid

recognized the immediacy of that threat. On the oilier hand, the

additional Japanese forces increased the potential threat to the British

Malay States and Singapore, and to the Netherlands East Indies and

the Philippines. The price the Japanese Government hoped to exact

from the United States and Great Britain for the removal of this

latter threat had been determined at the Imperial Conference on

September 6 (Japan time). The subsequent fall of the Konoye

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Cabinet and accession of General Tojo in October had only increased

Japan’s determination to use this potential threat to blackmail the

United States, if possible, into (1) ceasing all aid to China, (2) accept-

ing a military and naval status in the Far East inferior to that of

Japan, and (3) furnishing all possible material aid to Japan. Further-

more, since the Japanese Army at no time evidenced a willingness to

withdraw its troops from China, or to agree not to use northern French

Indo-China as a base for operations against China, it would seem

clear that the Japanese strategy was not only to blackmail the United

States into granting those “minimum demands” but also, having

accomplished that, to turn on China from northern French Indo-

china and thus to expedite the liquidation of the “China Incident”

and the establishment of a Japanese “just peace” in the Far East.

Japan Delivers its Next-to-Last Proposal to the United States

{November 10, 1941)

After the Imperial Conference on November 5 (Japan time) the

Japanese-American conversations were “on the last lap” as far m the

Japanese Government was concerned (ex. 1, p. 101). Immediately

after that conference the final Japanese diplomatic, naval, and mili-

tary maneuvers began. The instructions Foreign Minister Togo

sent to Ambassador Nomura to resume the talks and to present pro-

posal “A” to the United States Government had their counterparts

m operational orders issued to the Japanese Navy and, without doubt,

to the Japanese Army as well. Those orders contemplated naval, air,

and troop dispositions which were commenced immediately. Many

of those dispositions were detected and observed by the United

States, Great Britain, or the Netherlands, but the major Japanese

naval movement was successfully kept secret by the Japanese until

the attack on Pearl Harbor on ^e morning of December 7, 1941.

It is imperative to an accurate appraisal of this closing period of the

Japanese-American conversations to keep in mind those Japanese

military and naval dispositions. Reports of the military movements

toward the south and alarms about Japanese naval movements (except

the one toward Pearl Harbor) reached Washington and the State De-

partment during November as the Japanese Ambassadors were pre-

senting their final proposals, and agam, as in July, discredited the

intentions of the Japanese Government. Commencing in the middle

of November the American consuls at Hanoi and Saigon in north and

south French Indochina reported extensive new landings of Japanese

troops and equipment in Indochina (tr. 1138). About November 21

(Washii^ton time) the State Department received word that the

Dutch had information that a Japanese naval force had arrived near

Palao, the nearest point in the Japanese mandated islands to the heart

of the Netherlands Indies (ex. 21; tr. 1138).

It is now known that at the same time a powerful Japanese naval

striking force, its formation and purpose successfully kept secret, was

assemblii^ in a northern Japanese harbor for the attack on the United

States Pacific Fleet, under orders issued on or about November 14

(Japan time). On November 21 (Japan time) the comm^der in

chief of the combined Japanese fleet was directed to order his forces

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to advance to the area in which they were to wait in readiness and to

station them in such positions that—

in the event of the situation becoming such that commencement of hostilities be

inevitable, they will be able to meet the situation promptly (tr. 436-7).

On November 25 (Japan time) the commander in chief issued an order

which directed the naval strUcin^ force to “advance into Hawaiian

waters and upon the very opening of hostilities \* \* \* attack

the main force of the United States Fleet in Hawaii and deal it a mortal

blow” (tr. 437). The order provided, however, that —

Should it appear certain that Japanese-American negotiations will reach an ami-

cable settlement prior to the commencement of hostile action, all the forces of

the Combined Fleet are to be ordered to reassemble and return to their bases

(tr. 437).

The striking force sailed from Hitokappu Bay in northern Japan at

9 8. m. November 26 (Japan time), or about 7 p. m. on November 25

(Washington time) (tr. 450).

In the meantime, it had been decided in Tokyo to send Saburu

Kurusu, former Japanese Ambassador to Germany, to Washington to

assist Ambassador Nomura. On the evening of November 4 (Japan

time) Mr. Kurusu told Ambassador Grew that the mission had been

broached to him “only yesterday afternoon” (ex. 30, p. 471), although

it appears from the comments made by Foreign Minister Toyoda to

Ambassador Grew on October 10 (Japan time) that the matter had

been under consideration for some time. Arrangements were made

by the State Department for the Pan-American dipper to be held in

Hong Kong for 2 days to permit Mr. Kurusu to travel on that plane,

and he left Tokyo early on November 5 (Japan time). Foreign Minister

Togo cabled Ambassador Nomura on November 4 (Japan time) of

this development, saying that Ambassador Kurusu was being sent to

assist Ambassador Nomura and to be his “right-hand man” in view

of “the gravity of the present negotiations and in view of your request

on instructions from me” (ex. 1, p. 97). Two days later the Foreign

Minister cabled that the reason for Ambassador Kurusu’s dispatch

“so quickly” was “to show our Empire’s sincerity in the negotiations

soon to follow.” The officials of the Japanese Army and Navy, the

Foreign Minister said, were “pleased with the special dispatch of the

Ambassador” (ex. 1, p. 101).

In Washington, as soon as he received Foreign Minister Togo’s in-

structions to resimie the conversations. Ambassador Nomura arranged

a meeting with Secretary HuU. At that meeting, which took place

on the morning of November 7 (Washington time). Ambassador

Nomura informed the Secretary that he had now received instructions

from the new Japanese Government, and that he wished to resume the

conversations. He then said that the new Japanese Cabinet had de-

liberated on the various questions at issue between the two Govern-

ments —

with a view to making the utmost concessions that they could make, having due

regard for the situation in the Far East and the attitude of public opinion in

Japan (vol. II, p. 707).

He said that of the three principal questions on which there were

divergent views, he thought that it would not be difficult to reconcile

the views of the two Governments on two, namely, nondiscrimination

in international trade and Japan’s obligations under the Tripartite

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Pact. He realized that the difficulties of reaching an agreement on

the third, the China question, were greater. So saying, he handed

to Secretary Hull a document (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 709-710) contain-

ing formulae relating to the withdrawal of Japanese troops from

China and to nondiscrimination in international trade. This docu-

ment was, he said, to be taken in conjunction with the United States

proposals of June 21 and October 2 and the Japanese proposal de-

livered to the Secretary on September 27. It embodied the substance

of the provisions of proposal “A” regarding those two points, but was

silent regarding the question of Japan’s obligations under the Tri-

partite Pact. Secretary Hull expressed the hope that some concrete

statement concerning the latter point could be worked out that would

be of help, but Ambassador Nomura said it did not seem to him any

further statement was necessary than had already been made, con-

sidering the attitude of the Japanese Government which “manifestly

desired to maintain peace in the Pacific.” During the conversation

Secretary Hull again mentioned that before entering into any formal

negotiations he intended to discuss the matter with the Chinese, the

British, and the Dutch (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 708). Ambassador Nomura

requested a meeting with President Roosevelt, which was subse-

quently arranged for November 10 (Washington time).

The afternoon of November 7 (Washington time), Secretary Hull

attended a Cabinet meeting at the White House. The situation in

the Far East appears to have been uppermost in the minds of those

present; especially the President, Secretary Hull, and Secretary

Stimson. Secretary Stimson had had a conference with the President

the day before, November 6 (Washington time), and had recorded in

his dauy notes that he and the President had talked —

about the Far Eastern situation and the approaching conference with the messen-

ger who is coming from Japan. The President outlined what he thought he

might say. He was trying to think of something which would give us further time.

He suggested he might propose a truce in which there would be no movement

or armament for 6 months and then if the Japanese and Chinese had not settled

their arrangement in that meanwhile, we could go on on the same basis. I told

him I frankly saw two great objections to that; first, that it tied up our hands

just at a time when it was vitally important that we should go on completing our

reenforcement of the Philippines; and second, that the Chinese would feel that

any such arrangement was a desertion of them. I reminded him that it has

always been our historic policy since the Washington conference not to leave the

Chinese and Japanese alone together, because the Japanese were always able to

overslaugh the Chinese and the Chinese know it. I told him that I thought the

Chinese would refuse to go into such an arrangement (tr. 14414-14415).

The morning of the next day, November 7 (Washington time).

Adnmal John R. Beardall, President Roosevelt’s naval aide, at the

President’s direction, requested the appropriate officers in the Navy

Department to arrange for the delivery to the President of complete

translations of the intercepted Japanese messages, rather than memo-

randa briefly summarizing the messages as had been delivered there-

tofore under the existing agreement between the Army and the Navy

in that connection. Such arrangements were made and, commencing

November 12 (Washington time), complete translationa were de-

livered each day to Admiral Beardall for delivery to President Roose-

velt. According to reported statements made by Admiral Beardall

at the time, the President told him that he (the President) “was in

fact either seeing or being told about the material through Hull” (tr.

14525-14526).

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According to Secretary Stimson’s notes of the Cabinet meeting on

November 7 (Washington time). President Roosevelt took —

what he said was the first general poll of his Cabinet and it was on the question of

the Far East — whether the people would back us up in case we struck at Japan

down there and what the tactics should be. It was a very interesting talk —

the best Cabinet meeting I think we have ever had since I have been there. He

went around the table — first Hull and then myself, and then around through the

whole number and it was unanimous in feeling the country would support us.

He said that this time the vote is unanimous, he feeling the same way. Hull

made a good presentation of the general situation. I told them I rather nar-

rowed it down into a foUowing-up the steps which had been done to show what

needed to be done in the future. The thing would have been much stronger if

the Cabinet had known — and they did not know except in the case of Hull and

the President — what the Army is doing with the big bombers and how ready we

are to pitch in (tr. 14415-14416).

Secretary Hull testified that at this Cabinet meeting, after Presi-

dent Roosevelt turned to him and asked whether he had anything in

mind —

I thereupon pointed out for about 15 minutes the dangers in the international

situation. I went over fully developments in the conversations with Japan and

emphasized that in my opinion relations were extremely critical and that we should

be on the lookout for a military attack arwwhere by Japan at any time, When I

finished, the President went around the Cabinet. All concurred in my estimate of

the dangers. It became the consensus of the Cabinet that the critical situation

might well be emphasized in speeches in order that the country would, if possible,

be better prepared for such a development.

Accordingly, Secretary of the Navy Knox delivered an address on November 11,

1941, in which he stated that we were not only confronted with the necessity of

extreme measures of self-defense in the Atlantic, but we were “likewise faced with

grim possibilities on the other side of the world- — on the far side of the Pacific\*';

and the Pacific no less than the Atlantic called for instant readiness for defense.

On the same day Under Secretary of State Welles in an address stated that be-

yond the Atlantic a sinister and pitiless conqueror had reduced more than half of

Europe to abject serfdom and that in the Far East the same forces of conquest

were menacing the safety of all nations bordering on the Pacific. The waves of

world conquest were “breaking high both in the East and in the West," he said,

and were threatening more and more with each passing day “to engulf our own

shores." He warned that the United States was in far greater p>eril than in 1917;

that “at any moment war may be forced upon us" (tr. 1131-1132).

Statements which were made by Foreign Minister Togo to Am-

bassador Grew in Tokyo 3 days later, on November 10 (Japan

time), show the attitude with which the Japanese Foreign Office was

approaching the conversations during this period immediately follow-

ing the Imperial Conference on November 5. After informing the

Ambassador that new proposals had been sent to Ambassador Nomura

for presentation to the United States Government, the Foreign Min-

ister urged the necessity of a speedy settlement, saying that national

sentiment would ‘‘not tolerate further protracted delay in arriving at

some conclusion^' and that the position was “daily becoming more

pressing." He said that the new proposals represented the “maximum

possible concessions by Japan," and handed to the Ambassador the

texts of the two documents submitted to Secretary Hull on Novem-

ber 7. During the Foreign Minister's comments on these documents,

he expressed the defsire that the British Government should conclude

an agreement with Japan simultaneously with the United States, in

view of Great Britain's interests in the Pacific. The Foreign Minister

told Ambassador Grew that he felt that the United States did not ade-

? [uately appreciate the realities of the situation in the Far East. Re-

erring to the steadily increasing population of Japan^ he stated it

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was necessary to assure the raw materials necessary for the existence

of that population and that unless the United States realized this fact

as among the realities of the situation, a successful conclusion to the

conversations would be difficult. Ambassador Grew told the Minister

that his statements penetrated to the heart of the whole problem,

since one of the fundamental purposes of the conversations was to

open a way for Japan to obtain such necessary supphes, together with

a full flow of trade and commerce and market for her industries, but

by peaceful means as opposed to the use of force. In reply to this the

Minister said, as reported by Ambassador Grew, that —

He did not wish to go into the fundamentals of the question, but he thought

that he could advert briefly to the importance of commercial and economic rela-

tions between the United States and Japan. The freezing by the United States of

Japanese assets had stopped supplies of many important raw materials to Japan.

Economic pressure of this character is capable of menacing national existence to a

greater degree than the direct use of force. He hoped that the American Govern-

ment would take into consideration circumstances of this character and realize

the possibility that the Japanese people, if exposed to continued economic pressure,

might eventually feel obliged resolutely to resort to measures of self-defense

(ex. 29, vol. II, p. 714).

The Minister saw no inconsistency between insisting that Japan

would not give up the fruits of 4 years of hostilities in China and at

the same time accepting the principle of refraining from aggression

and the use of force (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 710-714; ex. 1, pp. 109-111).

Ambassador Nomura’s meeting with President Roosevelt took place

at the White House on the morning of November 10 (Washington

time), with Secretary Hull and Minister Wakasugi present. At this

meeting the Ambassador read from a prepared document an explana-

tion of the proposals he had been instructed by his Government to

present (i. e., proposal “A”), the substance of which (except as regards

the Tripartite Pact) he had already communicated to Secretary Hull

on November 7. Regarding the first question, the application of the

principle of nondiscriniination in international trade, he said that his

Government had now decided to accept its application in all Pacific

areas, including China, upon the imderstanding that the principle

would be applied uniformly to the rest of the world as well. As to the

second question, the attitude of the two Governments toward the

European war, he stated that his Government was not prepared to go

further in black and white than the language contained in its proposal

of September 27, which was:

Both Governments maintain it their common aim to bring about peace in th9

world, and, when an opportune time arrives, they will endeavor jointly for the

early restoration of world peace.

With regard to developments of the situation prior to the restoration of world

peace, both Governments will be guided in their conduct by considerations of

protection and self-defense; and, in case the United States should participate in

the European War, J^an would decide entirely independently in the matter of

interpretation of the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany, and Italy, and

would likewise determine what actions might be taken by way of fulfilling the

obligations in accordance with the said interpretation (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 63®.

He added that if the United States was in a position to give assurance

that it had no intention of placing too liberal an interpretation on

the term “protection and self-defense,” his Government would be

prepared to reciprocate. Concerning the third question, the station-

ing and withdrawal of troops from China and French Indochina,

Ambassador Nomura submitted the following formula:

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With r^ard to the Japanese forces which have been despatched to China in

connection with the China Affair, those forces in si^cihcd areas of North China

and Mengchiang (Inner Mongolia) as well as in Hainan-tao (Hainan Island) will

remain to be stationed for a certain required duration after the restoration of

peaceful relations between Japan and China.. All the rest of such forces will

commence withdrawal as soon as general peace is restored between Japan and

China and the withdrawal will proceed according to separate arrangements be-

tween Japan and China and will be completed within two years with the firm

establishment of peace and order.

The Japanese Government undertake to respect the territorial sovereignty of

French Indo-China. The Japanese forces at present stationed there will be with-

drawn as soon as the China Affair is settled or an equitable peace is established

in East Asia (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 716).

The Ambassador said that this formula clearly indicated that the

stationing of Japanese troops in China was not of a permanent nature,

and that however desirable the complete and immediate withdrawal

of all Japanese troops from China might be, it was ^‘impracticable

under the present circumstances. In a written statement, which he

then read, Ambassador Nomura said that as viewed from the Japanese

side it seemed that the United States had remained adamant in its

P osition and had shown little sim of reciprocation to “concessions^'

y the Japanese with the result that “in certain quarters in my

coimtry some skepticism has arisen as to the true intention of the

United States Government." He continued:

People in my country take the freezing of the assets as an economic blockade

and they go even so far as to contend that the means of modern warfare are not

limited to shooting. No nation can live without the supply of materials vital to

its industries. Reports reaching me from home indicate that the situation is

serious and pressing and the only way of preserving peace is to reach some kind

of amicable and satisfactory understanding with the United States without any

unnecessary loss of time. In the face of these mounting difficulties, the Japanese

Government besnt all its efforts to continue the conversations and bring about a

satisfactory understanding solely for the purpose of maintaining peace in the

Pacific- My Government therefore is now submitting certain proposals as its utmost

effort for that purpose, and I shall feel very grateful if I can have the views of

your Government on them at the earliest possible opportunity (ex. 29, vol. II,

p. 717).

In reply, President Roosevelt read a brief statement which concluded:

We hope that our exploratory conversations will achieve favorable results in

the way of providing a basis for negotiations. We shall continue to do our beat

to expedite the conversations just as we understand that the Japanese Govern-

ment is anxious to do. We hope that the Japanese Government will make it

clear that it intends to pursue peaceful courses instead of opposite courses, as

such clarification should afford a way for arriving at the results which we seek

(ex. 29, vol. II, p. 718).

The President referred to the improvement of American relations with

the South American countries under the “good neighbor policy" as

compared to the policy of force that had been employed by the United

States in some cases. Then, according to Ambassador Nomura's

report to Tokyo the same day —

Speaking on the remark I had made to the effect that economic pressure had

aroused the ill feelings of the Japanese people and had made them impatient, the

President said, “It is necessary to find a modus vivendi if the people are to live,'\*

and proceeded to explain that this expression should be translated as “method of

living" (ex. 1, p. 116).

Ambassador Nomura reported that it was not clear to him what the

phrase “modus vivendi" really meant, and that he intended to ascer-

tain whether the President was referring to, possibly, “a provisional

agreement" (ex. 1, p. 116).

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Upon receipt of Ambassador Nomtira's report, Foreign Minister

Togo cabled uie Ambassador that there were —

indications that the United States is still not fully aware of the ezceedingdy criti\*

calness of the situation here. The fact remains that the date set forth in my messo^e

No. 7S6 is absolutely immovable under present conditions. It is a definite dead line

and therefore it is essential that settlement be realized by about that time. The session

of Parliament opens on the 16th ♦ \* The government must have a clear

picture of things to come, in presenting its case at the session. You can see,

therefore, that the situation is nearing a climax and that time is indeed becoming

short.

I appreciate the fact that you are making strenuous efforts, but in view of the

above-mentioned situation, you redouble them? When taking to the Secre-

tary of State and others, drive the points home to them. Do everything in

your power to get a clear picture of the U. S. attitude in the minimum of time.

At the same time do everything in your power to have them give their speedy

approval to our final proposal.

We would appreciate being advised of your opinions on whether or not they

will accept our final proposal A (ex. 1, pp. 116-117).

Ambassador Nomura immediately cabled the Foreign Minister that

Secretaiy Hull had agreed to study the Japanese proposals the fol-

lowing day, Armistice Day, and that his next meeting with the Sec-

retary was scheduled for the afternoon of November 12 (Washington

time) (ex. 1, p. 118).

On November 11 (Japan time), as the result of statements made by

Foreign Minister Togo to him on October 26 (Japan time) (ex. 1,

p. 91), the British Ambassador in Tokj^o, Sir Robert Craigie, called

on the Foreign Minister upon instructions from the British Foreign

Oflice and urged the desirability of a supreme effort to reach an agree-

ment with the United States, sajring that when the point of actual

negotiations was reached the British Government would be ready to

join in seeking an agreement (ex. l,pp. 117-118; ex. 158). Secreta^

Hull was informed of the instructions to the British Ambassador in

Tokyo during a conversation with Lord Halifax on November 12

(Washm^n time) (ex. 168). During the conversation between

Foreign Minister Togo and Sir Robert Craigie, the Foreign Minister

went to great lengths to convince the British Ambassador how critical

the situation was, saying that in the view of the Japanese Government

the negotiations had reached the final phase, that the Imperial Gov-

enment had made its “maximum concessions,” and that if the

United States refused to accept those terms and sign the agreement

“within a week to ten days,” it would be “useless”\_to continue the

negotiations, as the Japanese domestic political situation would permit

“no further delays in reaching a decision.” He emphasized this

latter point in his report of the conversation to Ambassador Nomura,

saving that it was “absolutely impossible that there be any further

delays,” that while there were indications that the United States

Government was “still vmder the impression that the negotiations

are in the preliminary stages and that we are still merely exchanging

opin^ns,” as far as Tokyo was concerned, “this is the final phase,”

and expressed the “fervent” hope that Ambassador Nomura would

do —

everything in (his) power to make them realize this fact and bring about an

agreement at the earliest possible moment (ex. 1, p. 119).

At the meeting between Secretary Hull and Ambassador Nomura

on November 12 (Washington time), the Ambassador said that his

new Government had asked him to emphasize its desire to expedite a

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settlement because the internal situation in Japan was difficult,

people were becoming impatient and a session of the Diet was impend-

ing. He expressed the hope that “within a week or ten days” some

agreement could be reached. Secretary Hull commented that the

matters submitted on November 10 were being worked on as rapidly

as possible, and that as soon as a good basis had been reached in the

exploratory conversations the United States could then approach the

Chinese Government and sound out their attitude. He had previ-

ously handed to the Ambassador a document setting forth his general

ideas relating to mutual conciliation between Japan and China. In

response to a question from Minister Wakasugi, who was also present,

Secretary Hull hinted that Japan and China might be “brought to-

gether” by the United States, but did not say in so many words that

the United States would mediate between them. The conversation

ended with Secretaiy Hull expressing the hope that he might have

something by way of conunent on the Japanese proposals on Novem-

ber 14 (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 722-726). Accordii^ to Ambassador

Nomtira’s report to Tokyo, Secretary Hull also indicated that the

British and the Dutch were being informed generally of the natme of

the conversations, and that if a basis for negotiations should be

worked out, it was possible that they might sign with the United

States, although the Secretary “could not guarantee this” (ex. 1, p.

120). Ambassador Nomura told the Foreign Minister he was not

“satisfied with their attitude toward taking up negotiations,” and he

sent Minister Wakasugi to see one of Mr. Hull’s advisors the follow-

ing day to press for an early decision. During that conversation,

Mr. Wakusugi said that the public in Japan was becoming impatient

“and almost desperate,” and that he hoped for a clear-cut answer

the next day as to whether the United States would accept or not the

Japanese proposal of September 25 as modified through November

10, or desired changes therein, or whether the United States’ pro-

posal of June 21 was its final [proposal (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 729-731;

ex. 1, pp. 123-125). Similar representations concerning the need

for immediate agreement were made to Ambassador Grew on Novem-

ber 12 (Japan time), including statements that the negotiations had

reached their final phase, that Japan had made the greatest possible

concessions, and that “a very critical and dangerous state of affairs

will result should any appreciable delay be encountered in success-

fully concluding the negotiations” (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 719-722).

Secretary Hull testified that:

during those early days in October, it looked naore and more like they were pre-

pared to, and were intending to, adhere to their piolicies \* ♦ ♦ the situation

floated along until Tojo’s government came into power, about the 16th, I think,

of October \* ♦ ♦ and the Konoye Government fell.

While they started out with a professed disposition to keep up the conversations,

we could detect circumstances and facts indicative of duplicity and double dealing,

and the real purpose was to go forward more energetically with their plans, as

was indicated by numerous demands on us to make haste, and statements that

this matter could not go on without something serious happening.

\* :|i \* \* \* If \*

The impression we received, at least myself, and some others, was that during

those months they tried to prevail on this Government by persuasion and threats

and other methods to yield its basic principles, so that Japan could maintain

intact her policy and her continued course of aggression and conquest (tr. 1178-

1179).

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On November 14 (Japan time), although he knew that Ambassador

Nomura had scheduled a meeting with Secretary Hull for November 15

(Washington time) at which proposal would be further discussed,

Foreign Minister Togo cabled the Ambassador the English text to be

used in presenting proposal and told the Ambassador he would be

notified when to present that ^‘absolutely final proposal'' to the United

States Government (ex. 1, pp. 125-126). This mess^e was translated

and available in Washington on November 14 (Washington time)

(ex. 1, p. 126). The same day Ambassador Nomura cabled the

Foreign Minister a long report (No. 1090) in which, although he

realized he would be “harsldy criticized," he cautioned against pre-

cipitate action:

I am telling Your Excellency this for your own information only\*

I believe that I will win out in the long run in these negotiations, and I wiU

fight to the end. I wiU do my very best with infinite patience and then leave the

outcome up to God Almighty. However, I must tell you the following:

1. As I told you in a number of messages, the policy of the American Govern-

ment in the Pacific is to stop any further moves on our part either southward or

northward. With every economic weapon at their command, they have attempted

to achieve this objective, and now they are contriving by every possible means

to prepare for actual warfare.

2. In short, they are making every military and every other kind of preparation

to prevent us from a thrust northward or a thrust southward; they are conspiring

most actively with the nations concerned and rather than yield on this funda-

mental political policy of theirs in which they believe so firmly, they would not

hesitate, I am sure, to fight us. It is not their intention, I know, to repeat such a

thing as the Munich conference which took place several years ago and which

turned out to be such a failure. Already I think the apex of Genhan victories

has been passed. Soviet resistance persists, and the possibility of a separate

peace has receded, and hereafter this trend will be more and more in evidence.

3. The United States is sealing ever-friendlier relations with China, and insofar

as possible she is assisting Chiang. For the sake of peace in the Pacific, the

United States would not favor us at the sacrifice of China. Therefore, the China

problem might become the stumbling block to the pacification of the Pacific and

as a result the possibility of the United States and Japan ever making up might

vanish.

4. There is also the question of whether the officials of the Japanese Govern-

ment are tying up very intimately with the Axis or not. We are regarded as having

a very flexible policy, ready, nevertheless, in any case, to stab the United States

right in the back. Lately the newspapers are writing in a manner to show how

gradually we are tying up closer and closer with the Axis.

5. If we carry out a venture southward for the sake of our existence and our lives,

it naturally follows that we will have to fight England and the United States, and

chances are fdso great that the Soviet will participate. Furthermore, among the

neutral nations, those of Central America are already the puppets of the United

States, and as for those of South America, whether they like it or not, they are

dependent for their economic existence on the United States, and must maintain a

neutrality partial thereto.

6. It is inevitable that this war will be long, and this little victory or that little

victory, or this little defeat or that little defeat do not amount to much, and it is

not hard to see that whoever can hold out till the end will be the victor.

7. It is true that the United States is gradually getting in deeper and deeper in

the Atlantic, but this is merely a sort of convoy warfare, a'nd as things now stand

she might at any moment transfer her main strength to the Pacific.

Great Britain, too, in the light of the present condition of the German and

Italian Navies, has, without a doubt, moved considerable strength into the area of

the Indian Ocean. I had expected in the past that should the United States start

warlike activities in the Atlantic, there would be considerable feeling for a com-

promise in the Pacific, but there has been no evidence of such an inclination as

yet. There are even now many arguments against war with Germany as opposed

to internal questions, but there is not the slightest opposition to war in the Pacific.

It is being thought more than ever that participation will be carried out through

the Pacific area.

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8. Though I cannot be a hundred percent sure of the present situation in J apan^ hav-

ing read your successive wires I realize that the condition must he very critical. In spite

of the fact that it is my understanding that the people and officials^ too, are tightening

their belts, I am going to pass on to you my opinion, even though I know that I will be

harshly criticized for it. I feel that should the situation in Japan permit, I would

like to caution patience for one or two months in order to get a clear view of the world

situation. This, I believe, would be the best plan (ex. 1, pp. 127-129).

The Foreign Minister’s reply came back promptly and unequivocally:

For your Honor's own information.

1. I have read your #1090, and you may be sure that you have all my latitude

for the efforts you have put forth, but the fate of our Empire hangs by the slender

thread of a few days, so please fight harder than you ever did before.

2. What you say in the last paragraph of your message is, of course, so and I

have given it already the fullest consideration, but I have only to refer you to the

fundamental policy laid down in my #725. Will you please try to realize what

that means. In your opinion we ought to wait and see what turn the war takes

and remain patient. However, I am awfully sorry to say that the situation renders

this out of the question. I set the deadline for the solution of these negotiations in

my #736, and there will be no change. Please try to understand that. You see

how short the time is; therefore, do not allow the United States to sidetrack us and

delay the negotiations any further. Press them for a solution on the basis of our

proposals, and do your best to bring about an immediate solution (ex. 1 p. 137-8).

The next day, November 15 (Washington time), Ambassador

Nomura called on Secretary Hull and the Secretary handed the

Ambassador a statement, in writing, regarding the formula proposed

by the Japanese Government on November 10 (Washington time) for

dealing with the <]^uestion of nondiscrimination in international trade.

After noting that in its proposal, the Japanese Government recognized

the principle of nondiscrimination in international commercial relations to be

applied to all the Pacific areas, inclusive of China, on the understanding that the

principle in question is to be applied uniformly to the rest of the entire world as well

(ex. 29, vol. II, p. 734),

the statement suggested that the meaning of the condition attached

by the Japanese was not entirely clear. It was assumed that the

Japanese Government did not intend to ask the United States Govern-

ment to accept responsibility for discriminatory practices in areas out-

side its sovereign jurisdiction, or to propose including in an arrange-

ment with the United States a condition which could be fulfilled only

with the consent and cooperation of aU other governments. The

statement then reviewed the efforts of the United States over recent

years to reduce tariff barriers, and suggested that similar action by

Japan would be a “long forward step” toward the objective set forth

in the Japanese proposal. The need for the proviso noted above was

then questioned, and it was suggested that the proviso might well be

omitted. The statement was accompanied by a draft of a proposed

joint United States-Japanese . declaration on economic policy, which

Secretary Hull told Minister W akasugi constituted the United States

reply to the Japanese proposal on the question of nondiscrimination

in international trade (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 731-737).

Ambassador Nomura then stated that his Government regarded

the conversations as having progressed to the stage of formal n^otia-;

tions. In reply to this. Secretary Hull said that until the conversations '

had reached a point where he could call in the British, the Chinese,

and the Dutch and say that there was a basis for negotiation, the

conversations were exploratory. He pointed out that whereas the

United States proposal of June 21 made it clear that the settlement

under discussion related to the entire Pacific area, the proposal the

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previous Japanese Government had submitted on September 27 nar-

rowed the application of the proposals regarding economic nondis-

crimination and peaceful intent to the southwestern Pacific, and he

then requested that the new Japanese Government give assurances

on that point. He said that it would be difiEicult for him to go to

the British and the Dutch and say that Japan was willing to enter

upon a peaceful program but at the same time desired to adhere to

a fighting alliance with Germany. The Secretary said that if the

United States made an agreement with Japan while Japan had an

outstanding obligation to Germany which might call upon Japan to

go to war with us, this would cause “so much turmoil in the country

that he might be lynched.” He asked the Ambassador whether the

United States Government could assume that if the Japanese Govern-

ment entered into an agreement with it the Tripartite Pact would

become a “dead letter.” When Mr. Wakasugi inquired whether this

was an answer to the Japanese proposal on the question of Japan’s

relations under the Tripartite Pact, Secretary Hull said the United

States would be better able to reply after receiving an answer to the

question he had just raised. Ambassador Nomura said he was afraid

the American Government did not trust the Japanese Government,

though there was no material difference between the policies of the new

Government and the previous Government. Secretary Hull said that

the new Japanese Government seemed to be taking the attitude that

the United States Government must reply “at once” to their points,

and that he did not think that his Government —

should be receiving ultimatums of such a character from the Japanese Govern-

ment under circumstances where the United States had been pursuing peaceful

courses throughout and the Japanese Government had been violating law and

order (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 734).

He concluded by saying that when he had heard further from the new

Japanese Government regarding its peaceful intentions, and when the

question of nondiscrimination could be cleared up as suggested in the

proposals he had handed to Ambassador Nomura during the meeting,

and also in regard to the Tripartite Pact, he believed that some solution

could be reached on the question of stationing troops in China. The

Secretary emphasized at the same time that he did not desire any

delay and that he was working as hard as he could to bring about a

wholly satisfactory and broad settlement. It was agreed mat there

should be a further meeting after Ambassador Nomura had received

instructions from his Government (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 731-734; ex. 1,

p. 132).

In his report of this meeting to Tokyo, Ambassador Nomima said

that he had told Mr. Hull he felt his Government would be “very

disappointed” over these replies. He continued:

Today’s talks can be boiled down to tbe fact that the United States did clarify

their attitude on the trade question. On the other two problems, although we

agree in principle, we diflfer on interpretations. They harbor deep doubts as to

the sincerity of our peaceful intentions and apparently they view the China situa-

tion through those eyes of suspicion (ex. 1, p. 137).

There is no evidence before the Committee indicating that at that

time Ambassador Nomura had any knowledge that the Japanese naval

striking force had already started assembling for the attack on Pearl

Harbor.

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The Tojo Cabinet Refuses to Consider Any Suggestion Less

Favorable to Japan Than Its “Absolutely Final Proposal”

(November J 8-1 9, 1941)

Ambassador Kurusu reached Washington on November 15 (Wash-

ington time) (tr. 1133). On the morning of November 17 (Washing-

ton time), with Ambassador Nomura, he called on Secretary Hiul

prior to their meeting with President Roosevelt. After he had been

introduced. Ambassador Kurusu said, among other things, that he

was fullj^ assured of Premier Tojo’s desire to reach a peaceful settle-

ment with the United States, and that Premier Tojo was optimistic

regarding the possibihty of settling the differences in' respect to non-

discrimination in international trade and Japan’s attitude toward the

European war, but felt that there were greater difficulties in the

question of withdrawing Japanese troops from China. Before the

meeting with President Roosevelt, Ambassador Nomura handed

Secretary Hull two documents which he said the Japanese Govern-

ment was submitting m response to the questions that had been

raised at the conference on November 12 regarding Japan’s peaceful

intentions and the scope of the proposed understanding between the

two Governments (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 738-739).

At the meeting at the White House, Ambassador Kurusu was for-

mally received by President Roosevelt. The conversation was

largely devoted to a discussion of the relation of Japan and the

United States to the war in Europe and to the China problem. Con-

cerning the latter the President said that at a suitable stage the

United States would, so to speak, “introduce” Japan and China to

each other and tell them to proceed with the remaining adjustments,

the Pacific questions having already been determined. Secretary

Hull explained at length that America’s military preparations were

for defense before it was too late, that the United States was on the

defense in the present Pacific situation and that Japan was the

aggressor. The conference ended with the understandmg that both

Ambassadors would see Secretary Hull the next morning (ex. 29,

vol. II, pp. 740-743).

At that meeting at the White House no effort was made by either

side to solve the three major points of difference between the two

countries, and there is no evidence before the Committee of any con-

tact between representatives of the two Governments on the afternoon

of November 17 (Washington time). However, as Ambassador

Nomma reported to Tokyo the next day (No. 1135), that evening the

two Japanese Ambassadors “went to call on a certain Cabinet mem-

ber.” “This,” they cabled the Fore^ Minister, \*‘is what he told us”:

The President is very desirous of an understanding between Japan and the

United States. In his latest Speech he showed that he entertained no ill will

towards Japan. I would call that to your attention. Now the great majority

of the cabinet members, with two exceptions, in principle approve of a Japanese

American understanding. If J apan would now do something real, such as evacuat-

ing French Indo-China, showing her peaceful intentions, the way would be open for

us to furnish you with oil and it would probably lead to the reestablishment of normal

trade relations. The Secretary of State cannot bring public opinion in line so

long as you do not take some real and definite steps to reassure the Americans

(ex. 1, p. 154).

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There are indications in the record before the Committee that this

meeting between the two Japanese Ambassadors and a member of

President Roosevelt’s Cabinet on the evening before their meeting

with Secretary Hull was more thah a coincidence. Under Secretary

Welles testified before the Conunittee in another connection that he

had been told by Secretary Hull “and other individuals” that Mr.

Frank Walker, then Postmaster General and as such a member of

President Roosevelt’s Cabinet, was “negotiating” with the Japanese

and that he thought Mr. Walker “had conversations both with Admiral

.Nomura and later, when Kurusu was here, with him, as well” (tr.

.1319-1320). Furthermore, the record of outside telephone calls

through the White House switchboard shows that at 6:25 p. m. on

November 17, before the meeting of the two Japanese Ambassadors

with the “certain Cabinet member,” Postmaster General Walker

talked with Secretary Hull, and that he also talked with Secretary

Hull at 9:22 o’clock the next morning, November 18 (Washington

time), before Secretary Hull’s conference at 10:30 o’clock with the

two Ambassadors (ex. 179).

The suggestion made that evening by the Cabinet member — that

some action by Japan to show her peaceful intentions, “such as evacu-

ating French Indochina,” wovild open the way for the United States to

relax its freezing orders — was substantially the proposal made by the

two Ambassadors to Secretary Hull at their meeting with him at 10:30

the next morning. While at that meeting the greatest emphasis was

.placed on the question of Japan’s obligations under the Tripartite

.Pact, during the discussion of this subject, after Secretary Hull had

pointed out that the American public would never understand an

agreement between Japan and the United States if Japan continued

to adhere to the Tripartite Pact, Ambassador Nomura said that the

situation in the southwest Pacific was now critical, with the United

States and Great Britain reinforcing their armed forces in Singapore

and the PhiUppine Islands to counter Japan’s sending troops to

French Indochina. He suggested that if this situation couldjnow be

checked, if the tension comd be relaxed, an atmosphere could be

created in which the talks could continue. Ambassador Kurusu then

said that the freezing regulations had caused impatience in Japan and

a feeling that Japan had to fight while it could ; he said that what was

needed now was to do something to enable Japan to change its course.

Secretary Hull asked to what, extent a relaxation of freezing would

enable Japan to adopt peaceful policies. He explained that —

what he had in mind was to enable the peaceful leaders in Japan to get control

of the situation in Japan and to assert their influence.

Ambassador Nomura then asked whether there was any hope of a

solution — some small beginning toward the realization of “our hig h

ideals” — and continued % suggesting:

the possibility of going hack to the status which existed before the date in July when

following the Japanese move into southern French Indochina^ our freezing measures

were put into effects The Secretary said that if we should make some modifications

in our embargo on the strength of a step by Japan such as the Ambassador had

mentioned we do not know whether the troops which have been withdrawn from

French Indochina will be diverted to some equally objectionable movement

elsewhere. The Ambassador said that what he had in mind was simply some

move towa'rd arresting the dangerous trend in our relations. The Secretary said

\* While the Japanese move that precipitated the United States freezing order was into southern French

Indochina, Japanese troops had moved into northern French Indochina in 1940.

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that it would he difficult for him to get this Government to go a long way in removing

the embargo unless this Government believed that Japan was definitely started on a

peaceful course and had renounced purposes of conquest. The Ambassador said

that the Japanese were tired of fighting China and that Japan would go as far

as it could along a first step. The Secretary said that he would consult with the

British and the Dutch to see what their attitude would be toward the suggestion

offered by the Japanese Ambassador (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 750).

Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu pursued their suggestion further

at a conference with Secretary Hull the next day, November 19

(Washington time). Ambassador Nomura told the Secretary that

they had reported to their Government the conversation of the

preceding day and were momentarily expecting instructions.

The Secretary then asked how the Ambassador (Nomura) felt about the possi-

bilities. The Ambassador said that yesterday he had made the suggestion in regard

to a restoration of the status which prevailed before the Japanese moved into south

Indochina in the latter part of July because he felt that, as this action had precipitated

our freezing measures which in turn had reacted in Japan to increase the tension, if

something could be done on his suggestion, it would serve to relieve that tension and

tend to create a better atmosphere in our relations. The Secretary asked whether the

Ajnbassador contemplated that if a proposal such as the Ambassador had sug-

gested were carried out w’e would go on with the conversations. The Ambassador

replied in the affirmative. The Secretary expressed the view\* that this might

enable the leaders in Japan to hold their ground and organize public opinion in

favor of a peaceful course. He said that he recognized that this might take

some time.

The Ambassador said that what was in his mind was that both sides now

appeared to be preparing for eventualities and that nevertheless the Japanese

desired a quick settlement, especially in view of our freezing measures. The

Secretary said that he presumed that the Ambassador had in mind, in connection

with the continuation of our conversations, further efforts to iron out the impor-

tant points on which our views had not so far diverged. The Ambassador agreed

(ex. 29, vol. II, p. 751).

In reporting to Tokyo on November 18 (Washington time) the

substance of their conversation with Secretary Hull on that day, the

two Japanese Ambassadors had, in fact, dispatched four separate

tjlegrams (ex. 1, pp. 146, 149, 151, 152), each of which outlined the

suggestion they had made, thereby indicating the importance the two

Ambassadors attachad to it. The sending of four telegrams may also

have reflected the fact that they had already received from the Forei^

Minister the English text of proposal which was far more drastic

than their suggestion and was, they knew, regarded in Tokyo as

Japan^s ^'absolutely final proposal.^’ Furthermore, they had been

told by the Foreign Minister that they would be notified when to

present it to Secretary Hull. The two final telegrams show that both

Japanese Ambassadors regarded a return to the status prior to freezing

as the only means to success in the negotiations. In his message

(No. 1133) Ambassador Kurusu said:

In view of the internal situation in our country, although I think there will be

difficulties to be met in trying to reach a settlement in harmony with the wishes

of the Americans, I feel that as a stopgap for the present, we should ask them to

consider our strong desires for a \*Hime limit” in connection with the conclusion of

such a Japanese- American agreement and for the purpose of breaking the present

deadlock, ask them for the removal at once of the freezing act and also for assurances

regarding imports of a specified amount of oil.

In the conference of the 18th both Ajnbassador Nomura and I suggested the re-

sumption of the status quo prior to 24 J uly, but in view of the progress of negotia-

tions thus far, the Americans will likely not consent to this merely for our agreeing

to not forcefully invade any territory aside from French Indo-China as per

Proposal or for our promise in vague terms of evacuation of troops from

French lodo-China \* \* ♦ Please have your mind made up to this. I

desire instructions re ‘^time limit and \* \* \* as we desire to press for a

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speedy settlement, please give consideration to the above and advise at once

(ex. 1, pp. 151-152).

In his message (No. 1134) to the Foreign Minister Ambassador

Nomura outlined at greater length what he and Ambassador Kurusu

had in mind:

In our conversations of today, as a practical means of alleviating the ever worsen-

ing front with which we are faced and to quiet the fearful situation, as well as, to

brir^ about a return to the situation existing before che application of the freezing

legislation, we suggested the evacuation of Japanese troops stationed in the southern

part of French Indo-China.

Hull, showing considerable reluctance replied, ''After Japan had clearly dem-

onstrated her intentions to be peaceful I will confer with Britain, the Netherlands

and other interested powers.'^

In the past it would seem that the greatest stumbling block for the American

authorities was the question of our troops of occupation in China. Recently,

however, the United States, what with her internal situation and, especially

insofar as it concerns the revision of the Neutrality Agreement, her increasing

involvement in the war in the Atlantic, seems to have undergone a change.

She is now, rather, exhibiting a tendency to lay more emphasis on Japan's peace

plans insofar as they pertain to the Tri-Partite Alliance. With regard to other

questions, too, it seems very clear that they are of a mind to bring about a

compromise after making sure of our peaceful intentions. In view of these

circumstances, as a result of our deliberations of successive days it would seem

that should we present Proposal "B" immediately, an understanding would be

more difl5cult to realize than if we went on with our discussions of Proposal

"A". Therefore, looking at it from a practical point of view, we are of the opinion

that prior to presenting of Proposal "B" it would be more advisable to reach a prac-

tical settlement, principally on the questions of the acquisition of goods and the can-

cellation of the freezing legislation mentioned in Proposal "B", and then to try to

proceed with the solution of other questions on this basis. Unless we follow this course

we are convinced that an immediate soluiion will be extremely difficult.

♦ « : :|e )|t

The United States, of course, has indicated clearly that she is not interested

in mere promises as much as she is in putting said promises in effect. It is neces-

sary, therefore, for us to be prepared to withdraw our troops as soon as the freeing

order is rescinded and materials are made available to us.

Please advise us as to your intentions after perusing my message #1133 (ex. 1,

pp. 152-3).

The temporary arrangement suggested by the two Japanese Am-

bassadors was summarily rejected by the Japanese Government in

Tokyo. On November 19 (Japan time), in a message in which he

referred to the Ambassadors' messages No. 1133 and No. 1134 above,

Foreign Minister Togo emphasized that in the negotiations consent

could be given only ‘ 'within the scope of the instructions of this

office." He told Ambassador Nomura that —

the internal situation in our country is such that it would be difficult for us to handle

it if we withdraw from Southern French Indo-China, merely on assurances that

conditions prior to this freezing act will be restored. It would be necessary to have

a proposed solution that would come up to the B proposal. With the situation as

urgent as it is now, it is of utmost importance that you play your hand for the

amelioration of the situation, to the extent of the proposal in your message, then

to push on for an understanding.

The Ambassador (Kurusu) did not arrange this with us beforehand, but made the

proposal contained in your message for the purpose of meeting the tense situation

existing within the nation, but this can only result in delay and failure in the negotia-

tions. The Ambassador, therefore, having received our revised instructions, (after

reading our #797, 800 and 801) will please present our B proposal of the Imperial

Government, and no further concessions can be made.

If the V. S. consent to this cannot be secured, the negotiations will have to be broken

off; therefore, with the above well in mind put forth your very best efforts (ex. 1,

p. 155).

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Ambassador Nomura immediately cabled the Foreign Minister in

Tokyo his astonishment at the Japanese Government’s unwillingness

to consider seriously the suggestion he and Ambassador Kurusu had

made. His message (No. 1136), dated November 19 (Washington

time) follows in full:

I know that it is beyond our powers to imagine the anxiety felt by the Cabinet

leaders who bear the heavy responsibility of saving the nation and succoring the

people at this time when relations between Japan and the United States have now

at last reached the point of cruciality. There are now three ways which the Em-

pire might take —

(1) Maintain the status quo.

(2) Break the present deadlock by an advance under force of arms.

(3) Devise some means for bringing about a mutual non-agression arrange-

ment.

No. 1 would mean that both sides would continue to increase war preparations

and send out larger fleets of war vessels bringing about a state where only a contact

would be needed to start a conflagration. In other words this would finally result

in an armed clash and it differs from No. 2 only in the matter of the longer or

shorter time involved.

No. 3 would mean finding some provisional arrangement by which the present

deadlock might be broken, and at the same time attaining our objectives under

the peace for which we have been striving. My #1184 of yesterday was sent with

this purpose in mind. The displeasure felt by the government is beyond my power of

comprehensionj but as I view it, the present, after exhausting our strength by

four years of the China incident following right upon the Manchuria incident, is

hardly an opportune time for venturing upon another long drawn out warfare on a

large scale. I think that it would be better to fix up a temporary ^Hruce” now in the

spirit of \*\*give and take'' and make this the prelude to greater achievements to come

iMer,

I am thus frankly setting before you my humble opinion as supplementary to

my message of yesterday (ex. 1, p. 158).

In a separate message Ambassador Nomura requested the Foreign

Minister to ‘^convey the above (message) to the Prime Minister” (ex. 1,

p. 158).

In reply to this Foreign Minister Togo cabled Ambassador Nomura

on November 20 (Japan time) that:

under the circumstances here, we regret that the plan suggested by you, as we have

stated in our message, would not suffice for saving the present situation.

We see no prospects for breaking the deadlock except for you to push negotiations

immediately along the lines of the letter part of our §798. Please understand this.

The Premier also is absolutely in accord with this opinion (ex. 1, p. 160).

Message No. 798 referred to in the next preceding paragraph was the

message the Foreign Minister had sent on November 19 (Japan time)

which rejected Ambassador Nomura’s suggestion for a “provisional

arrangement” and instructed him to present proposal “B,” the Japa-

nese Government’s “absolutely final proposal.”

Foreim Minister Togo’s message of November 20 (Japan time),

which thus finally and conclusively rejected the suggestion made by

Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu, was sent not only after the

Foreign Minister had received the Ambassadors’ four telegrams of

November 18 (Washington time), including No. 1133 and No. 1134

quoted in part above, but also after the Foreign Minister had received

Ambassador Nomura’s message No. 1135 of the same date, reporting

on the meeting of the two Ambassadors with the member of President

Roosevelt’s Cabinet on the evening of November 17 (Washington

time). Consequently, the record before the committee shows that the

Japanese (Government, including Premier Tojo, refused to consider

the provisional arrangement suggested by Ambassadors Nomxura and

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Kurusu mth knowledge not only that Secretary Hull had agreed to

discuss it with the British and the Dutch— thxis indicating, in the

light of his prior statements, that he believed a basis for negotiations

had been suggested by the two Ambassadors — but with the further

knowledge that practically the same suggestion had been made to

Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu by a member of President Koose-

velt’s Cabinet.

The seriousness with which the Japanese Government regarded the

stage that had now been reached in the negotiations is evidenced by

the fact that on November 15 (Japan time), the Japanese Foreign

Office sent out a circular message to its officials abroad, mcluding those

in Washington, prescribing “the order. and method of destroying the

code machines in the event of an emeigency” (ex. 1, p. 137). Four

days later the Foreign Office sent out circmar messages establishing

the so-called “winds code,” to be used in case of an emeigency and the

cutting off of international commimications. The receipt of a mes-

sage implementing this code waS to be the signal to “destroy all code

papers, etc.” (ex. 1, pp. 154-155). Those two messages were sent from

Tokyo hejore Japan’s “absolutely final proposal” was presented to

Secretary Hull, and appear to have been the first Japanese messages

intercepted which dealt with the destruction of codes, code machines,

et cetera.

Japan Delivers Its “Absolutely Final Proposal” to the United

States and Demands an Agreement on That Basis

{November 20, 1940

On November 20 (Washington time), Thanksgiving Day, Ambassa-

dors Nomura and Kurusu called at the State Department. Am-

bassador Kurusu told Secretary Hull that they had referred to their

Government the suggestion Ambassador Nomura had made at the

meeting 2 days before for a return to the status which prevailed prior

to the Japanese move into southern French Indochina in July. He

said that both he and Ambassador Nomura had anticipated that the

Japanese Government might perceive difficulty in moving troops out

of Indochina in short order, but that nevertheless the Japanese

Government was now prepared to offer a proposal “on that basis.”

He said that the Japanese proposal represented an amplification of

the suggestion Ambassador Nomura had made (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 753).

The proposal which Ambassador Kurusu then read and handed to

Secretary HuU was the second formula, proposal “B,” approved at

the Imperial Conference in Tokyo on November 5 (Japan time) as a

“last effort to prevent something happening.” In his messages to

Ambassador Nomura, Foreign Minister Togo had described it as “an

ultimatum” (ex. 1, p. 99), as “our absolutely final proposal” (ex. 1,

p. 99), and as “our last possible bargain” (ex. 1, p. 93). As originally

drawn up and approved, proposal “B” had consisted of four provi-

sions, each of which was contamed in the Japanese proposal of Novem-

ber 20 (ex. 1, pp. 97, 99; ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 755-756). “If necessary,”

those four provisions were to be supplemented by others dealing with

the three points previously at issue in the conversations — i. e., the

evacuation of troops from China and French Indochina, the Tripar-

tite Pact, and nonaiscrimination in international trade. In the Eng-

hsh text of proposal “B” cabled to Ambassador Nomura on November

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14 (Japan time), specific provisions covering those three points were

added to the original four provisions (ex. 1, p. 126). However, the

Foreign Minister’s instructions to Ambassador Nomura on November

19 (Japan time) to present proposal “B” had also directed him to

delete the provisions dealing with nondiscrimination in international

trade and the Tripartite Pact, leaving only the provision relating to

evacuation of troops in addition to the four provisions approved on

November 6 (Japan time) (ex. 1, p. 156). But whereas the formula

concerning the evacuation of troops which Ambassador Nomura had

presented to Secretary Hull on November 7 (Washington time) had

covered the evacuation of Japanese troops from both China and

French Indochina, the provision contained in the Japanese proposal

of November 20 covered the evacuation of Japanese troops from French

Indochina only. To this, possibly with an eye to the suggestion

made by Ambassador Nomura to Secretary Hull on November 18,

the Japanese Government had added a provision for the transfer of

their troops from southern French Indochina to northern French

Indochina “upon the conclusion of the present arrangement.” ^

As read and delivered to Secretary Hull by Ambassador Kurusu,

the Japanese proposal follows in full:

1. Both the Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to

make any armed advancement into any of the regions in the Southeastern Asia

and the Southern Pacific area excepting the part of French Indo-China where the

Japanese troops are stationed at present.

2. The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw its troops now stationed

in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and

China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area.

In the meantime the Government of Japan declares that it is prraared to re-

move its troops now stationed in the southern part of French Indo-China to the

northern part of the said territory upon the conclusion of the present arrange-

ment which shall later be embodied in the final agreement.

3. The Government of Japan and the United States shall cooperate with a

view to securing the acquisition of those goods and commodities which the two

countries need in Netherlands East Indies.

, 4. The Governments of Japan and the United States mutually undertake to

restore their commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of the

assets.

The Government of the United States shall supply Japan a required quantity

of oil;

5. The Government of the United States undertakes to refrain from such

measures and actions as will be prmudicial to the endeavors for the restoration of

general peace between Japan and China (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 755-756).

When Ambassador Kurusu handed the Japanese proposal to him,

Secretary Hull said that he would examine and study it sympa-

thetically. Secretary Hull referred to the fact that the United States

was supplying aid to both Great Britain and China, and indicated

that imtil Japan made it perfectly clear that her policy was one of

peace it would be impossible to cease aiding China. However,

Ambassador Kurusu observed in connection with paragraph 5 of the

proposal that it “might be interpreted to mean that American aid

to China would be discontinued as from the time that negotiations

were started.” (Ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 753-755.)

In his testimony before the Committee Secretary Hull summarized

the Japanese note of November 20 in these words:

\* Secretary Hull testified that the conditional offer of the Japanese “to withdraw troops from southern

Indochina to northern Indochina was meaningless as they could have brought those troops back to southern

Indochina within a day or two, and furthermore they placed no limit on the number of troops they might

mntinue to send there.” (Th 14261.) t »

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The plan thus offered called for the supplying by the United States to Japan

of as much oil as Japan might require, for suspension of freezing measures, for

^scontinuance by the United States of aid to China, and for withdrawal of moral

and material support from the recognized Chinese Government. It contained a

provision that Japan would shift her armed forces from southern Indochina to

northern Indochina, but placed no limit on the number of armed forces which

Japan might send into Indochina and made no provision for withdrawal of those

forces until after either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the

establishment of an ‘‘equitable'' peace in the Pacific area. While there were stip-

ulations against further extension of Japan's armed force into southeastern

and the southern Pacific (except Indochina), there were no provisions which

would have prevented continued or fresh Japanese aggressive activities in any

of the regions of Asia lying to the north of Indochina — for example, China and

the Soviet Union. The proposal contained no provision pledging Japan to aban-

don aggression and to revert to peaceful courses (tr. 1137-38).

It is now known that the Japanese note of November 20, was, in

fact, a restatement in more peremptory terms of Japan’s “minimum

demands” determined at the Imperial Conference in Tokyo on

September 6 (Japan time). As applied to the United States, the

three major Japanese “demands” decided upon at that Imperial

Conference were, that the United States would not “intervene in or

obstruct a settlement by Japan of the China Incident”, i. e., would

cease all aid to China; that the United States would “take no action

in the Far East which offers a threat to the defense of the Empire”;

and that the United States would “ cooperate with Japan in her attempt

to obtain needed raw materials” (ex. 179, Konoye Memoirs, pp. 77-

78). In an intercepted message to Ambassador Nomura which was

translated and available in Washington on November 24 (Washing-

ton time). Foreign Minister Togo said:

our demand for a cessation of aid to Chiang (the acquisition of Netherlands

Indies goods and at the same time the supply of American petroleum to Japan as

well) is a most essential condition (ex. 1, p. 172).

Secretary Hull testified that the Japanese must have known that

their proposal was — •

an utterly impossible proposal for us, in the light of our 4 or 6 years exploration

of each others situations and attitudes (tr. 1181).

He continued —

To have accepted the Japanese proposal of November 20 was clearly unthinkable.

It would have made the United States an ally of Japan in Japan’s program of

conquest and ag^ssion and of collaboration with Hitler. It would have meant

yielding to the Japanese demand that the United States abandon its principles

and policies. It would have meant abject surrender of our position under

intimidation (tr. 1140).

Secretary Hull and President Roosevelt, as well as other high

officials of the Government, not only knew from the intercepted

Japanese messages already mentioned that the note the Japanese

delivered on Thanksgiving Day, November 20, was their “absolutely

final proposal,” they also knew from the same source that the Japanese

Government had fixed November 25 (Japan time) as the dead hue

by which the written a^eement of the United States, Great Britain,

and the Netherlands to its demands were to be obtained. On Novem-

ber 22 (Washington time), the following intercepted message from

Foreign Minister Togo to Ambassador Nomiu-a was translated and

available in Washington:

It is awful^ hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my #736 (Novem-

ber 25). You should know this, however, 1 know you are working hard. Stick

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to our fixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring

about the solution we desire. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why

we wanted to settle J apanese- American relations by the 25th, but if within the next

three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the sign-

ing can be completed by the 29th, (let me write it out for you — twenty-ninth) ; if

the pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great

Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished, we have

decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the dead line absolutely

cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen. Please

take this into your careful consideration and work harder than you ever have

before (ex. 1, p. 165).

Even with four added days of grace, the situation was, Secretary

Hull testified,

critical and virtually hopeless. On the one hand our Government desired to

exhaust all possibilities of finding a means to a peaceful solution and to avert

or delay an armed clash, especially as the heads of this country’s armed forces

continued to emphasize the need for time to prepare for resistance. On the

other hand, Japan was calling for a show-down.

There the situation stood — the Japanese unyielding and intimidating in their

demands and we standing firmly for oiur principles.

The chances of meeting the crisis by diplomacy had practically vanished.

We had reached the point of clutching at straws (tr. 1140) .

Neither Secretary Hull nor President Roosevelt, nor any of their

advisors, knew, however, that almost simultaneously with the delivery

in Washington of the Japanese ultimatum of November 20, the

Imperial Japanese General Headquarters in Tokyo had ordered the

commander in chief of the Japanese combined fleet to .direct the

Japanese naval striking force, already assembling in a harbor in

northern Japan, to “advance to the area in which they are to wait

in readiness” for the attack on Pearl Harbor (tr. 437).

The United States Replies

{November 26, 1941)

The United States reply was handed to Ambassadors Nomura and

Kurusu in the late afternoon on November 26 (Washington time),

6 days after the deliverjr of the Japanese ultimatum (tr. 1147). Those

6 days were a period of intense activity, involving not only the highest

officials in the United States Government but also the highest officials

of the British, Dutch, Australian, and Chinese Governments.

From time to time Secretary Hull had told the Japanese Ambassa-

dors that when his conversations with them got beyond the exploratory

stage he would talk with the representatives of the British, Dutch,

and Chinese Governments. On November 18 (Washington time),

after the Japanese Ambassadors suggested a return to the status prior

to the freezing orders in July, Secretary Hull told them he would

consult the British and the Dutch to see what their attitude would

be (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 750). Immediately after that conference.

Secretary Hull req^uested the British Minister, Sir Ronald Campbell,

to call on him. Secretary Hull’s memorandum of his conversation

with the Minister is as follows:

I said that I had engaged in a lengthy conference with the two ranking Japanese

representatives, including Mr. Kurusu, who is here for the purpose of carrying on

conversations with this Government. I added that the conversation related to

the question of a proposed peaceful settlement for the Pacific area. I stated that

nothing was agreed upon at this meeting and that the discussion included the

subject of two opposing policies — of conquest by force on the one hand and a

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policy of peace, law, and order on the other. I went on to say that the three main

points on which we have encountered serious difficulties in former conversations

with Ambassador Nomura, namely, the bringing of Japanese troops out of

China, the Tripartite Pact and certain phases of commercial policy, were discussed

at length; but that the Japanese made no concessions on the troop matter or on

the matter of the Tripartite Pact. I told the Minister that the Japanese finally

inquired whether a brief temporary partial arrangement could not be worked out

that would enable them to improve public sentiment in Japan along the lines of

peace rather than of military action. This would also include the idea of Japan's

coming out of China. They said while the United States and maybe Great Britain

and the Netherlands East Indies, if they should be so disposed on consultation,

would to a partial extent relax embargoes on exports to Japan, Japan on its part

would correspondingly take steps in the direction of a peaceful policy and in

organizing and educating its public opinion in support of such a policy during the

next few months. The Japanese suggested further that the whole question of a

general peaceful settlement for the Pacific area would be gradually developed and

public opinion in Japan would enable them to meet us more satisfactorily them-

selves, and presumably satisfactorily to us, on the more difficult questions such

as removing their troops from China and the Tripartite Pact. They did not,

however, make any definite commitments as to just how far they could comply

with our position with respect to these two points.

I said to the British Minister that I had made it clear to the Japanese that if

their Government cared to present something on this point, I would give it con-

sideration in the event it appeared to be feasible of consideration, but that I

could make no promise, and that if it should be deemed feasible, I would confer

with the British, the Dutch, the Chinese and the Australians about any phase

of the matter in which they would be interested to which they would give con-

sideration. I also said to the Japanese that, of course, unless Japan decides on a

peaceful policy rather than a policy of force and conquest, we could not get far

in any kind of discussion but that I could understand why they might need a little

time to educate public opinion, as stated (ex. 168).

The next day the Australian and Netherlands Ministers called

separately on Secretary Hull, at his request, and to each he gave the

substance of his talk with the British Minister (ex. 168).

Before turning to a discussion of the preparation of the United

States' reply to the Japanese note of November 20, it is important .to

recall briefly the evidence before the Conamittee of the consideration

given earlier in November to —

the possibility of reaching some stop-gap arrangement with the Japanese to tide

over the immediate critical situation and thus to prevent a breakdown in the

conversations, and even perhaps to pave the way for a subsequent general agree-

ment (Hull, tr. 1128).

At the Joint Board meeting on November 3 CWashington time)

which followed the conferences called by Secretary Hull to detertnine

whether “the military authorities would be prepared to support fur-

ther warnings” by the United States to Japan as urged by Generalis-

simo Chiang Kai-shek, General Marshall had expressed the view that —

the basis of U. S. policy should be to make certain minor concessions which the

Japanese could use in saving face. These concessions might be a relaxation on oil

restrictions or on similar trade restrictions (ex. 16).

The Joint Board had decided that the War and Navy Departments

would prepare a memorandum for President Roosevelt which would,

among other things, oppose the issuance of an ultimatum to Japan as

urged by the Generalissimo, advocate State Department action to put

off hostilities with Japan as long as possible, and suggest that an

agreement be made with Japan to tide the situation over for the next

several months. However, the joint memorandum which General

Marshall and Admiral Stark actually submitted to President Roose-

velt on November 5 contained only the first of the Joint Board’s

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recommendations; no reference was made in the memorandum to the

second or third points recommended by the Board and mentioned

above (ex. 16).

The day after the Marshall-Stark joint memorandum was given to

President Roosevelt, Secretary of War Stimson —

had an hour’s talk alone with the President wdth regard to the Far Eastern situa-

tion and his approaching conference with Kurusu, who was coming from Japan.

The thing uppermost in his mind was how to gain more time (tr. 14386-14387).

In his notes of that talk with the President, Mr. Stimson recorded:

The President outlined what he thought he might say. He teas trying to think

of something which would give us further time. He suggested that he might pro-

pose a truce in which there would be no movement of armament for 6 months

and then if the Japanese and Chinese had not settled their arrangement in that

meanwhile, we could go on on the same basis (tr. 14414).

At the Cabinet meeting the next day, November 7, the President

had heard Secretary Hull’s estimate of the situation in the Far East

and had polled the Cabinet as already described (tr. 14415). On

November 10, during his talk with Ambassador Nomura, the Presi-

dent had made reference to a “modus vivendi,” and after this meeting,

in his report to Tokyo, Ambassador Nomura had said he intended to

find out whether the President referred to “possibly, a provisional

agreement” (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 718; ex. 1, p. 116). Again, in his report

to Tokyo of the meeting with President Roosevelt on November 17,

Ambassador Nomura had commented that, in connection with a remark

by the President that the United States desired to preserve peace in

the Pacific,

I could see that he was outlining some formula in his mind (ex. 1, p. 139).

It was on the evening of the same day that the two Japanese Am-

bassadors had called on a member of the President’s Cabinet and had

been told that the President “was very desirous of an imderstanding

between Japan and the United States,” and if Japan would do some-

thing real to show her peaceful intent, “such as evacuating French

Indo-China,” the way would be open “for us to furnish you with oil

and it would probably lead to the reestablishment of normal trade

relations” (ex. 1, p. 154).

Exhibit 18 before the Committee includes the following undated,

pencilled memorandum in President Roosevelt’s handwriting:

6 months

1. U. S. to resume economic relations — some oil and rice now — more later.

2. Japan to send no more troops to Indo-China or Manchurian border or any

place South (Dutch, Brit, or Siam).

3. Japan to agree not to invoke tripartite pact if U. S. gets into European war.

4. U. S. to introduce Japs to Chinese to talk things over but U. S. to take no

part in their conversations.

Later on Pacific agreements, (ex. 18). [Italics in original.]

Attached to the President's memorandum, which was obtained from

the files of the State Department, is a cover sheet on which appears

the following typewritten note: ‘Tencilled memorandum given by

the President to the Secretary of State (not dated but probably written

shortly after November 20, 1941)" (ex. 18). However, the fact that

the memorandum suggests only that Japan should not be permitted

to send ‘'more troops to Indochina or Manchurian Border," whereas

by November J8 the Japanese Ambassadors were suggesting to Secre-

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tary Hull the withdrawal of Jap^ese troops from at least southern

French Indochina, would seem to indicate that the memorandum may

have been written by the President before the latter date.

Likewise, since early in November the State Department had been

giving intensive study to the possibility of reaching some stopgap

arrangement, knowing that —

The presentation to the Japanese of a proposal which would serve to keep alive

the conversations would also give our Army and Navy time to prepare and to

expose Japan’s bad faith if it did not accept. We considered every kind of

suggestion we could find which might help or keep alive the conversations and at

the same time be consistent with the integrity of American principles (Hull,

tr. 1128).

Two of those suggestions were used in preparing the United States’

reply to the Japanese note of November 20. On November 1 1 (Wash-

ington time), the Far Eastern Division of the State Department had

submitted to Secretary Hull a draft of a proposal intended to serve

as a —

transitional arrangement the very discussion of which might serve not only to

continue the conversations pending the advent of a more favorable situation,

even if the proposal is not eventually agreed to, but also to provide the entering

wedge toward a comprehensive settlement of the nature sought providing the

proposal is accepted by Japan and provided further that China is able to obtain

satisfactory terms from Japan (ex. 18).

This draft proposal consisted of two parts, the first of which contained

a statement of principles and mutual pledges with respect to economic

relations which followed closely the lines of the counterproposals made

to the Japanese on several prior occasions beginning in April. The

second part contemplated immediate Japanese-Chinese negotiations

during which there would be an armistice between those countries

and the United States would hold in abeyance the shipment of supplies

of a military character to China and Japan would not increase or

supply its military forces m China and French Indochina. Upon

the conclusion of a peace settlement between Japan and China the

United States was to negotiate with both China and Japan for the

resumption of normal trade relations (ex. 18).

On November 18 (Washington time). Secretary of the Treasury

Morgenthau sent to President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull a draft

of a proposed comprehensive settlement between Japan and the United

States (ex. 168). This draft was revised in the Far Eastern Division

of the State Department the same day and copies of the revised draft,

entitled “Outhne of Proposed Basis for Agreement Between the United

States and Japan,” were sent at once to General Marshall and Admiral

Stark for their consideration (ex. 18). As revised, the proposal set

forth in summary form various steps “proposed” to be taken by the

United States and Japanese Governments, respectively (ex. 18). The

evidence before the Committee shows that on the same day, November

19, Secretary Hull had two meetings with Admiral Schuirmann,

through whom the State Department maintained haison with the

Navy Department (tr. 1173), and that a conference attended by

Admiral Stark for the Navy Department and by General Gerow for

the War Department (General Marshall was out of town) was held

at the State Department on the mo rning of November 21 (Washing-

ton time) at which the “Outline” was discussed. At that conference

Secretary Hull requested both Admiral Stark and General Gerow to

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submit their comments on the “Outline” from the military and naval

standpoint (ex. 18).

This they did the afternoon, of the same day, November 21 (Wash-

ington time). In his memorandum General Gerow said that he be-

heved General Marshall would concur in the views which he expressed

concerning the “Outline” and advised Secretary Hull that on the basis

of a hasty study War Plans Division saw “no objection to its use as a

basis for discussion.” He said that —

the adoption of its provisions would attain one of our present major objectives —

the avoidance of war with Japan. Even a temporary peace in the Pacific would

permit us to complete defensive preparations in the Philippines and at the same

time insure continuance of material assistance to the British — both of which are

hi^ly important.

The foregoing should not be construed as suggesting strict adherence to all the

conditions outlined in the prop>osed agreement. War Plans Division wishes to

emphasize it is of grave importance to the success of our war effort in Europe that we

reach a modus vivendi with Japan (ex. 18).

General Gerow suggested the deletion from the “Outline” of a pro-

vision which would require Japan to withdraw all Japanese troops from

Manchuria except for a few divisions necessary as a police force, pro-

vided Russia withdrew all her troops from her far eastern front except

for an equivalent remainder, on the ground that such a provision

would probably be unacceptable to Russia. He requested that the

War Department be given an opportimity to consider the military

aspects of any major changes that might be made in the proposal

(ex. 18).

In his memorandum. Admiral Stark objected to provisions in the

“Outline” which would place limitations on American naval forces in

Pacific waters, commit the United States to use its influence toward

causing Great Britain to cede Hong Kong to China, and require

Japan to sell to the United States a specified tonnage of merchant

vessels. He agreed with General Gerow that the provision concerning

the withdrawal of Japanese troops in Manchuria should be deleted.

He made several suggestions regarding the phrasing of other provisions,

and ended his memorandum with the comment that while the provi-

sions of the “Outline” m^ht be assmned to abrogate the Tripartite

Pact on the part of Japan, it would be helpful if that could be specifi-

cally stated (ex. 18).

The following day, November 22 (Washington time), there was

completed in the State Department the first draft of a counterpro-

posal in reply to the Japanese note of November 20. This draft

coimterproposal was in two sections. The first section contained a

proposed modus mvendi as an alternative to the Japanese proposals

of November 20, and was prefaced by a brief statement of the cir-

cumstances leading to its preparation. Revised drafts of this section

were prepared on November 24 and 25. From November 22 to

November 26 the modus vivendi project was discussed and given

intensive consideration within the State Department, by President

Roosevelt and by the highest authorities of the Army and Navy,

including Secretaries Stimson and Knox and General Marshall and

Admiral Stark. The modus vivendi was also discussed with the Brit-

ish, Australian, Chinese, and Dutch Governments, principalljr

through their diplomatic representatives in Washington. Such revi-

sions as were made in the original draft of this section are discussed

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in connection with the final draft of November 25, which is set forth

in full below.

The second section of the November.22 draft consisted of two parts.

The first part contained the statement of principles and mutual

pledges with respect to economic relations which had been prepared

by the State Department's Far Eastern Division on November 11.

The second part was based primarily upon the ‘Dutline" sent by the

State Department to the War and Navy Departments on November

19, modified, however, in accordance with the suggestions made by

Admiral Stark and General Gerow in their memoranda of November 21

to Secretary Hull mentioned above. The changes made in this section

in the succeeding drafts of November 24 and November 25 were few

in number and, as so modified, this section became the reply to the

Japanese note of November 20 which was handed by Secretary Hull

to the Japanese Ambassadors on November 26 (Washington time).

Secretary Hull testified that all who saw the modus vivendi section

also saw the section which became the United States reply of Novem-

ber 26 (tr. 14363).

The final, November 25 (Washington time), draft of the modus

vivendi section was as follows:

The representatives of the Government of the United States and of the Govern-

ment of Japan have been carrying on during the past several months informal

and exploratory conversations for the purpose of arriving at a settlement if possible

of questions relating to the entire Pacific area based upon the principles of peace,

law and order, and fair dealing among nations. These principles include the

principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all

nations; the principle of non interference in the internal affairs of other countries;

the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treat-

ment; and the principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation

for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement

of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.

It is believed that in our discussions some progress has been made in reference

to the general principles which constitute the basis of a peaceful settlement

covering the entire Pacific area. Recently the Japanese Ambassador has stated

that the Japanese Government is desirous of continuing the conversations directed

toward a comprehensive and peaceful settlement in the Pacific area; that it would

be helpful toward creating an atmosphere favorable to the successful outcome of

the conversations if a temporary modus vivendi could be agreed upon to be in

effect while the conversations looking to a peaceful settlement in the Pacific were

continuing; and that it would be desirable that such modus vivendi include as one

of its provisions some initial and temporary steps of a reciprocal character in

the resumption of trade and normal intercourse between Japan and the United

States.

On November 20 the Japanese Ambassador communicated to the Secretary of State

proposals in regard to temporary measures to be taken respectively by the Government

of Japan and by the Government of the United States, which measures are understood

to have been designed to accomplish the purposes above indicated. These proposals

contain features which, in the opinion of this Government, conflict with the funda-

mental principles which form a part of the general settlement under consideration and

to which each Government has declared that it is committed.

The Government of the United States is earnestly desirous to contribute to

the promotion and maintenance of peace in the Pacific area and to afford every

opportunity for the continuance of discussions with the Japanese Government

directed toward working out a broad-gauge program of peace throughout tbe

Pacific area. With these ends in view, the Government of the United States offers

for the consideration of the Japanese Government an aUemative suggestion for a

temporary modus vivendi, as follows:

MODUS VIVENDI

1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan, both

being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific, affirm that their national policies are

directed toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the Pacific area and that

they have no territorial designs therein.

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2. They undertake reciprocally not to make from regions in which they have

military establishments any advance by force or threat of fqrce into any areas in

Southeastern or. Northeastern Asia or in the southern or the northern Pacific area.

3. The Japanese Government undertakes forthwith to withdraw its armed

forces now stationed in southern French Indochina and not to replace those

forces; to reduce the total of its forces in French Indochina to the number there

on July 26, 1941; and not to send additional naval, land or air forces to Indochina

for replacements or otherwise.

The provisions of the foregoing paragraph are without prejudice to the position

of the Government of the tJnitea States with regard to the presence of foreign

troops in that area.

4. The Government of the United States undertakes forthwith to modify the

application of its existing freezing and export restrictions to the extent necessary

to permit the fallowing resumption of trade between the United States and Japan

in articles for the use and needs of their peoples:

(a) Imports from Japan to be freely permitted and the proceeds of the sale

thereof to be paid into a clearing account to be used for the purchase of the exports

from the United States listed below, and at Japan’s option for the payment of

interest and principal of Japanese obligations within the United States, provided

that at least two-thirds in value of such imports per month consist of raw silk.

It is understood that all American-owned goods now in Japan the movement of

which in transit to the United States has been interrupted following the adoption

of freezing measures shall be forwarded forthwith to the United States.

(b) Exports from the United States to Japan to be permitted as follows :

(i) Bunkers and supplies for vessels engaged in the trade here provided for and

for such other vessels engaged in other trades as the two Governments may agree.

(ii) Food and food products from the United States subject to such limitations

as the appropriate authorities may prescribe in respect of commodities in short

supply in the United States.

(iii) ^ Raw cotton from the United States to the extent of $600,000 in value per

month.

(iv) Medical and pharmaceutical supplies subject to such limitations as the

appropriate authorities may prescribe in respect of commodities in short supply

in the United States.

(v) Petroleum. The United States will permit the export to Japan of petro-

leum, within the categories permitted general export, upon a monthly basis for

civilian needs. The proportionate amount of petroleum to be exported from the

United States for such needs will be determined after consultation with the British

and the Dutch Governments. It is understood that by civilian needs in Japan

is me^nt. such purposes as the operation of the fishing industry, the transport

system, lighting, heating, industrial and agricultural uses, and other civilian uses.

(vi) The above-stated amounts of exports may be increased and additional

commodities added by agreement between the two governments as it may appear

to them that the operation of this agreement is furthering the peaceful and equi-

table solution of outstanding problems in the Pacific area.

5. The Government of Japan undertakes forthwith to modify the application

of its existing freezing and export restrictions to the extent necessary to permit

the resumption of trade between Japan and the United States as provided for in

paragraph four above.

6. The Government of the United States undertakes forthwith to approach

the Australian, British and Dutch Governments with a view to those Govern-

ments’ taking measures similar to those provided for in paragraph four above.

7. With reference to the current hostilities between Japan and China, the

fundamental interest of the Government of the United States in reference to

any discussions which may be entered into between the Japanese and the Chinese

Governments is simply that these discussions and any settlement reached as a

result thereof be based upon an4 exemplify the fundamental principles of peace,

law, order and justice, which constitute the central spirit of the current con-

versations between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United

States and which are applicable uniformly throughout the Pacific area.

8. This modus vivendi shall remain in force for a period of three months with

the understanding that the two parties shall confer at the instance of either to

ascertain whether the prospects of reaching a peaceful settlement covering the

entire Pacific area justify an extension of the modus vivendi for a further period

(Ex. 18.)

Comparison of this final draft of the modus vivendi section and the

prior draft? of November 22 and November 24 shows that paragraphs

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1, 2, 5, 6, 7, and 8 above were contained in each draft and remained

the same in substance throughout, with but few changes in text. In

paragraph 3, the final draft added the proviso contained in the second

sentence and omitted specific mention of a limitation of 25,000 upon

the total number of Japanese troops to remain in French Indochina,

retaining from the prior drafts, however, the limitation expressed in

terms of “the number there on July 26, 1941.'’ Paragraph 4 was the

same in both the final draft and the draft of November 24, but differed

from the corresponding provision in the November 22 draft, which had

been as follows:

The Government of the United States undertakes forthwith to remove the

freezing restrictions which were placed on Japanese assets in the United States on

July 26 and the Japanese Government agrees simultaneously to remove the freez-

ing measures which it imposed in regard to American assets in Japan. Exports

from each country would thereafter remain subject to the respective export

control measures which each country may have in effect for reasons of national

defense (ex. 18).

During the 5 days from November 22 to November 26, inclusive,

the State Department was the focal point of great activity. After

the preparation of the November 22 draft of the modus vivendi and in

accordance with his conversations with the British Minister on Novem-

ber 18 and the Netherlands and Australian Ministers on November 19,

on Saturday, November 22 (Washington time), Secreta^ Hull

arranged a meeting at the State Department with Lord Halifax, the

British Ambassador; Dr. Hu Shih, the Chinese Ambassador; Dr. A.

Loudon, the Netherlands Minister; and Mr. Richard G. Casey, the

Australian Minister. His report of that meeting follows in full:

The British Ambassador, the Australian Minister, and the Netherlands Minister

called at my request, the Chinese Ambassador joining us later on. I enumerated

the high points in the conversations which I have been carrying on with the

Japanese officials here since the spring of this year. They are fully set forth in

records of my conversations during that time and need not be repeated here.

I concluded with an account of the Japanese proposal for a modus vivendi.

I showed it to them to read, with the exception of the Chinese Ambassador

who had not yet arrived, and then proceeded to outline my proposed reply in

the nature of a substitute for the Japanese proposal. There seemed to be gen-

eral agreement that a substitute was more desirable than a specific reply to the

Japanese proposal, section for section. The substitute reply was substantially

what is contained in the present final draft, which I am considering handing to

the Japanese. Each of the gentlemen present seemed to be well pleased with

this preliminary report to them, except the Chinese Ambassador, who was some-

what disturbed, as he always is when any question concerning China arises not

entirely to his way of thinking. This reaction on his part is very natural. He

did not show serious concern in view of the provision in our proposed modus

vivendi which would block a Japanese attack on China in order to destroy the

Burma Road. He inquired whether this would commit the Japanese not to

further invade China during the coming three months, to which I replied in the

negative, adding that this was a question to be decided under the permanent

agreement now receiving attention. I made it clear that this proposal was made

by the Japanese and that there was probably not one chance in three that they

would accept our reply even though it does provide that this proposed temporary

arrangement constitutes a part of the general conversations looking toward a

general agreement on the basic questions (ex. 18).

Secretary Hull's memoranda of his subsequent conversations with

those who attended this meeting show that each of them immediately

reported to their respective Governments, for comment, the terms

of the Japanese note of November 20 to the United States and of the

November 22 draft of the proposed modus vivendi (ex. 18).

Later that day, November 22, Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu

called on Secretary Hull. The Secretary told them that he had

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talked with the representatives of the other Governments mentioned

above, and

that there had been a discussion of the question of whether things (meaning

Japanese peaceful pledges, et cetera) could be developed in such a way that there

could be a relaxation to some extent of freezing. The Secretary said that these

representatives were interested in the suggestion and there was a general feeling

that the matter could all be settled if the Japanese could give us some satisfactory

evidences that their intentions were peaceful.

The Secretary said that in discussing the situation with the representatives of

these other countries he found that there had arisen in their minds the same

kind of misgivings that had troubled him in the course of the conversations with

the Japanese Ambassador. He referred to the position in which the Japanese

Government had left the Ambassador and the Secretary as they were talking of

peace when it made its move last July into Indochina. He referred also to the

mounting oil purchases by Japan last Spring when the conversations were in

progress, to the fact that he had endured public criticism for permitting those

shipments because he did not wish to prejudice a successful outcome to the con-

versations and to the fact that that oil was not used for normal civilian con-

sumption.

The Secretary went on to say that the Japanese press which is adopting a

threatening tone gives him no encouragement and that no Japanese statesmen

are talking about a peaceful course, whereas in the American press advocacy of a

TOaceful course can always get a hearing. He asked why was there not some

Japanese statesmen backing the two Ambassadors by preaching peace. The

Secretary pointed out that if the United States and other countries should see

Japan coming along a peaceful course there would be no question about Japan’s

obtaining all the materials she desired; that the Japanese Government knows that.

The Secretary said that while no decisions were reached today in regard to the

Japanese proposals he felt that we would consider helping Japan out on oil for

civilian requirements only as soon as the Japanese Government could assert

control of the situation in Japan as it relates to the policy of force and conquest.

He said that if the Ambassador could give him any further assurances in regard

to Japan’s peaceful intentions it would help the Secretary in talking with senators

and other persons in this country (ex. 29, voL II, pp. 757-758).

Later, Secretary Hull commented that Japan made it very difficult

by leaving troops in Indochina. Ambassador Kurusu replied —

that the Japanese desired the troops in northern Indo-China in order to bring

about a settlement with China. He said that after the settlement of the China

affair J^an promised to bring the troops out of Indo-China altogether.

The Secretary emphasized again that he could not consider this, that also

uneasiness would prevail as long as the troops remained in Indo-China, and

commented that Japan wanted the United States to do all the pushing toward

bringing about a peaceful settlement; that they should get out of Indo-China,

Mr. Kurusu observed that the Japanese Foreign Minister had told Ambassador

Grew that we seemed to expect that idl the concessions should be made by the

Japanese side (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 760).

After further discussion of the troop situation in Indochina, Am-

bassador Nomura pressed Secretary Hull for an answer to the Japanese

proposal of November 20. In reply, the Secretary said —

that if the Japanese could not wait until Monday before having his answer there

was nothing he could do about it as he was obliged to confer again with the

representatives of the other governments concerned after they had .had an oppor-

tunity to consult with their governments. He repeated that we were doing our

best, but emphasized that unless the Japanese were able to do a little there was

no use in talking (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 761).

Ambassador Nomura “disclaimed any desire to press the Secretary too

hard for an answer \* \* ♦ and said that the Japanese would be

quite ready to wait until Monday’' (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 761). Am-

bassador Nomura sent two reports of this meeting to Tokyo (ex. 1,

pp. 167-169, 170-171), in one of which he observed:

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We (Japanese Ambassadors) kept a calm appearance throughput the talk, and

at no time became excited, and the opponent's attitude was also the same (ex,

l,p. 171).

The two Ambassadors did not meet with Secretary Hull ajgain until

Wednesday afternoon, Noveinber 26 (Washington time), when the

Secretary gave them the United States reply (ex. 29, voL II, pp.

764-770).

There is no evidence before the Committee of any meetings or

conferences outside the State Department regarding the modus

Vivendi the next day, Sunday, November 23 (WashS^ton time).

However, Monday, November 24 (Washington time), l&e the pre-

ceding Saturday, was a day of great activity. A new draft of the

entire counterproposal was completed in the Department over the

weekend (ex. 18). During the early part of the afternoon Secre-

tary Hull had telephone conversations with Secretary Stimson and

Secretary Knox, as well as a conference with Admiral Schuirmann

(tr. 1166). At 3:30 p. m.. Secretary Hull had a conference at the

State Department with General Marshall and Admiral Stark, at

which the new draft was discussed in detail (tr. 1166; ex. 18). Dur-

ing this conference General Marshall expressed the opinion that

25,000 Japanese troops in French Indo-China, the maximum per-

mitted under the current draft of the modus vivend/iy would not be a

menace (ex. 18). Following his conference with General Marshall and

Admiral Stark at the State Department, Lord Halifax, Dr. Hu Shih,

Dr. Loudon, and Mr. Casey called on Secretary Hull at his request,

and to each of them he handed copies of the latest draft of the modus

vivendi. The Secretary's memorandum of that meeting records that

they spent an hour reading the draft and taking notes to send back to.

their Governments. The memorandum continues:

The Chinese Ambassador objected to more than a maximum of 5,000 Japanese

troops being left in Indochina. I again stated that General Marshall had a few

minutes before expressed to me his opinion that 25,000 troops would be no menace

and that, while this Government did not recognize the right of Japan to keep a

single soldier in Indochina, we were striving to reach this proposed temporary

agreement primarily because the heads of our Army and Navy often emphasize to

me that time is the all-important question for them, and that it is necessary to be

more fully prepared to deal effectively with the situation in the Pacific area in case,

of an outbreak by Japan. I also emphasized the point that, even if we agree

that the chances of such an outbreak are not great, it must be admitted that there

are real possibilities that such an outbreak may soon occui^any day after this

week — unless a temporary arrangement is effected that will cause the agitated

state of public opinion to become more quiet and thereby make it much more

practicable to continue the conversations relative to the general agreement.

The Chinese Ambassador dwelt on the matter of reducing the proposed figure

of 25,000 soldiers to remain in Indochina to 5,000, I pointed out and each of

the representatives understood the great advantage it would be to our five coun-

tries to have Japan committed to a peaceful course for three months and set forth

the advantages to each of having additional time in which to make further prepara-

tions, et cetera, et cetera. They seemed to be very much gratified. They

seemed to be thinking of the advantages to be derived without any particular

thought of what we should pay for them, if anything. Finally, when I discovered

that none of their governments had given them instructions relative to this phase

of the matter, except in the case of the Netherlands Minister, I remarked that

each of their Gk)vernments was more interested in the defense of that area of the

world than this country, and at the same time they expected this country, in case

Of a Japanese outbreak, to be ready, to move in a military way and take the lead

in defending the entire area. And yet I said their Governments, through some

sort of preoccupation in other directions, do not seem to know anything about

these phases of the questions under discussion.' I made it clear that I was defi-

nitely disappointed at these unexpected developments, at the lack of interest and

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lack of a disposition to cooperate. They said nothing except the Netherlands

Minister who then replied that he had heard from his Government and that it

would support the modus oivendi proposal. I then indicated that I was not sure

that I would present it to the Japanese Ambassador without knowing anything

about the views and attitude of their Governments. The meeting broke up in

this fashion (ex. 18).

Later that day Secretary Hull sent to President Roosevelt a draft of

a proposed message from the President to Prime Minister Churchill.

The proposed message summarized the Japanese note of November 20,

saying that the Japanese Ambassador had “represented” tWt the

conclusion of such a “modus vivendi” might give the Japanese Gov-

ernment opportunity to develop public sentiment in Japan in support

of a liberal and comprehensive program of peace covering the Pacific

area and that “the domestic political situation in Japan was so acute

as to render urgent some relief such as was envisaged in the proposal.”

The message pointed out that the Japanese proposal “would appar-

ently not exclude advancement into China from Indo-China.” It

went on to say that the United States Government proposed to inform

the Japanese Government that in its opinion the Japanese proposals

contained features “not in harmony with the fundamental principles

which underlie the proposed genera settlement” to which each Gov-

ernment had declared that it was committed, and then siunmarized

the terms of, the modus vivendi which was being considered by the

United States Government as an alternative proposal. The message

advised the Prime Minister that the British Ambassador in Washing-

ton had been informed and w«s informing the British Foreign Min-

ister (ex. 18). President Roosevelt returned the draft message to

Secretary Hull with the notation “O. K., see addition. F. D. R.”

(ex. 18). The “addition” referred to by the President was the follow-

ing sentence which he had written in longhand for insertion at the

end of the message:

This seems to me a fair proposition for the Japanese but its acceptance or rejection

is really a matter of internal Japanese politics. I am not very hopeful and we

must all be prepared for real trouble, possibly soon (ex. 18).

The message, with the sentence added b^ the President, was sent to

the Prime Minister at 11 p. m. that evenmg, November 24 (Washing-

ton time), through Ambassador Winant in Ix>hdon (ex. 18).

The next day, Tuesday, November 25 (Washington time), the draft

coimterproposd was once more revised in the State Department.

This was the final re\dsionpf the section containing the modus vivendi.

At 9:30 a. m. Secretary Stimson and Secretary Knox met with Secre-

tary Hull at the State Department for their “usual Tuesday morning

meeting” (tr. 14,390), which Secretary Stimson described in his notes:

Hull showed us the proposal for a three months’ truce, which he was going to

lay before the Japanese today or tomorrow. It adequately safeguarded all. our

interests, I thought as we read it, but I don’t think there is any chance of the

Japanese accepting it, because it was so drastic. In return for the propositions

which they were to do; namely, to at bnce evacuate and at once to stop all prepa-

rations or threats of action^ and to take no aggressive action against any of her

nei^bors, etc., we were to »ve them open tr^e in sufficient quantities only for

their civilian population. This; restriction was particularly applicable to oil.

We had a long talk over the general situation (tr. 14,417-14,418).

. It is clear that Secretary Stimson’s description of the modus vivendi

as “so drastic” refers to the limited nature of the trade concessions

to be made by the United under it.

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At noon that day the so-called ‘War Council'^ composed of President

Roosevelt, Secretaries Hull, Stimson, and Knox, and General Marshall

and Admiral Stark met at the White House. The discussion centered

on the Japanese situation. According to Secretary Stimson’s notes,

the President

brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps (as soon as)

next Monday, for the Japanese are notorious for making an attack without warn-

ing, and the question was what we should do. The question was how we should

maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much

danger to ourselvesJ It was a difficult proposition. Hull laid out his general

broad propositions on which the thing should be rested — the freedom of the seas

and the fact that Japan was in alliance with Hitler and was carrying out his

policy of world aggression. The others brought out the fact that any such ex-

pedition to the South as the Japanese were likely to take would be an encircle-

ment of our interests in the Philippines and cutting into our vital supplies of rub-

ber from Malasia. I pointed out to the President that he had already taken the

first steps toward an ultimatum in notifying Japan way back last summer that

if she crossed the border into Thailand she was violating our safety and that

therefore he had only to point out (to Japan) that to follow any such expedition

was a violation of a warning we had already given. So Hull is to go to work on

preparing that (tr. 14,418-14,419).

In addition to Secretary Hull's testimony regarding this meeting

(tr. 1144), the record before the Committee contains a copy of a

letter written by the Secreta^ to the Roberts Commission a little

over a month after the meeting. In that letter, after stating that

at the meeting of the War Council on November 25, as weU as the

meeting on November 28, he had “emphasized the critical nature"

of the relations between the United States and Japan, the Secretary

continued:

I stated to the conference that there was practically no possibility of an agree-

ment being achieved with Japan; that in my opinion the Japanese were likely to

break out at any time with new acts of conquest by force; and that the matter of

safeguarding our national security was in the hands of the Army and the Navy.

At the conclusion I with due deference expressed my judgment that any plans for

our military defense should include an assumption that the Japanese might make

the element of surprise a central point in their strategy and also might attack at

various points sim^taneously with a view to demoralizing efforts of defense and of

coordination for purposes thereof (ex. 174).

General Marshall testified that he had “a very distinct recollection

of Mr. Hull's saying at one of those meetings, one of the last, ‘These

fellows mean to fight; you will have to be prepared'" (tr. 3079).

Admiral Stark, who attended the War Council meeting on November

25, added a postscript concerning it to a letter of that date which he

sent to Admiral Kimmel at Pearl Harbor. In the postscript, he

described the comments of the President and the Secretary of State:

I held this up pending a meeting with th6 President and Mr. Hull today. I

have been in constant touch with Mr.~ Hull and it was only after a long talk

with him that I sent the message to you a day or two ago showing the gravity of

the situation. He confirmed it all in today’s meeting, as did the President.

Neither would be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack (ex. 106).

After the meeting at the White House, Secretary Hull returned to

the State Department and Secretary Stimson to the War Department.

Secretary Stimson recorded in his notes:

J With reference to this sentence in Secretary Sthnson^s notes, General Marshall testified: “\* • • they

were trying to arrange a diplomatic procedure, rather than firing off a gun, that would not only protect

our interests, by arranging matters so that the Japanese couldn’t intrude any further in a dangerous way,

but also anything they did do, they would be forced to take the offensive action, and what we were to do

had to be prepared for the President by Mr. Hull. It was not a milit^ order. It was not a military

arrangement” (tr. 13801).

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When I got back to the Department I found news from G-2 that an (a Japanese)

expedition had started. Five Divisions have come down from Shantung and

Shansi to Shanghai and there they had embarked on ships — 30, 40, or 50 ships —

and have been sighted south of Formosa. I at once called up Hull and told him

about it and sent copies to him and to the President of the message from (^2

(tr. 14419).

Secretary Hull’s record of telephone calls shows a call on that day

from Secretary Stimson at 4:30 p. m. (tr. 1166), and the record of

outside telephone calls through me White House switchboard shows

such a call at 4:25 p. m. and that the call was completed (tr. 5545).

The latter record also shows that Postmaster General Walker tele-

phoned Secretary Hull four times that afternoon (tr. 5545-5546). The

first call was at 12:27 p. m., while the meeting at the White Hoiise

was in progress, and was not completed. The other calls, which were

completed, were at 3:30, 4:05, and 5:30 p. m.

In the meantime reports were reaching Washington of the reactions

of the Chinese, Dutch, and British Governments to the terms of the

proposed modus vivendi. As noted above, the Netherlands Minister

mformed Secretary Hull at the conference on the afternoon of Novem-

ber 24 (Washington time) that his Government would support the

modus vivendi proposal. The next day the Minister formalfy trans-

mitted to Secretary Hull his Government’s comments on the Japanese

note of November 20 and the proposed modus vivendi (tr. 4471-4474).

The comments of the British Foreim Secretary, Sir Anthonv Eden,

were contained in a memorandum handed to Secretary Hull on the

same day by Lord Hahfax, the British Ambassador (ex. 18). That

memorandum expressed the willin^ess of the British Foreim Office

to leave to Secretary Hull the decision whether to reject the Japanese

proposals or make a coimterproposal. It took the position that the

Japanese proposals should be regarded “as the opening movement in

a process of bargaining,” and suggested that if a counterproposal

should be made, “our demands shomd be pitched high and our price

low.” On this basis it was suggested “for the consideration of the

United States Government” that any counterproposal —

should stipulate for the total withdrawal from Indo-China not merely of the

Japanese “troops” as in the Japanese proposal but of Japanese naval, military and

air forces with their equipment and for the suspension of further military advances

in China in addition to satisfactory assurances regarding other areas in South

East Asia, the Southern Pacific and Russia; the quid pro quo being legitimate

relaxation of existing economic measures so as to allow the export of limited

quantities of goods to ensure the welfare of the Japanese civilian population,

but excluding goods of direct importance to the war potential, in particular oil,

of which we know the Japanese have no shortage except for military purposes.

These relaxations would of course only become effective as and when withdrawal

of Japanese armed forces took place, and we should expect in return to receive

goods of a similar nature from Japan if we required them.

Mr. Hull has of course made it perfectly clear to the Japanese that any interim

arrangement is only a first step in a wider settlement which must be in conformity

with basic principles acceptable to the United States. We feel that to prevent

misrei>resentation by Japan it will have to be made public that any interim agree-

ment is purely provisional and is only concluded to facilitate negotiation of an

ultimate agreement on more fundamental issues satisfactory to all parties con-

cerned (ex. 18). (Italics in original.)

Prime Minister Churchill’s reply to President Roosevelt’s message of

November 24 reached the State Department early on the morning of

November 26 (ex. 23). In it the Prime Minister said:

Your message about Japan received tonight. Also full accounts from Lord

Halifax of discussions and your counter project to Japan on which Foreign

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Secretary has sent some comments. Of course, it is for you to handle this busi-

ness and we certainly do not want an additional war. There is only one point

that disquiets us. What about Chiang Kai Shek? Is he not having a very thin

diet? Our anxiety is about China. If they collapse our joint dangers would

enormously increase. We are sure that the regard of the United States for the

Chinese cause will govern your action. . We feel that the Japanese are most unsure

of themselves (ex. 23) .

The views of the Chinese Government had already been made

known to the United States Government. The Chinese Foreign

Minister, to whom on November 22 the Chinese Ambassador in

Washington had cabled the substance of the Japanese note of Novem-

ber 20 and the proposed modus vivendi, sent the following message to

the Chinese Ambassador on November 24:

After reading your telegram, the Generalissimo showed strong reaction. He

got the impression that the United States Government has put aside the Chinese

question in its conversations with Japan instead of seeking a solution, and is still

inclined to appease Japan at the expense of China. \* \* \* We are \* \* \*

firmly opposed to any measure which may have the effect of increasing China’s

difficulty in her war of resistance, or of strengthening Japan’s power in her aggres-

sion against China. Please inform the Secretary of State (ex. 18).

On November 25, Owen Lattimore, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek’s

Anierican advisor, cabled Lauchlin Currie, one of President Koose-

velt’s administrative assistants:

After discussing with the Generalissimo the Chinese Ambassador’s conference

with the Secretary of State, I feel you should urgently advise the President of

the Generalissimo’s very strong reaction. I have never seen him really agitated

before. Loosening of economic pressure or unfreezing would dangerously increase

Japan’s military advantage in China. A relaxation of American pressure while

Japan has its forces in China would dismay the Chinese. Any Modus Vivendi”

now arrived at with Japan would be disastrous to Chinese belief in America and

analogous to the closing of the Burma Road, which permanently destroyed

British prestige. Japan and Chinese defeatists would instantly exploit the

resulting disillusionment and urge oriental solidarity against occidental treachery.

It is doubtful whether either past assistance or increasing aid could compensate

for the feeling of being deserted at this hour. The Generalissimo has deep

confidence in the President’s fidelity to his consistent policy but I must warn

you that even the Generalissimo questions his ability to hold the situation together

if the Chinese national trust in America is undermined by reports of Japan’s

escaping military defeat by diplomatic victory (ex. 18).

The same day. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek cabled Mr. T. V.

Soong in Washington the following message, which the latter promptly

delivered to Secretary Stimson and Secretary Knox:

I presume Ambassador Hu Shih has given you a copy of my telegram yesterday.

Please convey contents of the message to Secretaries Knox and Stimson imme-

diately.

Please explain to them the gravity of the situation. If America should relax

the economic blockade and freezing of Japanese assets, or even if reports that

the United States is considering this should gain currency, the morale of our

troops will be sorely shaken. During the past two months the Japanese propa-

ganda have spread the belief that in November an agreement will be successfully

reached with the United States. They have even come to a silent but nonetheless

definite understanding with the doubtful elements in our country. If, therefore,

there is any relaxation of the embargo or freezing regulations, or if a belief of that

gains ground, then the Chinese people would consider that China has been

completely sacrificed by the United States. The morale of the entire people will

collapse and every Asiatic nation will lose faith, and indeed suffer such a shock

in their faith in democracy that a most tragic epoch in the world will be opened.

The Chinese army will collapse, and the Japanese will be enabled to carry through

their plans, so that even if in the future America would come to our rescue the

situation would be already hopeless. Such a loss would not be to China alone.

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We could therefore only request the United States Government to be uncom-

promising, and announce that if the withdrawal of Japanese armies from China,

is not settled, the question of relaxing of the embargo or freezing could not be

considered. If, on the other hand, the American attitude remains nebulous

Japanese propaganda will daily perform its fell purpose so that at no cost to them

this propaganda will effect the break-down of our resistance. Our more than four

years of struggle with the loss of countless lives and sacrifices and devastation

unparalleled in history would have been in vain. The certain collapse of our

resistance will be an unparalleled catastrophe to the world, and I do not indeed

know how history in future will record this episode (ex. 18) .

The evening of November 25 (Washington time), Dr. Hu Shih,

the Chinese Ambassador, called on Secretary Hull and delivered to

him a copy of the Chinese Foreign Minister’s telegram quoted above.

According to Secretary Hull’s memorandum of the conversation, the

Ambassador endeavored to explain Generalissimo Chia^ Kai-shek’s

opposition to the modus vivendi on the ground that the Generalissimo

was not thoroughly acquainted with the over-all international aspects

of the Japanese situation, and viewed it only from his own situation

in Chimgking (ex. 18). The Secretary’s memorandum continued:

I replied that in the first place the oflBcial heads of our Army and Navy for

some weeks have been most earnestly urging that we not get into war with Japan

until they have had an opportunity to increase further their plans and methods

and means of defense in the Pacific area. In the second place, at the request of

the more peaceful elements in Japan for conversations with this Government look-

ing toward a broad peaceful settlement for the entire Pacific area, we have been

carrying on conversations and making some progress thus far; and the Japanese

are urging the continuance of these general conversations for the purpose of a

broad Pacific area settlement. The situation, therefore, is that the proposed

modus vivendi is really a part and parcel of the efforts to carry forward these

general conversations for the reasons that have been fully stated from time to

time, and recently to the Chinese Ambassador and to others.

I said that very recently the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek

almost flooded Washington with strong and lengthy cables telling us how ex-

tremely dangerous the Japanese threat is to attack the Burma ^ad through

Indochina and appealing loudly for aid, whereas practically the first thing this

present proposal of mine and the President does is to require the Japanese troops

to be taken out of Indochina and thereby to protect the Burma Road from what

Chiang Kai-shek said was an imminent danger. Now, I added, Chiang Kai-shek

ignores that situation which we have taken care of for him and inveighs loudly

about another matter relating to the release of certain commodities to Japan cor-

responding to the progress made with our conversations concerning a general

peace agreement. He also overlooks the fact that our proposal would relieve the

menace of Japan in Indochina to the whole South Pacific area, including Singa-

pore, the Netherlands East Indies, Australia, and also the United States, with

the Philippines and the rubber and tin trade routes. All of this relief from

menace to each of the countries would continue for ninety days. One of our

leading admirals stated to me recently that the limited amount of more or less

inferior oil products that we might let Japan have during that period would not

to any appreciable extent increase Japanese war and naval preparations. I said

that, of course, we can cancel this proposal but it must be with the understanding

that we are not to be charged with failure to send our fleet into the area near

Indochina and into Japanese waters, if by any chance Japan makes a military

drive southward.

The Ambassador was very insistent in the view that he would send back to his

Government a fuller explanation which he hoped might relieve the situation more

or less. Our conversation was, of course, in a friendly spirit (ex. 18).

The same evening, whether before or after his talk with Secretary

Hull is not clear from the record before the Committee, Dr. Hu Shin

called on Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck, political advisor to the Secretary.

After expressing to Dr. Hornbeck his complete confidence that the

United States ‘‘would yield nothing in the field of principles and pursue

no course of ‘appeasement’ ”, the Chinese Ambassador repeated what

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he had said at the conference the preceding day regarding the second

and third points of the modus vivendi, evidencing the concern of

his Government that point 2 wotild leave Japan free to continue opera-

tions against China and that point 3 would not s^ciently limit the

number of Japanese troops in Indo-China to dispel the Japanese

threat to the Burma Road. He expressed the hope that the modus

vivendi would be made more restrictive (ex. 18).

In the meantime, other intercepted Japanese messages available to

Secretaiy Hull before delivery of the United States reply on November

26 (Washington time), in addition to the messages (ex. 1, pp. 155, 160)

in which the Japanese Fore^ Minister told Ambassador Nomura

that a return to the status prior to the freezing orders was not enough

and that it would be necessary to have a solution that would “come

up to the B proposal,” had indicated that the Japanese Government

would accept nothing less than the terms of that proposal. Thus, on

November 24 (Japan time), the Japanese Foreign Minister cabled

Ambassador Nomura:

Our expectations, as 1 told you in my #798, go beyond the restoration of

Japan-American trade and a return to the situation of the freezing legislation and

require the realization of all points of Proposal B with the exception of clauses 6

and 7. (Note: Clauses 6 and 7 were not included in the Japanese proposal of

November 20.) Therefore, our demand for a cessation of aid to Chiang (the

acquisition of Netherlands Indies goods and at the same time the supply of

American petroleum to Japan as well) is a most essential condition (ex. 1, p. 172).

Again on November 26 (Japan time) Foreign Mmister Togo cabled

Ambassador Nomura that “our final proposal envbages an agreement

on the basis of the ‘B’ proposal in toto” with the two exertions already

noted (ex. 1, p. 176). The same dav the Foreign Mmister cabled

Ambassador Nomma that as soon as he reached a settlement on the

basis of the November 20 note —

it is essential that you secure guarantees for the acquisition of goods in connection

with clauses 2 and 3 (Note: clauses 3 and 4 of the November ^ note) of that pro-

posal. Of these goods the acquisition of ^troleum is one of the most pressing

and urgent requirements of the Empire. Therefore, \* \* \* prior to the sign-

ing of an understanding, and at as early a date as possible, I would like to have

you make our wishes known insofar as petroleum imports are concerned along the

following lines:

4,000,000 tons per year from the United States (ex. 1, p. 177).

On November 21 (Washington time) Ambassador Kurusu had

called on Secretaiy Hull and handed him a letter which he proposed

to sign as a clarmcation of Japan’s interpretation of the Tripartite

Pact. The proposed letter asserted that the Pact ^d not in any way

infringe the sovereign rights of Japan as an independent state; that

Japan was free to make its own interpretation; that the Japanese

Government would not become involved in war “at the behest of any

foreign power” ; and that it would “accept warfare only as the ultimate,

inescapable necessity for the maintenance of its security and the preser-

vation of its national Hfe against active injustice” (ex. 29, vol. II,

p. 757). The record of the conversations shows that the substance of

all of these assertions had been made by the Japanese many times

before. Secretary Hull asked the Ambassador whether he had any-

thing more to offer on the whole subject of a peaceful settlement, and

Mr. Kurusu replied that he did not (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 756).

Secretly Hull described this incident in bis testimony:

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The next morning, Kurusu came to my apartment in the hotel and was talking

about the Tripartite Agreement, endeavoring to minimize that, and I suddenly

inquired of him if his government had anything more to offer on the general peace

situation, and he quickly said, ^^No/'

So there we had nailed down what he said was the last proposal and what their

interceptions had informed us was very final in the matter (tr, 1181).

Secretarjr Hull had also received a report from Ambassador Grew of

his talk with Foreign Minister Togo on November 24 (Japan time),

during which the Foreign Minister stated that the withdrawal of the

Japanese troops from southern to northern Indochina was the maxi-

mum concession Japan could make ‘‘in any event'^ and that Japan

would be willing to have President Roosevelt act as “introducer”

between Japan and China “with the imderstanding that then the

United States would refrain from action prejudicial to restoring peace

between China and Japan,” i. e., cease all aid to China (ex. 29, vol. II,

pp. 762-763).

On Wednesday, November 26 (Washington time). Secretary Stim-

8on talked with Secretary Hull at 9:15 a. m. and again at 9:50 a. m.,

according to the White House telephone records (tr. 5546). Mr.

Stimson summarized the conversations in his notes:

Hull told me over the telephone this morning that he had about made up his

mind not to give (make) the proposition that Knox and I passed on the other day

to the Japanese but to kick the whole thing over — to tell them that he has no

other proposition at all. The Chinese have objected to that proposition — when

he showed it to them; that is, to the proposition which he showed to Knox and me,

because it involves giving to the Japanese the small modicum of oil for civilian

use during the interval of the truce of the three months. Chiang Kai-shek had

sent a special message to the effect that that would make a terrifically bad impres-

sion in China: that it would destroy all their courage and that they (it) would

play into the nands of his, Chiang^s, enemies and that the Japanese would use it.

T. V. Soong had sent me this letter and has asked to see me and I had called HuU

m this morning to tell him so and ask him what he wanted me to do about it.

He replied as I have just said above — that he had about made up his mind to

give up the whole thing in respect to a truce and to simply tell the Japanese that

he had no further action to propose (tr. 14,420).

On his return to the State Department from the War Council meet-

ing the preceding day. Secretary Hull had been told by Secretary

Stimson that the Japanese were embarking a large expeditionary force

of 30, 40, or 50 sl^s at Shanghai and that this expedition was pro-

ceeding along the Cfhina coast south of Formosa. Secretary Stimson

had also telephoned President Roosevelt about this, and had sent

copies of the intelligence report to him. A few minutes after his

telephone conversations with Secretary Hull on the morning of

November 26, Secretary Stimson telephoned the President to inquire

whether he had received the report on the Japanese expedition.

According to Secretary Stimson’s notes, the President —

fairly blew up — jumped up into the air, so to speak, and said he hadnT seen it and

that that changed the whole situation because it was an evidence of bad faith on

the part of the Japanese that while they were negotiating for an entire truce — an

entire withdrawal (from China) — they should be sending this expedition down

there to Indo-Qhina. 1 told him that it was a fact that had come to me through

G-2 and through the Navy Secret Service and I at once got another copy of the

paiier I had sent last night and sent it over to him by special messenger (tr.

14,420-14,421).

The record before the Committee contains the following “Mem-

orandum for the President,” dated November 26 (Washington time)

and signed by Secretary Stimson:

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Japanese Convoy Movement Towards Indo-China

About a month and a half ago we learned through Magic that the Japanese

Government informed the Vichy Government that they proposed to move ap-

proximately 50,000 troops into Indo-China in addition to the 40,000 already there

by previous agreement.

Today information has accumulated to the effect that a convoy of from ten to

thirty ships, some of 10,000 tons displacement, has been assembled near the mouth

of the Yangtse River below Shanghai. This could mean a force as great as 50,000

but more probably a smaller number. Included in this ship concentration was at

least one landing-boat carrier. The deck-load of one vessel contained heavy

bridge equipment. Later reports indicate that this movement is already under

way and ships have been seen south of Formosa.

The officers concerned in the Military Intelligence Division feel that unless we

receive other information, this is more or less a normal movement, that is, a logical

follow-up of their previous notification to the Vichy Government.

I will keep you informed of any other information in this particular field (ex. 98) .

At 6:54 p. m. that day the following priority message was dis-

patched from the Navy Department:

From the President. For the High Commissioner Philippines

Admiral Hart will deliver to you a copy of a despatch which with my approval

the CNO and the COS addressed to the senior Army and Navy commanders in

the Philippines. In addition you are advised that the Japanese are strongly

reenforcing their garrisons and naval forces in the Mandates in a manner which

indicates they are preparing this region as quickly as possible against a possible

attack on them by US Forces. However, I am more particularly concerned over

increasing opposition of Japanese leaders and by current southward troop move-

ments from Shanghai and Japan to the Formosa area. Preparations are becoming

apparent in China, Formosa, and Indo China for an early aggressive movement

of some character although as yet there are no clear indications as to its strength

or whether it will be directed against the Burma Road, Thailand, Malay Peninsula,

Netherlands East Indies, or the Philippines. Advance against Thailand seems

the most probable. I consider it possible that this next Japanese aggression

might cause an outbreak of hostilities between the U. S. and Japan. I desire that

after further informing yourself as to the situation and the ^neral outlines of

naval and military plans through consultation with Admiral Hart and General

MacArthur you shall in great confidence present my views to the President of

the Philippine Commonwealth and inform him that as always I am relying upon

the full cooperation of his Government and his people. Please impress upon

him the desirability of avoiding public pronouncement or action since that might

make the situation more difficult. Roosevelt (tr. 13,861-13,862).

The evidence before the Committee shows that at about 1:20 p. m.

that day, November 26, Secretary Hull telephoned Admiral Stark

(tr. 1166, 5546), that Admiral Stark called Secretary Hull at 2:35 p. m.

after attempting to telephone General Marshall (who was out of

town) at 1:28 (tr. 5546), and that late that afternoon Secretary Hull

conferred at the White House with President Roosevelt (tr. 1147).

The Secretary was preceded at the White House by the Chinese

Ambassador, Dr. Hu Shih, and Mr. T. V. Soong (ex. 179). Secretary

Hull testified that on November 26 he recommended to President

Roosevelt — and that the President approved — the Secretary’s calling

in the two Japanese Ambassadors and handing them the proposals

contained in the second section of the counterproposal that had

been under consideration at the State Department, while withholding

the modus vivendi plan (tr. 1147). President Roosevelt was. Secretary

Hull testified, “thoroughly familiar” with both sections of the counter-

proposal (tr. 14, 312). The record before the Committee contains

the following memorandum dated November 26 (Washington time)

from Secretary Hull for President Roosevelt:

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Memorandum for the Pri^sident

With reference to our two proposals prepared for submission to the Japanese

Government, namely:

(1) A proposal in the way of a draft agreeiQent for a broad, basic, peaceful

settlement for the Pacific area, which is henceforth to be made a part of the

general conversations now going on and to be carried on, if agreeable to both

Governments, with a view to a general agreement on this subject.

(2) The second proposal is really closely connected with the conversations

looking toward a general agreement, which is in the nature of a modus vivendi

intended to make more feasible the continuance of the conversations.

In view of the opposition of the Chinese Government and either the half-hearted

support or the actual opposition of the British, the Netherlands, and the Australian

Governments, and in view of the wide publicity of the opposition and of the addi-

tional opposition that will naturally follow through utter lack of an understanding

of the vast importance and value otherwise of the modus vivendi, 'Without in any

way departing from my views about the wisdom and the benefit of this step to

all of the countries opposed to the ag^essor nations who are interested in the

Pacific area, I desire very earnestly to recommend that at this time I call in the

Japanese Ambassadors and hand to them a copy of the comprehensive basic

proposal for a general peaceful settlement, and at the same time withhold the

modus vivendi proposal.

/s/ Cordell Hull (ex. 18).

In his testimony before the Committee, Secretary Hull gave a more

detailed statement of the considerations which led to his recommenda-

tion to the President:

I and other high officers of our Government knew that the Japanese military

were poised for attack. We knew that the Japanese were demanding — and had

set a time limit, first of November 25 and extended later to November 29, for —

acceptance by our Government of their extreme last-word proposal of November

20 .

It was therefore my judgment, as it was that of the President and other high

oflBcers, that the chance of the Japanese accepting our proposal was remote.

So far as the modus vivendi aspect would have appeared to the Japanese, it

contained only a little chicken feed in the shape of some cotton, oil, and a few

other commodities in very limited quantities as compared with the unlimited

quantities the Japanese were demanding.

It was manifest that there would be widespread opposition from American

opinion to the modus vivendi aspect of the proposal especially to the supplying

to Japan of even limited quantities of oil. The Chinese Government violently

OTposed the idea. The other interested governments were sympathetic to the

CSiinese view and fundamentally were unfavorable or lukewarm. Their co-

operation was a part of the plan. It developed that the conclusion with Japan

of such an arrangement would have been a major blow to Chinese morale. In

view of these considerations it became clear that the slight prospects of Japan^s

agreeing to the modus vivendi did not warrant assuming the risks involved in

proceeding with it, especially the serious risk of collapse of Chinese morale and

resistance and even of disintegration of China. It therefore became perfectly

evident that the modus vivendi aspect would not be feasible.

The Japanese were spreading propaganda to the effect that they were being

encircled. On the one hand we were faced by this charge and on the other by

one that we were preparing to pursue a policy of appeasing Japan. In view of

the resulting confusion, it seemed important to restate the fundamentals.% We

could offer Japan once more what we offered all countries, a suggested program

of collaboration along peaceful and mutually beneficial and progressive lines.

It had always been open to Japan to accept that kind of a program and to move

in that direction. It still was possible for Japan to do so. That was a matter

for Japan’s decision. Our hope that Japan would so decide had been virtually

extinguished. Yet it was felt desirable to put forth this further basic effort

in the form of one sample of a broad but simple settlement to be worked out in

our future conversations, on the principle that no effort should be spared to test

and exhaust every method of peaceful settlement (tr. 1145-1147).

Upon his return to the State Department from his conference with

President Koosevelt, at 5 p. m. Secretary Hull met with Ambassadors

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Nomura and Kurusu at the Department and handed them, in reply

to the Japanese note of November 20, the second section of the coun-

terproposal which had been under consideration since November 22,

together with an explanatory statement. The explanatory statement

was the first section of that counterproposal as quoted herein (pp. 70-71)

modified by the deletion of the modus vivendi and with further changes

made necessary thereby. It reviewed briefly the objectives sought

in the exploratory conversations, and stated that it was believed that

some progress had been made with respect to the general principles

involved. Note was taken of the recent statements of the Japanese

Ambassadors that it would be helpful toward creating an atmosphere

favorable to the successful outcome of the conversations if a temporary

modus vivendi could be agreed upon, to be in effect while the conversa-

tions looking toward a comprehensive and peaceful settlement in the

Pacific area were continuing. It was stated that the United States

Government most earnestly desired to afford every opportunity for

the continuance of the discussions to this end. The statement

continued:

The proposals which were presented by the Japanese Ambassador on Novem-

ber 20 contain some features which, in the opinion of this Government, conflict

with the fundamental principles which form a part of the general settlement under

consideration and to which each Government has declared that it is committed.

The Government of the United States believes that the adoption of such proposals

would not be likely to contribute to the ultimate objectives of ensuring peace

under law, order, and justice in the Pacific area, and it suggests that further

effort be made to resolve our divergences of views in regard to the practical appli-

cation of the fundamental princmles already mentioned.

With this object in view the Government of the United States offers for the con-

sideration of the Japanese Government a plan of a broad hut simple settlement cover-

ing the entire Pacific area as one practical exemplification of a program which this

Government envisages as something to he worked out during our further conversations.

The plan therein suggested represents an effort to bridge the gap between our

draft of June 21, 1941, and the Japanese draft of September 25, by making a new

approach to the essential problems underlying a comprehensive Pacific settlement.

This plan contains provisions dealing with the practical application of the funda-

mental principles which we have agreed in our conversations constitute the only sound

basis for worth-while international relations. We hope that in this way progress

toward reaching a meeting of minds between our two Governments may be

expedited (ex. 29, voL II, p. 767).

The outline of a proposed basis for aOTeement which Secretary Hull

handed to the Japanese Ambassadors follows, in full:

Strictly Confidential, Tentative and Without Commitment.

Washington, November 26, 1941,

Outline of Proposed Basis for Agreement Between the United States

AND Japan

\* SECTION I

Draft Mutual Dedaration of Policy

The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan both

being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific affirm that their national policies are

directed toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the Pacific area, that they

have no territorial designs in that area, that they have no intention of threatening

other countries or of using military force aggressively against any neighboring

nation, and that, accordingly, in their national policies they will actively support

and give practical application to the following fundamental principles upon which

their relations with each other and with all other governments are based :

(1) The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of

each and all nations.

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(2) The principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries.

(3) The principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity

and treatment.

(4) The principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation

for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of

international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.

The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States have

agreed that toward eliminating chronic political instability, preventing recurrent

economic collapse, and providing a basis for peace, they will actively support

and practically apply the following principles in their economic relations with

each other and with other nations and peoples:

(1) The principle of nondiscrimination in international commercial relations.

(2) The principle of international economic cooperation and abolition of

extreme nationalism as expressed in excessive trade restrictions.

(3) The principle of nondiscriminatory access by all nations to raw material

supplies.

(4) The principle of full protection of the interests of consuming countries

and populations as regards the operation of international commodity agreements.

(5) The principle of establishment of such institutions and arrangements of

international finance as may lend aid to the essential enterprises and the con-

tinuous development of all countries and may permit payments through processes

of trade consonant with the welfare of all countries.

SECTION II

Steps to he Taken by the Government of the Lnited States and by the Government of

Japan

The Grovemment of the United States and the Gk)vemment of Japan propose

to take steps as follows:

1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will

endeavor to conclude a multilateral nonaggression pact among the British Empire,

China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand, and The United

States.

2. Both Governments will endeavor to conclude among the American, British,

Chinese, Japan^, the Netherland, and Thai Governments an agreement where-

under each of the Governments would pledge itself to respect the territorial

integrity of French Indochina and, in the event that there should develop a

threat to the territorial integrity of Indochina, to enter into immediate consulta-

tion with a view to taking such measures as may be deemed necessary and ad-

visable to meet the threat in question. Such agreement would provide also that

each of the Governments party to the agreement would not seek or accept prefer-

ential treatment in its trade or economic relations with Indochina and would use

its influence to obtain for each of the signatories equality of treatment in trade

and commerce with French Indochina.

3. The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air, and police

forces from China and from Indochina.

4. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will

not support — militarily, jwlitically, economically — any government or regime in

China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital

temporarily at Chungking.

5. Both Governments will give up all extraterritorial rights in China, including

rights and interests in and with regard to international settlements and conces-

sions, and rights under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

Both Governments Will endeavor to obtain the agreement of the British and

other governments to give up extraterritorial rights in international settlements

and in concessions and under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

6. The Government of the United States and the Gk>vernment of Japan will

enter into negotiations for the conclusion between the United States and Japan

of a trade agreement, based upon reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment and

reduction of trade barriers by both countries, including an undertaking by the

United States to bind raw silk on the free list.

7. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will,

respectively, remove the freezing restrictions on Japanese funds in the United

States and on American funds in Japan.

8. Both Governments will agree upon a plan for the stabilization of the dollar-

yen rate, with the allocation of funds adequate for this purpose, half to be supplied

by Japan and half by the United States.

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9. Both Governments will agree that no agreement which either has concluded

with afiy third power or powers shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to

conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and

preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area.

10. Both Governments will use their influence to cause other governments to

adhere to and to give practical application to the basic political and economic

principles set forth in this agreement (ex. 167; ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 76S-770).

Ambassador Grew was fully informed the same evening of the sub-

stance of the United States’ reply. (Tr. 4513-4522 ; ex. 75.)

The record before the Committee shows that, commencing with the

first draft of an American counterproposal on November 22 (W ashing-

ton time), all the officials of the United States Government who were

consulted by Secretary Hull regarding the proposed modus vivendi

necessarily saw and considered the successive drafts of the foregoing

so-called “Ten Point” note, since from the outset the provisions which,

as revised, became the “Ten Point” note had constituted the second

section of the counterproposal and had been attached to the first

section containing the modus vivendi. The record also shows that

the provisions of the “Ten Point” note probably received more atten-

tion from the high officers of the Army and Navy than did the terms of

the modus vivendi, since the part containing the so-called “Ten Points”

was based primarily upon the State Department’s revision of the

Moigenthau suggestions of November 18. It will be recalled that that

revision was sent to the Army and Navy for comment on November 19,

and was the subject of the conference at the State Department on

November 21 attended by General Gerow and Admiral Stark, who

thereafter submitted their comments and suggestions to Secretary

Hull in memoranda of the same date. As has already been pointed

out, the first section of the “Ten Point” note was based almost entirely

upon the statement of principles contained m the draft proposal

submitted by the State Department’s Far Eastern Division to Secre-

tary Hull on November 11, which in turn had been frequently dis-

cussed with the Japanese d;iring the six months since the conversations

began in the spring of 1941.

Returning to Secretary Hull’s meeting with Ambassadors Nomura

and Kurusu, after the Japanese had read the documents handed them

by the Secretary, Ambassador Kurusu asked whether this was the

IJnited States reply to their proposal.

The Secretary replied that we had to treat the proposal as we did, as there was

so much turmoil and confusion among the public both in the United States and

in Japan. He reminded the Japanese that in the United States we have a political

situation to deal with just as does the Japanese Government, and he referred to

the fire-eating statements which have been recently coming out of Tokyo, which

he said had been causing a natural reaction among the public in this country.

He said that our proposed agreement would render possible practical measures of

financial cooperation, which, however, were not referred to in the outline for fear that

this might give rise to misunderstanding. He also referred to the fact that he had

earlier in the conversations acquainted the Ambassador of the ambition that had

been his of settling the immigration question but that the situation had so far

prevented him from realizing that ambition (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 764).

Ambassador Kurusu then commented adversely on various provisions

of tbe American note, saying among other things that he did not see

how his Government could consider paragraphs (3) and (4) , and that

if this represented the idea of the American Government he did not

see how any agreement was possible. He said that when they

reported the'United States’ answer to their Government “it would be

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likely to throw up its hands’ \ He suggested that it might be better

if they did not refer it to their Government before mscussing its

contents further informally in Washington. Later, he said that he

felt the reply could be interpreted ''as tantamount to meaning the

end.” He asked whether tne United States was interested in a

modus vivendi. Secretary Hull replied that he had explored that and

that he had done his best in the way of exploration (ex. 29, vol. II,

pp. 764-766).

In reply to Ambassador Kurusu’s suggestion that the document

should be discussed informally before reporting it to Tokyo —

The Secretary suggested that they might wish to study the documents carefully

before discussing them further. He repeated that we were trying to do our best to

keep the public from becoming uneasy as a result of their being harangued. He

explained that in the light of all that has been said in the press, our proposal was

as far as we would go at this time in reference to the Japanese proposal; that there

was so much confusion among the public that it was necessary to bring about

some clarification ; that w^e have reached a stage when the public has lost its per-

spective and that it was therefore necessary to draw up a document which

would present a complete picture of our position by making provision for each

essential point involved.

The Secretary then referred to the oil question. He said that public feeling

Wjas so acute on that question that he might almost be lynched if he permitted

oil to go freely to Japan. He pointed out that if Japan should fill Indochina with

troops our people would not know what lies ahead in the way of a menace to the

countries to the south and west. He reminded the Japanese that they did not

know what tremendous injury they were doing to us by keeping immobilized so

many forces in countries neighboring Indochina. He explained that we are

f irimarily out for our permanent futures, and the question of Japanese troops in

ndochina affects our direct interests (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 765).

At the conclusion of the meeting. Ambassador Nomura asked whether

the two Ambassadors could see President Roosevelt, and Secretary

Hull replied that he had no doubt the President would be glad to see

them at any time. The Ambassador also said that he would like to

have the counselor of the Japanese Embassy call on Mr. Joseph W.

Ballantine, one of the Secretary’s principal advisors on Far Eastern

affairs, the next day ‘‘to discuss further details” (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 766).

Secretary Hull testified:

The document handed the Japanese on November 26 was essentially a restate-

ment of principles which h^ive long been basic in this country's foreign policy.

The practical application of those principles to the situation in the Far East, as

embodied in the ten points contained in the document, was along lines which had

been under discussion with the Japanese representatives in the course of the in-

formal exploratory conversations during the months preceding delivery of the

document in question. Our Government's proposal embodied mutually profitable

policies of the kind we were prepared to offer to any friendly country and was

coupled with the suggestion that the proposal be made the basis for further con-

versations.

9|c :fe 9|c :|e

Our Government's proposal was offered for the consideration of the Japanese

Government as one practical example of a program to be worked out. It did

not rule out other practical examples which either Government was free to offer.

We well knew that, in view of Japan's refusal throughout the conversations to

abandon her policy of conquest and domination, there was scant likelihood of

her acceptance of this plan. But it is the task of statesmanship to leave no possi-

bility for peace unexplored, no matter how slight. It was in this spirit that the

November 26 document was given to the Japanese Government (tr. 1151-1152).

Before their meeting with Secretary Hull late in the afternoon of

November 26 {Washington time)j the two Japanese Ambassadors had

sent a joint telegram to Foreim Minister Togo in which they recog-

nized, even before Secretary Hull delivered the “ Ten Point” note to them,

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that the negotiations were for all practical piu-poses at an end. They

told the Foreign Minister:

“As we have wired you several times, there is hardly any possibility of having

them consider our “B“ proposal in toto. On the other hand, if we let the situation

remain tense as it is now, sorry as we are to say so, the negotiations will inevitably

be ruptured, if indeed they may not already be called so. Our failure and humiliation

are complete (ex. 1, p. 180).

They then asked the approval of the Foreign Minister of the only

remaining suggestion they had to offer, as a device to obtain more

time. The .Sibassadors suggested, with “grave misgivings,’’ that

they be permitted to propose to Secretary Hull that President Roose-

velt wire Foreign Minister Togo (not Emperor Hirohito) that “for the

sake of posterity he hopes that Japan and the United States will co-

operate for the maintenance of peace in the Pacific \* \* \* and

that you in retmn reply with a cordial message.” The Ambassadors

asked that their request be shown to the Navy Minister (ex. 1, p. 182).

While Ambassador Nomura and Ambassador Kurusu were meeting

with Secretary HuU at the State Department, and at their direction,

the counselor of the Japanese Embassy, Mr. Wakasugi, using the

trans-Pacific telephone, informed the Foreign Office in Toiyo that the

meeting was in progress and that “the future of the present talks

would be decided during the course of todayr’s conversation” (ex. 1,

p. 179). In making this call, Mr. Wakasugi used a telephone code

established earlier that day in a message from the Foreign Minister

which said “the situation is momentarily becoming more tense and

telegrams take too long” (ex. 1, p. 178). There is no evidence before

the Committee of the use of a trans-Pacific telephone code in con-

nection with the negotiations prior to the establishment of this code

by the Japanese Foreign Office before the American note was delivered

on November 26 Washington time).

Almost immediately upon his return to the Japanese Embassy,

Ambassador Kurusu telephoned the Japanese Foreign Office in Tokyo,

using the trans-Pacific telephone. He told the Chief of the American

Division, Kvunaicho Yamamoto:

I have made all efforts, bid they will not yield. I sent a cable expressing my opin-

ions to the Foreign Minister this morning.\* The situation is just like that.

Otherwise there is no means of accomplishing it (ex. 1, p. 179).

He continued —

I rather imagine you had expected this outcome'(ex. 1,'p. 180).

To which Bureau Chief Yamamoto replied:

Yes, I had expected it, but I wished to exert every effort up to the final moment

in the hope that something might be accomplished (ex. 1, p. 180).

That evening Ambassador Nomura cabled t^ee reports to the Foreign

Minister of the Ambassadors’ meeting with Secretary Hull. The

first was a brief r6sum6 of the “Ten Point” note, accompanied by this

comment:

In view of our negotiations all along, we were both dumbfounded and said we

could not even cooperate to the extent of reporting this to Tokyo. We argued

back furiously, but HULL remained solid as a rock. Why did the United States

have to propose such hard terms as these? Well, England, the Netherlands, ana

China doubtless put her up to it. Then, too, we have been urging them to quit

helping CHI AN 0, and lately a number of important Japanese in speeches have

I The message referred to above in which the Ambassadors said “Our failure and humiliation are com-

plete”.

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been urging that we strike at England and the United States. Moreover, there

have been rumors that we are demanding of Thai that she give us complete control

over her national defense. All that is reflected in these two hard proposals, or we

think so (ex. 1, p. 182).

The third telegram was a detailed account of the meeting (ex. 1, pp.

183-185). The second telegram consisted of general comments on the

situation (ex. 1, pp. 182-183). In it Ambassador Nomura showed

great concern lest some “independent action” taken by Japan while the

negotiations were continuing sbotdd place upon Japan the respon-

sibility “for the rupture of the negotiations.” He pointed out that

“up to the present we have only been able to press them for an early

solution. During this time we have not expressed any final intention.”

Recognizing that “such a thing as the darmcation of our intention is a

strict military secret,” the Ambassador recommended:

consequently, I think that it might be the better plan, dependent of course on the

opinions of the Government, that the current negotiations be clearly and irrevocably

concluded either through an announcement to the American Embassy in Tokyo or

by a declaration for internal and external consumption. I would like, if such a

course is followed, to make representations here at the same time (ex. 1, p. 183;.

The Tojo Cabinet Makes a Pretense Dp Continuing the Japa-

nese-American Conversations and at the Same Time Moves

Additional Japanese Troops into Southern Indochina

(November 27-Decemher 7, 1941)

The record before the Committee thus shows that there was little

hope or expectation in Washington on November 27, either among

those in the United States Government who were familiar with the

Japanese-American conversations or on the part of the two Japanese

Ambassadors, that the Tojo Government in Tokyo would continue

the conversations. Nevertheless, as requested by iimbassador Kurusu

the day before, a meeting with President Roosevelt was arranged for

2:30 p. m. on November 27 (Washington time) at the White House.

That morning, before the White House conference. Secretary HuU

held a “special and lengthy” press conference at which he reviewed

the Far Eastern situation and particularly the state of the Japanese-

American conversations in much greater detail than had been true of

the statement made to the press late the preceding afternoon, following

his conference with the two Japanese Ambassadors (tr. 1154-1161).

That statement had said only that the Japanese Ambassadors had

been handed for their consideration a document that was the culmi-

nation of conferences back and forth during recent weeks, and that it

was unnecessary to repeat what had been said so often in the past

that it rested.on certain basic principles with which the correspondents

should be entirely familiar in the hght of many repetitions (ex. 167).

At Secreta^ Hull’s press conference on the morning of November 27,

he emphasized that from the beginning he had kept in mind that the

groups in Japan led by the milita^ leaders had a plan to conquer by

force half of the earth with half its po^iulation; that this movement

had started in earnest -m 1937, and carried with it a policy of non-ob-

servance of any standards of conduct in international relations or of

any law or of any rule of justice or fair play. The Secretary said

that from the begioning, as the world was going more and more to a

state of international anarchy, the United States had sought to keep

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alive the basic philosophy and principles governing the opposing

viewpoint ia international relations, but that it was no easy under-

takiug. He then briefly reviewed the nature of the conversations he

had had with the Japanese, commencing in the spring of 1941, to

determine whether a peacefiil settlement relating to the entire Pacific

area might not be possible. He said that while the conversations

during the preceding several months had been purely exploratory, for

the past 10 days or so all phases of the basic questions presented and

of suggestions or ideas or methods of bringiug Japan and the United

States as close together as possible had been explored, on the theory

there might thus be reached the beginning of some peaceful and cordial

relations between Japan and other nations in the Pacific area, includ-

ing the United States. He said that during the conversations it had

been necessary to keep in mind not only the political situation in

Japan but also the activities of the Japanese Army and Navy, and he

cited the fact;

that we had known for some days \* \* ♦ that the Japanese were pouring men

and materials and boats and all kinds of equipment into Indo-China. \* ♦ \*

There was a further report that the Japanese Navy might make attacks some-

where there around Siam, any time within a few days (tr. 1156-1157).

He said that if the Japanese estabhshed themselves in Indochina in

adequate numbers, which they seemed to be doing, they would have

a base not only for operations against China but the whole South Sea

area. The Secretary said that the United States Government had

exhausted all its efforts to work out phases of this matter with the

Japanese; and that those efforts had been put forth to facilitate the

making of a general agreement. On November 26, he continued, be-

cause he had foimd there was so much confusion and so riiany col-

lateral manners brought in, while at the same time high Japanese

officials in Tokyo continued to proclaim their old doctrine of force,

he had thought it important to bring the situation to a clear perspec-

tive by restating the fundamental principles to which the United

States was committed and at the same time show how those princi-

ples could be applied to a number of specific conditions which would

logically be a part of a broad basic settlement in the entire Pacific

area. When he was asked whether he expected the Japanese to come

back and talk further on the basis of what he had given them on

November 26, Secretary Hull repUed that he did not know, but that

the Japanese might not do that. In reply to a question whether it

could be assumed there was not much hope that the Japanese would

accept the principles to which he had referred and go far epough to

afford a basis for continuing the conversations, the Secretary said

there was always a possibility but that he would not say how much

probability there might be.

Secretary Hull’s press conference took place at about 10 o’clock that

morning. Both before and after it, at 9:17 and 11 o’clock, the Sec-

retary talked with Secretary Stimson regarding the state of the nego-

tiations; he also talked with Admiral Stark that morning (tr. 1167,

5547). Secretary Stimson’s notes for that day (November 27) de-

scribe his two conversations with Secretary Hull :

A very tense, long day. News is coming in of a concentration and movement

south by the Japanese of a large Expeditionary Force moving south from Shanghai

and evidently headed towards Indo-China, with a possibility of going to the Philip-

pines or to Burma, or to the Burma Road or to the Dutch East Indies, but prob-

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abl^ a concentration to move over into Thailand and to hold a position from

which they can attack Singapore when the moment arrives.

The first thing in the morning I call up Hull to find out what his finale has been

with the Japanese — whether he had handed them the new proposal which we

passed on two or three days ago or whether, as he suggested yesterday he would,

he broke the whole matter off. He told me now that he had broken the whole

matter off. As he put it, “I have washed my hands of it and it is now in the hands

of you and Knox — the Army and the Navy.” I then called up the President.

The President gave me a little different view. He said they had ended up, but

they ended up with a magnificent statement prepared by Hull. I found out

afterwards that this was not a reopening of the thing but a statement of our con-

stant and regular position.

General Arnold came in to present the orders for the movement of two of our

biggest planes out from San Francisco and across the Mandated Islands to Manila.

There is a concentration going on by the Japanese in the Mandated Islands and

these planes can fly high over them, beyond the reach of their pursuit planes and

take photographs.

Knox and Admiral Stark came over and conferred with me and General Gerow.

Marshall is down at the maneuvers today and I feel his absence very much. Inhere

was a tendency, not unnatural, on the part of Stark and Gerow to seek for more

time. I said that I was glad to have time but I didn^t want it at any cost of

humility on the part of the United States or of reopening the thing which would

show a weakness on our part. The main question has been over the message that

we shall send to MacArthur. We have already sent him a quasi alert, or the first

signal for an alert, and now, on talking with the President this morning over the

telephone, I suggested and he approved the idea that we should send the final alert;

namely, that he should be on the qui vive for any attack and telling him how the

situation was. So Gerow and Stark and I went over the proposed message to

him from Marshall very carefully; finally got it in shape and with the help of a

telephone talk I had with Hull, I got the exact statement from him of what the

situation was (tr. 14,421-14,423).

Because of its relationship to events which followed, it is necessary

here to refer briefly to the background of Secretary Stimson^s obser-

vation in his notes that General Gerow and Admiral Stark desired ^^to

seek for more time.'’ It will be recalled that on November 5, in con-

nection with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's appeal for British and

American aid, General Marshall and Admiral Stark had concluded

that —

war between the United States and Japan should be avoided while building up

defensive forces in the Far East, until such time as Japan attacks or directly

threatens territories whose security to the United States is of very great impor-

tance (ex. 16).

As has been seen, one of the major considerations in the modus

vivendi proposal was the desire of\*the military and naval authorities

‘‘for more time." Howeveiv at the War Council meeting on Novem-

ber 25 attended by General Marshall and Admiral Stark, Secretary

Hull stated that there was “practically no possibility of an agreement

being achieved with Japan" (ex. 174, Item 13). The next day, at an

Army-Navy Joint Board meeting. General Marshall and Admiral Stark

directed the preparation of a memorandum to President Roosevelt

regarding what steps should be taken if the negotiations with Japan

should end without agreement. The meeting on November 27 de-

scribed by Secretary Stimson in his notes for that day was also

described in a memorandum for General Marshall prepared the same

day by General Gerow:

2. Later in the morning, I attended a conference with the Secretary of War

Secretarv of Navy, and Admiral Stark. The various messages to the Army and

Navy Commanders and to Mr. Sayre were discussed. A joint message for

General MacArthur and Admiral Hart was approved (copy attached). The

Secretaries were informed of the proposed memorandum you and Admiral Stark

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directed be prepared for the President. The Secretary of War wanted to be sure

that the memorandum would not be construed as a recommendation to the

President that he request Japan to reopen the conversations. He was reassured

on that point. It was agreed that tl^e memorandum would be shown to both

Secretaries before dispatch.

3. Both the message and the memorandum were shown to the Secretary of War.

He suggested some minor changes in the memorandum. These were made (copy

attached) (ex. 45).

In his""prepared statement^submitted to the Committee, Secretary

Stimson stated that at the meeting with General Gerow and Admir^

Stark,

I told them, which was the fact, that I also would be glad to have time but I

did not want it at the cost of humiliation of the United States or of backing

down on any of our principles which would show a weakness on our part (tr.

14, 394).

General Marshall summed up his viewpoint and that of Secretary

Stimson in his testimony before the committee:

He (Secretary Stimson) was very much afraid — he feared that we would find

ourselves involved in the developing situation where our disadvantages would be

so great that it would be quite fatal to us when the Japanese actually broke peace.

He also felt very keenly that, and thought about this part a great deal more

than I did, because it was his particular phase of the matter, that we must not go

so far in delaying actions of a diplomatic nature as to sacrifice the honor of the

country. He was deeply concerned about that.

My approach to the matter, of course, was much more materialistic. I was

hunting for time. Hunting for time, so that whatever did happen we would be

better prepared than we were at that time, that particular time.

So it was a question of resolving his views as to the honor, we will say, of the

United States, and his views of a diplomatic procedure which allowed the Japanese

to continue movements until we would be in a hopeless situation before the peace

was broken, and mine, which as I say, were much more materialistic, as I think

they should have been, that we should get as much time as we could in order to

make good the terrible deficiencies in our defensive arrangements (tr. 13.820-

13,821). . .

The memorandum for President Roosevelt, although dated No-

vember 27 (Washington time), was signed by (General Marshall

upon his retxim to Washington on November 28 (Washington time),

with the minor changes suggested by Secretary Stimson, and was as

follows:

Memorandum for the President

Subject: Far Eastern Situation.

If the cmrent negotiations end without agreement, Japan may attack: the

Burma Hoad; Thailand; Malaya; the Netherlands East Indies; the Philippines;

the Russian Maritime Provinces.

There is little probability of an immediate Japanese attack on the Maritime

Provinces because of the strength of the Russian forces. Recent Japanese

troop movements all seem to have been southward.

The magnitude of the effort required will militate against direct attack against

Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies until the threat exercised by United

States forces in Luzon is removed.

Attack on the Burma Road or Thailand offers Japanese objectives involving

less risk of major conflict than the others named, and clearly within the means

available, if unopposed by major powers. Attack on the Burma Road would,

however, be difficult and might fail. If successful, the Chinese Nationalist

Government might collapse. Occupation of Thailand gains a limited strategic

advantage as a preliminary to operations against Malaya or the Netherlands East

Indies; might relieve internal political pressure, and to a lesser extent, external

economic pressure. Whether the offensive will be made against the Burma

Road, Thailand, or the Philippines cannot now be forecast.

The most essential thing now, from the United States viewpoint, is to gain

time. Considerable Navy and Army reinforcements have been rushed to the

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Philippines but the desirable strength has not yet been reached. The process of

reinforcement is being continued. Of great and immediate concern is the safety

of the Army convoy now near Guam, and the Marine Corjw’ convoy just leaving

Shiuighai. Ground forces to a total of 21,000 are due to sail from the United

States by December 8, 1941, and it is important that this troop reinforcement

reach the Philippines before hostilities commence.

Precipitance of military action on our part should be avoided so long as con-

sistent with national policy. The longer the delay, the more positive becomes

the assurance of retention of these islands as a naval and air base. Japanese

action to the south of Formosa will be hindered and perhaps seriously blocked

as long as we hold the Philippine Islands. War with Japan certainly will inter-

rupt our transport of supplies to Siberia, and probably will interrupt the process

of aiding China.

After consultation with each other. United States, British, and Dutch military

authorities in the Far East agreed that joint military counteraction against Japan

should be undertaken only in case Japan attacks or directly threatens the terri-

tory or mandated territory of the Umted States, the British Commonwealth, or

the Netherlands East Indies, or should the Japanese move forces in,to Thailand

west of 100® east or south of 10® north, Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or

the Loyalty Islands.

Japanese involvement in Yunnan or Thailand up to a certain extent is advan-

tageous, since it leads to further dispersion, longer lines of communication, and

an additional burden on communications. However, a Japanese advance to the

west of 100® east or south of 10® north, immediately becomes a threat to Burma

and Singapore. Until it is patent that Japan intends to advance beyond these

lines, no action which might lead to immediate hostilities should be taken.

It is recommended that:

prior to the completion of the Philippine reinforcement, military counter-

action be considered only if Japan attacks or directly threatens United States,

British, or Dutch territory as above outlined;

in case of a Japanese advance into Thailand^ Japan be warned by the United

States, the British, and the DtUch governments that advance beyond the lines

indicated may lead to war; prior to such warning no joint military opposition

be undertaken;

steps be taken at once to consummate agreements with the British and Dutch

for the issuance of such warning.

[s] G. C. Mabshall [s] H. R. Stark (ex. 17).

Before the meeting at the White House at 2 p. m. on November 27

(Washington time), Secreta ry H ull conferred briefly alone with Presi-

dent Roosevelt (ex. 58). When the two Japanese Ambassadors

arrived, Ambassador Nomura seized the first opportunity to say that

they were disappointed over the failure of any agreement for a modus

vivendi. President Roosevelt expressed his grateful appreciation and

that of the United States Government to the peace element in Japan

which had worked hard in support of the movement for a peaceful settle-

ment in the Pacific area, and made it clear that the United States was

not overlooking what that element had done and was still ready to do.

He added that most people in the United States wanted a peaceful

solution of the Pacific problems, and that while he had not given up

yet, the situation was serious and that fact should be recognized.

He pointed out that the Japanese occupation of French Indo-China

had had the effect of a cold bath on the people of the United States

as well as on the United States Government, and intimated that a

second such bath appeared to be in the offing. He said that through-

out the conversations there had been no real indication of a desire for

peace by any of Japan^s leaders, and that this also had had its effect

on the conversations. According to his memorandiun of the meeting,

Secretary Hull then

made it clear that unless the opposition to the peace element in control of the

Government should make up its mind definitely to act and talk and move in a

peaceful direction, no conversations could or would get anywhere as has been so

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clearly demonstrated; that everyone knows that the Japanese slogans of co-

prosperity, new order in East Asia and a controlling influence in certain areas,

are aU terms to express in a camouflaged manner the policy of force and conquest

by Japan and the domination by military agencies of the political, economic,

social, and moral affairs of each of the populations conquered; and that so long

as they move in that direction and continue to increase their cultural relations,

military and otherwise with Hitler through such instruments as the Anti- Com-

intern Pact and the Tripartite Pact, et cetera, et cetera, there could not be any

real progress made on a peaceful course (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 772).

During the conversation, Ambassador Kurusu suggested that the

trouble was not with fundamentals so much as with their applica-

tion. However, with reference to a recent remark of President

Roosevelt about “introducing” Japan and China, when the Ambas-

sador asked who would take such action and the President said

“both sides” — meaning Japan as well as China — the Ambassador

pointed out “that from a practical standpoint that would be very

difl&cult to accomplish” (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 770-772).

According to Ambassador N omura’s report to Tokyo, as the meet-

ing ended. President Roosevelt told the Ambassadors that he was

leaving the next day, Friday, for Warm Springs, Ga., for a rest and

was planning to return the following Wednesday. He said that he

would like to talk with the Ambassadors then and would be very

gratified if some means of settlement could be discovered in the

meantime (ex. 1, pp. 192-194). In addition to Ambassador No-

mura’s cabled report of the meeting, Ambassador Kurusu telephoned

the Japanese Foreign Office in Tokyo, using the voice code previously

arranged, and said that in the conversation with the President “there

wasn’t much that was different from Hull’s talks of yesterday.” He

asked how things were in Tokyo, and was told that a crisis appeared

“imminent.” The Ambassador reported that the United States

wanted to continue the negotiations, but Bureau Chief Yamamoto

said “we can’t yield.” The Ambassador concluded by saying that

there was nothing of particular interest in the day’s talk with Presi-

dent Roosevelt, except that the southward advance of Japanese

troops was “having considerable effect” (ex. 1, pp. 188-191).

The record shows that President Roosevelt had an appointment

with Admiral Ernest J. King at 3:45 p. m. immediatefy after his

conference with the two Japanese Ambassadors (ex. 58), and that

at about 4:00 p. m. Secretary Stimson telephoned and talked with

Secretary Hull (tr. 1167, 5547). At 5:00 p. m. Secretary Hull tele-

phoned Admiral Stark, but was unable to reach him and talked with

Admiral Schuirmann instead (tr. 5547).

In addition to the conversations Secretary Hull had with officials of

the United States Government on November 27 (Washington time),

the Secretary and Under Secretary Welles also conferred that day

with representatives of three of the governments that had been

consulted in connection with the proposed modus mvendi. The

Netherlands Minister called and handed Secretary Hull a memo-

randum of the same date in which the Netherlands Foreign Minis-

ter took the position that inasmuch as the modus vivendi proposal

was only the beginning of negotiations, the military and economic

concessions suggested therein as a start seemed to be “quite far

reaching” and that it was “most unlikely” that Japan would at

the present moment leave the Axis (ex. 18) . The Austr^ian Minister,

Mr. Casey, also called on Secretary Hull and asked whether the

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modus vivendi had been abandoned permanently. When Secretary

Hull said he so considered it, Mr. Casey

expressed great concern and desired to know more about the movements of

Chiang Kai-shek and others intended to discourage the further consideration of

the modus vivendi. I referred to copies of British communications on the subject,

adding that Ambassador Halifax was strong for the proposal all the way and that

I sympathized with his situation but I did not feel that the communications

from Churchill and Eden, with qualifications such as were in them, would be

very helpful in a bitter fight that would be projected by Chiang Kai-shek and

carried forward by all of the malcontents in the United States, although I felt

unreservedly that Churchill and Eden, like the British Ambassador here, would

be for whatever we might do, even though not entirely to their liking in every

way. The Minister inquired whether I thought it would be feasible to take up

this matter further with the Chinese, and I replied that I did not think so, so far

as I am concerned. I thanked the Minister for his cooperation and that of his

Government (ex. 18).

Also that morning the British Ambassador '^urgently'' called on

Under Secretary Welles. The Under Secret^’s memorandum of

their conversation noted that Lord Halifax said that Secretary Hull

had telephoned him the previous evening and told him the nature

of the United States^ reply to Japan, and continued:

The Ambassador said that he was not quite clear in his own mind as to the

reasons which prompted this sudden change in presenting the Japanese Govern-

ment with a document other than the modus vivendi document which had so

recently been under discussion.

I said that Secretary Hull had requested me to say to the Ambassador in this

regard that one of the reasons for the determination reached was the half-hearted

support given by the British Government to the earlier proposal which had been

under discussion and the raising of repeated questions by the British Government

in regard thereto.

Lord Halifax said he could not understand this inasmuch as he had com-

municated to Secretary Hull the full support of the British Government.

To that I replied that the message sent by Mr. Churchill to the President

yesterday could hardly be regarded as ‘Tull support,'^ but on the contrary, very

grave questioning of the course then propos^.

Lord Halifax said that this message had been intended merely to express the

objections on the part of the Chinese Government. He went on to say that

he himself had been surprised by the vigor of the Chinese objections and that he

had, in fact, stated to the Chinese Ambassador that in view of the fact that only

ten days ago General Chiang Kai-shek was imploring the British and the United

States Government to prevent the closing of the Burma Road, it would seem

to him. Lord Halifax, that the course proposed by Secretary Hull gave positive

assurances to the Chinese Government that the Burma Road would in fact be

kept open if the modus vivendi agreement with Japan could be consummated.

He said that he felt that the attitude taken by the Chinese Government was

based partly on faulty information and partly on the almost hysterial reaction

because of the fear that any kind of an agreement reached between Japan and

the United States at this time would result in a complete breakdown of Chinese

morale.

I told Lord Halifax that information received this morning tended to show

that Japanese troop movements in southern Indochina were already very active

and that Japanese forces there were being quickly increased in number. I said

these reports likewise indicated that the threat against Thailand was imminent.

I said, in conclusion, that it was evident from the information received here that

the Japanese were preparing to move immediately on a very large scale. The

gravity of the situation, I thought, could not be exaggerated (ex. 18).

While on November 27 (Washington time) both Secretary Hull and

Under Secretary Welles thus believed the situation could not be more

serious, the record before the Committee indicates that the political

adviser to the Secretary, Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck, was less concerned.

In a memorandum of that date entitled ‘‘Problem of Far Eastern

relations — ^Estimate of Situation and certain probabilities,^' Dr.

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Hombeck expressed the opinion that he did not believe the United

States was “on the immediate verge of ‘war’ in the Pacific.” He

stated that in his opinion there was less reason on November 27 than

tWe was a week before for the United States to be apprehensive lest

Japan make war on the United States. “Were it a matter of placing

bets,” he wrote, “the imdersigned would give odds of five to one that

the United States and Japan will not be at ‘war’ on or before Decem-

15.” (tr. 5523-5537). [Italics in original.]

Apart from the remark of Bureau Chief Yamamoto during his

telephone conversation with Ambassador Kurusu the evening of No-

vember 26 (Washington time), when Yamamoto told the Ambassador

that he had expected that the United States would not yield to the

demands made by the Japanese Government in its note of November

20, and Yamamoto’s remark the next day in his telephone conversa-

tion with the Ambassador that Japan “can’t yield,” there is no evi-

dence before the Committee that the Japanese Foreign Office fiir-

nished the two Japanese Ambassadors any official comment or in-

structions as to their next step until INovember 28 (Japan time).

That day Foreign Minister Togo cabled the following instructions:

Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite of

this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal.

This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Government

can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a report of the

views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I wiU send

you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is in-

evitable. However, I do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are

broken of. Merely say to them that you awaiting instructions and that, although

the opinions of your Government are not yet clear to you, to your own way of

thinking the Imperial Government has always made just claims and has borne

great sacrifices for the sake of peace in the Pacific. Say that we have always

demonstrated a long-suffering and conciliatory attitude, but that, on the other

hand, the United States has been unbending, making it impossible for Japan to

establish negotiations. Since things have come to thu pass, I contacted the man

you told me to in your #1180 and he said that under the present circumstances

what you suggest is entirely unsuitable.\* From now on do the best you can

(ex. 1, p. 195).

This message, in the above form, was available in Washington on

November 28 (Washington time) (ex. I, p. 195), whether before or

after the War Coimcil meeting that da;^ is not known definitely,

although, as noted below, there is some iudication that it was not

availaffie until afterward.

The War Coimcil met at noon at the White House, with President

Roosevelt, Secretary of State Hull, Secretary of War Stimson, Secre-

tary of the Navy Knox, and General Marshall and Admiral Stark

present. Secretary Hull repeated the coroments he had made 3 days

before, at the War Council meeting on November 25, emphasizing

again that there was “practically no possibility of an agreement being

achieved with Japan,” that the Japanese were likely “to break out

at anj time with new acts of conquest,” emplojdng the element of

surprise as “a central point in their strategy,” and that the “safe-

guarding of our national security was in the hands of the Army and the

Navy” (Tr. 1203). Earlier that day Secretary Stimson had received

from the Military Intelligence Division (G-2) a summary of the

available mfo^ation regarding Japanese military and naval move-

1 This has reference to the suggestion made by the two Ambassadors on November 26 (Washington time)

that they be permitted to propose to Secretary Hull that President Roosevelt send a personal message to

Foreign Minister Togo (ex. 1, p. 180).

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ments in the Far East^ and had taken it to President Roosevelt and

suggested that he read it before the War Council meeting, which the

President had called. In his notes of the meeting, Secretary Stimson

said:

When we got back there at 12:00 o’clock he had read the paper that I had left

with him. The main point of the paper was a study of what the Expeditionary

Force, which we know has left Shanghai and is headed South, is going to do.

G-2 pointed out that it might develop into an attack on the Philippines or a

landing of further troops in Indo-China, or an attack on Thailand or an attack on

the Dutch Netherlands, or on Singapore. After the President had read these

aloud, he pointed out that there was one more. It might, by attacking the Kra

Isthmus, develop into an attack on Rangoon, which lies only a short distance

beyond the Kra Isthmus and the taking of which by the Japanese would effec-

tually stop the Burma Road at its beginning. This, I think, was a very good

suggestion on his part and a ve^ likely one. It was the consensus that the

present move — that there was an Expeditionary Force on the sea of about 25,000

Japanese troops aimed for a landing somewhere — completely changing the situa-

tion when we last discussed whether or not we could address an ultimatum to

Japan about moving the troops which she already had on land in Indo-China.

It was now the opinion of everyone that if this expedition was allowed to get

around the southern point of Indo-China and to go off and land in the Gulf of

Siam, either at Bangkok or further west, it would be a terrific blow at all of the

three Powers, Britain at Singapore, the Netherlands, and ourselves in the

Philippines. It was the consensus of everybody that this must not be allowed.

Then we discussed how to prevent it. It was agreed that if the Japanese got into

the Isthmus of Kra, the British would fight. It was also agreed that if the British

fought, we would have to fight. And it now seems clear that if this expedition

was allowed to round the southern point of Indo-China, this whole chain of

disastrous events would be set on foot of going.

It further became a consensus of views that rather than strike at the Force as

it went by without any warning on the one hand, which we didn’t think we could

do; or sitting still and allowing it to go on, on the other, which we didn’t think we

could do; that the only thing for us to do was to address it a warning that if it

reached a certain place, or a certain line, or a certain point, we should have to

fight. The President’s mind evidently was running towards a special telegram

from himself to the Emperor of Japan. This he had done with good results at

the time of the Panay incident, but for many reasons this did not seem to me to

be the right thing now and I pointed them out to the President. In the first

place, a letter to the Emperor of Japan could not be couched in terms which con-

tained an explicit warning. One does not warn an Emperor. In the second

place it would not indicate to the pecmle of the United States what the real nature

of the danger was. Consequently I said there ought to be a message by the

President to the people of the United States and I thought that the best form of a

message would be an address to Congress reporting the danger, reporting what

we would have to do if the danger happened. The President accepted this idea

of a message but he first thought of incorporating in it the terms of his letter to

the Emperor. But again I pointed out thiat he could not publicize a letter to an

Emperor in such a way; that he had better send his letter to the Emperor separate

as one thing and a secret thing\*, and then make his speech to the Congress as a

separate and a more understandable thing to the people of the United States.

This was the final decision at that time and the President asked Hull and Knox

and myself to try to draft such papers (tr. 14,424-14,426).

Shortly after the meeting ended, President Roosevelt left for Warm

Sprigs, Ga., telling reporters that the Japanese situation might

require his return at any time.^

Also on November 28, the Netherlands Minister called on Secretary

Hull to inquire what reactions the Secretary had had from the Jap-

anese situation. The Secretary recorded that he handed the

Minister —

three cables from Saigon and other localities in the French Indochina area indi-

cating that tens of thousands of Japanese troops with equipment, vessels, trans-

1 Earlier that day he had informed the press that American merchant vessels sailing the Pacific would not

be armed "'under existing circumstances.” When asked how long he expected the existing circumstances

to prevaU, the President had replied that that question “should be asked in Tokyo” (Washington Post,

November 20, 1041).

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ports, et cetera, were proceeding to that area from the north. He examined the

cables carefully and appeared much disturbed about the Japanese troop move-

ments. The Minister stated that this presented a very serious situation.

The Minister wanted to make clear that he had supported me unequivocally

in connection with the proposed modus vivendi arrangement which I abandoned

on Tuesday evening, November twenty-fifth, or practically abandoned when the

Chinese had exploded without knowing half the true facts or waiting to ascertain

them. I said that I had determined early We,dnesday morning, November

twenty-sixth, to present to the Japanese later in the day the document containing

a proposed draft of an agreement which set forth all of the basic principles for

which this Government stands and has stood for, for many years, especial I v

including the maintenance of the territorial integrity of China. I reminded the

Minister that the central point in our plan was the continuance of the conversa-

tions with Japan looking toward the working out Of a general agreement for a

complete peaceful settlement in the Pacific area and that the so-called modus

vivendi was really a part and parcel of these conversations and their objectives,

intended to facilitate and keep them alive and that, of course, there was nothing

that in any y^y could be construed as a departure from the basic principles which

were intended to go into the general p>eace agreement. The Minister said he

understood the situation (tr. 4475-4476) .

The British Minister, Sir Ronald Campbell, called on Dr. Hombeck

that day to inquire whether the Japanese-American negotiations had

in fact “broken down” as, he said, was stated in a message the British

armed authorities had received from the United States armed author-

ities.\* Dr. Hornbeck told the Minister that so far as he was aware

neither Government had “declared or indicated” that the negotiations

were terminated, but that he was not in a position to confirm or deny

the statement referred to by the Minister (ex. 18). At 7 o’clock that

evening the State Department sent a telegram to Ambassador Gauss

in Chungking which summarized the Japanese demands of November

20 and the terms of the proposed modus vivendi. The telegram briefly

reviewed the circumstances which led to the decision to withhold the

modus vivendi from the United States reply of November 26, concern-

ing which Ambassador Gauss had been previously informed, describing

in some detail for the Ambassador’s information the position regarding

the modus vivendi taken by the Chinese Government (ex. 18).

According to Secretary Stimson, the rest of the week-end after the

war council meeting on Friday “was largely taken up with preparing

a suggested draft of a message for the President to deliver to Congress”

(Tr. 14403). The record before the Committee shows that Friday

afternoon Admiral Stark called Secretary Hull on the White House

telephone at 2:49 o’clock and talked with one of the oflBcials of the

State Department’s Far Eastern Division, and that at 5:25 o’clock

Secretary Stimson called Secretary Hull and talked with Dr. Hom-

beck (Tr. 5548). The next day, Saturday, November 29 (Washington

time). Secretary Stimson and Secretary Knox sent to Secretary Hull

suggested drafts, which they had prepared, of the proposed message

to Congress decided upon the day before (ex. 161). In an attached

note in his handwriting. Secretary Stimson described his su^estions

as a “memo which may be helpful as to certain portions of the message

to the Congress.” Secretary Knox also forwarded a copy of his sug-

gestions to President Roosevelt en route to Warm Springs, with an

accompanying letter in which he said that he had had the assistance

of both Admiral Stark and Admiral Turner in preparing the summation

of the military situation contained in his draft. He told the President:

\* The message referred to appears to have been the Navy “war warning” dispatch of November 27 (W ash-

ington time) to Admiral Hart and Admiial Kimrael, which was sent to the United States Naval Observer

in LfOndon with instructions to “inform British” (ex. 37),

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The news this morning indicates the Japs are going to deliberately stall for two

or three days, so unless this picture changes, I am extremely hopeful that you will

get a two or three day respite down there and will come back feeling very fit

(ex. 161).

It seen s probable that Secretary Knox's information that the Japs

were stalling ‘Tor two or three days" was based on Foreign Minis-

ter Togo's message quoted above, in which the Foreign Minister

told Ambassador Nomura that with a report of his Government's

views on the United States' reply of November 26 “which I will send

you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured"

(ex. 1, p. 195). While this is not conclusive as to whether or not that

message was available before the War Council meeting on November

28 (Washington time), it does indicate that, although the message

was translated by the Navy on November 28, it was not seen by

Secretary Knox until “this morning", i. e., November 29 (Washing-

ton time).

The suggestions sent by Secretary Stimson and Secretary Knox to

Secretary Hull were combined in a single draft (ex. 161--A), which then

underwent extensive revision and modification. The revised draft

was ready by noon the same day, Saturday, November 29 (Washing-

ton time), according to a handwritten note accompanying a copy of it

which Dr. Hornbeck sent to Secretary Stimson the next day (ex.

161-A). It was accompanied by a draft of a proposed message to

Emperor Hirohito and by the following memorandum for President

Roosevelt dated November 29 (Washington time):

Memorandum for the President

There is attached a draft of a proposed message to Congress, to which draft the

Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War nlade material contributions, and

the officers of the Department made further contributions, which together com-

prise the draft of proposed message.

In order to get this to you today it has not been possible carefully to go over this

draft a second time. In fact, I myself have not had time to read it at all critically,

but expect to do so over the week-end and give you the benefit of any further com-

ment or suggestions.

I also enclose a draft by the Far Eastern officials of a possible message from you

to the Emperior of Japan. My personal view continues as on yesterday to be

that its sending will be of doubtful efficacy, except for the purpose of making a

record. It might even cause such complications as Col. Stimson and I referred to

on yesterday.

If you should send this message to the Emperor it would be advisable to defer

your message to Congress until we see whether the message to the Emperor effects

any improvement in the situation. I think we agree that you will not send mes-

sage to Congress until the last stage of our relations, relating to actual hostility,

has been reached.

I think you will desire to have any message to the Emperor dispatched in code

to Ambassador Grew for communication by him to the Emperor through appro-

priate channels (ex. 19).

The draft of a message to Emperor Hirohito was brief. In it, after

referring to the long period of unbroken peace between the United

States and Japan, the President was to state that he was addressing

the Emperor “because of the deep and far-reaching emergency which

appears to be in formation." He was then to continue:

Developments are occurring in the Pacific area which threaten to deprive each

of our nations and all humanity of the beneficial influence of the long peace

between our two countries. Those developments contain tra^c possibilities.

The history of both our countries affords brilliant examples in wnich your and

my predecessors have, at other times of great crisis, by their enlightened decisions

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and acts, arrested trends and directed national policies along new and better

courses — ^thereby bringing blessings to the peoples of both countries and to the

peoples of other lands.

Feeling deeply concerned over the present trend of events, I address myself to

Your Majesty at this moment in the fervent hope that Your Maiesty may, as I

am doing, give thought to ways of dispelling the dark clouds which loom over the

relations between our two countries and of restoring and maintaining the tradi-

tional state of amity wherein both our people may contribute to lasting peace and

security throughout the Pacific area (ex. 19).

The draft of the proposed message to Congress was longer, a docu-

ment of some twenty typewritten pages (ex. 19). It will be remem-

bered that the War Coxmcil had decided on November 28 that the

message was to be a message “to the people of the United States” as

well as “an address to Congress reporting the danger, reporting what

we would have to do if the danger happened” (tr. 14426). If the

President should send the message to Emperor Hirohito, that, the

War Council had decided, was to be “one thing and a secret thing,”

as a message to an Emperor could not be publicized as a message to

Congress could, and the President was to make his speech to Congress

“as a separate and more understandable thing to the people of the

United States” (tr. 14426). The proposed message began with these

words:

Gentlemen op the Congress: I come before you to report to you on serious

danger which is threatening this country and its interests in the Far East. Rela-

tions between the United States and the Japanese Empire have reached a stt^e

where I consider it incumbent upon me to lay before you the essential facts of

the situation and their extremely serious implications (ex. 19).

It then briefly reviewed the development of American foreign policy

in the Far East since 1833, discussing American relations wim China,

the acjjuisition by the United States of sovereignty oyer the Philippines

with its attendant responsibilities, and the relations between the

United States and Japan since 1908, including a brief discussion of

the Nine Power Treaty of 1921 . It considered the policy of aggression

followed by the Japanese first in Manchuria commencing in 1931 and

then in China, during the course of which American lives and property

had been imperiled and damaged in disregard for American rights

under existing treaties.

The proposed message then took up the relationship of Japan to

Germany and Italy in their scheme of world-wide conquest. It

pointed out that in flat defiance of its covenants Japan had invaded

and sought to overthrow the Government of China and that step by

step the Japanese armed forces, passing through the China Sea in

the immediate proximity of the Philippine Islands, had invaded and

taken possession of French Indo-China. It continued:

Today they are openly threatening an extension of this conquest into the

territory of Thailand. That step, if taken, would place them where they would

directly menace, to the North, the Burma Road, China’s lifeline, and, to the

South, the port and Straits of Singapore through which gateway runs the com-

merce of the world, including our own, between the Pacific and the Indian Ocean.

To the eastward of the Philippines, Japan has extended her threatening activi-

ties through the Caroline and Marshall Islands where, in violation of the man-

date under which she received the custody of those Islands, she has been secretly

establishing naval and air bases and fortifications directly on the line between

the United States and the Philippines.

By these steps Japan has enveloped with threatening forces the western,

northern, and eastern approaches to the Philippines. Should this process go

further, it will completely encircle and dangerously menace vital interests of the

United States.

« \* \* \* \* \* \*

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This situation, precipitated solely by Japanese aggression, holds unmistakable

threats to our interests, especially our interest in peace and in peaceful trade,

and to our responsibility for the security of the Philippine Archipelago. The

successful defense of the United States, in a military sense, is dependent upon

supplies of vital materials which we import in large quantities from this region

of the world. To permit Japanese domination and control of the major sources

of world supplies of tin and rubber and tungsten would jeopardize our safety in

a manner and to an extent that cannot be tolerated. Along with this would go

practical Japanese control of the Pacific.

Unless the present course of events in the Far East is halted and considerations

of justice, humanity, and fair dealing are restored, we will witness in that region

of the world precisely what has already transpired throughout the continental

limits of Europe where Hitler seeks dominion by ruthless force (ex. 19).

It was then pointed out that throughout the period in which Japan

had been making it clear that this was her program, the Government

of the United States had endeavored to persuade the Government of

Japan that Japan’s best interests lay in maintaining and cultivating

friendly relations with the United States and other countries that

believe in orderly and peaceful processes. Reference was made to

the 8 months of conversations with the Japanese which had been

carried on by the Secretary of State and the President for the purpose

of arriving, if possible, at some imderstanding agreeable to both

Governments, and the principles for which the United States had

stood, as set forth in the United States note of November 26 to Japan,

were summarized. It was stated that in this effort the United States

Government had had the agreement and support of the Governments

of Great Britain, Australia, the Netherlands, and China. Every

effort had been made, it was said, toward reaching a fair and workable

agreement, and to commit Japan to practices in line with the principles

advocated by the United States.

These efforts, the proposed message continued, had failed, and

Japan had refused to change her position or her practices, and rela-

tions between the two nations were threatened with rupture. The

supreme question presented to the United States, it was said, was the

question of self-defense; the immediate question was whether the

United States would, or would not, stand by while Japan went for-

ward with a program of conquest. The effects of that program of

conquest, if successful, on China and the Philippines were men de-

scribed, and it was said that —

If the Japanese should carry out their now threatened attacks upon, and were

to succeed in conquering, the regions which they are menacing in the southwestern

Pacific, our commerce with the Netherlands East Indies and Malaya would be

at their mercy and probably be cut off. Our imiiorts from those regions are of

vital importance to us. We need those imports in time of peace. With the

spirit of exploitation and destruction of commerce which prevails among the

partners in the Axis Alliance, and with our needs what they are now in this period

of emergency, an interruption of our trade with that area would be catastrophic

(ex. 19).

The proposed message then concluded by stating that the United

States did not want war with Japan, but that if war should come, the

fault and responsibility would be those of Japan, and that the primary

cause would have been the pursuit by Japan of a policy of aggression.

The polii^ of the United States and its relation with Japan should

not be influenced by fear of what attacks, acting imlawfully and with

resort to force, Japan might make upon the United States —

but by determination on our part to give the utmost support of which we are

reasonably capable to the fundamental principles of order and security and

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justice to which we have been and are committed, with confidence that it is

within our capacity to withstand any attack which anyone may make upon us

because of our pursuit of that course (ex. 19).

Also on November 29 (Washington time), the British Ambassador

called on Secretary Hull to learn of any further developments in the

Japanese situation, especially with reference to the question of the

proposed modus vivendi. As Secretary Hull described the conversa-

tion:

This caused me to remark in a preliminary way that the mechanics for the

carrying on of diplomatic relations between the governments resisting aggressor

nations are so complicated that it is nearly impossible to carry on such relations

in a manner at all systematic and safe and sound. I referred to the fact that

Chiang Kai-shek, for example, has sent numerous hysterical cable messages to

different Cabinet officers and high officials in the Government other than the

State Department, and sometimes even ignoring the President, intruding into a

delicate and serious situation with no real idea of what the facts are. I added

that Chiang Kai-shek has his brother-in-law, located here in Washington, dis-

seminate damaging reports at times to the press and others, apparently with no

particular purpose in mind; that we have correspondents from London who

interview different officials here, which is entirely their privilege to do, except

that at times we all move too fast without fully understanding each other^s

views, et cetera, et cetera. I stated that this was well illustrated in the case of

the recent outburst by Chiang Kai-shek. In referring to this I remarked that it

would have been better if, when Churchull received Chiang Kai-shek’s loud protest

about our negotiations here with Japan, instead of passing the protest on to us

without objection on his part, thereby qualifying and virtually killing what we

knew were the individual views of the British Government toward these negotia-

tions, he had sent a strong cable back to Chiang Kai-shek telling him to brace

up and fight with the same zeal as the Japanese and the Germans are displaying

instead of weakening and telling the Chinese people that all of the friendly coun-

tries were now striving primarily to protect themselves and to force an agree-

ment between China and Japan, every Chinese should understand from such a

procedure that the best possible course was being pursued and that this calls for

resolute fighting until the undertaking is consummated by peace negotiatons

which Japan in due course would be obliged to enter into with China.

I expressed the view that the diplomatic part of our relations with Japan was virtually

over and that the matter will now go to the ojficials of the Army and the Ncevy with whom

I have talked and to whom I have given my views for whenever they are worth. Speaking

in great confidence, I said that it would be a serious mistake for our country and other

countries interested in the Pacific situation to make plans of resistance without includ-

ing the possibility that Japan may move suddenly and with every possible element of

surprise and spread out over considerable areas and capture certain positions arid

posts before the peaceful countries interested in the Pacific would have time to confer

and formulate plans to meet these new conditions; that this would be on the theory that

the J apanese recognize that their course of unlimited conquest now renewed all along

the line probably is a desperate gamble a\*nd requires the utmost boldness and risk.

I also said to the Ambassador that a calm deliberale Japanese Government would

more than ever desire to wait another thirty days to see whether the German Army is

driven out of Russia by winter. I added that the extremist fire-eating elements in

J apan, who have preached a general forward movement supported by the Army and

Navy have influenced a vast portion of the Japanese public to clamor for such a

movement, would probably take no serious notice of the Russian-German situation,

but would go forward in this desperate undertaking which they have advocated for some

time; that at least it would be a mistake not to consider this possibility as entirely real,

rather than to assume that they would virtually halt and engage in some movements

into Thailand and into the Burma Road while waiting the results on the Russian

front. The Ambassador, I think, had his reservations on this latter point. He did not

disagree with what I said about the badly confused mechanics for the conduct of

diplomatic relations between several of our countries inj these critical times {ex. 18).

Also that day the Australian Minister, Mr. Casey, called on Secre-

tary Hull and intimated that he was prepared to suggest to the Japa-

nese Ambassador that Australia would be glad to act as mediator

between Japan and the United States. In his memorandum of the

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conversation, Secretary Hull noted that he gave the matter no serious

attention, except to teU the Minister —

that the diplomatic stage was over and that nothing would come of a move of

that kind. I interrupted him to make this conclusive comment before the

Minister could make a detailed statement of the matter on the assumption that

he would develop a set of facts along lines that he began to intimate (ex. 174).

That afternoon the State Department received from Ambassador

Grew the text of a Japanese note protesting the alleged flight of an

American airplane over the island of Formosa on November 20,

claiming this was a violation of Japanese territory and requesting

that the matter “be brought to the attention of the United States

authorities concerned.” .finbassador Grew was informed on Decem-

ber 6 (W asbington time) that the req^uested action had been taken, and

that on November 24 an unidentified airplane had carried out a

reconnaissance of Guam (ex. 130). The same afternoon (November

29) Secretary Hull received a request from the British Ambassador

for a copy of the text of the United States’ note of November 26 to

send to the British Foreign Minister, to whom the general character

of the note had previously been communicated (ex. 158). A copy of

the note was sent to the Ambassador by Under Secretary Welles the

following Tuesday (tr. 1338). Also that afternoon the State Depart-

ment instructed American diplomatic and consular offices at Saigon,

Bangkok and Singapore to report “all movements of military or

naval units” promptly to the American Consul at Manila, who was

told to transmit such information to Admiral Hart, the Commander

in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet (ex. 21).

Overshadowii^ the other events of the day, however, was an

Associated Press report of a speech made by Premier Tojo in Tokyo

before a rally sponsored by the “Imperial Rule Assistance Associa-

tion” and the “Dai Nippon East Asia League,” in commemoration

of the first anniversary of the Joint Declaration by the Governments

of Japan and Manchukuo and the Wang Ching-wei J^gime in Japanese-

occupied China (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 122).\* In his speech. Premier

Tojo said;

It is certainly the most fortunate lot of the three, powers to have the privilege

of collaborating together under this banner for cutting open the thorny way, and

1 year has already gone by since we started this honorable work together, and if

it is not the greatest task of the present century what else can it be.

However if we look around we find that there are still many countries who are

indulging in actions hostile to us. In fact they are trying to throw obstacles in

the way of the construction of the East Asia co-prosperity sphere and are trying

to enjoy the dream of exploitation of East Asia at the cost of the 1,000 million

populace of the East Asiatic peoples to satisfy their greed of possession.

The fact that Chiang Kai-shek is dancing to the tune of Britain, America, and

communism at the expense of able-bodied and promising young men in his futile

resistance against Japan is only due to the desire of Britain and the United States

to fish in the troubled waters of East Asia by pitting the East Asiatic peoples

against each other and to grasp the hegemony of East Asia. This is a stock in

trade of Britain and the United States.

For the honor and pride of mankind we must purge this sort of practice from

East Asia with a vengeance (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 148).

The reports of this speech by Premier Tojo commenced coming in

on November 29, the date fixed by Foreign Minister Togo as the final

deadline before which Ambassador Nomura was to obtain the written

\* Extracts from Premier Tojo's speech were carried in American newspapers on November 30 under such

headlines as “Japan Threatens to Purge Asia of U. S. and Britain" (Washington Post, November 30, 1941).

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agreement of the United States to the Japanese demands of November

20 or else things would “automatically” begin to happen (ex. 1, p.

165). It must be assumed Secretary Hull was aware of this and of

the Forei^ Minister’s message to .^^bassador Nomma stating that

the negotiations would be de facto ruptured within 2 or 3 days (ex.

1, p. 195).

Late Saturday evening, November 29 (Washington time), Secretary

Hull telephoned President Roosevelt at Warm Springs and had a

lengthy conversation with him, after which the President’s press

secretary told reporters:

In view of the reported statement — an Associated Press dispatch by the Premier

of Japan, the President tonight is of the opinion that he may have to leave Warm

Springs tomorrow afternoon, arranging the railroad schedule so as to arrive in

Washington Monday before noon (tr. 14337).

Secretary Hull testified that “the gravity of the situation was evident

from many sources”, and that as Premier Tojo’s statement reflected

the extreme acuteness of the situation, “in that sense it may be said

that the statement prompted my telephone call and the President’s

return” (Tr. 14,340).

In the meantime, after cabling Ambassador Nomura on November

28 (Japan time) that he did not wish the Ambassador “to give the

impression that the negotiations are broken off” (ex. 1, p. 195),

Foreign Minister Togo had followed up that message with another

the next day in which he instructed the Ambassador:

We wish you would make one more attempt verbally along the following lines:

The United States government has (always?) taken a fair and judicial position

and has formulated its policies after full consideration of the claims of both sides.

However, the Imperial Government is at a loss to understand why it has now

taken the attitude that the new proposals we have made cannot be made the basis

of discussion, but instead has made new proposals which ignore actual conditions

in East Asia and would greatly injure the prestige of the Imperial Government.

With such a change of front in their attitude toward the China problem, what

has become of the basic objectives that the U. S. government has made the basis

of our negotiations during these seven months? On these points we would

request careful self-reflection on the part of the United States government.

(in carrying out this instructiony please be careful that this does not lead to anything

like a breaking off of negotiations) (ex. 1, p. 199).

This message was translated and available in Washington on Sunday'

November 30 (Washington time). Late that evening Ambassador

Kurusu telephoned Bureau Chief Yamamoto in Tokyo that ar-

rangements had been made for the two Ambassadors to meet with

Secretary Hull the next morning, Monday. The Ambassador re-

ported that President Roosevelt was returning to Washington the

next day because of Premier Tojo’s speech, and cautioned against

such “ill-advised statements,” saying that it put the two Ambassadors

“in a very difficult position.” When Yamamoto urged the Ambassa-

dor to continue the negotiations. Ambassador Kurusu said they

would need Tokyo’s help, and both the Premier and the Foreim

Minister would need “to change the tone of their speeches.” The

Ambassador continued:

Actually the real problem we are up against is the effects of happenings in

the South. You understand don’t you? (ex. 1, p. 207).

Yamamoto rephed:

Yes, yes (ex. 1, p. 207).

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Secretary Hull testified that he telephoned the President that Sxm-

day ‘ “after conferring with our military regarding the Japanese Prinfe

Minister’s bellicose statement and the increasing gravity of the Far

Eastern situation” (tr. 1163). The record shows that the Secretary

had two telephone conversations that morning with Admiral Stark

at 10:30 and 12:08 o’clock (tr. 1167). Admiral Stark attended the

Secretary’s conference with President Roosevelt at 11:45 a. m. the

next day immediately following the President’s return to Washington,

and it would seem probable that the arrangement for Admiral Stark to

attend that conference was made during the Secretary’s telephone

conversations with him.

At 1:28 o’clock Sunday afternoon there was received in the State

Department, through Ambassador Winant in London, the following

message from Prime Minister Churchill for President Roosevelt:

It seems to me that one important method remains unused in averting war be\*

tween Japan and our two countries, namely a plain declaration, secret or public

as may be thought best, that any further act of aggression by Japan wiU lead

immediately to the gravest consequence. I realize your constitutional difficulties

but it would be tragic if Japan drifted into war by encroachment without having

before her fairly and squarely the dire character of a further aggressive step. I

beg you to consider whether, at the moment which you judge right which may he

very near, you should not say that ^^any further Japanese agression would compel

you to place the gravest issues before Congress”, or words to that effect. We

would, of course, make a similar declaration or share in a joint declaration, and

in any case arrangements are being made to synchronize our action with yours.

Forgive me, my dear friend, for presuming to press such a course upon you, but

I am convinced that it might make all the difference and prevent a melancholy

extension of the war (ex. 24)-

Also that Sunday both the Austrahan Minister, Mr. Casey, and the

British Ambassador, Lord Halifax, called on Secretary Hull. The

Austrahan Minister gave the Secretary the substance of a talk he had

had with Ambassador Kurusu. Secretary Hull recorded:

This amounted to very little and there was really nothing new in what he said

except that Kurusu made it repeatedly clear that the Japanese were very desirous

of continuing conversations with this Government. The Minister then referred

to his notes and said that the British Ambassador desired to urge, along with him,

the Australian Minister, that I do the best possible to continue our relations with

Japan so as to avoid a military conflict at this time, the idea being that they

needed more time for preparation to resist in the Pacific area. This view has

been asserted constantly during recent weeks by the British Ambassador, the

Australian Minister, and twice by the Netherlands Minister (ex. 168).

One of the purposes of the British Ambassador’s call was to hand

Secretary Hull the following memorandum:

MOST SECRET

There are important indications that Japan is about to attack Thailand and

that this\* attack will include a sea-borne expedition to seize strategic points in

the Kra isthmus.

We have plans for the rapid movement of a force from Malaya to hold a line

across the Kra isthmus in the neighborhood of Singora. Time is the essence of

thw plan, particularly at this season of the year when the Kra isthmus is water

logged. Consequently great tactical advantage lies with the side which gets

there first.

R. A. F. are reconnoitering on arc of 180 miles from Tedta Bharu for three days

commencing November 29th and our Commander in Chief, Far East has re-

quested Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet at Manila to undertake air recon-

1 Newspaper accounts of Secretary Hull's activities that Sunday state that the Secretary again telephoned

President Roosevelt at Warm Springs before his departure for Washington (Washington Post, December 1,

1941 ).

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naissance on line Manila-Camranh Bay on the same days. Commander in Chief,

Far East, has asked for permission to move into Kra isthmus, if air reconnaissance

establishes the fact that escorted Japanese ships are approaching the coast of

Thailand, and he asks for an immediate decision on this point.

To allow the Japanese to establish themselves so near the Malay frontier would

be an obvious threat to Singapore even though at the present season it might not

develop at once. We have also to bear in mind the encouragement which the

Japanese success would give to their extremists. Demands of appetite would

grow and other Far East peoples would be correspondingly depressed. It looks

therefore as though, to ensure the defense of Singapore and for wider reasons,

we might have to take the proposed action to forestall the Japanese (ex. 21).

In his memorandum of his conversation with the British Ambassador

Secretary Hull stated that the Ambassador —

was very desirous of ascertaining what the United States would do if the British

should resist any Japanese undertaking to establish a base on the Kra Isthmus.

7 said that the President was returning tomorrow morning and that I would lay all

phases of the situation before him on Monday noon. This I proceeded later to do

and the President agreed to notify and see the Ambassador later with respect to hu

inquiry. ♦ \* \* The Ambassador continued his attitude of desiring more time

for his Government to make preparations to resist in the Pacific area. He assured

me that his Government would be in harmony with any steps that we jmight

pursue to this end (ex. 21).

The next day Lord Halifax sent Secretary Hull a copy of a tele-

gram he had received from the British Foreign Office, ^‘as the point

may possibly arise in the course of your discussions this morning.”

‘‘You will remember,^’ he wrote the Secretary, “you mentioned the

point to me as I was leaving your office yesterday^’ (ex. 158). The

Foreign Office telegram was as follows:

It is conceivable that United States Government may raise with you the ques-

tion of the compatibility of the operation referred to with our treaty of non-

aggression with Thailand. It may be useful for you to know therefore that we

have given careful consideration to this point.

In July last we informed the Thai Government that we should regard the grant

of bases to Japan as an infraction of that treaty. Similarly (although we have

as yet made no communication to the Thai Government) we. should not feel we

could allow the treaty to be a bar to our entering Thailand if a Japanese invasion

occurred or was clearly impending. But it would be greatly preferable if in these

eventualities we could act in co-operation with the Thai Government. If there-

fore it were decided to undertake the operation, we should naturally do our best

to secure Thai's consent. It would be important however not to reveal to the

Thai Government prematurely the existence of our plan owing to the danger of

leakage to the Japanese (ex. 158).

Thus, the record before the Committee shows that as President

Roosevelt returned to Washington from Warm Springs, the infor-

mation available to his advisors in Washington indicated that a

crisis was fast approaching, if not already at hand.

A series of intercepted Japanese messages that were translated and

available in Washington the next day, December 1 (Japan time),

fully confirmed this view. In a telegram dated December 1 (Japan

time) to Ambassador Nomura, the Japanese Foreign Minister told

the Ambassador that —

The date set in my message No. 812 has come and gone and the situation

continues to be increasingly critical. However, to prevent the United States

from becoming unduly suspicious, we have been instructing the Press and others

that though there are some wide differences between Japan and the United

States, the negotiations are continuing.

(The above is for only your information) (ex. 1, p. 208).

That same day the Japanese Foreign OflGlce informed the Ambassador

that its four offices “in London, Hongkong, Singapore, and Manila

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have been instructed to abandon the use of the code machines and to

dispose of them,” and that the machine in Batavia had been returned

to Japan (ex. 1, p. 209). From a message dated November 29 from

the Japanese Ambassador in Thailand to Foreign Minister Togo in

Tokyo, it was learned that the Ambassador was conspiring with the

pro-Japanese faction in Thailand to place that country in a position

where it would be compelled to declare war on Great Britain. The

Japanese Ambassador in Thailand reported to Tokyo that the question

of joint military action between Thailand and Japan had been brought

up in the Thai Government, but that the Government had expressed a

desire to pursue a course of strict neutrality. He told Foreign

Minister Togo that the Thai Government —

had taken a fairly firm stand that the first one, regardless of whether they be

Britain or Japan, who makes the first move shall be considered Thai’s enemy.

Therefore, for Japan to be looked upon as Thai’s helper, she should put Britain

in a position to be the first aggressor. For the purpose of accomplishing this,

Japan should carefully avoid Thai territory, and instead, land troops in the neigh-

borhood of Kotaparu in British territory, which would almost certainly force Britain

to invade Thailand from Patanbessa.

The consequence would be Thai’s declaration of war on Britain. This strategy

is being given careful consideration. Apparently this plan has the approval of

Chief of Staff Bijitto. Our naval Attache has advised the Naval General Staff,

also, I think (ex. 1, p. 203).

While the record before the committee shows that all of these Japanese

messages were translated and available in Washii^ton on December

1, it does not show the exact hour when translation was completed.

It therefore cannot be said with certainty which, if any, of the mes-

sages were seen by Secretary Hull before his conference with the

Japanese Ambassadors that morning, or which of the messages were

seen by President Roosevelt, Secretary Hull, and Admiral Stark before

their conference immediately after the President’s return to Washing-

ton from Warm Springs.

The Invasion op Thailand by Japanese Forces From French

Indochina Appears Imminent

{December 1-7, 1941)

Thus on December 1 (Washington time) there was much information

in Washington that pointed towwd Thailand as the next objective of

Japanese aggression. Geographically, Thailand lies between French

Indochina on the east and Burma on the west, and, with the Gulf of

Siam, between French Indochina on the northeast and the British

Malay States on the south . After the Japanese occupation of southern

French Indochina in late July, Thailand thus became a barrier between

those forces and two possible objectives, the Burma Road on the one

hand and Singapore on the other. This strategic location of Thailand

had been emphasized by General Marshall and Admiral Stark in their

joint memorandum of November 5 (Washington time) when they con-

cluded that no military action against Japan should be undertaken by

the United States uidess., among other contingencies, the Japanese

should move their forces “into Thailand to the west of 100° east (i. e.,

toward the Burma Road) or south of 10° north” (i. e., toward Singa-

pore) (ex. 16).

It is desirable here to review briefly the situation with respect to

Thailand as it had developed since July. The record before the Com-

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mittee shows that after the Japanese invasion and occupation of

French Indochina late in July, the Thai ‘Government, fiiUy aware of

Thailand’s strategic position and importance to the Japanese, on

August 12 (Washington time) had] formally} asked the State Depart-

ment whether, in the event Thailand shoidd be attacked and should

resist attack, the United States Government would extend material

assistance to it, the Thai Government having determined and formally

announced that it would defend itself against attack by any other

country. Mr. Maxwell M. Hamilton, then Chief of the State Depart-

ment’s Far Eastern Division, to whom the question was presented,

had advised the Thai Minister that the matter would be taken up with

higher officers of the Department and that he would then communi-

cate further with the Minister (ex. 169, item 6). The Thai Minister

had previously made informal inquiry of the State Department to the

same effect, after Secretary Hull had stated at a press conference on

August 6 (Washington time) that the United States was becoming

increasingly concerned oyer events in the southwestern Pacific area

(ex. 169, item 1-6). Again on August 14, the Thai Minister had called

at the State Department and stated that he had received another tele-

gram from his Government which, “in the gravity of its tone, indicated

that a critical state had been reached in respect of the threat of in-

vasion.” He had further stated that he had been instructed “to spare

no effort to obtain an expression of the views of the American Govern-

ment in this situation,” and that the Thai Government was ready and

able to purchase in America the arms it needed (ex. 169, item 7).

On August 15 (Washington time) the State Department had received

from the United States Minister at Batavia in the Netherlands East

Indies a telegram containing the substance of a message from the

Netherlands Minister of Colonies in London to the Governor-General

of the Netherlands East Indies. In it the Minister of Colonies advised

the latter that he had been assured by the British Foreign Minister

that in the event of an attack by Japan upon the Netherlands East

Indies, the British Empire would back up the Netherlands completely.

The Governor-General was also advised that a further conference

would soon be held in London with the British Foreign Minister in

this connection —

since it has become clear now that the United States and England will not resist

Japanese occupation of Thailand with force of arms. It is also brought to your

attention that any guarantee or certainty of United States participation by force

of arms is absolutely excluded (ex. 169, item 8).

Secretary Hull had conferred with the Thai Minister in Washii^-

ton on Avgust 18 (Washington time). In reply to the Minister’s

previous inquiries as to the attitude of the United States Govern-

ment toward Thailand if Thailand should be attacked and should

endeavor in good faith to defend itself. Secretary Hull had stated

that the United States had been aiding China in many ways against

the aggression of Japan and that, in the contingencies mentioned, the

United States Government would place Thailand in the same category

(ex. 169, item 9).

The next action of importance in connection wdth Thailand appears

to have occurred on October 27 (Washington time), when the British

Minister in Washington, Sir Ronald Campbell, discussed the Thai-

land situation with Under Secretary Welles and left with him two

memoranda dated October 25 dealing with possible material aid to

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Thailand, including guns, ammunition, planes and aviation gasoline and

lubricating oil, by Great Britain and the United States (ex. 169, item

13). It will be recalled that it was about this time that Generalissimo

Chiang Kai-shek had appealed to Great Britain and the United States

for planes and pilots to defend the Burma Road against an anticipated

attack by the Japanese from northern French Indochina. The

American reply to the British memoranda of October 25 had been

delayed in order that both of these matters could be considered at the

same time (ex. 169, item 11). On November 6 (Washington time),

that reply, in the form of an aide memoirej had been handed to the

British Minister (ex. 169, item 13). The aide memoire pointed out

that for some weeks it had ]>een the policy of the United States

Government to rive svmpathetic consideration to priority and export

applications filed on behalf of the Thai Government and, whenever

practicable in the face of demand from other areas upon American

production, to take favorable action upon such applications. Regard-

ing the proposals contained in the British memoranda, the United

States reply commented that the British proposal to require the

acceptance of British instructors along with the howitzers and field

guns which were to be offered to the Thai Government might serve as a

pretext upon which the Japanese Government might exert additional

pressure upon Thailand. As to planes, the memoranda suggested

that the British might wish to consider the release to Thailand of a

number of airplanes at Singapore which it was imderstood were in

excess of the number for which pilots were available there. If this

should not be practicable, it was suggested that if the British shorid

decide to make available to Thailand planes from those being supplied

to it from the United States, the United States Government would be

agreeable to such an arrangement. Concerning aviation g^oline and

lubricating oil, it was stated that a reply would be made in the near

future, after fmther investigation (ex. 169, item 13).

On November 18 (Washington time) the State Department had

advised the American Minister at Bangkok that it had exj)lored the

possibility of making available to the Tnai C^vemment antitank and

antiaircraft guns and ammimition, but that it had been found impos-

sible to spare any of such items at the moment (ex. 169, item 15).

Four days later, on November 22 (W ashington time), the State Depart-

ment h^ advised the American Minister at Bangkok that the ques-

tion of supplying planes to Thailand had been under active considera-

tion by the British and the United States Governments but that

neither Government was in a position to supply any planes to Thai-

land at the present time. The Minister had been advised that the sup-

plying of aviation gasoline and aviation lubricating oil had also been

under consideration, and that the British Government was prepared

to furnish limited amounts of aviation gasoline and the United States

Government was endeavoring to arrange to supply aviation lubricating

oil (ex. 169, item 16). The same day reports had reached the State

Department from the British Embassy of Japanese requests for the

use of Thai airfields for “survey fights” and for aviation gasoline,

presumablj^ for such flights (ex. 169, item 17).

The British Ambassador, Lord Halifax, had called on Under Secre-

tary Welles on November 25 (Washington time) regarding a report

from the British Minister at Bangkok that the Thai Government was

again becoming very shaky and that unless some practical action were

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taken by Great Britain and the United States the Japanese influence

would again become predominant. The British Ambassador had

reported that the aviation gasoline and artillery the British had riven

the Thai Government had been regarded by the latter as completely

insufficient “and had had no appreciably beneficial effects.” When

Lord Halifax had said that the Thai Government was urgently

desirous of obtaining aimlanes, the Under Secretary had said that

the United States was building up its air strength as rapidly as possible

in the Philippines and that he had been informed by both General

Marshall and Admiral Stark that the planes the United States had in

the Philippines were infinitely more valuable to the United States

there than they would be in Thailand. The British Ambassador had

then suggested on behalf of his Government that the situation “mi^t

be ameuorated by a credit of $10,000,000 to Thail^d by the United

States.” Under Secretary Welles had said that this matter would be

given immediate consideration (ex. 169, item 18).

On November 27 (Washington time) the State Department had

advised the American Minister at Bangkok concerning renewed in-

structions which were given on November 22 to American diplomatic

and consular officers in Japanese-occupied areas of China, Hongkong

and French Indochina regarding the withdrawal of American citizens

from those areas, and had authorized him to inform Americar citizens

in Thailand of those instructions (ex. 169, item 20). The next day

the Thai Minister had called at the State Department and stated

that he feared a Japanese attack on Thailand was imminent. He

had said that Thailand would resist any such attack with all its

forces. Referring to the statement previously made to him that the

United States would place Thailand in the same category as China

and would offer assistance in the case of an attack by an a^ressor,

he had suggested that immediate consideration be riven to making

planes and other supplies available to Thailand. He had been ad-

vised that the matter would be promptly brought to the attention of

the appropriate authorities (ex. 169, item 23).

On November 29 (Washington time) the State Department had

received a telegram from, the American Minister at Bangkok stating

that on the previous day the Thai Prime Minister had urged his

people to be neutral but to prepare to fight if war became inevitable.

The Thai Prime Minister had been reported as saying —

that Great Britain and the United States had promised not to attack Thailand

and that the Japanese Ambassador had guaranteed that Japanese troops in

Indo-China are not intended for attack on this country in any circumstances

(ex. 169, item 28).

On December 1 (Washington time), the day President Roosevelt

returned to Washington from Warm Springs, the Thai Minister,

accompanied by his military attach^, called at the State Department

and described in detail the general military situation in Thailand,

stating that the military equipment now most urgently needed by

Thailand was heavy artilleiy, bombing planes, and pursuit planes.

The Minister expressed the hope that means could be found to make

this equipment available immediately in order that Thailand might

be better able to resist aggression by Japan (ex. 169, item 26).

The following day the State Department sent a telegram to the

American Consul at Singapore requesting him to render all possible

assistance in connection with the immediate delivery of small quanti-

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ties of appropriate aviation lubricating oils to Thailand, arrangements

for which, the Department said, had been tentatively agreed upon

between representatives of this Government and representatives in

TVashington of the British and the Netherland Governments (ex. 169,

item 28).

Germany Tells Japan the Time is Ripe lo Strike at the United

States, and Promises to Join with Japan in War Against the

United States

{November Z9, 1941)

\* Several additional intercepted Japanese messages between Tokyo

and Berlin that were translated and available in Washington on

December 1 (Washington time) disclosed that Germany once again

was exercising pressure upon Japan imder the Tripartite Pact. In a

message dated November 29, 1941, from the Japanese Ambassador,

Oshima, in Berlin to Foreign Minister Togo, the Ambassador reported

a conversation he had had with Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop the

day before, following a conference of high German Government and

military officials at the official residence of Chancellor Hitler. The

Ambassador reported that it was an absolute certainty that at that

conference Japan's moves were discussed in connection with discus-

sion of the German war against Russia. He quoted von Ribbentrop

as saying:

It is essential that Japan effect the New Order in East Asia without losing this

opportunity. There never has been and probably never will be a time when

closer cooperation under the Tripartite Pact is so important. If Japan hesitates

at this time, and Germany goes ahead and establishes her European New Order,

all the military might of Britain and the United States will be concentrated

against Japan.

As Fuehrer Hitler said today, there are fundamental differences in the very

right to exist between Germany and Japan, and the United States. We have

received advice to the effect that there is practically no hope of the Japanese-

U. S. negotiations being concluded successfully, because of the fact that the

United States is putting up a stiff front.

If this is indeed the fact of the case, and if Japan reaches a decision to fight

Britain and the United States, I am confident that that will not only be to the

interest of Germany and Japan jointly, but would bring about favorable results

for Japan herself (ex. 1, p. 200).

The Japanese Ambassador informed the Foreign Minister in Tokyo

that von Ribbentrop had said that the Germans would like to end

their war with Russia during the next year, and that he had then con-

tinued

should Japan become engaged in a war against the United States, Germany, of

course, would join the war immediately. There is absolutely no possibility of

Germany's entering into a separate peace with the United States under such

circumstances. The Fuehrer is determined on that point (ex. 1, p. 202).

Foreign Minister Togo replied to this message on November 30

(Japan time). His message was in three parts, only the first and

third of which were ever intercepted.^ Both of those parts were

translated and available in Washington, however, on December 1

(W ashington time) :

1. The conversations begun between Tokyo and Washington last April during

the administration of the former cabinet, in spite of the sincere efforts of the

I lii this connection, the War Department advised the Committee that the microflhns of Japanese' files

received from General MacArthur’s headquarters did not contain the second part of this message (tr. 13665).

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Imperial Government, now stand ruptured — broken. (I am sending you an out-

line of developments in separate message #986.) In the face of thi^ our Empire

faces a grave situation and must act with determination. Will Your Honor,

therefore, immediately interview Chancellor Hitler and Foreign Minister Ribben-

trop and confidentially communicate to them a summary of the developments.

Say to them that lately England and the United States have taken a provocative

attitude, both of them. Say that they are planning to move military forces into

various places in East Asia and that we will inevitably have to counter by also

moving troops. Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may

sudderUy break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash

of arms and add that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than

anyone dreams.

4. If, when you tell them this, the Germans and Italians question you about

our attitude toward the Soviet, say that we have already clarified our attitude •

toward the Russians in our statement of last July. Say that by our present

moves southward we do not mean to relax our pressure against the Soviet and

that if Russia joins hands tighter with England and the United States and resists

us with hostilities, we are ready to turn upon her with all our might; however,

right now, it is to our advantage to stress the south and for the time being we

would prefer to refrain from any direct moves in the north.

5. This message is important from a strategic point of view and must under all

circumstances be held in the most absolute secrecy. This goes without saying.

Therefore, will you please impress upon the Germans and Italians how important

secrecy is.

6. As for Italy, after our Ambassador in Berlin has communicated this to the

Germans, he will transmit a suitable translation to Premier Mussolini and Foreign

Minister Ciano. As soon as a date is set for a conference with the Germans and

Italians, please let me know.

Will you please send this message also to Rome, together with the separate

message (ex. 1, pp. 204-205).

In the separate message (#986) referred to above, Foreign Minister

Togo reviewed the course of the Japanese- American negotiations for

Ambassador Oshima^s benefit. He stated that during Sie 6 months

of negotiations

the Imperial Government adamantly stuck to the Tripartite Alliance as the

cornerstone of the international policy regardless of the vicissitudes of the inter-

national situation, and that Japan had based her hopes for a solution between

Japan and the United States definitely within the scope of that Alliance (ex. 1,

p. 205).

The Foreign Minister said that the American and Japanese views on

the question of the evacuation of Japanese troops from China and

French Indochina ‘Svere completely in opposition to each other.

He said that the United States had taken the position that as long

as the Imperial Government of Japan was in alliance with Germany

and Italy there could be no maintenance of friendly relations between

Japan and the United States, and that the United States had begun

to demonstrate a tendency to demand the divorce of the Japanese

Government from the Tripartite Alhance. '^That is to say,'' Ae

Foreign Minister continued,

it has become ^adually more and more clear that the Imperial Government could

no longer continue negotiations with the United States. It became clear, too,

that a continuance of negotiations would inevitably be detrimental to our cause.

3. The proposal presented by the United States on the 26th made this attitude

of theirs clearer than ever. In it there is one insulting clause which says that no

matter what treaty either party enters into with the third power it will not be

interpreted as having any bearing upon the basic object of this treaty, namely

the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. This means specifically the Three-Power

Pact. It means that in case the United States enters the European war at any

time the Japanese Empire will not be allowed to give assistance to Germany and

Italy. It is clearly a trick. This clause alone, let alone others, makes it im-

possible to find any basis in the American proposal for negotiations. What is

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more, before the United States brought forth this plan, they conferred with

England, Australia, the Netherlands, and China — they did so repeatedly. There-

fore, it is clear that the United States is now in collusion with those nations and

has decided to regard Japan along with Germany and Italy, as an enemy (ex. 1,

p. 206).

President Roosevelt Returns to Washington as the Far

Eastern Situation Moves Rapidly Toward a Climax

(December 1, 1941)

When the two Japanese Ambassadors called on Secretary Hull on

. Monday moraing, December 1 (Washington time), it was their first

conference with me Secretary since their meeting with him and Presi-

dent Roosevelt 5 days before. Ambassador Nomura’s description of

their arrival at the State Department shows that many assumed the

Ambassadors had requested the meeting with the Secretary to present

the Japanese Government’s reply to the American note of November

26. Ambassador Nomura reported to Tokyo:

Upon our arrital at the State Department we found not only newspapermen,

but even some members of the Departmental staff crowding the corridors. Some

of these spectators were of the opinion that the issue of war or peace was to be

immediately decided upon. In general, the scene was highly dramatic (ex. 1,

p. 210).

At the start of the conference Ambassador Kurusu asked the reason

for President Roosevelt’s sudden return to Washington, and Secre-

tary Hull indicated that one of the reasons was the recent ‘‘loud talk”

of the Japanese Premier. The Ambassador endeavored to minimize

the Premier’s recent speech and stated, in accordance with the in-

structions he had received from Tokyo, that the American note of

November 26 had been communicated to his Government and that

within a few days the Japanese Government’s observations concerning

it would be presented to the Secretary. He said that his Govern-

ment believed its proposals of November 20 to be equitable, and had

found it difiB-Cult to understand the position taken by the United

States Government. He had been directed, he said, to inquire what

was the ultimate aim of the United States in the conversations and to

request the United States Government to make “deep reflection of

this matter.” He said that the Japanese offer to withdraw its troops

from southern French Indo-China still stood (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 772-

774).

Secretary Hull replied that the United States Government had to

take into account the “bellicose utterances emanating from Tokyo”

and that there never would be possible any peaceful arrangements if

such arrangements had to be based upon principles of force. Later,

the Secretary called attention to reports received from the press and

other sources —

of heavy Japanese troop movements into Indochina and endeavored to make it

clear that, when a large Japanese army is anywhere in Indochina, we have to

give that situation all the more attention when Japanese statesmen say that they

will drive us out of east Asia. He pointed out that we cannot be sure what the

Japanese military leaders are likely to do, that we do not know where the Jap-

anese Army intends to land its forces, and that for this reason we cannot sit still

but will have to puzzle these things out in some way. The Secretaiw explained

that this situation had been very painful to him and he did not know whether the

Ambassador qpuld do anything in the matter of influencing the Japanese Govern-

ment. Mr. Kurusu said that he felt it was a shame that nothing should come

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out of the efforts which the conversations of several months had represented.

He said he felt that the two sides had once been near an agreement except for

two or three points, but that our latest proposals seem to carry the two sides

further away than before.

The Secretary pointed out that every time we get started in the direction of

progress the Japanese military does something to overturn us. The Secretary

expressed grave doubts whether we could now get ahead in view of all the threats

that had b^een made. He pointed out that the acts of the Japanese militarists

had effectively tied the hands of the Ambassadors and he did not know whether

the Ambassadors could succeed in having anything accomplished toward untying

their hands. Mr. Kurusu brought up again his contention made on previous

occasions that China had taken advantage of the Washington Conference treaties

to flaunt Japan, and commented that if we don^t look out China will sell both the

United States and Japan down the river. The Secretary observed that he has

been plowing through various contradictions in Japanese acts and utterances.

He pointed out that the Japanese had been telling us that if something quick is

not done something awful was about to happen; that they kept urging upon the

Secretary the danger of delay, and kept pressing the Secretary to do something.

He said that in view of all the confusion, threats and pressure, he had been brought

to the stage where he felt that something must be done to clear the foggy atom-

sphere; that his conclusion was that he must bring us back to fundamentals; and

that these fundamentals were embodied in the propsal which we had offered the

Japanese on November 26. He said that we have stood from the first on the

points involved in this proposal. He pointed out that everything that Japan was

doing and saying was in precisely the opposite direction from the course we have

been talking about in our conversations, and that these should be reversed by

his government before we can further seriously talk peace (vol. II, pp. 775-776).

The Secretary asked what possibility there was of peace-minded

people coming out in Japan and expressing themselves, whether any-

body in Japan would be free to speak unless he preached conquest.

When the Ambassador conamented that the Japanese people were not

talking about conquest, Secretary Hull pointed out that everyone in

i^erica xmderstood the implications of such terms as “New Order

in East Asia” and “Co-prosperity sphere”. The Secretary went on to

say:

that there was no reason for conflict between the United States and Japan, that

there was no real clash of interests. He added that Japan does not have to use a

sword to gain for herself a seat at the head of the table. He pointed out that

equality of opportunity is in our opinion the key to the future peace and prosperity

of all nations (ex. 29, vol II, pp. 776-777).

When Ambassador Kimisu, after remarking that war in the Pacific

would be a tragedy, added that the Japanese people believed that the

United States wanted to keep Japan fighting China, and to keep

Japan strangled, and that they believed they were faced with the

alternative of surrendering to the United States or fighting. Secretary

Hull said that he had practically exhausted himself here, that the

American people were going to assume that there was real danger to

this count^ in the situation, and that there was nothing he could do to

prevent it (ex. 29, vol. 2, p. 777).

Ambassador Nomura reported to Foreign Minister Togo that during

the conference Secretary Hull had emphasized:

The tone and trend of the 'Japanese Government’s expressions and movements

and that of the general public opinion organs, and the increase in strength of the

garrisons in French Indo-China (ex. 1, p. 210).

He reported that from the beginning of the conference the Secretary

had worn “a deeply pained expression,” but that during the couree

of their e^lanations the Secretary “showed visible signs of relief

(ex. 1, p. 210). . .

President Roosevelt reached Washington from Warna Springs

shortly before noon on Monday, December 1, and went directly to

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the White House for his conference with Secretary Hull and Admiral

Stark.\* It will be recalled that in Secretary HuD’s memorandum of

bis conversation with the British Ambassador the day before, the

Secretary stated that he laid before President Roosevelt on Monday

“all phases” of the matters he discussed with the British Ambassador,

whidi had included the Ambassador’s inquiry as to “what the United

States would do if the British shoxild resist any Japanese undertaking

to establish a base on the Era Isthmus”, and that “the President

agreed to notify and see the Ambassador later with respect to ^

inquiry” (ex. 21). Clearly, a further subject discussed at the WMte

House conference was Secretary Hull’s conversation that morning

with the Japanese Ambassadors. It would also seem probable that

at the conference the other events mentioned above that had occmred

after the President’s departure the preceding Friday were discussed.

These included Secretary Hull’s revised draft of the proposed mess^e

to Congress and the accompanying draft of a message to HiroMto;

the significance of Premier Tojo’s speech; the information received

from the British Ambassador concerning a possible Japanese move

into Thailand, which appeared to be confirmed that day by the

intercepted Japanese message revealing the intrigues of the Japanese

Ambassador in Thailand; Prime Minister Churchill’s plea for similar

or joint declarations by the United States and Great Britain that

“any further act of agression” would “lead immediately to the

^vest consequence,” at whatever moment the President should

judge right “which may be very near” ; and the intercepted Japanese

messages showing that the Japanese Government was only making

a pretense of continuing the conversations. In addition, the President,

Secretary Hull, and Admiral Stark must be assumed to have seen

either before or after the White House conference the exchange of

messages between the Japanese Foreim Minister in Tol^o and

the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin snowing the strong German

pressure on Japan to make war on Great Britain and the United

States and the Japanese reply that “imr may svdderUy break ovi

between the Anglo Saxon nations and Japan \* \* \* quicker than

anyone dreams."

There is no evidence before the Committee of any meeting between

Resident Roosevelt and the British Ambassador, Lord Halifax, dur-

ing the period December 1-7 (Washington time), and no reference to

such a meeting has been found in newspaper accounts of President

Roosevelt’s activities that week. However, the Washington Post re-

ported on December 2 that after the President’s conference on Decem-

ber 1 with Secretary Hull and Admiral Stark, the President had a

luncheon conference with Mr. Harry Hopkins, who bad been driven

to the White House from the [Naval Hospital for that purpose, re-

turning to the Naval Hospital after -the.^ conference; that thereafter

\* The next day, referring to this meeting, the Washington Post reported:

“President Roosevelt yesterday assumed direct command of diplomatic and military moves relating to

Japan as the lights of peace flickered low in the Orient and Kichisaburo Nomura, Japanese Ambassador

told reporters that ‘there must be wise statesmanship to save the situation.\*

\*Tt was in a tense atmosphere that the President reached the White House from Warm Springs shortly

befwe noon to receive a report from Secretary of State Hull on his conversation yesterday morning with

official Japanese representatives and to confer with diplomatic, naval and personal advisers.

“Washington reports indicate that Japan is massing t? oops in southern Indochina for a possible military

move into Thailand, which an authoritative statement made here last week indicated the United States

could not tolerate. In ManOa the leaves of United Ststes naval and military forces have been cancelled

and London reports said military and air forces are being mobilized in the Netherlands East Indies” (Wash\*

Ington Post, December 2, 1941).

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the President called Under Secretary Welles to the White House for a

brief conference, after which the Under Secretary “on orders” conferred

briefly with Lord Halifax; and that after the latter conferen^ Mr.

Welles returned to the White House for a further conference with the

R’esident that lasted an hour and a half. The record before the Com-

mittee does not show what matters were discussed at the conference

between Under Secretary Welles and the British Ambassador.\*

In the absence of other evidence concerning the subjects discussed

at the White House conference that noon, the evidence before the

Committee of action' taken that evening and the next morning at the

direction of President Roosevelt is important. Just before midnight

that day, December 1 (Washington tirne), the Navy Department

sent the following dispatch, marked priority, to Admiral Hart, Com-

mander in Chief of the United Stat^ Asiatic Fleet:

President directs that the following be done as soon as possible and within two

days if possible after receipt this despatch. Charter 3 small vessels to form a

“defensive information patrol.” Minimum requirements to establish identity as

U. S. men-of-war are command b^ a naval officer and to mount a small and

1 machine gun would suffice. Filipino crews may be employed with minimum

number naval ratings to accomplish purpose which is to observe and report by

radio Japanese movements in west China Sea and Gulf of Siam. One vessel to

be stationed between Hainan and Hue, one vessel off the Indo-China coast between,

Camranh Baj^ and Cape St. Jaques and one vessel off Pointe De Camau. Use of

Isabel authorized by President as one of the three but not other naval vessels.

Report measures taken to carry out President’s views. At the same time inform

me as to what reconnaissance measures are being regularly performed at sea by

both Army and Navy whether by air surface vessels or submarines and your

opinion as to the effectiveness of these latter measures (ex. 37).

In Tokyo oh December 1 (Japan time) the Japanese Cabinet met

at the ofiicial residence of Premier Tojo. Domei, the authoritative

Japanese news agency, issued a report stating that at the meeting

the Japanese Cabinet had decided to continue negotiations with the

United States, despite the divergence of views of the two Govern-

ments. In a telegram to Secretary Hull received the evening of

December 1 (Was!^gton time). Ambassador Grew reported that—

Tonight’s newspapers reported that the Cabinet at its meeting today, while

realizing the difficulty of adjusting the respective positions of the two countries,

nevertheless determined to continue the Washington conversations (ex. 25).

As already noted. Ambassador Grew testified before the Committee

that although he knew that the Cabinet meeting took place, he “did

not (know) and could not have guessed” that the Cabinet had dis-

cussed the attack on Pearl Harbor (tr. 1615).

' \S '

» The record before the Committee does, however, contain the following: On December 6, 1941, Captain

John Creighton, the United States Naval Attach^ at Singapore, sent a message to Admiral Hart, coir\*

mander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet, at Manila which stated, among other things, that “Brooke Popham (th?

British commander in chief at Singapore) received Saturday from War Department London quote: ‘Wo

have now received assurance of American armed support in cases as follows: 1. We are obliged execute oui

plans to forestall Japs landing Isthmus of Kra or take action in reply to Nips invasion any other part of Siam

• • “ (tr. 13520-13521) Captain Creighton testified before the Committee that he did not know or recall

who it was that gave him the information upon which this message was based, or where that person bad

obtained the information, and that it was “really nothing more than rumor" (tr. 13530). Upon receipt of

this message, Admiral Hart, on December 6, 1941, sent the following message to Admiral Stark in Washing\*

ton: “Learn from Singapore we have assured Britain armed support under three or four eventualities.

Have received no corresponding instructions from you." (ex. 40) Admiral (now Senator) Hart testified

that he never received a reply to his message (tr. 12850-12851). In this connection see also the discussion

infra of the second message received by the State Department on December 6 (Washington time) from

Ambassador W inant in London regarding the two Japanese naval convoys moving toward the Kra Isthmus,

in which Ambassador Winant said, among other things: “British feel pressed for time in relation to guar-

anteeing support Thailand, fearing Japan might force them to invite invasion on pretext protection More

British nave opportunity to guarantee support but wanting to carry out President’s wishes in message

transmitted by Welles to Halifax” (ex. 21) and Under Secretary Welles’ testimony before the Committee

in connection therewith.

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However, it b now known that at this meeting the Japanese Cabinet

gave its formal approval to the commencement of hostUities against

the United States, and that immediately thereafter an Imperial Naval

Order was issued on instructions from the Imperial General Head-

quarters:

Ja{)an, under the necessity of her self-preservation and self-defense, has reached

a position to declare war on the United States of America (tr. 438).

By that time, the Japanese naval striking force which had left its

rendezvous in northern Japan on November 25 (Washington time)

had steamed nearly half the distance to Pearl Harbor.

In Wash^ton, however. Ambassador Nomura that day cabled the

Foreign Minister there were indications that the United States desired

to continue the negotiations “even if it b necessary to go beyond

their stands on the so-called basic principbs” (ex. 1, p. 213).

He continued:

If it is impossible from the broad political viewpoint, to conduct a leaders’

meeting at this time, would it not be possible to arrange a conference between

persons in whom the leaders have complete confidence (for example, Vice President

Wallace or Hopkins from the United States and the former Premier Konoye, who

is on friendly terms with the President, or Adviser to the Imperial Privy Council

Ishii). The meeting could be arranged for some midway point, such as Honolulu.

High army and navy officers should accompany these representatives. Have

them make one final effort to reach some agreement, using as the basis of their

discussions the latest proposals submitted by each.

We feel that this last effort may facilitate the final decision as to war or peace

(ex. 1, p. 213)

It seems doubtful that Ambassador Nomura would have sent this

message, if in fact he knew that that day the Tojo Cabinet had

formally approved the commencement of hostilities against the United

States. The Foreign Minister’s message in reply to the Ambassador’s

suggestion, which was translated and available in Washington on

December 3 (Washington time), avoided any reference to the

Cabinet’s action:

As you are well aware, during the tenure of the previous cabinet, a meeting

between the leaders of the two countries was suggested by us but the proposals

failed to materialize. It is felt that it would be inappropriate for us to propose

such a meeting again at this time. Please be advised of this decision (ex. 1, p. 224).

President Roosevelt Asks the Japanese Government to Explain

Its Purpose in Moving Additional Troops into Southern

Indo-China

{December 2, 1941)

The next day, Tuesday, December 2 (Washington time), the two

Japanese Ambassadors called on Under Secretary WeUes at the latter’s

request. Secretary Hull being ill and absent from the State Depart-

ment. Under Secretary Welles told the Ambassadors that he had

been asked by President Roosevelt to communicate to them the

following, which he then read and handed to Ambassador Nomura:

I have received reports during the past days of continuing Japanese troop

movements to southern Indochina. Triese rep>orts indicate a very rapid and

material increase in the forces of all kinds stationed by Japan in Indochina.

It was my clear understanding that by the terms of the agreement — and there

is no present need to discuss the nature of that agreement — between Japan and

the French Government at Vichy that the total number of Japanese forces per-

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mitted by the terms of that agreement to be stationed in Indochina was very con-

siderably less than the total amount of the forces already there.

The stationing of these increased Japanese forces in Indochina would seem to

imply the utilization of these forces by Japan for purposes of further aggression,

since no such number of forces could possibly be required for the policing of that

region. Such aggression could conceivably be against the Philippine Islands;

against the many islands of the East Indies; against Burma; against Malaya or

either through coercion or through the actual use of force for the purpose of under-

taking the occupation of Thailand. Such new aggression would, of course, be

additional to the acts of aggression already undertaken against China, our attitude

towards which is well known, and has been repeatedly stated to the Japanese

Government.

Please be good enough to request the Japanese Ambassador and Ambassador

Kurusu to inquire at once of the Japanese Government what the actual reasons

may be for the steps already taken, and what I am to consider is the policy of the

Japanese Government as demonstrated by this recent and rapid concentration of

troops in Indochina. This Government has seen in the last few years in Europe

a policy on the part of the German Government which has involved a constant

and steady encroachment upon the territory and rights of free and independent

peoples through the utilization of military steps of the same character. It is for

that reason and because of the broad problem of American defense that I should

like to know the intention of the Japanese Government (vol. II, p. 779).

Ambassador Kurusu said that he was not informed by the Japanese

Government of its intentions but that he would communicate the fore-

going statement immediately to his Government. Then followed an

mconclusive discussion of the general situation, during which Under

Secretary Welles pointed out that the settlement which the United

States was offering Japan in the United States note of November 26

(Washington time) was one which would assure Japan of peace and

the satisfaction of Japanese economic needs much more certainly

than any other alternative which Japan might feel was open to her.

Ambassador Kurusu said that in view of the actual situation in the

Far East there were points in the United States proposal of November

26 which the Japanese Government would find it difficult to accept.

When asked by Under Secretary Welles whether a reply to the Ameri-

can proposal would be received from the Japanese Government,

Ambassador Nomura answered in the affirmative, but said that it

might take a few days in view of the important questions which it

raised for the Japanese Government (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 778-781).

In his report of this conversation to Foreign Minister Togo,

Ambassador Nomura said:

Judging by my interview with Secretary of State HULL on the 1st and my con-

versations of today, it is clear that the United States, too, is anxious to peacefully

conclude the current difficult situation. I am convinced that they would like to

bring about a speedy settlement. Therefore, please bear well in mind this fact

in your considerations of our reply to the new American proposals and to my

separate wire #1233 (ex. 1, pp. 222-223).

Soon after his meeting with the two Japanese Ambassadors, Under

Secretary Welles attended a meeting at noon at the White House at

which, in addition to President Roosevelt and Mr. Welles, only Secre-

tary Stimson and Secretary Knox were present. Secretary Stimson

described the meeting in his notes as follows:

I left for the White House conference at 12:00 o’clock and there were present

there just Knox, Sumner Welles and myself, as Hull is laid up with a cola The

President went step by step over the situation and I think has made up his mind

to go ahead. He has asked the Japanese through Sunmer Welles what they intend

by this new occupation of southern Indo-China — ^just what they are going to do—

and has demanded a quick reply. The President is still deliberating the possi-

bility of a message to the Emperor, although all the rest of us are rather against it,

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but in addition to that he is quite settled, 1 think, and he will make a Message to

the Congress and will perhaps back that up with a speech to the country. He said

that he was going to take the matters right up when he left us (tr. 14,427).

That afternoon, at his press conference. President Koosevelt was

asked—

if the Japanese marched into Thailand what would the United States Government

do? The President evaded the question. Another correspondent asked if the

President could give any indication of the nature of the information requested

from the Japanese representatives tjiis morning. The President said let us put

it this way, and this answers again many questions at the same time. Since last

April we have been discussing with the Japanese some method to arrive at an

objective that is permanent peace in the whole area in the Pacific and at times it

seemed that progress was being made. During the whole period up to the end of

June we assumed that as both nations were negotiating toward that objective —

there would be no act contrary to the desired end of peace. We were therefore

somewhat surprised when the Japanese Government sent troops to a specific

over-all total into Indo-China after very brief negotiations with the Vichy Gov-

ernment at the conclusion of which the Vichy Government let it be understood

clearly that they had agreed to this number of troops principally because they were

powerless to do anything else.

Sometime later conversations were resumed with the United States and again

we made it perfectly clear that the objective we were seeking meant the taking of

no additional territory by anyone in the Paicfic area. We received word the other

day that there were large additional bodies of Japanese forces of various kinds,

including troops, planes, war vessels, etc., in Indo-China and that other forces

were on the way. Before these forces had arrived the number of forces already

there had greatly exceeded the original amount agreed to by the French and the

number on the way were much greater, and the question asked this morning very

politely, at my request, was as to what the purpose and intention of the Japanese

Government was as to the future, eliminating the necessity of policing Indo-

China which is a very peaceful spot and we hope to receive a reply in the near

future.

In reply to a question as to whether any time for a reply had been set, the

President said that there had naturally been no time limit set (ex. 167).

The same day Ambassador Nomura sent a special report to the Jap-

anese Foreign OflBce concerning this press conference, as follows:

On the 2d in a press interview the President stated that he had sent us an in-

quiry that day concerning our increasing troops in French Indo-China. Express-

ing his own views for the first time, he briefiy stated that the trend of Japanese-

American negotiations for the past few days and our rumored increasing of troops

in southern ftench Indo-China had both thrown obstacles in the way of the prog-

ress of the negotiations (see special intelligence from Washin^on). This was the

first interview since returning from Warm Springs, and particular attention is to

be paid to the fact that he referred directly to negotiations (ex. 1, p. 223).

Also that day the first secretary of the Japanese Embas^, Mr.

Terasaki, called on officials of the State Department's Far Eastern

Division and delivered a document in which it was denied that Premier

Tojo had ever made the speech attributed to him on November 30.

Mr. Terasaki claimed that when Ambassador Kurusu referred to the

Premier's speech in his telephone conversation with Bureau Chief

Yamamoto the preceding Sunday evening, Yamamoto had been non-

plused and had asked ^‘What speech?" (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 777-778).

The record of that telephone conversation before the Committee shows

no such statement by Yamamoto; on the contrary Yamamoto is

shown to have taken no exception to Ambassador Kurusu's references

to the Premier's speech (ex. 1, pp. 206-207). That d^ the Chinese

Ambassador, Dr. Hu Shih, delivered to the State Department a

memorandum in further explanation of the position of the Chinese

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Government on the modus vivendi, which ended by stating that the

Chinese Foreign Minister had expressed —

great gratification in the latest reply of the Secretary (Hull) to the Japanese en-

voys, which, he understands, reaffirms the fundamental principles repeatedly

enunciated by the United States Government (ex. 18).

Two intercepted Japanese messages bearing on Japanese- American

relations generally were translated and available in Washington on

Tuesday, December 2 (Washington time). One was a message sent

from the Foreign Office in Tokyo to Washington on November 27

(Japan time), for retransmittal by Washington to Japanese diplomatic

establishments in various North and South American cities. “With

international relations becoming more strained,” the message set up

an emergency system of dispatches in hidden word codes to be used

in conummicating with those estabhshments. These emergency dis-

patches consisted of instructions regarding radio communications and

the evacuation of Japanese Embassies, messages stating that relations

between Japan and coimtries whose names were to be inserted were not

in accordance with expectations or had been severed, and messages

stating that Japan’s armed fdrces had clashed with the armed forces of

coimtries whose names were to be inserted or that Japan and countries

whose names were to be inserted were entering a “full fledged general

war” (ex. 1, pp. 186-188). The second message was from Hsinking

to Tokyo, dated November 28, and contained the following:

In view of the situation, after conferring with the competent authorities, the

following measures having to do with the treatment of British and American

nationals in Manchukuo in the event that war breaks out with England and the

United States are as outlined below. We are unanimously agreed on these matters.

Should there be any questions regarding them, please wire me at once.

I. Policy. On the outbreak of war with Engwnd and the United States, after

you have at the appropriate time gathered all these nationals together, they are

to be returned each to his own homeland at as early a date as possible. How-

ever, until this return can be arranged, they are to be interned in places of con-

centration in Manchukuo.

“The control of such property as they might leave behind will be administered

by the Manchukuo Government (ex. 1, p. 198).

On December 3 (Washington time) Secretary Hull held a press con-

ference at which he repeated in large measure the statements he had

made at his press conference on November 27 (Washington time),

making it plain that at no time had the Japanese Government shown

any disposition to modify its basic policies, which he described as at

complete variance with those of the United States (tr. 1163).\* That

afternoon the Secretary had a telephone conversation with Admiral

Stark at 4:45 o’clock (tr. 1167).

That day, and again the next day, the State Department received

telegrams from the American Minister at Bangkok expressing the

hope of the Thai Government —

that the American and British Governments will issue public statements to the

effect that Japan by invading Thailand would incur the enmity and armed

resistance of those two countries in addition to Thailand (ex. 169, item 30).

Other than Ambassador Nomura’s report on his and Ambassador

Kurusu’s conference with Under Secretary Welles on December 3,

and Foreign Minister Togo’s reply to Ambassador Nomura’s sugges-

tion regarding a “leaders conference”, both of which have been

mentioned above, there is no evidence before the Committee of other

\* Cf. Washington Post, December 4, 1941.

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intercepted Japanese messages bearing on Japanese- American relations

generaUy that were translated and available in Washington on De-

cember 3 (Washington time).

The next morning, Thursday, December 4 (Washington time),

six majority and minority leaders of the Senate and House met with

President Roosevelt for 2 hours and thoroughly canvassed the Far

Eastern situation “in connection with the defense of our own terri-

tories and vital interests in the Far East”, and were reported to have

left the White House “with the impression that the situation is

critical, but will not necessarily come to a show-down with the pres-

entation of Japan’s reply” to the President’s request for an account-

ing for the continued Japanese troop movements into southern French

Indochina (Washington Post, December 5, 1941). That afternoon

at 2 : 1 5 0 ’clock the President conferred for an hour with Secretary Kn ox

(ex. 58). As he left the meeting Secretary Knox told reporters that,

among other things, he knew definitely that there would be an investi-

gation of the publication that day by the Chicago Tribune, prac-

tically in full, of a copy of United States plans for fighting a global

war if it should eventuate, “the most highly secret paper in the

possession of the Government” (tr. 14, 411 ; Washington Post, Decem-

ber 5, 1941). At 3:30 o’clock. President Roosevelt conferred at the

White House with Secretary HulWex. 58). That evening, according

to a message dated December 6 (Washington time) from Ambassador

Nomura to Foreign Minister Togo —

those engaged in Plan “A” dined with the President and advised him against a

Japanese-American war and urged him to do the ‘introducing’ at once between

Japan and China. However, the President did not make known what he had in

mind. According to these men, this attitude of the President is his usual attitude

(ex. 1, p. 247).

In explanation of this information, Ambassador Nomura told the

Foreign Minister that —

In addition to carrying on frontal negotiations with the President and Hull

we also worked directly and indirectly through Cabinet members having close

relations with the President and through individuals equally influential (because

of its delicate bearing upon the State Department, please keep this point strictly

secret) (ex. 1, p. 247).

That day, Thursday, December 4, there were translated and

available in Washington the first intercepted Japanese messages

from Tokyo directing the destruction of code machines and machine

codes by the Japanese Embassy in Washington. As already noted,

there had been translated and available in Washington on December 1

(Washington time) a message sent from Tokyo on December 1 (Japan

time) which informed the Japanese Embassy in Washington that the

Japanese diplomatic oflBces in London, Hongkong, Singapore, and

Manila had been instructed to abandon the use of code machines and

to “dispose of them.” This message had specifically stated, however,

that regardless of other instructions, “the U. S. (office) retains the

machines and the machine codes” (ex. 1, p. 209). However, on

December 2 (Japan time), in one of the intercepted messages trans-

lated and available in Washington on December 4 (Washington time),

the Japanese Foreign Office had instructed the Japanese Embassy in

Washington to destroy one code machine imit completely, as well as

to burn all telegraphic codes except “those now used with the ma-

chine,” and the various other codes. The Embassy was also instructed

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to dispose of “all files of messages coming and going and all other

secret dociunents” at the time and in the maimer “you deem most

proper” (ex. 1, p. 215). This message was followed by a second mes-

sage on December 4 (Japan time) which gave more detailed instruc-

tions concerning the bumii^ of certain codes recently brought to

Washii^ton by a Japanese official from the Japanese Embassy in

Mexico City, and directed that a certain code keying be kept in

Ambassador Nomura’s custody “until the last moment” (ex. 1, p. 231).

Admiral Beardall, the Naval Aide to the President, testified that

about the 4th or 5th of December, in connection with the delivery

of “Magic” to the President, he called the President’s particular

attention to a message about the burning of codes. He testified that

to the best of his recollection the gist of his conversation with the

President was as follows:

I said, “Mr. President, this is a very significant dispatch,” which he read very

carefully, and he said “Well, when do you think it will hapjjen?” I said, “Most

any time” (tr. 14035-14036).

He testified that when the President said, “When do you think it

will happen,” he imderstood the President to mean, “When is war

going to break out, when are we going to be attacked, or something”

(tr. 14037).

A third intercepted message translated and available in Washington

on December 4 (Washii^ton time) was from Ambassador Nomura

to the Japanese Foreign (^ce, in which the Ambassador said:

' If we continue to increase our forces in French Indo-China, it is expected that

the United States will close up our Consulates, therefore consideration should

be given to steps to be taken in connection with the evacuation of the Consuls

(ex. 1, p. 227).

Also that day there was translated and available in Washmgton

Foreign Minister Togo’s reply, dated December 3 (Japan time), to

Ambassador Nomura’s report of his and Ambassador Kurusu’s con-

ference with Secretary Hull on December 1 (Washington time). In

it, the Foreign Minister put forward arguments for the Ambassadors’

use in their forthcoming meeting with Secretary HuU. The Foreign

Minister claimed that the United States was using the recent state-

ments of Japanese officials .and the Jap^ese troop movements in the

South “as an excuse to doubt our sincerity in wanting to bring about

a successful settlement in the Japanese-U. S. negotiations,” and

complained that Britain, the United States and others had been mak-

ing military preparations against Japan “at an increasing tempo”

and had been acting in a “more and more antagonistic manner of

late. “We are insisting”, the Foreign Minister said, “that aU aid to

Chiang cease as soon as Japanese-([3hmese negotiations, at the insti-

gation of the United States are launched” (ex. 1, pp. 225-226).

On December 5 (Japan time) Ambassador Grew sent a rush tele-

gram to Secretary Hull in which he stated:

You will no doubt be aware that the American proposal is being represented

here to the press and to the public as a mere restatement of “fanciful principles

which ignore the realities of the situation”, and that no intimation whatever has

been given out that the proposal, if implemented, would provide Japan by peace-

ful and orderly processes with that security — political as well as economic — which

she affects to seek by exercise of force. The response of most Japanese to whom

we have said that the American proposal, far from being a formulation of fanciful

principles designed to preserve the old order of things, is a well-balanced, con-

structive, practical and forward-looking plan for creating order out of the disorfers

of the past, has been to express strong disappointment that the private individual

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is not in a position to fonn any intelligent opinion with regard to a matter of

such supreme importance, while some have said that if the American proposal is

actually such as we have described it to be, an attitude of intransigence on the

part of the Japanese would be viewed with regret by the masses.

It is impossible to forecast precisely what effect publication of our proposal

would have. Undoubtedly reaction to certain phases of the proposal, notably

complete evacuation of China, would be strong and indeed might be so violent as

to eliminate the last possibility of an agreement. However, there would seem to

be even greater risks of the elimination of that possibility if the points at issue

continue in Japan to be befogged by ignorance and misrepresentation. 1 feel sure

that you will have considered the wisdom of publishing the proposal as soon as

possible after consultation with the Japanese Government, but even without the

latter’s assent if that should not be forthcoming (tr. 1821-1823).

The Japanese Government Claims its Troop Movements in

French Indochina are for the Purpose op Defense Against

AN Attack by the Chinese

{December B, 1941)

In the meantime, on December 3 (Japan time), Foreign Minister

Togo had sent Ambassador Nomura his message No. 875 contain-

ing the Japanese Government's formal reply to President Roose-

velt^s inquiry regarding the movement of additional Japanese troops

into soutnern French Indochina (ex. 1, p. 224). This reply took the

position that the Japanese reinforcements were a precautionaiy

measure against Chinese troops in bordering Chinese territory.

Ambassador Nomura had regarded the reply as unsatisfactory, and

had at once cabled the Foreign Minister:

I received your reply immediately. I presume, of course, that this rep^ was a

result of consultations and profound consideration. The United States Govern-

ment is attaching a great deal of importance on this reply. Especially since the

President issued his statement yesterday, it is being rumored among the journalists

that this reply is to be the key deciding whether there will be war or peace between

Japan and the United States. There is no saying but what the United States

Government will take a bold step depending upon how our reply is made. If it is

really the intention of our government to arrive at a settlement, the explanation

you give, I am afraid, would neither satisfy them nor prevent them taking the

bold step referred to — even if your reply is made for the mere puipose of keeping

the negotiations going. Therefore, in view of what has been elucidated in our

proposal which I submitted to the President on November 10th, I would like to

get a reply which gives a clearer impression of our peaceful intentions. Will you,

therefore, reconsider this question with this in mind and wire me at once (ex.

1, pp. 227-228).

The Foreign Minister's reply to Ambassador Nomura had come

back the next day:

What you say in your telegram is, of course, true, but at present it would be a

very delicate matter to jgive any more explanations than set forth in my #875.

1 would advise against it because unfortunate results might foUow, so please reply

in accordance with my aforementioned message (ex. 1, p. 232).

Accordingly, on December 5 (Washington time), the Japanese

Ambassadors called on Secretary Hull and presented their Guvem-

ment's reply to President Roosevelt's inquiry^ (ex. 29, vol. II, pp,

> It is significant that press reports which reached Washington early in the morning of December 5 (Wash-

ington time), stated that in Tokyo that day the authoritative Japanese news agency had announced that

“Japan cannot accept” the provisions of the United States’ note of November 26. Domei was reported to

have said: “Such a document cannot serve as a basic datum in Japanese-American negotiations hence-

forth”. These statements, together with Japanese comment critical of Secretary Hull’s remarks at his

press conference on December 3 (Washington time), were carried in morning newspapers in Washington on

December 5 under such headlines as “JAPAN ‘CAN’T ACCEPT’ TERMS’^ and “JAPAN EX-

PECTED TO REJECT TERMS” (Washinrton Post, December 5, 1941). Secretary Hull conferred

for a short time with President Roosevelt before his meeting with the Japanese Ambassadors (Washington

Post, December 6, 1941).

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781-783). The Japanese reply as handed to the Secretary follows

in full:

Reference is made to your inquiry about the intention of the Japanese Govern-

ment with regard to the reported movements of Japanese troops in French Indo-

china. Under instructions from Tokyo I wish to inform you as follows:

As Chinese troops have recently shown frequent signs of movements along the

northern frontier of French Indo-china bordering on China, Japanese troops, with

the object of mainly taking precautionary measures, have been reinforced to a

certain extent in the northern part of French Indochina. As a natural sequence

of this step, certain movements have been taken on the part of the Japanese

Government that may transgress the stipulations of the Protocol of Joint Defense

between Japan and France (vol. II, p. 784).

After reading the reply, Secretary Hull said:

that he understood that Japan had been putting forces into northern Indochina

for the purpose of attacking China from there. He said that he had never heard

before that Japan’s troop movements into northern Indochina were for the purpose

of defense against Chinese attack. The Secretary added that it was the first time

that he knew that Japan was on the defensive in Indochina (vol. II, p. 781).

Ambassador Nomura then repeated to the Secretary the gist of the

Foreign Minister’s message of December 3 (Japan’ time) mentioned

above, claiming that the Japanese were alarmed over increasing naval

and mihtary preparation of the “ABCD” powers in the southwest

Pacific, and asserting that the Japanese (Jovemment was "very

anxious” to reach an agreement with this Government and that the

United States ought to be willing to agree to discontinue aid to China

as soon as conversations between China and Japan were initiated.

The remainder of the conversation consisted largely of a repetition of

matters expressed many times before by both the Japanese and the

Secretary (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 781-783).

That inorning, December 5 (Washin^on time). President Roosevelt

had received a memorandum from Under Secretary Welles passing

on to him a suggestion from the Australian Prime Minister that u

Mr. Wendell Willkie should visit Australia with the “imprimateur”

of the President, his visit would be most welcome to the Australian

Government. The President had immediately dictated a letter to

Mr, Willkie regarding this, in which he said:

There is always the Japanese matter to consider. The situation is definitely

serious and there might be an armed clash at any moment if the Japanese con-

tinued their forward progress against the Philippines, Dutch Indies or Malaya

or Burma. Perhaps the next four or five days will decide the niatter (ex. 111).

Following his conference with the Japanese Ambassadors, Secretary

Hull had lunch at 1 o’clock at the White House with President

Roosevelt, after which both the President and the Secretary attended

a full Cabinet meeting at 2 o’clock (ex. 58).

That day the American Minister at Bangkok reported to the State

Department that he had been informed by the Thai Minister for

Foreign Affairs that the Japanese Ambassador in Thailand had told

the Minister that the Japanese forces in Indochina “definitely

would not be used to invade Thailand and that they were concen-

trated for use against the Burma Road” (ex. 169, item 31). Also

that day. Lord Halifax, the British Ambassador, cmled on Secretary

Hull, who recorded that the Ambassador —

said he had a message from Eden, head of the British Foreign Office, setting

forth the British view that the time has now come for immediate cooperation

with the Dutch East Indies by mutual understanding. This of course relates

to the matter of defense against Japan. I expressed my appreciation (tr, 14,615).

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The evening ofiDecember 5 (Washington time) the State Depart-

ment sent a telegram to the American Embassy in Tokyo via PeipiAg

by naval radio for the infoi-mation of the American Embassy in

Chungking and the American consul at Hong Kofig containing in-

structions applicable to all offices in Japan, Japanese-occupied areas

in China, Hong Kong, Indochina, and Thailand. Those instructions

were —

intended to enable officers, in the event of sudden emergency and in case com-

munications with the Department are delayed or severed, to take appropriate

action concerning Government property, alien employees, archives, leases, the

evacuation of the American members of the staff, et cetera (tr. 1967- A).

The telegram included the following paragraph concerning the

destruction of codes:

It is of the utmost importance that all confidential files, seals, codes, ciphers,

true readings, protectograph dies, et cetera, should be destroyed. Fee stamps

should be destroyed by burning in the presence of at least two competent witnesses

whose affidavits should be obtained (tr. 1967-D).

It ended as follows:

The sending of this instruction is in the nature of a precautionary measure and

the authority granted in the foregoing paragraphs is intended to enable the

officers concerned to deal with a sudden emergency. The concerned officers

should quietly formulate plans to deal with an emergency if and when it arises.

It ia highly desirable that discussion be kept to a minimum and that publicity be

avoided (tr. 1967-E).

Previously, on November 27 (Washington time), the day after the

delivery of the United States reply, the State Department had sent

a telegram to Ambassador Grew which strongly suggested the prob-

abihty that the Japanese- American conversations might ‘^lapse’' and

result “in withdrawal of our diplomatic and consular representation

from Japan/^ and that he should quietly prepare for that eventuality

(ex. 18). Also, on November 19 (Washington time), the State Depart-

ment had sent a telegram to the American Embassy in Tokyo via

Shanghai by naval radio, for the information of the American Em-

bassies at Chur^king, Peiping, and the American consul at Hong

Kong, in which it was stated that the Department desired that —

the American diplomatic and consular officers concerned call to the attention of

American citizens in the Japanese Empire, Japanese-occupied areas of China,

Hong Kong, Macao, and French Indochina the advice previously given in regard

to withdrawal and in so doing emphasize that the shipping problem in the Pacific

is very difficult and that because of urgent demands elsewhere there is no assurance

that it will be possible to retain in the Pacific even the the present facilities

(tr. 4508-4509).

The telegram of November 19 (Washington time) was the last of

three major warnings sent by the State Department during 1940 and

1941 advising American nationals to leave the Orient, the other major

warnings have been sent on October 6, 1940, and February 11, 1941

(tr. 4502-4508).

On December 5 (Washington time), there was translated and avail-

able in Washington a message sent 2 days earlier by Ambassador

Nomura to Foreign Minister Togo in which the Ambassador said:

JudMg from all indications, we feel that some joint military action between

Great Britain and the United States, with or without a declaration of war, is a

definite certainty in the event of an occupation of Thailand (ex. 1, p. 227).

At the Japanese Embassy in Washington that day. Councilor

Iguchi cabled the Japanese Foreign OflSce, in response to its instruc-

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tions to destroy one code machine unit and to bum all telegraphic

cddes except those used with the machine:

We have completed destruction of codes, but since the U. S.- Japanese nego-

tiations are still continuing I request your approval of our desire to delay for a

while yet the destruction of the one code machine (ex. 1, p. 236).

The Foreign OflEice promptly replied that its instructions regarding

code machines were:

of the two sets of “B” code machines with which your office is equipped, you are

to burn one set and for the time being to continue the use of the other (ex. 1, p. 237).

Both of these intercepted Japanese messages were translated and

available in Washington the next day.

The Last Hours

{December 6-8, 1941)

The next day was Saturday, December 6 (Washington time).

In the southwest Pacific, the Japanese naval and military forces whose

movements in and toward French Indochina had commenced in

earnest soon after the Imperial Conference in Tokjro on November 5

(Japan time) and had been observed both by British and American

forces based in Malaya and in the Philippines, had begun their final

dispositions. It is now known that at the same time, in the mid-

Pacific some 6,000 miles away, the Japanese naval force that had

left its rendezvous in northern Japan on November 25 (Washington

time) — still undiscovered and now almost within striking distance of

the Hawaiian Islands — was steaming at high speed toward, its target,

the United States Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor.

While reports of the final Japanese movMnents in the southwest

Pacific began to reach Washington before noon on December 6 (Wash-

ington time), the record before the Committee conclusively shows that

no one in the United States Government or in its military and naval

forces, either in Washington or in the field, knew of the approach of

the Japanese naval striking force to the Hawaiian Islands.

That morning, at 10:40 o’clock, the State Department received the

following telegram from Ambassador Winant in London, marked

“Triple priority and most urgent” and “Personal and secret to the

Secretary and the President”:

British Admiralty reports that at 3 a. m. London time this morning two piarties

seen off Cambodia Point, sailing slowly westward toward Kra 14 hours distant in

time. First party 25 transports, 6 cruisers, 10 destroyers. Second party 10

transports, 2 cruisers, 10 destroyers (ex. 21).

The State Department file copy of this message bears the stamp

“Sent to the President,” but does not indicate me hour when that

action was taken. The same information had been received in

Washington by the Navy Department earlier that morning in a mes-

sage sent by Admiral Hart from Manila at 7:55 a. m. (Washington

time) to Admiral Stark (tr. 4344, ex. 66). The information so received

by the Navy Department was communicated to the State Department

in a memorandum of December 6 signed by Admiral Schuirmann

(ex. 66). Secretary Hull’s engagement books for that day show that

he had an appomtment with Admiral Schuirmann at 1:50 p. m. (tr.

1168), at which time the memorandum was presumably handed to the

Secretary by Admiral Schuirmann. Similar information was received

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in the State Department from the War Department early the next

morning (tr. 14,290). The record of outside telephone calls through

the White House switchboard on December 6 shows that Secretary

Hull was again called by Secretary Stimson at 12:58 p. m. and by

Admiral Stark at 1:09 p. m. (ex. 58; tr. 1168). At 3:05 p. m. that

afternoon the State Department received a second message from

Ambassador Winant, marked ‘Triple priority and most urgent^' and

“Personal and secret for the Secretary/^ containing addition^ informa-

tion concerning the Ambassador's earher message regarding the

Japanese naval movement. The second message fmlows in full:

Again from Cadogan. Admiralty conference on information just forwarded,

Cadogan attending. They were uncertain as to whether destination of parties is

Kra or Bangkok. Latter would not be reached before Monday.

Note a discrepancy in time reported by me and time reported in our naval

despatch, latter stating 3 a. m. Greenwich time, by despatch as given me 3 a. m.

London time. Believe former correct.

British feel pressed for time in relation to guaranteeing support Thailand fearing

Japan might force them to invite invasion on pretext protection before British

have opportunity to guarantee support but wanting to carry out President's wishes

in message transmitted by Welles to Halifax.

Leaving to spend evening with Eden in order to go over with him your number

5682, December 5 although I had previously pressed on him each of the points

you outlined prior to reception your message with the exception of paragraph seven

which I agree is not clear and which I will clear up with him this evening. I want

you to know that I had nothing to do with the insertion of the reference to the

I. L. O.

I am having lunch with the Prime Minister tomorrow at his usual place in the

country and wiU be constantly in contact with the Embassy over private wires

in case you wish to communicate with me ^ (ex. 21).

At 5:15 o'clock that afternoon Secretary Hull again telephoned

Admiral Stark (tr. 1168).

That morning at 11 o’clock the State Department received the

following telegram from Ambassador Gauss in Chungking;

The Chief of the Information Department of the Foreign Office informed a

member of my staff yesterday that “the British wanted to move into Thailand

but hesitated to do so in the absence of a clear indication of the American atti-

tude.” He said that this report came from a very reliable source in the United

States. 1 attach no significance to the report except as indicative of an interesting

and somewhat prevalent tendency to play up the situation (ex. 169, item 32).

At 6 p. m. that day the Department sent a telegram to the American

Minister at Bangkok informing him that he might assure the Thai

authorities that the extension of credit to Thailand for its current

needs was fully agreed to in principle and that the Department

expected no delay in worHng out the details with the appropriate

lending agencies of the United States Government (ex. 169, item 33).

In the meantime, both President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull had

g 'ven renewed attention to the proposal to send a message to Emperor

irohito. It wiU be recalled that a draft of such a message had been

prepared the preceding Saturday and probably discussed the next

1 Under Secretary Welles was questioned at length by Senator Ferguson regarding the “message trans-

mitted by Welles to Halifax” referred to in Ambassador Winant’s telegram quoted above (tr. 1300-1316;

1337-1340). At Senator Ferguson’s request, Mr. Welles undertook to make a special search for the message

(tr. 1316), after which he reported to the Committee that it was his understanding that the message in

question was the message from President Roosevelt which he communicated to the Japanese Ambassadors

on December 2 (Washington time) and a copy of which he sent to the British Ambassador the same day

(tr. 1338) . The State Department advised Committee counsel that no written record of the message referred

to in Ambassador Winant’s telegram could be found in its files, and that accordingly it must be assumed

the message was oral (tr. 1300). See in this connection the discussion supra of Under Secretary Welles

reported conference with Lord Halifax on December 1 (Washington time).

^legram number 5682 referred to in Ambassador Winant’s telegram appears in the record before the

Committee as exhibit No. 166. It does not deal with the situation in the Far East in any way-

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Monday by the Secretary with the President upon his return from

Warm Springs. The next day, Tuesday (December 2), Secretary

Stimson had recorded in his notes:

The President is still deliberating the possibility of a message to the Emperor,

although all the rest of us are rather against it, but in addition to that he is quite

settled, I think, that he will make a message to the Congress and will perhaps

back that up with a speech to the country (tr. 14,427).

Secretary Hull testified that he was in consultation with President

Roosevelt at all stages of the drafting of the President’s message to

the Emperor (tr. 14,297). The record contains a note in President

Roosevelt’s handwriting, undated l?ut bearing a stamp showing that

it was received in Secretary Hull’s oflBce on December 6, which reads:

Dbab Coedbll; Shoot this to Grew — I think can go in grey code — saves time —

I don’t mind if it gets picked up.

F. D. R, (ex. 20).

The message to Emperor Hirohito attached to the President’s memo-

randum was returned to the President attached to a “Memorandum

for the President,” also dated December 6 and initialled by Secretary

Hull, as follows:

There is attached your message to the Emperor of Japan with page three of the

message amended to take care of the point with regard to which I spoke to you on

the telephone.

If you approve the draft as it now stands, we shall see that it gets off to Grew

at once (ex. 20). ■

Beneath Secretary Hull’s initials appears the following in President

Roosevelt’s handwriting:

C. H. O K — send the amended p. 3 to the British Ambassador & send a copy

to me. F. D. R. (ex. 20).

The amended page 3 bears the President’s handwritten “0. K.,”

followed by his initials (ex. 20). There is no explanation in the record

before the Committee of the reason for the President’s instruction to

send a copy of the amended page tliree to the British Ambassador.

The first three and last paragraphs of the message as thus finally

revised were substantially the same as those of the draft message

attached to Secretary Hull’s memorandum of November 2y to the

President. The remainder of the message sent — comprising the main

part — consisted of material that is not foimd in any of the drafts in

evidence before the Committee. Secretary Hull testified that the

message actually sent to the Emperor —

was prepared in final form on December 6, and included contributions made in the

White House as well as material contained in the drafts prepared in the State

Department during the preceding weeks (tr. 14,264).

At 8 o’clock that evening (December 6), the State Department dis-

patched to Ambassador Grew a brief telegram stating that an impor-

tant telegram to him was being encoded and that it contained the text

of a message from President Roosevelt to Emperor Hirohito, to be

communicated by Ambassador Grew to the Emperor at the “earliest

possible moment” (ex. 20). Both messages were initialled for Secre-

tary Hull by Dr. Hombeck (ex. 20), wluch may indicate that after

approving the message in final form the Secretary had left the Depart-

ment for the day. The telegram containing President Roosevelt’s

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message to Emperor Hirohito was dispatched from the State Depart-

ment at 9 o’clock that evening (ex. 20). The message follows in full:

Almost a century ago the President of the United States addressed to the

Emperor of Japan a message extending an offer of friendship of the people of the

United States to the people of Japan. That offer was accepted, and in the long

period of unbroken peace and friencffihip which has followed, our respective

nations, through the virtues of their pwples and the wisdom of their rulers have

prospered and have substantially helped humanity.

O^y in situations of extraordinary importance to our two countries need I

address to Your Majesty messages on matters of state. I feel I should now so

address you because of the deep and far-reaching emergency which appears to

be in formation.

Developments are occurring in the Pacific area which threaten to deprive each

of our nations and all humanity of the beneficial influence of the long peace

between our two countries. Those developments contain tragic possibilities.

The people of the United States, believing in peace and in the right of nations

to live and let live, have eagerly watched the conversations between our two

Governments during these past months. We have hoped for a termination of

the present conflict between Japan and' China. We have hoped that a peace of

the Pacific could be consummated in such a way that nationalities of many

diverse peoples could exist side by side without fear of invasion that unbearable

burdens of armaments could be lifted for them all; and that all peoples would

resume commerce without discrimination against or in favor of any nation.

I am certain that it will be clear to Your Majesty, as it is to me, that in seeking

these great objectives both Japan and the United States should agree to eliminate

any form of military threat. This seemed essential to the attainment of the high

objectives.

More than a year ago Your Majesty’s Government concluded an agreement

with the Vichy Government by which five or six thousand Japanese tropos w'ere

permitted to enter into Northern French Indo-China for the protection of Japanese

troops which were operating against China further north. And this Spring and

Summer the Vichy Government permitted further Japanese military forces to

enter into Southern French Indo-China for the common defense of French Indo-

China. I think I am correct in saying that no attack has been made upon

Indo-China, nor that any has been contemplated.

During the past few’ weeks it has become clear to the world that Japanese

military, naval, and air forces have been sent to Southern Indo-China in such

large numbers as to create a reasonable doubt on the part of other nations that

this continuing concentration in Indo-China is not defensive in its character.

Because these continuing concentrations in Indo-China have reached such large

proportions and because they extend now to the southeast and the southwest

corners of that Peninsula, it is only reasonable that the people of the Philippines,

of the hundreds of Islands of the East Indies, of Malaya and of Thailand itself

are asking themselves whether these forces of Japan are preparing or intending to

make -attack in one or more of these many directions.

I am sure that Your Majesty will understand that the fear of all these peoples

is a legitimate fear inasmuch as it involves their peace and their national existence.

I am sure that Your Majesty will understand why the people of the United

States in such large numbers look askance at the establishment of military, naval,

and air bases manned and equipped so greatly as to constitute armed forces capa-

ble of measures of offense.

It is clear that a continuance of such a situation is unthinkable.

None of the peoples w’hom I have spoken of above can sit either indefinitely or

permanently on a keg of dynamite.

There is absolutely no thought on the part of the United States of invading

Indo-China if every Japanese soldier or sailor were to be withdrawn therefrom.

I think that we can obtain the same assurance from the Governments of the

East Indies, the Governments of Malaya and the Government of Thailand. I

would even undertake to ask for the same assurance on the part of the Govern-

ment of China. Thus a withdrawal of the Japanese forces from Indo-China would

result in the assurance of peace throughout the whole of the South Pacific area.

I address myself to Your Majesty at this moment in the fervent hope that

Your Majesty may, as I am doing, give thought in this definite emergency to

ways of dispelling the dark clouds. I am confident that both of us, for the sake

of the peoples not only of our own great countries but for the sake of humanity

in neighboring territories, have a sacred duty to restore traditional amity and

prevent further death and destruction in the world (vol. II, pp. 784-786).

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Also at 9 o’clock that evening a teleOTam from Secretary Hull to

Ambassador Gauss at Chungking was dispatched by the State De-

partment, instructing the Ambassador to communicate to Generalis-

simo Chiang Kai-shek a copy of President Roosevelt’s message to

Emperor Hirohito, for the Gener^ssimo’s confidential information.

This telegram was also initialled ^ the Secretary by Dr. Hombeck.

After quoting the President’s message in full, the telegram concluded:

In communicating copv of this message to Chiang Kai-shek, please state orally

as from the President tnsit the quoted message has already been sent by the

President to the Emperor; that this message, as the situation now stands, would

seem to represent very nearly the last diplomatic move that this Government can

make toward causing Japan to desist from its present course; that if the slender

chance of acceptance by Japan should materialize, a very effective measure would

have been taken toward safeguarding the Burma Road; and that it is very much

hoped that Chiang Kai-shek will not make or allow to be spread in Chinese Gov-

ernment circles adverse comment (tr. 14,517).

The final comment may well have been intended to forestall

comment such as the Generalissimo had made at the time the modus

vivendi was under consideration.

Ambassador Grew testified that he first leamed of the President’s

message the evening of December 7 (Japan time) while listening to a

radio broadcast from San Francisco (tr, 1501-1503; ex, 30, pp. 486-

487). He immediately instructed Mr. Dooman, the Embassy

Counselor, to stand by, and not long thereafter the first, short telegram

from Secretary Hull was received. Although it showed on its face

it had been received in Tokyo at 12 noon (Japan time), an hour after

its dispatch from Washington at 11 a. m. (Japan time), the Secretary’s

second telegram containing President Roosevelt’s message to the

Emperor was not delivered at the Embassy until 10:30 p. m. “In

other words,” Ambassador Grew testified, “the telegram appears to

have been delivered to the Japanese post office, which handled tele-

grams, 1 hour after its receipt, and they held it up throughout that day,

from 12 noon until 10:30 p, m,” (Japan time) (tr. 1501), or 8:30 a. m.

December 7 (Washington time). Ambassador Grew saw Forei^

Minister Togo at about a quarter past 12 that night. He read Presi-

dent Roosevelt’s message aloud to the Foreign Minister, handed him

a copy, and then requested an audience with the Emperor to present

the President’s message personally. Not until after Ambassador

Grew had found it necessary to repeat his request did the Foreign

Minister agree to present the matter to the Throne, (tr, 14,516),

To return to events in Washington, President Roosevelt’s appoint-

ments for Saturday, December 6, as shown by his engagement book

were two, both at the White House and both in the morning. The

first was at 10 o’clock with Justice WUliam O. Douglas, and the

second was at 11:15 o’clock with Budget Director Harold O. Smith

(ex, 58). The President had no scheduled appointments that after-

noon. That evening the President and Mrs. Roosevelt entertained

at dinner at 8 o’clock at the White House (ex. 58). Apart from the

evidence already mentioned of the President’s activities that day in

connection with his message to Emperor Hirohito, the only other

evidence before the Committee affirmatively sho'wing the President’s

activities before the White House dinner that evening is a statement

contained in a letter dated May 22, 1946, from an official of the

Australian Legation in Washington in answer to certain inquiries

made by the Committee throng the State Department (tr, 14,631-

14,632). Referring to a telegram from the Australian Minister for

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External Affairs in Canberra to the British Secretary of State for

Dominion Affairs of the United Kingdom in London, a paraphrase

of which is quoted below, that letter states :

^'The telegram contains the substance of a message which the Australian

Minister for External Affairs had received from the Australian Minister at

Washington. This message was despatched from Washington at 9:30 p. m. on

December 6th, 1941. The information contained therein regarding the 'procedure

to he followed by the President had come orally from the Presided late in the afternoon

of December 6th (Tr. 14,631).

The paraphrase of the Australian Minister for External Affairs'

telegram is as follows:

Subject to conditions that President gives prior approval to text of warning as

drafted and also gives signal for actual delivery of warning, we concur in draft

as a joint communication from all His Majesty ^s Governments. I point out that

message from Australian Minister at Washin^on just received notes that,

1. President has decided to send message to Emperor.

2. President's subsequent procedure is that if no answer is received by him

from the Emperor by Monday evening,

(a) he will issue his warning on Tuesday afternoon or evening,

(b) warning or equivalent by British or others will not follow until Wednesday

morning, i. e., after his own warning has been delivered repeatedly to Tokyo and

Washington (tr. 13, 741-13, 742).

It would seem clear that the ‘'draft" referred to in the telegram

quoted above was the document, a copy of which was obtained by the

Committee from the files of President Roosevelt, attached to an im-

signed memorandum dated December 7, 1941, on stationery bearing

the oflScial seal of the British Government (tr. 13,738). The memo-

randum was as follows:

The Prime Minister would be very glad of any comments which the President

may have on the attached draft of a declaration to the Japanese Government.

The Dominion Governments have yet to give their views on this text. They

are being consulted urgently.

The Netherlands government have been given a copy of the draft (tr. 13,738)

The draft declaration to the Japanese Government which was attached

to this memorandum was as folllows:

Youb Excellency:

I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that I have been instructed to

make the following communication to the Imperial Japanese Government on

behalf of His Majesty's Governments in the United Kingdom, Canada, the

Commonwealth of Australia, New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa.

His Majesty's Governments in the United Kingdom, Canada, Commonwealth

of Australia, New Zealand, Union of South Africa have followed closely in con-

sultation with the United States Government the negotiations in which the latter

have been engaged with the Japanese Government with a view to relieving the

present tension in ’the Far East. His Majesty's Governments viewed with the

same concern as the United States Government the rapidly growing concentration

of Japanese forces in Indo-China which prompted the enquiry by the United

States Government to the Japanese Government on December 2nd. They have

found Japanese reply to that enquiry extremely disquieting. However valid the

explanations in regard to North Indo-China as to which they expressly reserve

their views the reply entirely fails to explain the fact that the bulk of Japanese

forces are stationed in South Indo-China and are being constantly and heavily

augmented.

There is no threat from any quarter against Indo-China and this concentration

in South Indo-China is only explicable on the assumption that the Japanese

Government are preparing for some further aggressive move directed against the

Netherlands East Indies, Malaya, or Thailand.

Relations between the Governments of the British Commonwealth and the

Netherlands Government are too well known for the Japanese Government to

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be under any illusion as to their reaction to any attack on territories of the Nether-

lands. In the interest of peace His Majesty’s Governments feel it incumbent

upon them, however, to remove any uncertainty which may exist as regards their

attitude in the event of attack on Thailand.

His Majesty’s Governments have no designs against Thailand. On the con-

trary, preservation of full independence and sovereignty of Thailand is an im-

portant British interest. Any attempt by Japan to impair that independence or

sovereignty would affect the security of Burma and Malay and His Majesty’s

Governments could not be indifferent to it. They feel bound therefore to warn

the Japanese Government in the most solemn manner that if Japan attempts to

establish her influence in Thailand by force or threat of force she will do so at her

own peril and His Majesty’s Governments will at once take all appropriate

measures. Should hostilities unfortunately result the responsibility will rest

with Japan (tr. 13738-13740).

It would seem clear that the foregoing draft is the draft warning to

Japan ‘‘concurred in’^ by the Australian Minister for External Affairs

in his telegram to the British Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs,

which was dispatched from Canberra the evening of December 7

(tr. 14, 631-14, 632).

In connection with these documents, it will be recalled that the

Marshall-Stark joint memorandum of November 27 to President

Roosevelt had recommended that —

prior to the completion of the Philippine reinforcement, military counteraction

be considered only if Japan attacks or directly threatens United States, British,

or Dutch territory as above outlined;

in case of a Japanese advance into Thailand^ Japan he warned by the United StateSf

the British, and the Dutch governments that advance beyond the lines indicated may

lead to war; prior to such warning no joint military opposition be undertaken;

steps be taken at once to consummate agreements with the British and Dutch for the

issuance of such warning (ex. 17).

It will be also recalled that on Sunday, November 30 (Washington

time), the State Department had received through Ambassador

Winant a rnessage from Prime Minister. Churchill to President Roose-

velt in which the Prime Minister, while stating that b© reaUzed the

President’s “constitutional dfficulties,” begged 'the President to

consider at such moment as the President should judge right “which

may be very near,” the President should not tell Japan “that any

further Japanese aggression would compel you to place the gravest

issues before Congress or words to that effect.” The Prime Minister

had said that tins was the one important method that remained

“unused in averting war between Japan and our two countries,”

and that Great Britain would “make a similar declaration or share

in a joint declaration” (ex. 24).

There is thus evidence before the Committee that by the late after-

noon of December 6 the President had determined upon a procedure

which contemplated that his message to Emperor Hirohito, as the

first step (which he took despite the views of those of his advisors

who felt that it wo\ild have Uttle effect), would be followed, as recom-

mended by General Marshall and Admiral Stark and previously

discussed at length with his principal Cabinet advisors, and as urged

by Prime Minister Churchill, by a warning to Japan by the United

States Government, with similar warnings by the Governments of

Great Britain and the Netherlands. The warning reconmended by

General Marshall and Admiral Stark was to be pven “in case of a

Japanese advance into Thailand,” and by late Satiu'day afternoon

the progress of the Japanese naval force around Cambodia Point had

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made such an advance an imminent probability. While both General

Marshall (tr. 13809) and Admiral Stark (tr. 13760) testified that to

the best of their recollection they were not consulted regarding the

President’s procedure outlined in the Australian message quoted above,

that procedur 5 followed the recommendation made in their joint memo-

randum of November 27 to the President so far as a warning to Japan

was concerned.

In this coimection it should be noted Aat accordir^ to Secreta^

Stimson, President Roosevelt plaimed to mve his warning to Japan in

his proposed message to Congress. He said:

The final view was that an additional warning to Japan should be given (tr.

14482).

« \* ' \* \* « \* \*

The President was in fact during the early part of December engaged in pre-

paring an address to Congress which would incorporate such a warning, and was

also considering a special telegram to the Emperor. Before the address to the

Congress was delivei^, however, the Japanese struck on December 7th (tr. 14478).

\*\*\*«\*\*«

The proposal was to go to Congress in advance, and through the address to

Congress to give the Japanese a final warning (tr. 14487).

Both the State Department, with respect to its files, and Miss TuUy,

as custodian of the President’s files, were requested by the Committee

to furnish it with all information and documents relating to the pro-

posed British warning and the telegram from the Australian Minister

for External Affairs mentioned above (tr. 14628-14629; 14632-14633).

The State Department searched its ^es twice and after the second,

search advised the Conunittee that no material relevant to those

documents had been found (tr. 14629). Miss Tully advised the

Committee that a further search of President Roosevelt’s files had not

disclosed any additional documents or memoranda regarding the

documents in question. Regarding the message from the Australian

Minister at Washington to Canberra, Miss Tully reported that she

believed that “he and the late President discussed the subject but, of

course, no record was ever made of such conversations” (tr. 14634).

The preceding day, perhaps at the meeting of his Cabinet, Presi-

dent Roosevelt had requested Secretaries Hull, Stimson, and Knox to

compile for him the iniormation available in their respective Depart-

ments concerning Japanese air, ground, and naval forces in French

Indochina and adjacent areas. A memorandum dated December 5,

1941, based on Office of Naval InteUigence estimates, was transmitted

by Secretary Knox to Secretary Hull with a covering, undated memo-

randum signed by the Secretary stating that the figures attached were

those concerning which he had just taUced with Secretary Hull on the

telephone (ex. 175). A similar memorandum, dated December 6,

and prepared by the Military Intelligence Division, was transmitted

by Secretary Stimson to Secretary Hull on the same day with a cover-

ing letter in which Secretary Stimson specifically referred to the Presi-

dent’s request of “yesterday” (ex. 175). The information contained

in the memoranda, together with information received in the State

Department from American diplomatic and consular sources, was

combined in the State Department in a “Memorandum for the Presi-

dent,” dated December 6, as follows:

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Japanese Forces and Recent Increase in Japanese Military Material and Equipment

in Indochina

According to information reported by our Consuls at Hanoi and Saigon, re-

ceived by them from French military sources in Indochina and not confirmed,

it is estimated that there are at present in northern Indochina (Tongking) 25,000

Japanese troops and 80,000 in southern Indochina, making a total of 105,000, and

that there are at the outside some 450 Japanese planes in Indochina. According

to a statement made December 4 by the Governor General of Indochina to our

Consul at Hanoi, there are api^ximately 70,000 Japanese troops in Indochina,

a little less than 30,000 being m Tongking and the balance in the south. The

estimate of 105,000 is considered to be approximately correct by the Military

Intelligence Division of the War Department.

According to the Office of Naval Intelligence of the Navy Department, 21

transports were sighted in Camranh Bay on December 2 by an air patrol from

Manila, 12 submarines were sighted at sea northeast of Saigon proceeding south

and nine of these submarines are now in Camranh Bay with other naval units

including several destroyers. Our Consul at Hanoi reported on December 5

information from a reportedly reliable source that there were in Camranh Bay 30

transports carrying an estimated division of troops. Our Consul at Tsingtao

reported on December 1 that for the preceding ten days an average of about three

transports had left Tsingtao daily loaded with troops in summer uniforms.

An official of the French Foreign Office at Vichy stated to an officer of our Em-

bassy on December 3 that the Japanese recently had been sending large amoimts

of military equipment and material into Indochina. According to our Consul at

Hanoi Japanese military equipment recently landed in Indochina includes, as

estimated by French military sources, 3,400 trucks and tractors, 600 automobiles,

500 motorcycles, 260 tanks (categories unspecified), 300 cannon, 2,000 machine

guns, 1,300 submachine guns, 2,100 pack horses and a large number of bicycles.

The marked increase in Japanese troops in Indochina reportedly began Novem-

ber 21 with the arrival of 21 troop and supply ships at Saigon, the landing of

20,000 troops there, the transfer of 10,000 troops from northern Indochina south-

ward and the subsequent landing of additional troops at both Saigon and Haiphong,

those landed at the latter place proceeding southward by train.

At nearby Hainan Island there are estimated by the Military Intelligence

Division of the War Department to be some 30,000 Japanese troops and an

unknown number of planes. Pursuit planes as well as bombers can fly from

Hainan Island to northern Indochina, either direct or via Waichow Islwd off

Pakhoi, Kwantung Province of China (ex. 175).

Secretary Hull testified that he was most invariably at home in the

evening ‘ Vorking on Departmental matters/' and that while it was

possible he might be mistaken, it was his best recollection that he was

‘^at home on the night of December 6, 1941" (tr. 14, 315-14, 317).

The record before the Committee shows that at 8:45 o'clock that

evening Secretary Hull had a telephone conversation with Secretary

Eiiox, lasting not over 2 minutes (ex. 58; tr. 1168). While Secretary

Hull's records indicate that he called Secretary Knox (tr. 1168), the

records of the While House switchboard operators indicate that &.cre-

tary Knox called Secretary Hull that evening at 8:45 p. m., between

two calls to Secretary Stimson made by Secretary Knox at 8:30 and

8:47 p. m. (ex. 58). It is not clear from the record ^ before the Com-

» Captain Kramer testified that before delivering copies of the first 13 parts to the White House, to Secre-

tary Knox, and to Admiral Theodore S. Wilkinson (then Director of Naval Intelligence), he telephoned tiie

several persons to whom he customarily made deliveries of intercepted Japanese messages, and that he com-

menced these phone calls “at about a quarter of 9“ (tr. 10446-10460). He testified that he did not begin

deliveries that evening imtil after 9 a. m., and that he did not reach Secretary Knox’s apartment until after

9:16 p. m. (tr. 10461). He further testified that Secretary Knox read the lengthy 13 parts before making any

telephone calls (tr. 14464) . On the basis of this testimony. Secretary Knox’s phone calls could not have been

made before 9:30 p. m., whereas the actual records made at the time show that the first of Secretary Knox’s

three calls to Secretary Stimson and Secretary Hull was made an hour earlier, at 8:30 p. m., and that his

telephone conversation with Secretary Hull occurred at 8:45 p. m. (ex. 68; tr. 1168). This evidence leaves

two major alternatives: (1) Captain Kramer’s memory with respect to times that evening was faulty

and the times he gave should all be moved back at least an hour, making his arrival at Secretary Knox’s

apartment prior to 8:30 p. m. Under such circumstances it would have been possible for Secretary Elnox’s

reading of the 13-part message to have been the immediate reason for arranging the meeting of the three

Secretaries the next morning, provided it is also assumed that the meeting was not arranged during the

several conversations among the three Secretaries earlier that Saturday; and (2) Captain Kramer’s memory

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mittee vdiether or not Secretary Enox’s three telephone calls through

the White House switchboard were the calls, “apparently to Mr. Hull

and Mr, Stimson” according to Captain Kramer (tr. 10676), made by

Secretary Knox after he received and read that evening the first 13

parts (Annex E attached hereto) of the intercepted message from

Foreign Minister Togo to Ambassador Nomura containiug the Jap-

anese Government’s reply to the United States note of November 26.

Secretary Knox ^ave instructions that the first 13 parts of that mes-

sage, together with any additional intercepted messages that might

become available during the night, should be brought to him at the

meeting at 10 o’clock the next morning at the State Department which

had been arranged with Secretaries Hull and Stimson (tr. 10676-

10677). Captain Kramer, who delivered the 13 parts to Secretary

Knox that evening, testmed that the Secretary agreed with the

conclusion he had placed on it, “that it aimed toward a conclusion of

negotiations” (tr. 10676), and that nothing was said by the Secretary

with respect to taking any action on the message (tr. 10454-10455).

There is no evidence before the Committee that Secretary Hull saw

the intercepted Japanese message containing the first 13 parts of the

Japanese reply before Sunday. Secretary Hull testified that he could

not “recall definitely the exact time” when he first saw that message

(tr. 14299). Regarding the so-called “^ot message” which preceded

it. Colonel Bratton, Chief of the Far Eastern Section, Military In-

teUigence Division, who was in charge of the delivery of “magic”

to the Secretary of State, testified before the. Committee that the

“pilot” message, which was sent by the Japanese Foreign Minister to

Ambassador Nomura on December 6 (Japan time) and was translated

and available in Washington the afternoon of December 6 (WasWg-

ton time), was distributed to the Secretary of State around 3 p. m.

that afternoon (tr. 12049-12050) . That message (#901) was as follows:

1. The Government has deliberated deeply on the American proposal of the

26th of November and as a result we have drawn up a memorandum for the

United States contained in my separate message #902 (in English).

2. This separate message is a very long one. I will send it in fourteen parts

and I imagine you will receive it tomorrow. However, I am not sure. The

situation is extremely delic'ate, and when you receive it I want you to please keep

it secret for the time being.

3. Concerning the time of presenting this memorandum to the United States,

I will wire you in a separate message. However, I want you in the meantime to

put it in nicely drafted form and make every preparation to present it to the

Americans just as soon as you receive instructions (ex. 1, pp. 238-239),

Colonel Bratton’s testimony in this regard is uncontradicted, and it

is therefore reasonable to conclude, since deliveries of “magic” were

made directly to the Secretary of State’s office, that Secretary Hull

with respect to times that evening was correct. Under such circumstances it must follow that the meeting

of the three Secretaries the next morning had been arranged before Secretary Knox knew of or saw the 13-

part message, unless the assumption is also made that Sectary Knox made a second series of calls after

§:30 p. m. to Secretary Hull and Secretary Stimson that were not made through the White House swit^-

board and, in the case of Secretary Hull, went unrecorded.

In this general connection, Secretary Hull testified:

“As I recall it, the meeting in my office on December 7 was the result of a mutual agreement on the

part of Mr. Stimson, Mr. Knox, and myself. It might have been suggested in the first instance by any

one or two of us three. According to my best recollection, the proposal for a meeting grew out of a

desire to continue our discussion of the situation created by the movement of the huge Japanese armada

southward and westward of the southernmost point of Indo-China“ (tr. 14318).

The log of the duty officer at the Navy Department that Saturday evening contains an entry showing

that at 8 p.m. Secretwr Stimson’s aide telephoned that Secretary Stimson desired certain specified informa-

tion regarding American, British, Dutch, Japanese, and Russian naval vessels in the Pacific before 9 a. m.

the next morning; that Secretary Knox, among others, was consulted in regard to this, and that Secretary

Knox directed that the information be compiled and delivered to him prior to 10 a. m. the next morning

(tr. 13046-13947; ex. 162). This would seem to indicate that the meeting of the three Secretaries had been

arranged prior to 8 p. m. on Saturday, December 6.

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saw the message that afternoon before leaving the State De-

partment. In the case of the first 13 parts of the 14-part message,

however, the evidence before the Committee as to whether or not the

first 13 parts were delivered to the State Department before the

morning of December 7 (Washington time) is contradictory ^ and

as stated above there is no evidence before the Committee that the

first 13 parts were seen by Secretary Hull Saturday evening, Decem-

ber 6 (Washington time).

The evidence before the Conunittee is imcontradicted, however, that

the first 13 parts were delivered to President Roosevelt a little after

9:30 o'clock the evening of December 6 (Washington time). At that

time, the President and Mr. Harry Hopkins, who was one of the

guests at the White House dinner party, were in the President's study

on the second floor of the White House. Commander Schultz, an

assistant to Admiral Beardall, naval aide to the President, who per-

sonally handed the intercepted messages to the President, testified

that he gained the impression the President was expecting them, and

that the President read the messages and then handed them to Mr.

Hopkins, who was pacing back and forth slowly. His testimony

continued:

Commander Schulz. Mr. Hopkins then read the papers and handed them

back to the President. The President then turned toward Mr. Hopkins and said

in substance — I am not sure of the exact words, but in substance — ‘‘This means

war.^’ Mr. Hopkins agreed, and they discussed then, for perhaps 5 minutes,

the situation of the Japanese forces; that is, their deployment and

Mr. Richardson. Can you recall what either of them said?

Commander Schulz. In substance I can. There are only a few words that I

can definitely say I am sure of, but the substance of it was that- — I believe Mr.

Hopkins mentioned it first — that since war was imminent, that the Japanese

intended to strike when they were ready, at a moment when all was most oppor-

tune for them

The Chairman. When all was what?

Commander Schulz. When all was most opportune for them. That is, when

their forces were most properly deployed for their advantage. Indochina in

particular was mentioned, because the Japanese forces had already landed there

and there were implications of where they should move next.

The President mentioned a message that he had sent to the Japanese Emperor

concerning the presence of Japanese troops in Indochina, in effect requesting their

withdrawal.

Mr. Hopkins then expressed a view that since war was undoubtedly going to

come at the convenience of the Japanese, it was too bad that we could not strike

the first blow and prevent any sort of surprise. The President nodded and then

said, in effect, “No, we canT do that. We are a democracy and a peaceful people.”

1 Colonel Bratton testified that the last of the 13 parts came into his office some time between 9 and 10

o'clock that night, and that he was in his office when the last of the 13 parts came in (tr. 12049) . He further

testified that he personally delivered the 13 parts to the night duty officer at the State Department some

time after 10 o'clock that night, telling the duty officer that it was a “highly important message as far as

the Secretary of State was concerned” and that it should be sent out to Secretary Hull’s quarters, which

he was assured would be done (tr. 12052-12053). This testimony is directly contrary to the affidavit of

Col. Clyde Dusenberry, then Colonel Bratton’s chief assistant, in the Clausen investigation. In his affi-

davit, Colonel Dusenberry stated that he specifically recalled the intercepted message in question and that

“it started coming in the night of 6 December 1941 when I was on duty. Colonel Bratton was also on duty

then and saw the message coming in and he remained until about half of it had been received. Thereu^n

he left and went home at about 9 p.m. I stayed so he could go home and sleep. I waited for the remainder.

The fourteenth part, being the final part of the message, was received about 12 that night. Thereupon I

left and went home. I returned the next morning to begin the distribution of this intercept consisting of the

fourteen parts and I began the distribution of the fourteen parts comprising this intercept about 9 a. m. on 7

December 1941 and finished with the delivery to the State Department as Kurusu and Nomura were meet-

ing with the Secretary of State. When I delivered the copy for OPD that morning I handed it to then Colonel

Thomas D. Handy who, upon reading it, said to me: “This means war,” or words to that effect. None oj

these parts comprising this intercept was delivered before the morning of 7 December 1941 because the first half

had been received while Colonel Bratton was on duty and he had seen this and had not had it delivered

that night” (Clausen, p. 60).

Colonel Dusenberry 's statements in his affidavit are in accord with the testimony of Gen. Sherman

Miles, then Chief of the Military Intelligence Division and the superior officer of Colonel Bratton and

Colonel Dusenberry, who stated that Secretary Hull, Secretary Stimson, and the others on the War De-

partment’s “magic” distribution list received on December 6 all intercepted Japanese messages that were

translated that day up to midnight \*\*except the first IS parts of the 14-part message\*\* (tr. 4123-4124).

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Then he raised his voice, and this much I remember definitely. He said, ‘‘But

we have a good record.^'

The impression that I got was that we would have to stand on that record, we

could not make the first overt move. We would have to wait until it came.

During this discussion there was no mention of Pearl Harbor. The only

geographic name I recall was Indochina. The time at which war might begin

was not discussed, but from the manner of the discussion there was no indication

that tomorrow was necessarily the day. I carried that impression away because

it contributed to my personal surprise when the news did come.

Mr. Richardson. Was there an 3 rthing said, Commander, with reference to

the subject of notice or notification as a result of the papers that were being read?

Commander Schulz. There was no mention made of sending any further

warning or alert. However, having concluded this discussion about the war

going to begin at the Japanese convenience, then the President said that he

believed he would talk to Admiral Stark. He started to get Admiral Stark on the

telephone. It was then determined — I do not recall exactly, but I believe the

White House operator told the President that Admiral Stark could be reached

at the National Theater.

Mr. Richardson. Now, was it from what was said there that you draw the

conclusion that that was what the White House operator reported?

Commander Schulz. Yes, sir. 1 did not hear what the operator said, but

the National Theater was mentioned in my presence, and the President went

on to state, in substance, that he would reach the Admiral later, that he did

not want to cause public alarm by having the Admiral paged or otherwise when

in the theater, where, I believe, the fact that he had a box reserved was men-

tioned and that if he had left suddenly he would surely have been seen because

of the position which he held and undue alarm might be caused, and the President

did not wish that to happen because he could get him within perhaps another

half an hour in any case.

Mr. Richardson. Was there anything said about telephoning anybody else

except Stark?

Commander Schulz. No, sir; there was not (tr. 12436-12444).

Captain E^rick, who testified that he was at the National Theater

that evening with Admiral Stark, recalled that when he and Admiral

Stark returned to the latter's home, one of Admiral Stark's servants

advised the admiral that there had been a White House call during

the evening (tr. 14757). According to Captain Krick's testimony.

Admiral Stark retired immediately to his study on the second floor

where he had a White House phone (tr. 14755). He returned between

5 and 10 minutes later, and told Captain Krick that —

conditions in the Pacific were serious; that was the substance of it, that condi-

tions with Japan were in a critical state, something of that sort (tr. 14767).

Captain Krick testified that while he could not recall that Admiral

Stark had said upon his return, “I have talked with the President of

the United States”, he had —

heard, of course, the statement of the servant that there had been a White House

call, and the Admiral retired immediately, and he may have stated that he was

going to call the White House; but I have the distinct impression that the

conversation was with the White House (tr. 14768).

There is no evidence before the Committee of any other action taken

by President Roosevelt the night of December 6 ("Washington time).

A report that the Japanese Embassy in Washington had burned its

codes and ciphers the preceding evening was received in the State

Department from the Navy Department on December 6 (Washington

time) (ex. 174). Intercepted Japanese messages which were trans-

lated in Washington that day, in addition to the first 13 parts of the

14-part message, included a message dated December 3 (Japan time)

instructing the Japanese Embassy in Washington to keep its “hidden

word” code lists “until the last moment” (ex. 1, p. 226); a message

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requesting Ambassador Nomura to have certain Embassy officials

“leave (TVashington) by plane within the next couple of days” (ex. 1,

p. 234) ; Ambassador Nomiu'a’s report on his and Ambassador Kurusu’s

meeting with Secretary Hull the day before; and a message dated

December 3 from the Japanese Ambassador in Borne to Foreign

Minister Togo reporting on his conference that day with Premier

Mussolini and Foreign Minister Ciano (ex. 1, pp. 228-229). In the

latter report the Ambassador stated that at the conference he had

described the developments in the J^anese-American negotiations

as set out in message No. 986 from Foreign Minister Togo to the

Japanese Ambassador in Berlin (which was translated and available

in "Washington on December 1 (Washington time) as has already

been described). During the course of the conference in Borne, the

Japanese Ambassador asked Mussolini and Ciano, if Japan should

declare war on the United States and Great Britain,

would Italy do likewise immediately? Mussolini replied: “Of course. She is

obligated to do so under the terms of the Tripartite Pact. Since Germany would

also be obliged to follow suit, we would like to confer with Germany on this

point” (ex. 1, p. 229).

The fourteenth and final part of the intercepted Japanese message

containing the text of the Japanese Government’s reply to the United

States’ note of November 26 was translated and available in Washing-

ton the next morning, Sunday, December 7 (Washington time) . The

record before the Committee shows that it was delivered to President

Boosevelt in his bedroom at the White House about 10 o’clock that

morning by Admiral Beardall, the President’s naval aide (tr. 14010;

14033). Admiral Beardall testified that when the President had read

it and such other messages as accompanied it in the deliverv poudi,

he turned to the admiral and remarked that it looked as if the Japanese

were going to break off negotiations (tr. 14011; 14034). While

Captain Kramer testified that he made a gecond delivery of “magic” to

the White House that morning, at about 11 o’clock. Admiral Beardall

testified that he had no recollection of delivering any other “ma^c”

messages to the President (tr. 14034), or of seeing the President agam,

until after he received word at home about 2 o’clock that afternoon

of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (tr. 14015).

Secretary Hull testified that he had no record of nor did he recall—

having seen or having talked with the President between 9:30 p. m. on December 6,

1941 and the moment of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. According to my

best recollection, I was available during all that period (tr. 14319).

He testified that on Saturday and Sunday up to the time of the

Japanese attack he —

was in constant contact \* \* \* with ofiScers of the State Department and

of the Army and Navy ♦ \* \*. It would be impossible to recall the details of

all the conversations which took place, but I might say that the Japanese large-

scale military movement from the jumping-ofiF place in Southern Indo-China was

very much in the minds of all of us who were called upon to consider that situation.

We were striving to ascertain the full significance of those military movements,

their probable destination, etc. (tr. 1431^14321).

That Sunday morning Secretaries Knox and Stimson met with

Secretary Hull at the State Department. Secretary Hull testified

that, according to his best recollection, the subject of that conference—

was in line with our increasingly frequent conferences over the telephone or in

person as the dangers and the threatened outbreak in Japan increased.

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For instance, on the day just before we had received all of this information

from our consuLs and from a British dispatch that this Japanese armada had left its

Tumping-off point and was sailing toward the Kra Isthmus and \* ♦ ♦ Prime

Minister Tofo had made a speech ♦ ♦ \* a little before this. But that, along

with these actual movements, especially these movements, was the occasion, the

chief occasion, I think of our conference.

« \* ♦

Senator Lucas. In the conversations that you had with Secretary Knox and

Secretary Stimson on Sunday morning of the 7th was there anything said in that

conversation about the likelihood of Japan attacking Peari Harbor?

Mr. Hull. Nothing. As you imderstand, the attack was then on apparently.

The fleet was moving toward the Kra Peninsula, which would greatly endanger

the situation.

Mr. Keefe. Pardon me, Mr. Chairman; I could not get yoiu- last answer. Will

you read it, please?

Mr. Hull. I said the attack was under way, according to the di^atches, on the

sixth. This fleet was moving, not up north in the Bay of Siam or Thailand, but it

was, so far as my impression extended, moving toward the Kra Isthmus, which

was probably a threat all the way down toward Singapore, down the peninsula,

and not far from Malaya (tr. 1605-1606).

The record before the Committee shows that all 14 parts (Annex

E) of the intercepted Japanese message containing the Japanese

reply to the United States note of November 26 were delivered to

Secretary E!nox at the State Department a few minutes before the

meeting of the three Secretaries (tr. 10468), and that the intercepted

message in which Foreign Minister Togo directed Ambassador Nomura

to dehver the Japanese reply to Secretary Hull at 1 p. m. that day

(ex. 1, p. 248) was handed to one of Secretary Hull’s private secretaries

at about 10:45 o’clock (tr. 10473). These deUveries were made by

Captain Kramer, who testified that at the time of the second delivery

he mentioned to Mr. Hull’s private secretary the tie-up between

1 p. m. Washington time and “the scheme that had been developing for

the past week or so in the Southwest Pacific with reference to Malaya

and the EIra Peninsula” (tr. 10472).

A further indication of the matters discussed at the conference of

the three Secretaries at the State Department that Simday morning

is a memorandum entitled “Location of U. S. Naval Forces in the

Pacific and Far East, as of 7 December 1941” in evidence before the

Committee (ex. 176). In the upper right hand comer of this memo-

randiun appears the following handwritten note: “SECNAV (2),

1000”, meaning, apparently, two copies for the Secretary of the

Navy at 10 o’dock. This note, considered in conjunction with the

log of the duty officer at the Navy Department the preceding evening

(ex. 162), leaves httle doubt that the memorandum was prepared

expressly for the conference at the State Department that morning.

The memorandum listed the major ships of the United States, Japa-

nese, British, Dutch, and Russian fleets in the Pacific Ocean by name,

and the destroyers and submarines in those fleets by number, giving

their location “as of 7 Dec. 1941”. The Japanese cruisers and

destroyers referred to in the Hart message to the Navy Department

and the Winant telegrams to the State Department the day before

were listed as “off southern Indochina.” The bulk of the Japanese

Navy was listed as in the two major Japanese naval stations at Kure

and Sasebo on the main Japanese islands of Honshu and Kyushu.

Included among the Japanese ships listed by name as in those two

Japanese naval stations that morning were all of the ships which,

it IS now known, were at that very moment less than 300 miles north

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of the Hawaiian Islands in the act of launching their bombers and

torpedo planes for the Japanese attack on the United States Pacific

Fleet in Pearl Harbor.

Secretary Stimson's notes for that day, which appear to have been

written the following day, describe in greater detail the meeting of

the three Secretaries.

Today is the day that the Japanese are going to bring their answer to Hull,

and everything in MAGIC indicated they had been keeping the time back until

now in order to accomplish something hanging in the air. Knox and I arranged

a conference with Hull at 10:30 and we talked the whole matter over. Hull is

very certain that the Japs are planning some deviltry and we are all wondering

where the blow will stride. We three stayed together in conference until lunch

time, going over the plans for what should be said or done. The main thing

is to hold the main people who are interested in the Far East together — the

British, ourselves, the Dutch, the Australians, the Chinese. Hull expressed his

views, giving the broad picture of it, and I made him dictate it to a stenographer

and I attach it to the end of this. Knox also had his views as to the importance

of showing immediately how these different nations must stand together and I

got him to dictate that and that is attached hereto. Hull was to see the Japanese

envoys at one o’clock but they were delayed in keeping the appointment and did

not come until later — as it turned out, till 2:00 o’clock or after. \* ♦ ♦ The

messages which we have been getting through Saturday and yesterday and this

morning aj\*e messages which are brought by the British patrol south of Indo-

China, showing that large Japanese forces were moving up into the Gulf of

Siam. This itself was enough excitement and that was what we were at work

on our papers about. The observer thought these forces were going to land

probably either on the ^eastern side of the Gulf of Siam, where it would be still

in Indo-China, or on the western side, where it would be the Kra Peninsula, or

probably Malaya. The British were very much excited about it and our efforts

this morning in drawing our papers was to see whether or not we should all act

together. The British will have to fight if they attack the Kra Peninsula. We

three all thought that we must fight if the British fought (tr. 14428-14429).

The statement dictated by Secretary Hull as referred to in Secretary

Stimson's notes, follows:

Proposed Statement for President by Hull

(See Record, December 7)

The Japanese Government, dominated by the militai^ fire-eaters, is deliberately

proceeding on an increasingly broad front to carry out its long proclaimed purpose

to acquire military control over one-half of the world with nearly one-hali its

population. This inevitably means Japanese control of islands, continents, and

seas from the Indies back near Hawaii, and that all of the conquered peoples

would be governed militarily, politically, economically, socially, and morally by

the worst possible military despotism with barbaric, inhuman, and semislavery

methods such as Japan has notoriously been inflicting on the people in China

and Hitler on the peoples of some fifteen conquered nations of Europe. This

would virtually drive and force aU free and pesiceful peoples off the high seas.

At this moment of serious, threatened, and imminent danger, it is manifest

that control of the South Sea area by Japan is the key to the control of the entire

Pacific area, and therefore defense of life and commerce and other invaluable

rights and interests in the Pacific area must be commenced within the South

Sea area at such times and places as in the judgment of naval and military experts

would be within sufficient time and at such strategic points as would make it

most effective. In no other way can it be satisfactorily determined that the

Pacific area can be successfully defended.

More than ever is the cohesive, closely related world movement to conquer

and destroy, with Hitler moving across one-half of the world and the Government

of Japan under the military group moving across the other half of the world by

closely synchronizing their efforts and collaborating and cooperating whenever to

their individual or their mutual advantage.

This at once places at stake everything that is precious and worth while. Self-

defense, therefore, is the key point for the preservation of each and aU of our

dviUzed institutions (tr. 14433-14434).

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Secretary Knoxes statement was as follows:

Suggestion by Knox

(See Record, December 7)

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1. We are tied up Inextricably with the British in the present world situation.

2. The fall of Singapore and the loss to England of Malaya will automatically

not only wreck her far eastern position but jeopardize, her entire effort.

3. If the British lose their position the Dutch are almost certain to lose theirs.

4. If both the British and the Dutch lose their positions we are almost certain

to be next, being then practically Japanese-surrounded.

5. If the above be accepted, then any serious threat to the British or the Dutch

is a serious threat to the United States; or it might be stated any threat to any one

of the three of us is a threat to all of us. We ‘should therefore be ready jointly to

act together and if such understanding has not already been reached, it should be

reached immediately. Otherwise we may fall individually one at a time (or some-

body may be left out on a limb).

6. I think the Japanese should be told that any movement in a direction that

threatens the United States will be met by force. The President will want to

reserve to himself just how to define this. The following are suggestions to shoot

at: Any movement into Thailand; or any movement into Thailand west of 100°

east and South of 10° North — this in accordance with the recommendations of

the British and Dutch and United States military authorities in the Far East; or

any movement against British, Dutch, United States, Free French, or Portuguese

territory in the Pacific area (tr. 14435-14436).

After the meeting at the State Department, Secretary Stimson went

to his home for lunch (tr. 14428). Secretary Bmox returned to the

Navy Department. Both his aide, Admiral Beatty, and his confi-

dential assistant. Major Dillon, testified that he arrived there from

the State Department probably about 11:30 o’clock, possibly a little

later (tr. 10239, 10253, 10260). Secretary Hull remained at the State

Department. At about noon, the Japanese Embassy telephoned the

State Department and asked for an appointment for Ambassador

Nomura with Secretary Hull at 1 p. m. that afternoon. Somewhat

later the Embassy telephoned again and requested that the appoint-

ment be postponed to 1:45 p. m., as Ambassador Nomura was not

quite ready (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 786).

That morning the First Secretary of the British Embassy in Wash-

ii^on, Mr. w! G. Hayter, called at the State Department on an

official of the F ar Eastern Division. In response to an inquiry whether

there was any news, Mr. Hayter is reported to have said —

after some hesitation, that the British Minister in Thailand had sent a message to

the (British) Foreign OflSce, which began ‘‘For God^s sake'\* and which was en-

dorsed by the Thai Foreign Minister requesting that British armed forces not

move into Thailand" (ex. 169, item 34). [Italics in original.]

At 1:50 o’clock that afternoon the Navy Department received the

following dispatch from Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, commander in

chief of the United States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, T. H.:

Air raid on Pearl Harbor. This is not drill (tr. 14204).

'V\^en this message was brought to Secretary Knox, he was talking

with Admiral Stark and Admiral Turner, in Major Dillon’s office, who

testified that after reading the message, the Secretary exclaimed: ^‘My

God, this can’t be true, this must mean the Philippines” (tr. 10262).

Secretary Stimson recorded in his notes for that day that —

S Bt about 2 o'clock, while I was sitting at lunch, the President called me up on

e telephone and in a rather excited voice asked me, “Have you heard the news?"

I said, “Well, I have heard the telegrams which have come in about the Japanese

advances in the Gulf of Siam," He said, “Oh no, I don't mean that. They have

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attacked Hawaii. They are now bombing Hawaii.” Well, that was an excite-

ment indeed (tr. 14428-14429).

Secretary Hull testified that President Roosevelt telephoned him

before the Japanese Ambassadors reached the State Department and

told him ‘There was a report that Pearl Harbor had been attacked’’ ^

(tr. 1594). He continued:

I discussed before they came whether I would accredit that report as the unques-

tioned truth of the situation and refuse to admit them or whether in view of the

extremely delicate relations I would leave open the one chance in ten or more that

the report was not correct. I proceeded to receive and confer with them although

I felt that the chances were altogether virtually certain that the report was true

(tr. 1594). '

The Japanese Ambassadors arrived at the State Department at 2:05

p. m., but were not admitted to Secretary Hull’s office imtil 2:20 p. m.

(ex. 29, vol. II, p. 786). According to the official State Department

record of the meeting Ambassador Nomura stated —

that he had been instructed to deliver at 1 :00 p. m. the document which he handed

the Secretary, but that he was sorry that he had been delayed owing to the need

of more time to decode the message. The Secretary asked why he had specified

one o'clock. The Ambassador replied that he did not know but that that was

his instruction.

The Secretary said that anyway he was receiving the message at two o'clock

(ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 786-787).

The document Ambassador Nomura handed Secretary Hull was

the full text of the memorandum contained in the 14-part message

that had been before the three Secretaries at their conference that

morning, the first 13 parts of which had been seen by Secretary Knox

and President Roosevelt the evening before. The full message as

intercepted before its delivery to Secretary Hull is printed as .^^ex

E attached hereto. Secretary Hull testified that the first few pages

defined “the Japanese attitude just the reverse of what it was,” as

“Peace, peace, peace,” and the next few pages defined the American

attitude “as just the reverse of what it was” (tr. 1594). The final

paragraph, which had been contained in the fourteenth part of the

intercepted message and had not been seen by either the President

or any of the three Secretaries before 10 o’clock that morning, was

as follows:

7. Obviously it is the intention of tie American Government to conspire with

Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the estab-

lishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and especially

to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at

war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present

negotiations. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust

Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the

Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.

The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government

that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot hut consider that it

is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations (ex. 1, p. 246; ex. 29,

vol. II, p. 792).

Secretary Hull testified that at the time he —

felt and knew of the extreme probability that the Pearl Harbor report was true.

I felt like taking liberties in talking to them about their government in what would

not be diplomatic language in ordinary times (tr. 1595).

Secretary Hull interrupted his reading of the memorandmn to ask

Ambassador Nomima whether the memorandum was presented under

1 Under Secretary Welles also testified that he first learned of the/ittack through a telephone call from

President Roosevelt (tr. 1322; 1362-1373).

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instructions from Hie Japanese Government. The Ambassador re-

plied that it was. When he finished reading, Secretary Hull turned

to the Japanese Ambassador and said:

I must say that in all my conversations with you during the last nine months

I have never uttered one word of untruth. This is borne out absolutely by the

record. In all my fifty years of public service I have never seen a document that

was more crowded with infamous falsehoods and distortions — infamous falsehood

and distortions on a scale so huge that I never imagined until today that any

Government on this planet was capable of uttering them (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 787).

According to the official State Department records of the meeting the

two Japanese Ambassadors “then took their leave without making

any comment^ (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 787).

Later that afternoon, Secretary Hull issued the following statement:

Japan has made a treacherous and utterly unprovoked attack upon the United

States.

At the ve^ moment when representatives of the Japanese Government were

discussing with representatives of this Government, at the request of the former,

principles and courses of peace, the armed forces of Japan were preparing ana

assembling at various strategic points to launch new attacks and new aggressions

upon nations and peoples with which Japan was professedly at peace including

the United States.

I am now releasing for the information of the American people the statement of

principles governing the policies of the Government of the United States and

setting out suggestions for a comprehensive peaceful settlement covering the entire

Pacific area, which I handed to the Japanese Ambassador on November 26, 1941.

I am likewise releasing the text of a Japanese reply thereto which was handed

to me by the Japanese Ambassador today. Before the Japanese Ambassador

delivered this final statement from his Government the treacherous attack upon

the United States had taken place.

This Government has stood for all the principles that underlie fair dealing,

peace, law and order, and justice between nations and h^s steadfastly striven to

promote and maintain that state of relation^ between itself and aU other nations.

It is now apparent to the whole world that Japan in its recent professions of a

desire for peace has been infamously false and fraudulent (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 793).

The surprise Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor had begun at 1:25

o^clock that Sunday afternoon (Washington time). It was followed

almost immediately by a Japanese attack upon Thailand at various

places on its land and sea frontiers. Five and half hours after the

attack on Thailand commenced the Thai Government gave the order

to cease fire (ex. 169). At 3 p. m. on December 7 (Washington time)

the fibrst Japanese attacks on Singapore were made; at 3:40 p. m.

(Washington time) the Japanese attacked Khota Baru in British

Malaya; at 6:10 p. m. (Washington time) they attacked the Gulf of

Davao in the Philippine Islands and the Islancl of Guam (tr. 14127).

In Tokyo, in the meantime, after receiving from Ambassador Grew

a copy of President Roosevelt’s message to Emperor Hirohito, Foreign

Minister Togo had gone to Premier To jo’s official residence with a

summary translation of the President’s message, and there, at an

eme^ency conference with the Premier and the other members of the

Cabinet, had determined the line of action to be taken (ex. 132, item

1, p. 2). At 7 a. m., December 8 (Japan time) Ambassador Grew

was awakened by a telephone call from an official of the Japanese

Foreign Office who requested him to call on Foreign Minister Togo

as soon as possible (ex. 30, p. 493). When Ambassador Grew arrived.

Foreign Minister Togo, “ctuu and formal,” handed him the Japanese

Governments memorandum breaking off the negotiations. The

Foreign Minister said that he had been in touch with Emperor Hirohito,

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who desired that the memorandum be regarded as his reply to Presi-

dent Roosevelt’s mess^e. Ambassador Grew reported to the State

Department that the Foreign Minister thereupon made to him the

following oral statement:

His Majesty has expressed his gratefulness and appreciation for the cordial

message of the President. He has graciously let known his wishes to the Foreign

Minister to convey the following to the President as a reply to the latter’s message:

“Some days ago, the President made inquiries regarding the circumstances of

.the augmentation of Japanese forces in French Indochina to which His Majesty

has directed the Government to reply. Withdrawal of Japanese forces from

French Indochina constitutes one of the subject matters of the Japanese- American

negotiations. His Majesty has commanded the Government to state its views to

the American Government also on this question. It is, therefote, desired that

.the President will kindly refer to this rejiy.

“Establishment of peace in the Pacific, and consequently of the world, has been

the cherished desire of His Majesty for the realization of which he has hitherto

made his Government to continue its earnest endeavors. His .Majesty trusts

that the President is fully aware of this fact” (ex. 178).

Following his conference with Ambassador Grew, Foreign Minister

Togo arr^ged a conference with the British Ambassador, Sir Robert

Craigie. Upon his arrival, the Foreign Minister informed the British

Ambassador that it had become necessary to break oflf the Japanese-

American negotiations, and handed him a copy of the memorandum he

had previously given to Ambassador Grew (ex. 132, item 2).

While Foreign Minister Togo was holding his conferences with the

American and British Ambassadors, a meeting of the Committee of

Advisement of the Privy Council, attended by all of the other members

of the Japanese Cabinet and certain other Japanese governmental

officials, was in progress in the Imperial Palace. At this meeting the

committee considered and approved an Address of Advisement to the

Throne and a draft of an Imperial Rescript declaring war against the

United States and Great Britain. One of the officii present at the

meeting asked Premier Tojo what Germany’s attitude would be.

Premier Tojo replied that “(jermany’s entrance in the war in our sup-

port is almost certain, and negotiations to that effect are now in prog-

ress” (ex. 132, item 3). Following the meeting of the Committee of

Advisement, a full session of the Privy Coimcil in the pr^ence of

Emperor Hirohito, was held in the Imperial Palace. At this meeting

the address to the Throne was presented and unanimously approved.

Later that morning. Ambassador Grew received the following com-

munication:

Excellency:

I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that there has arisen a state]of war

between Your. Excellency’s country and Japan beginning today.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances

of my highest consideration.

Shxgenobi Togo,

Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Ex. 30, p. 499.)

In Washington, Sunday evening, December 7 (Washington time),

a meeting of the Cabinet called by President Roosevelt took place in

the White House at 8:30 o’clock (tr. 14430). The President opened

the meetii^ by stating that it was the most serious Cabinet meeting

that had taken place since 1861, and he then described the Japanese

attack at Pearl Harbor so far as it was known at the time. After this

the President read a draft of a brief message to Congress which he

had prepared. According to Secretary Stimson’s notes, the draft

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} >resented much the same thoughts as were actually presented the

oUowing day to Congress (tr. 14431). The Cabinet meeting lasted

over three-quarters of an hour, after which the majority and minority

leaders of Congress joined the President and the Cabinet for a meeting

which lasted for over 2 hours. At this meeting the President reviewed

the events of the preceding weeks and described the events of that

Sunday in Washington and at Pearl Harbor. The President asked

whether the members of Congress would invite him to appear before

a joint session the following day and was told that they would. He

said that he could not tell them exactly what he was going to say,

because events were changing so rapidly (tr. 14431-14432; ex. 160).

The next day, December 8 (Washington time), shortly after noon,

President Roosevelt delivered the following address before a joint

session of Congress:

To THE Congress of the United States:

Yesterday, December 7, 1941 — a date which will h\*ve in infamy — the United

States of America was suddenly and deliberately attacked by naval and air

forces of the Empire of Japan.

The United States was at peace with that Nation and, at the solicitation of

Japan, was still in conversation with its Government and its Emperor looking

toward the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. Indeed, one hour after Japanese

air squadrons had commenced bombing in Oahu, the Japanese Ambassador to

the United States and his colleague delivered to the Secretary of State a fortnal

reply to a recent American message. While this reply stated that it seemed

useless to continue the existing diplomatic negotiations, it contained no threat

or hint of war or armed attack.

It will be recorded that the distance of Hawaii from Japan makes it obvious

that the attack was deliberately planned many days or even weeks ago. During

the intervening time the Japanese Government has deliberately sought to deceive

the United States by false statements and expressions of hope for continued peace.

The attack yesterday on the Hawaiian Islands has caused severe damage to

American naval and military forces. Very many American lives have been lost.

In addition, American ships have been reported torpedoed on the high seas be-

tween San Francisco and Honolulu.

Yesterday the Japanese Government also launched an attack against Malaya.

Last night Japanese forces attacked Hong Kong.

Last night Japanese forces attacked Guam.

Last night Japanese forces attacked the Philippine Islands.

Last night the Japanese attacked Wake Island.

This morning the Japanese attacked Midway Island.

Japan has, therefore, undertaken a surprise offensive extending throughout

the Pacific area. The facts of yesterday speak for themselves. The people of

the United States have already formed their opinions and well understand the

implications to the very life and safety of our Nation.

As Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy I have directed that all meas-

ures be taken for our defense.

Always will we remember the character of the onslaught against us.

No matter how long it may take us to overcome this premeditated invasion,

the American people in their righteous might will win through to absolute victory.

I believe I interpret the will of the Congress and of the people when I assert

that we will not only defend ourselves to the uttermost but will make very certain

that this form of treachery shall never endanger us again.

Hostilities exist. There is no blinking at the fact that our people, our terri-

toiy, and our interests are in grave danger.

With confidence in our armed forces — with the unbounded determination of

our people — we will gain the inevitable triumph — so help us God.^

I ask that the Congress declare that since the unprovoked and dastardly attack

by Japan on Sunday, December seventh ,a state of war has existed between the

United States and the Japanese Empire (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 793-794).

Within an hour after President Roosevelt finished his address, the

Senate and House of Representatives, acting independently, passed

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the following resolution, the Senate by a vote of 82 to 0 and the House

of Representatives by a vote of 388 to 1:

JOINT RESOLUTION Declaring that a state of war exists between the Imperial Oovernment of Japan

and the Government and the people of the United States and making providons to prosecute the same

Whereas the Imperial Government of Japan has committed unprovoked acta

of war against the Government and the people of the United States of America:

Therefore be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United Stales of

America in Congress assembled. That the state of war between the United States

and the Imperial Government of Japan which has thus been thrust upon the

United States is hereby formally declared; and the President is hereby authorized

and directed to employ the entire naval and military forces of the United States

and the resources of the Government to carry on war against the Imperial

Government of Japan; and, to bring the conflict to a successful termination, all of

the resources of the country are hereby pledged by the Congress of the United

States (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 795).

The declaration of war against Jaj^n was signed by President Koose-

velt at 4:10 p. m. that aftemoon^^ecember 8 (Washington time).

ANNEX A

Draft Proposal Handed by Ambassador Nomura to Secretary Hull on

May 12 {Washington time)

Confidential Memorandum Agreed Upon Between the Govern-

ment OP THE United States or America and the Government

OF Japan

The Governments of the United States and of Japan accept joint

responsibility for the initiation and conclusion of a general agree-

ment disposing the resumption of our traditional friendly relations.

Without reference to specific causes of recent estrangement, it is

the sincere desire of both Governments that the incidents which led

to the deterioration of amicable sentiment among our peoples should

be prevented from recurrence and corrected in their unforeseen and

unfortunate consequences.

It is our present hope that, by a joint effort, our nations nmy

establish a just peace in the Pacific; and by the rapid consummation

of an enUnte cordiale [amicable understanding], arrest, if not dispel,

the tragic confusion, that now threatens to engulf civilization.

For such decisive action, protracted negotiations would seem ill-

suited and weakening. ^ Both Governments, therefore, desire that

adequate instrument^ties should be developed for the realization

of a general agreement which would bind, meanwhile, both Govern-

ments in honor and in act.

It m our belief that such an understanding should comprise only

the pivotal issues of urgency and not the accessory concerns which

could be deliberated at a conference and appropriately confirmed by

our respective Governments.

Both Governments presume to anticipate that they could achieve

harmomous relations if certain situations and attitudes were clari-

fied or improved; to wit:

1. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting

international relations and the character of nations.

2. The attitude of both Governments toward the European War.

3. The relations of both nations toward the China Affair.

4. Commerce between both nations.

5. Economic activity of both nations in the Southwestern

Pacific area.

6. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization

in the Pacific area.

Accordingly, we have come to the following mutual under-

standing: —

/. The^ concepts of the Lnited States and of Japan respecting inter-

national relations and the character of nations.

The Governments of the United States and of Japan jointly

acknowledge each other as equally sovereign states and contiguous

Pacific powers.

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Both Governments assert the unanirnity of their national policies

as directed toward the foundation of a lasting peace and the in-

auguration of a new era of respectful confidence and cooperation

among our peoples. ,

Both Governments declare that it is their traditional, and present,

concept and conviction that nations and races compose, as members of

a family, one household; each equally enjoying rights and admitting

responsibilities with a mutuality of interests regulated by peaceful

processes and directed -t6 the pursuit of their moral and physical

welfare, which they are bound to defend for themselves as they are

bound not to destroy for others; they further admit their responsi-

bilities to oppose the oppression or exploitation of backward nations.

Both Governments are firmly determined that their respective tra-

ditional concepts on the character of nations and the underlying

moral principles of social order and national life will continue to

be preserved and never transformed by foreign ideas or ideologies

contrary to these moral principles and concepts.

II. The attitude of both Governments toward the European War.

The Governments of the United States and Japan make it their

common aim to bring about the world peace; they shall, therefore

jointly endeavour not only to prevent further extension of the Euro-

pean War but also speedily to restore peace in Emope.

The Government of Japan maintains that its alliance with the

Axis Powers was, and is, defensive and designed to prevent the na-

tions which are not at present directly affected by the European

War from engaging in it.

The Government of Japan maintains that its obligations of military

assistance- under the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany and

Italy will be applied in accordance with the stipulation of Article 3

of the said Pact.

The Government of the United States maintains that its attitude

toward the European War is, and will continue to be, directed by no

such aggressive measures as to assist any one nation against another.

The United States maintains that it is pledged to the hate of wat,

and accordingly, its- attitude toward the European War is, and wUl

continue to be, determined solely and exclusively by considerations

of the protective defense of its ovm national welfare and security.

III. The relations of both nations toumrd the China Affair.

The Government of the United States, acknowledging the three

principles as enunciated in the Konoe Statement and the principles

set forth on4he basis of the said three principles in the treaty with

the Nanking Government as well as in the Joint Declaration of

Japan, Manchoukuo and China and relying upon the policy of the

Japanese Government to establish a relationship of neighborly

friendship with China, shall forthwith request the Chiang i^i-shex

regime to negotiate peace with Japan.

IV. Commerce between both nations.

When ofl&cial approbation to the present Understandii^ has been

given by both Governments, the United States and Japan shall assure

each other to mutually supply such commodities as are, respectively,

available or required oy either of them. Both Governments further ■

consent to take necessary steps to the resumption of normal trade

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relations as formerly established imder the Treaty of Commerce and

Navigation between Uie United States and Japan.

V. Economic activity of both nations in the Southwestern Pacific area.

Having in view that the Japanese expansion in the direction of

the Southwestern Pacific area is declared to be of peaceful nature,

American cooperation shall be given in the production and procure-

ment of natural resources (such as oil, rubber, tin, nickel) which

Japan needs.

VI. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the

Pacific area.

a. The Governments of the United States and Japan jointly

^arantee the independence of the Philippine Islands on the condi-

tion that the Philippine Islands shall maintain a status of permanent

neutrality. The Japanese subjects shall not be subjept to any dis-

criminatory treatment.

b. Japanese imm^ration to the United States shall receive amicable

consideration’ — on a basis of equality with other nationals and frea-

dom from discrimination.

Addendum.

The present Understanding shall be kept a confidential memo-

randum between the Governments of the United States and of Japan.

The scope, character and timing of the announcement of this

Understanding wiU be agreed upon by both Governments.

Oral Explanation for Proposed Amendments to the Original

Draft

II. Par. 2.

Attitude of Both Governments toward the European Tkar.

Actually the meaning of this paragraph is virtually unchanged

but we desire to make it clearer by specifyir^ a reference to the

Pact. As long as Japan is a member of the Tripartite Pact, such

stipulation as is mentioned in the Understanding seems unnecessary.

If we must have any stipulation at all, in addition, it would be

important to have one which would clarify the relationship of this

Understanding to the aforementioned Pact.

III.

China Affair.

The terms for China-Japan peace as proposed in the original Under-

standing differ in no substantial way from those herein affirmed as

the “principles of Konoe.” Practically, the one can be used to

explain the other.

We should obtain an understanding, in a separate and secret doc-

ument, that the United States would discontinue her assistance to

the Chiang Kai-shek regime if Chiang Kai-shek does not accept the

advice of the United States that he enter into negotiations for peace.

If, for any reason, the United States finds it impossible to si^

such a document, a definite pledge by some highest authorities will

suffice.

The three principles of Prince Konoe as referred to in this para-

graph are:

1. Neighborly friendship;

2. Joint defense against communism ;

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3. Economic cooperation — ^by which Japan does not intend to

exercise economic monopoly in China nor to demand of China a

limitation in the interests of Third Powers.

The following are implied in the aforesaid principles:

1. Mutual respect of sovereignty and territories;

2. Mutual respect for the inherent characteristics of each nation

cooperating as good neighbors and forming a Far Eastern nucleus

contributing to world peace;

3. Withdrawal of Japanese troops from Chinese territory in

accordance with an agreement to be concluded between Japan

and China;

4. No annexation, no indemnities;

5. Independence of Manchoukuo.

III.

Immigration tb China.

The stipulation regarding large-scale immigration to China has

been deleted because it might give an impression, maybe a mistaken

impression, to the Japanese people who have been offended by the

past immigration legislation of the United States, that America is

now taking- a dictatir^ attitude even toward the question of Japanese

immigration in China.

Actually, the true meaning and purpose of this stipulation is fully

understood and accepted by the Japanese Government.

IV.

Naval, Aerial and Mercantile Marine Belalions.

(a) and (c) of this section have been deleted not because of dis-

agreement but because it would be more practical, and possible, to

determine the disposition of naval forces and mercantile marine after

an understanding has been reached and relations between our two

coimtries improved; and after our present China commitments are

eliminated. Then we will know the actual situation and can act

accordingly.

Courtesy visit of naval squadrons.

This proposal, (6) of IV might better be made a subject of a

separate memorandum. Particul^ care must be taken as to the

timing, manner and scope of carrying out such a gesture.

V.

Gold Credit.

The proposal in the second paragraph of V has been omitted for

the same reasons as suggested the omission of paragraphs (a) and

(c).

VI.

Activity in Southwestern Pacific Area.

The words, in the first paragraph, “without resorting to arms”

have been deleted as inappropriate and unnecessarily critical. Actu-

ally, the peaceful policy of the Japanese Government has been made

clear on many occasions in various statements made both by the

Premier and the Foreign Minister.

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VIII. [VIL]

Political Stahilizalion in the Pacific Area.

As the pan^aph (a) implying military and treaty obligation

would require, for its enactment, such a complicated legislative pro-

cedure in both countries, we consider it inappropriate to include this

in the present Unde(rstanding.

Paragraph (6) regarding the independence of the Philippine Is-

lands has been altered for the same reason.

^ In paragraph (c) [(d)] the words “and to the Southwestern Pa-

cific Area" have ' been omitted because such questions should be

settled, as necessity arises, through direct negotiation with the au-

thorities in the Southwestern areas by the Government of the United

States and of Japan respectively.

Conference.

The stipulation for holding a Conference has been deleted. We

consider tbat it would be better to arrange, by an exchange of letters,

that a conference between the President and the Premier or between

suitable representatives of theirs will be considered when both the

United States and Japan deem it useful to hold such a conference

after takii^ into due consideration the effect resulting from the

present Understanding,’

Announcement.

In r^ard to the statement to be issued on the successful conclusion

of the present Understanding a draft will be prepared in Tokio and

cabled to Washington for the consideration of the United States

Government.

(Ex. 29, Vol. II, pp. 420-425.)

ANNEX B

Draft Proposal Handed hy Secretary HvU to Ambassador Nomura on

June 81 (Washington time)

Unofficial, Exploratory [Washington j] June 21, 1941.

and Without Commitment

The Governments of the United States and of Japan accept joint

responsibility for the initiation and conclusion of a general agreement

of understanding as expressed in a joint declaration for the resump-

tion of traditional friendly relations.

Without reference to specific causes of recent estrangement, it is

the sincere desire of both Govemmente that the incidents which led

to the deterioration of amicable sentiment between their countries

should be prevented from recurrence and corrected in their unfore-

seen and unfortunate consequences.

It is our earnest hope that, by a cooperative effort, the United

States and Japan may contribute effectively toward the establishment

and preservation of peace in the Pacific area and, by the rapid con-

sumation of an amicable understanding, encourage world peace and

arrest, if not dispel, the tragic confusion that now threatens to engulf

civilization.

For such decisive action, protracted negotiations would seem ill-

suited and weakening. Both Governments, therefore, desire that

adequate instrumentalities should be developed for the realization of

a general understanding which would bind, meanwhile, both Govern-

ments in honor and in act.

It is the belief of the two Governments that such an understanding

should comprise only the pivotal issues of urgency and not the acces-

sory concerns which could be deliberated later at a conference.

Both Governments presume to anticipate that they could achieve

harmonious relations if certain situations and attitudes were clarified

or improved; to wit:

1. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting

international relations and the character of nations.

2. The attitudes of both Governments toward the European

war.

3. Action toward a peaceful settlement between China and

Japan.

4. Commerce between both nations.

5. Economic activity of both nations in the Pacific area.

6. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in

the Pacific area.

7. Neutralization of the Philippine Islands.

Accordingly, the Government of the United States and the Govern-

ment of Japan have come to the following mptual imderstanding and

declaration of policy:

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I. The eoncevts of the United States and of Japan respecting inter-

national relations and the character of nations.

Both governments affirm that their national policies are directed

toward the foundation of a lasting peace and the inaugmation of

a new era of reciprocal confidence and cooperation between our peoples.

Both Governments declare that it is their traditional, and present,

concept and conviction that nations and races compose, as members

of a family, one household living xmder the ideal of imiversal con-

cord through justice and equity; each equally enjoying rights and

admitting responsibilities with a mutualitj^ of interests regulated by^

peaceful processes and directed to the pursuit of their moral and physi-

cal welfare, which they are bound to defend for themselves as they

are bound not to destroy for others; they further admit their respon-

sibilities to oppose the oppression or exploitation of other peoples.

Both Governments are firmly determined that their respective

traditional concepts on the character of nations and the underlying-

moral principles of social order and national life will continue to be

preserved and never transformed by foreign ideas or ideologies con-

trary to those moral principles and concepts.

II. The attiivdes of both Governments toward the European war.

The Government of Japan maintains that the purpose of the Tri-

partite Pact was, and is, defensive and is designed to contribute to

the prevention of an unprovoked extension of the European war.

The Government of the United States maintains that its attitude

toward the European hostilities is and ivill continue to be determined

solely and exclusively by considerations of protection and self-defense:

its national security and the defense thereof.

Note (There is appended a suggested draft of an exchan^ of

letters as a substitute for the Annex and Supplement on the Part

of the Government of the United States on this subject which con-

stituted a part of the United States draft of May 31, 1941.

III. Action toward a peaceful settlement between China and Japan.

The Japanese Government having communicated to the Govern-

ment of the United States the general terms within the framework of

which the Japanese Government will propose the negotiation of a

peaceful settlement with the Chinese Government, which terms are

declared by the Japanese Government to be in harmony with the

Konoe principles regarding neighborly friendship and mutual respect of

sovereimty and territories and wdth the practical application of those

principles, the President of the United States wiU suggest to the

Government of China that the Government of China and the Gov-

ernment of Japan enter into a neigotiation on a basis mutually advan-

tageous and acceptable for a termination of hostihties and resumption

of peaceful relations.

Note (The foregoing draft of Section III is subject to further

discussion of the question of cooperative defense against com-

munistic activities, including the stationing of Japanese troops in

Chinese territory, and the question of economic cooperation

between Chuia and Japan. With regard to suggestions that the

language of Section III be changed, it is believed that considera-

tion of any suggested change can most advantageously be given

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after all the points in the annex relating to this section have been

satisfactorily worked out, when the section and its annex can be

viewed as a whole.) ,

rV. Commerce between both nations.

When official approbation to the present understanding has been

given by both Governments, the United States and Japan shall assure

each other mutually to supply such commodities as are, respectively,

available and required by either of them. Both Governments further

consent to take necessary steps to resume normal trade relations as for-

merly established under the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation

between the United States and Japan. If a new commercial treaty

is desired by both Governments, it would be negotiated as soon as

possible and be concluded in accordance with usual procedures.

V. Economic activity of both nations in the Pacific area.

On the basis of mutual pledges hereby given that Japanese activity

and American activity in the Pacific area shall be carried on by peace-

ful means and inxoniomuty with the principle of non-discrimination

in international commercial relations, the Japanese Government and

the Government of the Uiiited States agree to cooperate each with the

other toward obtaining non-discriminatory access by Japan and by

the United States to commercial supplies of natmal resomces (such

as oil, rubber, tin, nickel) which each coimtry nfeeds for the safeguard-

ing and development of its own economy.

VI. The 'policies of both nations affecting political staMLization in

the Pacific area.

Both Governments declare that the controlling policy imderlying

this imderstanding is peace in the Pacific area; that it is their funda-

mental purpose, through cooperative effort, to contribute to the main-

tenance and the preservation of peace in the Pacific area; and that

neither has territorial designs in the area mentioned.

VII. Neutralization of the Philippine Islands.

The Government of Japan declares its wUlingness to enter at such

time as the Government of the United States may desire into negotia-

tion with the Government of the United States with a view to the

conclusion of a treaty for the neutralization of the Philippine Islands,

when PhUippine independence shall have been achieved. '

[Annex 1 to Annex B]

Annex and Supplement on the Part op the Japanese Government

III. Action toward a peaceful settlement between China and Japan.

The basic terms as referred to in the above section are as follows:

1. Neighborly friendship.

2. (Cooperative defense against injurious communistic activities —

including the stationing of Japanese troops in Chinese territory.)

Subject to further discussion.

3. (Economic cooperation.) Subject to agreement on an exchange

of letters in regard to the application to this point of the principle of

non-discrimination in intematipnal commercial relations.

4. Mutual respect of sovereignty and territories.

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5. Mutual respect for the inherent characteristics of each nation

cooperating as good neighbors and forming an East Asian nucleus

contributing to world peace.

6. Withdrawal of Japanese armed forces from Chinese territory

as promptly as possible and in accordance with an agreement to be

concluded between Japan and China.

7. No annexation.

8. No indemnities.

9. Amicable negotiation in regard to Manchoukuo.

[Annex 2 to Annex B]

Annex and Supplement on the Part op the Government of the

United States

IV. Commerce between both nations.

It is understood that during the present international emergency

Japan and the United States each shall permit export to the other of

commodities in amounts up to the figmes of usual or pre-war trade,

except, in the case of each, commodities which it needs for its own

purposes of security and self-defense. These limitations are mentioned

to clarify the obligations of each Government. They are not intended

as restrictions against either Government; and, it is imderstood, both

Governments apply such regulations in the spirit dominating

relations with friendly nations.

[Annex 3 to Annex B]

Suggested Exchange of Letters Between the Secretary of State

AND THE Japanese Ambassador

The Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador:

Excellency: In Section II of the Joint Declaration which was

entered into today on behalf of om two Governments; statements are

made with regard to the attitudes of the two Governments toward the

European war. During the informal conversations which resulted

in the conclusion of this Joint Declaration I explained to you on a

number of occasions the attitude and policy of the Government of

the United States toward the hostilities in Europe and I pointed

out that this attitude and policy were based on the inalienable right

of self-defense. I called special attention to an address which I de-

livered on April 24 setting forth fuUy the position of this Government

upon this subject.

I am sure that you are fully cognizant of this Government’s attitude

toward the European war but in order that there may be no misunder-

standing I am again referring to the subject. I shall be glad to

receive from you confirmation by the Government of Japan that, with

regard to the measures which this nation may be forced to adopt

in defense of its own seciuity, which have been set forth as indicated,

the Government of Japan is not under any commitment which would

require Japan to take any action contrary to or destructive of the fun-

damental objective of the present agreement, to establish and to pre-

serve peace in the Pacific area.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consid-

eration.

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The Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary oj State:

Excellency: I have received your letter of June — .

I wish to state that my Government is fully aware of the attitude

of the Government of the United States toward the hostilities in

Europe as explained to me by you during our recent conversations and

as set forth in your address of April 24. I did not fail to report to

mv Govenunent the policy of the Government of the United States

as it had been explained to me, and I may assure you that my Govern-

ment understands and appreciates the attitude and position of the

Government of the United States with regard to the European war.

I wish also to assure you that the Government of Japan, with regard

to the measures which the Government of the United States may be

forced to adopt in defense of its own security, is not under any com-

mitment requiring Japan to take any action contrary to or destructive

of the fundamental objective of the present agreement.

The Government of Japan, fully cognizant of its responsibilities

freely assumed bj the conclusion of this agreement, is determined to

take no action immical to the establishment and preservation of peace

in the Pacific area.

AccejA, Excellency, the assurances of my most distinguished con-

sideration.

[Annex 4 to Annex B]

Suggested Letter To Be Addressed by the Secretary op State

TO THE Japanese Ambassador in Connection With the Joint

Declaration

Excellency: In the informal conversations which resulted in the

conclusion of a general agreement of understanding between our two

Governments, you and your associates expressed fully and franJdy

views on the intentions of the Japanese Government in regard to

appljring to Japan’s proposed economic cooperation with Cmna the

principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations.

It is believed that it would be helpful if you could be so good as to

confirm the statements already expressed orally in the form of replies

on the following points:

1. Does the term "economic cooperation” between Japan and

China contemplate the granting by the Government of China to

the Japanese Government or its nationals of any preferential or

monopohstic rights which would discriminate in favor of the

Japanese Government and Japanese nationals as compared with

the Government and nationals of the United States and of other

third coimtries? Is it contemplated that upon the inauguration

of negotiations for a peaceful settlement between Japan and

China the special Japanese companies, such as the North China

Development Company\* and the Central China Promotion Com-

pany and their subsidiaries, will be divested, m so far as Japanese

official support may be involved, of any monopohstic or other

preferential rights that they may exercise in fact or that may

inure to them by virtue of present circumstances in areas of China

under Japanese military occupation?

2. With regard to existing restrictions upon freedom of trade

and travel by nationals of third countries in Chinese territory

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under Japanese militwy occupation, could the Japanese Govern-

ment indicate approximately what restrictions will be removed

immediately upon the entering into by the Government of Chung-

king of negotiations with the Government of Japan and what

restrictions will be removed at later dates, with an indication in

each case in so far as possible of the approximate time within

which removal of restrictions would be effected?

3. Is it the intention of the Japanese Government that the

Chinese Government shall exercise full and complete control of

matters relating to trade, currency and exchange? Is it the

intention of the Japanese Government to withdraw and to

redeem the Japanese military notes which are being circulated

in China and tbe notes of Japanese-sponsored regimes in China?

Can the Japanese Government indicate how soon after the

inauguration of the contemplated negotiations arrangements to

the above ends can in its opmion be carried out?

It would be appreciated if as specific repUes as possible could be

made to the questions above listed.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest considera-

tion.

(Ex. 29, Vol. II, pp. 486-492.)

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ANNEX C

Text op Basic Japanese Terms op Peace With China

1. Neighborly friendship.

2. Kespect for sovereignty and territorial integrity.

3. Cooperative defense between Japan and China.

Cooperation between Japan and China for the purposes of pre-

venting communistic and other subversive activities wmch may con-

stitute a menace to the security of both countries and of maintaining

the pubUc order in China.

Stationing of Japanese troops and naval forces in certain areas in

the Chinese territory for a necessary period for the purposes referred

to alx>ve and in accordance with the existing agreements and usages.

4. Withdrawal of Japanese armed forces.

The Japanese armed forces which have been dispatched to China

for carrying out the China Affairs will be withdrawn from China

upon the settlement of the said Affairs, excepting those troops which

come imder point 3.

5. Economic cooperation.

(а) There shall be economic cooperation between Japan and China,

having the development and utilization of essential materials for

national defense in China as its principal objective.

(б) The preceding paragraph does not mean to restrict any eco-

nomic activities by third Powers in China so long as they are pursued

on an equitable basis.

6. Fusion of the Chiang Kai-shek regime and the Wang Ching-woi

Government.

7. No annexation.

8. No indemnities.

9. Recognition of Manchoukuo.

(Ex. 29, Vol. II, p. 633)

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ANNEX D

Japanese Proposals Submitted to Secretary HvU on September 27

{Washin^on time)

The Governments of Japan and of the United States accept joint

responsibiUty for the initiation and conclusion of a general agiw-

ment of understanding as expressed m a joint declaration for the

resumption of traditional friendly relations.

Without reference to specific causes of recent estrangement, it is

the sincere desire of both Governments that the incidents which led

to the deterioration of the amicable sentiment between their coimtries

should be prevented from recurrence and corrected in their imforeseen

and unfortimate consequences.

It is the earnest hope of both Governments that, by a cooperative

effort, Japan and the United States may contribute effectively toward

the establishment and preservation of peace in the Pacific area and,

by the rapid consummation of an ainicable understanding, encourage

world peace and arrest, if not dispel, the tragic confusion that now

threatens to engulf civii^ation.

For such decisive action, protracted negotiations would seem ill-

suited and weakening. Both Governments, therefore, desire that

adequate instrumentalities should be developed for the realization of

a generali understanding which would bind, meanwhile, both Govern-

ments in honor and in act.

It is the belief of both Governments that such an understanding

should comprise only the pivotal issues of urgency and not the acces-

so:^ concerns which could be deliberated later at a conference.

Both Governments presume to anticipate that they could achieve

harmonious relations if certain situations and attitudes were clarified

or improved; to wit:

1. The concepts of Japan and of the United States respecting

international relations and the character of nations.

2. The attitudes of both Governments toward the European

War.

3. Action toward a peaceful settlement between Japan and

China.

4. Commerce between both nations.

5. Economic problems in the Southwestern Pacific area.

6. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization

in the Pacific area. j

Accordingly, the Government of Japan and the Government of the

United States have come to the following mutual imderstanding and

declaration of policy:

I. The concepts oj Japan and of the United States respecting inter-

national relations and the character of nations.

Both Governments aflSrm that their national policies are directed

toward the foundation of a lasting peace and the inauguration of a

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new era of reciprocal confidence and cooperation between the peoples

of both countries.

Both Governments declare that it is their traditional, and present,

concept and conviction that nations and races compose, as members

of a farml^, one household living under the ideal of universal concord

through justice and equity; each equally enjoying rights and admit-

ing responsibilities with a mutuality of interests regmated by peace-

ful processes and directed to the pursuit of their moral and physical

Welfare, which they are boimd to defend for themselves as they are

bound not to destroy for others; they fmther admit their responsi-

bilities to oppose the oppression or exploitation of other peoples.

Both Governments are firmly determined that their respective tra-

ditional concepts on the character of nations and the imderlying

moral principles of social order and national life will continue to be

preserved and never transformed by fore^ ideas or ideologies con-

trary to those moral principles and concepts.

II. The aMitvdes oj both Governments toward the European War.

Both Governments maintain it their common aim to bring about

peace in the world, and, when an opportune time arrives, they will

endeavor jointly for the early restoration of world peace.

With regard to developments of the situation prior to the restora-

tion of world peace, both Governments will be guided in their conduct

by considerations of protection, and self-defense; and, in case the

United States sho\ild participate in the Emopean War, Japan would

decide entirely independently in the matter of interpretation of the

Tripartite Pact between Japan, Gennapy and Italy, and would like-

wise determine what actions might be taken by way of f ulfilling the

obligations in accordance with the said interpretation. « ^

III. Action toward a peacejul settlement between Japan and China.

Both Governments, taking cognizance of the fact that the settle-

ment of the China Affair has a vital bearing upon the peace of the

entire Pacific area and consequently upon that of the world, will

endeavor to expedite a rapid realization of the settlement of the said

.Affair.

The Government of the United States, recognizing the effort and

the sincere desire on the part of the Japanese Government concerning

the peaceful settlement of the China Affair, will, with the intention

of facilitating the realization of the settlement, render its good offices

in order that the Chungking Government may promptly enter into

negotiations with the Government of Japan for a termination of

hostilities and a resumption of peaceful relations, and will refrain

from resorting to any measures and actions which might hamper the

measures and efforts of the Government of Japan directed toward

the settlement of the China Affair.

The Government of Japan maintains that the basic general terms

of peace for the settlement of the Ghina Affair will be in harmony

with the principles embodied in the Konoye statement, and those

agreements between Japan and China and those matters which have

been put into effect in accordance with the said statement; that the'

economic cooperation between Japan and China will be carried on by

peaceful means and in conformity with the principle of non-dis-

crimination in the international commercial relations and also with

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the principle of especially close relationship which is natural between

ne^hboring countries; and that the economic activities of third

Powers in China will not be excluded so long as they are pursued

on an equitable basis.

Note: There is appended a draft of the basic terms of peace be-

tween Japan and China.

IV. Commerce between Japan and the United States.

Both Governments agree to take without delay measures necessary

for resuming normal trade relations between the two countries.

Both Governments guarantee each other that they will, as the first

of the measures envisaged in the preceding paragraph, discontinue

immediately the measures of freezing assets now being enforced, and

that they will supply mutually such commodities as are, respectively,

available and required by either of them.

V. Economic problems in the Sovihwstem Pacific area.

Both Governments mutually pledge themselves that the economic

activities of Japan and the United States in the Southwestern Pacific

area shall be carried on by peaceful means and m conformity with

the principle of non-discrimination in the international commercial

relations in pursuance of the policy stated in the preceding para-

graph, both Governments agree to cooperate each with the other

towards the creation of conditions of international trade and inter-

national investment imder which both countries will have a reason-

able opportunity to secure through the trade process the means of

acquiring those goods and commodities which each country needs for

the safeguarding and development of its own economy.

Both Governments will amicably cooperate for the conclusion and

execution of aOTeements with the Powers concerned in regard to the

production and supply, on the basis of non-discrimination, of such

specific commodities as oil, rubber, nickel, and tin.

VI. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the

Pacific area.

Both Governments, taking cognizance of the fact that it is a matter

of vital importance to stabilize promptly the situation in the South-

western Pacific area, undertake not to resort to any measures and

actions which may jeopardize such stabilization. The Government

of Japan will not make any armed advancement, using French Indo-

China as a base, to any adjacent area thereof (excluding China), and,

upon the estabhshment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area, will

withdraw its troops which are now stationed in French Indo-China.

The Government of the United States will alleviate its military

measures in the Southwestern Pacific area.

Both Governments declare that they respect the sovereimty and

territorial integrity of Thailand and Netherland E^t Indies, and

that they are prepared to conclude an agreement concerning the

neutralization of the Philippine Islands when its independence will

have been achieved.

The Government of the United States guarantees non-discrimina-

tory treatment of the Japanese nationals in the Philippine Islands.

[Here follows text of basic terms of peace between Japan and

China set forth in Annex C above.]

(Ex. 29, Vol. II, pp. 637-640.)

ANNEX E

(Text op Japanese Government’s Reply to United States Note

OP November 26, 1941, as Intercepted and Decoded in Wash-

ington Prior to Delivery to Secretary Hull by the Japanese

Ambassadors)

(Part 1 of 14)

MEMORANDUM

1. The Government of Japan, prompted by a genuine desire to come

to an amicable understanding with the Government of the United

States in order that the two countries by their joint efforts may

secure the peace of the Pacific area and thereby contribute toward

the realization of world peace, has continued negotiations with the

utmost sincerity since April last with the Government of the United

States regardi^ the adjustment and advancement of Japanese-

American relations and the stabilization of the Pacific area.

The Japanese Government has the honor to state frankly its views,

concerning the claiins the American Government has persistently

maintained as well as the measures the United States and Great

Britain have taken toward Japan during these eight months.

2. It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to insure

the stability of East Asia and to promote world peace, and thereby to

enable all nations to find each its proper place in the world.

Ever since the China Affair broke out owing to the failure on the

part of China to comprehend Japan’s true intentions, the Japanese

Government has striven for the restoration of peace land it has con-

sistently exerted its best efforts to prevent the extension of war-Uke

disturbances. It was also to that end that in September last year

Japan concluded the Tri Partite Pact with Germany and Italy.

(Part 2 of 14)

However, both the United States and Great Britain have resorted

to every possible measure to assist the Chungking re^me so as to

obstruct the establishment of a general peace between Japan and

China, interfering with Japan’s constructive endeavours toward the

stabilization of East Asia, exerting pressure on The Netherlands East

Indies, or menacii^ French Indo-China, they have attempted to frus-

trate Japan’s aspiration to realize the ideal of common prosperity

in cooperation with these regions. Furthermore, when Japan in ac-

cordance with its protocol with France took measures of joint defense

of French Indo-China, both American and British governments, will-

fully misinterpreted it as a threat to their own possession and induc-

ing the Netherlands government to follow suit, they enforced the

assets freezing order, thus severing economic relations with Japan.

While manifesting thus an obviously hostile attitude, these countries

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have strengthened their military preparations perfecting an encircle-

ment of Japan, and have brought about a situation which endangers

the very existence of the empire.

(Part 3 of 14)

Nevertheless, facilitate a speedy settlement, the Premier of Japan

proposed, in August last, to meet the President of the United States

for a discussion of important problems between the- two countries

covering the entire Pacific area. However, while accepting in prin-

ciple the Japanese proposal, insisted that the meeting should take

place after an agreement of view had been reached on fundamental

— (75 letters garbled) — The Japanese government submitted a pro-

posal based on the formula proposed by the American government,

taking fully into consideration past American claims and also incor-

poratmg Japanese views. Repeated discussions proved of no avail in

producing readily an agreement of view. The present cabinet, there-

fore, submitted a revised proposal, moderating still further the Jap-

anese clsrims regarding the prmcipal points of diflaculty in the nego-

tiation and endeavoured strenuously to reach a settlement. But the

American government, adhering steadfastly to its original proposal,,

failed to display in the slightest degree a spirit of conciliation. The

negotiation made no progress.

(Part 4 of 14)

Thereupon, the Japanese Government, with a view to doing its

utmost for averting a crisis in Japanese-American relations, sub-

mitted on November 20th still another proposal in order to arrive

at an equitable solution of the more essential and mgent questions

which, simplifying its previous proposal, stipulated the following

points:

(1) The Governments of Japan and the United States undertake

not to dispatch armed forces into any of the regions, excepting French

Indo-China, in the Southeastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area.

(2) Both Governments shall cooperate with a view to securing the

acquisition in the Netherlands East Indies of those goods and com-

modities of which the two coimtries are in need.

(3) Both Governments mutually undertake to restore commercial

relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of assets.

The Government of the United States shall supply Japan the re-

quired q^uantity of oil.

(4) The Government of the United States imdertakes not to resort

to measures and actions prejudicial to the endeavours for the restora-

tion of general peace between Japan and China.

(5) 'file Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now

stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace

between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace

in the Pacific area; and it is prepared to remove the Japanese troops

in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part upon

the conclusion of the present agreement.

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(Part 5 of 14)

As regards China, the Japanese Government, while expressing its

readiness to accept the offer of the President of the United States to

act as “Introducer” of peace between Japan and China as was pre-

viously suggested, asked for an undertaking on the part of the United

States to do nothing prejudicial to the restoration of Sino-Japanese

peace when the two parties have commenced direct negotiations.

The American government not only rejected the above-mentioned

new proposal, but made known its intention to continue its aid to

Chiang Kai-Shek; and in spite of its suggestion mentioned above,

withdrew the offer of the President to act as the so called “Intro-

ducer” of peace between Japan and China, pleading that time Was

not yet ripe for it. Finally, on November 26th, in an attitude to

impose upon the Japanese government those principles it has persist-

ently maintained, the American government made a proposal totally

ignoring Japanese claims, which is a source of profound regret to the

Japanese Government.

(Part 6 of 14)

4. From the beginning of the present negotiation the Japanese

Government has always maintained an attitude of fairness and mod-

eration, and did its best to reach a settlement, for which it made all

possible concessions often in spite of great difficulties.

As for the China question which constituted an important subject

of the negotiation, the Japanese Government showed a most con-

ciliatory attitude.

As for the principle of Non-Discrimination in International Com-

merce, advocated by the American Government, the Japanese Gov-

ernment expressed its desire to see the said principle applied through-

out the world, and declared that along with the actual practice of this

principle in the world, the Japanese Government would endeavor to

apply the same in the Pacific area, including China, and made it clear

that Japan had no intention of excluding from China economic activi-

ties of third powers pursued on an equitable basis.

Furthermore, as regards the question of withdrawing troops from

French Indo-China, the Japanese government even volunteered, as

mentioned above, to carry out an immediate evacuation of troops

from Southern French Indo-China as a measure of easing the situation.

(Part 7 of 14)

It is presumed that the spirit of conciliation exhibited to the utmost

degree by the Japanese Government in all these matters is fuUy appre-

ciated by the American government.

On the other hand, the American government, always holding fast

to theories in disregard of realities, and refusing to yield an inch on

its impractical principles, caused undue dela^ in the negotiation. It

is difficult to understand this attitude of tne American government

and the Japanese government desires to call the attention of the

American ^ vemment especially to the following points :

1. The American government advocates in the name of world peace

those principles favorable to it and urges upon the Japanese govern-

ment the acceptance thereof. The peace of the world may be brought

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about only by discovering a mutually acceptable formula through

recognition of the reality of the situation and mutual appreciation of

one another's position. Ah attitude such as ignores reahties and im-

poses one’s selfish views upon others will scarcely serve the purpose of

facilitating the consummation of negotiations.

(Part 8 of 14)

Of the various principles put forward by the American government

as a basis of the Japanese-^^erican agreement, there are some which

the Japanese government is readj^ to accept in principle, but in view

of the world’s actual conditions, it seems only a Utopian ideal, on the

part of the American government, to attempt to force their immediate

adoption.

Again, the proposal to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact

between Japan, the United States, Great Britain, China, the Soviet

Union, The Netherlands, and Thailand, which is patterned after the

old concept of collective security, is far removed from the realities of

East -Asia.

The American proposal contains a stipulation which states: “Both

governments will agree that no agreement, which either has concluded

with any third powers, shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to

confiict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the estab-

lishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area.’’ It is

presumed that the above provision has been proposed with a view to

restrain Japan from fulfilling its obligations under the Tripartite Pact

when the United States participates in the war in Europe, and, as such,

it cannot be accepted by the Japanese Government.

(Part 9 of 14)

The American Government, obsessed with its own views and

opinions, may be said to be scheming for the extension of the war.

While it seeks, on the one hand, to secure its rear by stabihzing the

Pacific area, it is engaged, on the other hand, in aiding Great Britain

and preparing to attack, in the name of seLf-defense, Germany and

Italy, two powers that are striving to establish a new order in Europe.

Such a policy is totally at variance with the many principles upon

which the American. Government proposes to found the stability of

the Pacific area through peaceful means.

3. Where as the American Government, under the principles it

rigidly upholds, objects to settling international issues through mih-

tary pressure, it is exercising in conjunction with Great Britain and

other nations pressure by economic power. Recourse to such pres-

sure as a means of dealing with international relations should be

condemned as it is at times more inhuman than military pressure.

(Part 10 of 14)

4. It is impossible not to reach the conclusion that the American

Government desires to maintain and strengthen, in collusion with

Great Britain and other powers, its dominant position it has hitherto

occupied not only in Chma but in other areas of East Asia. It is a

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fact of history that one countr — (45 letters garbled or missing) —

been, compelled to observe the status quo under the Anglo-American

policy of imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice the — es to the

prospeiity of the two nations. The Japanese Government cannot

tolerate the perpetuation of such a situation since it directly runs

coimter to Japan’s fundamental policy to enable all nations to enjoy

each its proper place in the world.

, (Part 11 of 14)

The stipulation proposed by the American Government relative to

French Indo-China is a good exemplification of the above-mentioned

American pohcy. That the six countries, — Japan, the United States,

Great Britain, The Netherlands, China and Thailand, — excepting

France, should undertake amoi^ themselves to respect the territoriM

integrity and sovereignty of French Indo-China and equaUty ^ of

treatment in trade and commerce would be tantamount to placing

that territory under the joint guarantee of the goyenunents of those

six coimtries. Apert from the fact that such a proposal totally

ignores the position of France, it is imacceptable to the Japanese

government in that such an arrangement cannot but be considered

as an extension to French Indo-China of a system similar to the

n — (50 letters missed) — sible for the present predicament of East Asia.

{Part 12 of 14)

5. AH the items demanded of Japan by the American government

regarding China such as wholesale evacuation of troops or uncon-

ditional application of the principle of Non-Discrimination in Inter-

national Commerce ignore the actual conditions of China, and are

calculated to destroy Japan’s position as the stabilizing factor of

East Asia. The attitude of the American government in demanc^g

Japan not to support mihtarily, politically or economically any regime

other than the regime at Ch unk ing, disregarding thereby the existence

of the N ank ing government, shatters the very basis of the present

negotiation. This demand of the American government falling, as it

does, in line with its above-mentioned refusal to cease from aiding the

Chunking regime, demonstrates clearly the intention of the American

f ovemment to obstruct the' restoration of normal relations between

apan and China and the return of peace to East Asia.

(Part 13 of 14)

5. In brief, the American proposal contains certain acceptable

items such as those concerning commerce, including the conclusion

of a trade agreement, mutual removal of the freezing restrictions, and

stabilization of the Yen and Dollar exchange, or the abolition of extra-

territorial rights in China. On the other hand, however, the pr<mosal

in question ignores Japan’s sacrifices in the four years of the China

Affair, menaces the empire’s existence itself and disparages its honour

and prestige. Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese gov-

ernment regrets that it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of

negotiation.

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6. The Japanese government, in its desire for an early conclusion

of the negotiation, proposed that simultaneously with the conclusion

of the Japanese-American negotiation, agreements be signed, with

Great Britain and other interested countries. The proposal was

accepted by the American government. However, since the American

^vemment has made the proposal of November 26th as a result of

frequent consultations with Great Britain, Australia, The Nether-

lands and Chungking, ANDND\*^ presumably, by cateri^ to the

wishes of the Chungking regime on the questions of UHTU.^

TLOKMMTT\*\* be concluded that all these coimtiies are at one with

the United States in ignoring Japan’s position.

(Part 14 of 14)

7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to

conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan’s

efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a

New Order in East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American

rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at war. This in-

tention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present

negotiations. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government

to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote

the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Gov-

ernment has finally been lost.

The Japanese Government resets to have to notify hereby the

American Government that in view of the attitude of the American

Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an

agreement through further negotiations.

(Ex. 1, pp. 239-245)

Appendix E

THE "WINDS CODE”

Appendix E

THE “WINDS CODE”

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Appendix E

THE ‘‘WINDS CODE''

Establishment and Nature op “Winds Code"

The “Winds code" was established and confirmed by five communi-

cations, two of which were processed by the Navy; i. e., Circulars 2353

and 2354, as follows: ‘

From; Tokyo

To: Washington

19 November 1941

Circular #2353

Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.

In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations) , and the

cutting off of international communications, the following warnings will be added

in the middle of the daily Japanese-language short-wave news broadcast.

(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZEAME.\*

(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI.\*\*

(3) Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KAZE HARE.\*\*\*

This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast,

and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard please destroy all

code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.

Forward as urgent intelligence.

26432

JD-1: 6875 (Y) Navy Trans. 11-28-41 (S-TT)

\*East wiod, rain

•♦North wind, cloudy

•••West wind, clear

From: Tokyo

To: Washington

19 November 1941

Circular #2354

When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the follow-

ing at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts:

(1) If it is Japan-U. S. relations ‘\*H I GASHI^\

(2) Japan-Russia relations, “KITA'\

(3) Japan-British relations (including Thai, Malaya, and N. E. I.); '\*NISHI''.

The above will be repeated five times and included at beginning and end.

Relay to Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Mexico City, San Francisco.

25392

JD-1: 6850 (Y) Navy Trans. 11-26-41 (S)

By way of confirming the winds code and reflecting its nature the

following dispatch. No. 281430, was received from the Commander in

chief of the Asiatic Fleet:\*

> Committee exhibit No. 1, pp. 154, 155.

• Id., No. 142.

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TOP SECRET

28 NOVEMBER 1941

PROM:CINCAF»

ACTION\*: OPNAV \*

INFO: COMSIXTEEN CINCPAC COMFOURTEEN\*

281430

FOLLOWING TOKYO TO NET INTERCEPT TRANSLATION RECEIVED

FROM SINGAPORE X IF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ARE ON VERGE

OF BEING SEVERED FOLLOWING WORDS REPEATED FIVE TIMES

AT BEGINNING AND END OF ORDINARY TOKYO NEWS BROAD-

CASTS WILL HAVE SIGNIFICANCE AS FOLLOWS X HIGASHI HIGASHI

JAPANESE AMERICAN X KITA KITA RUSSIA X NISHA NiSHi ENG-

LAND INCLUDING OCCUPATION OF THAI OR INVASION OF MALAYA

AND NEI XX ON JAPANESE LANGAUGE FOREIGN NEWS BROAD-

CASTS THE FOLLOWING SENTENCES REPEATED TWICE IN THE

MIDDLE AND TWICE AT THE END OF BROADCASTS WILL BE USED

XX AMERICA HIGASHI NO KAZE KUMORI « XX ENGLAND X NISHI

NO KAZE HARE X UNQUOTE X BRITISH AND COMSIXTEEN MON-

ITORING ABOVE BROADCASTS

Two further dispatches relate significantly to the winds code, the

first from Consul General Foote, our senior diplomatic representative

in the Netherlands East Indies, the second from Colonel Thorpe, our

senior Army intelligence officer in Java\*’'

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

BF

This telegram must be

Batavia

closely paraphrased be-

Dated December 4, 1941

fore being communicated

to anyone. (SC)

FROM

Rec^d. 9:19 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

220, December 4, 10 a. m.

War D^artment at Bandoeng claims intercepted and decoded following from

Ministry Foreign Affairs Tokyo:

^^When crisis leading to worst arises following will be broadcast at end weather

reports; one east wind rain war with United States, two north wind cloudy war

with Russia, three west wind clear war with Britain including attack on Thailand

or Malaya and Dutch Indies. If spoken twice burn codes and secret papers.^'

Same re following Japanese Ambassador Bangkok to Consul General Batavia:

‘^When threat of crises exists following will be used five times in texts of general

reports and radio broadcasts: one Higashi east America, two Kita north Russia,

three Nishi west Britain with advance into Thailand and attack on Malaya and

Dutch Indies.’\*

Thorpe and Slawson cabled the above to War Department. I attach little or no

importance to it and view it with some suspicion. Such have been common since

1936.

HSM FOOTE

\* Commander in chief, Asiatic Fleet.

\* Office of Naval Operations. '

\* Commandant Sixteenth Naval District; commander in chief, Pacific Fleet; commandant. Fourteenth

Naval District.

\* It is to be noted that, apparently through inadvertence in transmitting the mess^, the code phrase

referring to Russian has been improperly comingled with that referring to the United States.

7 See committee exhibit No. 142.

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FROM ALUSNA BATAVIA OPNAV RRRRR

DATE 6 DEC 1941 «

DECODED BY KALAIDJIAN

PARAPHRASED BY PURDY

031030 CR0222

FROM THORPE FOR MILES WAR DEPT. CODE INTERCEPT: JAPAN

WILL NOTIFY HER CONSULS OF WAR DECISION IN HER FOREIGN

BROADCASTS AS WEATHER REPORT AT END, EAST WIND RAIN

XXXXXX UNITED STATES: NORTH WIND CLOUDY RUSSIA: WEST

WIND CLEAR ENGLAND WITH ATTACK ON THAILAND MALAY AND

DUTCH EAST INDIES. WILL BE REPEATED TWICE OR MAY USE

COMPASS DIRECTIONS ONLY. IN THIS CASE WORDS WILL BE

INTRODUCED FIVE TIMES IN GENERAL TEXT.

DISTRIBUTION:

WAR DEPT ACTION

RECORD COPY: -20C— .

(Signature illegible)

FILES: CNO 20OP 20A

X SHOW OPDO

TOP SECRET SECRET

Efforts to Monitor

The evidence is undisputed that both services extended themselves

in an effort to intercept a message, in execution of the winds code, not

only through their own monitoring stations but throi^h facilities of

the Federal Communications Commission as well. WMe o^y frag-

mentary e^ddence of a dociunentary nature is available to indicate the

nature of instructions to monitor for an imjilementing or execute

message, the Federal Communications Commission file is complete

and, as indicated, there is no contention that every effort was not made

to intercept an execute message.\*

CONSIOERATIONS BEARING ON THE POSSIBILITY OF A MESSAGE IN

Execution of the “Winds Code” Having Been Beceived

Prior to December 7 , 1941

1. Capt. L. F. Safford in a prepared statement (read before the

joint committee) has set forth a positive assertion that a winds

execute message was received in the Navy Department on the morning

o/ December 4, 1941, and has elaborated on the circumstances which

serve, in his opinion, to indicate that a winds execute was dispatched

and why such a message would have been dispatched from Tokyo,

Safford asserted that when he first saw the message it had already

been translated by £[ramer; that Kramer had underscored all three

“code |>hrases” on the original incoming teletype sheet; and that he

had written in pencil or colored crayon the free translation: “War

with England (including NEI,“ etc.); war with the U. S.; peace with

Russia.” Safford has persistently testified that an authentic imple-

menting message was received.

• It is to be noted that this message bears the date December 5, IMl, whereas the ‘‘number group\*\* is

031030, indicating December 3, 1941. From evidence available (see discussion, infra) it appears this message

was dispatched from Batavia on December 3, 1941, but was not processed in the Navy Department unto

December 5, 1941, inasmuch as the message was sent “deferred.\*\*

\* See committee record, pp. 9809, 9810.

m d., at pp. 9622-9654.

u Netherlands Fast Indies.

00170 — 16 33

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2. Capt. A. D. Kramer testified before the committee that on the

morning oj December 6 the GY Watch Officer, thought by him possibly

to be Lieutenant Murray, came to the door of his office and showed

bim a message which he, Kramer, regarded as an implementation of

the winds code; that he saw this message only briefly, relying on the

evaluation of the GY watch officer as to the authenticity of the

message; that he had no recollection of writing on the message but

that had he written anything he positively would not have used the

word “war”; that he proceeded to Captain Safford’s office with the

GY watch officer when the message was delivered to Safford ; that he

never saw the message again. \*\*

It should be noted that Kramer testified the message he saw was

on a piece of teletype paper tom off from the machine and was not

more than a line or two, possibly three lines; that in no case did the

message contain some 200 words as alleged by Captain Safford in his

statement.\*® Fmther, that the message he saw referred to only one

country, which to the best of his belief was England.\*\* This testimony

must, of course, be considered along with Kramer’s testimony before

the Navy Court of Inquiry. When asked what Japanese language

words were used in the execute message he saw, he replied:\*® “Higashi

No Kazeame, I am quite certain. The literal meaning of Higashi No

Kazeame is East Wind, Rain. That is plain Japanese lai^uage.

The sense of that, however, meant strained relations or a break in

relations, possibly even implying war with a nation to the eastward,

the United States.”

3. Admiral R. E. Ingersoll testified that during December of 1941

he was Assistant Chief of Naval Operations; that he saw “messages”

which were supposed to implement the winds code, they being brought

to his office; that he did not recall definitely whether he saw them

prior to December 7 or thereafter; that an implementation of the code

received prior to December 7, if genuine, would simply have con-

firmed what had already been dispatched to the Fleet regarding

destruction of codes by the Japanese and would have required no

action; that he thought the message he saw referred to all three

countries; i. e. England, United States, and Russia.\*\*

4. Col. Otis K. Sadtler, in charge of the military branch of the

Army Signal Corps in December of 1941, testified that about 9 a. m.

or shortly thereafter on Friday, December 5, Admiral Noyes tele-

phoned him to the effect that the “message was in” (referring to an

implementing winds message) ; that Noyes told him “it was the word

that implied a break in relations between Japan and Great Britain” ;

that he went to General Miles’ office, informing Miles that the “word

was in” ; that Miles sent for Colonel Bratton and when Bratton came

in, he, Sadtler, told Bratton word had been received from Admiral

Noyes to the effect that diplomatic relations between Japan and

Great Britain were in danger; that Bratton asked him to verify receipt

of the message; that he called Admiral Noyes again, asking him to

verify the “Japanese word” and Noyes replied that he did not know

any Japanese but it was the one that “meant Japan and Great

Britain”; that upon reporting this information to General Miles’

w Committee record, pp. 10481 et wj.

Id., at p. 10491.

Hid., at p. 10501.

Navy court of inquiry (top secret) record, p. 957.

16 Committee record, pp. 11278 et seg.

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office he did not thereafter get in touch with Admiral Noyes concerning

the message; that he never saw the messi^e Noyes reported to him;

and that insofar as he could ascertain it did “not come over”, i. e. to

his office or the Army.\*^

5. Col. Rufus S. Bratton, Chief of the Far Eastern Section of

the Intelligence Branch of the Military Intelligence Division in De-

cember of 1941, testified that sometime around 9 or 10 a. m. on the

morning of December 5 he was called to General Miles’ office where

Sadtler stated Noyes had just called to say “it is in” (the winds

execute message) ; that Miles, at his suggestion, requested Sadtler to

get from Noyes a copy either of the Japanese text or of the English

translation so a determination could be made as to whether the mes-

sage was a genuine execute or another false alarm; that he did not

again see Sadtler concerning the matter; that he, Bratton, called up

the Navy, talking to either Captain McCollum or Kramer to inquire

if they had received a winds execute message and was advised that no

such message had been received; that he contacted Army SIS\*\* and

was likewise advised that no execute had been received; that the Army

continued to monitor for an implementing message up to and after

the December 7 attack.\*\*

6. Admiral Richmond K. Turner, Chief of War Flans in December

of 1941, testified before the committee as follows:

On Friday afternoon, I think it was, of December 5, Admiral Noyes called on

the telephone or the interphone, 1 do not know which, and said “The weather

messaae’’, or words to this effect, “the first weather message has come in” and I

said, ‘‘What did it say?” And he said, “North wind clear.” And I said, “Well,

there is something wrong about that,” and he said, “I think so, too”, and he hung

up.

I never saw a draft of that, I do not know from my own knowledge where he

got it from. I assumed until recently that it it was an authentic message. From

what I can determine since coming back here it was something entirely different,

but it was never told to me. If it had come in and had been authentic I am cer-

tain that I would have received a copy of it.

Turner testified that he did not see an implementation of the winds

code ^plying to the United States.\*®

7. To complete the picture it would seem apropos to set forth the

testimony of Rear Adm. Leigh Noyes at this point.

Noyes, in December of 1941, Director of Naval Communications,

testified before the committee that prior to December 7, 1941, no

genuine winds execute message was brought to him or to his attention

by anyone in the Navy Department; that prior to the Pearl Harbor

attack there were several instances when messages were brought to

him which were first thought to be winds execute messages but were

determined not to be genume; that the message described by Captain

Safford in his statement, if received, would not have been regarded

as an authentic execute message since (1) it is alleged to have been in

Morse code and not by voice (2) no provision was made for a negative

expression in the winds code (3) an execute would not have been

•» Id., at pp. 123i7-1236J.

Signal Intelligence Service.

»• Committee record, pp. 12068-12077:

Colonel Bratton testified : “I can state most positively that no execute of the winds code? was ever received

by me prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor. I find it hard to believe that any such execute message could

get into the War Department without passing over my desk.

“It is inconceivable to me. I might have missed it but I had some assistants who were on the watch for

it, and there were some people in the Army SIS who were also on the watch for it. They couldn’t all have

missed it. It is simply inconceivable to me that such a message could have been in the War Department

without some one of us knowing about it or seeing it.” Committee record, p. 12089

Jt Committee record, p. 5214.

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interpreted to mean war, and (4) Circular 2363 made no provision for

N. E. I. as stated by Sanord.

With respect to Colonel Sadtler’s testimony that Noyes called

bim saying “The message is in,” or words to that eflfect, Noyes stated

he had no present recollection of having made such a statement

although he would not say it did not occur masmuch as he talked with

the chief signal officer a number of times each day.®

Further, Noyes testified that he was directed to prepare a folder

for the Roberts Commission but that it did not include a winds

execute message and the folder in fact was supposed to contain no

magic nor any reference to it; that the McCollum message,® to his

knowledge, contained no reference to a winds execute message.®

8. The “Rochefort Message.”

On December 5, 1941, a dispatch signed “Miles” was sent by the

War Department to the assistant chief of staff headquarters Q—2,

Hawaiian Department, as follows: “

Contact Commander Rochefort immediately thru Commandant Fourteen

Naval District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather.

At first blush, the foregoing dispatch would suggest, inferentially at

least, the possibility of an execute message having been received.

Colonel Bratton, upon whose recommendation the dispatch was sent,

testified, however: ®

I had a discussion with Commander McCollum, now Captain McCollum, as to

the amount of knowledge that the Navy had in Hawaii. He assured me his man

Rochefort there at that time knew practically everything that there was to be

known about the U. S.-Japanese relations through one means or another. I

knew that suitable warning messages had been sent out to Hawaii and elsewhere.

I had not read the messages and did not know their exact contents. I wanted to

make sure that our G-2 in Hawaii got in touch with the ONI man in Hawaii,

to get from him all the intelligence that he had in his possession, and I knew that

if they got together on the subject of this winds message — I did not know, but I

felt that they were going from there, and that there would be a complete exchange

of intelligence and that the Army G-2 would then be in possession of just as much

intelligence as Rochefort, the ONI man, had.

Colonel Bratton’s testimony is to the effect that the dispatch of the

message to Gr-2 to contact Rochefort had nothing whatever to do with

receipt of a message in execution of the winds code. In this regard

Captain McCollum stated:®

I understood that G-2 was very anxious for their G-2 in Hawaii to have direct

access with Commander Rochefort, who had the only agency capable of inter-

cepting the winds messap in Hawaii, sir. The Army, as I understand it, had no

parallel set-up in^Hawaii atjthat time.

a In a statement snbmitted to the committee nnder date of February 25, 1046, in amplification of bis

testimony, Admiral Noyes said; ''In reading over my testimony I noted that I failed to bring out the follow-

ing point, which, however, is supported by my previous testimony and by documentary evidence.

"In connection with the alleged telephone conversation with me on 5 December to which Colonel Sadtier

testified and which 1 did not recall in that form:

"On 5 December there was received from Colonel Thorpe In Batavia addressed to General Miles in the

War Department. This message was transmitted by the Naval Attachi to Navy Departmenl for delivery to

General Miles. As I have already testified, the subject matter was under discussion between me and the

War Department during that day. It is very probable that I would have called Colonel Sadtlcr and notified

him of the fact that this message had been received and was being delivered to the War Department for

General MUes on account of its importance. Since discussion took place between me and the War Depart-

ment during that day on the subject matter of this message and the War Department recommended that

we should make no change in our original translation of the set-up of the Winds Code (see previous testi-

mony), it would appear that any possible authentic or false execute of the winds message would have

also been discussed and settled during that day.\*\* Committee record, pp. 14101, 14102.

M See discussion, infra,

M Committee record, pp. 12605-12620.

M Committb^ exhibit No. 32, p. 20.

M Committee record, p. 12120, 12121.

\*«Id.,atpp. 9271, 9272.

FBABL HABBOB ATTACK

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Considerations Militating Against Likelihood of “ W inds Code”

Execute Message Having Been Received Prior to December

7, 1941

1. Examination of Circular 2353 (to which Captain Safford admits

the alleged winds execute was responsive) reflects that an execute

warning would be added in the middle and at the end of the daily

Japanese language short wave news broadcast “in case of emergency

(danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and the cutting off of

international communications" When the execute was heard “all

code papers, etc.” were to be destroyed.

A reasonable construction of this circular would indicate that the

winds code was an emergency arrangement designed to be employed

in the event ordinary commercial means of international communica-

tions were no longer available to the Japanese Government. Con-

templating that such commercial means conceivably mi^t not be

available to her, it would appear natural that Japan should devise a

means such as the winds code to direct her diplomatic establishments

to destroy their codes and secret papers. Manifestljr and quite nat-

urally the winds code should provide for destruction of all code

papers inasmuch as the necessity for having any codes whatever of the

type outstanding would be precluded by the cutting-off of interna-

tional commimications.

Ordinary Commercial means of communications were available to

Japan up to the December 7 attack on Pearl Harbor and in fact

committee exhibit 1 is replete with instructions to Japanese diplo-

matic establishments with respect to destruction of codes. Accord-

ingly, it can fairly be concluded that recourse to the emergency

system provided by the winds code was not necessitated and in

consequence was not resorted to prior to December 7 inasmuch as

the contingency contemplating its use (cutting off of international

communications) did not materialize prior to the Pearl Harbor attack.

2. It is admitted and of course definitely known that a winds

execute message (Nishi No Kaze Hare — ^west wind, clear) applying

to England was transmitted from Tokyo stations JLG4 and JZJ

between 0002 and 0035 GMT, December 8, J941.“ Such a message

was of course reasonable inasmuch as Japan could very well contem-

J )late that ordinary commercial means of communications would no

onger be available after the Pearl Harbor attack.

Inasmuch as a genuine winds execute message applying to England

was transmitted after the Pearl Harbor attack, it would appear

anomalous that such a message should also have been sent prior to

December 7.“

3. The investigation conducted in Japan by headquarters of the

supreme allied commander reflected that a signal implementing

Circulars 2353 and 2354 was probably not transmitted prior to

December 8, Tokyo time, but was transmitted by radio voice broad-

cast at some hour after 0230, December 8, Tokyo time.\*® No evidence

could be obtained that an implementing signal was transmitted by

radio telegraph. Significantly, those who conducted the interrogation

S' See sections relating to destruction of codes, pts. in and IV, this report.

\*» See committee exhibit No. 142.

M Admiral Noyes suggested that Japan's sending an execute on December 7 was probably occasioned

by reason of the fact that some Japanese diplomatic establishment had failed to respond to instructions

to destroy their codes which had been dispatched through ordinary channels of communication.

M December 7, Washington time.

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in Japan had no knowledge prior to the interrogation that the United

States had information that the winds code was used on December 8,

ToWo time.\*^

Mr. Shinroku Tanomogi was head of the overseas department of

the Japan Radio Broadcasting Corporation in December 1941, and

as such was in charge of programs, including news programs, beamed

to foreign countries. Upon interview he stated he had no recollection

at all of any “east wind rain” report or any similar phrase being

broadcast prior to December 8.®\*

4. Inquiry made through the State Department reflects that no

winds execute message was intercepted prior to the Pearl Harbor

attack by the British, Dutch, or Australians.®\*

6. In his statement submitted for the committee’s consideration.

Captain Safford definitely states that the alleged implementing winds

message was part of a Japanese overseas “news” broadcast from

station JAP (Tokyo) on 11980 kilcoycles beginn^ at 1330 Greenwich

civil time on Thiu:sday, December 4, 1941, this time corresponding

to 10:30 p. m., Tokyo time, and 8:30 a. m., Washington time, December

4, 1941 ; that the winds message broadcast was forwarded by teletype

from Cheltenham to the Navy Department shortly before 9 a. m.

on December 4, 1941. Further, that when he first saw the message

it had already been translated by Kramer; that Kramer had under-

scored all three “code phrases” on the original incopiing teletype

sheet; and that he had written in pencil or colored crayon the follow-

ing free translations:

War with England (including NEI, etc.)

War with the U. S.

Peace with Russia.

Kramer has testified that had he seen such a message, as alleged '

by Safford, he would in no case have interpreted a winds execute to

mean war.®^

In this regard, the Thorpe and Foote messages, which interpreted

the winds code as meaning war, were not available to the Navy

Department until after the time Safford alleges the winds execute j

came in and was interpreted by Kramer to mean war. The Thorpe

dispatch, while intended for General Miles of the War Department,

was sent by Naval Communications and was received at the Navy

Department at 1:21 a. m., December 4, 1941.®® It was not decoded

until 1 :45 a. m., December 5, 1941, the delay being occasioned by the

fact that the dispatch was sent “deferred,” the lowest priority in

handling.®\* The Foote dispatch, it is to be noted, was not received

in the State Department imtil 9: 19 a. m., December 4. Consequently,

as indicated, no information was avaUable in the Navy Department I

on the morning of December 4 as alleged by Safford servi^ as basis

for interpreting a winds execute message to mean war. Even con- >

ceding the availability of the Thorpe and Foote dispatches, it would '

scarcely appear likely that the Navy Department would disregard its

own translation of the winds code and be guided solely by the dis-

patches from outside sources.

31 See committee exhibit No. 142.

Id., sec. 4B.

\*3 Committee exhibit No. 142, secs. 4c, 4d, 4e. See also committee record, p. 11564.

34 See Navy Court of Inquiry (top secret) record, pp. 968, 969, 976, 987; committee record, p. 10492.

33 Committee record, p. 10185.

3\* Id., at pp. 11255, 11256.

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6. The winds execute message Safford alleges he saw on the morning

of December 4, bore the “negative form for war with Russia" and

mixed up the plain language broadcast with the Morse broadcast.\*^

It is thus clear that the alleged winds execute of December 4 was not

re^onsive to the establishing winds code.

Captain Kramer, it should be noted, testified before the joint

committee that had the “negative form” been employed with respect

to Kussia, he would have regarded such fact as nullifying any credence

to be placed in a broadcast purporting to be a winds execute message.

It would appear agreed that the implementation of an establishmg

code must conform in meticulous detail to the code as originally

established.

7. Referring to Captain Safford 's statement, the following matters

appear to be subject to serious question:

A. Safford relies on Cincaf 281430 as basis for evaluation of a

winds execute message to mean war, pointing out that this

dispatch contained the statement “Nishi nishi England

including occupation of Thai or Invasion oi Malay and

N. E. I.”

It should be noted, however, that Cincaf 281430 indi-

cates the winds code would be employed “if diplomatic

relations are on verge of being severed.” In any event

the interpretation of Cincaf 281430 as relied upon by

Safford while possibly indicating war with England does

not by any reasonable construction indicate war with the

United States.\*®\*

B. Safford ’s reliance in his statement on Cincaf 281430 as pro-

viding basis for evaluating a winds execute as meaning war

is in contradiction of his testimony before the Navy Court

of Inquiry where reliance was placed on the Thorpe and

Foote dispatches.\*\*

While denied by Safford, the suggestion was made by

coimsel before the committee that Safford may have

shifted reliance on the Thorpe and Foote dispatches to

Cincaf 281430 by reason of tbe fact that he had learned

that both the Thorpe and Foote dispatches were not avail-

able to the Navy Department uRtU after the morning of

December 4."

C. Safford seeks to bring out that the alle^d winds execute was

intended for the Japanese London Embassy inasmuch as

the latter had destroyed its codes 3 days previously and a

winds message was the only way that Tokyo could get

news to its London Ambassador secretly.^\*

Tbis statement is not true insofar as it implies that no

other means of communication between Tokyo and Lon-

don was available. By Circular 2409 of November 27,

1941,^\* the Japanese established the “hidden word” code

and by Circular 2461 ^ instructed that this code be kept

That is. Circular 2353 with Circular 2354.

M Set forth, supra.

»\*• See committee record, p. 9670.

•• Navy Court of Inquiry (top secret) record, p. 748; see also committee record, p. 9667.

Committee record, pp. 9667, 9668.

41 Id., at p. 9639.

4» Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 186.

41 Id., at p. 226.

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until the last moment. This code system of communica-

tion was clearly available to the Japanese in communicat-

ing with their Loudon Ambassador and was in fact

employed on December 7 in Circular 2494.^\* Safford

admitted in his testimony before the joint committee the

availability in the London Embassy of the hidden word

code.

Furthermore, in Circidar 2443, dated December 1,^®

to London instructions were issued to discontinue use of the

code machine and to dispose of it immediately. Ostensibly

other code systems were still available after destruction of

the code machine and it is known that coded traflBc in

the system referred to as PA-K2 passed from the Japanese

London Embassy to Tokyo December 6, 1941.“

p. By way of lending credence to his assertion that a winds

execute was received, Safford has testified that Mc-

Collum’s dispatch of December 4 (not sent) was predicated

on such a winds execute and mentioned the execute in the

last portion.®^

McCollum definitely contradicted this in testifying

before the committee, asserting that his dispatch was

based on a memorandum he, McCollum, had prepared

under date of December 1 “ and bore no relationship

to a winds execute message; that he neither saw nor

received knowledge of a true winds execute prior to

December 7.“

E. In further substantiation of his allegation that a winds

execute was received on the morning of December 4,

Safford has referred to the fact that the dispatches from

OpNav to oiu\* own establishments to destroy their codes

was based on a winds execute.

This assertion is diametrically contrary to testimony of

Noyes “ and Kramer®^ who declared that OpNav in-

structions to oim establishments to destroy their codes

was based on instructions sent out by the Japanese ®^ to

their diplomatic establishments to destroy, codes, and

bore no relationship to a winds execute. The testimony

of McColliun and Ingersoll tends to confirm the foregoing.

F. Safford points out that the individual smooth translations

of the alleged winds execute for authorized Navy Depart-

ment officials and the White House were distributed at

noon on December 4, 1941, in accordance with standard

operating procedure.®®

Kramer, in testifying before the joint committee,

categorically denied that any copies of a winds execute

message were prepared for distribution by his section, it

“ Id., at p. 251.

« Id., at p. 209.

Committee record, p. 9740.

See pt. IV, this report, for discussion of so-called McCollum dispatch,

« Committee exhibit No. 81.

« Committee record, pp. 9124-9134.

w Id., at p. 12623.

« Id., at p. 10504.

Committee exhibit No. 1.

Committee record, pp. 9763 et seq.

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being noted that it was the responsibility of £[ramer to

prepare and distribute the smooth translations.^

G. Captain Salford has pointed out that a winds execute was

dispatched in Morse code. Captain Rochefort, who was

in charge of the Communications Intelligence Unit at

Pearl Harbor in December of 1941, testified that all of the

broadcast schedules giving the various frequencies fur-

nished by Washington were all voice frequencies; that to

him the very setting up of the winds code imphed

“voice”; that if an execute message were sent in Morse

code it would have meant that every Japanese Embassy

(and consulate) in every Japanese location throughout

the world for whom the message was intended bjr the

Japanese Government would “have had to mamtain

Morse code operators, people capable of receivii^ Morse

code. I do not think so.” “ '

Rochefort further testified that they were monitoring

for a winds execute message at Honolulu and continued

to do so until after the attack; that four of his best lan-

guage oflicers were on a 24-hour watch for an execute;

that no winds implementing message was intercepted.®\*

H. Admiral Noyes testified that he would not have regarded the

message which Salford alleges was received as an authentic

execute message inasmuch as (1) Morse code was allegedly

used and in consequence not responsive to Circular 2353;

(2) no provision was made in the winds code for a “nega-

tive form” with respect to Russia; (3) an execute message

would not have been interpreted to mean war; and (4) no

reference is made in Circular 2353 to N. E. I., although

the alleged execute was responsive to Circular 2353 and

Salford indicates reference was made to N. E. I.®^

8. Salford, in testifying before the joint committee, placed emphasis

on the fact that the winds code provided for destruction of aU codes

(Circular 2353) and by reason thereof a winds execute message would

have more significance than the itercepts contained in committeee

exhibit 1 which gave instructions with respect to destruction of

particular codes.®\*

If a winds execute message was dispatched for the Japanese London

Embassy on December 4, as alleged by Safford, it would necessarily

M Committee record, p. 10496|

« Id., at p. 12548.

\*• Id., at pp. 12532-12534.

\*1 Id., at pp. 12614, 12615.

When asked what there was in the winds execute messMe alleged by him to have been received which

Indicated war, Captain Safford testified: “For one thing there is instruction to destroy all code papers.

If that is regarded as synon 3 mious with the outbreak of war, as I have heard testified in this room, that by

itself means something more than the wording of these three paragraphs above • \* \*. Tokyo had sent

out instructions to various people telling them to bum their most important codes but to leave two codes

open. One was the so-called PA-K2 code and the other was the LA code. Now, with those two ezoep\*

tions all codes had been burnt, but this said, \* Please destroy all code papers,\* and so forth. In other woro^

there was no exceptions in this one.“ Committee record, p. 9778.

In marked contradiction of the foregoing testimony is the explanation of Captain Safford as to the reason

for Japan’s London Embassy having the PA-K2 code system after the alleged winds execute message was

received. He stated; “There were two systems that were exempt from destruction. One was PA-K2,

and the other was LA , neither of which were considered by ourselves as secret, and we presumed the Japanese

did not consider them secret.” Committee record, p. 9741.

It is to be noted, however, that the Honolulu consulate, as well as Tokyo, used the PA-K2 system for

some of the most vital messages shortly before December 7 (see committee exhibit No. 2). While this was

virtually the only system left after the messages ordering the destraction of various codes, the PA-O

system was employed for the sending of messages which would probably have tipped off the attack on Pearl

Harbor, had it not been for the fact they were not translated until after the attack.

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mean that all codes were to be destroyed by Japan’s London Am-

bassador. It is definitely known, as earlier indicated, that London

sent a dispatch' to Tokyo in the system known as PA-K2 on December

6, 1941. Such fact would indicate strongly that no winds execute

was dispatched on December 4 with consequent destruction of all

codes.\*\*

9. It appeam clear that both the Navy and Army were still looking

for a winds execute message after the morning of December 4, based

on records of the Federal Communications Commission.®\*

In this connection at 7:50 p. m. on December 5, 1941, the watch

oflBcer of FCC phoned Colonel Bratton of the Army with respect to a

false winds message received from the FCC Portland monitoring

station. The FCC watch officer submitted the following memorandum

for his superior with respect to Bratton’s remarks:

Remarks by Col. Bratton :

Results still negative but am pleased to receive the negative results as it means

we have that much more time. The information desired will occur in the middle

of a program and possibly will be repeated at frequeirt intervals. (Asked Col.

Bratton if I should communicate the information to Portland — concerning the

fact that the desired data will be in the middle of a program.) No, I will have a

conference with Lt. Col. Dusenberg in the morning and will contact Mr. Sterling

in that regard.

The foregoing would indicate that the Army had received no gen-

uine winds execute message by 7:50 p. m., December 5.

The FCC night watch log for December 4, 1941,®\* contains the

notation that at 9:32 p. m. “Lt. Brotherhood called to inquire if any i

other reference to weather was made previously in program inter-

cepted by Portland. Informed him that no other reference was made. ”

There is manifested here an interest by the Navy in the natm\*e of a

winds message on the evening of December 4 which is hardly likely j

if a true execute was received on the morning of December 4.

Further, it would a|>pear logical that had a true winds execute been

received on the morning of December 4 the FCC would have been

requested to discontinue its monitoring activities. This, however,

was not done and the FCC was still monitoring for a winds execute

and actually intercepted such an execute (with respect to England) j

after the Pearl Harbor attack.®\* !

10. Collateral considerations tending to minimize likelihood that

implementing winds message was dispatched from Tokyo. I

A. Referring to the message telephoned by the FCC to Brother-

hood at 9:05 p. m. on December 4,®\* Safford testified before

Admiral Hewitt \*\* that this was the “false” message which

appeared on this surface to use the “winds” code relating

to Russia but which was a genuine weather broadcast.

This message, Safford said. Brotherhood telephoned to

Admiral Noyes and later Kramer took ove look at it and said

it was not what was wanted and threw it into the waste basket.

He testified that this message was received \* \* \* 12

hours or more after what he referred to as the “true winds

message.”

M Committee record, p. 9740.

\*0 Committee exhibit No. 142-A.

Mid.

•\* See also testimony of Colonel Bratton, committee record, p. 12074.

M Committee exhibit No. 142, sec. 3.

M Hewitt inquiry record, p. 113.

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Query; Why would Kramer be “wanting” a winds

execute message 12 hours after Safford alleges Kramer had

an execute message and had noted thereon “War with

England, War with U. S., peace with Russia”?

B. In testifying before the committee, Justice Roberts stated he

had no knowledge of the winds matter and no access to

Magic. This would appear to be partially at least in con-

tradiction of Safford’s testimony that he last saw the winds

execute among material assembled for the Roberts

Commission.

Further, Admiral Noyes testified that he was directed

to prepare a folder for the Roberts Commission, but it did

not include a winds execute message and the folder was in

fact supposed to contain no magic nor any reference to it.\*®

C. Safford’s detailed recollection of the vsdnds matter, as set forth

in his statement, is in sharp conflict with his indefinite and

somewhat nebulous memory as reflected by his testimony

and the letters directed to Kramer during December 1943,

and January 1944.

It should be noted in this connection that Safford testi-

fied before Admiral Hart \*\* that the winds implementing

message came in on the evening of December 3 and

Kramer went down to get it. From all of the testimony

it appears that Safford’s position before the committee

was assumed after a process of elimination of possibilities

and reconstruction of a situation concerning which he

had only a partially independent recollection.

D. Considering the tight reign maintained by the military in

Japan and particularly the desire to clothe the movement

a^inst Pearl Harbor with utmost secreev, it would seem

highly improbable that the Japanese would tip off her war

decision in a news broadcast by advising her London

Ambassador of such decision 3 days before Pearl Harbor.

E. If a true winds execute was received and distributed on

December 4 it would appear reasonable to assume that

some record of the message could be found in the War or

Navy Departments. Yet despite repeated searches there

is no record whatever in either department of such a

message. In this connection Safford has su^ested that

intercept No. JD.-7001, marked “cancelled” in the Navy

• file of intercepts, may have been the missing winds exe-

cute. Such a premise, of course, presupposes a deliberate

abstraction by someone of an ofiicial record from the

Navy Department.

In evaluation of Safford’s suggestion with respect to

No. JD-7001, it shouM be noted that the file of JD inter-

cepts was maintained by Kramer who has emphatically

testified that no winds execute came into his section or

was distributed by him. Further, Kramer hasjrointed

out that there are several examples of canceled JD num-

bers in the file \*^ and presented several reasons in testi-

Committee record, p. 12620.

Hart inquiry record, p. 361.

This appears to be borne out by the record. See committee exhibit No. 142, sec. 6.

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fying before the committee why a JD number might be

canceled.

Significantly, a check of the Army file of intercepts for

the period December 3-5, 1941, reflected that the Navy

file contains all intercepts that are in the Army file.\*\*

Conceding for purposes of discussion that a winds exe-

cute message was received in the form alleged by Safford,

it will be noted that such message would not indicate where

or when Japan would strike but merely her possible pur-

pose to go to war. Bearing in mind the rather frank

admission by Army and Navy oflBcials that they knew

war was imminent in the days before December 7, credence

could scarcely be placed in the theory that the message

was deliberately destroyed when it contained no informa-

tion that was not admittedly already possessed.

Admiral Ingersoll, for example, testified before the com-

mittee that had a true winds execute message been re-

ceived it would have been regarded as merely confirmatory

of the implications contained in Japanese instructions to

destroy codes contained in committee exhibit 1, inasmuch

as instructions to destroy codes, particularly in the con-

sulates, meant war. The testimony of several other wit-

nesses, including Admiral Noyes and Colonel Bratton, is

to the same effect.

11. The testimony of Col. Robert E. Schukraft, assigned to the

office of the chief signal officer at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack,

before the committee on February 19, 1946, is of particular pertinence

to the testimony of Captain Kramer, set forth imder section 3, svpra.

Schukraft testined that 2 or 3 days prior to Pearl Harbor Col. Rex

Minckler brought to Schukraft’s office a piece of yeUow teletype paper

(the carbon copy) which contained what appeared to be a winds

execute message but that the message upon examination was obviously

not a true winds execute. Further, Schukraft testified Colonel

Minckler had indicated that the Navy had thought the message a

true vrtnds execute, Captain Kramer having seen the message and so

thinking. He stated that he concluded very positively that the

message was not a true execute of the Winds Code.\*\*

12. The following officers have stated they have no knowledge of a

message in execution of the Winds code prior to December 7, 1941:

Navy

Admiral Harold R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations.™

Admiral Leigh Noyes, Director of Naval Communications.^\*

Admiral T. S. Wilkinson, Director of Naval Intelligence.™

Capt. Arthm N. McCollum, in charge. Far Eastern Section of

Naval Intelligence.™

Admiral Joseph R. Redman, Assistant Director of Naval Com-

munications.™

M See Army liaison memorandum dated January 26, 1946. Committee record, pp. 8066, 8066.

•• Committee record, pp. 13008-13006.

w See Navy Court of Inquiry record, pp. 783, 872. Confirmed in testimony before the committee.

n Committee record, pp. 12605-12620.

» Hewitt inquiry record, pp. 308-401.

^ Committee record, pp. 0124-0134.

T4 Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 1103,

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Lt. Comdr. George W. Linn, GY watch oflScer.”

Lt. Comdr. Alfred V. Pering, GY watch oflBcer.”

Lt. Comdr. Allan A. Murray, GY watch officer.^

Lt.^ Frederick L. Freeman, assigned to section disseminating to

ONI intelligence received from radio intelligence units.”

Capt. Redfield Mason, fleet intelli^nce officer, Asiatic Fleet.”

Commander Rudolph J. Fabian, Radio Intelligence Unit at Cor

regidor.\*® I

Capt. Edwin T. Layton, Pacific Fleet intelligence officer.”

Capt. Jose^ John Rochefort, in charge, Communications Intel

ligence Unit, Pearl Harbor.”

Army

Gen. George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff.”

Mai. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow, Chief of War Plans.”

Maj. Gen. Sherman Miles, Chief of G-2.”

Col. Rufus W. Bratton, Chief, Far Eastern Section of G-2.”

Col. Robert E. Schukraft, Chief, Radio Interception for SIS.”

Col. Rex W. Minckler, Chief, SIS.”

Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Betts, executive assistant to the Chief of

Intelli^nce Branch MID.”

Lt. Col. Frank B. Rowlett, prior to Pearl Harbor attack a civilian

technical assistant to the officer of the Cryptoanalytic unit, SIS.”

William F. Friedman, a cryptRnalyst of War Department.\*\*

Over-all observations with respect to Captain Safford’s testimony;

13. As previously indicated Captain Safford has rather consistently

testified that a true winds execute menage was received prior to

December 7. However, there are certain discrepancies in his testi-

mony tending to show particularly that his recollection of the incident

attending receipt of such an execute has not been definite and has been

developed through a process of elimination.

A. The following testimony, in relation to a winds execute,

of Captain Safford before Admiral Hewitt reflects rather

clearly his indefinite recollection of the winds matter and

his ettorts to reconstruct a “vague memory”: •\*

Captain Safford. In the fall of 1943 it appeared that there was

going to be a trial or court martial of Aduural Kimmel. It was

hinted in the newspapers and various people in the Navy Depart-

ment were getting testimony ready for it. I realized I would be

one of the important witnesses, that my memory was very vague,

and I began looking around to get everything that I could to prepare

a written statement which I could follow as testimony. That was

the time when I studied the Robert’s Report carefully for the first

Hewitt inquiry record, pp. 140-142.

>• Id., at p. 148.

u Id., at pp. 433-441.

'• Id., at pp. 149, ISO.

"Id.,atpp. 73, 78.

" Id., at pp. 73. 78.

M Id., at pp. 289-271.

a Id., at pp. 46. 48.

a See Army Pearl Harbor Board (Top Secret) record, pp. 36-39. Confirmed in testimony before tbe

committee.

a Committee record, p. 4302.

a See Clausen investigation record, pp. 214, 216. Confirmed in testimony before tbe committee.

■ a Committee record, pp. 12068-12077.

a Id., at pp. 13093-13096.

a Clausen investigation record, p. 217.

a Id., at p. 194.

a Id., at pp. 226, 226.

a Hewitt Inquiry record, pp. 616-620.

a Id., at pp. 112,118.

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time and noted no reference to the winds message or to the message

which McCollum had written and which I had seen and I thought

had been sent. And then I began talking to everybody who had

been around at the time and who I knew had been mixed up in it to

see what they could remember to straighten me out on the thing

and give me leads to follow down to where I could put my hands on

ofl&cial messages and things so that it would be a matter of fact and

not a matter of memory. I also talked the thing over with what-

ever Army people were still around at the time and had anything

in this thing, and bit by bit these facts appeared to come together.

The investigation was conducted, if you call it that, for the purpose

of preparing myself to take the stand as a witness in a prospective

court martial of Admiral Kimmel.

B. The letters directed to Captain Kramer by Saflford and in-

^corporated in the committee transcript also indicate an

indefinite recollection of events prior to the attack on Pearl

Harbor

C. In testifying before Admiral Hart, Safford stated:\*^

The ^'Winds Message’’ was actually broadcast during the evening

of December 3, 1941 (Washington time), which was December 4 by

Greenwich time and Tokyo time. The combination of frequency,

time of day, and radio propagation was such that the ‘‘Winds

Message” was heard only on the East Coast of the United States,

and even then by only one or two of the Navy stations that were

listening for it. The other nations and other Navy C. I. Units, not

hearing the “Winds Message” themselves and not receiving any

word from the Navy Department, naturally presumed that the

“Winds Message” had not yet been sent, and that the Japanese

Government was still deferring the initiation of hostilities. When

the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, the British at Singapore, the

Dutch at Java, and the Americans at Manila were just as surprised

and astonishea as the Pacific Fleet and Army posts in Hawaii. It

is apparent that the W^’ar Department, like the Navy Department

failed to send out information that the “Winds Message” had been

sent by Tokyo. The “Winds Message” was received in the Navy

Department during the evening of December 3, 1941, while Lieu-

tenant (j. g.) Francis M. Brotherhood, U. S. N. R., was on watch.

There was some question in Brotherhood’s mind as to what this

message really meant because it came in a different form from what

had been anticipated. Brotherhood called in Lieutenant Com-

mander Kramer, who came down that evening and identified that

message as the ‘‘W inds Message” >ve had been looking for.

Yet in his statement and in testifying before the com-

mittee Safford has the message coming in on the morning

of December 4, 1941, it being brought to him by Lt. A.

A. Murray.

D. In testifying before the Navy Court of Inquiry Safford said:®\*

22. Q. Captain, in a previous answer you stated that the copy of

the intercept using the winds code which you saw on the morning of

4 December 1941 indicated a break in diplomatic relations between

the United States and Japan and Japan and Great Britain, and war

between these nations. Was there anything in the establi^ment of

the code originally which would indicate that a use of that code

would indicate war as contrasted with a mere break in diplomatic

relations?

A. The Dutch translation said “war.” The Japanese language is

very vague and you ckn put a number of constructions or interpreta-

tions or translations on the same message. In very important docu-

ments it was customary for the Army and Navy to make independ-

ent translations and the differences were sometimes surprising; that

See testimony of Captains Kramer and Safford before the committee.

Hart inquiry record, p. 361.

M Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 74S

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is, a difference in deme. The general facts would be alike. How-

ever, the people in Comihunication Intelligence and the people in

Signal Intelligence Service and the people in the Far Eastern Section

of Naval Intelligence, as well as the Director of Naval Intelligence,

considered that meant war and it was a signal of execute for the

Japanese war plans.

23. Q. Captain, I call your attention again to Document 3 in

Exhibit 64 which is an English-language translation of the Dutch

intercept. Was this your only source of information that the use of

this code would indicate ‘‘a war decision\*^ which is the wording used

by the attach^ in Batavia?

A. Mr. Foote's message to the State Department was even more

specific. It said, ‘‘When crises leading to worst arises following will

be broadcast at end of weather reports. 1. East wind rain — war

with United States. 2. North wind doudy — war with Russia.

3. West wind dear — war with Britain, including an attack on Thai-

land or Malaya and Dutch East Indies." This was apparently a

verbatim quotation from the Dutch translation.

Significantly, in testifying before the committee Safford

relies on Cincaf 281430 as the dispatch serving as basis for

inteir>reting a winds execute message to mean war. ' It has

now been conclusively shown that neither the Foote nor

Thorpe dispatches were available in the Navy Department

at the time Safford alleges an execute was received and in-

terpreted to mean war; i. e. the morning of December 4,

1941.»«

E. The testimony of Captain Safford taken in its entirety re-

flects substantial discrepancies as to where the alleged

execute message was received. It was only at the time

of submitting his statement to the committee that Safford

stated definitely the message came in at the Navy's

Cheltenham station.

14. Because of substantial discrepancies in testimony given in prior

proceedings with respect to the question of whether a winds execute

message was received in the War or Navy Department, the inquiry

conducted by Admiral Hewitt went fully into the matter, among

others, of determining if such a message was intercepted prior to

December 7, 1941. Admiral Hewitt found:®^

The interc^tion of a “winds" message relating to the United States during the

first week of December 1941, would not have conveyed any information of signifi-

cance which the Chief of Naval Operations and the commander in chief. Pacific

Fleet, did not already have.

No message in the “winds" code relating to the United States was received by

any of the watch officers in the Navy Department to whom such a message would

have come had it been received in the Navy Department. No such message was

intercepted by the radio intelligence units at Pearl Harbor or in the Philippines,

although intensive efforts were made by those organizations to intercept such a

message. The evidence indicates further that no such message was intercepted

by the British or the Dutch, despite their efforts to intercept such a message.

Neither the Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Asiatic Fleet nor the Fleet Intelligence

Officer of the Pacific Fleet nor the Intelligence Officer of the Far Eastern Section of

the Office of Naval Intelligence, recalled any such message. The Chief of Naval

Operations, the Director of Naval Communications, and the Director of Naval

Intelligence recalled no such message. Testimony to the effect that a “winds"

code message was received prior to the attack was given by Captain Safford, in

charge of Op-20-G, a communications security section at the Navy Department,

who stated that such a message was received on December 3rd or 4th, that it

related to the United States, and that no copy could be found in the Navy or Army

files. In his testimony before Admiral Hart, Captain Safford named, in addition

M See in this connection, committee record, pp. 9667, 9668.

n For Hewitt Inquiry report, see committee exhibit No. 167.

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to himself, three other officers who, he stated, recalled having seen and read the

''winds'' message. Each of those officers testified that he had never seen such a

message. The only other testimony to the effect that a "winds" message was

received was by Captain Kramer, an intelligence officer assigned to Op-20-G,

who said that he recalled that there was a message but that he could not recall

whether or not it related to the United States or EMland or Russia. It may be

noted that until he testified in this investigation, Captain Kramer erroneously

thought that a "hidden word" message intercepted on the morning of December

7th had been a "winds" message.

CONCLUSION: From consideration of all evidence relating to the

winds code, it is concluded that no genuine message, in execution of

the code and applying to the United States, was received in the W ar or

Navy Department prior to December 7, 1941. It appears, however,

that messages were received which were initially thought possibly to

be in execution of the code but were determined not to be execute

messages. In view of the preponderate weight of evidence to the

contrary,^ it is believed that Captain Safford is honestly mistaken

when he insists that an execute message was received prior to Decem-

ber 7, 1941. Considering the period of time that has elapsed, this

mistaken impression is understandable.

Granting for pu^oses of discussion that a genuine execute message

applying to the winds code was intercjspted before December 7, it is

concluded that such fact would have added nothing to what was

already known concerning the critical character of our relations with

the Empire of Japan.

Appendix F

GEOGRAPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND

NAVY AND ARMY INSTALLATIONS

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Appendix F

GEOGRAPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND NAVY AND ARMY

INSTALLATIONS

Geographical Considerations

The Territory of Hawaii consists of a chain of eight principal

islands.^ The island of Oahu is to be regarded as of most importance

by reason of the excellent enclosed fleet anchorage at Pearl Harbor

and the commercial port of Honolulu. Pearl Harbor is located on

the southern or lee side of Oahu, in a strategically and commercially

important position in the North Pacific Ocean, 3,430 nautical miles

southeast of Tokyo, approximately 2,000 nautical miles west to

southwest of San FVancisco, and 4,767 nautical miles east of Manila.\*

The islands have a mild subtropical climate with moderate seasonal

changes of temperature. They lie in the path of the steady north-

easterly trade winds; therefore, the northern portions of Oahu and

the immediately adjacent waters are characterized by fresh winds

from a northerly direction. The force of the trades is broken by the

confi^ration of the land so that so the south of Oahu the seas are

relatively smooth.

Much of the moisture of the trade winds is deposited on the high

peaks to the north, forming mist and clouds. Because of this, the

visibility to the south of the islands is better than to the north. The

northern fringe of the trade belt lies roughly about 300 miles to the

north of Oahu, a belt which is characterized by low ceilings, poor

visibility, squalls and rain.

The sea area around the Hawaiian Islands was, on December 7,

1941, divided into certain restricted fleet training areas where units

and aircraft of the Pacific Fleet might carry out exercises and target

practice. Two defensive sea areas were mapped off Pearl Harbor and

Kaneohe, these areas having been designated by the President of the

United States. Entry of all merchant ships, both United States and

foreign, and of all foreign men-of-war was prohibited unless specific

permission for such entry had been granted by the Secretary of the

Navy.\*

"When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor at 7:55 on the morning

of December 7, 1941, it was 1:25 in the afternoon of the same day in

Washington, D. C., and 3:25 a. m., December 8, in Tokyo. In order

to obtain the corresponding time in Washington and Hawaii, it is

necessary to subtract 14 hours and 19K hours, respectively, from

Tokyo time. The time of sunrise on the morning of December 7,

1 They are the islands of: Oahu, Hawaii, Maui, Kahoolawe, Lanai, Molokai, and Kauai, Niihau. See

attachment No. 1.

\* A nautical mile is roughly land miles. For a table of distances with respect to Pearl Harbor, see

committee exhibit No. 6, item 2.

3 For maps of the Hawaiian Islands and descriptions of the defensivesea areas, see committee exhibit No. 6.

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1941, was 6:26 a. m., and morning twilight was at 5:06 a. m., both

Hawaiian time>

Navy and Army Installations\*

NAVY

Pearl Harbor was the base of the United States Pacific Fleet at the

time Japan struck on December 7, 1941, having been such since May

of 1940. The island of Oahu was the headquarters of the Fourteenth

Naval District which included the Hawaiian Islands, Midway, Wake,

Johnston, Palmyra, and Canton Islands. Except for Pearl Harbor

itself, other installations were characterized as “minor” naval instal-

lations and were naturally integrated in the over-all defense of the

islands, of which Pearl Harbor was the focal point.

On the island of Molokai there was the Homestead Field Naval Air

Base, which consisted of a runway, a warming-up platform and

supporting installations.

On|the island of Maui there was the Puunene Naval Air Base,

which consisted of runways, a warming-up platform, and a CAA

Territorial landing field. Also on Maui was the Maalaea naval

emergency landing field, which consisted of two runways and other

supporting installations.

On the island of Hawaii, the largest island in the Hawaiian chain,

was located the naval radio station at Hilo.

On the most important island of the ^oup, Oahu, there was a

naval air station at Ewa, which consisted of a mooring mast, a landing

mat, and supporting installations.

' At the naval air station Kaneohe, on the opposite side of the island,

was a landing mat and warming-up platform and supporting installa-

tions and also a seaplane base.

At Kahuku Point, up at the north end of the island, there was an

emei^ency landing field.

At Lualualei was located a naval radio station — a transmitting

station.

At Wahiawa, in the interior, was located a naval radio receiving

station.

At Heeia, a naval radio transmitting station was located and at

Wailupe a naval radio receiving station.

Referring to Pearl Harbor itself, it is to be noted that the only

entrance is from the south by way of a channel which was blasted

through the frin^ng coral reef that had formerly blocked entrance to

the harbor. This channel extending to the harbor entrance proper

was 375 yards wide and 3,500 yards long with a minimum depth of 45

feet. The entrance proper to Pearl\* Harbor is between Keahi Point

and Holokahiki Point. From here the channel leads to the various

lochs and passages which form the harbor. The major channels or

the main chaim^ and water in the vicinity of the major ships’ berths

had a depth of 40 feet. From the sea buoys to the large drydocks a

portion of the channel had a minimum depth of 45 feet to provide for

the entrance and docking of damaged vessels. The entrance to the

harbor was closed by two protective nets where the channel throu^

\* See oommittee exhibit No. 6, item 4, for a table showing oomparatiTt times and dates for Greenwich,

England; Washington, D. C.; San Francisco; Hawaii; Tokyo; and Manila on December 0, 7, and 8, 194L

• See committee record, pp. 50 et seq.; also oommittee exhibits Nos. 5 and 0.

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the coral reefs was about 400 yards wide and the depth from 41 to 50

feet. The nets themselves consisted of a combined antitorpedo net

and antiboat boom to seaward and an inner antitorpedo net without

the boat boom.

The Pearl Harbor fleet base included every type of naval activity.

Many of the installations operable at that time were new, having been

built subsequent to August 1939. Major installations in operation

were, at the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor: one battleship dock, built in

1928; one battleship dock, under construction; one floating drydock,

18,000 tons; one large repair basin, supporting industrial establish-

ments for repairs to any^ing afloat; one fuel depot with two tank

farms above gro\md;\* one submarine base with all services for war

conditions; one section base, inshore patrol and harbor entrance con-

trol post; and, the administrative office of the Fourteenth Naval

District which was inside the navy yard.

At the Naval Air Station — ^Ford Island, which is the lai^e island at

the center of the harbor — there was a large flying field, warming-up

platform, sea plane parking areas, and supporting installations.

ARMY

On December 6, 1941, the Hawaiian Department included approxi-

mately 43,000 troops under the over-all command of Lt. Gen. Walter

C. Short. The principal elements of the department were two

Infantry divisions and supporting ground troops composing the beach

and land defense forces; the Coast Artillery command, consisting of

the seacoast and antiaircraft defense forces; and the Hawaiian Air

Force.

In the Kauai district were located the Third Battalion, Two

Hundred Ninety-ninth Infantry (less Companies K and L) and

attached troops; Company C, Two Hundred Ninety-ninth Infantry;

First Platoon, Signal Company Aircraft Warning; Air Corps detadi-

ment.

In the Maui district were the First Battahon, Two Hundred Ninety-

ninth Infantry, less Company C and attached troops; Company K,

Two Hundred Ninety-ninth Infant^ (Molokai); Fourth Platoon

Signal Company, Aircraft Warning; Air Corps detachment.

In the Hawaii district were the Second Battalion, Two Himdred

Ninety-ninth Infantry and attached troops; camp detachment,

Kilauea Mihtary Camp; Fifth Platoon Signal Company. Aircraft

Warning; Air Corps detachment.

On the principal island, Oahu, were located:

The Twenty-fourth Infantry Division (less Two Hundred and

Ninety-ninth Infantry Regiment); Twenty-fifth Infantry Division;

Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command; Hawaiian Air Force; Thirty-

foiu"th Engineers; Eight Hundred and Fourth Engineer Battalion

(Aviation); Eleventh Tank Company; Company A, First Separate

Chemical Battalion; Hawaiian Pack Train. The Twenty-fourth

Infantry Division was responsible for the CTOund defense of the

northern half of Oahu, and the Twenty-fifth Division for that of the

southern sector. Most of the components of these divisions were

located at Schofield Barracks.

• A tank fann is a ooUecUon of fuel-oil storage tanks.

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The Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command, under Maj. Gen. Henry

T. Burgin, insisted of the following harbor defense units:

Fifti^nth Coast Artillery Regiment (Harbor Defense).

Sixteenth Coast Artillery Regiment (Harbor Defense).

Forty-first Coast Artillery Regiment (Railway).

Fifty-fifth Coast Artillery Regiment (155 mm., tractor-drawn)

and antiaircraft units.

Sixty-fourth Coast Artillery Regiment, semimobile.

Ninety-seventh Coast Artillery Regiment, semimobile.

Ninety-eighth Coast Artillery Regiment, semimobile.

Two Hundred and Fifty-first Coast Artillery Regiment, mobile.

Other large-cahber gxms available for defense but manned by field

artillery were two 240-mm. howitzers and thirty-two 155-mm. how-

itzers. The seacoast guns were installed principally in permanent

fortifications. The fixed antiaircraft guns were emplaced generally

to defend the seacoast artillery, and the mobile antiaircraft imit's

were normally stationed at Fort Shafter, Schofield Barracks, and

Camp Malakole.

The principal units of Maj. Gen. Frederick L. Martin’s Hawaiian

Air Force were the Fifth and Eleventh Bombardment Groups, the

Fifteenth and Eighteenth Pursuit Groups, the Eighty-sixth Observa-

tion Squadron, and the Air Corps services. The Air Force was

generau}'^ disposed on four fields — Hickam, Wheeler, Haleiwa, and

Bellows.

For reference purposes in orienting the locations of various Army

and Navy installations (as of December 7, 1941), the following

illustrations are attached hereto:

1. Map of the Hawaiian Islands showing the disposition of Army

forces.

2. Map of the island of Oahu showing Army installations, including

airfields.

3. Map of the Hawaiian Islands showing United States naval

installations in the Hawaiian area.

We, the undersized, find it impossible to concur with the findings

and conclusions of the Committee^ report because they are illogical,

and unsupported by the preponderance of the evidence before the

Committee. The conclusions of the diplomatic aspects are based

upon incomplete evidence.

We, therefore, find it necessary to file a report setting forth the

conclusions which we believe are properly sustained by evidence be-

fore the Committee-

Homer Ferguson.

Owen Brewster.

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INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

The DuTJf of the Committee

'nie duty of this Committee is fixed by the terms of the joint reso-

lution under which it was created, as expounded by Senator Barkley,

author of the resolution, in his address to the Senate on September 6,

1945, explaining the purpose of the resolution.

Section 2 of the joint resolution reads :

The Committee shall make a full and complete investigation of the facts

relating to the events and circumstances leading up to or following the attack

made by Japanese armed forces upon Pearl Harbor in the Territory of Hawaii

on December 7, 1941, and shall report to the Senate and the House of Repre-

sentatives not later than January 3, 1946 (later extended to July 16, 1946),

the results of its investigation, together with such recommendations as it may

deem advisable.

In his address to the Senate on September 6, 1945, Senator Barkley

pointed out the need for this investigation by declaring that the re-

ports on Pearl Harbor by the President’s Pearl Harbor Commission

[the Roberts Commission], the Army Pearl Harbor Board, the

Na^ Court of Inquiry, and other authorities “are confusing and

conflicting, when compared to one another, and to some extent con-

tain contradictions and inconsistencies within themselves.” In this

connection he referred to the “widespread confusion and su^icion”

that prevailed “among the American people and among the Members

of Congress.”

In all these reports, which had resulted in' contradictions, con-

fusion, and inconsistencies, the central issue had been the fixing of

responsibility for the catastrophe that befell the American forces

at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. This fact Senator Barkley

fully recognized in his statement that the first purpose of the in-

vestigation is that of “fixing responsibility” for the Pearl Harbor

disaster “upon an individual, or a group of individuals, or upon a sys-

tem under which they operated or cooperated or failed to do either.”

In fulfillment of this obligation, Senator Barkley said, the investi-

gation —

should be conducted wltliout partisanship or favoritism toward any responsible

official, military, aaval, or civilian, high or low, living or dead. ♦ ♦ ♦

Congress itself should make its oton thorough, impartial, and fearless inquiry

into the facts and circumstances and conditions prevailing prior to and at the time

of the Pearl Harbor attack, no matter how far back it may be necessary to go

in order to appraise the situation which existed prior to and at the time of the

attack (Congressional Record, p. 8180, September 6, 1945).

The Joint Committee, therefore, is charged with the duty of in-

vestigating the entire subject de novo. It is and should be free from

the Sidings and conclusions of all previous investigations and in-

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a uiries except such material as members of this committee in their

iscretion may see fit to cite or incorporate in their report.

The second, purpose of the investigation, Senator Barkley ex-

plained, is that of ascertaining whether in view of what happened

at Pearl Harbor the findings might be useful to Congress in legislating

with regard to military and naval forces and the executive departments

having control of them, or which are supposed to work with them.

These views of the obligation of the committee were supported

wholeheartedly on the floor of the Senate by Senator Brewster and

Senator Ferguson and thereafter the Senate unanimously passed the

resolution as so interpreted.

Of necessity^ as used in relation to the obligation of this com-

mittee responsibility means responsibility for failure on the part of

individual officers or groups of officers or civilian officials to do their

full official duty in preparing for and meeting effectively the Japa-

nese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941; and the term

“duty” means duty according to the Constitution, laws, and estab-

lished administrative practices under which all such individuals and

groups of individuals were bound to operate prior to and on the day

of that catastrophe.

Fundamental Questions Before the Joint Committee

Liasmuch as all decisions and activities connected with this occur-

rence at Pearl Harbor were decisions and activities of executive au-

thorities of the Government of the United States, the issue of responsi-

bility for the degree of success attained by the Japanese attack involves

at least one general question and four subsidiary and specific questions :

The general question is: Did all the civil, military, and naval au-

thorities of the United States charged with responsibility for the con-

duct of diplomatic negotiations with the Japanese Government and

for preparedness and defense at Pearl Harbor competent^, efficiently,

and with proper regard for the trust imposed in them fulfill the duties

of their respective offices under the Constitution and laws of the United

States?

The subsidiary and specific questions are :

1. Did the high civil, military, and naval authorities in Washington

secure in advance of 10 o’clock a. m. (e. s. t.) December 7, 1941, infor-

mation respecting Japanese designs and intentions sufficient to con-

vince them beyond all reasonable doubt that war with Japan was

immediately imminent?

2. If so, did they give to General Walter C. Short and Admiral

Husband E. Kimmel, the commanders at Pearl Harbor, clear and

definite orders, immeaiately prior to the Japanese attack, instructing

them to be fully alert for defense against such an attack?

3. Was Hawaii adequately equipped for its defense against a Japa-

nese attack in accordance with the known circumstances?

4. Did the commanders at Pearl Harbor take the appropriate meas-

ures required by the orders issued to them from Washington, by the

duties of their respective offices, and by the information in their posses-

sion and the resources at their aisposal, to maintain the security of the

possessions of the United States as far as that responsibility was

mvested in them?

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The question of the wisdom of the foreim policy pursued by the

Government of the United States is excluded by the terms of the com-

mittee’s instructions. In any case, to go into tnis issue would involve

the committee in the complexities of history extending back more than

50 years and in matters of opinion which cannot be settled by reference

to anything as positive and definite as the Constitution, laws, and

established administrative practices of the United States Gqven^ent.

To understand the questions involved, however, an examination of

our relations in the Far East, and of the diplomatic negotiations lead-

ing up to December 7, 1941, are part and parcel of uie explanation

of the responsibilities involved in this inquiry.

Difficulties Facing the Joint Committee and Incompleteness of

THE Record

When all the testimony, papers, documents, exhibits, and other

evidence duly laid before the Committee are reviewed, it becomes

apparent that the record is far from complete. The Committee did

not have an opjiortuni^ to cross-examine any of the high civil execu-

tive principals in the Pearl Harbor affair. President Roosevelt and

Secretary Knox had died before the Committee was created. Harry

Hopkins, who was intimately and officially associated with President

Roosevelt, died shortly after the Committee began its work. The

ill-health of Secretary of War Stimson and Secretary of State Hull

prevented the Committee from getting the full benefit of their knowl-

edge, except for the information they voluntarily furnished.

It is extremely unfortunate that the Roberts Commission Report

was so hasty, inconclusive, and incomplete. Some witnesses were

examined under oath ; others were not. Much testimony was not even

recorded. The Commission knew that Japanese messages had been

intercepted and were available, prior to the attack, to the high com-

mand in Washington. The Commission did not inquire about what

information these intercepts contained, who received them, or what

was done about them, although the failure of Washington to inform

the commanders in Hawaii of this vital intelligence bears directly on

the question of whether those commanders performed their full duties.

Mr. Justice Roberts testified before this Committee :

I would not have bothered to read it (the Intercepted Japanese traffic) if it

had been shown to us (Tr., Vol. 47, p. 8836) :

If it were necessary to do so, detailed examples of the many short-

comings of the Roberts Commission could be set forth. The duty of

our Committee to examine the entire subject afresh does not require

an extended criticism of the Roberts Report.

It should be noted, however, that Justice Roberts had sufficient

legal experience to know the proper method of collecting and preserv-

ing evidence which in this case involved the highest interests of the

Nation. The facts were then fresh in the minds of key witnesses in

Washington. They could not then -have been ignorant of their where-

abouts at important times or have forgotten the details of events and

operations. No files would have been “lost” and no information would

have been distorted by the passage of time. The failure to observe

these obvious necessities is almost as tragic to the cause of truth as the

attack on Pearl Harbor itself was a tragedy for the Nation.

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These difficulties were supplemented by even greater ones stenuning

from Presidential restraints on the Committee and from the partisan

character of the Committee itself.

Even before the Committee commenced its work, it was confronted

with an order issued on August 28, 1945, and simed by President

Tnunan, which severely limited the power of the Committee to gain

access to the full facts. The order is as follows (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 26) :

August 28, 1945.

Memorandum for — ^The Secretary of State.

The Secretary of War.

The Secretary of the Navy.

The Attorney General.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Director of the Budget.

The Director of the Office of War Information.

Appropriate departments of the Government and the Joint Chiefs of Staff

are hereby directed to take such steps as are necessary to prevent reiease to the

public, except with the specific approval of the President in each case, of —

Information regarding the past or present status, technique or procedures,

degree of success attained, or any specific results of any cryptanalytic unit acting

under the authority of the United States Government or any Department thereof.

Hasbt S. TsmiAiT.

Restricted.

It was not until October 23, 1945, that President Truman made the

order less stringent by a new order. The modification left much to be

desired.

The application of the new order was limited to the State, War, and

Navy Departments. It relaxed the secrecy of records only so far as

“the Joint Committee” was concerned, while it continued to prevent

“individual” members of the Committee from searching records as re-

sponsible Members of Congress either alone, in groups, or even when

accompanied by Committee coimsel. By one way or another, control

over papers, records, and other information remained in the hands

of the majority party members.

The President’s October order also contained the unfortunate phrase

“any information in their possession material to the investigation^’’

which provided a cloak for those reluctant to yield information re-

quested by members of the Committee. It was always possible to

confront individual members with the view that the papers, data,

and information desired was not “material to the investigation.”

Decisions were made by the majority ruling out evidence as “not

material to the investigation” without members of the Committee ever

seeing the material about which the decision was made.

No subsequent modifying orders wholly removed these restrictions.

In an order of November 7, 1945, President Truman relaxed re-

straints on executives of the Government in order that they may

speak freely to individual members of the Committee, but the order

closed with the direction : “This does not include any files or written

material.”

in this fashion every facility and concession afforded to members

of the Joint Committee was hedged about with troublesome qualifica-

tions and restraints. The relaxation of restraints was often pub-

licized while the continuing qualifications were but little discussed.

The effect was to restrict individual members of the Committee in

practice while the appearance of their freedom of operations was

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held out to the public. In justice to Committee counsel and to

individual majority members of the Committee, efforts made by them

to overcome these restrictions should be recognized. It is a great

tribute to their fairness that the Committee did not break up over

this issue but continued to work despite the handicaps which were

never wholly removed.

The plain fact that an investigation could not be an investigation

if committee members remained mere spectators, persuaded some

members that restraints on their freedom were not justified. The

flimsiness of the argument for restrictions became even more evident

when permission to search files and other records was denied by

majority vote to individual members even when accompanied hy Com-

mittee counsel. Rightly or wronglv it was inferred from this that

there was a deliberate design to bloct the search for the truth.

Such a view was supported by the knowledge that restrictions on

individual members of congressional investigatory bodies were con-

trary to the best practices m other investigations. Some celebrated

instances were recalled. Speaking in the Senate on November 9, 1945,

during one of the discussions on Committee powers, the Senator from

Montana (Mr. Burton K. Wheeler) observed:

I concur in what the Senator from Illinois has said with reference to the

authorizing of a single member of the committee to hold hearings. I have

served on a good many investigations since I have been a Member of the Senate,

and some very important ones. I assisted to quite an extent in the Teapot Dome

investigation carried on by my colleague, Senator Walsh, of Montana, and likewise

I carried on the investigation of the Department of Justice. I was a minority

member of the committee.

In all my experience with any investigating committee, I have never known

of any one member of a committee not being permitted to go and look over the

files in any department of the Government of the United States. This is the first

time I have every known anything of that kind being questioned ♦ •

♦ ♦ • I call attention to the fact that in the Daugherty investigation I

sent for files myself, I asked for files from the Attorney General of the United

States, Mr. Daugherty. He refused to give them to me. I have forgotten the

ground he stated, but at any rate he refused to give them to me. When he did

so, the President of the United States, Mr. Coolidge, called him in and asked for

his resignation, and Mr. Daugherty was eliminated from the office of Attorney

General. After that time, when the new Attorney General was appointed, every

single file I ever asked for, as a minority member of the committee, was furnished

to me.

♦ • \* As I have stated, my colleague. Senator Walsh, of Montana, was a

minority member of the committee Investigating the Teapot Dome situation. I

know of my own personal knowledge that he got from the Department, and from

officials in the Department, information which he afterward used, and if he had

not been permitted to do that, and if I had not been permitted to do it, I am sure

there would have been a complete failure of the investigation of the Department

of Justice. (CJongressional Record, vol. 91, No. 198, November 9, 1945, p. 10755.)

Another instance is the more recent one in which President Truman

himself is well versed. As Senator, Mr. Truman headed a distin-

pruished committee bearing the popular designation ‘‘The Truman

Committee” (now the Mead Committee). The cardinal principle of

the Truman Committee in the 4 years during which it won the respect

and confidence of the American people^ rested on the proposition that

every individual member of the committee was wholly free to search

for any information deemed by him to be relevant wherever and

whenever he thought it could be found. Never once did the chairman

or the majority of the committee refuse to recognize that right and

that responsibility of each individual member.

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Untrammeled freedom of individual committee members in these

instances did not produce chaos or disorder as was argued would be

the case in the Pearl Harbor inquiry. On the contrary, the procedure

and results in each case did honor to the committees concerned and

proved salutary for the Nation. Complete concurrence with the

most admirable outline of the purposes and scope of the investigation

of the events leading up to Pearl Harbor and our entry into the World

War as presented to the Senate by the author of the resolution at the

time of its introduction and hearty approval of much that has been

done by the Committee must not blind us to the extent to which the

investigation lived up to its advance billing by its distinguished

sponsor.

At the very inception the tested practices in investigations of this

character that had demonstrated such extraordinary success in the

entire history of the Truman Committee were very definitely rejected

and neither of the two members of the Committee who had received

rather extended training under the then Senator Truman were al-

lowed to follow the course in the investigation of Pearl Harbor that

had repeatedly produced most gratifying results in their earlier ex-

perience.

This firm refusal by the Committee majority, consisting of six

Democrats as against four Kepublicans, at the very outset to allow

the scope to individual members even with every safeguard proposed

against the alleged danger of abuse was both unfortunate and dis

quieting.

Everything that has since developed must be viewed in the light

of this iron curtain that was thus imposed.

Permission was asked to conduct exploration for certain missing

records. Vigorous and public denial was made — ^presumably on

Executive authority — ^that any records were missing. Subsequently

it developed that several records were missing and most inadequate

explanations were supplied. How any public interest could possibly

have been prejudiced by affording any opportunity to examine the

manner of keeping records of this character has never been satis-

factorily explained.

These incidents revealed a disquieting determination to keep en-

tire control of the investigation in the hands of the Committee ma-

jority who were thus put in the unusual position of arrogating to

themselves the capacity to conduct an impartial and adequate inves-

tigation of their own administration. The history of human conduct

furnishes few precedents to justify such confidence.

Some of the effects of majority decision as well as gaps in the

data and testimony due to other causes illustrate the great difficulty

surrounding the work of the Committee.

Secretary Stimson declined to appear on the ground that his health

did not permit him to undergo the strain. Access to his diary was

denied by majority vote.

To accommodate Secretary Stimson because of his illness. Senator

Ferguson on March 6, 1946, submitted 176 questions as part of the

official record for Secretary Stimson to answer as if propounded in

open hearing of the Committee (Tr., Vol. 70, p. 14437 ff.).

Secretary Stimson did not answer any of these questions, and the

Committee made no effort to insist upon his answering these ques-

tions, which were highly pertinent to the inquiry.

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Later, Senator Fergiuon submitted a supplementary list of 61 ques-

tions to be answered in the same manner (Tr., Vol. 70, p. 14476).

Secretary Stimson answered these questions in writing, and his an-

swers are part of the record. These answers did not, however, make

up for the deficiencies in the failure to answer the earlier list of 176

questions.

Secreta^ Hull made three appearances, in the course of which he

g ave his official version of the matters before the Committee and was

riefly examined by the counsel, but minority members of the Com-

mittee were not permitted to cross-examine him. When his answers

to written interrogatories from Committee members proved unre-

sponsive, there was no way to secure further information from him.

The diary of former Ambassador Joseph C. Grew was likewise

denied to the Committee. The assertion of its confidential character

was somewhat belied by its submission for examination to certain

individuals with a view to its commercial publication.

The denial to the Committee of the Stimson and Grew diaries was

particularly obstructive because these principles placed excerpts of

the diaries in the record and withheld the rest. This was contrary

to the prime rule in American law that if part of a document is put

into the record by a witness in his own behalf, the court is entitled to

demand the whole of the document. Concerning each of these dia-

ries the Committee, by majority vote, refused to issue subpenas for

their production.

Many messages, probably several hundreds, between Winston

Churchill and President Franklin D. Roosevelt received prior to

December 7, 1941, were not available to the Committee, although

there is good reason to believe that they bore on the gathering crisis.

Other messages between Mr. Churchill and the British Embassy and

American authorities were made available to the Committee, but our

Government replies or action taken were not so available.

The former Prime Minister of Great Britain was in this country

not on official business while hearings of this Committee were going on.

His intimate knowledge of affairs leading up to Pearl Harbor would

have cleared up many gaps in the evidence. By majority vote, a

request for the appearance of Mr. Churchill was refused.

President Roosevelt’s secretary. Miss Grace Tully, was permitted to

determine for herself and the Committee and the country what por-

tions of the official correspondence of the late President had any

relevancy to Pearl Harbor. This could hardly be a satisfactory

substitute for the responsibility placed upon this Committee.

One of the very important questions concerning the defense of

Hawaii dealt with the delays in building airfields and the failure to

install radar and other warning devices. Members of the Committee

sought to inquire into the performance of one Col. Theodore Wyman,

J r., in this connection, but the Committee decided against it.

The whole question of whether or not it would have been possible

to avoid war by proper diplomatic action and thus avert the Pearl

Harbor tragedy was left largely unexplored.

We are peraitted only occasional glimpses into this realm but

these are fascinating.

A modus vivendi was under discussion with Japan in November

1941 to run for 3 months. This had been strongly urged by the War

and Navy authorities in order to supply absolutely essential time for

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preparation. Secretary Stimson and Knox went over the terms of

this document and advised Secretary Hull that it adequately pro-

tected our interest.

Suddenly the modus vivendi was dropped from the agenda and

there was substituted the Hull message wnich was followed shortly

after by the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Early on the morning after the delivery of the Hull message Lord

Halifax arrived at the State Department. He found Mr. Welles

in charge and asked him what has become of the modus vivendi. Mr.

Welles replied that it was dropped because of Chinese lack of inter-

est. Lord Halifax intimated a continuing British interest and Mr.

Welles significantly replied: “That is not the way London sounded

yesterday.”

The message from Churchill of the preceding day certainly bears

out the Welles’ observation. The Committee was told by the State

Department that there' is no record of any telephone conversations

between Mr. Churchill and President Roosevelt. This certainly in-

vites inquiiy.

The Halifax early morning visit in apparent ignorance of the

Churchill message of the day before and of the decision to drop the

modus vivendi is not in time with usual British diplomatic proce-

dure.

Whether or not the Japanese would have accepted the modus viven-

di must remain a matter of opinion.

Whether or not it should have been submitted is a matter on which

light might well be shed.

Particularly is this the case when we have the testimony of Gen.

George C. Marshall that a delay by the Japanese from December

1941 into January 1942 might have resulted in a change of Japan-

ese opinion as to the wisdom of the attack because of the collapse

of the German front before Moscow in December 1941.

Whether or not such a development would have been one to be de-

sired must remain for future investigation when more of the diplo-

matic history of the closing months of 1941 can be more thoroughly

explored.

In short, the Committee labored under great difficulties and was

not in possession of the full historical record pertinent to the case

before it. Nevertheless an investigation was made and an amazing

amount of material was developed in the limited time allowed to

cover such a vast field. It is the duty of the Committee to render

a report, regardless of the inadequacies of evidence, if sufficient facts

are at hand to pass on the issues of responsibility for the catastrophe

at Pearl Harbor. \_ A careful review of the evidence is convincing

enough that these issues can be decided now.

Form of This Report

Accepting the primary obligations of the Committee thus defined

and regarding the questions presented above as directly relevant to

this inquiry, we have reviewed the testimony, documents, and other

materials before the Committee, and we have drawn the following

conclusions in respect of responsibility for the catastrophe, which we

submit, are fully warranted by the evidence before the Committee.

For convenience, we present the conclusions seriatim and then re-

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produce each conclusion separately with co mm ent and citations of

evidence in support of it whenever it is not a mere statement taken

from the evidence before the Committee.

These citations, of course, do not exhaust all the evidence which

could be adduced to support the respective conclusions. To make

them so comprehensive would require the reproduction of hundreds,

if not thousands, of pages of testimony and documents. The con-

clusions stated below resolve all the evidence developed by the Com-

mittee. The citations are in each case merely representative and

authoritative — ^by way of explanation and clarification of what is con-

firmed by numerous witnesses and exhibits and stated by men who

were in a position to know what was known and done by ofiicials of

the United States, civil and military, in relation to Pearl Harbor. In

other words, citations of hearsay, controverted evidence, and gossip

have been avoided in an effort to keep the conclusions within the

bounds of unmistakable fact.

Another point with regard to the conclusions listed should be

emphasized : Collectively^ they conatitvie one statement in answer to

the general question and the four specific questions presented above

as necessarily raised by the primary duty of this Committee ; and many

items of eviaence cited in support of one or more conclusions also help

to sustain other conclusions. Hence in testing the validity of any one

among the conclusions, attention must be given to the cross references

to other items of evidence which are made in various parts of the text.

This unfortunately makes for some unavoidable duplication, but repe-

tition has been held to a minimum.

CoNCLtrsioNS OF Fact and Responsimlitt

1. The course of diplomatic negotiations with Japan during the

months preceding December 7, 1941, indicated a growing tension with

Japan and after November 26 the immediate imminence of war.

2. By November 7, 1941, President Roosevelt and his Cabinet had

reached the unanimous conclusion that war tension had reached such

a point as to convince them that “the people would back us up in case

we struck at Japan down there (in the Far Eq^t).” They then took

under consideration “what the tactics would be” (Tr., Vol. 70, p.

14415). Unless Japan yielded to diplomatic representations on the

part of the United States, there were three choices on tactics before

the President and the Cabinet; they could wait until Japan attacked;

they could strike without a declaration of war by Congress; or the

President could lay the issue of peace or war before Congress (Tr.,

Vol. 70, p. 14415 ff.).

3. So imminent was war on November 25, that the President in a

conference with Secretary Hull, Secretary Knox, Secretary Stimson,

General Marshall, and Admiral Stark, “brought up the event that

we were likely to be attacked perhaps (as soon as) next Monday”

(December 1) ; and the members of the conference discussed the ques-

tion “How we should maneuver them (the Japanese) into the position

of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves”

(Tr., Vol. 70, p. 1M18).

4. Having considered without agreeing upon the proposition that

a message on the war situation should be sent to Congress, the Presi-

dent and the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the Secre-

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tary of the Navy, pursued from November 25 to December 7 the tactics

of waiting for the firing of “the first shot” by the Japanese.

5. The appropriate high authorities in Washington had the organ-

ization for working in such close cooperation during the days imme-

diately prior to the Japanese attack on December 7 that they had

every opportunity to make sure that identical and precise instructions

warranted by the imminence of war went to the Hawaiian commanders.

6. Through the Army and Navy Intelligence Services exte^ive

information was secured respecting Japanese war plans and designs,

by intercepted and decoded tfapanese secret messages, which indicated

the growing danger of war and increasingly after November 26 the

imminence of a Japanese attack.

7. Army and Navy information which indicated growing immi-

nence of war was delivered to the highest authorities in charge of

national preparedness for meeting an attack, among others, the Presi-

dent, the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, and the Chief of Staff

and the Chief of Naval Operations.

8. Judging by the military and naval history of Japan, high author-

ities in Washington and the Commanders in Hawaii had good grounds

for expecting that in starting war the Japanese Government would

make a surprise attack on the United States.

9. Neither the diplomatic negotiations nor the intercepts and other

information respecting Japanese designs and operations in the hands

of the United States authorities warranted those authorities in exclud-

ing from defense measures or from orders to the Hawaiian commanders

the probability of an attack on Hawaii. On the contrary, there is

evidence to the effect that such an attack was, in terms of strategy,

necessary from the Japanese point of view and in fact highly probable,

and that President Roosevelt was taking the probability mto account —

before December 7.

10. The knowledge of Japanese designs and intentions in the hands

of the President and the Secretary of State led them to the conclusion

at least 10 days before December 7 that an attack by Japan within a

few days was so highly probable as to constitute a certainty and, having

reached this conclusion, the President, as Commander in Chief of the

Army and Navy, was tfhder obligation to instruct the Secretary of War

and the Secretary of the Navy to make sure that the outpost com-

manders put their armed forces on an all-out alert for war.

11. The decision of the President, in view of the Constitution, to

await the Japanese attack rather than ask for a declaration of war by

Congress increased the responsibility of high authorities in Wash-

ington to use the utmost care in putting the commanders at Pearl

Harbor on a full alert for defensive actions before the Japanese attack

on December 7, 1941.

12. Inasmuch as the knowledge respecting Japanese designs and

operations which was in the possession of high authorities in Wash-

ington differed in nature and volume from that in the possession of the

Pearl Harbor commanders it was especially incumbent upon the for-

mer to formulate instructions to the latter in language not open to

misinterpretation as to the obligations imposed on the commanders

by the instructions.

13. The messages sent to General Short and Admiral Kimmel by

high authorities in Washington during November were couched in

such conflicting and imprecise language that they failed to convey to

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the commanders definite information on the state of diplomatic rela-

tions with Japan and on Japanese war designs and positive orders

respecting the particular actions to be taken — orders that were bejond

all reasonable doubts as to the need for an all-out alert. In this re-

gard the said high authorities failed to discharge their full duty.

14. High authorities in Washington failed in giving proper weight

to the evidence before them respecting Ja^nese designs and opera-

tions which indicated that an attack on Pearl Harbor was highly

probable and they failed also to emphasize this probability in messages

to the Hawaiian commanders.

15. The failure of Washington authorities to act promptly and con-

sistently in translating intercepts, evaluating information, and send-

ing appropriate instructions to the Hawaiian commanders was in

considerable measure due to delays, mismanagement, noncooperation,

unpreparedness, confusion, and negligence on the part of officers in

Washington.

16. The President of the United States was responsible for the

failure to enforce continuous, efficient, and appropriate cooperation

among the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of

Staff, and the Chief of Naval Operations, in evaluating information

and dispatching clear and positive orders to the Hawaiian commanders

as events indicated the growing imminence of war; for the Constitution

and laws of the United States vested in the President full power, as

Chief Executive and Commander in Chief, to compel such cooperation

and vested this power in him alone with a view to establishing his

responsibility to the people of the United States.

17. High authorities in Washington failed to allocate to the Hawai-

ian commanders the material which the latter often declared to be

necessary to defense and often requested, and no requirements of

defense or war in the Atlantic did or could excuse these authorities

for their failures in this respect.

18. Whatever errors of judgment the commanders at Hawaii com-

mitted and whatever mismanagement they displayed in preparing for

a Japanese attack, attention to chain of responsibility in the civil and

military administration requires taking note of the fact that they were

designated for their posts by high authorities in Washington — all of

whom were under obligation to have a care for competence in the selec-

tion of subordinates tor particular positions of responsibility in the

armed forces of the United States.

19. The defense of Hawaii rested upon two sets of interdependent

responsibilities : (1) The responsibility in Washington in respect of its

intimate knowledge of diplomatic negotiations, widespread intelli-

gence information, direction of affairs and constitutional duty to plan

the defense of the United States; (2) the responsibility cast upon the

commanders in the field in charge of a major naval base and tne fleet

essential to the defense of the territory of the United States to do

those things appropriate to the defense of the fleet and outpost. Wash-

ington authorities failed in (1) ; and the commanding officers at

Hawaii failed in j[2).

20. In the final instance of crucial significance for alerting American

outpost commanders, on Saturday night, December 6, and Sunday

morning, December 7, the President of the United States failed to take

that quick and instant executive action which was required by the

occasion and by the responsibility for watchfulness and guardianship

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rightly associated in law and practice with his high office from the

establishment of the Republic to our own times.

21. The contention coming from so high an authority as President

Truman on August 3, 1945, that the “country is as much to blame

as any individual in this final situation that developed in Pearl Har-

bor,” cannot ^ sustained because the American people had no intima-

tion whatever of the policies and operations that were being under-

taken.

Conclusions Restated With Supporting Evidence

1. The course of diplomatic negotiations with Ja'pan during the

months preceding December 7, 190.^ indicated a growing tension with

Japan and after November 26 the immediate imndnence of war.

The duty of conducting negotiations with foreign governments from

March 4, 1933, to December 7, 1941, was vested in President Franklin

D. Roosevelt, under the Constitution, laws^ and established practice

of the United States, and he could delegate to the Secretary of State,

Cordell Hull, such correspondence and communications relating there-

to as he deemed fitting and proper. In respect of matters assigned to

him it was the duty of Secretary Hull to keep the President informed

of all transactions that were critical in nature and especially those in-

volving the possible use of the armed forces of the United States.

At least as early as October 8, 1940, President Roosevelt believed

that affairs had reached such a state that the United States would be-

come involved in a war with J apan. On that day Admiral Richardson

asked the President “if we were going to enter the war.” According

to the admiral’s account the President replied —

that if the Japanese attacked Thailand, or the Kra Peninsula, or the Dutch East

Indies we would not enter the war, that if they even attacked the Philippines he

doubted whether we would enter the war, but that they (the Japanese) could

not always avoid making mistakes and that as the war continued and the area

of operations expanded sooner or later they would make a mistake and we

would enter the war (Tr., Vol. 4, pp. 683-4).

In a letter dated January 21, 1941, President Roosevelt informed

Ambassador Grew that “our interests are menaced both in Europe and

in the Far East. \* \* \* Our strategy of self-defense must be a

global strategy \* \* \*” and that “our strategy” must envisage

“helping to prevent a closing of channels of communication” between

Great Britain and various parts of the world (Grew. Ten Years in

Japan, pp. 361-363) . Grew’s letter dated December 14, 1940, to the

President contained this sentence, “\* \* \* the principal point at

issue, as I see it, is not whether we call a halt, to the Japanese ptogram,

but when.” (Grew, Ibid., p. 360.) The President replied in a letter :

“I find myself in decided agreement with your conclusions.”

There is additional evidence for the conclusion that in January 1941

President Roosevelt then became convinced that the war was a global

war and that his decisions as Chief Executive and Commander in

Chief must thenceforward be made with reference to that conviction.

This evidence is as follows: Beginning in January 1941 representa-

tives of the American armed forces and representatives of British and

Dutch armed forces on the suggestion of the United States started a

series of conversations in respect of cooperation against Japan in the

Far East. Out of these and subsequent conversations were developed

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American-British-Dutch war plans for combined operations against

Japan if Japanese armed forces started hostile actions against Brit-

ish, Dutch, or American possessions in the Far East. President Roose-

velt approved these plans, ‘‘except officially,” as Admiral Stark

testified.

The President’s commitment to Great Britain was foreshadowed

by understandings previously reached between American, British,

and Dutch military authorities. In a memorandum to the President

dated November 27, 1941 (exhibit 17), General Marshall and Ad-

miral Stark stated :

After consultation with each other, United States, British, and Dutch mili-

tary authorities In the Far East agreed that joint military counteraction against

Japan should be undertaken only in case Japan attacks or directly threatens the

territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth,

or the Netherlands East Indies, or should the Japanese move forces into Thai-

land west of 100® East or South of the 10® North, Portuguese Timor, New Cale-

donia, or the Loyalty Islands.

The agreement referred to by Admiral Stark and General Marshall,

was reaped at conferences in Singapore in April 1941 between United

States, British, and Dutch military authorities in the Far East. It

provided that they would advise their respective Governments to

authorize military operations against Japan in the event of any of

the following Japanese movements (exhibit 50, par. 26) :

(a) A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the Territory or

Mandated Territory of any of the Associated Powers. It is not possible to define

accurately what would constitute “a direct act of war.” It is possible for a minor

incident to occur which, although technically an act of war, could be resolved by

diplomatic action. It is recognized the decision as to whether such an incident is

an act of war must lie with the government concerned.

(b) The movement of the Japanese forcdk into any part of Thailand to the

West of 100® East or to the South of 10® North.

(c) The movement of a large number of Japanese warships, or of a convoy of

merchant ships escorted by Japanese warshi|)s, which from its position and course

was clearly directed upon the Philippine Islands, the East coast of the Isthmus

of Kra of the East coast of Malaya, or had crossed the parallel of 6® North between

Malaya and the Philippines, a line from the Gulf of Davao to Waigeo Island, or

the Equator East of Waigeo.

(d ) The movement of Japanese forces Into Portuguese Timor.

(e) The movement of Japanese forces into New Caledonia or the Loyalty

Islands.

The report of the Singapore conversations and the memoranda to

the President by Admiral Stark and General Marshall on November 5

and 27, 1941, set forth definite geographic lines, over which a Japa-

nese advance was considered to require armed resistance from the

United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands. One line ran

north and south through Thailand. It was parallel to longitude 100®

east. A Japanese movement west of it was prohibited. This line

protected Burma and the Indian Ocean. Another line ran east and

west across the Isthmus of Blra and was parallel with latitude 10®

north. A Japanese movement over this line was forbidden. This line

in effect protected the Malay Peninsula and Sii^apore. The Singa-

pore report sets out certain additional lines. Une such line was a

parallel of latitude 6® north and extended between Malaya and the

Philippines.

This line protected the Dutch East Indies. They were also pro-

tected from Japanese attack, particularly one originating in the

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Palau Islands, by another line extending from the Gulf of Davao in

the Philii)pines to Waigeo Island in me Dutch East Indies. On

December 4, 1941, Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, sent

to the British and Dutch Admiralties his recommendation —

that If the Dutch authorities considered a warning should be given Japan it

should take the form of a declaration to Japan that in view of the current

situation Japanese naval vessels or expeditionary forces crossing the Davao-

Waigeo line would be considered hostiie and would be attacked (exhibit 79,

p. 12).

While the President did not approve written agreements on these

understandings he and the high authorities in Wamington acted with

the British and Dutch just as if a binding pact had been made.

Likewise the Japanese acted upon the same belief that the United.

States, Britain, and Netherlands East Indies were working together.

There is ample evidence in the record to this effect. (Ex. I, p. 205 —

Tokyo to Berlin dispatch : Id. p. 227, Washington to Tokyo dispatch.)

Subsequent American diplomatic negotiations with Japan were

based upon the principle of cooperation with Great Britain, the

Dutch Netherlands, China, and Australia. No separate over-all plan

for the simple defense of American possessions against Japan was

developed by the armed forces of the United States between Janu-

ary 1941 and December 7, 1941, with a view to safeguarding Ameri-

can interests separately. After the Japanese attack on December 7,

American, British, Dutch, and Australian operations in the Pacific

theater were conducted on the cooperative principle which had

governed the militarv and naval conversations and planning between

January and December 1941.

The danger of war with Japan formed a principal theme of dis-

cussion between President Eoosevelt and Prune Minister Churchill

at the Atlantic Conference in Aimust 1941, and agreements or under-

standings reached by President Roosevelt and Prune Minister Chur-

chill at that Conference were based on a common program for dealing

with Japan and close cooperation between the United States and

Great Britain in diplomatic, military, and naval affairs in respect

of the Far East as well as the Atlantic. Their chief understandings

as thus far disclosed by official records were three in number :

(1) Common diplomatic actions warning Japan against taking

any ifurther steps in dominating neighboring countries by force

or threat of force.

(2) Occupation of the Azores by the armed forces of the United

States with protective assistance by British armed forces in guard-

ing against a possible Nazi thrust from the mainland.

(3) Cooperation between the United States and (3reat Britain

in “the policing of the world” during a transition period following

the close of the war.

Admiral Stark and General Marshall did not approve these Singa-

pore agreements because they were of a “political nature,” beyond

their authority to sanction. They recommended, however, that they

be taken up by the political departments of the governments involved.

Further, under other provisions of the Singapore agreements, Britain

entrusted the naval defense of her vital interests in the so-called

Malay barrier exclusively to the United States and the Dutch. Only

three British vessels were allocated to the defense of this area, and

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these only for escort and patrol. This arrangement was not approved

by Stark and Marshall (exhibit 65 ) .

’ After an understanding was reached at the Atlantic Conference on

a common diplomatic action against Japan —

the President expressed the belief that by adopting this course any farther move

of aggression on the part of Japan which might result in war could be held oft

for at least thirty days." [ItaUos supplied.J

The Prime Minister thought that there was a reasonable chance of

averting a war in the Pacific (Sumner Welles, Memorandum of Con-

versation, August 11, 1941; Ex. 2^-C, p. 9).

It is scarcely thinkable that in his discussions with Prime Minister

Churchill at the Atlantic Conference in August 1941, President Roose-

velt would have assumed that the United States was to cooperate with

Great Britain in “the policing of the world” for a transition period

after the war unless he was then certain that at some stage in the devel-

opment of the war the United States would become involved in it.

In his statement to the Japanese Ambassador on Sunday, August 17,

1941j immediately following his return from the Atlantic Conference

President Roosevelt warned Japan against further attempts to domi-

nate “neighboring countries,” not merely the possessions of the United

States, and used diplomatic language which, according to long-estab-

lished usages, had only one meaning, namely, that such furmer at-

tempts would result in a conflict with the United States. His state-

ment read :

• • \* this Government (of the United States) now finds It necessary to say

to the Government of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes any further

steps in pursuance of a policy or program of military domination by force or

threat of force of neighboring countries, the Government of the United States

toUl be compelled to take immediately any and all steps which it may deem neces-

sary toward safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of the United States

and American nationals and toward insuring the safety and security of the United

States. [Italics supplied ; Foreign Relations of the United States : Japan, vol. II,

pp. 666-667.]

In urging upon the State Depai-tment, in September 1941, an accept-

ance of the J^anese woposal for a conference between President

Itoosevelt and Premier Konoye, the American Ambassador in Tokyo.

Joseph Grew, declared that, in nis opinion, unless a certain amount of

confidence be placed by the United States in the professed sincerity of

the Premier Konoye and his supporters in making arrangements for

the proposed conference :

the ambassador does not believe that a new orientation can be successfully cre-

ated in Japan to lead to a general improving of Japanese-American relations and

to the hope that ultimate war may be avoided in the Pacific (Grew, Ten Years

in Japan, pp. 436-442).

Accordingly, in rejecting the Japanese proposal for this conference.

President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull, whatever their reasons and

however justifiable these reasons may have been, had before them the

deliberate judgment of the American Ambassador in Tokyo that such

action would reduce the chances of peace and increase the probability

of war. The Konoye Cabinet fell on October 16, 1941, after all Jap-

anese efforts to bring about the conference between President Roose-

velt and Premier Konoye had failed.

On November 26, 1941, Secretary Hull, with the approval of Presi-

dent Roosevelt, rejected the Japanese proposal of November 20 for a

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temporary agreement, sometimes called a modus vivendi (below con-

clusion 19) and presented to Japan his memorandum of that date, the

Secretary recognized, and said, that there was then “practically no

possibility of an agreement being achieved with Japan.” Having

reached this conclusion, the Secretary, according to his account of

what happened, declared on November 25 and on November 28, at

meetings of high officials of this Government, “that the matter of safe-

OTarding our national security was in the hands of the Army and

Navy.” (Peace and War, 1943, p. 144.) This was presumptively a

warning to the War Department and the Navy Department to make

ready R)r war. Accepting it as such the two Departments sent to

General Short and Admiral Kimmel messages which, the Depart-

ments claimed, ordered the commanders to put into effect a due alert

for war — a possible Japanese attack (but see conclusion 13).

The President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and

the Secretary of the Navy were, therefore, certainly bound by the

duties of their respective offices to be on the alert day and night after

November 26, 1941, for the receipt of any word or message from Japan

and for the receipt of any intercepts or other information respecting

Japanese designs and intentions that were indicative of a breach of

relations and war. They were also bound by their duties to alert

and to keep on the alert for sudden attack their immediate subordi-

nates and the outpost commanders having duties in connection with

war operations.

By November 7 , President Roosevelt and his Cabinet had

reached the unanimous conclusion that war tension had reached such

a point as to convince them that Hhe people would back us up in case

we struck at Japan down there {in the car East)N They then took

under consideration '■'•what the tactics would beP {Tr.^ Vol. 70, p.

I44JS.) Unless Japan yielded to diplomatic representations on the

part of the United States, there were three choices on tactics before the

President and the Cabinet : T hey could wait until J apan attacked; they

could strike without a declaration of war by Congress; or the President

could lay the issue of peace or war before Congress. {Tr., Vol. 70,

p.imff.)

The proposal of an appeal to Congress was not new. So high was

the war tension in August 1941, that Prime Minister Churchill, recog-

nizing the constitutional inability of President Roosevelt to declare

war, proposed that the President seek authority from Congress to act

on certain conditions. The Prime Minister’s proposal contained in

his draft of parallel communications to Japan read :

If any third power becomes the object of aggression by Japan in consequence

of such counter measures or in their support of them, the President would have

the intention to seek authority from Congress to give aid to such power. (Welles,

memorandum of conversation, August 10, 1941.)

The proposal to incorporate in the American communication to the

Japanese Government an announcement of this intention to appeal

to Congress was not accepted by President Roosevelt.

Sometime after November 7, 1941, when the President and his Cabi-

net unanimously agreed that “the country” would back them up in case

they struck at Japan in the Far East, high administration authorities

discussed the tactics of an appeal by President Roosevelt to Congress

in a special message laying before it the serious danger that was

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threatening the United States and its interests in the Far East. The

officers of the State Department, the Secretary of War, and the Secre-

tary of the Navy took part in drafting the proposed message for the

President and their draft when completed was accompanied by a

“Memorandum for the President,” dated November 29, 1941, initialed

by Secretary Hull (Ex. 19; 161). In a note sending this draft mes-

sage to the President, Mr. Hull wrote :

I think we agree that yon will not send message to Congress until the last

stage of our relations, relating to actual hostilities. [Eix. 19, italics supplied.]

The decision against laying the issue before Congress left to the

administration authorities only the tactics of renewing negotiations

with Japan (which as to substantative issues had come to an end on

November 26) or the tactics of waiting on Japanese decisions and

actions.

Mr. Roosevelt chose to wait until December 7, 1941, rather than

place this grave issue before Congress. This seems clear from the

testimony as late as the night before the attack as follows :

Commander Schulz said that when he delivered the 13-part message

to the President on the night of December 6 :

Mr. Hopkins then expressed a view that since war was undoubtedly going

to come at the convenience of the Japanese it was too bad that we could not

strike the first blow and prevent any sort of surprise. The President nodded

and then said, in effect, “No, we can’t do that. We are a democracy and a

peaceful people.” Then be raised bis voice, and this much I remember definitely.

He said, “But we have a good record.”

The impression that 1 got was that we would have to stand on that record,

we could not make the first overt move. We would have to wait until it came

(Tr., Vol. 63, p. 12442-3).

3. i^o imminent was war on November 2S that the President, in a

conference with Secretary Hull, Secretary Knox, Secretary Stimson,

General MarshdR, and Admired Stark, ^brought uy the event that we

were likely to he attacked perhaps {as soon as) next Monday''’ {Decem-

her 1); and the members of the conference discussed the question,

^’■How we should maneuver them {the Japanese) into the position of

firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves''

(Tr., Vol. 70, p. 14418).

In the diplomatic documents, exhibits, and testimony before the

Committee there is a wealth of evidence which underwrites the state-

ment that the tactics of maneuvering the Japanese into “the position

of firing the first shot” were followed by high authorities in Wash-

ington after November 25, 1941. Examples of such tactics are

a^rded by —

(a) Secretary Hull’s decision, with the approval of President

Roosevelt, to discard the proposal for a temporary agreement with

Japan without notifying the Secretary of War or the British and Aus-

tralian representatives in Washington who had collaborated in work-

ing out a draft of a memorandum with a view to reaching such an

agreement if possible (conclusion 19).

(&) The suDstitution for the proposed modus vivendi of the note

of November 26 to Japan, which, as Secretary Hull knew and said at

the moment, practically put an end to negotiations with Japan and

passed over to the Army and Navy the burden of safeguarding the

security of the United States.

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Secretary Stimson quoted his diary for November 26 as follows:

• • \* Hull told me over the telephone this morning that he had about made

up his mind not to give (make) the proposition that Knox and I passed on the

other day to the Japanese but to kick the whole thing over — to tell them that he

has no other proposition at all. • ♦ » i called Hull up this morning to tell him

[of Cbiang Kai-shek’s objections to the modus vivendi as set forth in a letter to

T. V. Soong and shown by him to Mr. Stimson] and ask him what he wanted me

to do about it. • \* • He replied as I have said above — that he had made up

his mind to give up the whole thing In respect to a truce and to simply tell the

Japanese that he had no further action to propose. • ♦ \* (Tr., Vol. 70,

p. 14420.)

(o) The rejection of appeals made to President Roosevelt by Gen-

eral Marshall and Admiral Stark on November 5 and also later on

November 27, 1941, for a delay in bringing about a breach with

Japan— appeals based on their belief that the Army and Navy were not

then ready for a war with Japan.

(d) The orders of the Secretary of War to the effect that General

Marshall and Admiral Stark should not put into their memorandum

appealing for delay, simed November 27, anything that could be “con-

strued as a recommendation to the President that he request Japan

to reopen the conversations” (Tr. Vol. 20, p. 3325, and below, especially

conclusion 19).

According to Secretary Hull, the tactics of waiting for the Japanese

to fire the first shot was, in a measure, forced upon the Administration

by the attachment of a large part of the American people to neu-

trality as exi>ressed in the neutrality legislation of Congress and by

their opposition to involvement in war in the Far East as well as

elsewhere.

This view Secretary Hull expressed in his statement to the Commit-

tee (Tr., Vol. 7, pp. 1096 ff.) and it is set forth more fully by other

documents before the Committee, particularly the State Department’s

publication: Peace and 'War: United States Foreign Policy 1931-J!il^

especially chapter 1.

In this chapter the State Department explains that the President

and Secretary Hull were hampered in the pursuit of the foreign policy

they had “clearly” decided upon — at a date not fixed by the Secre-

tary — on account of the opposition by “much of public opinion” in

the United States. In this chapter the State Department also ex-

plains that —

Our foreign policy during the decade under consideration (1931-41) neces-

sarily had to move within the framework of a gradual evolution of public

opinion In the United States away from the idea of isolation expressed in “neu-

trality” legislation. \* \* • The pages (in the volume) which follow show

the slow march of the United States from an attitude of Illusory aloofness toward

world-wide forces endangering America to a position in the forefront of the

United Nations that are now (1943) making common cause against an attempt

at world conquest unparalleled alike in boldness of conception and in brutality

of operation.

It is a serious question whether the President and his advisers were

justified in making the conclusions that the country would support

them for war; and whether actions taken by them upon their own

opinion without placing the matter before Congress was in violation

of their responsibilities under the Constitution and laws of the land.

(See Conclusion 2.)

J/.. Homing considered^ withoui agreeing upon the proposition^ that

a message on the war situation should he sent to Congress^ the President

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and the Secretary of State,, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of

the Navy purmed, from Novemher Z6 to Decemher 7, the tactics of

waiting for the firing of Hhe first shot” hy the Japanese.

Nothing that indicate any easing of the tension between the United

States and Japan appears m the records of the exchanges with the

Japanese representatives in Washington between November 27 and

December 6, inclusive. On the contrary, relations were rapidly de-

teriorating (Foreign Relations: 11, pp. 772-784).

It was the general opinion among Washington authorities that the

question was no longer “would Japan attack,” but “when and where.”

On November 28, President Roosevelt said to Secreta^ Stimson that

he could see only three alternatives before him in the situation : “first,

to do nothing ; second, to make something in the nature of an ultimatum

again, stating a point beyond which we would fight; third, to fight at

once” (Tr., v ol. 70, p. 14423) .

As late as December 2, President Roosevelt seemed to be still con-

sidering the subject of a message to Congress. Secreta^ Stimson

recorded on that day : The Presi<fent “is quite settled, I think, that he

will make a message to the Congress and will, perhaps, back that up

with a speech to the country” (ibid., p. 14427) . On December 2, he

was also considering the possibility of a message to the Japanese

E mp eror (ibid., p. 1M27).

With these possibilities of tactics before him, the President fully

abandoned the three projects: another ultimatum, fighting at once,

sending a message to Congress. He only turned to the fourth possi-

bility — sending an appeal to the Japanese Emperor — after it was too

late; that is, after 9 p. m. on the nmnt of December 6, when the White

House had been alerted that the Japanese answer to our note of No-

vember 26 was coming in and being decoded and his naval aide was on

special duty to receive and deliver it to him. Hence, in such respects,

he adhered to his first alternative, that of waiting for Japanese action.

6. The appropriate high authorities in Washington had the organ-

ization for working in such close cooperation during the days imme-

diately prior to the Japanese attack on Decemher 7 that they had every

opportunity to make sure that identical and precise instructions war-

ranted hy the imminence of war went to the Hawaiian commanders.

For the purpose of taking concerted actions in fulfillment of the

duties imposed upon them, authorities in Washington formed two

groups or organizations with a view to coordinating the operations

of the civil and military branches of the executive department. If

these groups were so loosely constituted as not to deserve the name of

organizations, this was due to a failure on the part of the members

to make them effective bodies for the discharge of their coordinating

responsibilities.

The first of these two groups consisted of the Secretary of State,

Secretary of War, Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Staff, and the

Chief of Naval Operations. Sometimes it was called colloquially the

“War Council.”

The second group included the President, Secretary of State, Secre-

tary of War, Secretary of Navy, usually the Chief of Staff and the

Chief of Naval Operations, and occasionally commanding general of

Air Force, General Arnold. This group was sometimes colloquially

called the “War Cabinet.”

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The use of these terms — ^“War Council” and “War Cabinet”— while

the country was still at peace seems to indicate that high civil and

military authorities in Washington were thinking in terms of war

and should have been more alert to the probable events of war such

as an attack upon our most important outpost and fleet in the Pacific.

Each of these groups or organizations —

was a sort of clearinghouse for information, a gathering place for discussion of

policies, so that each of the independent actors in the scene would know what

was going on and would have information to guide him in making his own

decisions that were more or less independent, but at the same time somewhat

dependent on the action of other members of the group. (Italics supplied.)

(Army Pearl Harbor Board Report, p. 219.)

If it be argued that these groups were loosely constituted and met

irregularly and informally and hence were not organizations in the

strict sense of the term [they met once a week at least and had other

irregular and additional meetings], it remains a fact that they existed

for the purposes described. Furthermore, if, owing to their loose

constitution, they did not discharge their duties efficiently, it also

remains a fact that the President had the power, and the correspond-

ing duty, to transform either or both of these groups into positive

organizations with positive obligations in respect of exchanging infor-

mation, making decisions, coordinating the civil and military branches

of the executive department, and framing orders to outpost com-

manders. (See Conclusion No. 16.)

At all events, these groups had every opportunity to make sure that

identical and precise instructions warranted by the imminence of war

went out to the Hawaiian commanders and the President had the

power and duty to see that this was done directly or through the

agenCT of these OTOups, especially the second — the “War Cabinet.”

6. Through the Army and Navy intelligence services extensive

information urns secured respecting Japanese war plans and designs^

hy intercepted and decoded Japanese secret messages^ which indi-

cated the growing danger of war and increasingly after November

the imminence of a Japanese attach.

With extraordinary sKill, zeal, and watchfulness the intelligence

services of the Arnw Signal Corps and Navy Office of Naval Com-

munications broke Japanese codes and intercepted messages between

the Japanese Government and its spies and agents and ambassadors

in all parts of the world and supplied the high authorities in Wash-

ington reliable secret information respecting Japanese designs, deci-

sions, and operations at home, in the United States, and in other

countries. Although there were delays in the translations of many

intercepts, the intdligence services had furnished to those high au-

thorities a large nuinber of Japanese messages which clearly indi-

cated the growing resolve of the J apanese Government on war before

December 7, 1941.

Incidentally, it was a matter of great imprudence for the State

and War Department to permit so large a number (200) of Japa-

nese consular representatives at so important a naval base as Hawaii.

Much of the espionage involved in the intercepts emanated from this

consular group in Hawaii.

Four volumes laid before the Committee contain hundreds of

these messages — including in some cases comment and interpreta-

tions :

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(1) Pearl Harbor: Intercepted, Diplomatic Messages. Ex. 1 (253

PP-);

(2) Japanese Messages Concerning Military Installations., Ship

Movements, etc. (of the United States) (mimeograph, Ex. 2) ; and

(3) Army Pearl Harbor Board: Top Secret Testimony, Report,

ana Ofjiciai Memoranda (mimeograph).

(4) The Navy Court of Inquiry Top Secret Testimony and Report.

No person has any intellectual or moral right to pass judgment on

the question of responsibility for Pearl Harbor who has not read,

compared, studied, and interpreted all of these documents.

With regard to the volume, nature, and details of the information

respecting Japanese designs and operations supplied by the Army

and Navy intelligence services to high authorities in Washington,

see below. (Condusion 20.)

The President and the other officials receiving the intercepted mes-

sages in Washington prior to December 7, 1941, considered it likely

that Japan would attach the United States. At a meeting of the Presi-

dent and his so-called War Coimcil on November 25, 1941, according

to Mr. Stimson’s notes, the President stated : “That we were likely to ,

be attacked perhaps (as soon as) next Monday” (Tr., Vol. 70, p. 14418) .

There was abundant evidence in the intercepted messages that Japan

intended to attack the United States. J apan had fixed a dead-line date

of November 25 [ex. I, p. 100] , extended to November 29 [ex. I, p. 165] ,

for reaching diplomatic agreement with the United States. There were

at least six Japanese messages emphasizing this dead line. If the

dead-line date passed without agreement, the Japanese Government

advised her Ambassadors in Washington : “Things are automatically

going^to happen.” The necessity for agreement by the dead-line date

was stressed by Japan in these terms: “The fate of our Empire hangs

by the slender thread of a few days” ; “We gambled the fate of our

land on the throw of this die” (exhibit 1, p. 137, 93). On November

26, 1941, prior to the advanced “dead-line” date, the United States

Government delivered to Japan a diplomatic note, which the inter-

cepted messages revealed Japan considered to be a “humiliating pro-

S osal,” impossible of acceptance (^exhibit 1, p. 195). The intercepted

iplomatic messages further revealed that Japan expected to “rupture”

negotiations with the United States when she replied to the American

note of November 26 (exhibit 1, p. 208).

To prevent the United States from becoming unduly suspicious,

Japan instructed her envoys in Washington to keep up a pretext or

continuing negotiations until this Japanese reply was ready for de-

livery (exhibit 1, p. 208) . A message from the Japanese Government

to its Ambassador in Berlin, sent on November 30, was intercepted and

translated by the Navy in Washington on December 1 (exhibit 1,

p. 204) . In this message the Japanese Ambassador was instructed to —

immediately interview Chancellor Hitler and Foreign Minister Rlbbentrop and

confldentiaily communicate to them a summary of developments \* \* \*. Bay

very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break

out hettoeen the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms

and add the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone

dreams. (Italic supplied.)

The President regarded this message as of such interest that he

retained a copy of it, contrary to the usual practice in handling the

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intercepted messages (Tr., Vol. 57, p. 10887). On December 2, 1941,

elaborate instructions from Japan were intercepted dealing in precise

detail with the method of internment of American and British na-

tionals in Asia ‘‘on the outbreak of war with England and the United

States” (exhibit 1, p. 198).

The probability that the Pacific Fleet would be attacked at Pearl

Harbor was clear from the “bomb plot” available in Washington as

early as October 9, 1941, and related Japanese messages. It will aid

in obtaining a clear understanding of these important messages if the

principal intercepted communications are set forth in full. They are :

From: Tokyo (Toyoda)

To: Honolulu

September 24, 1941

#83

Strictly secret

Henceforth, we would like to have you make reports concerning vessels along

the following lines insofar as possible :

1. The waters (of Pearl Harbor) are to be divided roughly into five sub-areas.

(We have no objections to your abbreviating as much as you like.)

Area A. Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.

Area B. Waters adjacent to the Island south and west of Ford Island. (This

area is on the opposite side of the Island from Area A.)

Area C. Bast Loch.

Area D. Middle Loch.

Area B. West Loch, and the communicating water routes.

2. With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have you

report on those at anchor, (these are not so important) tied up at wharves, buoys

and in the docks. (Designate types and classes briefly. If possiWe we would like

to have you make mention of the fact when there are two or more vessels along

side the same wharf.)

ABMY 23260 Trans. 10/9/41 (S)

From: Honolulu (Xita)

To: Washington

September 29, 1941.

Circular #041

Honolulu to Tokyo #178

Re your #083\*

(Strictly secret)

The following codes will be used hereafter to designate the location of

vessels :

1. Repair dock in Navy Yard (The repair basin referred to in my message to

Washington #48\*\*) : KS.

2. Navy Dock in the Navy Yard (The Ten Ten Pier) : KT.

3. Moorings in the vicinity of Ford Island : FV.

4. Alongside in Ford Island: F(l. (Bast and west sides will be differentiated

by A and B respectively.)

Relayed to Washington, San Francisco.

•Not available

••Available dated 21 August

JD-l 6730 23312 (D) Navy Trans. 10-10-41 (X)

From: Tokyo (Togo)

To: Honolulu (Riyoji)

November 15, 1941.

#111

As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make

your “ships in harbor report” irregular, but at a rate of twice a week. Although

you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy.

JD-l: 6991 25644 (Y) Navy Trans. 12-3-41 (S)

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From: Tokyo (Togo)

To ; Honolulu

November 18, IMl

#113

Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein: Area

“N”, Pearl Harbor, Manila Bay,\* and the Areas Adjacent thereto. (Make your

investigation with great secrecy. )

ARMY 25773 Trans. 12.5.41 (S)

\* Probaby means Mamala May.

From: Tokyo (Togo)

To: Honolulu

November 20, 1041

#111 Strictly secret

Please investigate comprehensively the fleet — bases in the neighborhood of

the Hawaiian military reservation.

ARMY 25604 JD 7029 Trans. 12-4-41 (S)

From: Tokyo

To : Honolulu

November 29, 1941

#122

We have been receiving rei>orts from you on ship movements, but in future

will you also report even where there are no movements.

JD-1: 7086 25823 (Y) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (2)

From: Honolulu (Kita).

To: Tokyo.

November 18^ 194L

# 222 .

1. The warship at anchor in the harbor on the 15th were as I told you in my

#219“ on that day.

Area — ^A battleship of the Oklahoma class entered and one tanker left port.

Area C\* — ^Three warships of the heavy cruiser class were at anchor.

2. On the 17th the Saratoga was not in the harbor. The carrier Enterprise, or

some other vessel, was in area C. Two heavy cruisers of the Chicago class, one

of the Pensacola class were tied up at docks KS. Four merchant vessels were

at anchor in Area D"\*.

3. At 10 a. m. on the morning of the 17th, eight destroyers were observed

entering the harbor. Their course was as follows : In a single file at a distance

of 1,000 meters apart at a speed of 3 knots per hour, they moved into Pearl

Harbor. From the entrance of the harbor through area B to the buoys in area C,

to which they were moored, they changed course five times, each time roughly

30 degrees. The elapsed time was 1 hour; however,, one of these destroyers

entered area A after passing the water reservoir on the eastern side.

Relayed to .

ARMY 26817 Trans 12-6-41.

In the ‘‘bomb plot” message of September 24, 1941, the Japane^

Government gave detailed instructions to its consul general in Hawaii

as to the character of report it required concerning vessels in Pearl

Harbor. Pearl Harbor was to be divided into five subareas. An al-

phabetical symbol was given each area. The Japanese Government

instructed tne consul :

With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have you report

on those at anchor (these are not so important) tied up at wharves, buoys, and in

docks. (Designate type and classes briefly. If possible we would like to have

you make mention of the fact when there are two or more vessels alongside the

same wharf.)

• Available, dated November 14. Code under study.

^ Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.

• Bast Loch.

« Middle Loch.

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This dispatch was decoded and translated in Washington on October

9, 1941 (eMibit 2, p. 12) .

On September 29, 1941, the Japanese consul in Hawaii replied to

his government. He established a system of symbols to be used in

designating the location of vessels at key points in Pearl Harbor.

This dispatch was decoded and translated in Washington on October

10, 1941.

On November 15, 18, 20, and 29 the Japanese Government ur^ntly

called for information about the location of sliips in Pearl Harbor

(exhibit 2, p. 13-15) . On November 15 the Japanese consul in Hono-

lulu was directed to make his “ships in harbor report” irregular but

at the rate of twice a week (exhibit 2, p. 13). The reports were to

give vessel locations in specific areas of the harbor, using the symbols

established in September (exhibit 2', p. 15). The greatest secrecy

was enjoined because relations between Japan and the United Stat^

were described as “most critical,” On November 18 the Japanese

consul general reported to Tokyo the locations of the ships in the vari-

ous subareas of Pearl Harbor, giving minute descriptions of the

courses, speed, and distances apart of destroyers entering the harbor

(exhibit 2, p, 14). On November 29 reports were requested even

though there were no movements of ships. These despatches were

intercepted, decoded, and translated in Washington on December 3,

4, 5, and 6, 1941.

The “bomb plot” message, and those messages relating to Pearl

Harbor which followed it, meant that the ships of the Pacific Fleet in

Pearl Harbor were marked for a Japanese attack. No other Amer-

ican harbor was divided into subareas by Japan. And no other

American harbor had such a large share of the fleet to protect.

In no other area did Japan seek information as to whether two or

• more vessels were alongside the same wharf. Prior to the “bomb plot”

message Japanese espionage in Hawaii was directed to ascertain

the general whereabouts of the American Fleet, whether at sea or in

TOrt. With the “bomb plot” message Japan inaugurated a new policy

directed to Pearl Harbor and to no other place, in which information

was no longer sought merely as to the general whereabouts of the fleet,

but as to me presence of particular ships in particular areas of the

harbor. In the period immediately preceding the attack Japan re-

quired such reports even when there was no movement of ships in and

out of Pearl Harbor. The reports which Japan thus sought and

received had a useful purpose only in planning and executing an attack

upon the ships in port. These reports were not just the work of

enthusiastic local spies gathering meticulous details in an excess of

zeal. They were tne product of instructions emanating from the

Government of Japan in Tokyo. Officers of the high command in

Washington have admitted before us that the “bomb plot” message,

if correctly evaluated, meant an attack on ships of the Pacific Fleet

in Pearl Harbor (Tr., Vol. 18, p. 3026 ; Vol. 23, p. 4014 ; Vol. 27, p. 4874 ;

Vol. 12, p. 2100-2102; Vol. 59, p. 11313-11314; Vol. 35, p. 6390, 6394;

Vol. 30, p. 5378).

On October 9th, 1941 (ex. 2, p. 12) , Lieutenant Commander Kramer

of Naval Intelligence in Washington promptly distributed the Pearl

Harbor “bomb plot” message to the President, the Secretary of the

Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, the Direc-

tor of Naval Communications, the Director of War Plans, and the

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Director of Naval Intelligence (Tr,, Vol. 59 p. 11209). It bore the

notation “interesting message” on a gist or flag (Tr. Vol. 59, p. 11207) .

It was accompanied by a summary of its contents as follows :

Tokyo directs special reiwrts on ships in Pearl Harbor which is divided into

five areas for the purpose of showing exact locations (Tr., Vol. 59, p. 11207).

Military Intelligence through Colonel Bratton delivered the “bomb

g lot” message to the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, and the

Ihief of the War Plans Division (Tr., Vol. 62, p. 12083). The mes-

sage was discussed several times oy Colonel Bratton, Chief of the

Far Eastern Section, Military Intelligence Division, War Depart-

ment General Staff, with his op^site numbers in the Navy Depart-

ment (Tr., Vol. 62, p. 12105). They discussed possible significance

of the message, as indicating a plan for an air attack on ships in Pearl

Harbor (Tr., Vol. 62, p. 12105). In the course of these discussions

oflScers in Naval Intelligence stated that the Japanese were wasting

their time in getting such meticulous detail about the location of ships

in Pearl Harbor because the fleet would not be in Pearl Harbor when

the emergency arose.

Simple reason in evaluating these bomb plot messages should have

discovered their significance.

1. Such meticulous detail was not needed to enable Japan to

keep track of the American fleet for general purposes.

2. The messages were sent to Tokyo obviously for use originat-

ing from there — air or sea attack.

3. The messages couldn’t be for sabotage. Sabotage is an on-

the-spot affair. Saboteurs have to be in Hawaii. They get their

information direct by local observation. Therefore, they needed

no bomb plot.

4. The only purpose could be for air attack, submarine attack,

direct invasion — all external operations.

5. Had Washington so evaluated this bomb plot, it could have

seen this significance and warned the commanders at Hawaii.

Washington authorities failed to do so or if they did in fact

evaluate it, they failed to pass the information on to the Hawaiian

commanders.

The commander of a fleet (in this case Admiral Kimmel) has cus-

tody of the fleet; he is at all times materially interested in its safety.

The commander of a naval base (in this case General Short) has the

duty of protecting the fleet when it is at his base. Any information

showing specific hostile interest in that fleet or in the harbor where

the fleet is anchored is basic information for the commander of the

fleet and the commander of the naval base.

In Washington, long prior to December 7, 1941, Army and Navy

intelligence officers, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Army Chief

of Staff, and other high authorities gained vital information (the

bomb-plot messages) from intercepted Japanese communications

affecting the fleet and the defense of the naval base at Hawaii. They

gained it from sources of information not available to Admiral Kim-

mel and General Short.

In these circumstances, it was the express duty of the Washington

authorities to pass this information in its original form on to Ad-

miral Kimmel and General Short. The information was of such

a specific character and so directly related to the fleet and naval

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base that Washington authorities were not justified in keeping it

to themselves or in evaluating it in any manner which would dilute

or generalize the significance of the messages in their original form.

Washington authorities failed in this, a prime responsibility in their

relations with the outpost commanders.

In the days immediately preceding Pearl Harbor, Japan made no

effort to conceal the movements orpresence of her naval forces in South

East Asia (Tr., Vol. 3, p. 453) . Tne movements of her troops in Indo-

China at tnat time were the subject of diplomatic exchanges between

the United States and Japan (Foreign Eelations of the United States,

Japan, 1931-41, vol. II, p. 779) . Yet the intercepts showed that some

Japanese plan went into effect automatically on November 29, from

which Japan hoped to divert'American suspicion by a pretext of con-

tinued negotiations. The Pearl Harbor “bomb plot” messages gave

some hint of what might follow “automatically.”

• Only the President and his top advisers in Washington had this in-

formation. Other messages intercepted later were even more reveal-

ing . These were the intercepted Japanese messages distributed in

Washington on Saturday afternoon and evening, December 6, and

several hours before the blow fell on Sunday morning, December 7.

These were :

1. The “Pilot message.” This was a message from Japan to her

Ambassadors in Washington advising them that the Japanese reply

to the American note of November 26 was ready and being sent to

them in 14 parts ; that it was to be treated with great secrecy pending

instructions as to the time of its delivery ; and that the time for its

delivery was to be fixed in a separate message (Exhibit 1, p. 238).

2. The first 13 parts of the tfapanese reply. This included all but

the last paragraph of the Japanese note handed to the Secretary of

State on December 7 (Exhibit 1, pp. 239-244).

3. The fourteenth and last paragraph of the Japanese reply, and

' the message to the Japanese Ambassadors which fixed the time for de-

bvery of the Japanese note as 1 p. m. Washington time, December 7

(Exhibit 1, p. 248) .

Full details of the timing and significance of these messages, how

they were handled, and what was done about them is discussed in con-

clusion 20.

It is sufficient to say here that prior to December 7, 1941, a great

, volume of secret information obtained by American and other intelli-

f ence services from intercepted Japanese messages was available in

Washington with which to gage the designs, intentions, and operations

of J apan relative to the United States. This information was distrib-

uted to high authorities in Washington and practically pone of it was

' passed on to the commanders in Hawaii although it bore directly on

their responsibilities in the defense of their outpost.

7. Army and Navy information which indicated growing immi-

nence of war was delivered to the highest authorities in charge of

national preparedness for meeting an attach, among others, the Presi-

dent, the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, ana the Chief of Staff

and the Chief of Naval Operations.

The “magic” intelligence was regarded as preeminently confidential

and the policy with respect to its restricted distribution was dictated

by a desire to safeguard the secret that the Japanese diplomatic codes

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were being broken. Delivery of the English texts of the intercepted

messages was limited, within the War Department, to the Secretary of

War, the Cliief of Staff, the Chief of the War Plans Division, and the

Chief of the Military Intelligence Division; within the Navy, to the

Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of the

War Plans Division, and the Director of Naval intelligence; to the

State Department; and to the President’s naval aide for transmittal

to the President. By agreement between the Army and Navy m

Washington, the Army was responsible for distribution of magic within

the War Department and to the State Department; the Navy for dis-

tribution within the Navy Department and to the White House.

The President requested the original raw messages in English ex-

amining them personally and on December 6 had his naval aide on

special night duty to receive and deliver them to him.

The dissemination of magic materials did not include the command-

ers at Hawaii, but on a few occasions material derived therefrom was

dispatched by the Navy Department to Admiral Kimmel. The War

Department did not send the magic to the field. A large amount of

other intelligence obtained from various sources within and without

the country was not sent to either of the commanders in Hawaii.

8. Jvdging hy the military and na/ood history of Japwn, high authori-

ties in Washington and the comananders in Hawaii had good grounds

for expecting that in starting war the Japanese Gorernrneni would

make a surprise attack on the United States.

There is no evidence in the record before the Committee that Presi-

dejnt Roosevelt, Secretary Hull, Secretary Stimson, and/or Secretary

Knox expected at any time prior to December 7 a formal declaration of

war on the United States by Japan in case the diplomatic negotiations

came to a break. Indeed, all the evidence bearing on expectations in

Washington as to Japan’s probable methods of making war point to

the belief of the Administration that Japan would begin with a sur-

prise attack.

For example, Secretaiy Hull on November 25 and November 28 at

a meeting of “high officials,” when he stated that the matter of safe-

guarding our national security was in the hands of the Army and

Navy, “expressed his judgment that any plans for our military defense

would include the assumption that the Japanese might make the ele-

ment of surprise a central point in their strategy, and also might attack

at various points simultaneously with a view to demoralizing efforts

of defense and of coordination for purposes thereof” (Peace and War,

1943, p. 144).

Speaking to Ambassador Halifax on November 29, Secretary Hull

said that it would be a —

serious mistake ♦ ♦ ♦ to make plans of resistance without including the

possibility that Japan may move suddenly and with every possible element

of surprise ♦ \* ♦ that the Japanese recognize that their course of un-

limited conquest ♦ ♦ ♦ is a desperate gamble and requires the utmost

boldness and risk. {Peace and War, 1943, pp. 144-145).

Ambassador Grew reported to Hull on November 3 —

Japan may resort with dangerous and dramatic suddenness to measures which

might make inevitable war with the United States. {Peace and War, p. 775.)

9. Neither the diplomatic negotiations nor the intercepts and other

information respecting J apanese designs and operations in the hands of

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the United States authorities warranted those authorities in excluding

from defense measures or from orders to the Hawaiian commanders

the prohahility of an attach on Hawaii. On the contrary., there is

evidence to the effect that such an attach was, in terms of strategy,

necessary ^om the Japanese point of view and in fact highly prohaole,

and that President Roosevelt was tahing the probability into account —

before December 7.

The fleet was stationed at Pearl Harbor in a large measure, if not

entirely, for the purpose of exercisii^ a deterring effect on the

aggressive propensities of the Japanese Government during the diplo-

matic negotiations and of making the Government more likely to yield

to the diplomatic representations of the United States in matters of

policy. This was done contrary to the advice of the Commander in

Chief of the U. S. Fleet, Admiral Richardson (who was removed

because of protest on that issue), and with which Admiral William

D. Lea^, former Chief of Naval Operations agreed; (Tr. vol. 6, p.

916) . The fleet could produce this effect only as an instrument of war

that constituted a potential threat to the Japanese; that is, a powerful

instrument which could be used effectively to strike Japanese armed

forces if they moved too far southward in the direction of British,

Dutch, and/or American possessions in that region.

Having determined to move far southward and having moved far

on the way early in December toward that region, the Japanese were

warned by every principle of sound naval strategy to destroy, if pos-

sible, the American fleet at Hawaii on their left flank.

As Prime Minister Churchill said, in an address to the House of

Commons on January 27, 1942, with reference to the Atlantic Con-

ference and British strategic decisions as time went on after that

Conference:

It must also be remembered that over the whole Pacific scene brooded the

great power of the United States Fleet, concentrated at Hawaii. It seemed

very unlikely that Japan would attempt the distant invasion of the Malay

Peninsula, the assault upon Singapore, and the attack upon the Dutch Blast

Indies, while leaving behind them in their rear this great American Fleet.

President Roosevelt recognized this strategic consideration as shown

by his message to Chiang Kai-shek as follows :

Meanwhile we are exchanging views with the British Government in regard to

the entire situation and the tremendous problems which are presented, with a

view to effective coordinating of efforts in the most practicable way pos-

sible. • \* \*

Indirectly influencing that situation: American military and naval defensive

forces in the Philippine Islands, which are being steadily increased, and the

United States Fieet at Hawaii, lying as they do along the flank of any Japanese

military movement into China from Indo-china, are ever present and significant

factors in the whole situation, as are the increasing British and Dutch defen-

sive preparations in their territories to the south (Exhibit 16, State Department

message, approved by President Roosevelt and transmitted through Ambassador

Hu Sbih to Chiang Kai-shek).

High authorities in Washington definitely knew from a message

received from Ambassador Winant in London at 10 : 40 a. m. December

6, 1941 (Washington time) that two large Japanese forces had been

seen sailing toward the Kra Peninsula and were distant only fourteen

houiB in time (Ex. 21). Washington authorities should have known,

therefore, that this would bring the strategic principle of what to do

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about Hawaii into immediate military calculations. They took no

steps to alert Hawaii.

The Japanese were fully aware of this strategic principle in Decem-

ber 1941, as their attack on Pearl Harbor demonstrated.

During the weeks preceding December 7, what was the attitude of

high authorities in Washington with regard to the probability of

Japanese action against Pearl Harbor in accordance with this stra-

tegic principle?

Some of those high authorities thought that the Japanese would not

take the risk of such an attack. Indeed those authorities were seriously

lacking in information respecting the progress and state of Japanese

military and naval preparedness and equipment, and they were un-

aware of the degree to which the Japanese were equipped to attack the

American fleet and militant installations at Pearl Harbor. The State

Department seemed to labor under the impression that the United

States could defeat Japan in a few weeks. (See also Secretary Knox

Annual Navy Report of June 30, 1941, released December 6, 1941.)

Judging by the testimony and documents before the Committee, most

of the high authorities in Washington, especially after the Atlantic

Conference in August 1941, so concentrated their attention on Ameri-

can-British-Australian-Dutch plans for combined actions against the

Japanese in southeastern Asia that they failed to give sufficient, if

any, careful consideration to the strategic principle which enjoined

the Japanese to destroy, if they could, the American fleet at Hawaii

on their left flank before advancing too deeply into southeastern

waters.

Nevertheless the possibility, indeed the probabilitjr, of a Japanese ,

attack on Pearl Harbor had entered into the calculations of high au-

thorities in Washington and the commanders at Pearl Harbor for

years, months, and days before December 7, 1941.

The whole raison d^etre of the powerful naval and military installa-

tions in Hawaii, as publicly announced, was defense against a Japa-

nese attack. (See testimony of Mr. Grew for discussion of this point,

Tr., Vol. 9, p. 1586.) Preparations for defense against attack neces-

sarily implied the possibility of an attack.

American war plans and maneuvers in the Hawaiian area for years

prior to December 7, 1941. took into full account the probability of a

Japanese attack by air. (See Martin Bellinger report. Ex. 44.)

None of the Army and Navy witnesses tefore the committee ad-

mitted they had neglected the possibility — or the probability— of a

Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor during the period prior to December

7. On the contra^, they testified that they had consistently reckoned

with the possibility, even when they minimized the probability.

(Tr., for example, Vol. 12, p. 2111, Vol. 13, pp. 2162, 2167, 2172, 2173,

Vol. 14, p. 2341.)

Intercepts of Japanese messages made by the Army and Navy intel-

ligence services showed high authorities in Washington that the

Japanese Government had ordered its agents in Hawaii to report on

American military and naval installations and ship movements in

that region. They also required reports on “lack of movements.”

For example, September 24, 1941, it ordered an agent to subdivide the

waters of Pearl Harbor into five subareas, as well as to report on ship

movements there. Prior to and after this date Japanese agents were,

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up to the Japanese attack, reporting on ship movements, installations,

and other matters of military and naval significance to the Japanese

government. (Japanese messages concerning Military installations,

Ship movements, etc.^ pp. 2-29. See conclusion 6.)

It is true that owing to neglect or delays in Washington some of

these messages were not translated prior to December 7, 1941, but

enough messages had been translated to provide copious information

to high authorities in Washington. Delays in translations were not

due to lack of congressional appropriations (General Marshall, Tr.,

Vol 19, p. 3149).

Witnesses before the Committee, it may be noted, in extenuation of

their lack of emphasis on the probability of an attack on Pearl Harbor,

called attention to the fact that Japanese agents were also reporting on

the military and naval installations of the United States at Panama,

the Philippines, the west coast, and other points. But to men, comije-

tent, careful, and watchful, men alert on their all-around and indivis-

ible responsibility, this fact provided no excuse whatever for mini-

mizing the probability of an attack on Pearl Harbor any more than

at any other American outpost. Nor does it excuse the failure of W ash-

ington authorities to note that far greater detail was being asked for

by the Japanese about Hawaii at a time when Japanese movements in

the Southeastern Pacific had to contend with the strategic position of

Hawaii where the real American striking force, the fleet, rested.

A full review of the testimony and documents before the Committee

confirms the conclusion reached by the Army Pearl Harbor Board

(p. 107) ; after its survey of relevant facts: “We must therefore con-

clude that the responsible authorities, the Secretary of the Navy and

the Chief of Staff in Washington, down to the generals and admirals

\* in Hawaii, all expected an air attach before Pearl Harbor (that is

December 7, 1941).” As a general statement, when testifying after

the Pearl Harbor attack, they did not expect it. Apparently the only

person who was not surprised was the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson.

who testified : “Well, I was not surprised !”

10. The knowledge of Japanese designs and intentions in the hands

of the President and the Secretary of State led them to the conclusion

at least 10 days before December 7 that an attack by Japan within a

few days was so highly probable as to constitute a certainty and., having

reached this conclusion, the President, as Commander in Chief of the

Army and Navy, was under obligation to instruct the Secretary of

'War and Secretary of the Navy to make sure that the outpost comr-

manders put their armed forces on an all-ovt alert for war.

Besides the knowledge of Japanese designs and operations which

the President and the Secretary of State acquired from their diplo-

matic negotiations with Japan, they also had the knowledge of Japa-

nese designs and operations made available to them by the Army and

Navy intelligence services. This additional knowledge could only

serve to fortify the conviction already reached as early as November

25, namely, that a Japanese attack was near at hand or to use Presi-

dent Roosevelt’s own words, “we were likely to be attacked perhaps

as soon as Monday” (December 1) . (See above, conclusion 3.)

The nature of the additional information placed at the disposal of

the President and Secretary of State by the Army and Navy Intelli-

gence Service is indicated by the citations of Army and Navy inter-

cepts of Japanese messages. (See conclusion 20.)

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Through intercept of Japanese messages extending over many

months prior to December 7, 1941, translated and laid before high

authorities in Washington by the Army and Navy Intelligence Serv-

ices, these Washington authorities learned that Japanese spies and

agents, directed W the Japanese Government, were collecting and

transmitting to Tokyo an immense amount of exact and detailed

information respecting the military and naval installations and the

state of preparedness in the Hawaiian Islands, as well as elsewhere,

but more detailed in relation to Hawaii than elsewhere. (See

conclusion 6.)

As early as September 24, 1941, Washington authorities knew that

Japanese agents in Hawaii were instructed to divide the waters of

Pearl Harbor into five subareas and later to report to Tokyo regularly

on ships in the Harbor, ship movements, and also to report even

though there were no ship movements. These and other Japanese

messages requested information also on military installations, and

American preparedness materiel, defensive practices, including air

reconnaissance, and other matters of vital importance to Japanese

armed forces in case they made an attack on Pearl Harbor. (See con-

clusion 6.) Owing to inexcusable delays on the part of Army and

Navy authorities in Washington in translating the intercepts of Japa-

nese messages, many of the most critical and important messages

intercepted on and after November 24, 1941, were unavailable for

general distribution among high authorities in Washington before

the Japanese blow fell at Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7.

From a message from Tokyo to Washington, dated and translated

on November 28, authorities in Washington learned that the Japanese

Government regarded the American note of November 26 as “a‘

humiliating proposal,” and that “Japan cannot use it as a basis for

negotiations.” They further learned from this same Tokyo message

that the Japanese answer would be sent to the Japanese ambassadors

in Washin^on in two or three daysj which negotiations will he

de facto rwpturedf' [Italics supplied.]

From a message from Tokyo to Berlin, dated November 30 and

translated December 1, high authorities in Washington learned that

the American note of November 26 was considered by the Japanese

Government as “insulting” and that it was impossible for the Japa-

nese Government to find any basis in the American proposal for

negotiations, and that, in the Japanese Government’s opinion, the

United States regarded Japan, along with Germany and Italy as an

enemy.

From a message from Tokyo to Berlin, dated November 30 and

translated December 1, high authorities in Washington learned that

the Japanese Government regarded negotiations with the United

States as “ruptured — ^broken,” and that the J apanese Government had

stated that “the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker

than anyone dreams.”

Although the knowledge gained from these and other items of

information was sufficient to warn high authorities in Washington that

Japan was on the verge of starting hostilities, reference should be

made in this connection to the so-called “winds” messages concerning

which there had been much dispute and no little mystery. The story,

though long, may be abbreviated here.

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Colonel Otis Sadtler testified before the Army Pearl Harbor Board

that about November 20, 1941, a Japanese message was intercepted

notifying nationals that another message was to come indicating

whether war. if launched, would be against the United States, Great

Britain, or Bussia or any combination of them. The first message

stated that the second or “activating” message to come would indicate

by reference to the directions of the winds and weather the names of

the countries against which war would be started. The Army Pearl

Harbor Board also had evidence to the effect that the second or “acti-

vating” message from Japan had come and that it meant “War with

England, War with America, Peace with Kussia.” According to the

Board’s report :

This original message has now disappeared from the Navy files and cannot

be found. It was in existence just after Pearl Harbor and was collected with

other messages for submission to the Roberts Commission. Copies were in

existence in various places but they have all disappeared (Top Secret, p. 8).

The evidence before this Committee bearing on the interception of

the activating message from Tokyo and on the contention that it

indicated hostilities between Japan and the Anglo-American com-

bination covers hundreds of pages. Admittedly the evidence is con-

fusing and conflicting, but after reviewing it; Admiral Royal E.

Ingersoll, deputy to Admiral Harold Stark, testified before the Hart

Inquiry to questions 68 and 69 :

68. Q. During November or December, ’41, were you cognizant of a special

code which the Japanese had arranged, under which they were to inform their

nationals concerning against what nations they would make aggressive move-

ments, by means of a partial weather report?

A. Yes; I do recall such messages.

69. Q. Do you recall having seen, on or about 4 December, the broadcast direc-

tive, thus given, indicating that the Japanese were about to attack both Britain

and the United States?

A. Yes.

Admiral Ingersoll, Deputy to Admiral Harold Stark at Washing-

ton, and Admiral Turner, Navy operations officer at Washington, both

stated they did not know until 1945 about the allegation that there

had been no wind execute message. Even if the wind execute message

they saw was a false one they believed it true at the time and should

have acted accordingly.

If, however, the receipt of the activating “winds” message be wholly

discounted, such discounting in no way affects the other items of un-

mistakable evidence which demonstrates that high authorities in

Washin^on had sufficient knowledge of Japanese desi^s to convince

them before the attack that war with Japan was an imminent certainty.

From a message from Toyko to Washington, dated December 2 and

translated December 3, high authorities in Washington learned that

the Japanese Government had ordered its Washington Embassy to de-

stroy all codes except one and all secret documents. (One code ma-

chine was to be kept for use in the final negotiations which ended in

the rupture of relations on December 7.)

From a message dated December 6 and translated on December 6,

sometime in the afternoon, Washington authorities learned that the

Japanese Government had notified the Japanese Embassy in Wash-

ington that a memorandum for the United States would be sent in 14

parts and to be prepared to present it — the memorandum that would

make a rupture in relations with the United States.

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Messages serving as guides to profcedure in the matter of this 14-

part message follow :

(Secret)

From: Tokyo

To: Washington

December 7, 1941

(Urgent — Very Important)

#907 To be handled in Government Code

Be my #902.a

Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if pos-

sible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1 : 00 p. m., on

the 7th, your time.

Trans. 12/7/41 (S)

Army 25850

a S.LS. #26843 — text of Japanese reply.

(Secret)

Prom: Tokyo

To: Washington

December 6, 1941

#904

Re my #902

There is really no need to tell you this, but in the preparation of the aide

memoire be absolutely sure not to use a typist or any other person.

Be most extremely cautious in preserving secrecy.

Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

Army 25844

JD: 7144

(Secret)

From: Tokyo

To: Washington

December 7, 1941

(Extremely Urgent)

#910

After deciphering part 14 of my #902 a and also #907 b, #908 c and 909 d,

please destroy at once the remaining cipher machine and ail machine codes.

Disi>ose in like manner also secret documents.

Trans. 12/7/41 (S)

The “pilot message” was filed in Tokyo at 6: 56 a. m. Washington

time December 6; it was intercepted by the Navy by 7: 20 a. m. Wash-

ington time December 6, and forwarded to the Navy Department. It

was sent by the Navy to the Army for decryption and translation about

noon, Washington time, on December 6 (exhibit 41 ) . It was decrypted,

translated, and distributed about 3 p. m., Washington time, by the

Army, to Mr. Hull, Mr. Stimson, General Marshall, the Chief of the

War Plans Division, General Gerow, and the Chief of Military Intel-

ligence, General Miles (Tr., Vol. 62, p. 12050). In the Navy Depart-

ment the Director of Naval Intelligence — Admiral Wilkinson — re-

ceived the so-called “pilot message” prior to 6 p. m., Washington time,

on December 6 (Tr., Vol. 26, p. 4658) . He had previously told his sub-

ordinates to be on the lookout for the Japanese reply and felt sure that

he gave instructions that the “pilot message” was to be delivered to

Admiral Stark (Tr., Vol. 26, p. 4662). Admiral Turner, Chief of the

War Plans Division in the OflSce of the Chief of Naval Operations,

received the “pilot message” in the evening of December 6 (Tr., Vol.

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30, pp. 5440-5442) . Admiral Stark and General Marshall each denies

that on December 6 he had knowledge of the “pilot message” (Tr.,

Vol. 21, p. 3473, and Vol. 32, p. 5813). We find on the testimony of

General Miles and Colonel Bratton that the “pilot message” was de-

livered to General Marshall during the afternoon of December 6,

1941 (Tr., Vol. 21, pp. 3589-3590, and Vol. 62, pp. 12049-12050).

In late afternoon or early evening of December 6, American Naval

Communications intercepted, decoded, and translated the first 13 parts

of this memorandum from the Japanese Government to the State De-

partment — the answer to the United States note to Japan on November

26. The translation of these 13 parts was presented to President

Roosevelt between 9 and 10 o’clock that eveni^. After he had read

the 13 parts, the President said in substance, “This means war.”

The evidence indicated that the first 13 parts were read on the

evening of December 6 by, particularly, the President, Mr. Harry

Hopkins, Secretary Knox, Admiral Ingersoll, Admiral Turner, Ad-

miral Wilkinson, Admiral BeardaU, General Miles, Captain Kramer,

and Colonel Bratton.

Owing to the practice of making decisions by war cabinets, councils,

joint committees, and individuals, official responsibility of each man

was so blurred that each man became indifferent to his own individual

responsibility. A good example of this is Admiral Turner’s assump-

tion that so long as Admiral Wilkinson, Admiral Ingersoll, and Secre-

tary Knox had seen the 13-part message, “I did not believe it was my

function to take any action.” No one took action that night; all

waited for the next day.^

When Mr. Knox received the message he called Mr. Stimson and

Mr. Hull and arranged a conference with them for Sunday morning

at 10 a. m. (Tr., Vol. 56, pp. 10675-10681). Mr. Stimson asked the

Navy Department on Saturday evening to furnish him by 9 a. m.

Sunday morning the following information :

Compilation of men-of-war in Far East : British, American, Japanese, Dntch,

Russian ; also compilation of American men-of-war in Pacific Fleet, with locations,

with a list of American men-of-war in the Atlantic without locations (Tr., Vol.

69, p. 13,988; italics inserted).

Admirals Stark, Ingersoll, and the Secretary of the Navy were con-

sulted about this request. The Secretary of the Navy directed that

^ On many occasions the obligation of an officer was weakened by intermeddling of

superiors. President Roosevelt, himself, often directed detailed operations for which held

commanders were responsible. An example of this occurred in connection with an order

on December 2, 1941, which the Chief of Naval Operations sent to the Commander in

Chief of the Asiatic Fleet, commencing as follows :

^'President directs that the following be done as soon as possible and within 2 days if

Possible after receipt this despatch\*\* (exhibit 37, p. 39).

The President’s directions were that the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet was to

charter three small vessels to form a “defensive information patrol.’\* The minimum re-

quirements to establish these ships as United States men of war would suffice in manning

them. These requirements were command by a naval officer and the mounting of a small

gun and one machine gun. The employment of Filipino crews with the minimum number

naval ratings was authorized. The ships were to observe and report by radio Japanese

movements to the West China Sea and Gulf of Slam. The President prescribed the point

at which each vessel was to be stationed. One vessel was to be stationed between Hainan

and Hue ; one between Camranh Bay and Cape St. Jaques ; one oif Pointe De Camau

(exhibit 37, p. 39). All these points were clearly in the path of the Japanese advance

down the coast of Indochina, and toward the Gulf of Siam. The Navy Department did

not originate this plan (Tr., Vol. 60, p. 11351) The Navy Department would not have

directed it to be done unless the President had specifically ordered it (Tr., Vol. 60, p. 11351).

Admiral Hart was already conducting reconnaissance off that coast by planes from Manila

(Tr., Vol. 60, p. 11350). So far as the Navy Department was concerned, sufficient informa-

tion was being received from this air reconnaissance (Tr., Vol. 60, p. 11351 K Had the

Japanese fired upon any one of these three small vessels, it would have constituted an overt

act on the part of Japan (Tr., Vol. 60, p. 11352). Interferences such as these by superior

officers, however, permitted by the line of authority, breed indifference to responsibility

on the part of the officer who is superseded.

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the information be compiled and delivered prior to 10 o’clock Sunday,

December 7, (Tr., Vol. 69, p. 13989). This was done. The compila-

tion showed that practically all the ships of the Pacific Fleet were in

Pearl Harbor (Exhibit 176, p. 2).

In the early morning of December 7, 1941, about 5 a. m. Washington

time, the message fixing the hour for delivery of the Japanese note as

Ip. m., Washington time, was available in the Navy Department in

Washington (Tr., Vol. 56, pp. 10694-10701). This was 8^ hours be-

fore the attack on Pearl Harbor. Admiral Stark and his principal

subordinates have testified before us that they had knowledge of this

message about 10:30 a. m. (Tr., Vol. 26, p. 4676; Vol. 49, pp. 9146-

9148 ; Vol. 55, p. 10469) . This was 5V^ hours after it had been received

in the Navy Department. It was about 3 hours before the attack.

The relation of 1 p. m. Washington time to early morning in Hawaii

was pointed out to Admiral Stark (Tr., Vol. 49, pp. 9146-9148, 9154-

9156, 9236-9254 ; Vol. 26, pp. 4679, 4685) . It meant dawn in Hawaii —

the strategic time at which to launch an attack. Admiral Stark was

urged W the Director of Naval Intelligence to send a warning to the

fleet (Tr., Vol. 26, p. 4673). The chief intelligence officers of the

Army had the “1 p. m. message” by 9 a. m. Washington time, imme-

diately appreciated its significance, but did not succeed in bringing

it to General Marshall’s attention until nearly several hours later

(Tr., Vol. 62, pp. 12077-12078, 12079-12081). Marshall was horse-

Back riding in Virginia. No action was taken by the Army until he

saw and read the 1 p. m. message and related intercepts, at which

time he sent a message to General Short which went over com-

mercial facilities and was received after the Pearl Harbor attack

(Tr., Vol. 18, pp. 2935-2939, Vol. 45, p. 8396). Admiral Stark took

no action on this information except to agree to the inclusion in the

belated Army message of instructions to General Short to advise

Admiral Kimmel of its contents (Tr., Vol. 32, pp. 5814-5816).

Mr. Hull, Mr. Stimson, and Mr. Knox had the 1 p. m. message at

their conference about 10:30 a. m. Washington time, December 7

(Tr., Vol. 55, p. 10473). The relation of WaSiington time to time in

Hawaii and the Philippines was brought to their attention (Tr., Vol.

55, pp. 10473-10475). Mr. Stimson’s notes describing the Sunday

morning conference state :

Today is the day that the Japanese are going to bring their answer to Hall,

and everything in MAGIC indicated they had been keeping the time back nntii now

in order to accomplish something hanging in the air. Knox and I arranged

a conference with Hull at 10 : 30 and we talked the whole matter over. Hull

is very certain that the Japs are planning some deviltry and we are all wonder-

ing where the blow will strike (Tr., Vol. 70, p. 14428).

The 1 p. m. message was delivered to the White House about 10 : 30

a. m. Sunday, December 7, 1941 (Tr., Vol. 55, p. 10476) .

On the morning of December 7, before 8 o’clock. Navy Intelligence

had ready for high authorities of the United States Government a

translation of its intercept of the fourteenth and final part of the

Japanese memorandum.

ITie fact that General Marshall decided on the basis of the inter-

cepts of Japanese messages made available on or before 11:25 o’clock

on the morning of December 7, to send an urgent war warning to the

outpost commanders is itself evidence that, despite previous messages

to outpost commanders, Washington authorities recognized that their

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knowledge of these intercepts and their minute direction of affairs

placed an obligation on them to convey precise information to out-

post commanders and to make sure that they were on an all-out alert

for war. Owii^ to inexcusable delays in Washington this final warn-

ing to General Short did not reach him until after the J apanese attack.

General Marshall failed to use the scrambler telephone on his desk

to call General Short in Hawaii on Sunday morning, December 7,

nearly 2 hours before the attack, and give him the same information

which he sent in the delayed telegram which reached General Short

after the attack. General Marshall testified that among the possible

factors which may have influenced him against using the scrambler

telephone was the possibility that the Japanese could construe the facC

that the Army was alerting its garrisons in Hawaii as a hostile act

(Tr., Vol. 20, pp. 3389-3390).

The Japanese would have grasped at most any straw to bring to such portions

of our public that doubted our integrity of action that we were committing an act

that forced action on their part (Tr., Vol. 19, p. 3193) .

This explanation is no excuse for the failure to put the Hawaiian

commanders on the full alert for defense. Such an alert could not

be considered a hostile or aggressive act on the part of the United

States.

11. The decision of the President., in view of the Constitution^ to

await the Japanese attach rather than ask for a declaration of war

by Congress increased the responsibility of high authorities in Wash-

ington to use the utmost care in putting the commanders at Pearl

Harbor on a full alert for defensive actions before the Japanese attack

on December 7, 1941.

The difficulty of coping effectively with the menace of Japanese

hostilities by the method of maneuvering and waiting for an attack

or attacks (conclusions 2, 3, and 4) was recognized by the President

and his immediate subordinates. They knew that the power to declare

war was vested in Congress alone by the Constitution. Prime Min-

ister Churchill, who had referred to this matter at the Atlantic Con-

ference (conclusion 1) again suggested to President Koosevelt, on

November 30, 1941, that the President inform the J apanese that further

aggression on their part would compel him “to place the gravest

issues before Congress” (Tr., Vol. 8, p. 1253). President Roose-

velt must have given serious thought to the constitutional difficulty

during the several days prior to December 7, while he was consider-

ing plans for a special message to Congress (conclusions 3 and 4).

After it was decided, therefore, that no message be sent to Congress

it then became all the more incumbent upon the President and the Sec-

retary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Staff, and

the Chief of Naval Operations to make doubly certain that war warn-

ing messages to General Short and Admiral Kimmel be so clearly

formulated as to mean to them an all-out alert of the forces imder their

command.

12. Inasmuch as the knowledge respecting Japanese designs and

operations which was in the possession of high authorities in Wash-

ington differed in nature and volume from that in the possession of

the Pearl Harbor commanders it was especially incumbent upon the

former to formulate instructions to the latter in language not open

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to misinterpretation as to the ohligaMons imposed on the commanders

hy the instructions.

Since Washington authorities knew that vital information in their

possession— diplomatic, military, and naval — ^was not being sent to

General Short and Admiral Kimmel, and that this was because of

Washington’s own decision, it was obligatory for them to give particu-

lar care to the formulation of messages to the commanders which

revealed the growing war tension, the menacing imminence of the

breach in American- Japanese relations, and the resolve of those high

authorities to wait for an attack, while still carrying on maneuver-

ing (conclusions 1-5 and below, conclusion 20).

The increasing assumption of the detailed direction of affairs by

high authorities in Washington added to the obligation of those high

authorities to give precise instructions to the outpost commanders.

For information in possession of Washington authorities not sent

to General Short and Admiral Kimmel, see Army Pearl Harbor Board

and Navy Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry reports, top secret reports,

and top secret memoranda. It is true that General Short and Admiral

Kimmel had a great deal of information as to Japanese designs and

operations which was not in the messages sent to them by the War

Department and the Navy Department. It is also true that there

were differences of opinion among high authorities in Washington

over the nature of the information conveyed by certain intercepts;

for example, the so-called “winds message” and the activating “winds

message.” But it is beyond all question that Wa^liington author-

ities had a large volume of information, particularly as to vital

diplomatic decisions and Japanese intentions which was not trans-

mitted to the Hawaiian commanders- This withholding of informa-

tion from General Short and Admiral Kimmel was in part due to

a general policy adopted in Washington.

General Sherman Miles, at the hearing of November 30, testified

that neither the intercepted messages nor essential information de-

rived from them had been sent to Hawaii, although in exceptional

cases the substance of some messages had been transmitted in naval

code. The exceptional practice of sending the substance in some mes-

sages was stopped in July 1941 and General Miles testified that, so

far as he knew, General Short and Admiral Kimmel were not notified

of this change — this discontinuance of sending even the substance of

some intercepts. (Tr., Vol. 13, pp. 2140-2142.)

Admiral Kimmel had remiested all information and was assured

by Admiral Stark he would get it. A few messages were sent up

until December 7, but he had no notice that he was not getting all the

information available.

From among the numerous items of crucial information in posses-

sion of Navy Intelligence and Washington authorities and not trans-

mitted to General Short one may be selected as particularly perti-

nent to Pearl Harlwr. Through its intelligence sources in the Four-

teenth Naval District at Pearl Harbor and in Washington, the Navy

discovered the presence at Jaluit, in the Marshall Islands, of a

Japanese fleet composed of aircraft carriers and other vessels, but lost

track of it about December 1. Jaluit is 1,500 miles nearer to Pearl

Harbor than is the mainland of Japan. The Japanese fleet there was

a strong force capable of attacking Hawaii. Information about this

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Japanese fleet was delivered to the War Department, but it was not

transmitted to General Short. General Short testified during the

Army board hearings on Pearl Harbor that knowledge of the Jap-

anese fleet at Jaluit would have materially modified his point of

view and actions (Army Pearl Harbor Report, pp. 146-147) .

Japan had fixed a dead-line date of November 25 (Exhibit 1, p.

100), extended to November 29 (Exhibit 1, p. 165) (see Japanese

messages), for reaching a diplomatic agreement with the United

States. There were at least six messages. If the dead-line date

passed without agreement, the Japanese Government advised her

Ambassadors in Washington: “Things are automatically going to

happen.” The necessity for agreement by the dead-line date was

stressed by Japan in these terms :

The fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days ; (and also)

we gambled the fate of our land on the throw of this die (Exhibit 1, p. 137, 93).

On November 26, 1941, prior to the advanced “dead line” date, the

United States Government delivered to Japan a diplomatic note,

which the intercepted messages revealed Japan considered to be a

“humiliating proposal,” impossible of acceptance (Exhibit 1, p. 195).

The intercepted diplomatic messages further revealed that Japan

expected to ^‘rupture” negotiations with the United States when she

replied to the American note of November 26 (Exhibit 1, p. 195) . To

prevent the United States from becoming unduly suspicious Japan

instructed her envoys in Washington to keep up a pretext of continuing

negotiations until this Japanese reply was ready for delivery (Exhibit

1, p. 208).

A message from the Japanese Government to its Ambassador in

Berlin, sent on November 30, was intercepted and translated to the

Navy in Washington on December 1 (Exhibit 1, p. 204). In this

message the Japanese Ambassador was instructed to—

immediately interview Chancellor Hitler and Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and

confidentially communicate to them a summary of development. \* • • Say

very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break

out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms and

add the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone

dreams.

The President regarded this message as of such interest that he

retained a copy of it, contrary to the usual practice in handling the

intercepted messages (Vol. 57, pp. 10887-10888).

On December 2, 1941, elaborate instructions from Japan were inter-

cepted dealing in precise detail with the method of interment of

American and British nationals in Asia “on the outbreak of war with

England and the United States” (Exhibit 1, p. 198).

None of these messages showing the imminence of war was sent to

Admiral Kimmel or General Short.

IS. The messages sent to General Short and Admiral Kimmel by high

authorities in Washington during November were couched in such

conflicting and imprecise language that they failed to convey to the

commanders defnite information on the state of diplomatic relations

with Japan and on Japanese war designs and positi/oe orders respect-

ing the particular actions to he taken — orders that were beyond all

reasonable doubts as to the need for an cdl-out alert. In this regard

the said high authorities failed to discharge their full duly.

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On this subject the Committee has before it hundreds of pages of

testimony, exhibits, and documents in which conflicting views are

expressed by men presumably of competence and understanding as to

the sufliciency or insufficiency of the war warnings to General Short

and Admiral Eimmel. According to the obligations conferred won

the Committee by the joint resolution creating it, as explained by ^n-

ator Barkley in his address to the Senate on September 6, 1945, the

Committee is bound to weigh all messages and information available

to General Short and Admiral Kimm el.

A full review of all the testimony, exhibits, and papers relative to

the so-called war- warning messages sent to General l^ort and Admiral

Kimmel would fill a volume of at least 500 pages, so we content our-

selves with presenting the following facts in respect to the conflicting,

imprecise, and insufficient character of these messages.

It should be here observed that Washington had taken unto itself

such a minute direction of affairs as regards outposts that the usual

discretion of outpost commanders was narrowly limited.

First of all, it is to be noted that the four reports by the Army

and Navy boards created to investigate Pearl Harbor found the warn-

ing messages insufficient to put the Hawaiian commanders on a full

war alert; and the President’s Commission on Pearl Harbor, while

finding the commanders guilty of dereliction of duty, itself places

neglect on the part of the War Department, in respect to such orders,

as among the contributory causes of the catastrophe at Pearl Harbor,

thus qualifying its own conclusions.

The President’s Commission, though limited by his instructions to

a search for derelictions of duty and errors of judgment on the part

of the Army and Navy personnel, made a point of declaring that the

Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of the

Navy had fulfilled their obligations with regard to matters bearing

on the situation at Pearl Haimor and that the Chief of Staff and the

Chief of Naval Operations had fulfilled their command responsi-

bilities in issuing warning messages to the two commanders.

But the Commission includes among the grounds for charging Gen-

eral Short and Admiral Kimmel with dereliction of duty their failure

“to consult and confer” with each other ^^respecting the meaning and

intent of the warnings^ Thus the Commission in effect concedes that

the war warning messages were couched in language so imprecise that

the commanders would have to consult and confer in order to discover

what the messages meant.

Having made this statement, the Commission goes on to lay some

of the blame for the Pearl Harbor catastrophe on the War Depart-

ment and the Navy Department (that is, upon Secretary Stimson.

Secretary Knox, and/or General Marshall and Admiral Stark, whom

the Commission had earlier in its report exculpated) . The Commis-

sion declared that among the —

causes contributory to the success of the Japanese attack were: limphasis In

the warning messages on the probability of aggressive Japanese action in the Far

East and on antisabotage measures. Failure of the War Department to reply

to the message relating to the antisabotage measures instituted by the Com-

manding General, Hawaiian Department.

Had the Commission been in a mind to do so, it might have added :

Failure of the War and Navy Departments to mention in these mes-

sages the probability of an attack on Pearl Harbor.

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Secretary Stimson apparently was not considering the attack at

Pearl Harbor when the message of November 27 was prepared, for

he said : “The main question has been over the message that we shall

send to Mac Arthur” (Tr., Vol. 70, p. 14422). General Mac Arthur,

having the magic intercepts, was in a better position to judge the

situation than was Admiral Kimmel who had to rely upon the inade-

quate and ambiguous information from Washington.

Finally, it is to be noted that the Commission also places among the

“contribute^ causes” the “nonreceipt by the interested parties, prior

to the attack, of the warning message of December 7, 1941.” As a

matter of fact the “nonreceipt” of this warning message was due to

inexcusable delays of high authorities in Washington (conclusion 20) .

Hence, it appears that the President’s Commission, by direct state-

ments and by implication, admits definitely that the war- warning

messages to General Short and Admiral Kimmel were imprecise, in-

definite, and constituted no sufficient warning for an all-out alert, par-

ticularly the messages to General Short, whose primary duty it was

to defend Pearl Harbor and protect the fleet while in the harbor.

The Army Pearl Harbor Board, after a careful examination and

comparison of the war-warning messages, concluded that the messages

of November 27 were “conflicting” and that the statements in the

message to General Short were “inadequate” and “misleading”

(APHB, pp. 229, 129-133). The Army Board also criticized the War

Department for failure to send “specific directives” to outpost com-

manders (ibid., p. 159) .

Despite its conclusion that General Short had displayed lack of

judgment, the Army Board laid against him no charge oi dereliction

of duty and made no recommendations in that respect. The Navy

Court of Inquiry likewise criticized the war-warning messages for

lack of directives as to actions at Pearl Harbor (1-34) and concluded

that “no offenses have been committed nor serious blame incurred on

the part of any person or persons in the naval service.” It recom-

mended no further proceedings be had in the matter (1-46, 1-47).

In the testimony and other evidence presented to this Committee

there is no proof that warrants traversing the judgment reached by

the President’s Commission, the Army Pearl Harbor Board, or tbie

Navy Pearl Harbor Court to the effect that the war-warning messages

were not in fact clear and unmistakable directives for an all-out alert

against a probable Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The funda-

mental messages in the nature of “war warnings” were those of Novem-

ber 24 and 27.

On November 24, 1941, Admiral Kimmel received the following

message marked for action :

CHANCES OF FAVORABLE OUTCOME OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN

VERY DOUBTFUL. THIS SITUATION COUPLED WITH STATEMENTS OP

JAPANESE GOVERNMENT AND MOVEMENTS THEIR NAVAL AND MIL-

ITARY FORCES INDICATE IN OUR OPINION THAT A SURPRISE A GORES-

SIVE MOVEMENT IN ANY DIRECTION INCLUDING ATTACK ON PHILIP-

PINES OR GUAM IS A POSSIBILITY. CHIEF OF STAFF HAS SEEN THIS

DESPATCH CONCURS AND REQUESTS ACTION ADEES TO INFORM

SENIOR ARMY OFFICERS THEIR AREAS. UTMOST SECRECY NECES-

SARY IN ORDER NOT TO COMPLICATE AN ALREADY TENSE SITUATION

OR PRECIPITATE JAPANESE ACTION. GUAM WILL BE INFORMED

SEPARATELY (Ex. No. 37, p. 82).

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On the next day, November 25, Admiral Stark confused the direc-

tions in this messa^ and diluted its effectiveness by sending a letter

to Admiral KimmS in which Admiral Stark concluded “I won’t go

into the pros and cons of what the United States may do. I’ll be

damned if I know. I wish I did.” The postscript of this letter read :

I held this up pending a meeting with the President and Mr. Hull today.

I hare been in constant touch with Mr. Hull and it was only after a Hong

talk with him that I sent the message to you a day or two ago showing the

gravity of the situation. He confirmed it all in today’s meeting, as did the

President. Neither would be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack. From

many angles an attack on the Philippines would be the most embarrassing

thing that could hapi>en to us. There are some here who think it likely to

occur. I do not give it the weight others do, but I included it because of the

strong feeling among some people. You know I have generally held that it was

not time for the Japanese to proceed against Russia. I stiU do. Also I still

ra^er look for an advance into Thailand, Indo-China, Burma Road areas as

the most likely.

I won’t go into the pros or cons of what the United States may do. I wilj.

be damned if I know. I wish I did. The only thing I do know is that we may

do most anything and that’s the only thing I know to be prepared for; or we

may do nothing — I think it is more likely to be “anything” (Exhibit No. 106).

If any candid person has doubt about their insufficiency to

constitute orders for an all-out alert to meet a probable Japanese attack

on Pearl Harbor, he can allay his doubt by examinii^ carefully the

messages of November 27 to General Short and Admiral Kimmel

printed below in parallel columns : ^

To General Short\* To Admiral Kimmel\* ^

Negotiations with Japanese ai^ar to Consider this dispatch a war wan^

be terminated to all practical purposes ing. The negotiations with Japan in an

vnth Wily the barest possibilities that effort to stabilize conditions in the

the Japanese Oovernment might come Pacific have ended, Japan is expected

bach and offer to continue, Japanese to make aggressive move within the

future action unpredictable but hostilev next few days. An amphibious ewpediX

action possible at any moment. If hos- \tion against either the Philippines, \

tilities cannot, repeat can not, be yT/tai, or Kra Peninsula or possibly ^

avoided tAe U. 8, desires that Japan/ Borneo is indicated by the number and

commit the first overt act. This poUcy equipment of Japanese troops and the

should not, repeat not, be construed as organization of their naval task forces/

restricting you to a course of action You will execute a defensive deploy-^

that might Jeopardi 2 se your defense, ment in preparation for carrying out]

Prior to Japanese hostile action you are the tasks assigned in WPL 46 only.y

directed to undertake such reconnais- Guam, Samoa and Continental Di^

sance and other measures as you deem tricts have been directed to take appro/4

necessary but these measures should be priate measures against sabotagey^A

carried out so as fwt, repeat not, tO\ similar warning is being sent by fne

alarm the civil population or disclos^ War Department, Inform naval dis-

intent. Report measures taken. Should trict and Army authorities. British to

hostilities occur, you will carry out task be informed by Spenavo.

assigned in Rainbow Five as far as

they pertain to Japan. Limit di^

semination of this highly secret inf or- )

mation to minimum essential officers^

^Italics supplied.

The use of the term ‘‘war warning” in constant reference to this

message of November 27 to Admiral Kimmel creates a wrong im-

1 In addition to the above messages General Short was sent during the last week in No-

vember two other messages relating solely to sabotage. , ^

Admiral Kimmel also received several messages assigning his carriers to the movement of

planes to other islands. , ,

» WPIi 46 was an over-all plan of action to be placed in effect by United States forces, in

association with the British and Dutch, when war finally broke out.

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pression. The entire message is of the utmost importance and should

be read as a whole rather than adopt two words from it which when

taken alone create the wrong impression..

In response to the message to him, General Short soon replied that

he had alerted his command against sabotage :

Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage Liaison with the Navy.

Reurad four seven two twenty-seventh (Exhibit 32, p. 12).

The Chief of the War Plans Division of the Army^ General Leonard

T. Gerow, saw General Short’s reply, noted and initialed it (exhibit

46). General Marshall saw General Short’s reply, initialed the docu-

ment to which it was appended, and routed it to the Secretary of

War (exhibit 46) (Tr.,Vol. 22, pp. 3722-3723). The Secretary of War

saw, noted, and initialed General Short’s reply (Exhibit 46).

General Marshall had in May 1941 taken with him to the Presi-

dent an aide memoire concerning the defense of Hawaii. It con-

tained the following sentence:

In point of sequence, sabotage is first to be expected and may, within a

very limited time, cause great damage. On this account, and in order to as-

sure strong control, it would be highly desirable to set up a military control

of the islands prior to the likelihood of our involvement in the Par East.

(Committee Exhibit No. 59.)

To General Short’s response, the War Department made no answer

whatever. The President’s Commission on Pearl Harbor took note of

this failure on the part of the War Department and placed it among

the contributory causes of the catastrophe. In their testimony before

this Committee, General Marshall and General Gerow admitted that

the failure to inform General Short immediately as to the insufficiency

of his antisabotage alert was a mistake on their part and General

Marshall took full responsibility upon himself for this failure (Tr.,

Vol. 19, pp. 3126 and 3164) . Keasonably conclusive evidence that the

war warning messages which had been sent to General Short and

Admiral Kimmel on November 27 were insufficient to constitute a

proper and adequate war warning is provided by General Msirshall’s

decision to send another warning message to General Short on the

morning of December 7, despite the insistence of other high authorities

in Washington that the previous messages were sufficient.

Two points in the message of November 27 to General Short deserve

special consideration. It informed him that “the United States de-

sires Japan to commit the first overt act,” if hostilities cannot be

avoided. And it also informed him that such measures as he deemed

necessaij to adopt “should be carried out so as not to alarm the dvil

population or disclose intent.” A limitation on dissemination was to

“minimum essential officers.”

As to “overt act,” it is to be emphasized that an aU-out alert for

defense against a possible or probable attack by an enemy is not

an overt act of war. Nor did the Government of the United States

regard it as such, for, on the basis of reports respecting a probable

Japanese attack. General Marshall, on June 17, 1940, instructed Gen-

eral Herron, the Commanding General in Hawaii, to order an all-out,

full, war alert and the armed forces were set in motion immediately

and kept alerted for six weeks (testimony Tr., Vol. 17, pp. 2776 ff.) .

This message reads :

Immediately alert complete defense organization to deal with possible trans-

pacific raid comma to greatest extent possible without creating public hysteria

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or provoking undue curiosity of newspapers or alien agenta Suggest maneuver

ba^. Maintain alert nntll further ordera Instructions for secret communi-

cation direct with Chief of Staff will be furnished you shortly. Acknowledga

No United States official then regarded this action as an overt act

against Japan. Moreover, when in this 1940 case Washin^on au-

thorities were worried .about hostile Japanese action, they ordered the

commanding general at Hawaii to an immediate “complete defense

organization to deal with possible trans-Pacific raid” in language that

was crystal clear.

The fact is that the War Department and Navy Department did

not instruct General Short and Admiral Kimmel to put into effect an

all-out war alert, and the War Department was informed by General

Short that he had actually put into effect the alert against sabotage.

Furthermore, the actions of the War Department in instructing Gen-

eral Short in November and December as the Army Pearl Harbor

Board correctly stated, showed “a lack of adequate procedure under

which to advise the Hawaiian Department and to control its actions”

(APHB, p. 240).

The War Department failed to reply to General Short’s antisabotage

report. It failed to give him further instructions for a stronger alert.

These failures, it is reasonable to say, contributed heavily to the

unpreparedness existing at Pearl Harbor when the Japanese struck.

It could reasonably follow from this failure that the Army airplanes,

instead of being scattered, were bimched together wing to wing; ammu-

nition, except that near the fixed antiaircraft guns, was in storehouses;

antiaircraft artillery and two combat divisions were in their permanent

quarters and not in combat positions. As the Army Pearl Harbor

Board stated :

Biverything was concentrated in close confines by reason of the antisabotage

alert No. 1. This made them easy targets for an air attack. In short, every-

thing that was done made the situation perfect for an air attack, and the Japa-

nese took full advantage of it (APHB, Report, pp. 193-84).

This was known to the War Department by General Short’s reply

to the message of November 27, but the Department took no action.

The President’s lack of power under the Constitution to meet the

Japanese menace by an attack without a declaration of war by Con-

gress increased the responsibility of high authorities in Wasmngton

to use the utmost care in putting the commanders at Pearl Harbor on

a full alert for defensive actions before the Japanese attack on Decem-

ber 7, 1941. This they did not do.

H. HiqK axithorities m WasMiigton failed in gvvmg -proper weight

to the emdenoe before them respecting J apanese designs and operations

which indicated that an attach on Peart Harbor vms Jdgldy probable

and they failed also to emphasize this probability in messages to the

Hawaiian commanders.

Washington authorities had before them prior to December 7 con-

clusive evidence that the Japanese Government and its agents were

mving minute attention to American military and naval installations,

ship movements, and preparedness in the Hawaiian area, as well as in

other areas. But despite their knowledge of this fact, those authorities

failed to emphasize, in orders to the Hawaiian commanders, the perils

of an attack on Pearl Harbor. They did worse than fail in this respect.

With poor judgment as to the effect of their own words upon the com-

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manders, they went out of their way to emphasize the probability of

attack elsewhere. The following passage in the war-warning mes-

sage of November 27 from the Navy Department to Admiral Kimmel

reflected the loose thinking that prevailed widely in Washington :

Japan is expected to make an aggressive move within the next few days. An

amphibious expedition against either the Pbll^ines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula, or

possibly Borneo, is indicated by the number and equipment of Japanese troops

and by the organization of their naval forces.

These words not only displayed the apparent ignorance of Wash-

ington authorities respecting Japanese designs on Pearl Harbor but

also gratuitously conveyed to Admiral Kimmel a false impression.

Although the message of the War Department to General Short on

the same day did not contain these mi^eading words, General Short,

in conferring with Admiral Kimmel on “the meaning and intent” of

their messages learned about this expectation that uie Japanese at-

tack would occur in the Far East.

Notwithstanding their apparent ignorance of the full meaning of

Japanese movements in the Southeastern Pacific, Washington au-

thorities knew or should have known from their understandings of

parallel action with the British and Dutch, that a Japanese attack

on the Philippines, Thaij or the Kra Peninsula meant war with

America. It also meant, in view of the strategic principle that the

flank of an advancing force must be guarded, that Japan would not

leave the strong fleet at Hawaii on its left flam without doing some-

thing about it. This was the meaning to Washington of the Japanese

move in the Southeastern Pacific.^ Without having the benefit of

these diplomatic understandings, it did not have the same meaning

to Admiral Kimmel and General Short.

Testimony and documents before the Committee lend support to — ^in

no way traverse — ^the Sixteenth Conclusion of the President’s Com-

mission which found :

“The opinion prevalent in diplomatic, military, and naval circles, and in the

public press,” was “that any immediate attack by Japan would be In the Far

Bast.” [Italics supplied.]

16. The failwre of Washington authorities to axst promptly and

consistently in translating intercepts, evaluating information, and

sending appropriate instructions to the Hawaiian commanders was

in considerable meagre due to delays, mismanagement, noncoopera-

tion, unpreparedness, confusion, and negligence on the part of officers

in Washington.

The record before this Committee is crowded with items of evidence

which sustains this conclusion.

As to delays, take for example section B of Japanese Messages G on-

coming MiUtary Installations, Ship Movements, Etc. [Exhibit 2].

Pages 16-29 give “messages translated after December 7, 1941.” Here

are messages exchanged by the Japanese Government and its agents

^Meanwhile we are exchanging views with the British Government in regard to the

entire situation and the tremendous problems which are presented, with a view to effective

coordinating of efforts in the most practicable way possible. • • \*

Indirectly influencing that situation : American military and naval defensive forces in

the Philippine Islands, which are being steadily increased, and the United States Fleet at

Hawaii, lying as they do along the flank of any Japanese military movement into China

from Indo china, are ever present and signiflcant factors in the whole situation, as are the

increasing British and Dutch defensive preparations in their territories to the south

(Exhibit 16, State Department message, approved by President Roosevelt and transmitted

through Ambassador Hu Shih to Chlang Eai>shek).

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"which were intercepted by American intelligence services before De-

cember 7, hut not translated until after December 7. Special atten-

tion should be drawn to the message from a Japanese agent in Hono-

lulu to Tokyo on December 6, 1941, listing the ships at anchor in Pearl

Harbor on that day and reporting to To%o :

It appears that no air reconnaissance Is being conducted by the fleet air arm —

a fact with which high authorities in Washington were not acquainted,

if the testimony before this Committee is awjcepted as accurate and

comprehensive.

(me of the great tragedies was that a message sent from Honolulu to

Tokyo December 6, 1941, was not translated until December 8, 1941,

after the attack. The following appeared in the m^age “at the pres-

ent time there are no signs of barrage balloon equipment. I imagine

that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take

advantage for a surprise attack against these places” (Exhibit 2, p.

27 ).

Another message intercepted and translated in the rough and avail-

able on the desk of a responsible officer in the Naval Intelligence on

the afternoon of December 6, 1941, provided for land-sea signals at

Hawaii. These signals were intended to disclose to Japanese the loca-

tion of our ships in Pearl Harbor — apparently nothing was done about

the message either in evaluating it in Washington or transmitting it to

the commanders in Hawaii (Exhibit 2, p. 22).

As to mismanagement, noncooperation, unpreparedness, and negli-

gence, the e"vidence cited in the following pages is sufficient (Conclu-

sions 8, 10, and 16) . ,

Since President Roosevelt was convinced as early as the middle of

August that a clash with Japan was a matter of a few weeks, the re-

sponsible officers of his administration had ample time to strengthen,

organize, and consolidate the agencies in Washington, especially the

Army and Navy communication and intelligence services, in such a

manner to assure the speedy translations oi intercepts, prompt dis-

tribution to the appropriate officials, swift evaluation, and proper

decisions based on such information and evaluation. Lack of time

cannot be pleaded as an excuse for this failure, despite the difficulties

involved in securing competent and reliable specialists.

General Miles admitted at the hearing on December 3, 1945, that

there had been no meeting of the joint Army-Navy Intelligence Com-

mittee between October 11 and December 8 or 9, 1941, and declared :

I regret to say, Mr. Congressman, there were still discussions and difScolties

going on between the War and Navy Departments as to Just what the functions

of that committee would be, where it would sit, what rooms it would have, what

secretary it would be allowed, et cetra.

There was lack of cooperation between the Army and the Na"vy

regarding the fourteen parts of the Japanese final message between

9 :30 p. m, on December 6 and the morning of December 7 about 10 :30.

The exist^ce of the first thirteen parts of this Japanese message,

which President Roosevelt received between 9 and 10 o’clock on Satur-

dajr evening and interpreted as meaning war, was kno"wn more or less

accidentally to certain high Army and Na"vy authorities about the

same time. But Admiral Stark testified before this Committee at the

hearing on January 1, 1946, that the first thirteen parts and the di-

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rective for delivery to Secretary Hull at one o’clock Sunday, did not

come to his attention until late on the morning of December 7. Ad-

miral Stark thougJit that he went to his oflEice between 10 :30 and 11

o’clock that morning and that as nearly as he could remember he did

not see the directive message for one o’clock delivery until about 10 :40

that morning. It was the final part of the Japanese message, and the

one o’clock directive that convinced General Marshall that war was

immediately at hand and led him to send the warning dispatch which

reached General Short after the Japanese attack.

For this noncooperation and mismanagement, high authorities in

Washington were fully responsible. The President, the Secretary of

State, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, General

Marshall, and Admiral Stark were all in Washington or environs.

It is true that General Marshall and Admiral Stark — ^when they

appeared before this Committee — could not remember where they

were during the evening and night of December 6 but they were at

least accessible to officers of the Army and Navy Departments, or

should have been; hence, there was no excuse for the failure of these

high authorities to assemble on the evening of December 6, inquire

into the defensive preparedness of outpost Commanders, and send

peremptory directives to them.

The setting up of so many councils and committees, and the inter-

meddling of so many men created such a state of confusion in Wash-

ington that the high principle of individual responsihUity was ap-

parently lost to si^t. The result was that no one among the Presi-

dent’s chief subordinates was enough concerned on the night of Decem-

ber 6 to do anything about the 13 parts which indicated a crucial stage

in Japanese- American relations. (See Conclusion No. 10.)

In the ibwer, operating echelons of the Army and Navy, on the

other handj men seemed to see or to sense the gathering crisis and even

the immediate danger to Hawaii. They tried to take steps to meet

it but were discouraged by their superiors. This was notably evident

in the testimony of Captain Arthur McCollum, Chief of the Far East-

ern Section of Naval Intelligence. Alarmed by conditions on Decem-

ber 4, 1941, he prepared a dispatch to fully alert the fleets in the Pacific.

He tried to get permission to send this dispatch at a meeting attended

by Admiral Stark, Ingersol, Turner, and Wilkinson but was discour-

aged from doing so on the ground that the messages of November 24

and 27 to Admiral Kimmel was sufficient. He protested that it was

not sufficient and that he would like to send his Deceftiber 4 dispatch

anyway. The dispatch he prepared and wanted to send was never

sent, and the result was tragic. (See testimony of Captain Mc-

Collum, Tr., Vol. No. 49, p. 9132 ff.)

Finally, there is no excuse for the failure of General Marshall and

Admiral Stark to be on the alert early Sunday morning or for their

failure, after they did meet near the middle of the morning, to reach

the outpost Commanders with a definite war-warning message before

the Japanese attack came at Pearl Harbor. This failure was all the

more inexcusable for the reason that some time in July 1941, the prac-

tice of sending intercepts to General Short and Admiral Kimmel had

been abandoned.

16. The President of the United States was responsible for the fail-

ure to enforce continuous., efficient., and appropriate cooperation among

the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy., the Chief of Staffs

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and the Chief of Naval Operations^ in evaluating^ information and

dispatching clear and positive orders to the Hawaiian commanders as

events indicated the growing immiinence of war; for the Constitution

and laws of the United States vested in the President full power, as

Chief Executive and Commander in Chief, to compel such cooperation

and vested this power in him alone with a view to establishing his

responsibility to the people of the United States.

As to the power, and therefore of necessity, the responsibility of

the President in relation to the chain of events leading to the catas-

trophe at Pearl Harbor, there can be no doubt. The terms of the Con-

stitution and the laws in this respect are clear beyond all cavil.

The Constitution vests in the President the whole and indivisible

Executive power subject to provisions for the approval of appoint-

ments and treaties by the Senate.

The President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,

appoints high officers, civil and milita^.

is Chief Magistrate in all civil affairs, including those related to

the maintenance and operation of the Military and Naval Establish-

ments.

Under the law he conducts all diplomatic negotiations on behalf

of the Uiuted States, assigning to his appointee, the Secretai^ of State,

such duties connected therewith as he sees fit, always subject to his

own instructions and authorizations.

Under the Constitution the President is Commander in Chief of

the armed forces of the United States, and with the approval of the

Senate he appoints all high military and naval officers. He assigns

them to their duties in his discretion except in the case of the Chief

of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations^these appointments must

be approved by the Senate.

And why did the framers of the Constitution vest these immense

K wers in one magistrate — ^not in a directory or a single official checked

, a council, as was proposed in the Convention of 1787 ?

\*The answer to this question is to be found in No. 70 of The Fed-

eralist. The purpose of establishing a single rather than a plural

Executive was to assure “energy in the Executive,” “a due dependence

on the people,” and “a due responsibility.” A plural Executive, it is

there argued, “tends to deprive the people of the two greatest securi-

ties they can have for the faithful exercise of any ddegated power,

first, the restraints of public opinion \* \* \*; and, secondly, the

opportunity of discovering with facility and clearness the misconduct

of persons they trust \* \* \*.”

The acts of Congress providing for the organization, operations,

powers, and duties of the Military Establishments under the Presi-

dent particularized the powers and duties of the President in relation

to them ; in brief, they empowered him to issue orders and instructions

to the civil Secretaries and also directly to the Chief of Staff and the

Chief of Naval Operations.

Such are the terms of the Constitution and the laws relative to the

Chief Executive.

From March 4, 1933, to December 7, 1941, F ranklin D. Roosevelt was

President and Commander in Chief of the armed forces of the United

States and in him was vested all Executive powers under the Consti-

tution and the laws.

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He appointed Cordell Hull as Secretary of State in 1933 and re-

tained hun in that office during this period.

He appointed all the Secretaries of War and of the Navy during this

period.

He selected, or approved the choice of, all Chiefs of Staff and Chiefs

of Naval Operations during this period.

He selected, or approved the choice of, all the men who served as

military and naval commanders in charge of the Hawaiian area and

he assigned them to their posts of duty.

In support of the doctrine that the President is entrusted with

supreme Executive responsibility and cannot divest himself of it, we

have more recent authority. Speaking at a press conference on Decan-

ber 20, 1940, on a subject of administrative ^tions, President Roosevelt

said : “There were two or three cardinal principles ; and one of them is

the fact tha^ou cannot, tmder the Constitution, set up a second Presi-

dent of the United States. In other words, the Constitution spates one

man is responsible. Now that man can delegate, surely, but in the

delegation ne does not delegate away any part oi the responsibility

from the ultimate responsibility that rests on him” {PvMic Papers,

1940 volume, p. 623) .

• • •

Although there were two departments for the administration of

military and naval affairs during this period, they were both under

the supreme direction of the President as Chief Executive and Com-

mander in Chief in all matters relative to separate and joint planning

for defense and war, to disposition of forces and materiel, to prepared-

ness for operation in case of an attack. In respect of the President’s

power, the two departments were one agency for over-all planning

and operational purposes.

The President nad power to issue directions and orders to the Secre.-

tary of War and the Secretary of the Navy and also directly and in-

directly to the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations and

on occasions used this power.

Furthermore, under the Reorganization Act of 1939, President

Roosevelt had enjoyed the power, by grant of Congress, to reorganize

the Department of War and the Department of the Navy if he deemed

it necessary in the interest of efficiency and more effective cooperation

between the Departments. Since he did not reorganize the two De-

partments under that act, he must have deemed them properly con-

structed as they were.

By virtue of the powers vested in him the President had, during

this period, the responsibility for determining the reciprocal relations

of diplomatic decisions and war plans.

In fine. Secretary Hull, Secretary Stimson, Secretary Knox, General

Marshall, Admiral Stark, General Short, and Admiral Eommel were

all men of President Roosevelt’s own choice — ^not hang-over appointees

from another administration to which incompetence may be ascribed —

and the President had ample power to direct them, coor^nate their

activities, and bring about a concentration of their talents and energies

in the defense of the United States.

Thus endowed with power and in full charge of diplomatic negotia-

tions, the President decided long before December 7, at least as early

as the Atlantic Conference in August, that war with Japan was a

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matter of a few weeks or months, was so highly probable and so

imminent as to warrant a dedication of his abilities to preparation

for that war. Having decided against an appeal to Congress for a

declaration of war and having resolved that Ixe would avoid even the

appearance of an avert act against Japan, the President chose the

alternative of waiting for aU overt act by Japan — an attack on terri-

tory of the United States. Possessing full power to prepare for meet-

ing attack and for countering it with the armed forces under his

command, he had supreme responsibility for making sure that the

measures, plans, orders, and dispositions necessary to that end were

taken.

During the weeks and days preceding the Japanese attack on Decm-

ter 7, 1941, the President and his chief subordinates held many meet-

ings, discussed the practical certainty of an attack, and, jointly or

severally, made decisions and plans in relation to the coming of that

attack — or overt act. Yet when the Jtmanese attack came at Pearl

Harbor the armed forces of the United States failed to cope with the

attack effectively.

In view of all the evidence cited in support of the preceding conclu-

sions and more of the same kind that could be cited, this failure cannot

all be ascribed to General Short and Admiral Kimmel, nor to their

immediate superiors, civil and military. Those authorities had their

powers and corresponding responsibilities but the ultimate power and

responsibility under the Constitution and the laws were vested in the

President of the United States.

This does demonstrate the weakness of depending on the political

head of the Government to bring about the necessary coordination of

the operating activities of the military branches, particularly in the

areas of intelligence. The major lesson to be learned is that this

coordination should be done in advance of a crisis.

17. High authorities in Washington failed to allocate to the H.Or

waiian commanders the material which the latter often declared to he

necessary to defense and often requested., and no requirements of

defense or war in the Atlantic did or coudd excuse these avlhorities

for their failures in this respect.

The first part of this conclusion calls for no special citations of au-

thority, In reports of the President’s Commission, of the Army Pearl

Harbor Board, and of the Navy Court of Inquiry, three points in this

respect are accepted as plain facts : (1) The ultimate power to allocate

arms, ammunition, implements of war, and other supplies was vested

in the President and his aide, Harry Hopkins, subject to the advice of

General Marshall and Admiijil Stark ; (2) General Short and Admiral

Eommel made repeated demands upon their respective Departments

for additional material, which they represented as necessary to the

effective defense of Pearl Harbor; and (3) Washington authorities,

having full discretion in this regard, made decisions against General

Short and A<toiral Kimmel and allocated to the Atlantic theater,

where the United States was at least nominally at peace, materiel,

especially bombing and reconnaissance planes, which were known to

be absolutely indispensable to efficient defense of Pearl Harbor. (See

Exhibits 106 and 53, request for materials.)

The decision to base the fleet at Pearl Harbor was made by the Presi-

dent in March 1940, over the protest of Admiral Richardson.

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The second part of this conclusion may be arguable from the point

of view of some high world strategy, but it is not arguable under the

Constitution and laws of the United States. The President it is true,

had powers and obligations under the Lease-Lend Act of March 1941.

But his first and inescapable duty under the Constitution and laws was

to care for the defense and security of the United States against a

Japanese attack, which he knew was imminent; and, in the alloca-

tions of materiel, especially bombing and reconnaissance planes, he

made or authorized decisions which deprived the Hawaiian com-

manders of indispensable materiel they could otherwise have had and

thus reduced their defensive forces to a degree known to be dangerous

by high officials in Washington and Hawaii.

When this decision to base the fleet at Pearl Harbor was made,

certain definite facts in relation to such base must be presumed to

have been fully known and appreciated by the responsime command

at Washington.

The base is a shallow-water base with limited base mobility, with

no chance for concealment or camouflage and without enough air

beaches to properly park the necessary defensive air \_ ecjuipment.

Entrance to the ease is by a narrow winding channel requiring sorties

at reduced speed, and in single file, and presenting the possibility of

a blockade of the base by an air or submarine attack on the entrance.

The base is surrounded by high land immediately adjacent to the

city of Honolulu, thereby affording full public familiarity with instal-

lations and movements within the case at all times.

The base is located on an island where the population was heavily

Japanese, and where, as was well known, Japanese espion^e was

rampant, and making it probable that any defensive insufficiency

of any kind or nature would be open to Japanese information.

All of the fuel for the base must be transported, by tanker, from

the mainland more than 2,000 miles away, thus intensifying the

necessity for complete defensive equipment and supplies for the base.

The waters about Oahu are of a depth facilitating the concealed

movement of submarines, and the near approach of submarines to

the shore, thereby favoring such methods or hostile attack.

The approaches to Oahu cover a full circle of 360°, with open sea

available on all sides.

The situation thus confronting the Pacific Fleet upon reaching its

Pearl Harbor base seems entirely clear. Before the base could be a

safe base, it must be supplied with adequate defense facilities, which

facilities must be in kind and amount in relation to the physical char-

acteristics of the base above referred to. An absence of adequate

defensive facilities directly increased the peril of the fleet. Since the

decision to base the fleet at Pearl Harbor was made at Washington,

the responsibility for providing proper base defense for the fleet

rested primarily upon Washington. (See Stark letter, November 22,

1940, Tr., Vol. 5, p. 706 ff.) It becomes important, therefore, to con-

sider what defensive equipment was essential to protect the Pearl

Harbor base, whether such defensive equipment was supplied, and, if

not, the reasons for such failure.

The character of the defensive equipment necessary for the defense

of the^ Pearl Harbor base is not seriously in dispute. The base most

essential, being located on an island, approachable from all directions,

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the first protective equipment necessary was a sufficient number of long-

di^ance patrol planes to permit proper distance reconnaissance cov-

ering a 360® perimeter. The evidence indicates that to supply such

a reconnaissance program would require approximately 200 patrol

planes, with a sufficient supply of spare parts to keep the planes in

operation, and a sufficient number of available crews to permit a con-

tinuous patrol.

Base defense also required sufficient fighter planes to meet any

attack which might be considered possible. This would require ap-

proximately 175 planes.

The second class of essential defense equipment was a suitable

number of antiaircraft batteries with suitable and sufficient ammuni-

tion and sufficient experienced crews for ready operation.

The third class of defense equipment were torpedo nets and baffies.

It would be necessary for a considerable portion of the fleet to be in

Pearl Harbor at all times, fueling and relaxation of men together

with ship repairs requiring the ships in the fleet to have constant

recourse to the base at more or less regular intervals. The mobility of

the Pearl Harbor base was limited, and ships using the base were in a

more or less defenseless situation except for the defense power of their

own ship batteries. The British attack on the Italian Fleet at Taranto,

Italy^ brought the question of torpedo bomber defense to the fore.

Admiral Stark wrote on November 22, 1940 — expressing fear of a

“sudden attack in Hawaiian waters” on the fleet, and asking about

torpedo net protection. (Tr., Vol. 5, p. 707.) Admiral Kichardson,

then in command, expressed no enxiety about the security of the fleet,

and thought toroedo nets unnecessary, but thought security to the fleet

must be carried out, even at the expense of fleet training and extra

discomfort. Approximately four-fifths of the damage to the fleet upon

the attack was the result of torpedoes fired by torpedo-bombing planes

attacking the base at low altitudes. Against such an attacK, anti-

toroedo baffles and nets would have been of extraordinary value.

The fourth class of defense equipment for the base lay in the newly

discovered device known as radar, which before December 7 had been

sufficiently perfected to permit the discovery of approaching planes

more than 100 miles away.

It seems to be agreed that it is not the duty of the fleet, ordinarily,

to furnish its own base defense. That duty is supposed to be per-

formed by the base defense itself, usually in the hands of the Army.

The fleet, however, is always to be expected to furnish every available

defensive effort it has, in event of an attack upon a base.

The record discloses that with full knowledge of the defense necessi-

ties inherent in the defense of the Pearl Harbor base, and with full

knowledge of the dangers and peril imposed upon the fleet while based

at the Pearl Harbor base, and with full knowledge of the equipment

essential to a proper protection of the fleet at such base, it was de-

cided by President Roosevelt to remove the fleet from the mainland

bases and base it at Pearl Harbor.

The record discloses that from the time the fleet arrived at Pearl

Harbor until the attack on December 7, the high command at Hawaii,

both in the Army and the Navy, frequently advised the military au-

thorities at Washington of the particular defense equipment needs at

the Pearl Harbor base (Exhibits 53 and 106) . Nowhere in the record

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does any dissent appear as to the reasonableness, or the propriety, of

the requests for defense equipment made by the hi^h command in

Hawaii. On the contrary, the necessity for such equipment was ex-

pressly recognized and the only explanation given for a failure to

provide the equipment was that by reason of unavoidable shortages,

the requested defense equipment at Hawaii could not be supplied.

It was asserted that more equipment had been provided for Hawaii

than for any other base, and this is probably correct. The trouble

with such an explanation is that Hawaii was the only nonmainland

base charged with the defense of a major part of our Pacific Fleet,

and the equipment supplied to Hawaii was admittedly insufficient.

The Philippines received much equipment which might well have

gone to Hawaii, because Hawaii could have been defended, whereas

no one expected the Philippines to be able to stand a direct

Japanese onslaught. Gteneral Marshall reported to the President in

March 1941 (Exhibit 59) that “Oahu was believed to be the strongest

fortress in the world” and practically invulnerable to attack and mat

sabotage was considered the first danger and might cause great damage.

The Government made the Atlantic theater the primary theater and

the Pacific theater a secondary and a defense theater. We raise no

issue as to the propriety of such decision, but we cannot fail to point

out that such decision resulted in the failure of the militaiy authorities

in Washington to supply the Pearl Harbor base with military defense

equipment which everyone agreed was essential and necessary for the

defense of the base and the fleet while in the base. As we have said,

such a more or less defenseless condition imposed increased peril upon

the Pacific Fleet, so long as it was based at Pearl Harbor. We are

forced to conclude, theremre, that in view of the obligations assumed

by the Government in other military theaters, and to which we have

just referred, and the consequent inability of the Government to prop-

erly contribute to the safety of the fleet at Pearl Harbor, that the only

alternative left which might have relieved the fleet from the resultant

peril would have been to have changed the original decision to base

the fleet at Pearl Harbor, and thereupon retvm the -fleet to its severed

mainland bases. It appears obvious that the safety of the fleet would

have been helped by such removal. The perimeter of a defense at a

mainland base would only be 180° instead of 360°, thus permitting

distant patrol reconnaissance by one-half as many planes. The trans-

portation and supply facilities to the mainland base would be im-

mensely improved, as would all necessary communication facilities.

The mobility of the fleet at a mainland base would have been improved

and the concentration of the fleet in a single limited base would have

been avoided. ~We therefore are of the opinion that the fleet should

not have been based at Pearl Harbor unless proper base defenses were

assured.

Since no such change in policy was approved, and the fleet remained

based at Pearl Harbor without the necessary defense equiiunent to

which we have referred — ^plus the fact that tne precise status of the

defense wea^ess must be assumed to have been open to the nmiaiml

J apanese espionage operating in Hawaii, and therefore that the Tokyo

war office must be assumed to have been cognizant of the status of

affairs at Pearl Harbor, we are forced to conclude that the failure to

remove the fleet from Pearl Harbor to the mainland must be viewed

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as an important relevant factor necessarily involved in the success of

the J apanese attock on December 7.

The record discloses that the Army and Navy had available, be-

tween February 1 and December 1, 1941, an abundance of long-

distance patrol planes suitable for reconnaissance purposes. Exhibit

172 shows that the Army received between February 1 and December

1, 1941, approximately 600 long-distance bombers capable of flying^

loaded, missions, of 1,250 miles or more. Of these 12 went to Hawaii

and 35 went to the Philippines. During the same period the Navy

received approximately 560 similar long-distance bombers, of whicn

approximately 175 were assigned to carriers in the Pacific, During

the same period the Army received approximately 5,500 antiaircran

guns, of which 7 went to Hawaii and 100 to the Philippines. If it be

true that it was found necessary to send this equipment elsewhere,

as we assume, still it would seem that Hawaii instead of having high

priority, occupied a subordinate position.

We have referred to the unavoidable vulnerabilities of the Pearl

Harbor base, together with the identification of the essential defense

equipment necessary for its proper defense. We likewise noted the

demands made by the high command at Hawaii for such equipment,

the agreement that such equipment was proper and necessary, and the

continued and increased peril imposed upon the fleet by the failure to

provide siqch equipment.

It seems proper here to note the extmt to which the Pearl Harbor

base was deprived of needed and essential equipment.

( 1 ) We have pointed out that the perimeter of Oahu defense covered

360°. Full defense reconnaissance would likewise be required for

the full 360°. The evidence discloses that it would take approxi-

mately 200 patrol planes to furnish sfuch recoimaissance. Such

reconnaissance would require flights of not less than 750 miles from

Oahu. The evidence shows that the wear and tear upon patrol planes

engaged in such <^tant operations would be heavy, that a certain

proportion of available planes would have to be under repair and

adjustment, and that only about one-third of the assigned planes

would be available for a particular day’s patrol. In a similar way,

in connwtion with the overhaul and repair of planes, a proper store

of repair parts would be essential and of even greater importance,

spare crews for the operation of the planes would be required, since

the same crew could not fly such patrol missions daily.

The record se^s to establish that there were available at Pearl

Harbor on December 7, approximately 85 patrol planes suitable for

distant patrol, of which not to exceed 55 were in operable condition.

The supply of spare parts was not ample, nor were there sufficirait

extra crews for a continuous operation.

With reference to fighter planes, the situation was not so acute.

An estimate appears in the record that 185 fights planes would be

necessary to defend the base, and there were, on December 7, 105

available fighter planes, which, if prOpertly alerted, would have been

available for base defense.

The fleet itself had been depleted by assignments to the Atlantic

theater, and the man supply for plane service had likewise been used

as a reservoir from which to supply reserve demands for that theater.

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We agree that Admiral Kimmel was faced with a sharo dilemma.

■ He was the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet. Under WPL

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fleet ready for action promptly upon the breaking out of war. He had

available 50 or 60 patrol planes, and he would need these planes in aid

of fleet niovements if his fleet was to take the offensive against the

enemy. If he used these patrol planes for base defense, such heavy

duty would reduce their efficiency and ultimately put them up for

repair in event the distance patrol duty should cover an extended

period. In such an event his fleet could not sail against the enemy as

required by WPL 46 because his patrol planes would be out of com-

mission. He had therefore to make a choice between fleet training

and preparation and base defense. He says his decision not to carry

on distant reconnaissance was based upon his belief, in common with

his staff, that Pearl Harbor was not in danger from a Japanese attack.

Wie think in making such a decision Admiral Kimmel was unjustified

in concluding, first, that there was no danger of attack at Pearl Harbor,

and, second, that such a decision did not violate the fundamental

proposition that no disposition should be taken which unnecessarily

increased fleet peril. The absence of distant reconnaissance imme-

diately imperiled fleet safety. We therefore think the abandonment

of distance reconnaissance was unjustified.

(2) The fuel reserves were insufficient, limiting fuU use of the fleet at

sea, required constant augmentation from the mainland, and the loca-

tion of such fuel supplies was such as to make theln vulnerable to any

raiding attack. The fleet was required to come into the base at fre-

quent intervals to refuel. The facilities at the base made such refuel-

ing slow. The fleet was without a sufficient supply of fast tankers to

permit refueling at sea, and there was ever present the inescapable fact

that a destruction of the fuel supply would necessarily immobilize the

entire fleet.

(3) It is difficult to reach a conclusion with respect to the sufficiency

of the antiaircraft batteries and supplies available at Pearl Harbor on

December 7. General Short testified as to the number of guns

available on December 7, 1941, as compared with the number available

in December 1942. It is apparent that the antiaircraft gun equipment

had been much augmented during the year following the Pearl Harbor

attack. The difficulty we have with respect to the antiaircraft bat-

teries situation, as with the available force of fighter planes, is that

practically none of these guns were alerted on December 7, and

ammunition was not readily available, the crews serving them were

not in attendance, and the only seeming excuse for such conditions was

the common belief that there was no danger of an attack on Pearl

Harbor and therefore no reason for any battery alert. Even if there

had been twice as many batteries (or fighter planes) available, there

is no reason to believe the condition of alert would have been different.

The ships in the harbor were not provided with proper torpedo

protection. The letter of June 13, 1941, with respect to the use of

aerial torpedoes, seems to demonstrate the responsibility of the high

command at Washington to provide a torpedo defense. Such a

defense was well known and could have been provided and, if provided,

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might have obviated the greatest source of damage suffered by the

fleet during the raid, even though Admiral Bichardson in 1940

thought sudi defense unnecessary. But it could not have been pro-

vided at Hawaii; it had to come from Washin^on. Washington’s

advices on the subject did more harm than good, because they inti-

mated that an attack was possible even in shallow water, but at the

same time, negatived the probability of attack. (See letter of June

13, 1941, Ex. No. 116, letter from Chief of Naval Operations (R. E.

Ingersoll) to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, among

others.)

The installation of the radar in Hawaii was inexcusably delayed.

It was a method of defense peculiarly essential in Hawaii. It was

known that there were insufficient planes and insufficient guns to pro-

tect the base, and this made the availability of radar all the more

necessary. It seems we could have priority for radar protection in

New York and other mainland points, where no attack was probable,

but none in Hawaii, where radar information was essential. The

result was that fixed radio installations were not accomplished at all

S rior to the Pearl Harbor attack, and such fixed installations would

ave furnished the most distant services. The mobile sets available

had, by reason of the delay, been operating only on a short experi-

mental basis. There was a scarcity of trained operators. The oper-

ators were trying to learn and operate at the same time. The selected

hours of operation, which provM of vast importance, were not wisely

fixed. Service stopped at 7 a. m., the very time when the danger

was acute.

No suitable information center had been established, and it is con-

ceded that such a center was essential to radar information. This was

particularly true at Hawaii, because radar had not yet been developed

to the point where the nationality of approaching planes could be ascer-

tained. The information as to whether approaching planes were,

therefore, friendly or enemy, depended upon the constant presence

at an information center of representatives of the military services

who could instantly advise as to location of friendly planes. No such

information center was established, and no assignment of trained

operators to such stations was ever made. Thus, there was no one

on duty who could have known whether the approaching planes were

enemy planes, or, in^ead, our own B-I7’s, en route from the mainland.

The lack of material does not appear to be the fault of a failure of

appropriations by Congress to the Army and Navy. A table showing

these appropriations as requested by the President in his budget es-

timates and as finally passed by Congress follows :

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Appropriations y Navy Department, fiscal yeare 19S2 to 1941, inclusive

Fiscal year

Appro-

priations

requested by

the Navy

Department

Budget esti-

mate of

appropri-

ations

submitted to

the Congress

Amounts made avaiklble

by the Congress

Appro-

priations

Contract

authority

1932:

Annnfti appropriation act

$354,809,746

0

1347,794,248

0

$338,262,123

0

$7,700,000

0

Supplemental\* and deficiency approprla-

lion acts

Total 1

354,809,740

347,794,248

358,262,123

7,700,000

1933:

Annual ^propriatioD act

399,139,886

10,000^000

■

317,583,591

10,000,000

5,715,000

0

Supplem^tal\* and deficiency appropria-

tion aota\_ , \_ \*

Total

409,139,886

351,677,450

327,583,591

5,715,000

1934:

Annual appropriation act

352,717,786

0

308,669,562

0

308,669,662

0

8,100,000

0

Supplem^tal\* and deficiency appropria-

non acts

Total

352,717,786

308,669,662

308,669,562

8,100,000

1935:

Annnfll appropriation act - -

318,324,414

17,086,504

286,332,392

17,075,257

284,658,799

17,076,257

2,800,000

0

Supplemental\* and deficiency appropria-

tion acts

Total . . \_ - \_ \_

335,410,918

303,407,649

301,734,056

2,800,000

1936:

Annual appropriation act

502,855,817

23,931,725

485,443,847

23,931,726

458,684,379

23,915,851

6,590,000

0

Supplemental\* and deficiency appropria-

lion acts

Total

526,787,542

609,376,572

482,600,230

6,590,000

1937:

Annual appropriation act

585,010,984

1,921,300

549,591,299

1,921,300

526,546,532

1,921,300

13,000,000

0

Supplem^tal'and deficiency appropriation

acts

Total

586,932,284 j

551,612,599

528,467,832

13,000,000

1938:

Annual appropriation act — .

1

594,269,223

4,766,000

562,425,709

4,766,000

g §

S

15,000,000

0

Supplem^tal\*and deficiency appropriation

acts. \_\_ -

Total

599,035,223

667,191,709

519,139,808 1

15,000,000

1939:

Annual appropriation act

629,665,104

89,714,905

564,406,461

85,839,950

546,866,494

76,669,700

15,000,000

0

Supplem^tal\*and deficiency appropriation

acts

Total

719,380,009 1

650,246,411

623,526^194 |

15,000,000

1940:

Annual appropriation act -

788,775,549

288,602,340

790,342, 453

186,088,316

773,049,151 j

170,326,098

Supplemental\*and deficiency appropriation

acts

Total

1,077,377,889

976,430,769

943,375,249

22,450,000

1941:

Annual appropriation act

1,384,442,202

3,852,187,700

1,337,311,677

2,224,094,342

1,274,171,138 ;

2,276,212,207

148,741,612

797,356,500

Supplemental and deficiency appropriation

acts

Total

5,236,629,902

3, 561,405,919

3,549,383,345

946,098,112

Total asked, 1934-41, inclusive

9,434,271,533

7,428,240,190

7,266,896,276 |

8,285,9

34,388

Budget cut requests, $2,006,031,343.

Congress exceeded budget by ^7,694,108.

Appropriations j War Department Military Establishment^ fiscal years 1932 through 1941 — Continued

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Total asked by Anny 1932-34, $17, 186, 894,377.

Total granted by budget, $16,390,079,707 or a cut of $795,814,670.

Total granted by Congress, $16,828,795,047 or $438, 715, 340 above budget.

Office of the budget officer for the War Department Nov. 1, 1945.

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The fatal error of Washington, authorities in this matter was to

undertake a world campaign and world responsibilities without firrt

making provision for the security of the United States, which was their

prime constitutional obligation.

18. Whatever errors of judgment the corrmumders at Hau>aii comr

milted and whatever raiarnanagemerd they displayed in preparing for

a Japanese attack, attention to chain of responsibility in the civil

and military administration reqaires taking note of the fact that they

were designated for their posts by high authorities in Washington —

all of whom were v/nder obligation to have a care for competence in the

selection of subordinates for particular positions of responsbitaty in

the armed forces of the United States.

This conclusion is self-evident, especially in view of all that goes

before, and needs no comment.

19. The defense of Hawaii rested upon two sets of interdependent

responsibilities: {!) The responsibility in Washington in respect of

its intimate knowledge of diplomatic negotiations, widespread in-

telligence information, direction of affairs, and constitutional duty

to plan the defense of the United States; (S) the responsibility cast

upon the commanders in the field in charge of a major naval base and

the fleet essential to the defense of the territory of the United States

to do those things a'^^oprpite to the defense of the fleet and outpost.

Washington authorities faded in (1) and the commanding offieers at

Hawaii faded in (8).

In the discharge of these responsibilities neither the high authori-

ties in Washington nor the commanders in Hawaii acted upon the

assumption or belief that Hawaii could or would be the point of any

hostile attack. Therefore, in discharging their respective respon-

sibilities neither the Washington authorities nor the field commanders

interpreted those responsibilities in the terms of danger to Hawaii

Many of the failures of performance can be attributed to this cardinal

fact. The question presented to this committee is : “Were they justi-

fied in such an assumption or belief?” And the answer is emphati-

cally, “No.”

Evidence set forth in this report in detail is ample to show that in

the period approximately from May 1940 to December 7, 1941, the

high authorities at Washington assumed so much of the direction of

afmirs at Hawaii as to remove many of the basic responsibilities from

the commanders in the field. The result was to reduce the discretion

of the commanders in the field by those things which they were ordered

to do by directions from Washington and not to do certain things un-

less they were so ordered from Washington. Another result of this

practice was to lull the commanders in the field into awaiting instruc-

tions from Washington.

Being charged with the responsibility attaching to the highest com-

mand in Washington and having taken so much of the responsibility

and direction of affairs away from the commanders in the field, the

high authorities in Washington themselves failed in the performance

of their responsibilities, as the evidence in the conclusions of this re-

port clearly shows.

Nevertheless the commanders in the field were left with sufficient

responsibility which they were under obligation to discharge as field

commanders of the major outpost in the Pacific defense of the United

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States. There is adequate and sufficient evidence to show that they

failed to discharge that responsibility.

While great emphasis and analysis has been made of such warning

messages sent to Admiral Eammel as those of November 24, 1941,

November 27, 1941, and November 28, 1941 (see Conclusion No. 13),

attention should be directed to many other messages reflecting the

nature of the diplomatic and naval relations between Japan and the

United States immediately prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Among these is the message of December 3, 1941, sent from the

Washin^on Office of Naval Operations for action to Admiral ElimmeL

This message informed him l^at Japanese diplomatic posts at Hong-

kong, Singapore, Batavia, Slanila, Washington and London had been

instructed “to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to

bum confidential and secret docmnents”. A second message on the

same day sent from Washington to the Commander of the Asiatic

Fleet and marked as information to Admiral Kimmel gave further

data on destruction of code machines and secret document at various

places including “all but one copy of other systems” at Washington.

On December 4, 1941, Admiral Kimmel, among others, was in-

formed by Washington Naval Operations that Guam was to destroy

all secret and confidential publications, retaining only minimum secret

codo channels for essential communications and was to be ready in-

stantly to destroy all classified matter retained.

While none of these messages placed Hawaii at the prime center of

danger, they certainly reflected the last critical stages in diplomatic

relations. It is well known in diplomatic and military circles that

destruction of codes, code machines, and secret documents is usually

the last step before breaking off relations between governments. War

does not necessarily have to follow, but it may foUow either simulta-

neously or close on the heels of the destruction of codes. Other mes-

sa^ and events, supplemented by daily reports of the crisis in Hono-

lulu newspapers, should have raised the significance of the information

in the hands of Admiral Eommel. Yet he testified that he “didn’t

consider that of any vital importance.” (Tr. Vol. 39, p. 7477.)

General Short did not receive copies of these messages sent from

Washin^on Naval Operations to Admiral Kimmel regarding the

destruction of codes. Admiral Kimmel had the express responsibility,

as part of his duty to effect liaison with General Short, to communicate

this vital information to General Short. He failed to do so.

Admiral Kimmel should have been aware of the meaning of code

destruction and of the Japanese reputation for surprise action. He

should have been vigilant. He owed this to his position as commander

of the fleet which was closely related to the scene of eimected hostili-

ties.

Admiral Kimmel failed in the performance of this obligation.

While General Short did not receive the information from Admiral

Kimmel that the Japanese were destroying codes and secret papers,

he did have partial notice about these developments. At a staff con-

ference on the morning of December 6, in the presence of the Chief of

Staff for General Short, Col. George W. Bicmell had reported that

Japanese consuls were burning their papers (Exhibit 148). General

Fielder testified that he was present at the staff conference and in-

formed General Short that the Japanese consul at Honolulu had de-

stroyed his codes and papers (Exhibit 148) .

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Before the Roberts G>mmission General Short testified that he did

not know that these consular records were being burned (Boberts

Commission Record, p. 1620). Later, before our Joint Committee,

he corrected this earlier testimony to say that he had been advised on

the morning of December 6 that the Honolulu consul was burning hjs

papers ('D'. Vol. 46, pp. 8398, 8399). The evidence on this point is

not decisive and it is certainly an open question, not determined by

the testimony, whether he also knew that the codes were being de-

stroyed.

The evidence as to General Short|s knowledge of the burning of

papers and the destruction of codes is therefore much le^ clear and

precise than in the case of Admiral Eommel. As a contributing fac-

tor in the circumstances bearing upon General Short’s failure to be

pr^ared to meet the Japanese attack, this evidence must be discounted.

The contribution of the Hawaiian commanders to the Pearl Harbor

disaster was the failure of the Army and Navy in Hawaii to institute

measures designed to detect an approaching enemy force, to effect

state of readiness commensurate with the remization that war was at

hand, and to employ every facility at their command in preparing for

the Japanese attack, even though these facilities were inad^uate.

The attack came as an astounding, bewildering, and catastrophic sur-

prise to the commanders at Hawaii. They realized that air attack

on Pearl Harbor by Japan was at least a possibility. Specifically,

they failed —

(o) To appreciate fully the character of their responsibilities as

Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and Commander

in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, even though such' warning as ttiey Imd

received from Washington had been inadequate. They failed to carry

out the principle of command by mutual cooperation.

(6) To integrate and coordmate their facilities for defense and

tighten up their defenses.

(c) To effect liaison on a basis designed to acquaint each with the

operations of the other, which was necessary to their joint security,

and to exchange fully all significant intelligence.

(d) To institute reconnaissance with such limited forces at their

disposal on a basis expected to detect an attack from without.

(e) Their radar was in an experimental stage and vital information

revealed by it was improperly evaluated; their planes were grouped

wing to wing on the field ; a large number of officers and men were not

at their posts; their ammunition was not immediately at hand for

action.

(/) To effect a state of readiness throughout their commands con-

sonant with the character of the warnings sent them and designed to

meet an attack from without.

(g) To emplov the facilities, materiel, and personnel at their com-

mand, which, although limited, were adequate at least to minimize the

force of the attack, in repelling the Japanese raiders.

(A) To appreciate the significance of intelligence available at

Hawaii affecting the performance of their duties as outpost com-

manders.

(^) The significance of Japanese submarines sighted early on the

morning of December 6, was not properly weighed and information

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about such submarines was not diligently transmitted to responsible

authorities for action.

The commanding officers in Hawaii had a particular responsibility

for the defense of the Pacific Fleet and the Hawaiian coastal frontier.

This responsibility they failed to discharge. The failure of the W ash-

ington authorities to perf orm\_ their responsibilities provides extenu-

ati^ circumstances for the failures of these commanders in the field.

These failures in Washington were :

(а) High Washington authorities did not communicate to Admiral

Kimmel and General Short adequate information of diplomatic nego-

tiations and of intercepted diplomatic intelligence which, if communi-

cated to them, would have informed them or the imminent menace of

a Japanese attack in time for them to fully alert and prepare the

defense of Pearl Harbor.

(б) High Washington authorities did not commxmicate to Admiral

Kimmel and General Short such vital intercepted Japanese intelligence

information as the “bomb plot” messages and the “dead-line messages”

which, if so communicated, would have served &s specific warnings of

impending hostile attack. In particular, the “bomb plot” messages

directly concerned the safety of the fleet and security of the naval

base at Pearl Harbor (and at no other place) and if communicated to

the Hawaiian commanders would have informed them of specific

Japanese designs affecting Pearl Harbor in time for them to alett and

prepare their defense.

(o) By conflicting and imprecise me^ages and orders high Wash-

in^on authorities created suph a condition of confusion relative to

what the Hawaiian commanders were to do and were not to do about

alerting and preparing for defense at Pearl Harbor, as to remove from

such commanders that clear responsibility which would have otherwise

attached to them by reason of their positions.

(<f) High Washington authorities positively misled the command-

ers at, Hawaii by indicating in messages sent to Hawaii the prob-

ability that Japanese hostile actions were likely to take place at points

in the Southwestern Pacific without mentioning the danger of attack

at Hawaii. From their superior information of Japanese designs and

intentions the high Washington authorities were in a better position

to evaluate Japanese actions than were the Hawaiian commanders.

Having directed the attention of the Hawaiian commanders to prob-

able Japanese action at points other than Pearl Harbor, the high

Washington authorities misled the Hawaiian commanders and so

contributed to their unpreparedness in the defense of Pearl Harlwr.

(e) High Washington authorities took over so much of the detailed

direction of affairs respecting operations of the Pacific Fleet and of

the Hawaiian naval base as to limit narrowly the discretion and

freedom allowed to the Hawaiian commanders. Having thus weak-

ened the individual obligations of the Hawaiian commanders and hav-

ing failed correspondingly to provide them with clear and adequate

orders, high Washington authorities reduced the responsibility of the

Hawaiian commanders in the defense of Pearl Harbor.

(/) Having failed to provide the Hawaiian commanders with suf-

ficient, adeq^uatej and appropriate matoriel and equipment for the

defense of Hawaii, high Washington authorities compelled the Hawai-

ian commanders to make choices of action jeopardizing their dAfartga

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■which they would not have made on their own responsibility had they

had the needed materiel and equipment; and this failure in Washing-

ton was a strong factor in the failure of the defense at Hawaii.

(g) The responsibility of the Hawaiian commanders was further

reduced by explicit orders from Washin^on not to do anything to

alarm the civil population and that the hi^ authorities in Washington

desired Japan to commit the first overt act.

(h) Having assumed so much of the detailed direction of affairs

relating to Hawaiian defense, Washington authorities had the ob-

ligation to correct all wrongful decisions at Hawaii which had been

made in response to Washin^on orders. A crucial decision of this

kind was made by General Snort when he alerted his command only

against sabotage in response to orders in the message of November

27, 1941. With superior knowledge of impending danger and having

the immediate obligation to correct General Short’s error of judg-

ment, Washington authorities, particularly Gen. George C. Marshall

and Gen. Leonard T. Gerow, did not do so but permitted General

Short to assume that he had done all that had been required of him.

This error, as later proved, left the defenses at Hawaii particularly

vulnerable to external attack.

(i) In the critical hours from the afternoon of December 6 to

10:30 a. m. on December 7, Washington authorities failed to take the

instant action called for by their special knowledge of Japanese

messages on those days wmch would have placed the Ha-waiian

commanders on the specific alert for probable danger to Hawaii.

The conclusion that “everybody” in the chain of authority “from

the higher officials here in Washington down through the lieutenant

who disregarded the radar message at Pearl Harbor on Sunday morn-

ing, December 7, just muffed the situation, let the Japs outsmart them,”

was expressed by Representative Clark in the form of a question put

to Admiral Kimmel (Tr., Vol. 39, p. 7331). Admiral Kimmel

replied : “I think you should draw those conclusions, sir, rather than

me.” Mr. Clark then said “That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.”

The word “muffed” is colloquial and rhetorical, not precisely descrip-

tive; and the word “situation” is as vague as it is general. But Itepre-

sentative Clark’s idea translated into plain English fairly describes

events and actions from November 25 to December 7. “Everybody

from the higher officials here in Washington do-wn through the lieu-

tenant” at Pearl Harbor failed to take many actions that in the very

nature of things were to be expected of him, failed to discharge obliga-

tions necessarily attached to his office, and must bear a share of the

responsibility for the catastrophe according to the extent of his powers

and duties.

In extenuation of failures on the part of high authorities in Wash-

ington two statements were often made by witnesses who appeared

before the Committee. First, it is easy to see now the mistakes and

failures made by high authorities but this is merely “hindsight.”

Second, those high authorities were busy men carrying hea'vjr burdens

in their respective offices — ^burdens so heavy that many failures on their

part must be excused.

Undoubtedly, hindsight is often easier and better than foresight.

But the exercise of prudence and foresight with reference to knowledge

in his possession is a bounden duty imposed on every high authority

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in the Government of the United States by the powers and obligations

of his office. For every failure to exercise prudence and foresight

with reference to knowledge in his possession he must bear a corre-

r nding burden of responsibility for the consequences that flow from

t failure. By virtue of his office he is presumed to have special

competence and knowledge; to act upon his special Imowledge, and

to be informed and alert m the discharge of his duties in the situation

before him.

The introduction of hindsight in extenuation of responsibility is,

therefore, irrelevant to the determination of responsibility for the

catastropne at Pearl Harbor.

The question before this Committee is: What did high authorities

in Washington know about Japanese design and intentions; what

decisions did they make on the basis of their knowledge; and what

actions did they take to safeguard the security of uie American

outposts?

^ With regard to General Marshall and Admiral Stark, they were

certainly carrying heavy burdens m preparing the armed forces

of the United States for war; in making war plans; in building up an

, Army and Navy (which they knew were not yet ready for war), and

in struggling for a postponement of the war until the Aymy and

Navy were better prepared to cope with the foe. With regard to the

President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the Secre-

tary of the Navy, it may be said justly that they were carrying heavy

burdens also. But all these officials, as Secretary Stimson’s diary

demonstrates, spent many days before December 7 in general discus-

sions which led to no decisions. This they did at a time when they

possessed special knowledge of Japanese designs and were acquainted

with their own intentions and resolves and certainly had the leisure

to do the one obvious duty dictated by common sense— that is — draw

up a brief plan for telling the outpost commanders just what to do

in a certain contingency on receipt of orders from Washington.

‘ That contirmency was a Japanese attack on American possessions

somewhere, ^cretary Stimson records that “the question (during

those days) was how we (the President, Secretary Hull, Secretary

Stimson, Secretary Knox, General Marshall, and Admiral Stark)

should maneuver them (the Japanese) into the position of firing the

first shot without allowing too much damage to ourselves.” In any

event, inasmuch as the President decided against appealing to Con-

gress for a declaration of war on Japan, they were all waiting for the

Japanese to fire the first shot, and in those circumstances it was their

duty to prepare definite plahs and procedures for action in meeting

that attack.

This is exactly what they did not do at any time before December 7.

They had plans for action or actions by the armed forces of the United

States if Congress declared war or if by some process the United

States got into or entered the war. War plans (for example, Rain-

bow No. 5 which was WPL 46) were to go into operation only after

war had begun and were not intended for preparation in meeting a

sunrise attack.

They prepared no plan giving the outpost commanders instructions

about the measures they were to take in preparing for and meeting a

Japanese attack on American possessions when and if it came. This

plan could have been drawn up in a few hours at most and set down

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in two or three typewritten pages at most. With modifications ap-

propriate to the various outposts this plan could have been sent to the

respective commanders by couriers or swifter means of communica-

tion. And a procedure could have been adopted for instructing the

commanders by one word in code, or a few words, to put plans for

meeting Japanese attack into effect. No such plan was drawn up or

at all events no such plan was sent to the commanders. No procedure

for giving them the code word or words for action under any plan or

procedure was ever adopted by the authorities in Washington whose

official duty it was to prepare, with all the resources at their command,

for meeting the Japanese attack which they privately recognized as

an imminent menace.

. Of particular infractions of duty in Washington, which were numer-

ous and are written large in the evidence before the Committee, a few

illustrations may be given in summary form :

Secretary Stimson and Secretary Hull were in a substantial meas-

ure responsible for the confusion that resulted in equivocal form of

the so-called warning message to (Jeneral Short on November 27.

Secretary Stimfeon called up Secretary Hull early in the morning of

November 27 and Secretary Hull declared positively:

I have washed my hands of it and it is now in the hands of yon and Knox —

the Army and the Navy.

Secretary Stimson then called up President Roosevelt and the Presi-

dent g&ve him “a little different view.” But from the President, that

day. Secretary Stimson got the President’s approval —

that we should send the final alert, namely that he (General Short along with

other Commanders) should be on the qnl vive for any attack.

Secretary Stimson and General Gerow started the draft of the

warning message with the words : “Negotiations with Japan have been

terminated.” Secretary Stimson, after a conversation with Secretary

Hull over the telephone, altered this definite statement to read:

N^tiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with

only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government mipM come bade

to continue,

thus introducing confusion into a sentence of crucial importance.

(Stimson, Diary: Army Pearl Harbor Board Report, pp. 120 ff.)

General Marshall and General Gerow admitted to the dkimmittee

that thw made a mistake in failing to reply to General Short’s report

to the War Department on November 27, that he put into effect the

alert against sabotage. This reply referred to the message of Novem-

ber 27 by number so there could be no mistake as to what it answered.

It was in reply to the words of the message to Short on November 27

and the words “report measures taken.” They also assumed fuU

reimonsibili^ for that mistake (Tr., Vol. 19, p. 3126-3164) .

(General Marshall could not i^call that he had made, after November

27, any inquiries as to the measures taken by General Short in Hawaii

(Tr., Vol. 17, p. 2905). In other words, ne apparently had no in-

Tormation about the steps taken for the defense of Pearl Harbor dur-

ing the ten critical days of mounting war tension, when Washington

authorities were, through intercepts of Japanese messages, becoming

increasingly certain about Japan’s steps toward war, except General

Short was Verted to sabotage and had liaison with the Navy. Alerted

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to sabotage meant the planes were bunched on the field and in no posi-

tion to take to the air quickly.

Responsible officers in the War Department told the Committee

they failed to reach General Marshall after the receipt of the first

thirteen parts of the Japanese memorandum had been intercepted late

in the afternoon of December 6. General Marshall testified that he

bad an orderly at his home to receive calls when he was away at night

and hence he could have been reached (Tr., Vol. 18, p. 2941). He

also testified that he was unware of any effort to locate him at his home

or elsewhere by messenger or telephone during the evening of December

6 — or the morning of December 7 — ^until he was taking his shower after

a ride in the park.

Secretary Stimson interfered with efforts of General Marshall and

General Gerow to postpone the breach with Japan until the Army and

Navy were ready to meet a Japanese attack with better prospects of

success. The Secretary insisted that in asking for the delay no recom-

mendation should be made to the President advising a reopening of

conversations with the Japanese representatives. In fact, conversa-

tions had not been formally closed on November 26 (Tr., Vol. 20, p.

3325 ; Vol. 22, p. 3668-69) .

Secretary Hull made “several general statements” to General Mar-

shall on diplomatic matters but did not read to him or give him a

copy of the November 26 memorandmn to Japan in advance of de-

livery (Tr., Vol. 19, p. 3076) . Secretary Hull gave confused and con-

flicting statements to Secretary Stimson, Secretary Knox, General

Marshall, and Admiral Stark and, so far as the evidence before the

Committee goes. Secretary Hull did not at any time tell them definitely

that relations with Japan were ipso facto ruptured, as he had learned

from intercepted Japanese messages. In other words. Secretary

Hull’s words and actions during the last few weeks of tension added to

the uncertainty that reigned in the War and Navy Departments.

Despite all his conferences with representatives of tne two Depart-

mentSj he went ahead changing his plans and notions without giving

them information respecting his crucial decisions.

It was with sufficient reason that Admiral Stark, on November 25,

wrote a letter to Admiral Kimmel, saying :

I won’t go into the pros and cons of what the United States may do. I will be

damned if I know. I wish I did. The only thing I know is that we may do most

anything, and that’s the only thing to be prepared for; or we may do nothing—

I think it more likely to be anything (Tr., Vol. 36, p. 6713).

This letter reached Admiral Kimmel on December 3, adding to the

confusion already created by the war- warning message of November

27.

This message to Admiral Kimmel differed in one respect from the

message sent % the War Department to General Short; it stated defi-

nitely that “the negotiations with Japan • \* \* have ended.” But

not content with tnat, the Navy Department, two days later, sent to

Admiral Kimmel another dispatch quoting the War Department’s

message to General Short as follows :

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated with only the barest po^ibility

of resumption (Tr., Vol. 36, p. 6729).

After stating in its message of November 27 that “Japan is expected

to make an aggressive move within the next few days,” the Navy De-

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p^rtment immediately added: “An amphibious expedition against

either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo is

possibly indicated \* \* ,\*” Since there was not a line in the message

about a possible expedition against Hawaii, these words, according to

legal and common-sense usage, warranted Admiral Kimmel in con-

cluding that an attack on Pearl Harbor was not expected by the Navy

Hmartment and that he was not to expect such an attack.

In explaining to Representative Keefe how he expected Admiral

Kimmel to expect an attack on Pearl Harbor in view of the fact that

the Navy Department’s message mentioned only points in the Far

Hast as possible points of attack. Admiral Stark gave probably the

best explanation available to him :

That Is true, but the attack we envisaged down there, we stated that the

make-up, and so forth, of this amphibious expedition Un the Far East), not a

raiding force or a carrier force, but an amphibious exp^ition, and the x)oints of

that amphibious expedition might be so and so. There was no question, there

had not been in my mind at any time, of am amphibious expedition against the

Hawaiian Island • • • (Tr„ Vol. 36, p. 6521).

Of the many instances showing failures of Washington authorities

to cooperate and keep one another duly informed wSsn such acts of

duty were vital to the interests of the United States, none was more

fateful than actions on the so-called modus vivemdi proposed by Japan

on November 20, 1941.

Item 1 of the Japanese proposal read :

Both the Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to

make any armed advancement into any of the regions in the Southeastern and

Southern Pacific area excepting the part of Blench Indo-Chlna where Japanese

troops are stationed.

Item 2 read:

The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw its troops now stationed

in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and

China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area.

Wholly apart from the merits or demerits of these and other items

in the Japanese proposal of November 20, here was an opportunity at

least to prolong “the breathing spell” for which General Marshall and

Admiral Stark were pleading in their efforts to strengthen the armed

forces of the United States tor war. On November 5, General Mar-

shall and Admiral Stark presented a strong plea to the President

begging for time in which to make the Army and Navy ready for

war. H\Tiile the Japanese proposal for a modus vivendi was under

consideration by the President and Secretary Hull, General Marshall

and Admiral Stark prepared another plea for the postponement of

the breach with Japan so that the Army and Navy could be made

stronger in striking or defensive power. They did not ask for any

surrender of American principles; they merely called for delay.

The Japanese proposal for a modus vivendi offered an opportunity

to stop for a few weeks the advance of Japanese armed forces into

the Southeastern and Southern area — ^the advance which, according to

American war plans, made in cooperation with British and Dutch

officers, provided for American action against Japan or American

participation in a war against Japan. It i.s true that President Roose-

velt had not committed the United States officially to these plans but,

according to the testimony of Admiral Stark, “the President except

officially, approved of” the basic principles of these plans. (Tr., VoL

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35, pp. 6370-72.) American official War Plan WPL 46 was based

on them. Whether written in binding agreements or not,

American, British, and Dutch authorities acted in conwrt just as if

binding pacts had been made. The Japanese, as Washington clearly

learned from the intercepts, also actM upon the assumption that

American, British, and Dutch agreements for concerted action existed.

President Roosevelt evidently deemed it both feasible and desirable

to reach some kind of modus mvendi with Japan with a view to a

possible settlement in general or in any event a prolongation of nego-

tiations with Japan until American armed forces were better prepared

for war. Proof of this was found in a pencilled memorandum written

by the President for the Secretary of State “not dated but probably

written shortly after November 20. 1941,” that is, after the receipt of

the Japanese proposal (Exhibit 18).

President Roosevelt’s memorandum for Secretary Hull with regard

to the possible terms of the modus viv&ndi with Japan read :

6 Months

1. U. S. to resume economic relations — some oil and rice now — ^more later.

2. Japan to send no more troops to Indo-China or Manchurian border or any

place South (Dutch, Brit or Siam).

3. Japan not to invoke tripartite pact even if the U. S. gets into European war.

4. U. S. to introduce Japs to Chinese to talk things over but U. S. to take no

part in their conversation.

\*\*\*\*•\*•

Later in Pacific agreements.

Besides the President’s instructions or suggestions, Secretary Hull

had before him the “outline of a proposed basis for agreement between

the United States and Japan,” which had been carefully prepared by

Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury. Henry Morgen-

thau’s “outline” with a covering note, dated November 19, 1941, was

presented to Secretary Hull, initialled M. M. H. (Maxwell M. Hamil-

ton, Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs) . The covering note

informed Secretary Hull that all the senior officers of the Division

concurred with Mr. Hamilton in the view that “the proposal is the most

constructive one I have seen.” Mr. Hamilton urged Secretary Hull to

give most careful consideration to the proposal promptly, and sug-

gested that the Secretary make copies of the proposed “outline” avafl-

able to Admiral Stark and General Marshall and arrange to confer with

them as soon as they had had an opportunity to examine the “outline”

(Exhibits 18; 168).

With the President’s instructions or suggestions and Secretary

Morgenthau’s “outline” before him. Secretary Hull considered the

terms of a possible agreement with Japan as the basis of a general

settlement or an indemiite continuation of negotiations in connection

with the Japanese proposal for a modAis vivendi. This is no place

to give a fifty-page summary of the record of the events connected

witn Secretary Hull’s operations. Nor is it necessary to discuss the

merits of the case. But the following recital of facts illustrates the

confusion and lack of cooperation that prevailed in Administration

circles.

Secretary Hull drafted a memorandum for at least a kind of truce

with Japan.

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Secretary Hull discussed his proposals with British, Dutch, and

Australia^ representatives in Washington.

Secretary Hull had a conference on the proposals with Secretary

Stimson and Secretaiy Knox at his office on November 25. Of this

conference Secretary Stimson noted in his Diary :

Hull showed us the proposal for a three months’ truce, which he was going

to lay before the Japanese today or tomorrow. It adequately safeguarded

all our Interests, I thought as I read it, but I don’t think there is any chance

of the Japanese accepting It, because it was so drastic. (Tr., Vol. 70, p. 14417).

The next day, November 26, Secretary Hull told Secretary Stimson

over the telephone that he had about made up his mind not to nve

the proposal for the three months’ truce to the Japanese but “to kick

the whole thing over.” Under pressure coming from Chian^ Kai-

shek, Winston Churchill, and otherSj relative to the modm vvvendi.

Secretary Hull refrained from making an independent decision on

this important step and it appears he was led to decide it without

thought of the military capacities necessary to back upour diplomatic

position. On that day, November 26, Secretary Hull, with the

approval of President Roosevelt, kicked the whole thing over

and sent to the Japanese the now famous memorandum which Japan

treated as an ultimatum. In taking this action Secretary Hull gave

no advance notice to General Marshall and Admiral Stark, who were

then preparing their second careful memorandum to the President

begging for a postponement of war with Japan until the Army and

Navy could make better preparation for waging it. Moreover, it

should be noted that Secretary Hull did not give to the British and

Australian representatives any advance information about his sudden

decision “to kick the whole thing over.”

When Secretary Hull, with the approval of President Roosevelt,

made this decision on November 26 and handed his memorandum to

the Japanese ambassadors on November 26, he was practically certain

that the Japanese government would reject his proposals and that a

break in relations would be a highly probable consequence of his action.

For this statement there is sufficient evidence from Secretary Hull

himself. In his account of the meeting with the Japanese represen-

tatives, when he presented the memorandum to them. Secretary Hull

reported that, after reading the document, Mr. Kurusu said “that

when this proposal of the United States was reported to the Japanese

Government, tiiat Government would be likely to ‘throw up its Imnds’ ;

Iffiat this response to the Japanese proposal (the so-called moSus vi-

venii proposal from Tokyo) could be interpreted as tantamount to

the end of the negotiations.” So certain was Secretary Hull of the

coming breach that, according to his account, he declared on Novem-

ber 25 and November 28 at a meeting of “high officials” that “the mat-

ter of safeguarding our national security was in the hands of the

Army and Navy” {Peace omd, War, 1931-19J(1, [1943, p. 144]).

Some exchanges with the Japanese occurred after November

27, 1941, but none of these exchanges altered in any respect the situa-

tion created by Secretary Hull’s memorandum of November 26 to

3 a^pan.

If Secretary Hull or a^ other high authority in Washington had

any doubt wnether the Japanese would treat the memorandum of

November 26 to Japan as an ultimatum, that doubt must have been

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entirely cleared up 2 days later. On November 28, the Army inter-

cepted a message from Tokyo to the two Japanese Ambassadors in

Washington which expressed the views of the Japanese Government on

Secretary Hull’s document. The Japanese message characterized it as

“this humiliating proposal” and as “quite unexpected and extremely

regrettable.” The Japanese message also informed the Ambassadors

that the reply of the tfapanese Government would come in 2 or 3 days

and that “^e negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevita-

ble.” Washington also knew that the deadline had been fixed for

November 29, and that after that “things would automatically happ^.”

The Japanese Ambassadors were instructed not to give the impression

that “the negotiations are broken off” and told : “From now on do the

best you can.”

In short, on November 28, 1941, Washington authorities had avail-

able to them definite and conclusive information that the breach with

Japan was near at hand and that the reply from Tokyo would sig-

nalize that breach. More definitely than the first 13 parts of the

Japanese message intercepted on the evening of December 6, this

notice from Tol^o to its representatives in Washington on November

28 meant a rupture of relations with the United States. If the 13 parts

meant war to the President, the Japanese message on November 28

also meant war. Hawaii knew nothing of these intercepts of

December 6 and 7 until after the attack.

These instances of failure on the part of high authorities in Wash-

ington to perform acts of duty and judgment required by their re-

spective offices, and many others that could be cited, merely point

to the greatest failure of all, namely, the failure of those authorities

to organize for the war they regarded as immediately imminent.

Here the conclusions reached by the Army Pearl Harbor Board as to

the War Department apply to the whole executive department of

which it was a part:

A few men, without organization in a true sense, were attempting to conduct

large enterprises, take multiple actions, and give directions that should have

been the result of carefully directed commands, instead of actions taken by

conference. We were preparing for war by the conference method. We were

directing such preparations by the conference method; we were even writing

vital messages by the conference method, and arriving at their content by

compromise Instead of by command ♦ • • (Report, pp. 12-13).

To this comment, the Army Pearl Harbor Board should have added

that powerful individuals among these authorities were reaching de-

cisions on their own motion and taking actions of a dangerous nature

on their own motion, despite all the conferring, talking, and com-

E romising, were proceeding as if there was no organization in the

rovemment of the United States that was charged with preparing

for and waging war.

Nor is this confusion and pulling at cross pur^ses to be explained

away by any such vague assertion as the Army Pearl Harbor Board

offered : “that it was a product of the timje and conditions due to the

transition from peace to war in a democracy.” Failures to perform

duties commensurate with the powers vested in officials by the Consti-

tution and the law cannot be justified by appeals to any overriding

requirements of democracy. Provisions for organizing the executive

department and the supreme command of the armed forces of the

United States wire incorporated in the Constitution and the laws, and

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adeqwte powers to organize and vm,ify for operating pwrposea all

subsidiary agencies were vested in the President of the United States.

(See Conclusion 16.)

Going down the line along the chain of authority to the com-

manders in Hawaii, it must be said that General Short and Admiral

Kimmel were as negligent in certain respects as their superiors in

Washington. They were aware that a Japanese attack at some point

was impending and, despite any general expectation that the attack

would come in the Far East, they were under obligations to be intently

on guard themselves. But they failed to affect the close cooperation,

especially between December 3 and December 7, that was required by

their special toowledge and official duties. Each of them showed an

unwarranted indifference to what the other was doing in the way of

scanning the horizon, watching for signs of trouble, and preparing for

the woi^. Finally, they failed to make the best and most efficient

disposition and use of the material they possessed in the discharge of

grave responsibilities imposed on them.

20. In the final instance of crucial significance for alerting the Amer-

ican outpost commanders., on Saturday night., December 6 and Sunday

morning, December 7, the President of the United States failed to

take that quick and instant executive action which was required by the

occasion and by the responsibility for watchfulness and guardianship

rightly associated in law and practice with his high office from the

estahlishment of the Repvddic to our own times.

Before noon on Saturday of December 6, 1941, the President was

aware that a situation had been established which, by a unanimous

decision of himself and his War Cabinet reached 8 days before, made

an American- Japanese war a matter of a very few hours. He and

his Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, and his Chief of Staff and

Chief of Naval OperationSj had discussed on November 28 the pres-

ence of a Japanese expeditionary force at sea. It was their decision

that if this expeditionary force got around the southern point of

Indo-China, it would be a teriffic blow to the British, Dutch, and

Americans. “This must not be allowed.” It was agreed that if the

Japanese got into the Isthmus of Era, the British would fight and

if the British fought we would have to fight. “And it now seems

clear that if this expedition were allowed to round the southern point

of Indo-China, this whole chain of disastrous events would be set

on foot \* \* \*” (Tr. Col. 70, p. 14, 425) . At 10 : 40 on the morning

of December 6, the State Department was advised by Ambassador

Winant that the British had sighted a Japanese task force in the

South China Sea and Gulf of Siam headed for the Era Peninsula

or Thailand. The Japanese had passed the southern point of Indo-

China.

In testifying before the Joint Committee as to the significance of

this information Under Secretary Welles said :

I should say that the chances had diminished from one In a thousand to one

In a million that war could then be avoided (Tr. Vol. 8, p. 1324).

No word of this situation went to the American commanders at

Pearl Harbor.

Although the War Cabinet, as earlyas November 28, had anticipated

the situation of noon of December 6 as making war inevitable, the

Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations not only did not

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advise the commanders in the field as to this situation, but also ex-

hibited so little concern ai>proximately 20 hours later that the Chief

of Staff went horseback riding on the morning of !^cember 7 and

the Chief of Naval Operations, having spent the evening at a theater,

g t to his office late on the morning of the 7th. Each of these officers

ew on the morning of December 7 that a Pacific war would stairt

within a few hours and, by their own judgment and that of the Presi-

dent, that such war must involve the United States. In the light of

the situation known to th^ and to the President and his Secretaries

of State, War, and Navy on the morning of December 7, and in view

of the decisions reached in anticipation of such a situation, an alert

should have been sent to Hawaii prior to the alert sent by coo^ercial

cable by General Marshall on December 7 at 11 : 50 a. m., which alert

^d not reach the Hawaiian commanders prior to the attack — the

November 27 and all prior alerts having been confusing, misleading,

and imprecise.

Before 10 o’clock on the evening of December 6, 1941, President

Boosevelt had reached a great decision as to the immediate imminence

of the war which he had long expected. He had then finished reading

the first 13 parts of the intercepted memorandum which was to be

presented to Secretary Hull by the Japan^ .^bassador and special

agent on the next day, and had said to his aide, Harry Hopkins^ in

s^stance, “This means war.” In reply to a comment by Mr. Hopkins,

the President had also indicated that the United States could not

strike the first blow for the purpose of preventing any sort of surprise

(Tr., Vol. 63, pp. 12441-12443).

The President’s evaluation of the intelligence before him as to the

probable day, hour, and place of the comingJapanese attack is nowhere

in the evidence before this Committee. But, given all the informa-

tion that had come to him during the preceding days, he had every

reason for assuming that the day and hour could not be far off (con-

clusions 3 and 10) . The place on which the first Japanese blow would

fall was within the territory and possessions of the United States

where outpost commanders were on guard.

Between 10 o’clock on the evening of December 6 and the Japanese

attack on Pearl Harbor 16 hours were to pass. The President had

at his disposal at least 15 hours in which to inform those outpost com-

manders of impending danger, to add new and urgent warning to the

inde^te warnings that had ]^n sent out during previous days and

weeks.

The President’s acquaintance with the nature of warfare, and it was

by no means elementary, must have convinced him that the conse-

quences of the first magnitude would flow from the .success or failure

of the United States armed forces in meeting the Japanese attack

when it came. Unqualified success on the part of the American forces

could wreck Japanese war plans and cripple Japanese armed forces.

Disaster to the armed forces of the United States could, and probably

would, prolong the war for months or years, with all that was entailed

in American blood and treasure.

In this situation, having decided about 10 p. m. December 6, that the

intercepted message meant war, the most imperative duty that con-

fronted the President was that of alerting his immediate subordinates

in Washington and, either directly or through them, the outpost com-

manders. This duty was imposed, upon him by the circumstances and

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^ the obligations of his office as Chief Executive and Commander in

Chief of the armed forces of the United States— in peace ^d war.

Of all the men in the branches of civil and military administration

responsible for the security and defense of the United States, the

President alone was endowed with ultimate , power under the Consti-

tution and the laws. Means of swift communication were at his elbow.

Willing aides — civil and military and naval — were at his beck and call.

The most powerful men next to the President in authority — ^men

bound to obey his orders and serve without stint, were not far from

the President’s side; and anyone of them, if so instructed, could have

found and alerted all the others. Secretary Hull, Secretary Stimson,

Secretary Knox, General Marshall, and Admiral Stark were nearby.

They could be reached quickly by means of communication at the

President’s command.

Indeed, Capt. Alwin D. Kramer, who had carried the 13-part

intercept to tne White House for delivery to President Roosevelt

by Commander Schulz (Tr., Vol. 56, p. 10665 ff.; Vol. 63, p. 12437),

immediately turned his attention to the task of alerting the President’s

chief subordinates. Captain Kramer tried to reach Admiral Stark by

telephone and failed; he likewise failed to reach Admiral Turner

(Tr., Vol. 55, p. 10449; Vol. 56, pp. 10667-10673).

Thereupon Captain Kramer tmephoned to Secretary Knox, found

him at home, and took to Secretary Knox the intercepted message and

other documents. After the receipt of the papery Secretary Knox,

realizing at once their significant nature, called up Secretary Hull and

Secretary Stimson and arranged with them for a meeting at the State

Department on Sunday morning at 10 o’clock. Having completed

this arrangement Secretary Biiox instructed Captain Kramer to bring

all the important messages in question to the State Department at

10 o’clock Sunday morning (Tr., Vol. 55, p. 10467) . Thus, as Captain

Kramer testified, on Saturday night he had reached the top man in

the White House and the top man in the Navy (Tr., Vol. 56, p. 10681).

According to the testimony of Col. Rufus Bratton, chief of the Far

Eastern Section, Military Intelligence Division, of the War Depart-

ment, the 13-part message was sent to the State Department on Satur-

day night. Colonel Bratton stated :

So I, realizing that the Secretary of State was primarily interested in this

message, it being a diplomatic one and it being a reply to a message that he had

sent to the Japanese Government, gathered up his folder, put it in the pouch,

locked the pouch, and personally delivered it to the night duty ofiScer in the State

Department sometime after 10 o’clock that night. I told the night duty ofllcer,

whose name I have forgotten, that this was a highly important message as far

as the Secretary of State was concerned, and that I would like to have it- sent

out to his quarters. He assured me that he would do so. I left it with him,

securing from him a receipt for what I had given him (Tr., Vol. 62, pp. 12052-

12053).

Thus it is evident that about 10 o’clock Saturday night President

Roosevelt could have reached Secretary Hull, Secretary Stimson, and

Secretary Knox in a few minutes, had he chosen to do so.

What about General Marshall and Admiral Stark, to whom the

President under the law could go directly with orders for operations?

If not at home, they should have been in places known to their orderlies

or assistants, for the War and Navy Departments had been alerted,

lights were burning all night in offices of those Departments; and

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resj)onsible oflSicers were there waiting for news and orders. News of

the intercepted Japanese messages had been delivered to Army author-

ities about nine o’clock that night — ^before it had been delivered to

Secretay Knox, head of the Navy Department (Tr., Vol. 57, p. 10765) .

The White House was alerted. The President’s naval aid was stand-

ing by at the White House on the evening of December 6.

Within less than an hour President Roosevelt, convinced that the

13-part message meant war, could have brought to his side one or more

of the four men immediately responsible for war action imder his

direction, could have taken council with them, and could decide upon

the orders necessary to alert all the outpost commanders before mid-

night.'

In this situation, with these powers and obligations entrusted to

him, what did the President do ? Recognizing the gravity of the hour

and the occasion, he was moved to act-^t firet. He tried to reach by

telephone, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, and at

the first attempt failed. Apparently it was reported to the President

that Admiral Stark was at a theater. What then? According to the

testimony of Commander Schulz, who had brought the 13-part message

to the President’s room in the White House, the President said in

the presences of the commander, that he did not want to cause any

undue alarm by having Admiral Stark paged or otherwise notified

in the theater, “because he (the President) could get him (Admiral

Stark) within perhaps another half hour” (Tr., Vol. 63, pp.12443-44) .

Apparently the President did communicate with Admiral Stark

later that evening, but the evidence before the Committee is indirect,

for Admiral Stark’s mind seems to be a complete blank as to his where-

abouts and doings on the evening of December 6. 1941. 'When he testi-

fied before the Committee at its regular hearings, the admiral was

under the firm impression that he did not talk with the President over

the telephone on that evening, but then confessed that he might be

mistaken. Later, however, at a special session of the Committee on

May 31, 1946, Admiral Stark testified that a friend, Capt. H. D. Krick,

had recently given him some information on the point. Captain

Krick had informed Admiral Stark that they had been together on

the evening of December 6, 1941 and that the admiral had been in

communication with the President over the telephone. But this recent

information did not refresh the admiral’s memory, for he declared at

the special session of the Committee that he still had “no recollection

whatever of any events of that evening” (Tr., Vol. 71, p. 14723 ff.).

With regard to anything that passed between the President and

Admiral Stark that evening, assuming that Captain Krick’s memory

is good, the record before this Committee is as empty as Admiral

Stark’s mind.

'What did the President do on Sunday morning between his rising

hour and about 1:25 p. m. (eastern standard time, 7 :65 Honolulu

time) when the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor began ?

During this lapse of hours, additional news of Japanese designs

was in Washington.

About 5 o’clock in the morning of December 7, the fourteenth part

of the Japanese message reached the Navy Department. Although

it ccmld have been decoded in less than half an hour, that

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operation was delayed in the office and this fourteenth part did not

come into the hands of Captain Kramer until about 7 : 30 a. m.

other inexplicable del^ occurred. Captain Kramer did not deliver

this message to the White House until 10 or 15 minutes before 10

on Sunday morning (Tr., Vol. 56, p. 10718)^. But 2 hours or more

then remained in which to put the outpost commanders of full de-

fensive war alert.

On or about 10 : 30 on Sunday morning, two other highly informa-

tive messages were delivered at the White House (Tr., Vol. 57, p.

10743 ff.).

The first was the intercepted Japanese government message in-

structing the Japanese ambassador to deliver the fourteen-part reply

to the Secretary of State at 1 P. M. December 7 (Washington time).

(Secret)

From : To^o

To: Washington

December 6, 1941.

#904

Re my #902

There is really no need to tell you this, but in the preparation of the aide

memoire be absolutely sure not to use a typist or any other person.

Be most extremely cautious in preserving secrecy.

Army 25844

JD: 7144 Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

The second was a message from Tokyo to the Japanese embassy in

Washington, marked ^‘extremely urgent.” It ordered Japanese

agents, after deciphering the fourteenth part, the notice as to delivery

at 1 o’clock, and two other messages, to destroy at once the remaining

cipher machines and all machine codes (Ex. 1, pp. 248-249) — a notice

that carried a war warning to high authorities in Washington.

Meanwhile General Marshall, who testified that he did not see Pres-

ident Roosevelt between November 28 and the afternoon of December

7, reached his post in the War Department. Before him lay the final

14-part message and the message stating that the delivery to Secretary

Hull was to be at 1 o’clock. On the basis of this and other informa-

tion, in his possession, General Marshall concluded that war was at

hand, that the hour “one o’clock” was indicative of “some very definite "

action” by the Japanese at 1 o’clock, and that a new and definite warn-

ing message should go to General Short — ^the message that did not

reach General Short until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was

over (Tr., Vol. 18, p. 2926 ff.) .

During the hours from 10 o’clock Saturday night to 11 o’clock

Sunday morning. President Roosevelt had at his command not only

the latest intercepts and his own knowledge of diplomatic negotiations

with Great Britain and Japan but also special knowledge that had

come to him before the evening of December 6 ; for example :

(1) The message from Tokyo to the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin

telling him to see Hitler and Ribbentrop and —

say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly

break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of

arms and add that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker

than anyone dreams (Ex. 1, p. 204).

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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

This message, received in Washin^on on November 30, so moved

President Roosevelt that he expressed a desire to retain or have a copy

of it (Tr., Vol. 57, pp. 10887-10888) .

(2) The message transmitted at 10:40 o’clock in the morning of

December 6 by Ambassador Winant in London from the British

Admiralty, stating that large Japanese expeditionary forces were

moving swiftly toward Kra — a threat which was to bring into play

American-British war plans for combined action against Japan

unless the President refused to give official sanction to the plans he

had approved “except officially.”

Knowing all these things and more besides, including the zero hour

of 1 o’clock fixed by the Japanese Government for the delivery of the

message that meant a de facto rupture of relations, unable under the

Constitution to commit the overt act of striking J apan at once, waiting

for the Japanese to fire “the first shot without allowing too much

danger to ourselves,” President Roosevelt was under direct and imme-

diate obligation to make certain that urgent messages be sent to the

outpost commanders, including General Short and Admiral Kimmel,

and sent not later than 11 o’clock on Sunday morning by the swiftest

possible means of communication.

For his failure to take this action Saturday night, December 6, or

early Sunday morning, December 7, President Roosevelt must bear

a responsibility commensurate with his powers and duties under the

Constitution, with his position as Commander in Chief of the Army

and Navy, and with the trust vested in him as the Chief Executive

by the people of the United States.

21. The contention, eorrmig from so high an authority as President

Truman on August 3, 1945, that the ^'•country is Os rmich to hlame as

any individual in this final situation that develofed in Pearl Harhorf

cannot he sustained because the American people had no intimation

whatever of the policies and operations that were being undertaken.

How could the desire of the American people in the months before

December 7, 1941, to keep out of war be responsible for the specific

failures of Washington and Hawaii in the defense of Pearl Harbor?

How could Congress be to blame for unpreparedness when it enacted

into law greater defense appropriations than the President and his

Budget Bureau recommended? (See Conclusion No. 17.)

• How could the American people be held responsible for the secret

diplomacy of Washington authorities? They were never advised of

the many secret undertakings by Washington authorities. Indeed,

the high authorities in Washin^on seemed to be acting upon some

long-range plan which was never disclosed to Congress or to the

American people.

A nation in mortal danger is entitled to know the truth about its

peril. If foreign policy and diplomatic representations are treated

as the exclusive secret information of the President and his advisors,

public opinion will not be enlightened. A people left in the dark by

their leaders cannot be held responsible for the consequences of their

leader’s actions.

On December 1, 1941, it was known to the Secretary of War and to

the President and his close advisors that Japan had informed Hitler

on December 1 that war was imminent. They knew this by intercept-

ing the following message from Tokyo to Berlin :

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

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[Secret]

From: Tokyo.

To : Berlin,

llovember 80, 1941.

#985. (Part 1 of 8) •

Re my Circular #2387.^

1. The conversations begun between Tokyo and Washington last April during

the administration of the former cabinet, in spite of the sincere efforts of the

Imijerial Government, now stand ruptured — broken. (I am sending you an outline

■of developments in separate message #986'). In the face of this, our Empire

faces a grave situation and must act with determination. Will Your Honor,

therefore, immediately interview Chancellor HITLER and Foreign Minister

RIBBENTROP and confidentially communicate to them a summary of the de-

velopments. Say to them that lately England and the United States have taken a

provocative attitude, both of them. Say that they are planning to move military

forces Into various places in East Asia and that we will inevitably have to counter

by also moving troops. Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger

that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and J[apan

through some clash of arms and add that\* the time of the breaking out of this

war may come quicker than anyone dreanm.

Army 25552

JD: 694S Translated 12-1-41 (NR)

(Source: Exhibit No. 1, page 204.)

The Secretary of War, the President and his advisors also were fully

aware that Japanese military movements were under way and that

these movements would involve the United States in war.

Notwithstandi ng this intimate knowledge of the imminence of war,

the Secretary of War told the American people as late as December 5

that the negotiations with Japan were still in progress. Also, despite

the extreme gravity of the situation, known fully to the “War Cabi-

net,” the Pr^ident permitted the Senate and the House of Representa-

tives to adjourn on December 4 and 5 respectively until noon of

December 8 without having informed them of the impending danger

to the country. (See Conclusion 20.) This seems to follow consis-

tently the understanding observed by Mr. Hull when he gave to the

President a proposed draft of a message to Congress which was never

used. Mr. Hull said : “I think we agree that you will not send message

to Congress until the last stage of our relations, relating to actual

hostilities.” (Exhibit 19; see also Conclusion No. 2.)

How could the American people be responsible for the warlike der-

ations conducted from Washington over which the people had no

control and about which they were never informed?

In the future the people and their Congress must know how close

American diplomacy is moving to war so thait they may check its ad-

vance if imprudent and support its position if sound. A diplomacy

which relies upon the enemy’s first overt act to insure effective popu-

lar support for the Nation’s final war decision is both outmoded and

dangerous in the atomic age. To prevent any future Pearl Harbor

more tragic and damaging than that of December 7, 1941, there must

be constant close coordination between American public opinion and

American diplomacy.

Eternal vigilance is still the price of liberty even in the atomic era,

Whether or not the Pearl Harbor tragedy could have been avoided

• Part 2 not ATattable. For Fart S toe 8. L S. #2»MS8.

\*N6t available.

« See 8. I. S. #25554, 25555.

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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

by diplomatic means is a most appropriate matter for consideration

by all concerned with the 3,000 American boys who there lost their

lives.

Exhaustive attention has been given to the military aspects of the

events leading up to Pearl Harbor and an invaluable record has been

compiled for future students of the situation.

A far less complete record has been written of its diplomatic aspects

and here there is the most urgent need of further exploration in

justice to the future generations of Americans who may learn here

a little of the lessons for which America has paid so great a price.

How to avoid war and how to turn war — ^if it finally comes — to

serve the cause of human progress is the challenge to diplomacy today

as yesterday. Here, too, much cannot be known regarding all the petty

Episodes that finally add up to war. No war comes in a moment.

War is the sum of many minor decisions and some that are major.

In this diplomatic aspect the Pearl Harbor investigation has sad^y

failed to live up to the lofty prospectus with which it was launched.

In the light of these facts and of the foregoing conclusions, the

charge that the “country” is to blame for what happened at Pearl

Harbor cannot be sustained.

Conclusion :

In our opinion, the evidence before this Committee indicates that

the tragedy at Pearl Harbor was primarily a failure of men and not

of laws or powers to do the necessary things, and carry out the vested

responsibilities. No legislation could have cured such defects of

official judgment, management, cooperation, and action as were dis-

played by authorities and agents of the United States in connection

with the events that culminated in the catastrophe at Pearl Harbor on

December 7, 1941.

This demonstrates the weakness of depending on the political head

of the Government to bring about the necessary coordination of the

activities of the military branches, particularly in the area of intelli-

gence, and unification of command. The major lesson to be learned

IS that this coordination should be accomplished in advance of a crisis.

SuMMART OP KeSPONSIBILITIES

Having examined the whole record made before the Joint Com-

mittee and having analyzed the same in the foregoing Conclusions of

Fact and Responsibility, we find the evidence supports the following

final and ultimate conclusion :

The failure of Pearl Harbor to be fully alerted and prepared for

defense rested upon the proper discharge of two sets of interdepend-

ent responsibilities: (1) the responsibilities of high authorities in

Washington; and (2) the responsibilities of the commanders in the

field in charge of the fleet and of the naval base. (See Conclusion

No. 19.)

The evidence clearly shows that these two areas of responsibilities

were inseparably essential to each other in the defense of Hawaii.

The commanders in the field could not have prepared or been ready

successfully to meet hostile attack\* at Hawaii without indispensable

information, materiel, trained manpower and clear orders ’ from

Washington. Washington could not be certain that Hawaii was in

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 573

readiness without the alert and active cooperation, of the commanders

on the spot.

The failure to perform the responsibilities indispensably es^ntial

to the defense of Pearl Harbor rests upon the following civil and

military authorities :

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT— President of the United

States and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

HENRY L. STIMSON— Secretary of War.

FRANK KNOX — Secretary of the Navy.

GEORGE C. MARSHALL— General, Chief of Staff of the

Army.

HAROLD R. STARK — Admiral, Chief of Naval Operations.

LEONARD T. GEROW — Major General, Assistant Chief of

Staff of War Plans Division.

The failure to perform the responsibilities in Hawaii rests upon the

military commanders:

WALTER C. SHORT — Major General, Commanding Gen-

eral, Hawaiian Department.

HUSBAND E. KIMMEL — Rear Admiral, Commander in

Chief of the Pacific Fleet.

Both in Washington and in Hawaii there were numerous and

serious failures of men in the lower civil and military echelons to per-

form their duties and discharge their responsibilities. These are too

numerous to be treated in detail and individually named.

Secretary of State, CORDELL HULL, who was at the center of

Japanese- American negotiations bears a grave responsibility for the

diplomatic conditions leading up to the eventuality of Pearl Harbor

but he had no duties as a rmevant link in the military chain of re-

sponsibility stemming from the Commander in Chief to the com-

manders at Hawaii mr the defense at Pearl Harbor. For this rea-

son and because the diplomatic phase was not completely explored

we offer no conclusions in his case.

Homer Ferguson.

Owen Brewster.

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